ML20133K986

Transcript of 850807 Evidentiary Hearing in Houston,Tx. Pp 14,605-14,803

ML20133K986
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Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	08/07/1985
From:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
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CON-#385-273 OL, NUDOCS 8508120448
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{{#Wiki_filter:, ORG NAL O UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO: STN 50-498-OL STN 50-499-OL HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER COMPANY, et al. (SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, Units 1 and 2) EVIDENTIARY HEARING l ( LOCATION: HOUSTON, TEXAS PAGES: 14605 - 14803 l WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 7, 1985 DATE: i _ T8.0 /o!,

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14605 (. 1 2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 5 ----------------------------------X 6 In the Matter of:  : DOCKET NO. 7 HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER  : STN-50-498-OL 8 COMPANY, ET AL.,  : STN-50-499-OL 9 (South Texas Project Units 1 & 2) : 10 ----------------------------------X 11 University of Houston 12 Teaching Unit II, #215 4 13 Houston, Texas (a~) 14 15 16 Wednesday, 7 August 1985 17 18 The hearing in the above-entitled matter was 19 convened, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:05 a.m., 20 BEFORE: 21 JUDGE CHARLES BECHHOEFER, Chairman, 22 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. 23 JUDGE JAMES C. LAMB, Member, 24 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. 5 CE) TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

f 14606 (

         .1              JUDGE FREDERICK J. SHON, Member, 2                        Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

3 4 APPEARANCES: 5 On behalf of the Applicants: 6 MAURICE AXELRAD, Esq., 7 ALVIN GUTTERMAN, Esq., , 8 DONALD J. SILVERMAN, Esq., 9 STEVEN P. FRANTZ, Esq.,

     -10                            Newman & Holtzinger, i       11                           Washington, D.C.

12 (} 13 On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff: 14 EDWIN J. REIS, Esq., 15 ORESTE RUSS PIRFO, Esq., 16 Office of the Executive Legal Director 17 18 On behalf of the Intervenor: 19 LANNY ALAN SINKIN, 20 3022 Porter St. N.W., #304 l 21 Washington, D.C. 20008 i 22 Representative for Citizens Concerned About 23 Nuclear Power. 24 TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14607 ( 1 WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 7, 1985 2 CONTENTS 3 4 WITNESSES: DIRECT CROSS REDIRECT RECROSS BOARD 5 CLOIN ROBERTSON 14608 14707 14772 14799 14720 6 14713 14801 7 8 EXHIBITS: FOR ID. IN EVD 9 CCANP Exhibit 128 14673 14674 10 CCANP Exhibit 129 14675 14682 11 CCANP Exhibit 130 14685 14687 12 CCANP Exhibit 131 14687 14691 14691 14695 {} 13 14 CCANP Exhibit 132 CCANP Exhibit 133 14704 14706 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14608 (<'>h 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Good morning, ladies and 3 gentlemen. Are there any preliminary matters this 4 morning? 5 MR. GUTTERMAN: I hcve the page to complete 6 CCANP Exhibit 72. 7 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay. Any other matters? 8 MR. SINKIN: No. 9 CLOIN ROBERTSON 10 testified further upon his oath as follows: 11 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED 12 By Mr. Sinkin: {} 13 14 Q A Good morning, Ar. Robertson. Good morning. 15 Q Did you attend the April 30th briefing that 16 Quadrex gave to Houston Lighting & Power? 17 A No. 18 Q Can you tell me why you didn't attend that ( 19 briefing? 20 A Not definitively. During that period of time, 21 I was heavily engaged in handling the licensing ! 22 activities with Allens Creek, and I can only guess that 23 something in that area had occupied my time to the point 24 where I considered that more important than attending l g- 25 this particular briefing. U) TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14609 () 1 Q Did you attend the May 7th Quadrex briefing of 2 Houston Lighting & Power and Brown & Root? 3 A No. 4 Q Would that have been for the same reason, that 5 you were' involved with Allens Creek? 6 A As I recall, I received a set of Quadrex report 7 volumes reasonably early that morning and I elected to 8 spend my time starting my review of that report rather 9 than attend a particular briefing session that Quadrex 10 was having with Brown & Root. 11 Q When did Mr. Goldberg first inform you that you 12 were to be part of the three person review team for (} -13 14 Houston Lighting & Power to decide on notifications? Mr. Goldbe'rg and I discussed that, it seems to A 15 me it was sometime during the first few days of May in 16 detail as to how we would handle our review. I can't be 17 exact, but it seems to me it was a matter of three or 18 four days prior to the receipt of the report. And at l 19 that discussion, we decided that the review would be done 20 by Mr. Goldberg and myself and Dr. Sumpter. 21 Q Did you attend the May 7th Brown & Root meeting 22 where Quadrex findings were discussed? 23 A Yes. 24 0 What was your role in that meeting? 25 A Observer, listening to and taking as much TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14610 0 1 information as I could from the Brown & Root 2 presentations so that I would have as much understanding 3 of the Brown & Root assessments as possible. 4 Q Did you contribute directly to the discussion 5 or were you simply an observer? 6 A I was an observer strictly, except that the one 7 point at the end of their discussion of computer codes, I 8 made the observation to the group in words somewhat like 9 this, that I suggest that they look carefully at this 10 matter because it was an issue of importance to Mr. 11 Goldberg and myself. Those are pretty close to the words 12 I used. 13 0 Computer codes had been identified since the

  -{)

l 14 beginning of the Quadrex report as an issue, is that not i L 15 correct? 16 A I don't know, except the first time I heard 17 anything about it was at the April 13th meeting of l 18 Quadrex.

19 0 That you had a concern since April the 13th at 20 least about that issue? _.

21 A I knew that that was an issue that Quadrex was i 22 addressing and it was an issue I was interested in. i 23 Q Were you sitting with Dr. Sumpter in that Brown 24 & Root meeting? I 25 A I believe we were sitting side by side. () TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14611 1 Q What was his role in the meeting? 2 A As I recall, he did not say anything at the 3 meeting. He and I talked to each other from time to time 4 but I don't recall Dr. Sumpter saying anything to the 5 group at large. 6 0 were you taking notes during that May 7th 7 meeting? - 8 A No. 9 Q Was Dr. Sumpter? 10 A I don't remember. 11 0 Were you present -- well, at any time while you 12 were present, did Brown & Root make a decision to refer 13 some Quadrex findings to NUS for a response? ,

 }

l'4 A I don't recall -- I do not recall Brown & Root 15 doing anything to refer anything to anybody else during 16 that meeting. They were under instructions to come to 17 conclusions by the next morning. I don't recall them 18 referring any matters on to any other entity except 19 themselves. 20 Q Let me ask your counsel to show you CCANP 96 21 and 97 and see if this in any way refreshes you memory? 22 A 96 and 977 23 Q Right, they go together. 24 A I still do not recall any particular statements 25 made that evening that would be a reference of Brown & TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14612 ( l Root to matters object on to NUS. It could have 2 happened. I don't know. 3 Q You've never seen 96 or 97 before? 4 A Yes, I've seen them before. 5 0 When did you see them prior to today? 6 A Well, I can't tell you for sure at the times 7 I've seen them, but I saw the May lith NUS letter some 8 time in my review of Quadrex issues getting ready for 9 this proceedings. 10 Whether I've seen it before then or not, I 11 don't know. I can't be definitive, but I know I saw it 12 at that point and I must -- you know, I've seen the May 13 8th also as part of this same activity, but I can't tell {~ ) 14 you that I've seen it before recent months. I may have, 15 I just don't -- I can't recall. 16 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, my notes don't 17 reflect that these are actually in evidence. I would 18 like to move CCANP 96 and 97 into evidence at this time. 19 MR. GUTTERMAN: I would object to that, Mr. 20 Chairman. I can't see that anybody has authenticated it 21 and I don't see what the basis is or how it could be

    .22 offered to prove anything.

23 MR. REIS: That's the main part of the staff 24 objection is that it has no probative value. Nobody's 25 said anything about it. O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14613 1 MR. SINKIN:- Well, these letters -- 2 MR. REIS: It's just not material. 3 MR. SINKIN: These letters demonstrate that 4 there were at least some items on May the 8 that Brown & 5 Root referred to somebody else for response that was not 6 received until May the lith. 7 MR. REIS: That doesn't show that. 8 MR. SINKIN: It shows that the items referring 9 to NUS were referred to NUS for response and that NUS 10 responded on May the lith, 11 MR. GUTTERMAN: First of all, I think Dr. 12 Sumpter testified about this very matter and explained 13 why Mr. Sinkin's explanation of this matter is not the 14 only one, it's probably not the right one. And t'here's 15 no testimony to put these things in perspective other 16 than Dr. Sumpter's which was not based on a knowledge of 17 these specific documents. 18 No witness has told us what these documents

   . 19 are, and why they were written; nobody's authenticated 20 it; I can't see that it proves anything.

l 21 MR. REIS: Further, it's just not probative to

22 whether the matters should have been reported in that it 23 doesn't -- if you look at 97, there's nothing there, as

! 24 to whether anything should have been reported. I ! 25 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We're trying to figure out TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14614 O 1 if we've previously ruled on this document at all. 2 MR. REIS: I can't fined a ruling on it. 3 Unless it went over to the next day. 4 MR. SINKIN: I don't think they were offered. 5 That's what I had my note here. 6 JUDGE SHON: Okay. We don't think they were 7 offered either. 8 JUDGE BECHROEFER: The Board will decline to 9 admit these two documents. I would say at least as of 10 this time, given the authent'ication. 11 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) After the Brown & Root meeting 12 adjourned on May the 7th, did you and Dr. Sumpter discuss (} 1,3 the Quad' rex review further that evening? 14 A No. 15 Q How about the next morning? 16 A Yes, we did discuss it the next morning. 17 Q Can you tell me the circumstances that that 18 discussion took place in? 19 A Only that we met. I can't recall whether it 20 was my office or his office, we were both in the same 21 building; and we discussed various matters. I don't 22 recall what they all might be. But I believe I can 23 clearly recall that we discussed shielding calculations, 24 and there may have been other matters. 25 That's the only one that I could attest to TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14615 1 clearly that was discussed. I'm sure there were a lot of 2 others. 3 Q Was this just you and Dr. Sumpter; was anyone 4 else present? 5 A Yes, I recall it was just the two of us. 6 Q Was Dr. Sumpter surprized that Brown & Root had 7 identified only one potentially reportable finding? 8 MR. GUTTERMAN: Objection. I think the 9 question ought to be -- we've been through this about ten 10 times now, why don't you ask him if Dr. Sumpter said he 11 was surprised. 12 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Did Dr. Sumpter indicate to 13 you that he was surprised that Brown & Root had (]} 14 identified only one potentially reportable finding? 15 A I don't recall he and I discussing any in that 16 fashion. I don't -- I can't -- I can't recall any 17 statement by Dr. Sumpter that he was surprised about the 18 Brown & Root's determinations. We -- I'm sure, we did 19 discuss the fact that we didn't agree at that point, the 20 morning of May 8th; we were not in agreement with what 21 determinations Brown & Root had made. 22 0 There were other findings at that time that you 23 and Dr. Sumpter thought were potentially reportable? 24 MR. GUTTERMAN: I'm sorry, what's got me lost 25 is other than what? O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

I 14616 O 1 MR. SINKIN: Other than the one Brown & Root 2 said was potentially reportable. 3 A Yes. I believe we were both of the same 4 opinion during the evening before that the computer code 5 situation was representative of a potentially reportable 6 condition, and I believe Dr. Sumpter, from my impression 7 of our discussions, had -- I have the impression he had 8 reached a conclusion that the shielding calculations were 9 in that same category and we were, between the two of us, 10 discussing it further. 11 I know we discussed both of those issues the 12 next morning. And that we, before we -- before noon, we 13 had both concurred with each other in terms of the (]) , 14 shielding calculations and computer code case. 15 0 Were there any other findings at that time when 16 you and Dr. Sumpter were meeting that were, for lack of a 17 better term, a close call, but you decided weren't 18 potentially reportable but you seriously considered it? 19 A I don't recall -- Well, I would -- first of 20 all, to fully answer that question, I think I would have 21 to go through a very large number of those discipline 22 findings and refresh my memory somewhat. But two items 23 that we did discuss, I know we discussed, and I can't 24 recall the particulars in great detail, one of which was 25 the common instrument air line, that was, as I recall, a O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14617 (:) 1 very brief. And another one, which was more substantial 2 had.to do with.what I call the entire nuclear analysis , 3 area. 4 Q By that do you mean the Quadrex section which 5 is nuclear analysis where all those questions are? 6 A That is correct. 7 0 You had a more substantial discussion about 8 that area of findings? , 9 A Yes. It was somewhat general as well as 10 particular about certain things. I cannot recall at this 11 point what the particulars were except I know they 12 referred directly to the findings and the questions and () 13 . answers that supported those findings. 14 I would also -- I must say, that the evening 15 before we also had discussion between the two of us of 16 some of these same matters and it's no longer clear in my 17 head just which ones got discussed at what point in time 18 and to what extent. 19 Q The evening before was during the Brown & Root review? 20 21 A Yes. 22 Q Between the time that you and Dr. Sumpter met 23 on the morning of the 8th and the convening of the review l 24 team around noon on the 8th, did you have any further j 25 discussions or meetings with anyone about Quadrex?

 )

1 l l TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14618 O 1 A Not that I can recall. I'm sure there were no 2 meetings. Whether or not I discussed anything further 3 with other members of the licensing staff, I can't  ! 4 recall. Excuse me, I do recall something. 1 5 0 Okay. 6 A During that morning, I received information 7 from the licensing staff having to do with matters that 8 had been previously reported to the NRC under 50.55(e) . 9 I can't remember when I asked them to start looking at 10 that but I did get the feedback from them that morning 11 relative to things that had previously been reported to 12 NRC. 13 Q Did they give you a printout, a document on

  }

14 that? 15 A No. There was no printout or document. It 16 was, as I recall, a telephone conversation. And some 17 items were mentioned and I don't remember the complete 18 list. But as I recall, there was -- there were quite a 19 few items discussed on the phone as to whether or not 20 those were the same things as Quadrex had identified. 21 Q I'm going to ask your council to show you CCANP 22 82. Have you ever seen this document before, that you 23 recall? 24 A I have seen this one or something very similar i 7 25 to it. At least with the same items that I see on here. TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14619 O 1 And when did you see that document? Q 2 A I don't recall when I might have seen this 3 particular one or if I've seen this exact one. But this 4 is a standard type of -- you know, this one, this is not 5 one of our standards. This is devoted strictly to -

                                               ~

6 Quadrex issues. And would have been -- had to have been 7 prepared well after May the 8th. That's all I can tell 8 you about it. 9 0 What is it that tells you this was prepared 10 well after May the 8th? 11 A Because it would not have been possible, I 12 don't believe, for these items enumerated per the Quadrex e'indings to have been put together in that time frame. O 13 I 14 didn't ask for such a thing in this form until, or a 15 particular printout of this, until well after May the 16 8th. There wasn't time to prepare this type of thing. 17 0 But during the morning of May the 8th, the 18 licensing staff did inform you about items in the Quadrex 19 report previously reported to the NRC. Is that correct? 20 A I had asked -- I gave them some particular 21 matters that had -- I had identified in reviewing the 22 Quadrex report that I wanted to know if we had reported 23 those previously. 24 Some of those matters were brought to my 25 attention by Dr. Sumpter who was much more familiar with - __ 2^'" ""'o""o S ""=" > " 8 - 8 " 2

f 14620 m U 1 the list of previously reported matters than I was at 2 that time. And I wanted to confirm exactly what we had 3 reported to NRC relative to some of these issues. 4 0 Can you tell me which items in 82, CCANP 82, 5 you had asked your licensing staff to respond to? 6 A I can't attest to that. I asked them to 7 respond to this particular item, however I can recall 8 that they did inform me that the auxiliary feedwater pump 9 motors, the environmental qualification had been 10 previously reported, and that the second item on here 11 having to do with the MAB dead loads had been reported. 12 The item, I think it's on page 2, Incident 13 Review Committee report 71, I believe, if I have it 14' right, we had made a previous report to the NRC about a 15 breakdown in the QA program relative to vendor 16 surveillances, and I believe this is the one that refers 17 to that. 18 Number 78, cooling of primary shield 19 penetrations had been previously reported, and I was 20 aware of that one; or made aware of it. And No. 81, 21 " Cable tray support design," I believe, was, I believe 22 was one. 23 I can't be absolutely sure. 24 JUDGE LAMB: Excuse me. Mr. Robertson, with 25 respect to that one, reading the Quadrex finding, does TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14621 (v~h 1 that relate to the deficiency that was reported to NRC? 2 THE WITNESS: I haven't read that. I was -- 3 excuse me, I was just going down the list of what I 4 thought I recalled having had been -- having been 5 reported. I believe that was one -- I'll have to read 6 the Quadrex finding. 7 In response to your question, sir, I did not 8 regard this particular finding as being a candidate for 9 reportability, because it was discussing 10 over-conservatism and over-design not deficiencies in 11 design. So the correlation between this one and this 12 report 81, to me, does not correlate in a direct fashion. But I was, I believe, aware thit we had made'an () 13 NRC report on cable tray support design previous to the 14 15 Quadrex report being received. 16 JUDGE LAMB: My reason for asking was that the 17 title of the document is Quadrex findings previously 18 reported. And from what you've just told me, that 19 probably was not my interpretation -- 20 THE WITNESS: No, sir, I believe what happened -- 21 in fact, I know this is what happened, that a couple of 22 times after we received the Quadrex report, I had the 23 licensing people go through the Quadrex report and 24 correlate any finding to any previous report to NRC and i 25 they did that regardless of whether the Quadrex finding i r-) (/ i TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14622 O 1 would have been representative of a potential reportable. 2 If Quadrex brought it up as a finding and we had made a 3 previous NRC report on -- relative to that issue, I 4 wanted that cross connection. And this is a document 5 that responded to that. 6 So strictly if Quadrex brought it up as an

      '7 issue, good, bad or indifferent, had we ever made a 8 report about anything related to that subject to NRC, and 9 that's the basis that I believe this document has been 10  prepared.

11 (No hiatus.) 12 13 , 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 () TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

e 14623 I) 1 JUDGE LAMB: So, inr,tead of being Quadrex 2 findings that had been reported, this is subjects -- 3 you're relating subjects that were reported, Quadrex 4 subjects; is that correct? 5 THE WITNESS: We are talking about -- yes, we 6 are looking -- we are going through surveying the 7 Quadrex report. And if Quadrex had a finding about a 8 certain subject and we could find in our Incident Review 9 Committee files that we had made a report on that 10 subject, then the two got linked. They were really 11 independent of a determination of did the second column - 12 really have any meaning to the first column, but except

 )

13 in the sense that the same subject was addressed. 14 JUDGE LAMB Thank you. 15 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) In terms of Incident Review 16 Committee reports, I'm not sure if you finished. There 17 was one more, the safety injection system. 18 A I can't recall whether that one was brought up 19 to me at that point in time or not. 20 Q Okay. In discussing the cable tray support 21 design, what was the 50.55(e) report made concerning 22 that support design? (} 23 A I don't know at this point. I don't recall. 24 Q In looking at the actual Quadrex finding on 25 that point, does the last centonco suggest to you TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14624 () 1 something that's non-conservative? 2 A No, it suggests to me that it's 3 over-conservative. 4 Q Let me just be sure I understand that sentence 5 because as I had read that sentence originally, it 6 seemedtoindicatetherewastoomuchdistance5etween 7 the supports. 8 MR. GUTTERMAN: Mr. Chairman, I object to the 9 question because we don't have a finding at issue that's 10 related to over -- well, to #inding 4.1.2.3 whatever it 11 is, (i) or (1). It's just a waste of time to go into gs 12 it. U 13 MR. SINKIN: Whil, the Board has asked on more 14 than one occasion about this particular finding in light 15 of the fact that it seemed to be only about 16 over-conservatism. I'm trying to just clarify that last 17 sentence if that's indeed all that this finding's 18 about. 19 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I think we'll overrule the 20 objection. 21 0 (By Mr. Sinkin) Do you remember the 22 question? We're focusing on that last sentence. {} 23 Let me ask another question. 24 A Yes. 25 0 As I had read that originally, it scomed to be TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 /

e 14625 () 1 saying that the distance between supports was excessive. 2 A Well, I did not interpret it that way and I 3 did not interpret it as representative of any type of 4 deficiency. 5 Q Okay. Was Mr. Powell in charge of preparing 6 this analysis for you? 7 MR. GUTTERMAN: Objection. Since he -- well, 8 I'm not sure which analysis we're talking about. Are we 9 talking about this document? Are we talking about -- 10 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) The analysis that compared 11 Quadrex findings with IRC reports. 12 MR. GUTTERMAN: I'm still confused. Are we 13 talking about discussing on the morning of May 8th or 14 are we talking about this document which the witness has 15 prepared subsequently. 16 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Let's try in terms of the 17 analysis on the morning of May 8th that was provid d to 18 you, who did you talk to? 19 A As I recall, I asked Mr. Jacobi to undertake 20 that and I am sure that to do that he utilized Mr. 21 Powell to help him out since Mr. Powell kept the files. 22 So, I cannot understand how I could have got the (} 23 information without Mr. Powell having been involved. 24 Q And then the process continued beyond May the 25 8th. You had the licensing staff continue to try and TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14626 () 1 correlate reportable -- correlate Quadrex findings with 2 previous reports to the NRC7 3 MR. GUTTERMAN: Objection. If we are talking 4 about why things were or were not reportable on May 8th 5 in this hearing, subsequent reviews by the licensing 6 staff seem' irrelevant to me. 7 MR. SINKIN: I assume you apply that to all 8 the subsequent reviews? 9 No, Mr. Chairman. This is the licensing staff 10 continuing to decide whether further items should be 11 reported. Not really. This is the licensing staff 12 providing information to Mr. Robertson upon which he can i 13 decide whether items have previously been reported and I 14 think it is relevant to the continuing views of this 15 report by Mr. Robertson and HL&P management. 16 MR. GUTTERMAN: Well, we have Mr. Sinkin's 17 testimony on that. I don't think Mr. Robertson has 18 explained the purpose for the subsequent document. 19 MR. SINKIN: I would be willing to ask that 20 question, Mr. Chairman, just to get the ball rolling. 21 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We'll overrule that 22 objection. {} 23 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) The question, Mr. Robertson, 24 was whether after May the 8th the process continued of 25 the licensing staff attempting to correlate Quadrex TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14627 (")% (- 1 findings with previous notifications to the NRC by HL&P. 2 A Well, I can answer it this way. The licensing 3 staff did correlate those matters. They did it on more 4 than one occasion. I can't remember exactly how many 5 times we went through the process of review. 6 One of those times was relatively soon after 7 May the 8th. And, as I recall, I received from Mr. 8 Powell just two or three pages of handwritten notes that 9 made that initial correlation. On other occasions later 10 that was also rereviewed. One of those times was as 11 late as 1983 -- excuse me, I believe it was 1983 as we rs 12 were looking over the status of the Quadrex lssues. 13 But there were more than -- there was more 14 than one such look and relook at these issues. 15 0 was this particular document ever presented to 16 you? 17 A I can't attest tc this particular one. I've 18 seen some that were very similar to this, if not this 19 one.

                   ,' 20         0    What was your purpose in requesting the 21   licensing staff to correlate these two items?

22 A After May the 8th, I continued periodically to 23 further review the issues raised in the Quadrex report (]} 24 and from time to time I would have a question. I would 25 start looking for answers to that question, what other TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14628 [ ,(O) 1 information did we have about that issue. And among 2 those questions occasionally would be have we reported o 3 this or something similar to this to the NRC already. 4 So, this was just one of several sources of 5 information that I reached out for to understand a 6 particular Quadrex issue in more detail. 7 0 But I believe you testified that the first 8 discussion was actually on May the 8th, so you had -- 9 _ A Yes. 10 0 -- been assigned this task on May the 7th? 11 A Yes. Because one of the things that

       . 12    registered with me when I read the Quadrex report was a 13    matter dealing with the aux feedwater pump. And if we 14-   had not previously reported that, the way it was stated 15    in Quadrex my first inclination would have been this is 16    a reportable matter or potentially reportable. However, 17    as I recall, Dr. Sumpter made me aware very early on 18    that this matter had already been reported. So, that 19    keyed me to looking to see just what had we reported 20    that related to Quadrex, the Quadrex report.

J 21 I would also note that Mr. Jacobi, senior 22 licensing engineer in the group, supervising engineer, 23 senior in terms of time in the licensing group, was also [}

   ,         24    well aware of previous 55(e) reports. He also looked 25    over the Quadrex report on his own and I'm sure that he TATE REPORTING         (713) 498-8442

14629 () 1 provided me information about some of these matters that 2 had been previously reported, as well as Dr. Sumpter. 3 Q So, Mr. Jacobi had a copy of the Quadrex 4 report? 5 A He either had one or had access to one, yes. 6 Q And Mr. Powell had a copy of the Quadrex 7 report? 8 MR. GUTTERMAN: Could we get a time frame 9 involved in this? 10 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) I'm talking about May the 11 8th, 9th, 10th, that time frame. 12 A I don't know whether Mr. Powell had one at 13 that point or not. 14 Q You said you assigned this task on May the 7th 15 to try and correlate these two items. 16 A I started inquiries on May the 7th within the 17 licensing staff to provide me information relative to 18 matters we might have reported to NRC previously that 19 were also subjects of findings in the Quadrex report. I 20 don't believe I made any blanket assignment of go review 21 the Quadrex report against the 55(e) file and see which 22 ones correlate. I don't believe I made that kind of an

 ,r]      23  assignment at that point in time.

(/ 24 0 More of a see what's familiar to you kind of 25 assignment? TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

y i 4 14630 L () 1 A It was more here are some issues that we think 2 have been previously reported, confirm it for me and 3 tell me anything else that you see that looks like it 4 could be. 5 Q Was the meeting the evening of May the 7th at 6 Brown & Root, was that the first time you actually -- 7 no, you said you got the three volumes the morning of 8 May the 7th and started your review then. 9 A That's correct. 10 Q Was it between that point and the beginning of 11 the Brown & Root meeting that you initiated this task at 12 the licensing division? , 13 A Yes. 14 Q And was it Mr. Jacobi who called there? 15 MR. REIS: Asked and answered. 16 MR. SINKIN: The only trouble I have, Mr. 17 Chairman, is my notes reflect that originally he thought 18 it was May the 8th and that he assigned the task to Mr. 19 Jacobi on May the 8th is what my notes say. I just want 20 to be sure that we' re talking about May the 7th and that 21 he assigned it to Mr. Jacobi on May the 7th. 22 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I suppose you can answer.

       ,        23   You probably have, but --

24 A I know that I discussed these issues with Mr. 25 Jacobi on May the 7th and the 8th and I am reasonably TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

ug u 14631 ("' . ( ) 1 certain that I also directly talked to Mr. Powell 2 perhaps on both of those days about the same matters. 3 As a follow up he could have called me to give me 4 information. I know that he called me on one occasion 5 to give me information. 6 So, there was a continuum of communication 7 going on. I can't pinpoint exactly to whom and when 8 during those two days. Both of the gentlemen were 9 deeply involved in it. 10 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) On May the 7th did you 11 provide either Mr. Jacobi or Mr. Powell with a copy of r- 12 the Quadrex report? L_)g - 13 A No, I did not. In a direct fashion. Mr. 14 Jacobi may have used mine. I mean, his desk was right 15 across the hall. 16 Q I see. 17 A And he may have used mine for part of the time 18 or part of my report. There were other copies made 19 available so it would not have been necessary for him to 20 do that. 21 Q Were you present when I think it's Mr. Stanley 22 actually delivered the copies to HL&P or did you get {} 23 your copy from someone at HL&P? 24 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, I'm going to object 25 to this line and the last six questions have not been TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14632 () 1 material at all. Going to it in this fine detail, we 2 don't have any question here apparently right now of 3 credibility that I see on these matters, and going into 4 this fine detail just adds nothing to the record and 5 just takes up time. It's just not material. It's not 6 probative of any issues who got one within which hour or 7 which day. 8 It's plain that they had the document then 9 and, you know, all these people that have been -- and 10 that they worked with them, they had them or they were 11 available to them. Whether it was at 9:00 a.m. or 10:00 (w 12 a.m. or whether he was present when Mr. Stanley L) 13 delivered them, it's just not material to any issue that 14 this Board has to decide. 15 And I wouldn't make this objection if this was 16 the first question asked this way, but as I think back 17 the last six questions, they've all been not material. i 18 MR. SINKIN: I'll withdraw the question, Mr. l.; l 19 Chairman. l 20 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) I do have one more question 21 in this line, though. Was Mr. Powell also across the 22 hall from you with Mr. Jacobi? {} 23 A No, he was physically located at Clinton Drive 24 at the Brown & Root offices. l l 25 0 On May the 8th the Houston Lighting & Power l (713) 498-8442 TATE REPORTING

e 14633 () 1 review team convened around noon; is that correct? 2 A Yes. As I recall it, somewhere in the 3 vicinity of 1:00 o' clock, 12:30, something on that 4 order. 5 Q And was that the first time at that meeting 6 that you had had an opportunity to discuss the final 7 Quadrex report with Mr. Goldberg? 8 A I don't know that that was the first 9 opportunity, but it was the first time it occurred. 10 0 At the May 8th meeting of the review team, did 11 Mr. Goldberg say that he had no idea Brown & Root was fS 12 , performing as badly as the Quadrex report indicated? V 13 A I don't recall those words. He may have, but 14 I don't recall those words in that form. There was 15 discussion about what these various things meant and 16 what they implied about Brown & Root's performance in 17 many different areas, but I don't recall that specific 18 statement as such. He may have made it. 19 Q Setting aside whether he used those particular 20 words, did Mr. Goldberg express the sentiment to you and 21 Dr. Sumpter that he had no idea Brown & Root was l l 22 performing as badly as the Quadrex report indicated? 23 A It seems to me that I heard Mr. Goldberg say, 24 and I don't know what the words were, something about, l 25 well, this is a real problem for Brown &' Root in terms TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14634 () 1 of their engineering activities, some words to that 2 effect. And Dr. Sumpter and I both at that point said, 3 hey, slow down, what's in the Quadrex report is not as 4 bad as some of the words might make it sound, nor is it 5 as big an indictment of Brown & Root engineering as 6 those words might make it sound. 7 There was, as I recall, some front end 8 discussion where we were suggesting to him things 9 weren't as bad in Brown & Root engineering as he might 10 have supposed based on just reading the Quadrex report 11 cold. - g- 12 Q Which aspects of the Quadrex report was he ( 13 most disturbed by? 14 MR. GUTTERMAN: Again, I assume the question 15 is what did he say he was most disturbed by? 16 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Which aspects of the Quadrex 17 report did Mr. Goldberg say he was most disturbed by? 18 A I don't recall him singling anything in 19 particular out in that sense. I gathered he was as 20 upset in terms of the progress of the project as I was 21 in reading the Quadrex report and getting the impression 22 that engineering overall was not nearly as far along as ('T 23 it should be based on our understanding of where V 24 construction was, the amount of time that Brown & Root 25 engineering had been working or, the design, what the TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14635 () <~ . 1 schedule was calling for in terms of future construction 2 activities. 3 As I recall, we were both displeased with 4 seeing the status of Brown & Root engineering activities 5 that would go to support the continuation of 6 construction in a rapid fashion, meaning on their 7 schedule. It didn't look like they were where we could 8 reasonably expect them to be. 9 Q You expressed your reaction or your and Dr. 10 Sumpter's reaction to Mr. Goldberg as saying slow down. 11 Was Mr. Goldberg fairly upset over what he had read as 12 you perceived him? , O' 13 A I wouldn't describe him as being -- having a 14 physical appearance of being upset, no. That he was not 15 pleased about the status of engineering I would say was 16 fairly clear. He, as I recall, didn't use any angry 17 words or any words that are impolite in conversation. 18 But clearly he was displeased with what he perceived to 19 be the status of engineering design, particularly in 20 terms of what he perceived as progress that needed to be 21 made and where design should be relative to where it 22 looked like it might be. 23 Q And he expressed this as a real problem for 24 Brown & Root in terms of engineering work. I believe 25 the substance -- you said you couldn't quote the words, TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14636 () I but that he had said something like this is a real 2 problem for Brown & Root in terms of engineering? 3 A He was referring, as I took it, to the Brown & 4 Root engineering organization was just not making the 5 progress it should, didn't have the work done that it 6 should have had done at this point in time. And the 7 Quadrex report also emphasized that there were 8 weaknesses in the Brown & Root technical areas that 9 showed up in terms of again lack of progress. 10 Lack of progress can many times be correlated 11 very directly to the organization and the capabilities 12 of the people, the experience of those people. All

-)

R/ 13 those things correlate together in experienced nuclear 14 engineers' views and those correlations were clearly 15 there, from my perception and from my impression they 16 were there for him. 17 Q On May the 8th at this Houston review team 18 meeting, how did you set up to go about doing your 19 review? Did each of you have copies of the Quadrex 20 report? 21 A I had a copy. I can't recall exactly whether 22 Dr. Sumpter had one, but I am sure he did. Dr. Sumpter 23 and I were sitting in chairs out in front of Mr. 24 Goldberg's desk. He sat behind his desk and had, as I 25 recall, the Quadrex report and the Brown & Root TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14637 r~ () j 1 assessment sheets on his desk in front of him. As I 2 recall, I did not have a copy of the Brown & Root 3 assessment sheet, only the Quadrex report. However, we 4 were in such a proximity that we could read the Brown & 5 Root assessment sheets that he had if we needed to. 6 0 other than the Quadrex report and the Brown & 7 Root assessment, did you have any other documents as 8 part of your review process? 9 A Not that I recall. 10 Q Did you start with the discipline findings and 11 go finding by finding and discuss each one? 12 A We started with the discipline' findings, yes. 13 We went through them one by one. Some were discussed at 14 some length, some were discussed very quickly. Some 15 were is there any question about this one? No and go 16 on. 17 So, the consideration of the various findings 18 was not uniform in the amount of attention devoted to 1 19 each one, nor the amount of discussion. It was go down 20 the list and if we all saw it the same way and it was 21 not a potentially reportable item, we went on. The ones 22 that somebody had a question about, we stopped and 23 discussed it.

    )

24 Q Which items provoked the most discussion among 25 the group? l TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14638 () 1 A I can't recall which ones provoked the most 2 discussion. I do recall there was some discussion of 3 the shielding calculations. There was very little about 4 the computer code. None really about HVAC in the sense 5 of it being potentially reportable. 6 A number of other areas I know were discussed, 7 particularly in the area of pipe stress, pipe supports 8 where Mr. Goldberg's expertise in those matters was 9 needed because they really fell outside the expertise of 10 myself and Dr. Sumpter and his expertise was very high 11 in those particular areas. I know I relied on his 12 judgments in those afeas quite extensively. 13 Q Other than the shielding and computer codes 14 and HVAC and pipe stress, pipe supports, what items in 15 the Quadrex discipline findings p'roduced the most 16 discussion? 17 A I can't recall which ones were the particular 18 subjects of extensive discussion at this point, I just 19 know that there were some that were discussed at more 20 length than others. I can't recall which ones. 21 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Robertson, do you 22 remember any subject where any of the review group 23 members started out suggesting that it be reported, then 24 after discussion it was determined that it wasn't 25 reportable? TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14639 () 1 THE WITNESS: Sir, I can't recall a particular 2 case that would fit what you just described. It seems 3 to me that there were a number of areas that Mr. 4 Goldberg discussed in the pipe stress and other areas to 5 make sure that that work on the basis that it was 6 described either represented future work or work that 7 was not yet done because he had some concern about the 8 technical adequacy of their approach and the basis they 9 were using in some of those areas. I believe he asked 10 some questions about where Brown & Root was at in those 11 areas, what was the status of that design activity with 12 those kind of things in mind. 13 From my own perspective, I started out having 14 read the Quadrex report through and particularly looking 15 at the nuclear analysis section, I started out with the 16 idea that that group as a group represented a 17 potentially reportable, and almost reluctantly worked my 18 way through the Quadrex findings. 19 I say almost reluctantly because when I first 20 read it the impression was so direct, it took me some 21 time in reviewing details and understanding what they 22 said to come to the conclusion that instead of a group 23 being out of control, which was my first impression, it (]} 24 was a group that for whatever reason wasn't producing a 25 product. What they produced and what they had on file TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14640 () I was not that bad, they simply hadn't been able to do the 2 work that I would have expected them to do at that stage 3 in the project. 4 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Do you think in that 5 limited period of time you were able to come to a 6 conclusion, a definite conclusion in that regard? 7 Definite enough so that you could not report it to the 8 NRC as a potentially reportable item? 9 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 10 JUDGE SHON: And you say that was a conclusion 11 you reached simply by reading it to yourself, no one f-'. 12 talked you into this notion? 13 THE WITNESS: I don't think anybody could have 14 talked me into that in that sense, sir. But I read it 15 and my first impression -- and I read through the 16 generic findings first on my way to reading into the 17 discipline findings. And my first -impression was that 18 there was a serious question of the -- this group's 19 capability in terms of what they were doing, controls 20 that might or might not be there. My first impression 21 was they were producing defective product and then I 22 started reading the details. 23 I listened to the status of the activities the O-s- 24 evening of the 7th. I talked to Dr. Sumpter. I talked 25 to Mr. Jacobi who was also familiar with many of these TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14641

  <^                                                                          .

(_x) 1 aspects. And, as I say, almost reluctantly, in a sense, 2- came to the conclusion that the group was not producing 3 and putting out on the street defective product, but 4 instead were struggling unsuccessfully to produce a 5 product. 6 It seems like they would start an analysis, 7 they would get either part way through it or they would 8 get it even preliminarily done, someone else would take 9 a look at it and say, hey, this isn't going to work, we 10 can' t live with that, go back and do it again and they 11 would void that one out and start again. And they just , 12 weren' t being able to generate in a timely fashion this 7-V) 13 analysis work that needed to be done. 14 MR. GUTTERMAN: I wonder if this would be a 15 reasonable time for a break? 16 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Why don't we take a l 17 fifteen-minute break. i 18 MR. SINKIN: That's fine. l 19 (Brief recess taken.) l l 20 (No hiatus.) 21 22 m 23 r t 24 25 TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14642 1 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Back on the record. 2 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Just to pick up a little bit 3 from the questions asked by the Board, Mr. Robertson, if 4 you would turn to the Quadrex report, Page 4-74, when you 5 said that you relied on Mr. Goldberg's expertise in 6 primarily pipe stress and pipe supports, is finduing 7 4.7.2 one of the areas you were referring to? 8 MR. GUTTERMAN: Talking about a finding, Mr. 9 Sinkin, or a section? 10 MR. SINKIN: Section 4.7.2 well, let's just say 11 4.7.2.1, the most serious finding in this section. 12 A Excuse me, can you repeat your question. I'm (} 13 not sure I'm focusing on exactly the section that you're 14 referring to. 15 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) I'm looking at Page 4-74, and 16 it has the most serious findings under piping and 17 supports, technical adequacy assessment. You had made 18 the remark to the Board in questioning just before the 19 break that in the area of pipe stress and pipe supports, 20 you relied on Mr. Goldberg's expertise. 21 My question is: Are these findings under 4.7.2.1 22 one of the areas where you relied on Mr. Goldberg's 23 expertise? 24 A Yes, in the sense of the detail technical 1 25 matters; for example, on page 4-75, item D, would have ( TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14643 V 1 represented one of those. 2 Q Do you remember.if there was discussion of that 3 item at the May 8th meeting? 4 A I don't recall. 5 0 On page 4-59, actually starting at the bottom 6 of Page 4-58 are the most serious findings in the nuclear 7 analysis section. If I remember what you said before the 8 break, you had actually read the generic finding in this 9 area first in your considerations and that had raised a 10 concern and then moved to the discipline findings. Is 11 that correct? 12 A When I started, I read through the entire generic 'section, and then I read through the discipline {} 13 , 14 findings sections, to really read the entire report in 15 those areas, particularly with the most serious. 16 And then I went back and started a what I would 17 call an evaluation process, based on a detailed review of 18 the most serious discipline findings. When I got to 19 computer codes and nuclear analysis, I didn't stop with 20 the most serious, but read and looked at all of the 21 findings in those two areas in particular. I can't 22 recall whether I did that with any other sections or not 23 but I did with those two. 24 Q Did you reference back to the volumes that 25 contained the questions in those sections, too? O< TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14644 /~T . V 1 A Yes. In those two sections. 2 0 Looking at the bottom of Page 4-59, wherein 3 finding 4.6.2.l(b), the paragraph at the bottom of Page 4 4-59 and over to 4-60, part of what Quadrex is saying is 5 that the analyses that were in place among those, at 6 least in some areas, they could find none that were 7 sufficient, correct and current. 8 Did you do any research on May the 8th or read 9 anything on May the 8th that would have indicated to you 10 that analyses in those areas were sufficient, correct and 11 cutcent, that the Quadrex report was wrong on this point? 12 MR. GUTTERMAN: This question is now limited to () 13 what happened on May the 8th and is excluding what 14 happenad on May the 7th? 15 MR. SINKIN: I guess it should include May the 16 7th. 17 0 (By Mr. Sinkin) Did you learn on May the 7th 18 or do any research on May the 8th that indicated to you 19 that the analyses in the areas that Quadrex could find 20 none that were sufficient correct and current, were 21 indeed sufficient, correct and current? 22 A I don't -- I wouldn't want to characterize it 23 in quite that fashion, in terms of what I found. This 24 section, I believe, that you referred me to, 4-59, came 25 out of the generic section, did it not? No, I'm sorry, TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14645 g~)., \- 1 4-62, yeah, that is. Okay. 2 When I read this and then proceeded to look at 3 the questions and answers and the support for these 4 statements as well as take advantage of the information 5 Brown & Root presented on the evening of the 7th, and 6 with discussions with some of the HL&P people, 7 particularly Dr. Sumpter and Mr. Jacobi, when I got 8 through with that, I came to the conclusion that -- I'll 9 try to pick up their own words here if I can -- that in 10 fact there was some of the analyses that were sufficient 11 for the purpose, that some of those that could have been 12 characterized, and it wasn't clear which ones Quadrex put {) 13 14 into this category, as where Quadrex said they were incorrect, I disagreed, that there was -- those were 15 correct, and to some extent the currency; in terms of 16 total sufficiency to support the ongoing design 17 activities, they were not what I expected to see as 18 interim types of analyses that would provide the support 19 to ongoing design work that would not cause very 20 substantial conservatisms to continue to have to be 21 carried in the design if you did not, in the end, expect 22 to find yourself in difficulty. 23 What I mean by that is this: When you first 24 start a project, you complete a set of analyses that are 25 very conservative and they act as an upper bound and they O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14646

 -(Z) 1 provide the basis for the issuance of a construction 2 permit. And designers go to work designing structures 3 and internal walls and support ledges out of concrete and 4 steel; as and as time goes on, the nuclear analysis 5 group, one would expect, to perform almost a continuum 6 but not a -- I think of it as a three-stage process, 7 where they redo those analyses and they take advantage of 8 more detailed lay outs that have been developed and they 9 refine their calculations that in turn provides a better 10 and less conservative basis for the design to continue.

11 For example, they might now have a more 12 detailed layout associated with the reactor cavity and f]) 13 the support structures, and be able to perform another i 14 iteration of the compartmental pressurization, 15 differential pressurization curves, or values, and be 16 able to predict again what the pressure against the 17 structural walls must be, and hopefully reduce some 18 conservatism and reduce the amount of thickness and steel 19 that would otherwise be put in. 20 This process continues and you expect during i 21 the life of the project that these kind of interim 22 analyses that are solely picking up more definitive data 23 as input, might be done or redone to or three times 24 before the final analysis is completed. 25 Not having that interim set of analyses, would i O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14647 (. 'u) 1 simply mean that the conservatisms that were started 2 originally would have to be continued; you couldn't 3 refine them in any meaningful way. And then you are also 4 at the same time raising the risk that the end product, 5 when you finally get to the final analysis, that you will 6 find a problem with that end product, the hardware that's 7 been installed; it was built with preliminary data, 8 perfectly proper procedure to go through, and when the 9 final data comes in, you do a final analysis and you find 10 out something doesn't meet its criteria. 11 You now have not only a matter to be reported 12 to the NRC, you have a very substantial matter internally 13 of costly backfit to fix something up. That's not a very (~N O 14 good way to design a plant. So this whole iteration 15 scheme is an important element to have occur as an 16 orderly design process. You don't have to do it, but you 17 increase your risks if you don't perform those interim 18 analyses. And in the end you'll find something wrong; 19 you also have the very real potential to increase your 20 costs as you carry conservative assumptions far down the 21 construction path. 22 I don't know whether that fully answers your 23 question in the way you asked it or not, but that's the 24 best I can do in a general sense. 25 0 That's very helpful, thank you. O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14648 ,/~' b) 1 In terms of the May 8th meeting, the review 2 team meeting, how specifically did you deal with the 3 generic finding? Let me ask a preliminary question, 4 excuse me. 5 Was the general approach on the discipline 6 findings to look only at the most serious but in certain 7 areas, you went beyond that because you had particular - 8 concerns? 9 A No, I think we perhaps slightly misunderstood 10 each other. During my part of the review process, on the 11 7th and the morning of the 8th, I personally did go in to 12 other than the most serious findings, in at least two ex 13 areas, the compute'r code area and the nuclear analysis (j 14 area. But on the afternoon of the 8th, I do not recall 15 that the review team looked at other than the discipline 16 findings as a group. 17 0 Other than the most serious? 18 A That's right. I'm sorry, that's not what I 19 said. I'm not aware that we looked at anything other 20 than the most serious findings as a group. Now, in terms 21 of the generics, we did not specifically focus on any of 22 the generics that I recall; however, I had reviewed the 23 generics in the sense of reading through them and what 24 struck me in reading through them initially was that 25 different generic findings were using the same item with TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14649 1 4 slight twist of words and it would show up the same 2 item, what I would look at as being the same basic item 3 might show up in two or three different of the generic 4 findings or two or three different ways of expressing the 5 same thing. 6 And then when I look at the discipline 7 findings, then I saw the same words showing up in the 8 discipline findings as individual items. So by the time 9 I had finished with the computer codes and nuclear 10 analysis in'particular, I was pretty well satisfied that 11 there wasn't anything in the generics that I hadn't also 12 looked at in the discipline findings; I'd seen those same 13 words, even in the discipline findings, I found 14 repetition, where different set of words in terms of 15 different findings really came back to the same item. 16 0 in the May 8th review team meeting, did you 17 record the determinations on notifiability that you were 18 making as you went along? 19 A No, I don't recall recording them. I believe 20 Mr. Goldberg was making some marks in his copy of the 21 Brown & Root assessment sheets that he was using like a 22 checklist. There were only three items; it wasn't all 23 that difficult to retain those mentally. So I don't 24 recall making any notes. 25 0 I thought there might have been notes made of TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14650

/m                                                                    .

b 1 decisions not to report as well as decisions to report. 2 A Not that I recall. 3 Q Did the review team seek assistance from anyone 4 else during the period of the review? 5 A I don't recall any request for outside a 6 assistance relative to reviewing the findings for 7 reportability. We did request Mr. Powell to come over to 8 the office and be prepared to notify NRC later on, as 9 soon as we had finished the review, that is we called him 10 earlier in the afternoon and asked him to come over and 11 stand by, 12 Q But he did not actually participate in the 13 review? t')T t m 14 A I don't recall that he did. Once he was there, 15 if there was some question about had something be 16 reported before, I'm sure we would have asked him and I'm 17 sure he would have responded. But I don't recall 18 specifically that this occured. 19 Q During the r.eview, did the review team contact 20 Brown & Root? 21 A We did not make contact that I recall with 22 Brown & Root until after we had completed our review. 23 And at that time, Mr. Goldberg called Mr. Saltarelli and 24 discussed with Mr. Saltare111 the -- well, how do I 25 phrase it. He discussed with him what we had done, asked TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14651 O 1 Mr. Saltare111 some questions about his views on, in 2 particular, the shielding calculations, I remember, and I 3 believe in summary, informed Mr. Saltare111 that we were 4 reporting three items to the NRC. 5 Q Did Mr. Goldberg report to you and Dr. Sumpter 6 what the reactions of Mr. Saltarelli had been during the 7 conversation? 8 A No. I was there during the conversation; there 9 wasn't any necessity for him to report. It was on a 10 voice box. 11 Q It was on a voice box, you were listening? 12 A I could hear very clearly what his reaction

                                                              ~

13 was. - 14 0 Okay. That's fine. 15 MR. SINKIN: I would ask Applicants to show you 16 a document, it's attached to the Applicants May 3rd, 1985 17 response, and I think it's Document No. 1. 18 MR. AXELRAD: '85 response to what? 19 MR. SINKIN: These were the documents released l 20 from under the protective order of the court. 21 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Judge Bechhoefer, 22 would it possible for is it permissible for me to have a 23 cup of water or a glass of water up here? 24 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Sure. 25 MR. SINKIN: I've got a cup over here. f TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14652 1 THE WITNESS: That's c11 right, we will take 2 care of it. 3 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: You can finish my coffee, if 4 you would like. 5 THE WITNESS: You have the convenience, sir, of 6 a podium to set your coffee behind. 7 MR. SINKIN: The one I'm looking for is dated 8 May 11, 1981, it's from Saltarelli to Hawks. 9 MR. GUTTERMAN: Okay. I have it, if you've got 10 it, I'd just as soon you show the witness yours because 11 I'd like to be able to look along, and what we would be 12 doing is deproving me of the opportunity to look at my 13 copy.

 )

14 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I've got one but I haven't 15 got it out yet. 16 MR. SINKIN: May 3rd, it's the cover letter, 17 and it's a document dated May, lith 1981. 18 MR. GUTTERMAN: You are talking about a May 19 lith memorandum from Saltarelli to Hawks, subject Quadrex 20 design review? 21 MR. SINKIN: Right. 22 MR. GUTTERMAN: I'll look over Mr. Robertson's 23 shoulder. 24 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Let me ask you to just review 25 that document for a moment, Mr. Robertson. TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14653 1 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I'm having trouble finding 2 my copy. 3 JUDGE SHON: I don't have mine with me. 4 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: What group was this in. 5 MR. SINKIN: The cover letter is dated May 3rd, 6 1985. On this package of documents -- 7 MR. PIRFO: The cover letter is attached to 8 about an half an inch document, or half an inch of 9 papers, which are various documents. 10 MR. GTTERMAN : I will be right back. I will 11 show you which document we're talking about so you can -- 12 these were the documents that were subject to the court {} 13 14 protective order and we had to wait until we got the court order released. 15 MR. PIRFO: Judge Bechhoefer, do you want to 16 see the cover letter it came in under? I could show you 17 that if that would help -- 18 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: NO, I was looking at the 19 wrong group. 10 MR. SINKIN: May 3rd. 11 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: May 3rd? 12 MR. GUTTERMAN: Would it be faster if we had 13 somebody make a copy or -- 14 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We have got it. We were 15 just reading it. TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14654 p) s_ 11 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Mr. Robertson, what I've asked 12 you to review is a Brown & Root interoffice memorandum 13 dated May lith 1981, from E.S Saltarelli to J.L. Hawks, 14 subj: at: Quadrex Design Review. Does this document 15 refresh your memory that Mr. Knox Broom and Mr. 16 Saltarelli participated in the discussion on May the 8th 17 over the voice box? 18 A I don't recall Mr. Broom being a part of it. 19 He could have been. I do recall distinctly that we were 10 discussing matters with Mr. Saltare111. 11 0 And when it says that Mr. Goldberg had no 12 problem with our assessment of items 4.4.2.1(a)/(b) . That's a reference to the fact that Brown & Root had (} 13 14 identified that as a potentially reportable item and 15 Houston Lighting & Power agreed. Is that correct? 16 A Well, it's not quite -- the thrust is correct, 17 but my -- the way that occurred, I believe, was that 18 Brown & Root recommended to us that that was reportable, 19 not potentially reportable, they went directly to the end 10 product. They also elected to file this matter as a Part 11 21, with the NRC. So in both of those cases, we did not 12 disagree with their assessment and their activity. 13 We did not -- we agreed with them that it was 14 reportable, their conclusion; we didn't disagree with 15 that conclusion. We also did no -- had no concern in TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14655 (O _/ that sense that they were reporting it as a Part 21. We 11 12 still elected to call it potentially reportable on our 13 call in. But as far as I could see at that point, the 14 evaluation to determine whether it was reportable versus 15 potentially reportable was not going to take very long to 16 complete. 17 Q Well, if Applicants would show you Applicants' 18 Exhibit 62. Do you have that? If you would refer to -- 19 well, they have a series of sheets addressing each 10 discipline findings. And under the 4.4.2.1(a)/(b) 11 finding, it says: Addressed in Enclosure (2). 12 And I want to direct your attention to {} 13 14 Enclosure (2) , which on its cover says: Summary of Brown & Root 15 Findings on South Texas Project, Quadrex Engineering 16 Review, (May 1981), Item .4.4.2.1(a)/(b), and on the 17 second page of the actual' response under " Status of 18 Proposed Resolution," the second paragraph states that 19 "This problem is potentially reportable under 10 CFR 50 10 55(e) and is currently being investigated as a potential 11 10 CFR Part 21." 12 Does that refresh you recollection as to the 13 actual status of the Brown & Root response on May 8? 14 A Point to again where you are. I Status of proposed resolution is the heading on _ 15 Q , \-) TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14656 ,cn 11 the page and the second paragraph. 12 A No. In response to your question, this -- I

 ~

13 don't think it -- if I understood you correctly, does 14 this change what I -- might this change what I said a few 15 minutes ago and the answer is no. 16 O So you're saying -- go ahead. 17 A The evening of the 7th, at the discussion where 18 this matter was brought up, was very quickly done on the 19 part of Brown & Root, where the discipline individuals 10 speaking on behalf of this issue simply said this is 11 reportable. And he gave two or three reasons why that 12 was so. 13 And somebody, I don't recall'who, that was up (] s-14 at the administrative end of it says does anybody 15, disagree with this? And the answer was silence. And he 16 said okay, fine. Let's go on. 17 We were also informed the next day by telephone 18 that Brown & Root was making a Part 21 report on this 19 matter. So as far as I was concerned, Brown & Root had 10 made the determination and I thought properly so, that 11 this matter was reportable and were filing the Part 21. 12 Q When you said you were informed the next day, 13 are you referring to the phone call with Mr. Saltare1117 14 A I don't recall now whether the first bit of 15 information came to my attention that they were filing a TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14657 r'

  's 11 part 21. But I believe it was before our discussion with 12 Mr. Saltarelli.

13 (No hiatus.)

,     14 15 16 17 18 19 10 11 12 f

13 -- 14 15 16 17 18 ! 19 10 l 11 12 13 1 14 15 l TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14658 () 1 Q And then returning to the May lith, 1981 f 2 document, the Brown & Root document. It records Mr. 3 Goldberg as telling Mr. Saltare11i that two other items, 4 verification of computer codes and verification of 5 shielding codes, had also been determined by HL&P to be 6 potentially reportable. Does that conform to your 7 memory of what Mr. Goldberg you? 8 A Yes. 9 Q And then it says, "In his opinion," referring 10 to Mr. Goldberg, "all shielding is safety-related." Was 11 that Mr. Goldberg's opinion expressed to Brown & Robt as 12 of May the 8th, 1981? 13 A I don't recall Mr. Goldberg holding forth that 14 all shielding was safety-related, no. I do recall 15 distinctly discussing certain areas of shielding that we 16 had agreed did represent a safety-related design item, 17 particularly the s$Ielding around the control room. In 18 our mind at least that clearly represented a 19 safety-related item or at least it had to bi handled as 20 if it were. We at that point were simply saying it's 21 safety-related and we're treating it that way. 22 .O And Mr. Saltare11i is recorded here as saying 23 he had. disagreed with the position on the shielding 24 codes. Do you remember that disagreement? 25 A Yes. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14659 () 1 Q What was it that Mr. Saltare111 said about 2 shielding codes that was in disagreement with your 3 review of the review team? 4 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, again we're going on 5 in a matter that is not material. The shielding was 6 reported, there is no question in the record it was 7 reported. Whether Brown & Root'had a disagreement or 8 not I just don't think is germane. 9 We're going on on things and taking up hearing 10 time with matters that aren't material to any 11 determination at this point. This was reported. The fw '12 fact that Brown & Root might have not had the same (-) ' 13 perception that HL&P has is just not material to what 14 this Board has to decide. l 15 MR. SINKIN: Well, there's an extensive amount i 16 in the record so far on what HL&P's views of shielding 17 were and what I'm trying to highlight was where Brown & 18 Root disagreed with them and what that disagreement was 19 to clarify what HL&P's views were more than anything. i 20 MR. GUTTERMAN: I can't see how that relates 21 to any of the issues in this proceeding. It really 1 22 doesn't even matter what HL&P's views were. The l {} 23 question was did they decide that it was potentially 24 reportable and did they fulfill the reporting 25 obligations of reportability having decided that. The TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14660 () 'l record's clear that they did that. 2 MR. SINKIN: They reported one particular 3 shielding item, that's not to say they reported 4 everything in the Quadrex report related to shielding 5 that might have been potentially reportable. 6 MR. GUTTERMAN: Mr. Chairman, I don't know of 7 any issues in this proceeding related to shielding 8 calculations. The Board has identified 26 findings in 9 the Quadrex report for issue in this proceeding and I 10 don't think any of them relate to shielding. 11 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We will sustain that 12 objection. f-} Q. 13 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) The memorandum goes on to 14 recount three items which HL&P did not take the position 15 were reportable, but did differ with Brown & Root's 16 assessment of those items or at least Brown & Root's 17 approach. 18 In the section titled item 4.4.2.1(g), Mr. 19 Saltare111 records that "Although our design 20' verification process meets the NRC requirements, he," 21 meaning Goldberg, "wants to see a complete list of 22 criteria which qualifies verifiers in each specific {} 23 discipline." 24 Did Mr. Goldberg make that request of Brown & 25 Root to see a list of criteria which qualifies verifiers TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 I

e 14661

( ) l' in each specific discipline?

2 A I don't recall this item being mentioned at 3 that point. I have to speculate even that this might 4 even have occurred in a different conversation 5 subsequent to the one that I was present at. I don't 6 know. 7 But I don't recall anything, any discussion of 8 this particular item with Mr. Saltare111 as part of that 9 review team, review team process. It might have 10 occurred, I just don't recall it. 11 Q How about the next item 4.5.5.1(a) which says, 12 "There is a question whether the standard review plan

  %pJ                                                                      ~

13 allows analysis in lieu of testing to determine 14 operability of active components." Do you remember a 15 discussion on whether the standard review plan allowed 16 analysis in lieu of testing? i 17 A No. 18 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman -- the question is ( 19 answered. I had an objection, but it's answered. 20 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Turning to the next page, l 21 item 4.5.2.1 (c) , it says, "Mr. Goldberg does not agree I 22 to our response and believes secondary events from the l pipe rupture event should be considered." {) 23 The first question is is the -- you might want 24 25 to look at 4.5.2.1(c). You might want to look at the (_ TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14662 () 1 Brown & Root response as well as the actual Quadrex 2 report. 3 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, in that the preface 4 is so long to this question, I'd like to object now, 5 although it isn't formulated. I object to any questions 6 on this item. It's not listed in your prehearing order, 7 sixth prehearing order of May 17th, 1985, on page 12 8 where you indicate the most serious ones that may be 9 gone into, most serious findings that may be gone into 10 and this is not one of them. 11 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Has this one been linked up 12 with a generic? - 13 MR. REIS: We haven't had that. I don't 14 know. That was my objection to the last question, too, 15 but the answer was there before I could object. 16 MR. GUTTERMAN: I would join in that 17 objection, Mr. Chairman. , 18 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Has it been linked up to a 19 generic or not? 20 MR. SINKIN: I don't think in testimony to 21 date it's been linked up to a generic. It hasn't come 22 up. Let's see if we can do that. (~'i 23 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, I object to that U 24 procedure, "let's see if we can do that." Either he 25 knows now and can get on with questioning or he can't. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

   ~

l 14663 () 1 To look at it and say, gee whiz, there's an objection 2 now to this question and then see whether it falls in 3 the scope of this hearing is impermissible. 4 We have to move forward. And I don't 5 understand this bit, "well, let's see if we can get at 6 it another way," and we'll spend three hours seeing 7 whether we can get at it another way. 8 It's not one of them listed. There is no 9 connection made. He should have made the thing before, 10 he should have made the connection before. 11 , MR. SINKIN: I do have a response to that, Mr. f_s 12 Chairman. U 13 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Based on the current record 14 at least as we understand it, we will sustain the 15 objection. 16 MR. SINKIN: I do -- 17 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We aren't necessarily 18 stopping you from linking it up. 19 MR. SINKIN: I understand, Mt. Chairman, but I 20 think I should have the opportunity to respond to 21 objections before you rule. I think Mr. Reis' objection 22 I could have explained quite adequately, but let me try 23 it this way. 24 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Mr. Robertson, in looking at 25 item 4.5.2.1 (c) , if you will turn in the Quadrex report TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14664 () 1 to page 3-11, it's the 3.1(1) nuclear related analysis. 2 A I'm sorry, can you give me the page number 3 again? Three -- 4 0- Well, 3-11 is where the finding starts. 5 A Okay. 6 , O At the bottom the areas of greatest concern 7 have been with nuclear analysis, piping and support, 8 special stress and HVAC. Would you say that 4.5.2.1(c) 9 falls into any of those categories? 10 A Yes. 11 , Q And if you turn the page they have at the 12 middle "A few examples pertinent to nuclear related 13 analysis are as follows," and item number 4 states, "In 14 other instances, inappropriate methods have been 15 selected." And it says, " Specific details regarding 16 these concerns are provided in various sections listed 17 there."

                                                         ' ~

18 MR. REIS: Mr. -- 19 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Would you say that the -- 20 would you say that the Quadrex finding in 4.5.2.1(c) 21 that secondary effects from a pipe rupture event were 22 not adequately investigated would fall into 23 inappropriate methods of nuclear analysis found in 24 section 4.5? 25 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, I object to the TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14665 () 1 question. By no stretch of the imagination could it be 2 concluded that in saying you could go into the generic 3 matters you are opening everything in 4.4 through 4.7 to 4 review in this proceeding and that's exactly what's 5 happening at this point. 6 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman -- 7 MR. REIS: What he has is an overbroad 8 reference and he says that because you said you could go 9 into the generic matters, you can go into every one of 10 these matters in there. There are innumerable ones. 11 The purpose of the sixth prehearing order was to narrow 12 issues, not to expand them. 13 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, first of all, I 14 went to page 3-11 to tie it to the particular area of 15 nuclear analysis we're concerned about. 16 Secondly, there was absolutely nothing in the 17 order that would in any way restrict the use of finding 18 3.1 (i) ( 4) as to how you could link that up through 19 generics to this particular -- through discipline 20 findings to this particular generic. 21 Mr. Reis is raising an objection that just 22 doesn't appear in the Board's order in any way that this 23 couldn't be done. I think I've adequately demonstrated

)

24 through the witness that this finding relates to this 25 generic. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14666 () 1 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The Board will sustain the 2 objection. 3 We think this reference is so general that we 4 did not intend to include all of the findings which were 5 not -- all the discipline findings which were not "6 specifically identified. These are just sort of a broad 7 catch-all listing. We did not intend to include that. 8 So, we will sustain the objection. 9 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, if I might, this is 10 essentially a reversal of various rulings as far as I'm 11 concerned because we have at various times in this 12 proceeding had findings,that were not specifically 13 identified in the generic or in your order linked 14 nonetheless to generic findings by testimony that were 15 most serious findings that supported a given generic 16 that we intended to rely on in our findings on the 17 question of whether the generic findings should have 18 been reported. 19 If you are now ruling that only the discipline 20 findings specifically referenced in the generics are at 21 issue here or are specifically referenced in your order 22 are at issue and no other discipline findings that 23 support a generic are at issue, that's, one, in 24 contradiction of the order which was issued which this 25 proceeding began with, and, two, substantially undercuts TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14667 () 1 evidence already in the record. 2 Now, I want to be sure that if that's what 3 you' re ruling, we' re quite aware that that's what you' re 4 doing. 5 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We certainly aren't ruling 6 with respect to anything that's already in the record. 7 We're ruling only that this particular phrase, this 8 catch-all is a little too broad. It includes numerous 9 findings not specifically identified, just almost as a 10 cross reference and the reference is so general that we 11 are disallowing this one. It has nothing to do with our 12 carlier rulings. 13 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Mr. Robertson, when you were 14 testifying regarding your concerns in the area of 15 nuclear related analysis and you said that in that area 16 you read more than just the most serious findings, you 17 read all the findings to see if your concerns were 18 satisfied, looking at page 3-12, item 4, did you go 19 through each of those sections to see if there were 20 nuclear analysis problems that were of concern to you or 21 did you go only to the discipline section titled nuclear 22 analysis which is 4.67 23 A In the context that you're asking the 24 question, it would just be 4.6. l 25 Q Thank you. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14668 () 1 Af ter you completed your discussions on May 2 the 8th as to which findings -- 3 MR. SINKIN: We' re finished with those 4 documents, counsel. 5 0 (By Mr. Sinkin) Af ter you completed your 6 discussions on May the 8th as to which findings were 7 potentially reportable, who called Mr. Powell to come to 8 the meeting? 9 MR. GUTTERMAN: I'll object to the question 10 because I don't think the testimony Mr. Robertson has 11 given said that the call was after they were finished. 12 MR. SINKIN: I'm almost sure he did, but -- 13 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: It was to the contrary, 14 there was a discussion of a standby status where he was 15 present while the meeting was still going on. 16 MR. GUTTERMAN: That's the basis for my 17 objection. 18 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: If you want to -- 19 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) In Mr. Powell's standby 20 status, was he present in the meeting? 21 A As I recall it, he was in the room at least 22 for a portion of the time after he arrived. I can't 23 recall that he was there from the time he arrived onward 24 without a break or leaving the room. He was there for 25 part of the time. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

UJ^J 1 l 14669 I) 1 Q And Mr. Powell's responsibility was going to 2 be to notify the NRC of the potentially reportable 3 findings; is that correct? 4 A That is correct. 5 Q When you reached that point in the meeting 6 where you were discussing with Mr. Powell which findings 7 were going to be reported, did Mr. Powell have a copy of 8 the Quadrex report that he was reviewing at the same 9 time? 10 A I don't recall. Certainly he had access to 11 one. There were at least three copies, if not more, 12 available right there among the three of us. Whether or

  )

13 not he had one separately than that, I don't recall. He 14 certainly had access to one. 15 0 Was there discussion at that point as to how 16 Mr. Powell would word his notification to Region IV? 17 A Yes, there was discussion related to the 18 wording to be used in his notification. 19 0 Was there discussion about whether he would 20 actually mention the Quadrex report or not? 21 A I don't recall whether that was explicitly or 22 to what extent. The only thing that I can in any way (} 23 recall about that, somebody, and I don't know who it

'      24 was, asked a question do we inform the NRC of the source 25 of our 55(e)'s. That' question was asked and the answer TATE REPORTING        (713) 498-8442

14670 () I was no. And I don't remember who asked it and who 2 answered it. I don't recall any discussion more than I 3 that. 1 4 0 Was the actual specific wording that Mr. 5 Powell would use in talking to the NRC written out prior 6 to his leaving the room? 7 A Yes. i 8 Let me qualify that last statement in the 9 following sense. He had three different items to report 10 and the statement he was going to make about those three 11 items had been written out. Other words that he might i 12 use to make a complete statement, whatever that was, 13 were not written out, just those three specific items. 14 JUDGE SHON: The wording of the items was 15 written out, is that what you mean? 16 THE WITNESS: Yes. This is typically done. 17 He will sit down and prepare the words that he's going 18 to read to the NRC at the other end. He will write 19 those down and then when he gets to the point of what he 20 is reporting, he simply reads those words off. l 21 He does that as an orderly process of being an 22 engineer. He wants to make sure he knows what he's l 23 going to say and that he says it all and completely and 24 that he has a record to create his minutes from later. 25 So, this was not an abnormal item, thing for l TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14671 () I him to do. 2 0 (By Mr. Sinkin) Turning to page 4-31 of the 3 Quadrex report, finding 4.4.2.1. 4 MR. REIS: Can I have that again, Mr. Sinkin, 5 please? 6 MR. SINKIN: It's page 4-31. 7 0 (By Mr. Sinkin) My question to you, Mr. 8 Robertson, is which of the lettered findings within that 9 finding was Mr. Powell's report to NRC supposed to 10 cover? 11 MR. GUTTERMAN: I object to the 12 characterization of this section as if it's one ' I don't see why we . 13 finding. It says findings on it. 14 can't just call it what it says it is. 15 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Which lettered findings among 16 the most serious findings 4.2.2.1 was Mr. Powell's 17 notification to the NRC supposed to cover? 18 A Within the list of items (a) through (g), it 19 would cover (a) and (b). 20 0 Thank you. 21 Turning to page 4-14 of the Quadrex report, 22 the most serious findings 4.2.2.1, which of the lettered 23 findings in that section was Mr. Powell's report to NRC 24 supposed to cover? 25 A It covers in particular item (c) in a rather TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14672 ( ) 1 direct fashion. It also touches (a) and (b). And it 2 touches what we reported very simply stated was that it 3 wasn't possible in cases for a user, that is an 4 engineer, using a code to know the particular status of 5 his code. And we had the findings that related to 6 options, which codes were and were not verified so that 7 our statement of what we thought the potential 8 reportable item was was really a statement simply said 9 that the user couldn't tell the status of the 10 verification of the codes that he was using. 11 So, to that extent, it touches all three of 12 those items, even though it comes very directly out of 13 item (c). 14 Q Turning to page 4-86 of the Quadrex report, 15 the most serious findings 4.8.2.1, which of the lettered 16 findings within this section was Mr. Powell's report to 17 NRC supposed to cover? 18 A That would be item (d) on page 4-86. 19 0 At the time Mr. Powell actually called Region 20 IV -- let me start before he Icaves the room. Before he 21 leaves the room to make his notifications, if indeed he 22 left the room, before he makes his notifications, was 23 Mr. Powell instructed to notify the resident reactor , 24 inspector as well of the three findings or was there 25 discussion one way or another about that? TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

so . 14673 () 1 A I don't recall any discussion of the resident 2 inspe ctor . It was a routine thing to do, so I don't -- 3 there would have been no reason to discuss it. 4 Q Was there any discussion about whether the 5 resident reactor inspector would be provided a copy of 6 the Quadrex report?

                                                                                 ~

7 A Not that I can recall. 8 Q Mr. Robertson, I'm going to hand you a copy of 9, what I ask be marked as CCANP 128 and ask if you 10 recognize this document. 11 (CCANP Exhibit No. 128 marked for 12 identificati'on. ) 13 A Yes, I have seen that. 14 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) And are these the what are l 15 known as telephone minutes in which Mr. Powell records i 16 the actual words he spoke to Mr. Crossman in notifying l 17 Mr. Crossman of the three potentially reportable l 18 findings? 19 A Yes. In fact, this is typical of the 20 telephone minutes he would prepare for such. I 21 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, I would move CCANP 22 128 into evidence. {} 23 MR. GUTTERMAN: No objection.

!       24               MR. REIS:    No objection.
.       25               JUDGE BECHHOEFER:     CCANP 128 is admitted.

TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14674 () 1 (CCANP Exhibit No. 128 admitted in 2 evidence.) 3 MR. SINKIN: And this would be a good time to 4 break for lunch, if you would like. 5 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, just so the Staff can 6 plan, can Mr. Sinkin give us an estimate of how long -- 7 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We don't have to do this on 8 the record. 9 (Luncheon recess taken.) 10 (No hiatus.) 11 2 .(:) 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 () 23 24 25 TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14675 ( l JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Back on the record. 2 I would like to note for the record that during 3 the lunch break, I changed the date on the subpoena for 4 Dr. Broom to Tuesday, did theh at 9:30 a.m. Dr. Broom 5 apparently is not in town at the present, and will not be 6 back until late Friday. So we changed the date on his 7 subpoena until 9:30 a.m., Tuesday the 13th. 8 MR. SINKIN: We are discussing, Mr. Chairman, 9 whether there's a way to avoid calling Mr. Broom and 10 maybe at the next break, we'll have some thoughts about 11 that. 12 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I guess you may -- any {} 13 14 further preliminary type matters? Sinkin can resume. Other than that, Mr. 15~ Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Mr. Robertson, after the NRC 16 was notified by Mr. Powell of the various findings from 17 the Quadrex report, did the incident review committco 18 meet to evaluate the items notified to the NRC? 19 A Yes. . . 20 0 I'm going to show you what I ask be marked as 21 CCANP 129. 22 (CCANP 129 marked for identification.) 23 0 (By Mr. Sinkin) This is a document dated May 24 12, 1981, a nemorandum from Mr. Powell to Mr. Jacobi, 25 entitled Incident Review Committee, (IRC) , Meeting TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14676 O 1 Minutes Concerning Computer Program Verification (Item 2 No. 96), May 11, 1981. 3 Do you recognize these minutes? 4 A Yes. 5 0 At the third paragraph, beginning "On the 6 evening of May 8th," do you see that paragraph? 7 A Yes. 8 0 The last line states: This concern is 9 potentially reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50 55(e). Is 10 this an instance where an item has been notified to the 11 NRC, but the IRC nonetheless makes its own independent 12 determination of whether that item should have been {} 13 notified? , 14 A No. In this particular case, IRC is completing 15 its own obligations to fulfill its own procedures. And 16 the chairman of IRC had been informed that this matter 17 was potentially reportable, he had made that report, but 18 in terms of compliance with internal project procedures, 19 the incident review committee had never met. 20 So in this particular case, this was a meeting 21 to complete that procedural activity and document that 22 the IRC had completed its obligation of following its own 23 procedures. 24 0 Under the procedures in place at this time, l() 25 keeping that sentence in mind that I called your l TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14677 (V~) attention to, could the IRC have decided that the item 1 2 had been erroneously notified and withdrawn the 3 notification? 4 A They could have met and come to a conclusion 5 differently than what we had and then would have brought 6 that to my attention, as to their difference of 7 conclusion. They could have done that, yes. They could 8 not at that point -- well, I don't know -- I guess -- I 9 don't know quite how to answer that. They could have 10 come to a conclusion that was different as a result of 11 their meeting. 12 I don't know how to answ'er the part of it could (} 13 14 they have withdrawn it, because that's, in my mind, speculation. I haven't faced that in that form. I don't 15 know -- I don't know to answer that question. 16 0 I was really looking for what their authority 17 was. Let me give you a hypothetical, and maybe that will 18 help illustrate. Let's say your review committee met, 19 determined that the computer code item was notifiable 20 because a given document didn't exist. The IRC meets, 21 there's a discipline representative says that says to the 22 IRC, "Here is the documents, it does exist." l 23 And they say, "Oh, there was no reason to 24 notify NRC," and they withdraw the notification as I > opposed to following through with a 30 day report. 25 TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 L_

14678 O 1 Does the IRC have that kind of authority to 2 withdraw a notification that had already been made. 3 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, I object on the 4 grounds of lack of materiality. We know, and there's no 5 dispute in the record, that this was reviewed, the 6 Quadrex was reviewed by a special committee. Whether or 7 not this IRC could have taken action over the head of Mr. 8 Goldberg and a special committee, I just don't think is 9 material to this proceeding. I just don't understand 10 where we're going with this very long question. And 11 therefore I don't think it's material to this proceeding, 12 I object to the question. 13 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, I have a response. 14 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I see, Mr. Sinkin? 15 MR. SINKIN: There has been testimony in the 16 proceeding that the IRC did not review the decision to 17 report, they simply responded to the fact items had been 18 reported. What I am trying to elucidate is this sentence 19 here where the IRC is saying, in fact, this concern is 20 potentially reportable. 21 As I read that sentence, the IRC made their own 22 independent determination that in fact the item was 23 potentially reportable. And if they have the authority 24 to say no it's not reportable in this time frame, that 25 would tend to support that understanding of that TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14679 ('r LJ l sentence. 2 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, where would we be if 3 we understood that sentence to mean what Mr. Sinkin says. 4 Would we be any further to determining any even subissue 5 in this case, whether -- and I take it the subissue is 6 whether the IRC was wrong' fully relieved of their duties 7 to consider the Quadrex report because it was considered 8 by Messr. Goldberg et al. I don't think that -- it's 9 just not probative of that at all, no matter how you 10 interpret that sentence, 11 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The Board will sustain this 12 objection but we will note that Mr. Reis' comment or (~} Rj

      ' 13 statement that nothing the IRC would do to overrule Mr..

14 Goldberg et al is -- nothing of that sort is relevant, we 15 will not agree with that. 16 If the IRC could have overruled Goldberg et al 17 on a non-reportability decision, that is, in our view, 18 quite relevant. 19 MR. REIS: I would not dispute the point -- 20 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: And we are limiting our 21 agreement and our sustaining the objection to the 22 circumstances that this is a review of an item that was 23 reported. I'm not sure you even meant that, but your 24 words could be construed that way. l l s 25 MR. REIS: I'm sorry I overspoke. l v ! TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14680 0 1 0 (By Mr. Sinkin) Well, okay. That was my next 2 question. At this time the IRC did have the authority to 3 overrule a decision of the review team that a particular 4 item was not reportable. Is that correct? 5 A I wouldn't want to characterize it that way. 6 The IRC would meet and assess matters brought before it. 7 If they came to a conclusion that this was not 8 reportable, then the next step in that process would have 9 been to bring that to me for concurrence. That didn't 10 occur, so I don't know -- I think I'm answering your 11 question as I understood it. 12 Q Actually that was the previous line of 13 questioning. This line of questioning changes the (]) , 14 situation. The review team has decided something is not 15 reportable. 16 A Okay. 17 0 The IRC had the authority to find that it was 18 reportable despite that determination by the review team. 19 At this time at HL&P, the IRC could do that. That is 20 correct? 21 A They could have looked at any matter and come 22 to their own independent conclusion as to whether it was 23 reportable, potentially reportable, or not reportable; 24 and would have brought, again, would have brought that 25 matter to my attention first and we would have reasoned O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14681 rs . U 1 together as to what the situation was, if there had been 2 a different of opinion between myself and the IRC 3 committee. 4 If resolution had not been reached, then there 5 would probably have been further discussions with Mr. 6 Goldberg and so on until we can reach a consensus as to 7 whether something was or was not potentially reportable. 8 0 When you say and so on, is there anybody beyond 9 Mr. Goldberg to go? 10 A It never, to my knowledge, never had any such 11 matter get to him. We're in hypothetical ground here. 12 0 I understand. {) 13 14 A Certainly if I had had a disagreements with the IRC and we could not mutually resolve that, it would have 15 been taken to Mr. Goldberg. 16 Q You were aware of what the procedure was in May 17 of 1981 for determining whether a finding was potentially 18 reportable were you not? 19 A Yes. 20 0 PEP-ll I think is the reference to that? 21 A Yes. 22 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, I would move CCANP 23 129 into evidence. 24 ' MR. PIRPO: Mr. Chairman, maybe I can get a 25 clarification. This document, it's unclear to me from TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14682 1 the notes I made on the original, was not originally 2 marked as 99? 3 MR. GUTTERMAN: No. 4 MR. SINKIN: No, it was suggested to be marked 5 as 99 and we decided it wouldn't be marked at all. 6 MR. PIRPO: Okay. 7 MR. PIRFO: The staff has no objections. 8 MR. GUTTERMAN: Well, I don't see any 9 materiality to it but I would just as soon not object and 10 have an extended argument about it. 11 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay, CCANP 129 will be 12 admitted. {} 13 14 (CCANP Exhibit No. 129 received in evidence. 15 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Returning to CCANP 129 for a 16 moment, Mr. Robertson, on the second page, it lists the 17 attendees at this IRC meeting. Can you identify for me 18 who the people are other than Mr. Powell? 19 MR. GUTTERMAN: I object to that because I 20 don't see the materiality of the identification of all 21 these people, just a waste of time to go through a half 22 dozen names and explain their position. 23 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, we are illustrating 24 how the incident review committee actually worked at the 25 time the Quadrox report was delivered. How they made , TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14683 ( 1 their decisions, who sat in on their proceedings, what 2 their deliberations were, that's what they documents 3 show. I think so that's very relevant and material to 4 this proceeding. 5 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, I think it's not 6 material. It is far removed from a material iscue that 7 this Board has to decide. We know that there was a 8 regular incident review committee, we know that the 9 Quadrex wasn't referred to them; we have the procedures 10 by which they operate. To go into this in excruciating 11 detail just serves no purpose except to eat up time. And 12 I don't know what the -- why we are going into it and 13 wasting time on this. -- (]} 14 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman -- 15 MR. REIS: We have certain things established 16 and if it would help in allowing the Board to reach a 17 conclusion on the ultimate issues before it, that would 18 be fine. But it won't. 19 MR. SINKIN: I would just like to take 20 exception as to ene Mr. Reis' remarks and he's made it 21 over and over again, as if I am deliberately trying to 22 waste time. I've been working overtime to try and get a 23 stipulation together with the NRC staff so that we could 24 cut out a great deal of time in these hearings. I'm not 25 here to delay these hearings. I happen to think this is TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14684 1 important or I wouldn't do it. 2 MR. GUTTERMAN: Mr. Chairman, this document

   ^

3 clearly does not represent what the IRC normally did in 4 its initial decisions about whether something was or was 5 not potentially reportable. This is a document 6 reflecting a follow up meeting to determine action items 7 after the thing had already been called in to the NRC.

          .8  You know, identifying of all the people on this list and 9  what their positions were and what they ate for dinner 10   today-has just nothing to do with with this hearing.      And 11   I think we are just wasting time; I don't want to

12. attribute any motives to Mr. Sinkin about it; I'm just 13 ' dealing with what is suggested that we do.

     }

14 MR. R'EIS: I apologize if Mr. Sinkin got any 15 idea that I was making an ad hominem comment. 16 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We will sustain the 17 objection but we will note that there's ne individual 18 out of this list who we are going to v nt to know more 19 about later, that's Mr. Blau. And wt will ask those 20 questions if they're not asked previously, and Mr. Blau's 21 relationship to the IRC. 22 MR. SINKIN: Are you telling me I can who ask 23 who Mr. Blau is? But not the others? 24 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, we have a particular 25 reason for asking it. We're going to follow -- but TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14685 1 you're welcome to ask the question. I will need it as a 2 foundation for some questions I'm going to ask. But 3 you're welcome to ask the questions if you want on Mr. 4 Blau. I'm just saying if you don't, I will. 5 MR. SINKIN: I got you. 6 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Mr. Robertson, I'll show you 7 what I ask be marked as CCANP 130. 8 (CCANP Exhibit No. 130 marked 9 for identification.) 10 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) This is a document entitled Houston 11 Lighting & Power office memorandum, dated May 13, 1981, 12 from Mr. Powell to Mr. Jacobi, incident review committee 13 meeting minutes concerning HVAC. Do you recognize this 14 document? 15 A Yes. 16 JUDGE SHON: I got -- this is identical to that 17 as far as I can see, down to the number. 18 MR. SINKIN: Wait a minute, which one did I 19 just hand you. How wierd. 20 Can we go off the record for just a second. 21 (Discussion off the record.) 22 O (By Mr. Sinkin) Can you tell me, Mr. 23 Robertson, on this CCANP 130, at the bottom, item two, 24 what B&R Special Problem No. 16 was? 25 A I have only limited knowledge of it, but it's TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14686 m (J l my understanding that it represented a special activity 2 that had been previously set in motion by Brown & Root 3 engineering to re-evaluate and re-look and if 4 appropriate, redesign the HVAC system based on certain 5 recognized inadequacies of the HVAC system that had been 6 brought to the attention of Brown & Root. 7 Q To the extent of you_ limited knowledge, were 8 the problems identified by Quadrex the problems being 9 addressed by B&R in that Special Prchlem 16? 10 A As far as I am aware, Special Problem 16 did 11 cover those items that Quadrex identified in its report. 12 Q Were you aware of Special Problem No. 16 on May 13 the 8th when you made your reportability determinations? [} 14 A I don't believe so. I may have been, as a 15 result of it being mentioned the evening before by Brown 16 & Root. Since they did cover a number of items in their 17 presentation having to do with their onw work progress, 18 where they were at and what they were doing and various 19 matters, they may have mentioned that this activity was a 20 part of Special Problem 16 concerns. They could very 21 well have done that. 22 Q But you don't remember that? 23 A I don't specifically remember it. 24 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, I would move CCANP 25 130 into evidence. 1 TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14687 O 1 MR. GUTTERMAN: I have the same attitude 2 towards this one as I did towards 129, Mr. Chairman. I 3 don't see that is material but I'm not going to object. 4 MR. REIS: The staff feels similarly. 5 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: CCANP 130 will be admitted. 6 (CCANP Exhibit No. 130 received in evidence. 7 CCANP Exhibit No. 131 marked for identification.) 8 Q Let me show you what I ask be marked as CCANP 131 9 which is a document headed a HL&P memorandum, May 19, 10 1981, from Mr. Powell to Mr. Jacobi, incident r'e view 11 committee meeting minutes concerning verification of 12 shielding analysis calculations. Do you recognize this document, Mr. Robertson? (-} \- 13 , 14 A Yes, I do. 15 Q The first paragraph of this document states 16 that the IRC was convened to evaluate a concefn with 17 B&R's position that shielding calculations are not safety 18 related and therefore need not be design verified. 19 Was the concern that originally led you to make a 20 notification to the NRC that B&R would not go verifying 21 their shielding calculations because they hadn't 22 classified them as safety related? 23 MR. GUTTERMAN: I'm sorry, I couldn't follow 24 the whole question. Could I get it read back. 25 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I'm not sure it doesn't omit TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14688 O 1 one word. 2 MR. SINKIN: Perhaps. 3 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Shouldn't there be a "not" 4 in there someplace. 5 (The last-above question was read back 6 by the reporter.) 7 MR. GUTTERMAN: Okay, I guess I have an 8 objection to the question on-the grounds that it 9 characterizes the first paragraph of the memorandum by 10 quoating part of a sentence out of context. Seems to me 11 that the question ought to take into account the entirety 12 of the sentence we just referred to but not take a part (} 13 14 of it out of context. (By Mr. Sinkin) Fine, I didn't mean do do Q 15 that. If you would just tell me if the first paragraph 16 accurately captures the concern that led you to notify 17 the NRC regarding this item. 18 A I think I can best answer that by simply saying 19 that when we reviewed Quadrex report and looked at a - - 20 particular finding related to shielding calculations, our

     '21 initial impression in our review and discussion and 22 decision was that it looked to us like shielding 23 calculations, particularly certain ones such as those 24 associated with control room and perhaps others, should 25 very well be classified as safety related calculations.

O ll TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498

                                                . -8442

14689 1 And Quadrex had said they were not so classified and we 2 decided that that represented a condition that we felt 3 warranted notification of NRC. I think that's as 4 simplist as I can say it. 5 (No hiatus.) 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

  .n 14690

() 1 Q I understand. Is the root of the concern that 2 because the calculation is not classified as 3 safety-related, it will not be verified consistent with 4 requirements of verification for safety-related 5 calculations? 6 A The concern has several meanings, I think. 7 One, we had certain process commitments to meet under 8 Appendix B dealing with verification of safety-related 9 calculations. To find that a class of calculations were 10 not being verified that would appear to require that is 11 a very serious matter. It's not something to be skipped 7- 12 over lightly. . V) 13 So, that made it -- that automatically made it 14 a serious matter to look at. The fact -- whether or not 15 they had made a mistake in how they classified it, that 16 might have been the root cause of why it didn't get 17 verified. But what we were simply faced with was a 18 condition where a certain class of calculations had not 19 been verified and it was our preliminary opinion that 20 they should have been and that represented a breakdown 21 in the control process from the standpoint of 22 verification of analyses. 23 MR. SINKIN: I would move CCANP 131 into 24 evidence, Mr. Chairman. 25 MR. REIS: No objectica. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

    +

14691 ( )- 1 MR. GUTTERMAN: I have my same lack of 2 objection, I guess. 3 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: CCANP 131 will be 4 admitted. 5 (CCANP Exhibit No. 131 admitted in 6 evidence.) 7 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Mr. Robertson, I hand you 8 what I ask be marked as CCANP 132. 9 (CCANP Exhibit No. 132 marked for 10 identification.) 11 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) This is a document titled 12 Houston Lighting & Power Company bffice Memorandum, 13 dated June 4th, 1981, from Mr. Powell to Mr. Jacobi, 14

Subject:

Incident Review Committee meeting minutes 15 concerning verification of shielding analysis 16 calculations. 17 Do you recognize this document, Mr. Robertson? 18 A Yes, I do. 19 0 On page 2 of this document in the numbered 20 paragraph 5 about the middle there is a statement that 21 " Brown & Root's shielding calculations are checked and 22 approved by two engineers other than the originator, 23 1.e. a checker and the discipline project engineer." {) 24 And at the end of that paragraph it says, "In addition 25 to these procedures, additional internal procedures have TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14692 () 1 been implemented that include a simplified ' hand 2 calculation by the checker.'" 3 Now, the final paragraph of this document is 4 the IRC's conclusion regarding whether this item is, in 5 fact, reportable under 50.55(e). As I read their

                                                                ~

6 conclusion, the fact that Brown & Root did have a 7 several tier review system for shielding calculations 8 meant that whether or not they classified it as 9 safety-related did not raise a safety-related concern in 10 this context because the process for checking the 11 calculations was the same as if they were being

-    12 verified. Is that how you understand the IRC disposed 13 of this item?

14 MR. GUTTERMAN: Well, I'll object to the 15 question to the extent that Mr. Robertson's being asked 16 what the IRC had in mind. If you're asking him to 17 interpret that paragraph and what his view of it is, I 18 don't have any objection to that. - 19 MR. SINKIN: Fine. 20 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) I assume this report, like 21 other IRC reports, came to you for review; is that 22 correct? 23 A No, it was issued -- the first time I saw it 24 it was issued. The matter was discussed with me 25 verbally before this report was written. What's in here TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14693 () 1 did not come as a surprise, but I did not review the 2 document. 3 Q No, I meant that the document once written is 4 sent to you. 5 A Yes. 6 Q And you're part of the review process for 7 whether what's documented there is correct, is the 8 correct analysis of the problem. That kind of analysis 9 is what you do? 10 A If I received this and had an objection to 11 what was in it, I certainly would let that be known, 12 yes. 13 Q Right. Okay. 14 Well, let me ask you how you understood, based 15 on the conversations you had and the document itself, 16 how you understood the last paragraph of this documenc? 17 A It was my understanding that regardless of 18 what words were used to describe the process, that, in 19 fact, the calculations in question received a thorough 20 review, check and, in essence, quote, verification, 21 unquote, as part of their being processed so that in 22 terms of distinction between the handling of these 23 calculations and a regular safety-related calculation,

  )

24 you would not really find any distinction. It would go 25 through the same rigor of process as any safety-related TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14694 () 1 calculation would.

                                                                        ~

2 Q And you considered that an adequate basis for 3 deciding that it was not a reportable finding? 4 A That was part of the basis. 5 Q What was -- 6 A That answered the question of the potential 7 for a defective set of calculations being processed and 8 resulting in a defective shielding design arriving. It 9 did show that the process was properly controlled and 10 that the appropriate checks on the adequacy of the 11 calculation were in place and that they could be relied 12 upon without additional review. That did not settle the 13 issue itself as to whether or not the calculation set 14 should or should not be officially classified as 15 safety-related. 16 Q So, that was a second issue that has to be 17 resolved before you decide on the ultimate 18 reportability? 19 A Yes, It would certainly be a part of that 20 decision, yes. 21 Q When the HL&P review team met on May the 8th, 22 were they aware of this several tier checking process by 23 Brown & Root? {'} 24 A I can only speak for myself. I was not. 25 Q Was there any -- TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14695 I was under the impression at that point in

 -( )      1      A 2 time that the calculations were generated and I was not 3 aware that it received any type of check at that point 4 in time.

5 Q Was there any discussion about that particular 6 point of verification and what Brown & Root had in place 7 during the me~eting? 8 A I don't recall that that kind of a detail on 9 this particular issue was discussed at the meeting. 10 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, I would move CCANP 11 132 into evidence. 12 MR. GUTTERMAN: No objection. 13 MR. REIS: No objection. 14 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: CCANP 132 will be 15 admitted. 16 (CCANP Exhibit No. 132 admitted in l 17 evidence.) 18 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Are you familiar with the 19 subsequent Bechtel review of the Quadrex findings that 20 produced two different reports, one was a Bechtel task 21 force report, one was a report called EN-619. Are you 22 familiar with those reports? I r- 23 A Yes, I am. (_)s 24 Q Are you familiar with Bechtel having 25 identified a component that Brown & Root classified as TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14696 () 1 non-safety-related which Bechtel considered as possibly 2 safety-related? 3 A Just those words doesn't trigger anything in 4 my mind. If you can point me to a specific item, I can 5 perhaps respond better. 6 Q This is report EN-619. I'll show you some 7 references. It doesn't have page numbers, so it's a 8 little bit difficult to reference this document, but I 9 am in the generic findings section and it's the response 10 on generic finding 3.l(d) . 11 MR. GUTTERMAN: Where exactly in that response e 12 are we looking? 13 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Under additional comments 14 there is a sentence that says, "The project team in the 15 development of work package EN-613 has noted one case 16 where B&R apparently may not have properly identified a 17 safety-related component." 18 Does that refresh you at all as to what that 19 component could have been? l 20 A No, I do not know what the component is. I 21 have seen that particular description before, but I 22 don't recall right now what that component was. 23 Q In the back of EN-619 is a letter to Mr. Dew (-)T m 24 at Houston Lighting & Power from Bechtel dated August 25 the 3rd, 1982. And in that letter under item 3.1(d) it TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14697

 ,~

(,), 1 says, "The Bechtel transition team in the development of 2 work package EN-615 has noted one case where B&R 3 apparently did not properly identify a safety-related 4 component. This has been identified as IRC item 123." 5 Does that at all refresh you? 6 A No, I don't mentally keep track of these 7 things by IRC item number. I'm sure if I saw the item 8 number, I would know -- or saw the subject, I would 9 probably know more about it than just a number 10 associated with the report. 11 Q If I'm correct, you said yesterday that 12 Bechtel doesn't have an IRC; 'is that right? 13- MR. GUTTERMAN: I don't believe that was Mr. l 14 Robertson's testimony. I believe it was Mr. Wisenburg's 15 testimony. 16 MR. SINKIN: Oh, I think it was Mr. 17 Wisenburg's testimony. 18 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) To the best of your 19 knowledge, if there's an IRC refer _ence in EN-619, is 20 that to the HL&P IRC? l 21 MR. GUTTERMAN: I wonder why we're talking l 22 about EN-619 when CCANP strenuously and successfully 23 argued to keep it out? 24 MR. SINKIN: Well, we don't need the entire l 25 document for one small item. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

        ,~                                                             _

14698 () 1 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Were you familiar with -- 2 MR. PIRFO: Having argued EN-619, this seems 3 anomalous, to say the least, that Mr. Sinkin would be 4 going into it after what Mr. Gutterman has said. Now 5 he's saying we don't need the entire document. 6 I don't understand. He opposed it. He moved 7 to strike it. He was successful on that score. Now 8 he's going into 619 again. I mean, this is strange, to 9 say the least. 10 MR. SINKIN: It's qualitatively quite 11 different. If there's a single finding in one huge 12 document Ehat indeed something that Quadrex pointed to Cl3> - 13 as a safety concern might have propagated itself through 14 the project in some way, that that's qualitatively quite 15 different than someone going back and saying we agree 16 that something wasn't reportable because we've looked at 17 three thousand other documents and they don't indicate 18 its reportable either. It's qualitatively quite 19 different. 20 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, the Staff in addition 21 has another objection. It's obvious Mr. Sinkin doesn't 22 know what that item is either and he's fishing. A trial (- 23 is not a place to conduct discovery and he's fishing V} 24 around to find something. The staff also objects on 25 that ground. The last few questions show it. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14699 () 1 MR. SINKIN: Actually, Mr. Chairman, I'm not 2 sure the last question really needs to even be tied to 3 EN-619. The last question was simply whether Bechtel 4 had an IRC, if that's what he was aware of, too. 5 MR. GUTTERMAN: That's immaterial. 6 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We will sustain the 7 objection to the particular question asked. 8 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Going back to the Quadrex 9 report, Mr. Robertson, if you would turn to page 3-5, 10 generic finding 3.1(d). This finding is headed 11 safety-related versus non-safety-related distinctions. 12 And on the next page, 3-6, it has a list of cases where 3 13 Quadrex says, "The Brown & Root position was felt to be 14 either inaccurate or questionable," and there are seven 15 of those. Do you see those? 16 A Yes. , 17 Q Do you remember testifying yesterday that 18 Quadrex told HL&P on April'13th at the aseting that the 19 people in Brown & Root Quadrex talked to about pipe 20 break outside containment did not seem to understand the 21 necessity to do this analysis? 22 A Yes. p, J 23 Q Is item 1 on page 3-6 a similar observation? 24 A As far as I know, it's the same one. 25 0 And item 2 is an item that the HL&P review TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14700 () 1 team reported to the NRC; is that correct? 2 A Well, to the extent that it would relate to 3 shielding certainly. I'd have to look at the others, 4 N-23 and N-25, to see if they also were a part of that, 5 but -- 6 Q But as far as -- 7 A -- in terms of shielding, the answer is yes. 8 Q And item 3 is an item that the HL&P review 9 team reported to the NRC also, is it not? 10 A That is correct. 11 Q And item 4 as well? 12 A Yes. In the sense that we did report that . Cl-) - 13 matter. 14 I'm not so sure that the way this is said it 15 necessarily totally relates to the distinction between 16 safety-related and non-safety-related. But, yes, we did 17 report that not all the computer codes appeared to have 18 been qualified based on the users being able to, A, know 19 they were being done, or even the broader question, were 20 all the computer codes used in safety-related work, had 21 they actually been qualified. We couldn' t answer those 22 questions. Those were part of the bases for making the ! 23 report. l (~) rs/ l 24 Q By qualified you mean the same as verified? i 25 A Thank you for correcting me. No, I do not. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

m 14701 ,3 (_) 1 Computer code -- to have a proper computer 2 code you have to have two things, something called 3 verification and something called qualification. In 4 common terminology we simply use verification usually to 5 mean both things. But verification is the process of 6 checking the actual computer language statements to 7 ascertain that they are correct and that the product 8 they put out is consistent and that the work they do is 9 as expected that you have a validity of ranges for which 10 options are good, what the limitations are on the code. 11 The verification that the work that comes out is correct g-) 12 based on.the input going in, that's verification. \) 13 Qualification is the process that looks at the 14 computer code equations, the basic process and says, 15 yes, the technical approach used to put this particular 16 sof tware package together is the right one to solve this 17 particular problem set or it is the right set of 18 equations to have used. It wasn't just an accident that 19 you got the right answer, but somebody actually selected 20 heat transfer type equations to go in heat transfer type 21 places. That's what I call qualification. 22 You have to put both of those two things together to complete the package of verification process {} 23 24 which says the code is now set and ready for use. 25 Q Given just the information we've been over TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14702 ' (,) 1 about these four items, that Quadrex had told you about 2 item number 1, that you had filed 50.55(e) notifications 3 coming out of the next three items, why would the HL&P 4 review team on May 8 not also report to the NRC a 5 generic finding that Brown & Root did not take a 6 technically adequate approach to safety-related versus 7 non-safety-related design activities? 8 A Because, as I remember this, the shielding 9 classification of codes was really the only one that 10 represented a failure as we saw it to properly classify 11 something; The others did not relate to the correct 12 classification of something, but it rather related to 13 things not done or things not completed, but didn't 14 relate to improper classification. 15 Now, I must say I would have to review all 16 those different questions to make certain that my answer 17 is fully correct. But my recollection is that with the 18 exception of the classification of shielding, there were 19 no other misclassifications. 20 Q So, as you read 3.1(d), the only question 21 raised by Quadrex under the heading safety-related 22 versus non-safety-related distinctions is, in fact, the 23 question of whether systems were classified 24 appropriately as safety-related or non-safety-related? 25 A That is correct. Within the sense of TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

m 14703 ,n !,_) ~ 1 50.55(e), that would be -- that was the review process 2 we were undertaking, that would be the meaningful item 3 of that statement. 4 Q But under 50.55(e) you reported three other 5 items -- two other items -- 6 A Yes. 7 Q -- that you are now saying were not 8 classification questions? 9 A They were not a case of misclassification, 10 they were a case of in the computer codes not completing 11 the work of a code that was to be used or might be used (~3 12' for safety-related work, not doing the work necessary to . LJ 13 make it safety-related. But they didn't misclassify the 14 code. 15 In the case of the HVAC systems, they had 16 failed, as I understood it, to account for all the heat 17 loads in all the different places and they were coming 18 up short on the capability to provide proper cooling in 19 all the right places. 20 Q Is the common thread to the three 21 notifications that Brown & Root was not taking a 22 technically adequate approach to safety-related as 23 opposed to non-safety-related design activities? (~Nx_) 24 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, I object to the 25 question in that I don't know what the word " approach" TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14704 () 1 means in that sentence. 2 I'll withdraw the obj ection. It's vague, but 3 I'll withdraw it. 4 A I don't see the common thread as you described 5 it. There was not a commonality. In the sense as I 6 understood your question, I did not see a common 7 thread. 8 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Mr. Robertson, I am handing 9 you what I ask be marked as CCANP 133 and ask if this is 10 the statement you gave to the Nuclear Regulatory 11 Commission.

 .s     12              (CCANP Exhibit No. 133 marked for
-]  -

13 identification.) 14 A Well, without reading it word for word, it 15 certainly looks like it. And I see some of my 16 corrections in there with initials, so I certainly would 17 agree that this seems to be a copy of my statement. 18 - Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Turning to page 4 of the 19 statement, in the second paragraph you state that you 20 received a telephone call from Dave Barker who advised 21 that Shannon Phillips had requested a copy of the 22 Quadrex report from someone in the HL&P quality 23 assurance department and been told no. And in the (J-) 24 parentheses you say either Frazar or Geiger. 25 Have you since that time been able to TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

c -zc~ 14705 () 1 reconstruct exactly who interacted with the NRC staff on 2 that particular day? 3 A This process has been discussed among myself, 4 Mr. Barker and Mr. Frazar and we believe we have sorted 5 out how it might have occurred. However, the statement 6 I have made I stand on. This is what happened as far as 7 I knew on the day that this occurred. 8 But apparently, based on our discussions, Mr. 9 Frazar went several different paths in attempting to get 10 resolution of this request by Mr. Phillips and had 11 called Mr. Goldberg, couldn't get him, called Mr. Barker 7 12 and called Mr. Oprea, I believe. He received, as I ( 13 understand it, from Mr. Oprea go ahead and provide the 14 Quadrex report. 15 Meanwhile, Mr. Barker must have called me and 16 I told him to go ahead and give the report to Mr. 17 Phillips and I understood it -- at that point I 13 understood that Mr. Phillips was down at the site, most l 19 unfortunate since it turned out he was in the building l 20 where I was at. If I had known that, he would have 21 gotten the report a little quicker than it turned out he l 22 did, but that's beside the point. 23 In any event, I told Mr. Barker to go ahead l (-)

     ~/

24 and give Mr. Phillips -- make a copy available for him. 25 And apparently at the same time that Mr. Barker was TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14706 () 1 talking to me, Mr. Frazar was on the phone to Mr. Oprea, 2 he was trying to get his problem fixed and he went 3 several different paths. 4 So, it was a matter of several different 5 people winding up getting called in a very quick time 6 frame by Mr. Frazar and that's how I got into the 7 process. As best we can reconstruct it. 8 Q I understand. j 9 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, I would move CCANP 10 133 into evidence. , 11 MR. GUTTERMAN: No objection. i 12 MR. REIS: , No objection. 13 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: CCANP 133 will be 14 admitted. 15 (CCANP Exhibit No. 133 admitted in 16 evidence.) 17 MR. SINKIN: That concludes my 18 cross-examination, Mr. Chairman. I 19 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I guess the Applicant 20 should go next since the Staff usually goes last. 21 MR. GUTTERMAN: The Applicants have the burden 22 of proof, so I would expect the Applicants should have i 23 the right to go last. 24 MR. SINKIN: Wait a minute. 25 MR. PIRFO: He goes last. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 L

n 14707 () 1 MR. SINKIN: It's my direct case. I think I 2 go last. 3 MR. AXELRAD: On direct you go last, but in 4 terms of -- 5 MR. SINKIN: In terms of this round, yeah. 6 MR. REIS: I don't have any problems either

,        7 way. It doesn't matter to me.

8 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: If the Staff doesn't care, 9 then the Staf f can lead off. 10 11 CROSS-EXAMINATION . fs 12 BY MR. REIS: km) 13 Q Mr. Robertson, first, maybe I didn't catch, 14 what is your present title with HL&P? 15 A I am general manager of nuclear engineering. , 16 Q Now, going first to CCANP Exhibit 127, there l 17 is a reference there in this document to some material 18 delivered under the table.

                                                                      ~

19 A Yes. Excuse me, I no longer have a copy of 20 that in front of me that I'm aware of. I may have and 21 not know where it is. 22 Okay. Go ahead, sir. 23 0 There is a reference to some material 24 delivered under table at the bottom of page -- it's page 25 two of the document, but it's stamped number 3 on top. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14708 () 1 , A Yes. 2 0 Was that material that you referred to, did 3 that material tend to show that Brown & Root's 4 engineering was deficient or that they were doing their 5 job or was it of both categories? 6 A I can' t I don' t think definitively answer that 7 it was one or the other or could have been both. There 8 was a point made, as I remember it, that the Brown & 9 Root engineers were really trying to provide information 10 to Quadrex and that they had received some of their 11 material from other than an official transmittal. And I 12 can' t ' characterize it any further than that. O 13 Q Mr. Robertson, before you talked about certain 14 matters being in the Quadrex report that had been 15 subject to former 50.55(e) reports, in other words, 16 before May 1981 - '81? 17 MR. GUTTERMAN: Yes. 18 Q (By Mr. Reis) -- can you quantify that in any 19 way? Can you give me an estimate of the number of items l 20 that were included in the Quadrex report, give me an l 21 estimate of the number of systems included in the 22 Quadrex report that had been subject to former 50.55(e) 23 reports.

 '                  It seems to me that there was something on the 24      A 25 order of a half a dozen items that Quadrex mentioned in TATE REPORTING         (713) 498-8442

             . _n .

14709 O 1 o e cor or e aio 9ere or eueir etaaiae ta e sea 2 also been previously reported by HL&P to the Regulatory 3 Commission. 4 (No hiatus.) 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 l O 24 i l 25 ! TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14710

 -es N_]

1 Q You also testified that a great deal of the 2 Quadrex report dealt with what you -- I think you 3 characterized as over-conservatisms; in other words, 4 where they were concerned about the project being over 5 designed from a safety point of view. Can you quantify 6 in any sense the number of most serious findings in the 7 Quadrex report that dealt with over-conservatisms? 8 A Well, I can't off the top of my head do that. 9 I could go through of course and enumerate them out over 10 a period of time. I don't know whether it's -- if you 11 wish me to do that I'd be happy to do it. 12 O No. 13 A But there were a considerable number; I would 14 not suggest that those were a majority number, but a 15 considerable number out of a total of some three hundred 16 findings overall, 310, I believe it is, I would estimate 17 that there's probably ten percent of those, if one looks 18 at them, turn out to be suggestions of overkill or 19 over-conservatisms on the part of Brown & Root 20 engineering that relate to, in Quadrex's mind, more 21 costly way of doing business than they thought might be 22 appropriate. 23 One example that jumps out at me was the 24 Quadrex concern, not concern, finding, that Brown & Root 25 had chose to provide seismic supports for pipes TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14711

                                                                    ~

Cl) l everywhere. And that in Quadrex's opinion, this was not 2 a very cost effective way of doing it. Others would look 3 at it differently and say that not having to complete a 4 very large amount of complex analysis might actually 5 represent a cost savings. I'm not so sure which way the 6 outcome of that one is, but clearly providing a seismic 7 support for all the pipes is a conservative thing to do. 8 Q Mr. Robertson, in Exhibit 6 2, which is the 9 Brown & Root assessment that came to you on May 8th of 10 the Quadrex items, and particularly in appendix, 11 Enclosure (2) , not appendix two, but Enclosure (2), you 12 were asked some questions about the status of proposed

                              /

{} 13 resolution that appears on page tw6oof that enclosure, 14 were you not? 15 A Yes, sir. 16 Q And there's reference in the first paragrapn 17 there to both the HVAC capacity and to breaks outside i 18 containment, pipe breaks outside containment. 19 A HVAC there -- yes, okay. Yes. 20 .0 Can you tell us what the relationship between i 21 those matters are if there is any relationship? 22 A I'm not aware of any direct relationship 23 between the HVAC area and the pipe break outside 24 containment, in a direct fashion. There is an incorrect 25 relationship that's always possible to find, and that is O l l TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 L

, 14712 i( 1 that you have not done a pipe break analysis and have 2 designed your HVAC system without considering that you , 3 may have to accommodate some pipe break effects in HVAC, 4 then later on you do a pipe break analysis, and find out 5 you're short on HVAC, it can have that kind of interplay 6 in the design area. 7 But just reading it on its surface, I do not 8 see that being what is expressed here. 9 Q It wasn't a case of a possible loss of coolant 10 outside of containment, requiring a larger HVAC capacity 11 within containment? 12 A No, not'that I'm aware of. 13 Q Okay. In CCANP Exhibit 128, there's a lifting, (]} i 14 three numbers that appear on the face of it, three 15 numbered items, is that the wording you agreed upon to 16 inform the NRC of these matters at the meeting with Mr. 17 Goldberg? 18 A I didn't mark it. I believe you're referring 19 to the telephone minutes. . 20 0 That's right. 21 A Yes, those are -- that does represent the words 22 go that was put together to be called in to NRC. 23 MR. REIS: That's all I have. 24 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We were discussing whether - 25 we want to take a break now. Didn't you tell us you had O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14713 /s () 1 about 45 minutes? 2 MR. GUTTERMAN: I don't think it would be that 3 long but I think it would be appropriate to take a break 4 right now. 5 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: All right. Why don't we 6 take a fifteen minute break. 7 (Brief recss taken.) 8 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Gutterman are you 9 handling it? 10 MR. GUTTERMAN: Yes. 11 It turns out I only have a few questions, Mr. 12 Chairman. 13 CROSS-EXAMINATION ( 14 By Mr. Gutterman: 15 Q The first thing, Mr. Robertson, I'd like to 16 make sure the record is clear on one point regarding your 17 testimony. Concerning your personal review of the 18 nuclear analysis area, and I believe you testified about 19 your consideration of whether there was a reportable 20 deficiency regarding the Brown & Root nuclear analysis 21 group. Had you reached a conclusion regarding whether 22 you felt that there was a reportable deficiency regarding 23 the nuclear analysis group at the time you entered the 24 meeting on May 8th with Mr. Goldberg and Dr. Sumpter to 25 discuss which findings would be reportable? ( TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14714 ( l A Yes. I had~ reached a conclusion. That 2 conclusion at that point in time, by the time we entered 3 the meeting, was that the group as a whole did not 4 represent a reportable, condition, that is a group out of 5 control or a group producing a bad product. 6 ' I can't recall exactly when I reached that 7 determination, but as a result of my own review, I had 8 indeed reached the conclusion that there was nothing 9 within the nuclear analysis group that warranted a report 10 to NRC at that point in time. 11 Q I believe you also testified about 12 participating with Mr. Goldberg in discussions regarding the process by which Houston Lighting &. Power Company {} 13 14 would review the Quadrex report for reportability; you 15 had those discussions I believe you testified sometime 16 before May 7th. Could you explain to us why it was 17 decided that the review would be conducted by yourself, 18 Mr. Goldberg and Dr. Sumpter? 19 A Yes. We had reason to believe, based on the 20 preliminary presentations that had been made by Quadrex, 21 that their report was going to cover a very broad range 22 of subject matter, was going to cover a broad range of 23 what I would call engineering design processes, and a 24 very large range of technical design issues, meaning the 25 specific technical methodology being applied. TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14715 g . O 1 And it was based on that consideration of the 2 broad spectrum of items that needed to be reviewed that 3 we jointly agreed that it would be best if the most 4 experienced engineers in engineering design that we 5 could, that we had, acted as the primary reviewers of i 6 this report. 7 And in that consideration, Mr. Goldberg, 8 myself, Dr. Sumpter, represented a very broad and rather 1 9 extensive background and experience base in the design of 10 plants. Mr. Goldberg had had very great deal of 11 experience in the mechanical design area, piping, pipe 12 stress supports, and in construction areas, and in other 13 related areas; I had a large experience base in nuclear {v~} 14 analysis, in computer codes, and in the overall process 15 of engineering design, itself, and Dr. Sumpter had 16 extensive experience in areas such as health physics, 17 radiology and in addition, was the most familiar 18 individual that we could identify in terms of the status 19 of Brown & Root engineering. 20 We put all those things together, we were 21 looking at the background and experience that essentially 22 covered the entire plant design basis. And we could not 23 identify a more experienced group of individuals to 24 utilize, therefore we elected to do it that way. 25 Additionally, as I perhaps secondary TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14716

    -s 1 consideration, was the very proceduralized nature of the 2 IRC would mean a time consuming process on their part to 3 administratively hold a whole series of meetings, 4 bringing in many different individuals to represent the 5 different aspects of design that would be brought before 6 it. We looked at that as being of such time consuming 7 nature that we were not satisfied that we could have a 8 good review of that report and what we considered to be a 9 timely way. So for those basic reascns, we elected to 10 proceed with the review as has been stated here.

11 Q Let's see. Describe for us your personal 12 educational background, professional experience? {} 13 14 A I received a Bachelor of Science from the United States Military Academy in 1958; and served five 15 years on active duty at which time I entered MIT Nuclear 16 Engineering Department and in 1965, received a Master of 17 Science in nuclear engineering; in 1967, a nuclear 18 engineer degree from MIT in nuclear engineering; in 19 mid-1966, I joined Nolls Atomic Power Laboratories and 20 worked in core thermal hydraulics, and then safety system i 21 analysis, protection, protective system analyses, i 22 combination, plant analyses, for about a total of about 23 four years plus a little bit more. 1' 24 And there I had the responsibility to perform 25 those kind of analyses for the USS Nimitz class carrier TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-84;2 L.

14717 1 and we undertook to cause the design of that reactor 2 system to meet the requirements of the AEC safety 3 regulations. Even though that was not a something that 4 was required by law or anything of that type, it was a 5 decision made by the Navy that we would attempt to bring 6 the Nimitz class reactors in the safety sense into 7 compliance with AEC requirements, we which did. 8 Then from 1973 to 1977, I worked in New York 9 State, for New York State, as initially part of the 10 Atomic Energy Counsel where I reviewed safety reviews and 11 performed safety reviews of commercial power plants 12 located in New York State, and then in 1974, along about 13, April or May, something along that time, I joined the 14 state authoriuy as maneger of siting and was responsible 15 for the environmental assessment and planning of sites in 16 New York State that would be later used as electric 17 generating stations. l 18 And in that regard, we performed the 19 environmental type analyses, planning and basic safety 20 consideration analyses, that would show a site was 21 suitable for use by coal, oil, although oil was beginning 22 to disappear, and for nuclear plants. 23 In 1977, I joined Stone & Webster as senior l 24 licensing engineer and initially was responsible for the l 25 preparation of that department's licensing procedures, TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14718 r^N U 1 and personally as part of that, wrote the Stone & Webster 2 separation criteria procedure and the Stone & Webster 3 single tailure criteria procedure, and quite a few 4 others; helped develop a basic program, procedure and 5 training program, for Part 21 reporting by Stone & 6 Webster, and of course that is those considerations very 7 directly related to 55 (e) , since we do, Stone & Webster 8 did have to advise clients when they found a matter that 9 looked like it was pertinent to 55(e). 10 In January of 1978, I was appointed supervisor 11 of safety system design and analysis, and in that 12 position, was responsible for the specification of safety () 13 system design requirements and criteria, and the analysis' 14 of those safety systems for all Stone & Webster plants. 15 And remained in that position until I came to Houston 16 Lighting & Power. I think that sort of covers the 17 ballpark. 18 0 The other thing I wanted to ask you about is if 19 you could give us a little bit more detailed description 20 of the meeting that you testified _you attended on May 21 7th, 1981 with Brown & Root that considered the Quadrex 22 report. 23 A Yes. The meeting was held in a large 24 auditorium and I have -- I keep mentally thinking of that 25 night as being like a Navy court cf inquiry, headed up by TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

= 14719 r^s . O a Mr. Steve Dew who was prosecuting attorney, so to 1 2 speak; and he and Mr. Saltarelli and some other senior 3 people sat in a board of review and called before them 4 the various discipline chiefs who came to present their 5 rationale for why the matters of the discipline findings 6 in the most serious category that belonged to them were . 7 or were not reportabl'e, and what their basis for those 8 decisions were. 9 The meeting lasted from about 5:00 o' clock 10 until something in the order of 11:00 o' clock that night. 11 And it, again, was a varying amount of time spent on each 12 discipline. And some cases, the statements were very 13 simple on the part of the discipline chief as to why this (~'] 14 matter was or was not reportable, in other cases, there 15 were questions asked by somebody of the -- in that senior 16 group and either the discipline chief or one of his other 17 supervisors who were present would respond to that 18 question and provide additional information. 19 That continued throughout that period of time 20 until they had covered all discipline findings and that's 21 when the meeting broke up. 22 Q You mentioned Mr. Saltarelli and Mr. Dew. Can 23 you recall any of the other senior level people who were 24 there? 25 A I can't be absolutely sure but it seems to me TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14720 (~%. k) - 1 that Mr. Hawks and Mr. Pinto where there, and I'm sure 2 there were some others. I believe -- I just don't recall 3 all the names. But it struck me that the senior 4 management in engineering of Brown & Root were present in -- 5 at that meeting. 6 MR. GUTTERMAN: That's all I have. 7 BOARD EXAMINATION 8 By Judge Lamb: 9 Q Mr. Robertson, I'd like to make certain that we 10 understand accurately how the IRC functioned and what 11 their authority was at that time. 12 When a matter was brought before the IRC, they 13 met on it, reached a decision, at that point, did they D(~N 14 have the authority to report directly to the NRC? 15 A Yes, they did. They also had instructions when 16 they reached a conclusion about some matter, that they 17 were to immediately call myself; if I wasn't around, Mr. 18 Goldberg, and discuss what their findings were with us, 19 particularly if they had reached a conclusion that 20 something should be called in. 21 They also had those same instructions if they 22 had a meeting and there was a serious matter in their 23 view, and they decided it was not reportable, they were 24 still to make that phone call and discuss it. And they

 -     25 did so. If they could not reach either one of us, they J

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14721

 /~T                                                                  .

kJ 1 were to go ahead and call it in without reaching us. 2 0 I had understood and I wanted to check to see 3 whether this was correct, that normally before calling 4 they would get your concurrence or Mr. Goldberg's 5 concurrence? 6 A I wouldn't want to call it -- 7 Q Or was that necessary? 8 A No, sir, I don't think so -- we didn't look at 9 it as concurrence as much as we did what was their basic -- 10 what was their basis for reaching this decision, and was 11 there anything that in our experience needed to be added 12 to that decisional process before they completed it. (~N 13 I can't recall that we ever'had a disagreement

 \-)

14 in the end; I can recall times when I sent them back" to 15 do more, in both cases, where they had reached a 16 conclusion of yes and in cases where they'd reached a 17 conclusion of no, I sent them back to do more work. I 18 said, "You haven't got to the bottom of this. You don't 19 have the right answer in the sense you haven't considered 20 all the factors in this." 21 And whether the answer was no, "Go look at it 22 and call me back after you checked it out." 23 I was more concerned with the ones when they 24 were coming up negatively than I was with with the ones But in terms of absolute authority, they had -- !( l 25 positively. l I TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 i

14722 k 1 they did have the authority to go ahead and call. 2 I can't recall whether there was ever a clearly -- 3 I know there was no case were they wanted to call and 4 they were overruled, in that sense and told not to. 5 There were some times when they came to a conclusion it 6 wasn't reported and they were told, "Well, either you 7 call or one of us is going to," you know, words not quite 8 that strong but the same meaning. 9 Q So then actually, you didn't -- you did or 10 didn't have veto power over the'IRC? 11 A In essence, we had logic veto power. When I 12 say logic veto power, as I say, I don't recall ever 13 overruling them, I don't recall that ever' occurred. [} , 14 But there were many times when they were told, 15 "You haven't looked at this whole thing in the right way. 16 We disagree or I disagree, this is a matter that should 17 be called to NRC. Have.you looked at this particular 18 aspect of it?' 19 Most of the time when they re-looked at it, 20 they would come back with a different conclusion. There 21 were a few occasions were a simple statement was made, 22 "Well, that may be all well and good, but I think this is 23 a matter that warrants NRC's attention, therefore we're 24 going to call it in. Would you please go ahead and do 25 so." TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14723 1 Q Were there any instances in which they felt 2 that something should be reported and you or Mr. Goldberg 3 countermanded that? 4 A Not in that sense, sir. There were, I believe 5 there were a few occasions where they'd reached a 6 conclusion and I may have raised some issues and asked 7 them, "Have you considered this part of it?" And when the 8 answer was no, I would say, "Well go do it. And then 9 tell me if you're still -- if you've still got the same 10 observation." 11 But I can't recall ever having vetoed them in a 12 direct fashion. That's -- that doesn't register as the 13 way of doing it. But frequently, we would point out 14 things that they had maybe not considered yet and asked 15 them to go back and look at those in addition to what 16' they had already done. We didn't have any -- we had no 17 program or any intention of curtailing their freedom to 18 make whatever recommendations they felt appropriate. 19 Q Did I understand correctly that,there were l 20 occasions in which they came up with a recommendation 21 something should be reported but then when sent back to l 22 re-study it they changed their minds? 23 A I think there may have been an occasion of l 24 that, but it doesn't register that there was more than 25 one or two times that that occurred. It was in all cases l TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14724 1 as far as I know, it was a very clear case of some basic 2 element of that matter that they had not considered and 3 once they did, the conclusion was straightforward. 4 Q This was not a result of being told not to 5 report it? 6 A No. No. That -- we didn't operate in that 7 way. It was more a matter of they had gone through their 8 process and we were trying to provide or I was, providing 9 them with my best judgment as to making that process 10 complete, and make sure they'd considered all factors 11 before they ceased their activity. 12 O Now, looking at the operation of the special (} 13 team, you an Mr. Goldberg and Dr. Sumpter, and with - 14 respect to which parts of the Quadrex report should or 15 should not have been reported under 50.55(e), who made 16 the ultimate decision on those matters? 17 A I don't know that there was -- that there is an 18 answer to that. At noon on the 8th, I had reached the 19 conclusion there were three matters to be reported, and I 20 believe, if my memory is right, Dr. Sumpter also agreed 21 we had three matters to report, and at the end of that 22 day, we reported those same three matters. 23 0 Were they the same three? 24 A Same three, sir. 25 Q Was Mr. Goldberg in agreement with those? TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

1 1 14725 s . k_) At the end of the day, yes. 1 A 2 O In other words, this was a consensus among the 3 three of you? 4 A That's correct. There was no dissenting vote 5 on any one of the three matters. ~ 6 Q Do you still agree with those decisions in 7 retrospect knowing what you've learned since then? 8 A Yes, sir. 9 Q That those three should have been reported and 10 that no others should have been reported? 11 A Given the information that we had available on 12 the 8th of May, I believe those three decisions were (~ 13 correct. - V} , 14 Q How about given information since then,that 15 that change your conclusion? 16 A Given information 30 days later, probably would 17 not have reported the shielding calculations. 18 A Probably would have only made two reports. 19 0 Were there any that you did not report that you 20 would have reported, based on what you've learned since 21 then? 22 A No, sir, I'm not aware of any that -- I'm not 23 aware of any items that have arisen since then that came 24 directly out of the Quadrex report that would have been 25 reported at that time, knowing what we know now. TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14726 (. 1 Q Now, with respect to the matters that were 2 reported, HL&P deferred actions on those matters by the 3 special team until the final Quadrex report had been 4 received? 5 A Yes, sir. 6 0 They did receive briefings prior to that time; 7 you had clues that some of these were forthcoming, that 8 there were matters that might be reportable. Would it 9 have been appropriate for HL&P to have proceeded with its 10 own IRC investigations before receiving the final Quadrex 11 report? 12 A Well, difficult to answer that well, sir. rg 13 After receipt of the Quadrex report, I became aware of C/ 14 the activities that had been going on for some time 15 relative to HVAC. And in my view, that matter should 16 well have been reported to NRC earlier than it was. I 17 was not aware of that information until after May the 18 8th, however. 19 But there were other people within our 20 organization that were and they should have been more 21 sensitive to that, I think, than what they perhaps were. 22 They seemed to be best I can tell, they were interested 23 in solving the problem and they just overlooked the 24 necessity to enter that into the 55(e) process. 25 In terms of computer codes, it's difficult to TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 i

14727 1 say. .I did not have enough information personally to 2 reach a definitive conclusion. I understand that there 3 was an audit performed in late 1980, something of that 4 time, that raised the question -- raised a question with 5 about the status of computer codes. It might be that as 6 a result of that, some other evaluation of computer codes 7 should have been undertaken. But based on what I heard 8 of the one briefing I attended, I did not receive enough 9 information to tell me that there was a meaningful 10 problem that could be evaluated and come to a reasonable 11 conclusion that there was a matter serious enough to be 12 reported. 13 There were enough matters raised just as issues 14 that if one had undertaken to evaluate each and every one 15 of them, I don't know -- I wouldn't have known how to 16 separate which ones to look at and which ones not to the 17 way Quadrex presented them, I guess. It would have been 18 almost impossible to start tracking down each one given 19 the rather broad brushed quick simple way Quadrex 20 presented their or made their presentation. 21 They simply didn't provide us enough 22 information at the briefing I attended that triggered to 23 me that we had enough to start an evaluation. If they 24 had just simply walked in the door and said, "We think 25 there's something wrong with your computer codes O '\_/ TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14728 1 verification program at Brown & Root," would I have 2 followed it up, the answer is yes. I would have. l 3 I would have wanted to know what it was that 4 caused somebody to make that that kind of a statement. 5 But since we did have a forthcoming report that was to be 6 organized and have the factual basis, it did not seems to 7 me that it was necessary to suddenly run out and start 8 creating a group of task forces to look at a very large 9 number of matters that Quadrex made a statement about 10 that there was something wrong in that area or there's 11 some problem here or there's some better way of doing it, 12 or there's some missing document here. 13 There just wasn't enough information to take

 )

14 definitive action at that point in time. 15 0 With respect to the item that you feel should 16 have been reported earlier, you view that as a serious 17 oversight? 18 A Serious, yes. Any time you don't do an 19 evaluation of something of this type, that's a serious 20 matter. However, I would also say in perspective, given 21 the many thousands of different design activities that 22 occur on a project, a very large number of interactions 23 that can you remember among groups, that it's not totally 24 to be unexpected that occasionally one will slip through 25 the crack for awhile and not get caught until late. I'm TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

           - _ . _ _ _ . - ~ -        . _ _ - - ,. __

14729 l\

  '#    1  not surprised at that. I don't like it.

2 Q Did the special review team, the three of you, 3 consider reporting the entire Quadrex report, submitting 4 this entire report to the NRC under 50.55(e)? 5 A I don't think we discussed directly that day 6 whether or not the entire report represented something 7 that should be reported as a report. I think without 4 8 question, though, that if there had been a substantial 9 number of different reportable items show up, I think 10 without question we would have said, "Okay, that's it, 11 the whole report goes." 12 But we didn't find that. We found three, . /c( 13 isolated case itself and they didn't seem to have a 14 ' common thread, they didn't seem to relate to each other, 15 so we did not present the entire report. We discussed it -- 16 we've discussed -- we have discussed it since that time 17 as to what were our feelings on that day even though we 18 didn't express them, I think we all had the same type of 19 feelings that if there had been very many of them, what's 20 the number, eight, ten, twelve, something on that order, 21 if we had had that many reportable things or potentially 22 reportable findings, that probably would have been a 23 solid clue that the entire report warranted notice to 24 NRC. 25 Q Did the NRC staff indicate at any time as far TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14730 (,~) 1 as you know that the whole report should be submitted to 2 them under 50.55(e) ? 3 A I'm not personally aware of that view on the 4 part of the staff. I can recall reading the minutes of a 5 document wherein I believe somebody on the Region IV 6 staff asked a question. I wasn' at that meeting. But I 7 was reading the minutes of it afterwards. 8 Where he had asked that question had we 9 considered that. And I believe the response was that we 10 didn't believe that submitting the entire report as a 11 notification package was warranted, we didn't believe it 12 was necessary. 13 Q Did that report in part or in to the to 14 represent a QA breakdown in your view? 15 A No, sir. In fact what it told me was perhaps 16 the opposite, because one of the things that seemed to 17 strike me was that the disciplines within Brown & Root 18 had a tremendous in place control process, their 19 activities were very rigorously controlled under -- 20 speaking under design criterion three of Appendix B. 21 Their activities were so rigorously controlled that that 22 it was almost a hinderance to getting work done. 23 They did not have the what I call the 24 management coordination that would cause the various 25 disciplines to interact with each other on a rather TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14731 /~T

'l  1   informal basis, they would follow their procedures that 2   said do this, they would do this. Then they would go 3   talk about it form 11y with another discipline, per 4   procedure; the other discipline would have objections.

5 They'd go back and start again, or make a modification. 6 And they followed that rather rigorous procedure, this is 7 - what I was getting out of the report, they were following 8 this rather rigorous procedure or set of procedures, so 9 they were they were very well controlled. 10 .What I detected as a problem was that the Brown 11 & Root upper engineering management had not put in place 12 the management techniques that cause disciplines to 2 13 interact with each other on,an informal basis and caused 14 resolution of concerns among disciplines to be recognized 15 very early, very informally, and not show up as 16 differences later on. 17 I was used to seeing things where it was almost 18 unheard of, to issue a formal document and find out there 19 was something wrong with that document from the 20 perspective of another discipline. I'm used to seeing 21 that coordination occur at the very ground level. And 22 that a system design description or whatever it is, is 23 informally worked amongst all the discipline engineers. 24 And when it's finished and sent around for review and 25 approval, and officially reviewed, not very many comments O) TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14732 ~ 1 show up. 2 They've already long sense been ironed out by 3 the coordination of the various disciplines that occurs 4 on a more informal basis. 5 (No hiatus.) 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 O V TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14733 1 O What would you have been looking for in order 2 for it to look like a QA breakdown to you that was 3 different from what you actually saw? 4 A Okay. I would have been looking to see or 5 find the following -- well, I shouldn't say the 6 following types, certain symptoms. Symptoms of the 7 process turning out defective product is a symptom'that 8 tells you that there's something wrong somewhere, of 9 course. To find out that certain processes that are 10 required, aren't being followed or there's processes 11 missing for work that is going on. Those types of , g 12 things would be indicative of a QA breakdown where the (_ 13 process is found to be defidient. 1 14 A symptom of it is when you start getting a 15 lot of defective product. Here I didn't detect a lot of 16 defective product. It was a lack of product more than a l 17 defective product. 18 Q In other words, your feeling is that the 19 Quadrex report did not turn up so many defects as an l 20 indication that there was not enough production? 21 A It was telling us that there was a problem in 22 production. And if you looked at it, you came to the lp 23 conclusion that they hadn't done the preplanning l b 24 necessary at the top levels of engineering management to j i 25 put in place what I call the smooth planned, scheduled, TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14734 1 organized set of activities that's going to carry from [J'T 2 day one until it is finished. 3 For example, I participated in a new plant 4 proposal at Stone & Webster. Came in one day, we 5 started work the next day on a schedule. One month 6 later we turned out a milestone schedule in detail that 7 specified every major engineering milestone and activity 8 that was going to occur over the next seven years. Now, 9 that was done with a team of people that came together

                      ~

10 at the front end, experienced people. We put the whole 11 program together and that plant when it started its

p. *12 design process would never have a question about when b 13 was something due, when was a certain analysis due and 14 who was going to do it. It was there. It was defined 15 up front.

16 Here Quadrex seemed to tell me that Brown & 17 Root management didn't lave that preplanned process in 18 place. When they got ready to do an activity, when 19 somebody reminded them that a certain item was going to 20 have to be done shortly, whether that was construction, 21 whatever the source of it was, that's when they sat down 22 and did their procedural work and their schedule work. 23 They did it just at the time they were getting ready to O 24 start. That was my impression.

25. They didn't preplan it. They didn't do it TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

I 14735 1 back in 1973. And that's symptomatic of the way AE's (')T \_ 2 did business in their first few plants. After they had 3 done a few, they began to catch on that it made a lot of 4 sense to plan this stuff out in great detail up front so 5 that you had a smooth design activity going on. 6 Q The Quadrex report -- of the large number of 7 items discussed in the Quadrex report, didn't a lot of 8 those relate to deficiencies in design? 9 A Not as I recall, sir. The only deficiencies 10 in design that I recall were HVAC, there were true 11 deficiencies in design there. But I don't recall others

 -  12 that related to deficiencies in design.

O. 13 Quadrex frequently called to our attention 14 that certain activities that were yet to be done didn't 15 look like the Brown & Root process was yet ready to do 16 it. They didn't perhaps have all the TRD's prepared yet 17 to undertake that work. They didn't seem to know quite

                         ~

18 how they were going to attack that problem. And those 19 areas were in large part those areas of nuclear plant 20 design that has in the past typically been the hardest 21 for AE's to deal with, the nuclear analysis sections. 22 Piping, piping supports, radiological activities, those 23 kind of things. Those kind of analyses that have been O 24 hard spots in all the AE's over a period of time were 25 showing up here on Brown & Root as being hard spots TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14736

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() 1 here, too. 2 Q Am I paraphrasing you properly, characterizing 3 what you said accurately if I say that your feeling was 4 that what Brown & Root did was in general acceptable in 5 quality, they just didn't do enough of it? 6 A That's right, sir. 7 Q And they weren't far enough along in their 8 planning for it? 9 A They were not -- it did not appear that they 10 were yet ready to undertake some of the activities that 11 were going to be very urgently needed if they continued 12 the current construction schedule. , O' 13 I was surprised, frankly, to take a tour of 14 the South Texas Project and see the buildings, huge 15 massive buildings all up, standing there and very little 16 equipment inside. I just wasn't used to seeing this 17 kind of construction activity. I'm used to seeing a lot 18 of equipment go in as the building goes up. As you 19 complete a portion of the building, you start putting l 20 equipment in. And it just wasn't there. 21 There was no cable tray to speak of, i 22 essentially zero cable tray, essentially zero piping. i 23 You'd find a piece every thirty feet, a piece of pipe O

 \  24 hanging on a temporary hanger. Major pieces of 25 equipment, you'd find pumps set, no piping connecting it i

TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 L

14737 Smaller pieces of equipment wouldn't even (} 1 to anything. 2 be there. 3 I just wasn't used to seeing a plant with that 4 much civil work done and that little equipment inside 5 it. And that was -- that occurred before the Quadrex 6 report. When I saw the Quadrex report I began to think, J7 well, maybe I know why I saw that picture. 8 Q Did you either with or without the rest of the 9 review team consider submitting the Quadrex report to 10 this Board, that is before it was actually submitted? 11 A I can't say that I consciously thought about c 12 that, sir. I was well aware of what this Board was

  ) 13  looking at at that point in time in 1981 and I was well 14  aware of what Quadrex was addressing and it simply did 15  not occur to me that the two were directly related.

16 I understood the issues before this Board to 17 be basically construction related activities and the QA 18 program as associated with construction. And this 19 report dealt with the engineering and the capabilities 20 of Brown & Root to perform that engineering and the 21 technical basis and process they were going to use to 22 solve engineering problems and were using. 23 I didn't see this report, among other things, 24 as even being a QA report that related directly to the 25 QA program in a direct fashion. It was an engineering TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14738 1 review. So, I didn't correlate the two in terms of (} 2 those issues. And maybe I should have, but I didn't. 3 Q Was this discussed at all? 4 A Not that I'm aware of. I don't recall 5 discussing it at all, sir. 6 Q Do you feel that the problems which were 7 reported in the Quadrex report could reflect on the 8 competence of HL&P which was under evaluation at that 9 time insofar as its ability to control its contractor 10 who was doing design work? 11 A Well, I may have a biased view here, sir. I

-    12 believe the Quadrex report really represented a positive O   13 step forward in HL&P's increasing its responsibilities.

14 We elected to go out and have an engineering review 15 performed. At that point in time, I'm not aware of any 16 other project that had commissioned this kind of 17 report. They had commissioned reports on isolated parts 18 of project work, but I'm not aware of anybody who had 19 initiated a report on looking at the basic engineering, 20 what are these people doing, what techniques are they 21 using, do they understand what they're supposed to be 22 doing. That's really what the thrust of the Quadrex 23 report was about. So, I think that was a very positive O 24 step. 25 Once we got it, and even before, we were TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14739 (~') 1 taking very positive actions at HL&P to increase the v 2 experience level of HL&P, to become I don't want to say 3 more involved, but better involved in the engineering 4 process. We wanted people better able to help resolve 5 the engineering process and get it moving than what we 6 seemed to have.' And we looked at that, I think all of 7 us came to HL&P in the early 1980's, as being 8 essentially needing more experience, people who actually 9 had had hands-on work in designing these plants, we 10 needed more of that so that they could better understand 11 what the problems were within Brown & Root and better 12 understand how to fix them. ()

                                                          ~

13 So, in my view, Quadrex represented a step l 14 forward. And I believe personally our review that we 15 performed in that rather short period of time speaks 16 rather highly of the competence of the individuals that 17 performed the review. That was a lot of material to 18 absorb in a matter of a couple of days total time and 19 come to a conclusion that, as far as I know, the NRC 20 staff agrees that we reported those things that needed 21 to be reported out of that rather massive list of items 22 that were candidates. 23 0 To your knowledge, did the NRC's staff request 24 or suggest that the report be submitted to this Board 25 before it was? TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14740 (} 1 A I'm not aware of any suggestion or request by 2 the staff to provide it to the Board any earlier than 3 mid September. It was a matter of two or three days 4 thereafter. As far as I know, that was the first time 5 it was suggested. 6 Q Did you or anybody else as far as you know 7 indicate or even suggest that the report should be kept 8 as confidential, secret or proprietary? 9 A Not in the sense of I think you mean that, 10 sir. We made a conscious decision that we would not 11 send it out of house. But within Brown & Root and

 .. 12 within HL&P, I have no idea how many were floati*ng O  13 around. There were no special markings on it saying 14 don't reproduce. Nobody that I'm aware of had any 15 hesitation to reproduce it. There were plenty of copies 16 available. Anybody who had a need for one could get 17 one, so --

18 0 Was there any discussion of withholding it 19 from the NRC or from this Board? 20 A No, sir, not in the sense of not making it 21 available. We told Mr. Sells that we did not plan on 22 sending it officially to New York, but it's there if you l 23 want to see it, you're welcome to it, we'll make it 24 available to you to review or anybody -- it's available 25 for NRC review, period. There was never any TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 L

14741 (~') 1 contradiction to that view. xs 2 Q Did you indicate earlier that when deciding 3 what would be reported to the NRC, the question came up 4 as to whether they should be informed that these arose 5 from the Quadrex report? 6 A All I recall, sir, was there was a question 7 asked is do we quote the Quadrex report as part of our 8 call in to NRC. As I recall, the question was do we 9 identify -- something like do we identify the source 10 when we make these calls. And the answer, no, we don't 11 do that type -- you know, we typically don't identify

    -      12 where it comes from. Okay, go ahead, finish it up.

x~) That was -- as I recall it, that was like the extent of 13 14 the discussion. It was not a big issue, it was a 15 question of, well, when you call these things in, do you r 16 identify what the source of your information is? 17 0 Is that done normally? 18 A As far as I am aware, we do not identify where 19 we acquire the basic information that goes into a 55(e) 20 potential reportable call to this date. 21 Q What I'm exploring, of course, is the question 22 of whether there was some reason that is not yet clear g-( 23 to us as to why the Quadrex report would not have U 24 been -- in other words, again, was there any effort to 25 keep the Quadrox report in low profile or withnold it to TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14742 1 some degree from the NRC? I ') 2 A I don't think it was being looked at in that 3 form or fashion. We were well aware, of course, that 4 any document we sent to NRC is going to ultimately wind 5 up in the public document room. And from that 6 standpoint I'm sure we all were reluctant to even -- at 7 that point to even think about what the misconception 8 would be if somebody reads this Quadrex report without 9 understanding what's in it. It's just filled with 10 things that are inflammatory just because of the way the 11 words were put together. 12 , There was a considerable number of items that 13 were really not well said, things that were presented by 14 Quadrex as recommendations of how to improve the 15 ef ficiency of the process. But several places their 16 words nade it sound like there was some deficiency 17 existing in that regard. And it was this -- of course, 18 there were some of the things that Quadrex said we flat 19 disagreed with. 20 But it was all of these things together that 21 made us reluctant to just freely put this document out 22 in public because we were -- we're sensitive to what the 23 reactions would be and how difficult it would be to take

• 24 a report this big and properly get people to understand 25 what it was really saying. It's just almost impossible TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14743 (} 1 to do that. There's just too much material there to 2 properly explain it to everybody, to everybody's 3 satisfaction. 4 Q To your knowledge, to what degree was Mr. 5 Oprea involved in decisions about reporting under 6 50.55(e) or submitting the report to NRC or this Board? 7 A My understanding of how the process worked was 8 that Mr. Oprea did not really have any or want to have 9 any direct input into the decisional process of was 10 something reportable or not reportable. However, he did 11 sign at that point all letters going to Region IV. That

     -- 12   was procedurally how we handled it.

O 13 So, he did want to know anytime we made a call 14 to Region IV, made a notification, he wanted a call from 15 somebody informing him what the subject matter was, what 16 it was about so that if he in return got a call from 17 Region IV, he could have an intelligent conversation. 18 So, that was his only requirement. If you call one in, 19 tell re about it and that was it. Othe'r than that he 20 really had no involvement in the process. 21 Q Thank you. 22 JUDGE LAMB: That's all I have. 23 Q (By Judge Shon) I have one or two questions. 24 In the course of discussing with Dr. Lamb why 25 it was that you decided to keep this report inhouse and TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14744 fN 1 eventually decided to tell the NRC you may look at it V 2 here but we're not sending it to you, you mentioned a 3 number of things that you thought might happen to cause 4 you public difficulties of one sort or another. After 5 the report indeed did get wider circulation, did these 6 things all happen? A

                                         ~

7 Yes, sir. 8 0 I think I'll leave it at that. 9 Q (By Judge Bechhoefer) To continue for a 10 moment the line that Dr. Lamb, Mr. Shown just discussed 11 with you. After the telephone notification, say, of the c > 12 three items, there is normally, is there not, a () 13 thirty-day follow-up report? 14 A Yes, sir. 15 0 Do you recall having any discussions with 16 anyone about whether those thirty-day follow-up reports 17 should mention, among other things, the source of the 18 information which gave rise to the deficiency? 19 A I don't recall any discussion of that, sir. 20 If the source of the information were pertinent to 21 understanding it, we would include it. 22 For example, if you make a report that is 23 based on a difficulty in some vendor's shop, you would 24 one way or another make NRC aware of where that 25 difficulty came from because that might have TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 i

14745 1 ramifications for other nuclear projects. That might 2 even fit into a Part 21 type' condition. 3 But in any event, what you want to give NRC is 4 enough information that they can understand the issue 5 and understand its scope. And by scope I mean is this 6 something just associated with your project or is it 7 something that reaches out to other projects. Clearly 8 we want to keep NRC advised if we think there's any 9 potential for a reach out of one of our activities into 10 another nuclear plant. 11 We have in the past informed Region IV of 12 certain matters that we thought would be of concern to 13 them because they might want to ask questions or look at 14 this activity in another plant. In one case I recall 15 didn't even fit a 55(e) condition, but we elected to 16 make Region IV aware of it because they might have an 17 interest in pursuing it somewhere else. l 18 We're very sensitive -- the point I'm trying 19 to get at is we're very sensitive of what we perceive to 20 be the NRC's concerns that problems in one plant that 21 may be common to another plant, that they become known, 22 that the NRC is aware of them so that they can take ! 23 whatever action is appropriate with respect to those 1 l O 24 problems. We're very sensitive of that. 25 In this particular case, this was an TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14746 r 1 engineering report dealing with the engineering

    }

2 activities of Brown & Root and we were well aware they 3 did not have design responsibilities for any other 4 nuclear plant so there just didn't seem to be a reason 5 to go into the source. It wasn't pertinent to 6 understanding the issues in that sense. 7 Q Would the source -- would a reference to the 8 source have helped Region IV understand the scope of the 9 particular deficiency or problem being reported? 10 A I don't think so, sir. In our follow-up 11- report we start expanding to make sure we bound the g; 12 problem, whatever that boundary turns out to be. U 13 Frequently we make a 55(e) report by telephone and we - i le don't know at that point in time the full scope of that 15 difficulty. But as part of our follow-up and 16 resolution, one of our objectives that we strive for and 17 I believe attain is to bound that problem and make sure 18 that we have covered all aspects of it. 19 And in that regard, computer codes, for 20 example, grew quite a lot bigger in terms of scope of 21 the review process after we made our initial report than 22 we thought it really had at the time we made it. HVAC 1 l 23 also I think really grew, although we had the idea at i l 24 the time that it was probably a pretty complete redesign l l 25 effort that was going to have to occur. It turned out I TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14747 believe to be a total redesign review when we got into

     ;  1 2 it. Everything in HVAC had to be reviewed.

3 But it wasn't necessary -- Quadrex was a small 4 part. What Quadrex said about those two matters was a 5 small part of what ultimately turned out to be the 6 actions necessary to resolve those issues. 7 Q So, you don't think that if the Quadrex 8 findings related to the particular subjects reported had 9 been provided to Region IV, they would have had an 10 easier job of understanding what was involved with the 11 particular findings?

  ,-   12       A    Well, I.--

I ( 13 Q Or particular reported items I should say. 14 A Well, I can' t speak for the NRC staff. I 15 wouldn't attempt to. But from my pe'rspective, I don't 16 believe it would have materially helped them to have 17 received the references to the Quadrex report in 18 understanding the issue. No, I don' t see that. But I 19 can't speak for the staff. 20 Q I recognize that. 21 Mr. Robertson, could you describe -- I believe 22 the record probably shows who Mr. Blau is, but could you 23 describe perhaps again what his position was around May O 24 and June of 1981? 25 A Mr. Blau -- TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14748 {} 1 Q And his relationship in particular to the IRC 2 review process. 3 A Okay. Mr. Blau was our senior individual in 4 the project engineering organization of HL&P. He was 5 manager of engineering and that's -- I don't know 6 whether that's the exact title, but that's its meaning. 7 And, as such, he reported to Mr. Barker, I believe, on 8 matters and was responsible for the engineering area. 9 In terms of IRC, a member of his organization, 10 himself if he wanted to or somebody else he designated 11 or more than one were required members at each meeting

  -   12   of the IRC, an engineering member, a member from the l

l 13 project engineering organization. But I believe his l 14 title at that point was manager of engineering. I 15 believe that's his title, but if it's not -- if that 16 wasn't his title, that was the meaning of the title. 17 Q I notice that Mr. Blau is listed as attending 18 the meetings which are reflected by -- well, the' 19 meetings reflected by CCANP Exhibits 129, 130, 131, 132, 1 20 just as examples. He's present at all of those 21 meetings. Would he personally attend most meetings of 22 that sort do you know? l l 23 A I don't know, sir. I would not be surprised 1 (~%

 '\_)

24 at his attendance at one of those meetings, any one that 1 25 the IRC held. If it dealt wish a matter of substantial TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14749 () 1 interest to engineering, I wouldn't be surprised at his 2 attendance. As to whether or not he attended a lot of 3 those meetings routinely, I don't know. Clearly he was 4 here at these three that we're looking at. That doesn't 5 surprise me, as such. 6 Q Was Mr. Blau present at the meeting on May 7 7 at Brown & Root that you mentioned you attended? 8 A I don't recall, sir, who was in attendance. 9 There were forty to fif ty people in that room when it 10 started. There were a considerable number of HL&P 11 people present. 12 By 11:00 o' clock -- j-

  %-)                                                                    '

13 0 More than you and Dr. Sumpter? 14 A Yes. 15 By 11:00 o' clock, however, the HL&P attendance 16 had dwindled considerably. If my memory is right, it I 17 was down to one because I think Dr. Sumpter left a few 18 minutes before it ended. But at one point he and I were 19 the only two left. But there were -- it seems to me, 20 I'm under the impression there was like a dozen people 21 from HL&P present when that meeting started and I can't 22 recall whether Mr. Blau was one of them or not. He in 23 all probability was. P O 24 Q Do you recall whether you had any discussions 25 with other members of the review team around the May 7 TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14750 or May 8 dates concerning documentation of (v~) 1 2 non-reportable Quadrex findings, findings which your 3 team would determine to be non-reportable? 4 A I don't recall any discussions about that, 5 sir.

    ~

6 Q Particularly do you recall any discussions in 7 which Mr. Blau might have been involved? 8 A I know -- I'm reasonably certain I did not 9 talk to Mr. Blau on either the 7th or 8th. I certainly 10 don't recall it if it occurred. 11 Q Could someone show Mr. Robertson the document 12 that's numbered 17 whic,h are some of Mr. Blau's notes. Os. 13 Mr. Robertson, could you look at the last two 14 items which are numbered either 9 and 10 or 5:00 o' clock 15 and 6:00 o' clock, depending on what series of -- what 16 columns you follow. Would these items refresh your 17 recollection in any way of any discussions dhat you're 18 aware of at least involving the documentation of 19 non-reportable Quadrex items, items determined by your 20 group to be non-reportable? 21 A Are we talking about the last two items on 22 this page, sir? 23 0 Yes. 24 A Okay. That does not refresh me in terms of 25 any personal involvement with Mr. Blau in that sense. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14751 (]) 1 I'm well aware that we had either told Brown & 2 Root in writing or were in the process of telling them 3 that they were going to have to respond and find an 4 appropriate way of resolving all the issues raised by 5 the Quadrex report. And that did not relate directly to 6 reportability, that was a matter of engineering activity 7 that Brown & Root must review the Quadrex report and 8 present to us a resolution program to resolve each and 9 every one of those issues that is meaningful to be 10 resolved. 11 There's a few of them that there is no 12 resolution for. They dealt with past events that were 0, f over and done and there wasn't anything more to be 13 14 done. But for all of those future activities or ongoing 15 activities that would appear to require some response, 16 they were going to have to respond to it and either 17 indicate an action to be taken or justify why there was 18 no action to be taken. 19 Now, in terms of the last one, I really can't 20 elaborate on that. I don't relate that particularly to 21 anything that I'm aware of. 22 Q I take it you've never seen these notes n 23 before? U 24 A Not that I'm aware of, sir. 25 Q Did your review group discuss at all whether TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14752

 ' _)s q        1 every item should have been referred to the IRC for 2 further review after your group got done?

3 A No, I don't believe we discussed it in that 4 way. 5 0 Well, how did you discuss it?

                                                             ~

6 A That's what I'm just trying to reco11ect, 7 sir. I cannot remember at that point in time or 8 af terwards any formal instruction or program that would 9 have caused IRC, and I'm talking about the near term of 10 May 1981, that would have caused IRC to review the 11 Quadrex report in great detail to see if there was s 12 anything else there that they should evaluate. I don't ! 13 recall that. l l 14 I know it was also clear in our minds that as 15 part of the Brown & Root resolution and as part of our 16 own activities, it was conceivable that something else l 17 would pop up that would be -- that would meet the 18 requirements for reportability and there was -- that was 19 a recognized condition that might occur. If it did, it 20 would be reviewed by the IRC and a determination made. 21 If it was deemed to be potentially reportable, it was 22 going to be called in. l r3 23 We believed we had made the solid well-founded k>

 \       24 review effort that was appropriate for us to make in 25 terms of an immediate review of that report through the TATE REPORTING        (713) 498-8442

14753 () 1 use of Brown & Root and our own independent assessment. 2 And that wasn't the end of it, but in terms of 3 reportability, we felt we had probably completed that. 4 And indeed that seems to be what has happened. 5 But we were still going through a much more 6 comprehensive review with Brown & Root to resolve all of 7 the issues. It was very conceivable that something else 0 would show up as requiring a report to NRC. If it did, 9 it would be handled in routine fashion, normal fashion. 10 (No hiatus.) 11 () 13

• 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

() 24 25 TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14754 1 Q (By Judge Bechhoefer) Did the review group on 2 May 8 consider or discuss whether there would be adequate 3 documentation of the items which were determined to be 4 not reportable? 5 A Well, I don't believe that was discussed in 6 that fashion. 7 Q Did you ever consider sending the report to the 8 IRC for purposes of -- the Quadrex report to the IRC for 9 purposes of documenting the non-reported items? 10 A I don't think -- I can't recall doing it 11 formally. I can recall talking to Mr. Jacobi and Mr. 12 Powell and quite possibly others, and pointing out to 13 them that, " Hey, if you see anything else-in there that

  ~)

14 looks like it needs to be brought before IRC, make sure 15 you do it." 16 But I can't recall formally asking them to 17 review the report. To go to your other question, that you 18 just asked, I think, I'm not aware -- maybe I'm missing u 19 something, but I'm not aware of a reason why we would 20 document the items that were found not reportable. 21 There are reasons why we would document those 22 that are found to be reportable or potentially 23 reportable. 24 Q Right. Well, I was at least under the _ 25 impression that if an item were referred to the IRC, it

 \_/

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14755 L) 1 would be documented whether it was reported or not? 2 A That is correct, sir, by their procedure, they 3 would document something yea or nay. That's right. 4 Q Did you ever consider, did your group consider 5 following a comparable procedure for the non-reported 6 items? 7 A No, sir, not in that sense, no, sir. Not that 8 I recall. 9 Q (By Judge Shon) As I understand the process 10 that Mr. Wisenburg described in some detail yesterday, 11 there is a step in effect before the IRC that is the step 12 at which someone decides to make out or not make out a ("3 13 DEF. I take it that when you got through, the three of %)- 14 you who considered these things, in effect, you deemed

• 15 that all items that were not the items you referred to 16 the IRC, not the reported items, all those other items of 17 any kind were simply not even worth making out a DEF for.

18 Is that the level at which they existed? 19 A That's -- you are correct in that that's the 20 effect. At the point in time that we're talking about of 21 May 7th and 8th of 1981, the DEF process had not been 22 instituted within the procedure. 23 Q I recognize that. But -- 24 A But in essence, your perception is correct. We 25 did what the DEF process would cause to occur within TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

l

                                                                                 \

14756 () 1 engineering today, the three of us did that process, and l 2 you're correct. We made the assessment that it, in that 3 terminology, it was not necessary to process that 4 imaginary DEF any further to IRC. 5 JUDGE SHON: Thank you, that's what I wanted to 6 establish. 7 Q (By Judge Bechhoefer) To carry that one step 8 further, take a specific example, your review of the 9 nuclear analysis findings, do you believe that those 10 findings either individually or collectively were not 11 sufficiently -- I don't know if the word significant is 12 correct, but sufficiently significant to start the IRC 13 referral process? This is assuming you would not have {} 14 reviewed them through the review group. Assume away for l 15 a moment your review group, if the review group hadn't 16 been there, would you have referred those particular 17 findings to the IRC for disposition? 18 A Assuming that I had the benefit of Quadrex 19 report and hearing the Brown & Root presentgtion of the 20 evening before and that information that I had developed 21 up until noon of May 8th, I would not have -- I don't 22 believe I would have felt obligated to send it on to IRC. 23 I can't identify why I would have felt it had 1 24 to go on to IRC. However, I must add that independent of l - 25 that, as an engineer responsible for licensing activities V l TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14757 c tm U at that point, tha2 certainly wouldn't have been the end 1 2 of my looking at nuclear analysis. It wasn't in May 8th, 3 1981, it was not the end of it and even if as you say, 4 there had been nothing else, that wouldn't have ended it. 5 There were questions that were raised there 6 that needed to be resolved. They were not safety 7 questions as such. An example being very simply why - 8 weren't they making progress? Why weren't they making 9 progress? What did they lack in terms of people, if 10 that's what it was? I didn't know. What was it they 11 lacked? I just didn't know. 12 And I did follow that up later on to find out 13 why couldn't they make progress. I got some of those ('} answers.

      ~

14 I didn't find a safety hazard. 15 Q Turn, for instance, just as an example, to 16 question N-17, I guess that's in Volume III of the 17 Quadrex report. 18 A Okay. 19 0 If you had read, I assume you did read, but 20 given the Quadrex assessment, would that not in itself 21 have been sufficient to at least fill out one of those, 22 if you had a DEF form, fill it out and start the process? 23 A If all I read was N-17 and knew nothing more, I 24 probably would have come to the conclusion that I had to 25 notify NRC. I don't think -- it wouldn't have occurred TATE REFORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

                                           ~            _           _       - - - . . _ _

14758 b(m If all I knew was read this, and I 1 to me about the DEF. 2 and I knew knowing more than than just reading N-17, 3 probably my reaction is "I've got a problem that warrants 4 calling to the attention of NRC." 5 I don't know whether that's the answer to your 6 question, sir, but that's what I understood you to be 7 asking. 8 0 Well, my question is: Wouldn't at the very 9 least, this have called for some documentation, whether 10 or not it eventually? 11 A I'm sorry -- 12 0 I'm trying to see whether there was enough

         ~

{} 13 documentation of this item and others. 14 A Yes. If the DEF -- 15 0 I'm using this as an example. 16 A If the DEF system were in effect in May 1981, 17 and there was going to ae an orderly assessment of this 18 matter, clearly this would have been a candidate to go on 19 the DEF list. Yes. 20 The assessment was actually conducted during 21 that two-day time frame to get additional information 22 about this, the same thing that might have occurred on a 23 DEF system over a four or five or six, seven day time 24 period, in a formal way. s 25 Q Do you think you ended up, the system which you (V s TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14759 O 1 used, ended up with the equivalent documentation to what 2 would have resulted if you had gone through the IRC type 3 process? 4 A Not assuming the DEF process was present, no, 5 sir, because there's no equivalent to the DEF, there was 6 no equivalent of the DEF generated that would identify 7 what any one of the three of us might have thought were a 8 significant matter on its face. And that's really were a 9 DEF starts, some individual, at whatever level, says, 10 "Here's something that doesn't look right." 11 His instructions are: If you think that has any 12 connection to a safety hazards, safety

 ' 13 condition, write up a DEF and start the process.

14 So there's, I'm sure, a considerable number 15 here, depending on the individual who would look at it, 16 what his background is, what his understanding of it is, 17 what his understanding of where Brown & Root was at, that 18 very large number of DEF's would have been generated out 19 of the Quadrex report, if.that system had been in place 20 and that type of review had been undertaken. 21 Q Was there not an equivalent system in place in 22 in May and June of 1981 under which some documentation 23 would have resulted? 24 A No, sir, not that I'm aware of. The only 25 documentation that I'm aware of that was put in place at TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14760 S .

 )

1 that time was the formal process conducted by IRC, their 2 minutes of their meetings. They did publish minutes of 3 their meetings and those minutes would reflect items 4 found to be potentially reportable or items considered 5 and found not to be potentially reportable or reportable. 6 Those would have been documented in the IRC minutes. But 7 not necessarily would there be anything else. 8 Now, an IRC meeting could be triggered by an 9 NCR somewhere; there's many different pieces of paper 10 that could have made its way to IRC during that time 11 frame that would have triggered an IRC review. That 12 piece of paper would be a part of the IRC files. 13 But the specific instructions at the time among

 )

14 other things were if any individual could identify , 15 something that he thought warranted a review, he could 16 call me personally. My phone number was published 17 throughout the area, throughout the project; he could 18 call other people. There were more than more than just 19 myself. An individual was identified at the site so the 20 people at the site could call locally. They could call 21 and just transmit their concern to us and we would in 22 turn take those on to IRC if tey were appropriate or 23 discuss it with them and resolve their concern. 24 And what we had in mind was or what I had in 25 mind when I put that out was make sure everybody is aware i \ I TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 L

i 14761 1 that if they've got a safety concern, get it in front of 2 us so that we can get it in front of the IRC and get it 3 evaluated. 4 And that was part of the memo that went out 5 that identified to people, you know, where to call. 6 Separately from this, were other things signed by Mr. 7 Jordan, I believe, and Mr. Oprea, giving their phone 8 numbers and telling anybody " Hey, if you've got any 9 concern call us, or call the NRC; my concern was 10 identifying to project people who they could call 11 directly and get something going through the 55(e) 12 process, the evaluation process.' That was separate than 13 Mr. Oprea's broader concern of "Anything you want to

 )

14 bring to the goes of HL&P that relates to safety, here's 15 my number, give me a call." 16 0 well, if your review group hadn't been in 17 existance, do you think this, just for example, item in 18 question N-17, this item, would that have been entered 19 into that process? 20 A Oh, yes, yes. Yes. 21 Q So that at the very least, you would have an 22 IRC memorandum on it? 23 A Well, yes. If this matter had been brought up 24 by somebody on project in this fashion, it would 25 undoubtedly have gone on to IRC and they would have TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14762 1 undoubtedly have performed a review of that matter; 2 whether it was telephoned to me or whatever form it 3 appeared on. 4 Q Turning to another matter, you answered a 5 number of questions about the document which is marked 6 CCANP 82 for identification, that's the Quadrex findings 7 previously reported. 8 Did you expect that the review that you 9 generated when you talked to Mr. Jacobi or Powell as the 10 case may be, on this subject, did you expect that there 11 would be be information, supplementary reports provided 12 to NRC or information generated that would give rise to 13 supplementary reports, supplementary to the reports that 14 had already gone in? 15 A I'm sorry, but I don't quite understand your 16 question here. 17 Q Did you have in mind when you asked Mr., as I 18 say, Jacobi or Powell, I don't remember, to see whether l i 19 certain items had been previously reported, did you have l 20 in mind that you were going to file, or that HL&P would ! 21 file supplementary reports to NRC on those items stating 22 that some additional information had been developed f 23 through the Quadrex report or -- l i 24 A I didn't have that in particular in mind, . 25 neither was it precluded. I was seeking knowledge. What l l TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14763 ( 1 had we already reported, what matters had we reported, 2 what did it cover. I wanted to make sure that if we had 3 had reported something, yes indeed, there wasn't 4 something more that would be additive to that report. It 5 had already been made to NRC. 6 On the other hand, I didn't want to 7 unnecessarily report something twice; that didn't seem to 8 make useful use of resources to cause NRC to have two 9 items to close out then in fact they were really the same 10 thing. 11 So I had understanding issues; yes if there was 12 something that needed to be expanded, that would have , 13 been -- it would show up as a result of looking at that.

  " }'                                             ,

14 But I can't say that I had that as a primary purpose, no. 15 Basically it was I was looking for information, what had 16 we already done, what did it cover. And then whatever 17 fell out of that, would fall out of it. If we needed to 18 supplement, we'd supplement. 19 Q Do you know -- 20 A That wasn't the predetermination. 21 Q Do you know if any supplements were in fact 22 filed as a result of this review? 23 A I'm not aware of any, sir. I don't believe 24 there were. I'm just not aware of any if there were. 25 Q Based on your knowledge of the Quadrex report TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14764 1 on May 8, '81, did you then believe that the generic 2 findings did not extend beyond their underlying 3 discipline findings? 4 A That is correct, sir. I could not find or did 5 not find or did not see that there were issues in the 6 generic findings that were broader than what was stated 7 in the discipline findings. 8 The wording used in the generic findings was -- 9 I thought it was rather unusual; I have never seen what I 10 looked at and thought of as so many of the same items 11 stated and restated in so many different ways and so many

          -12 different places and that if I stripped all that away, I 13 didn't have very much left. If I stripped all those

{} 14 duplications of statements away and I consolidated them 15 into the same common element as to where they came from, 16 didn't have much left. Sort of the skeleton wasn't very 17 big. j 18 And in looking at that, there wasn't -- I 19 couldn't find any big story to tell in terms of what it 20 was trying to tell me. 21 Q So if you added the duplicated items -- if you 22 added the duplicated items or combined them as the 23 generic findings, did you -- you do not perceive any 24 additional safety significance or reportability _ 25 significance?

     %)

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 L

14765 1 A No, sir. I didn't see -- outside of the items 2 that we did report, the HVAC system, the HVAC design 3 process, the computer code program, the shielding 4 calculations, if you take those and set them aside and 5 pull out what they mean to generics and then look and say 6 are there programming deficiencies showing up here, is 7 there a systematic breakdown being described here, you 8 ask those kinds of questions, and my answer was no. I 9 didn't see those kind of things left. 10 I saw Quadrex stating as generic items a number 11 of things that were at best recommendations for more 12 ' efficient ways of doing business. And I also saw some 13 things stated, the way they stated it, that were totally 14 at odds with my whole experience of how to handle the 15 engineering design process. 16 Their statements, for example, about Brown & 17 Root doing design verification of other people's work, 18 other organizations' work, that just struck me as 19 meaningless in one sense. I didn't understand, that's 20 not the way engineers do business; it's not the way A/E's 21 do business. Just struck me as being something so unique 22 that I couldn't understand it in the generic, in the way 23 they expressed it in the generics. 24 It became a little clearer after -- not on the 25 7th of May by any means, but later on it did become TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14766

 <"y                                                              .

LJ 1 clearer what they were trying to say, as I had a chance 2 to read more of the answers and questions, and they 3 weren't really trying to say what their words perhaps 4 could be interpreted to say. 5 0 Is that still your view today? 6 A Yes. 7 MR. GUTTERMAN: Mr. Chairman, I don't know how 8 much more you have. 9 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: One question. 10 MR. GUTTERMAN: Just thinking it might be 11 appropriate to take one more break before the close of 12 the day.

  '} 13 14       Q JUDGE BECHHOEFER:   I just have one question.

(By Judge Bechhoefer) Could 'you be shown 15 Applicants' Exhibit 57. 16 These are I believe Mr. Goldberg's notes of a 17 meeting which you attended. l I j 18 A Yes, sir. 19 0 Would you -- will you look just in general, are l 20 you familiar with the items that Mr. Goldberg has starred I 21 on -- 22 A In general, yes, sir. 23 Q Was there any discussion at that particular 24 meeting that those particular items, the ones that Mr. l 25 Goldberg has starred, should be reported as of at least l () TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 L

14767 (- U 1 as of that time or should be deemed potentially 2 reportable as of that point in time which was April 13? 3 A No, sir, I don't recall any discussion of any 4 item in terms of should it, should it not be, is it 5 potentially reportable. I do recall that we started at 6 that meeting to suggest to Quadrex that they should 7 organize their ultimate report in such a way that we 8 could focus quickly on those items that they thought 9 would be candidates for the reportability. 10 And I think, I can't be sure, but I believe it 11 was suggested that they put those that they thought might 12 be potentially reportable in a single category. I know (~3 13 that's not the way I came out, but I think that that was LJ 14 the initial suggestion that was made verbally. But there 15 was no discussion of these individual items as being 16 reportable. I think there's a number of them that I 17 recognized or when Quadrex went over them, as being items 18 that might very well have some significance when we found 19 out enough about them to know. 20 Q Well, if you turn -- just to use one, an area 21 that you seem to be quite familiar with, turn to Page 3, 22 the -- under nuclear

• analysis, item three, item three 23 there, does that -- do you recollect whether there was 24 any discussion, particularly discussion of that item?

25 A No, sir, I do not. I recall only that when Mr. TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14768 1 Stanley started to discuss nuclear analysis, he was, I 2 thought, rather blunt in his opening statement and he 3 said -- words to the effect that "I don't understand what 4 this-group is doing, if anything. They don't seem to 5 know what they're supposed to do." 6 It's those kinds of words that he used to 7 introduce the nuclear analysis activity. From that time 8 on, he just mentnioned very rapidly what I would classify 9 as items that raised in his mind this type of concern. 10 - He went over this, as I recall it, he just went 11 down this list very rapidly, this type of list; I don't 12 -know if this is inclusive, just listing things that 13 concerned him. , 14 One' that I remember was at some point, and I 15 believe'it was in the nuclear analysis group, he 16 mentioned specifically that they were, they had not 17 performed pipe break outside containment yet and they 18 were way late in doing so. But there was no discussion 19 of these matters being reportable or should they be 20 reported on that day. 21 In fact as far as I was concerned there wasn't 22 enough information for me to know. One of the things 23 that that concerned me was hearing Quadrex say that it 24 was -- using words that it was necessary that Brown & 25 Root have a top level document defining separation and ( TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

il 14769 O 1 single failure criteria. And I just flat disagreed with 2 that statement, it wasn't necessary. Nice maybe. Maybe 3 more efficient. But there are other ways of doing of 4 doing that than just having those two documents 5 available. It wasn't a necessary condition, as far as I 6 could see. 7 And it bothered me to hear Quadrex make that 8 kind of statement that I could disagree with right off 9 the bat, that maybe their word selection isn't too good; 10 how they're trying to explain things. 11 But it doesn't make sense, it doesn't make .i 12 sense to me some of the things that they said, as I 13 mentioned earlier, about design verification [} 14 requirements. Their perception of, I think they used the 15 statement about generating groups checking to see how 16 their output was used, that didn't make sense to me. I 17 wasn't used to that kind of a process, I didn't 18 understand how you could do it. Generating group puts 19 out a memo says, "Here's a temperature good for so and 20 so." They send it out; they knew who they sent it to, 21 but they don't know who else gets a hold of it and they 22 don't know who else may be using it. 23 I don't know how -- I couldn't conceive of what 24 Quadrex was trying to tell me at that point. I didn't i l 25 understand it. And that was common throughout their t TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14770

    )

1 whole presentation. I didn't have enough information to 2 understand some of their concerns. 3 In fact, I didn't have enough really to 4 understand all of it, except I began to get the idea they 5 were not pleased with what they were finding. 6 MR. GUTTERMAN: Mr. Chairman, it's been a l 7 couple of hours since we started this session. I wonder  ; 1 8 if it's -- 9 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That's the end of -- that's 10 the end of the Board's questions. Why don't we take a -- ' 11 well, five or ten minute break anyway. 12 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, just a moment. (} 13 It's, I think, back to me now for redirect. 14 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That's correct. 15 MR. SINKIN: I would appreciate a little bit 16 more extended break to get ready for redirect. If we 17 could make it to 5:30, 20 minutes break, I would 18 appreciate it. 19 , - MR. REIS: I don't see -- 20 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yeah, 5:30 is okay. 21 (Recess.) 22 (No hiatus.) 23 24 3 25 G TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14771 i (]) 1 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Back on the record. 2 Mr. Sinkin? 3 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, I'm just going to 4 make an observation at this point. This is my direct 5 case. It is the end of my case, so my observation won't

          '6   be necessarily carried on any further.                                                But it seems to 7   me that since it's my direct case, that after the other 8   parties have cross-examined, if I need time to prepare 9   for my cross-examination, that should be a matter of 10    right and that instead a situation was set up where I 11    seemed to have been pressured to prepare my redirect as 12    quickly as possible; whereas, the Applicants on their 13    redirect can take as long as they like and I don't think 14    that was quite fair.                                               I do feel prepared. I don't feel 15    I need any more time, but the circumstances'were less
     . 16      than ideal.
        -17                                                JUDGE BECHHOEFER:              I might add that we did 18    discuss with you whether we should adjourn and allow you 19    to prepare overnight.

20 MR. SINKIN: The Board did and the decision 21 was let's try and finish Mr. Robertson to let him go, 22 which was very much my sen2iment, too. 23 MR. GUTTERMAiu I don't want to get into a O 24 long discussion about this, but I think when we broke 25 CCANP asked that they have till 5:30. It's now 5:35. I TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14772 () I think CCANP got what they asked for. 2 MR. REIS: I think we could just go ahead. 3 4 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 5 BY MR. SINKIN: 6 Q Mr. Robertson, are you aware that the Incident 7 Review Committee did review a Quadrex item prior to the 8 final report being delivered? 9 A Not -- no, I am not aware that it was -- that i aey reviewed something that directly arose out of the 11 Quadrex report. I'm not surprised to know that they

,-   12  didn't review something that Quadrex might have also l

13 identified. And I may have known earlier more about it, 14 but it doesn't register right now in particulars. 15 Q If I said it was an error that dealt with the 16 upset condition values, an error from the code that was 17 used by Brown & Root, would that refresh your memory at 18 all? 19 A Not really, not from just that amount of 20 information. 21 Q If Applicants could show you CCANP Exhibit 94 22 and 95. 23 MR. GUTTERMAN: Mr. Chairman, I'm a little 24 perplexed about why this is within the scope of the 25 cross-examination or the Board examination. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14773 I) 1 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Sinkin, can you v. 2 explain? 3 MR. SINKIN: In the cross-examination by other 4 parties the question came up about reviews for 5 notification in relation to various meetings that were 6 held by Quadrex and the witness' statement was that 7 action on notifiability was deferred until the final 8 Quadrex report was received. 9 I'm asking him if he's familiar with a 10 particular event where action was not deferred until the 11 final report was received. Since CCANP Exhibit 95 s 12 demonstrates that Mr. C. G. Robertson received a copy of [e Q./

        }

13 an IRC report on April 27th, 1981, specifically 14 identifying that the Quadrex audit had identified a 15 matter that was then reviewed by the IRC, I'm trying to 16 refresh his memory. 17 MR. GUTTERMAN: I can't see the relationship 18 between that and Mr. Robertson's testimony about what he 19 heard at a meeting on April 13th. 20 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman? In reviewing my 21 notes further, it indicates that the question was asked 22 briefings, plural, prior to that time and then it was g- 23 also asked whether it was appropriate for the IRC to

    \_/

24 proceed with its own investigation before receiving the 25 Quadrex review. The witness said that there was no TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14774 () 1 review for reportability on any matter, actions were 2 deferred until the final Quadrex review was received. 3 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I guess we'll overrule the 4 objection. 5 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Have you had a chance to 6 review CCANP 94 and 95, Mr. Robertson? 7 A Okay. 8 0 Does that refresh your recollection that the 9 IRC did review an item prior to the receipt of the final 10 Quadrex report that resulted from the Quadrex study? 11 A Frankly, I don't remember that this occurred, 12 but I don't doubt.that it did. I have no idea in what (s)

                                          ~

~s 13 form it got brought before the IRC from that standpoint 14 either. 15 I remember the discussion relative to this 16 particular issue when we received the Quadrex report, 17 yes, but I don't recall that I was aware that the IRC -- 18 I may have been, but I don't recall it, that the IRC had 19 already met on it. And neither do I know nor. at this 20 point do I recall even if I knew what the source of the 21 IRC's input was to cause them to hold this meeting. 22 Whether it came from Brown & Root, whether it came from 23 one of our engineers, I wouldn't know. (-) \a 24 Q Do you know -- 25 A But apparently from reading it, refreshing my TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e - ._ 14775 () 1 memory, they did indeed look at a particular item that 2 Quadrex also put in their final report. 3 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, I move to strike 4 everything after he said "it doesn't refresh my 5 recollection." It is not responsive to the question. 6 The question is does this document refresh your memory. 7 Everything after that was conjecture and I move to 8 strike everything after that as conjecture. 9 MR. SINKIN: To some extent, I think that's 10 true, Mr. Chairman, 11 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I think it's true. You may 12 have to reask the question. O 13 MR. SINKIN: Yeah, I may have to try again. 14 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: But we will strike the part 15 referenced by Mr. Reis. 16 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Well, let's start with CCANP 17 94, Mr. Robertson. Do you know who Mr. A. D. Poole is? 18 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, I object. There is 19 no showing of materiality as to who A. D. Poole may be. 20 MR. SINKIN: I beg your pardon? 21 MR. REIS: There's no showing that it may be 22 material to the ultimate determination in this case. 23 MR. SINKIN: We're attempting to refresh the 24 witness' recollection of the event. We're doing it by 25 calling specific attention to specific parts of the TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14776 (~ . (_% j 1 event. That's normally how one refreshes the witness' 2 recollection. 3 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, he's trying to 4 impeach the witness on the answers he's elicited from 5 the witness before. The witness said he had no 6 recollection of this document. That's it. He's now 7 trying to impeach the witness -- 8 MR. SINKIN: No, I'm not. 9 MR. REIS: -- on that point. He said he had 10 no recollection of this document. I think that ends 11 it. 12 MR. SINKIN: At that point he had no 13 recollection. If you call his attention to particular 14 parts of the document, he may then have a recollection. 15 That's the normal process. 16 MR. GUTTERMAN: Mr. Chairman, it seems like 17 we're in the middle of a deposition here or some kind of 18 discovery. The witness reviewed both documents. He 19 said having reviewed them, it did not refresh his 20 recollection, he didn't remember it at all. These 4 21 documents are already proved up and we're just wasting 22 time on this. 23 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I think since the witness (~)s 24 does not remember these documents, we will sustain the 25 objection. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14777 () 1 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Mr. Robertson, when we were 2 reviewing the document that had Quadrex findings in one 3 column and HL&P IRC reports in the other column, do you 4 remember that document? 5 A Yes. 6 Q In the period May 7-May 8, you had some 7 reports from licensing that there were certain IRC 8 reports that related to Quadrex findings, if I remember 9 correctly; is that correct? 10 A There were -- I had asked our IRC chairman 11 either directly or indirectly through Mr. Jacobi to 12 inform me of what items IRC might have previously 13 reported to the NRC that would also in essence be the 14 same thing as Quadrex had brought up as an issue in its 15 report, yes. 16 Q And some of those items were a direct 17 relationship. For example, Quadrex found something and 18 the IRC had reported something quite similar, like the 19 auxiliary feedwater pump I think you used as an example. 20 A Yes. 21 Q Others were much more indirect where the 22 Quadrex finding might even say it's over-conservative 23 and there might be reporting in that area, but there

   -}

(~- 24 wasn't a direct relationship; is that correct? 25 A There were some that could be considered TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

my av - - 14778 () 1 indirect, yes. 2 Q Now, you stated in response to 3 cross-examination that the number of reportable items in 4 the report was part of your basis for reaching a 5 decision on whether there had been a quality assurance 6 breakdown. Do you remember that? 7 A Yes. 8 Q Given the fact that Quadrex was reporting 9 things that had already teen notified to the NRC in the 10 direct relationship category and tne fact that other new 11 reports were coming out of the Quadr:x report to the

 ,      12 NRC, did that not indicate to you the possibility of an 13 engineering breakdown?

14 A No. There had been 55(e) reports made for the 15 previous three or four years. Sometimes there was a 16 long period of time between some, I believe, and other 17 times they happened relatively frequently. And to find 18 that an engineering review had identified something that 19 had already been brought forth and addressed to NRC, 20 that's not surprising. And it is not -- it's not 21 indicative of a breakdown. 22 Quite the contrary, it's indicative of a ( ( 23 control process that identifies these things. It would

   )

k 24 have been much more indicative of a breakdown if these 25 items had not previously been reported to NRC, if they TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14779 e (m) 1 had gone undetected. But something in the process had 2 detected these things earlier and brought them to the 3 attention of HL&P. So, from my perspective, the items 4 that were previously reported simply reflected a control 5 process. 6 0 What about indicating a breakdown in the 7 control of engineering activities, a criterion 7 type 8 breakdown? 9 A Excuse me, I've got to look at criterion 7. 10 0 That's fine. 11 A Okay. Excuse me. Can you repeat your

f. .

12 question, please? , s/ ' 13 0 Whether the fact that in the Quadrex report 14 there were both items notified to the NRC previously and 15 new 50.55(e) items being notified to the NRC would 16 indicate to you a breakdown under criterion 7 in the 17 control of engineering services? 18 A No. I don't interpret it quite in'that 19 fashion. Criterion 7 to me I don't normally associate 20 with the performance of your major AE or perhaps in 21 large part with your NSSS vendor. The design activities 22 that are performed by those two in particular I usually (S 23 think of as falling under criterion 3. U k 24 I look at criterion 7 as covering things that 25 those two entities might send out of their shop for TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

l 14780 I[ ) 1 fabrication, for purchase or for services they might l 2 _ contract for, but I don't associate criterion 7 in the 1 3 same fashion that your question implied. 4 Q Between the time you joined HL&P March 21st, 5 1981, I think it was? 6 A 20th, I believe. 7 0 20th, all right, and May 8 of 1981, did you 8 review the quality assurance audits performed by HL&P of 9 Brown & Root's engineering program? 10 A No. I may have seen some, but I cannot recall 11 any particulars and I know I did not have any program of 3 12 such review. Q If you would look at CCANP 125. In 13 Q 14 particular, if you would turn to the second page of that 15 document dated October 24 and read the third paragraph. 16 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We were trying to figure 17 out what this is related to in terms of either our 18 questions or the Applicants' or Staff's questions. 19 MR. SINKIN: I think the question I will ask 20 will demonstrate whether it's related or not. 21 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Okay? 22 If you had had this document, if you had 23 reviewed this document, been familiar with this document 24 prior to May the 8th and then received the Quadrex 25 report -- or May the 7th and then received the Quadrex TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14781 I fs (,) 1 report, would that change your opinion on whether you 2 would report the Quadrex report to the Nuclear 3 Regulatory Commission as an engineering breakdown under 4 criterion 3 or 7, whichever one? 5 MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, I still don't see the 6 relevance or material -- I mean, I don't see how it's

                                                                         ~

7 based on my questions, Applicants' questions or the 8 Board's questions. It certainly isn't demonstrative of 9 that. 10 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, I am in part 11 following up. The line of questioning was what would it 12 have taken for you to belieVe there had been a quality 13 assurance breakdown. The witness' answer was eight, 14 ten, twelve potentially reportable findings, maybe that 15 would have been a solid clue. I'm asking in that same 16 context would this have been a solid clue. 17 JUDGE LAMB: Mr. Sinkin, the question I 18 believe was mine and it was in the context of the 19 Quadrex report. 20 MR. GUTTERMAN: The question was what would 21 have to have been different about the Quadrex report to 22 have made it reportable. 23 JUDGE LAMB: As a QA breakdown. 24 MR. GUTTERMAN: As a QA breakdown. 25 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We'll sustain the TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

      -sruv 1

14782 r- . (_)b 1 objection. I think it's beyond the scope of Dr. Lamb's 2 question. 3 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) You were asked if the 4 problems identified in the Quadrex report reflected on 5 HL&P's ability to control design work and you answered 6 that Quadrex represented a positive step forward. You 7 then said that no other project had commissioned a 8 report like this and that what was going on in Quadrex 9 was they were asking what are these people doing, do 10 they really understand what they are doing. Do you 11 remember that? g3 12 . A Yes, with one minor correction. I believe I (/

• said that this was the first of this type of review 13 14 process that I was aware of.

15 Q Aware of,' fine. 16 My question is, given the questions you 17 thought Quadrex was answering, what are these people 18 doing, do they really understand what they are doing, 19 how do you think Quadrex answered that question? 20 A They answered the questions I think, however, 21 I'm not so sure that the way they answered it didn't 22 lead to misinterpretations of what they were saying, 23 just the words and the way they put them together, but I

'-       24 believe they answered the question in the sense that 25 Brown & Root was having great difficulty in those areas TATE REPORTING         (713) 498-8442

e 14783 l ) 1 of design activities that are typically associated with 2 the heart of nuclear engineering activities, pipe 3 stress, piping, nuclear analysis, computer codes which 4 had been a common industry problem for a while. 5 In these areas Brown & Root was struggling to 6 put in place the right technical resources, put in place 7 the processes that would allow them to continue into 8 those areas. They seemed to have done a rather large 9 part of the civil structural work and actually gotten it 10 built, but they couldn't or it didn't seem to be 11 producing the other parts of the nuclear engineering 12 design activities needed to fill those buildings. And 13 Quadrex identified that, if you understand what they 14 said, they ' identified that they were having great 15 difficulty turning out a product. 16 I think they also said something else, that 17 the methods chosen by Brown & Root were, with a few 18 exceptions, I don't think there were very many of those, 19 but the methods chosen were technically adequate. They 20 hadn't in some cases been able to produce any work with 21 those methods. 22 But I'm not aware of more than one or two 23 places where Quadrex identified a technically inadequate [} 24 method that Brown & Root was pursuing or trying to 25 pursue or going to pursue. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

      -u-vm 14784 f( )     1      Q    In response to questions from Chairman 2 Bechhoefer about your post-notification reports, the 3 thirty-day reports, he asked about the sources of 4 information, whether they were pertinent to an 5 understanding of those reports. Was it common at HL&P 6 when they did their follow-up reports in 50.55(e) to 7 identify how the deficiency was originally found?

8 A No, I don't believe it was common, neither was 9 it something that was not done either. I mean, I think 10 you'll find cases of both where the source of 11 information was not identified and other cases where the 12 source was. As I said, particularly with respect to . (_- - 13 items where we thought NRC would have a reason to want 14 to know what the source of that was, what the source of 15 the information was. But it was not common practice, as 16 I understood it, to quote from internal reports or 17 things like this as being the source of information. 18 Q You stated that af ter the initial reports were 19 made in the computer code area and to some extent in the 20 HVAC area, the scope of the matters to be addressed grew 21 substantially. Do you remember that? 22 A Yes. 23 Q Why in that case were there not additional k 24 50.55(e) reports filed to cover the items that were 25 beyond the scope of the initial notification? TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 14785 ( ); 1 A They were covered in the thirty-day and 2 follow-up reports. The scope of the process necessary 3 to resolve that issue was clearly identified in those 4 reports. So, NRC was informed as to the scope change 5 and what was going on. 6 Q You stated that at the meeting on May the 7th 7 at Brown & Root there were forty or fifty people present 6 and that there were HL&P personnel present. Can you 9 tell me how many HL&P people were there? 10 MR. GUTTERMAN: He also answered that in the 11 same description. He said there were about a dozen. 73 12 . MR. SINKIN: I'm sorry. I. missed that. \-) 13 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: He said it went down to 14 two. 15 MR. SINKIN: And it went down to one. 16 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Among those dozen, did they 17 represent the spectrum of HL&P engineering disciplines? 18 A It seems to me that that was so, that the

       ,19 individuals from HL&P did indeed represent a pretty 20 broad spectrum.

21 Q You were asked a question whether the HL&P 22 review group, the three people, discussed referring the 23 Quadrex report to the IRC for further review. In your

'       24 answer you said you could not remember any formal 25 instruction or program that would have caused the IRC to TATE REPORTING         (713) 498-8442

l l 14786 1

                                                                             )

() 1 review. 2 I'd like to go back to the actual question 3 that was asked. In the review group itself, was there l 4 any discussion about furthering the Quadrex report on to 5 the IRC? 6 MR. GUTTERMAN: Do you mean forwarding? 7 MR. SINKIN: Excuse me? 8 MR. GUTTERMAN: I thought you said 9 furthering. 10 MR. SINKIN: Forwarded over to the IRC. 11 A I don't recall that there was any discussion 12 by three ' team members of having the IRC formally or 13 informally, for that matter, review the Quadrex report. 14 I don't recall any discussion on that day of the Quadrex 15 report being reviewed by 'IRC other than the three items 16 that were. 17 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) You engaged in a fairly 18 lengthy dialogue comparing the current DEF process with 19 the May 7th-May 8th process and how they were similar 20 and not similar. I only had one clarification 21 question. 22 In the DEF process, if you decide a DEF is not 23 necessary, is any further analysis conducted on that x; 24 item? 25 A Well, I assume by that you mean if the TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

mrvu 14787 () 1 individual decides a DEF is not necessary, he doesn't 2 prepare one. So, in that case, unless he does something 3 else, the answer would be no. 4 Q I guess the question was more if he decides a 5 DEF is not necessary, would he do anything else 6 normally? 7 MR. GUTTERMAN: That's so speculative and 8 vague and -- 9 MR. SINKIN: I don't think so at all. I think 10 the answer is fairly clear. 11 MR. GUTTERMAN: I don't see how it's a 12 meaningful question. ., 13 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Am I not correct if an 14 individual or an engineer is walking through the site 15 and sees something, he could prepare a DEF, sees 16 something that might warrant further study? 17 THE WITNESS: Our instructions to our people 18 are to prepare a DEF anytime they become aware of 19 something that they believe would represent something of 20 safety significance that could or should possibly be 21 reviewed for reportability, prepare it. 22 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I take it if he were r 23 walking through the site in the same way and didn't see 24 something he would not document the fact that he didn't 25 see anything? TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

m o y-tsw 14788

 /T                      THE WITNESS:   That's correct, sir.

1 Tss/ 1 1 2 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) But in this instance we're 3 dealing with in a sense things that have already been 4 seen. You have the Quadrex report. You're looking at 5 the findings. The questions were related to how the DEF 6 process would compare to that. You look at a Quadrex 7 finding, you don't prepare a DEF about it. Normally 8 would anything else be done about that finding? 9 A Well, with respect to reportability, if an 10 issue doesn't warrant the DEF process, then nothing more 11 would be done in the system with respect to that 12 matter.

      ~

13 Now, just because something doesn't warrant 14 reportability or review for reportability in no way 15 would mean that there does not need to be or probably 16 should be and there would be some action taken by 17 engineering to resolve any issue that's brought up. 18 There are many many things that come to the attention of 19 engineering that do not represent something that falls 20 into the 55(e) category. And they don't ignore those 21 things, they take action to resolve them, whatever that 22 might be. 23 (No hiatus.) (")T 24 25 TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

14789 O 1 Q So those would be non-safety related items and 2 they would take action outside the DEF process? 3 A Not necessarily non-saftey related. They could 4 be safety related or non-saftey related. 5 Q In response to questioning about Quadrex 6 question N-17, you stated that if all you had read was 7 N-17, it probably would have been notified to the NRC. 8 What else did you read or learn that led you not to 9 notify the NRC of what was in question N-17? 10 MR. REIS: I would like Mr. Sinkin to indicate 11 at what period was no notification made of N-17. ' 12 MR. SINKIN: We're talking about on May 8th. 13 MR. REIS: As contrasted to later times. 14 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) As opposed to later time, on 15 May 8th, what did you know on May 8, that led you not to 16 report what was found in N-17. 17 A I had, in addition to what is just stated 18 there, I had the presentation the evening before by Brown 19 & Root where they had covered one or more, and I don't 20 recall right now how many of the findings that came out 21 of that particular assessment. And the status of 22 engineering activities was described at that meeting. 23 I can't recall the exact words that were used 24 and so forth. In addition, I had opportunity to discuss 25 that with Dr. Sumpter and as I indicated earlier, I'm TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14790

  ~S                                                                    .

(V 1 sure with Mr. Jacobi sirece both of those individuals had 2 prior knowledge of nuclear analysis activities. 3 I also, that evening before, had some direct 4 conversations with the supervisor of nuclear analysis at 5 Brown & Root. I can't tell you what all of those where 6 because I don't remember, who said what to whom. But out 7 of that conglomeration of conversations, I did indeed 8 obtain more information, enough to satisfactory me, that 9 I did not need to report that particular item as it was 10 reflected in a discipline finding on to NRC. 11 Q Looking at question N-17, can you recall what 12 information specifically you received that made it no (~} 13 longer notifiable in your view? \_/ 14 A Well, I don't know that this is a c'omplete 15 answer to what I knew at that point, but I was aware that 16 among other things, Brown & Root had initiated a new 17 re-analysis of this area with NUS, and if my memory is 18 correct, that was in fact the discipline finding most 19 directly related to this assessment. 20 There were some other, I may have known some 21 other things at that point in time, be aware of them. I 22 do remember that particular -- that one particular item. 23 I know you I did read very carefully the B&R response to 24 sort out, in my own mind, what those temperatures were -- 25 different temperatures were setting up, what the basis p. TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14791 i ,rg V 1 was being set up. And I'm sorry to be so vague in that 2 sense but I just don't remember the details of it, to the 3 extent that I think your question is asking. 4 Q Would the fact, just using the first fact 5 alone, would the fact that Brown & Root had initiated a 6 new re-analysis of this particular problem with NUS that 7 was going to cover this problem, would that fact alone be 8 enough to change an item from potentially reportable to 9 not potentially reportable? 10 A Well, it seems to me that we're talking about 11 an entire analysis basis. And excuse me, I'm not being 12 responsive. 13 0 It's late in the day for all of us.

 )

14 A Yes. 15 Q So just take your time. 16 A Reminded me of something else and I was going 17 down the wrong path. Would you please restate your 18 question again. 19 Q Just taking the first fact that you mentioned 20 that Brown & Root had initiated a new re-analysis of this 21 question with NUS, a re-analysis that would cover the 22 obversation made by Quadrex. Does the existance of that 23 analysis change a potentially notifiable finding to a 24 non-potentially notifiable finding? 25 A Okay. As I said, I believe the discipline w ' TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

E 14792 [) 1 finding, one of them, at least, that came from here, had 2 to do with a recommendation that the analysis of the ECP 3 be re-done. And in the sense that NUS was already doing 4 that, that would have been an appropriate response. 5 But just a recommendation to re-do an analysis

                                                    ~~

6 is not of itself something that meets the criteria for 7 reportability. So I don't know that that question can be 8 answered in that way. 9 What I had started to say was related to basic 10 question, I believe, and that is the analyses that had 11 been performed hear were preliminary, they had not been 12 finished; particularly the EPC -- the ECP design had not

 /   13 been finished, it was still carried as using preliminary 14 data, even though th'e pond had been built, I believe.

15 Therefore, on that basis, one would want to 16 find a particular deficiency in the calculation such that 17 it would show that the pond as built would be deficient; 18 that would be one of those tests that would lead you to a 19 reportability. 20 If they had not completed the analysis, then it 21 is a case of having built an item, a structure, using 22 . preliminary data with the analyses yet to be confirmed. 23 And I believe this fits in that category of preliminary 24 set of analyses that had not yet been finished. We're

 ,_  25 talking about an interim set. On that basis, they would

(,) TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14793 0 1 not be reportable unless you had a reason to believe that 2 the as-built structure was indeed not going to be 3 satisfactory. And reading this, I didn't find that. 4 I found questions about the analysis but not 5 really something that told me the ECP was going to be 6 deficient, not based on my experience as to temperatures 7 and the affects of temperatures in the operation of 8 equipment related to the ECP in terms of chilled water, 9 component cooling water effects. 10 O Let me go back to the fundamental question 11 then. What did you see when you read this that led you 12 to conclude this was a potentially reportable finding 13 absent further information?

 }

14 A Well, when I -- I am used to seeing a facility 15 such as the ECP that is built, if it is built and built 16 with preliminary data, built to such conservative 17 standards that there's never really a question about it 18 meeting the preliminary analysis numbers. 19 And here apparently there was some questions 20 about the adequacy of the analyses. The analyses were 21 not clearly showing an as built ECP that was 22 satisfactory. That's not something I'm used to seeing, 23 I'm not used to seeing analyses in the interim, even 24 preliminary, $b4e don't clearly show that it's working 25 satisfactory. So if you see that, you start generating S pJ t TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14794

 \(^j) 1    mental questions, hey what's wrong.

2 0 Then maybe the question I should have asked was 3 if you -- if those kinds of questions are raised about a 4 preliminary analysis but you know that it's a preliminary 5 analysis and there's going to be a final analysis, does 6 that change your mind about whether there's a notifiable 7 finding or not?

        ,8         A     Now you're -- okay, now you're into the area of 9    engineering judgment.         Things don't always come out nice 10     and clean and clear.         And one has to in such cases, look 11     at what is really there in the terms of hardware, 12     analysis, many times make a judgment.          This happens to be

(~T 13 an area that I felt very comfortable making such V 14 judgments. And I wouldn't try to tell you that 15 everything about this about this is black and white. I 16 don't believe it is. I made certain judgments about the 17 effects of temperature and what the real temperature 18 would have to be. Mother nature sets certain limits on 19 temperature. Typical equipment that uses that as a 20 source have certain temperature rises. 21 Typically the heat loads in a power plant that 22 come into this, they're not all that different one from 23 another. 24 So I felt comfortable in making this kind of 25 judgment, as to what the impacts of these temperatures as 3 G TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14795 O G 1 presented, what would they really mean to the safe 2 operation of the plant. And I made those judgments. 3 0 In observing -- in giving your observations 4 about the Quadrex report, you noted that there were 5 things that they would say that weren't clear, that you 6 felt didn't really say what they wanted to say was one 7 thing I noticed. And one of those you pointed out was 8 the design verification of one discipline of the work of 9 another discipline. And I think if you turn to page 3-3 10 of the Quadrex report, we may be looking at the generic 11 finding that you found was not -- did not say what 12 Quadrex was trying to say.

                                                ~

{} 13 14 You further testified that you, after looking into what the basis for the finding was, you understood 15 what they were trying to say and it wasn't as they had 16 worded it. My question is: What did you understand 17 they were trying to say? 18 3.l(b) (i) , I think, is the one that captures 19 what we're talking about, it may not be. 20 A I may have mentioned part of that. I don't 21 believe that is the one I was referring to, as you quoted 22 it. I believe I was referring to one that used words 23 like verification. Whether it's in the generic or 24 whether it's in the discipline findings, I frankly don't ,-) 25 know. There were findings, most serious category, V s TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14796 () 1 related to the verification of work by others, by Brown & 2 Root, or lack thereof. As a matter of fact, it's down -- 3 I see some of those words down at the bottom of that same 4 page, 3-3. I think you had pointed me to Item No. 1. 5 0 Maybe it's -- right, I think that probably that 6 first sentence in that paragraph at the bottom? 7 A Yes, I believe I was referring explicitly to 8 those words. 9 0 When you did further analysis of what Quadrex 10 based this on, what did you determine was in fact what 11 Quadrex was trying to say? 12 A They were simply -- well, they were saying that  ; 13 Brown & Root needed to increase its review of inputs -{ } 14 received from these other agencies. And I'm not -- I'm 15 not sure that that's all they meant. 16 But that seemed to be the basic thrust when I 17 went back and read the questions, that had to do with 18 what Brown & Root was doing relative to input that was 19 received from other vendors. Instead of always using the . . 20 word design verified, you find them starting to use words 21 'back there like " reviewed" or " checked for consistency," 22 those kind of words. There'sabigdifferenc$between 23 those words and " design verified." 24 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Sinkin, do you have a 25 lot more? i. TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442'

14797 O 1 MR. SINKIN: I have about twc more and then 2 I'll be done. 3 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: It's getting awfully late 4 and I'm -- 5 MR. SINKIN: I know it is. 6 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Based on something you said, 7 the impression I got was you did not read all of the 8 questions and answers prior to May 7th and 8th; is that 9 correct? 10 A That's correct. 11 Q How did you select which ones you did read? 12 A I looked at those that I considered myself (} 13 14 representing the most expertise within the three members on those particular issues. Also, I happen to be those 15 that -- for want of another reason, perhaps I took the 16 most interest in personally, too. The nuclear analysis l 17 and computer code area clearly fell into that category, 18 and I thought they represented some of the more important 19 elements of the Quadrex report. 20 0 My final question is about the necessity of 21 having a top level document defining such things as

22 separation and single failure; you said it's not 23 necessary to have often such a document, there are other 24 ways to do it. If you -- let's do a hypothetical which I gs 25 think paralels what Quadrex was doing, but let's just use

 \b                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 l TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

14798

~h                                                                           -

(V 1 it as a hypothetical. If you go into an assessment of 2 the technical adequacy of the work of an engineering 3 group and in discipline after discipline, you find that 4 they either cannot produce the list of items that they 5 consider for single failure or they cannot produce clear 6 guidance for another discipline as to what's there for 7 single failure, or separation, would not one approach to 8 curing that problem be to say to the project you must 9 have a top level document that tells all these 10 disciplines what it is they're suppoced to be doing? 11 A That could be an approach. I doubt it would be 12 sufficient under the circumstances you described, because 13 putting a top level docu,ent m out on something as complex {'} 14 as single failure that would cover all the disciplines' 15 application of that in their area is mind boggling to me 16 to try to think about how to do it. If you put out 17 certain general guidance, you would still have to rely on 18 each of the disciplines or areas of design to further 19 supplement that in much more detail in some fashion to 20 have a complete documentation of that particular matter. 21 On the other hand, plants have been designed 22 without any such documentation of that type, top level or 23 middle level very satisfactorily. I'm not suggesting 24 that's necessarily the best practice but it has occurred.

 - 25             (No hiatus.)

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

e 14799 1[ ) 1 Q What if you already know that what you're 2 dealing with is a design engineering group that lacks 3 experience? Nuclear doesn't seem to demonstrate an 4 understanding of some fundamental nuclear principles, 5 and that when you asked them, they've said, well, this 6 is what we've got and what they're showing you is 7 totally inadequate. How do you cure that problem? 8 A It may take some rather dramatic activities 9 the way you've described it, I guess. 10 I think what you're suggesting is that, yes, 11 indeed, if you had a group of inexperienced engineers, 12 either in terms of total engineering experience or () 13 experience in the area that they're now concerned about, 14 it might very well be necessary to have some very 15 specific and detailed guidance for them to be successful 16 in their activities. Could very well be. 17 MR. SINKIN: That's all I have, Mr. Chairman. 18 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Reis? 19 MR. REIS: I have about two questions. 20 21 RECROSS EXAMINATION 22 BY MR. REIS: 23 Q Who was Steve Dew and how do you spell his 24 name? 25 A Mr. Dew at that time was one of the senior l TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

usruo

                              .  .                                                                14800

() 1 individuals and I don't recall exactly his title, 2 although I was reminded of it recently. He worked for 3 Brown & Root. He was in the engineering organization, 4 relatively new to it, had not been there a long period 5 of time. And I want to say assistant engineering 6 manager or something of that type. He was -- in my 7 mental viewing it, he was four or five people down from 8 Mr. Saltare11i or maybe it was only three people, but 9 something on that order. He worked for Brown & Root and 10 subsequently joined HL&P. 11 Q Okay.  ; l 12 A You spell it D E W. . 13 Q After May 8th, 1981, were additional matters 14 or findings in the Quadrex report sent to the NRC l 15 pursuant to 50.55(e) as a result of Bechtel's task force l 16 review? 17 A Yes. When we were presented with the task 18 force review, I believe it was March of 1982, somet ime l l 19 March or early April, they had recommended one 1 20 additional item be considered potentially reportable 21 that had to do with a common instrument air line that's 22 located in the fuel handling building. 23 0 Thank you.

    )
 '-      24                  A        Since they had recommended it, we made the 25       notification.

TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

6 14801 () 1 MR. REIS: That's all I have. 2 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Gutterman? Mr. 3 Axelrad? 4 MR. GUTTERMAN: We have no further questions. 5 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The Board has no further 6 questions. 7 Do you have any follow-up on the last -- 8 MR. SINKIN: One follow-up question. 9 MR. PIRFO: It's got to be about Mr. Dew. 10 11 REDIRECT EXAMINATION (Cont'd) 12 BY MR. SINKIN: 13 Q Mr. Dew wedt to HL&P you said? 14 A Yes. 15 0 And what position did he take there? 16 A He was -- he joined us as engineering manager, 17 I believe. 18 MR. SINKIN: That's all I have, Mr. Chairman. 19 MR. PIRFO: We don't have any more questions 20 about Mr. Dew. 21 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Robertson, I guess 22 you're excused. We appreciate your attendance. 23 MR. GUTTERMAN: I assume his sequectration is (V~T 24 over? 25 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes. You can read the TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

y sv vo 14802 () 1 newspapers. You can read the transcripts. Maybe you 2 won't want to, but you may. 3 THE WITNESS: Well, I did take the 4 opportunity -- I assume we can go off the record on 5 this. 6 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Off the record. 7 (Discussion off the record.) 8 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Back on the record for a 9 minute. 10 Mr. Axelrad? 11 MR. AXELRAD: Yes. In one of the recesses 12 this afternoon the parties have discussed CCANP Exhibit 13 121 and CCANP's subpoena of Dr. Broom. And we have 14 reached a stipulation that it would not be necessary for 15 Dr. Broom to appear. We will stipulate to the 16 authenticity of CCANP number 121 and then we would argue 17 before the Board the materiality or any other arguments 18 that may be available as to whether or not that exhibit 19 should be accepted into evidence. And in view of the 20 lateness of the hour, I would suggest we do that 21 tomorrow morning. 22 MR. SINKIN: That's fine. 23 MR. PIRFO: The Staff was party to that

 '        agreement as well, with the caveat I'll bring up in the 24 25  morning.

TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

r - 14803 1 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We'll consider it first 2 thing in the morning. 3 MR. AXELRAD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 4 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We'll adjourn till 9:00 5 o' clock. 6 (Hearing recessed at 6:37 p.m.) l 7 8 9 10 11 12 ~ th 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ( 25 i i TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 L

llhl CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTERS 2 3 This is to certify that the attached proceedings before 4 the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR COMMISSION in the matter of: 5 6 NAME OF PROCEEDING: EVIDENTIARY HEARING HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER COMPANY, 7 ET AL (SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 AND 2) 8 9 DOCKET NO.: STN 50-498-OL STN 50-499-OL 10 11 PLACE: HOUSTON, TX

    .2 DATE:                 Wednesday, August 7, 1985 13 14  were held as herein appears, and that this is the 15  original transcript thereof for the file of the United 16  States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

17 18 y , R. Patrick Tate, CSR

                             *b w y.

s( 7 .o Susan R. Goldstein, CSR 22 Official Reporters

 <S3 L_)

24 25

i

           ),            CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTERS 2

3 This is to certify that the attached proceedings before 4 the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR COMMISSION in the matter of: 5 6 NAME OF PROCEEDING: EVIDENTIARY HEARING HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER COMPANY, 7 ET AL (SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 AND 2) 8 9 DOCKET NO. STN 50-498-OL STN 50-499-OL , 10 11 PLACE: HOUSTON, TX

    ~12       DATE:                Wednesday, August 7, 1985

, ) 14 were held as herein appears, and that this is the 15 original transcript thereof for the file of the United 16 States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 17 18 19 5 c-R. Patrick Tate, CSR 20 A

                                                      '" c     'b 21                          +o_b#

Susan R. Goldstein, CSR 22 Official Reporters t 25}}