ML20133B429

Transcript of 850731 Evidentiary Hearing in Houston,Tx. Pp 13,410-13,630.Supporting Documentation Encl

ML20133B429
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Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	07/31/1985
From:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
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CON-#385-154 OL, NUDOCS 8508060173
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ORIGINAL 0

UN11ED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO: STN 50-498-OL STN 50-499-OL HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER COMPANY, et al.

(SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, Units 1 and 2)

EVIDENTIARY HEARING LOCATION: HOUSTON, TEXAS PAGES: 13410 - 13630 DATE: WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 1985

/0 -

0's i

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Official Reporters 8500060173 050731 444 North Ca itol Street PDR ADOCK 05000490 Washington, C. 20001 i PDR (202)347 3700 NAT10NWICE COVERACE ,

13410

(~')

(_/ 1 2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 5 ----------------------------------X 6 In the Matter of:  : DOCKET NO.

7 HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER  : STN-50-498-OL 8 COMPANY, ET AL.,  : STN-50-499-OL 9 (South Texas Project Units 1 & 2  :

10 ----------------------------------X 11 University of Houston 12 -

Teaching Unit II, #215

- 13 Houston, Texas 14 15 16 Wednesday, 31 July 1985 17 18 The hearing in the above-entitled matter was 19 convened, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:00 a.m.,

20 BEFORE:

21 JUDGE CHARLES BECHHOEFER, Chairman, 22 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

23 JUDGE JAMES C. LAMB, Member, 24 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

25 O

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13fil

() 1 JUDGE FREDERICK J. SHON, Member, 2 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

3 4 APPEARANCES:

5 On behalf of the Applicants:

6 MAURICE AXELRAD, Esq.,

7 ALVIN GUTTERMAN, Esq.,

8 DONALD J. SILVERMAN, Esq.,

9 STEVEN P. FRANTZ, Esq.,

10 Newman & Holtzinger, 11 Washington, D.C.

12 73 13 On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff:

V 14 ORESTE RUSS PIRFO, Esq., .

15 Office of the Executive Legal Director 16 17 On behalf of the Intervenor:

18 LANNY ALAN SINKIN, 19 3022 Porter St. N.W., 4304 20 Washington, D.C. 20008 21 Representative for Citizens Concerned About 22 Nuclear Power.

23 24 25 O

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l 13412  :

()l

\- 1 CONTENTS 2

3 WITNESSES: DIRECT CROSS VORI DIRE REDIRECT 4 SIDNEY BERNSEN and 13427 12507 13429 -

5 FRANK LOPEZ, JR. 13463 - - -

6 7

8 9

10 EXHIBITS: FOR ID IN EVD.

1.' . Applicants' Exhibit 63 13442 13460 12 Applicants' Exhibit 64 13463 13 Applicants' Exhibit 72 13470 13473 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 l 25 TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-0442

13413 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Good morning, ladies and 3 gentlemen. Before we resume with the Bechtel panel, are 4 there preliminary matters?

5 MR. AXELRAD: We have one preliminary matter, 6 Mr. Chairman. On Monday, a question was raised with 7 respect to audits of soils conditions at the STP in 1985.

8 What we've decided to do is, in order to eliminate any 9 question of any kind, is that we're in the process of 10 compiling all of the audits with respect to soils that 11 have been performed at the South Texas Project by either 12 HL&P or Ebasco or Bechtel since the 1984 audit report 13 which was the initial document involved in this O 14 contention, so we're compiiing those audit reports and 15 the responses to those audit reports and we will make 16 copies available of those to the parties and to the Board 17 after lunch today.

18 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That sounds fine. Are we 19 going to have adjourn to read them all.

20 MR. AXELRAD: Well, the soils panel is not 21 going to be on until tomorrow.

22 MR. SINKIN: Oh, I see go home tonight to read 23 them.

24 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I mean are they very 25 extensive, or are they --

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\-) 1 MR. AXELRAD: I don't honestly remember, but I 2 would suspect it's about a half inch of material. We are 3 not -- none of those materials will be exhibits in this 4 proceeding for us but we're making it available to the 5 parties. If the parties see anything in there that they 6 wish to tender as exhibits or question on then our 7 witnesses will be able to answer those.

8 The one thing that we will be providing, which 9 will an exhibit is the revised version of the response to 10 the notice of violation. That will be substituted as the 11 exhibit that we previously indicated, the original 12 version of the response of notice of violation, that 13 would be a substitute exhibit.

14 MR. PIRFO With regard to soils, I represented 15 to the Board a couple of days ago that Mr. Tapia would be 16 here as of this morning. It doesn't matter for purposes 17 of the hearing, but he actually will not arrive until 18 late this afternoon. But since I had represented to the 19 Board he would be here this morning, I wanted you to know 20 he won't be here until late this afternoon.

21 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, I guess we'll 22 reserve comment about these new documents until we have a 23 chance to look at them. I hope we'll have time to 24 prepare on these documents before the witnesses appear.

l 25 There is another matter that I wanted to bring i

( TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 t

13415 I

([l> 1 up this morning and to put on the record. I received a 2 call two days ago from a reporter in Austin that there 3 was going to be a meeting in Arlington, Texas between 4 HL&P and the NRC to discuss how the NRC would be going 5 through the documents released from under the gag order.

6 And I made arrangements with with one someone 7 in Dallas to contact the NRC office and request to appear 8 as our representative at that meeting. And she was told 9 that the meeting was closed; we would not be allowed to 10 attend.

11 I then contacted -- last night I found that out 12 and I spent a good bit of the evening trying to do

,- 13 something about this.

~

14 We contacted Region IV and asked that the 15 meeting be transcribed in case their decision that the 16 meeting should be closed turned out to be in error, that 17 if we could show that, later we would get the transcript.

18 We were told last night late that they were not 19 going transcribe the meeting either. We are pursuing 20 this this morning still; and I would just like it on the 21 record that we object to the NRC staff scheduling 22 significant meetings when we are in licensing hearings, 23 when CCANP's primary representative, myself, cannot be 24 present at those meetings, even were they open.

25 Wo object to the NRC staff and HL&P holding C)

V TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

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k-) 1 secret meetingc. We think they should be open and we 2 certainly object to them refusing to even produce a 3 transcript to protect the possibility that they've closed 4 the meeting improperly. And we just wanted to put that 5 on the record this morning.

6 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Pirfo, I have in my 7 files right in front of me a notice of a meeting dated 8 July 23. Is this the meeting that Mr. Sinkin is 9 referring to? Do you know the notice I'm talking about.

10 It was circulated to the parties.

11 MR. PIFRO: If I can approach and just take a 12 quick look, I think I've seen that, unless you have notes 13 on it or something. .

14 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: No, I don't.

15 MR. PIRFO: Let me just take a look at it to 16 save time. -

17 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: This just came in the 18 distribution list and it says the service list is on 19 there.

20 MR. PIRFO: This is the meeting. And this is --

l 21 I wanted to respond to Mr. Sinkin a little bit more 22 fully.

i 23 JUDGE BECH!!OEFER: Show it to Mr. Sinkin.

! 24 MR. SINKIN: I'm sure it was sent to my home in 25 Washington and I'm in !!ouston.

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\(~)

l 1 MR. SINKIN: We all have one address and you 2 sent a motion to our oiffice on Friday which I never 3 received.

4 MR. SINKIN: I am not objecting to the notice, 5 I found out about the meeting -- a reporter called me 6 because he got a notice too.

7 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Did Mr. Goldstein get a 8 notice or --

9 MR. SINKIN: I didn't call the Mr. Goldstein 10 even. The reporter called me and I said, "I'll get 11 somebody to go."

12 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: He could see it if he wants

. 13 to.

14 MR. PIRFO: He doesn't care to.

15 The first point I'd like to respond to is the 16 scheduling of the meeting. The fact that we're in 17 hearing is certainly a disadvantage for Mr. Sinkin 18 personally. But the NRC cannot be expected to conduct 19 its business around the schedule of one individual. So 20 it's unfortunate that it happened in this week. But we --

21 -from the looks of the hearing time that we've spent so 22 far, we're going to be in hearing for a good deal of the 23 fall. And to order the NRC's business around Mr.

24 Sinkin's personal Lchodule is a little bit wishful 25 thinking on !!r. Sinkin's part to think that can be done.

(-

(_)

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x- 1 secondly with regard do the meeting being 2 secret, I have hearsay upon hearsay upon hearsay 3 presented by Mr. Sinkin that the meeting was secret, and 4 as Judge Bechhoefer just showed the parties, there was a 5 notice about the meeting. I don't understand where che 6 secrecy involved in this meeting came in.

7 Now Mr. Sinkin had someone call from Dallas; I 8 don't know -- we don't know who that was; they called 9 someone else who we don't know who that person was.

10 Maybe one of these two people were misinformed or some 11 breakdown of communication reached Mr. Sinkin.

12 That's unfortunate but it's not the plight --

fs 13 it's not the problem of the NRC to make sure the U 14 communication lines to Mr. Sinkin are clear. I don't 15 understand where he got the idea that these meetings were 16 secret, and we rest on that.

17 MR. SINKIN: Let me just clarify something.

18 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Receipt me ask one question.

19 It's my experience that these meetings are also not 20 closed to intervenors.

21 MR. SINKIN: Normaly we are allowed.

22 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: At least in other cases that 23 I have been in.

24 MR. PIRPO: They are not closed.

25 JUDBE DECHHOEFER: That have not be closed.

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k>

1 1 MR. PIRFO: That's my impression and I assuma l 2 that's the case that obtains in this particular instance 3 as well.

4 J1DGE BECHHOEFER: To the extent proprietary 5 data is discussed, they are closed. But those are l

l 6 usually' segments of reetings where those types of 7 materials are discussed.

l 8 MR. SINKIN: I was probably not as clear as I 1

9 should have been. Let me start at the beginning. I got 10 a call about the meeting; I called someone in Dallas and 11 asked them to contacted the regional office and say they 12 were coming as our representative.

, 13 They called me back and said.they said I can't 14 come. I called the duty officer in Arlington got a 15 recording; called the duty officer in Washington last 16 night; talked to the duty officer in Washington told him 17 my prob 1cm, asked him to have Mr. Martin call me. The l 18 duty officer in Arlington called me. I told him the l

19 problem. Made the suggestion about we aren't asking that 20 we have to come, we're just ask that you take a l 21 transcript so if it turns out you shouldn't have closed 22 the meeting we will have the transcript available to us.

l 23 He said, "I'll check on it."

24 At 11:30 last night, the duty officer called me 25 back and said he had talked with some people, didn't say t

""""""" "'" * "' ~'"2

13420

~' '

(k >8 1 who, and that the meeting was closed and there would be 2 no transcript. And we checked again this morning with 3 the regional office and we haven't received a return 4 phone call by the time I left to come to these hearings.

5 MR. PIRFO: My impression is simply that Mr.

6 Sinkin was misinformed and didn't follow up with the 7 correct people. As far as having a transcript, I mean, 8 we can't be expected to order a transcript for the 9 convenience of Mr. Sinkin. So I see that as a total --

10 MR. SINKIN: Not for my convenience, for the 11 party that's not allowed to be present.

12 MR. PIRFO: Well, the party that's not there or 7- 13 for whomever.

14 JUDBE BECHHOEFER: It's contrary to my own 15 experience that parties are kept out. Now, I don't know --

16 except for proprietary data.

17 MR. SINKIN: I understand that.

18 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Or classified, if that's the 19 case, are discussed.

20 MR. PIRFO: Mr. Sinkin has stated his position 21 for the record here for whatever purposes that serves and 22 the staff has responded and I don't think it's 23 appropriate to continue this discussion at this point.

24 But I'm more than happy to if the Board deams it proper.

l 25 JUDGE DECIL!!OEFER: Do you have anyone who is in TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13421 1 Arlington who wishes to -- could attend? It starts at 2 9:30.

3 MR. SINKIN: We have been making calls to the 4 Arlington office, the person in Dallas, the in Dallas was 5 making calls and ready to attend and has not gotten 6 return phone calls. The last message I got at 8:30 this -

7 morning they were not returning her phone call.

8 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I was just wondering if they 9 walked into the room whether they had they would be kept 10 out.

11 MR. SINKIN: I did not want to have her do 12 that.

13 MR. PIRFP I have no idea. I don't see it as O 14 a --

15 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: This notice does not state 16 anything to the effect that it's a closed meeting. And 17 usually the notices when they're sent out to the parties 18 and probably made available to the press as well, but I'm 19 not sure how this is handled.

20 MR. SINKIN: That's the normal experience we 21 have, Mr. Chairman. I mean even if the notice is a 22 little late, I get a call and they say, "We mailed the

. 23 notice but you're not going to get in it time, we're l 24 going to have this meeting in Bethesda and if you would 25 like to come, let me know."

O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13422 1 MR. PIRFO: This notice is dated July 23rd.

2 MR. SINKIN: The notice is not at issue. It 3 went out obviously.

4 MR. PIRFO: If the notice is not at issue, I 5 don't understand what is in --

6 MR. SINKIN: We are in Houston.

7 MR. PIRFO: Unfortunately, we are yet to 8 develop a system where a person can be in two places at 9 one time.

10 MR. SINKIN: I have somebody in Dallas who's 11 waiting to go to the meeting who's be told they cannot 12 go.

13 MR. PIRFO: I cannot address that. I don't O 14 dispute the fact that ahe's been told she cannot go. All 15' I'm saying is perhaps she was misinformed.

16 MR. SINKIN: By the counsel for the region she 17 was informed.

18 MR. PIRFO: She was informed by Mr. Brown --

19 MR. SINKIN: Brown.

20 MR. PIRFO: -- that she could not to go that 21 meeting?

22 MR. SINKIN: That she could not go. ,

1 23 MR. PIRFO: I'll reserve any statement on that 24 until I've spoken with Mr. Brown and gotten the full 25 story firsthand.

()

l l

l TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

t i 13423 1 JUDGE BECHBOEFER: The notice says that Mr.

2 Constable should be contacted if you want to go. l t i l 3 MR. SINKIN: We tried the first and didn't ,

4 reach him. And so'we called the region directly, we  !

l 5 tried to. call the regional administrator and-the call  ;

6 back was from Mr. Brown saying the meeting was closed.  !

7 MR. PIRFO: Can I have a name of the person  !

l L 8 that called so I can talk to Mr. Brown and jog his l

9 memory.

10 MR. SINRIN: Juanita Ellis. l t

11 MR. PIRFO: I can remember that. l 12 MR. SINKIN: I thought you probably would.

l I

13 MR. PIRPO: If I may make one other observation O 14 and this doesn't go to Mr. Sinkin's credibility, but take i

15 it for what it is worth. First he tells'us it's the duty 16 officer and then tells me the in the last 30 seconds is

[

17 the regional administor or --  ;

18 MR. SINKIN: No, No, the regional counsel j 19 talked to Ms. Ellis.

20 MR. PIRFO: When did that take place?

21 MR. SINKIN: I called Ms. Ellis and said, l

22 Ther's a meeting, can you go?"

23 She says, " Fine." l 24 she calls the the region, she calls for Mr.

25 Martin; she gets a call back from Mr. Brown who says the O  ;

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[)

'> 1 meeting's closed; she calls me, tells me the meeting's 2 closed; I try and call Mr. Martin last night at 7:30, the 3 regional office is closed; I get a recording; I call up 4 the duty officer in Washington, ask him to have Mr.

5 Martin call me; he calls the duty officer in Arlington; 6 the duty Arlington in calls me says I'll talk to people 7 an get back to me; he gets back to me late liast night 8 and says no attendance, no transcript.

9 MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, in any event, it 10 seems to me that whatever point Mr. Sinkin wants to make 11 he has made on the record. I don't believe it has any 12 relevance to what this Board is here today to do. If Mr.

13 Sinkin subsequently has a problem with respect to what 14

• transpired at the meeting, and believes he has something 15 he should bring to the Board's attention, he will have 16 plenty of opportunity to do so. We have witnesses 17 waiting to testify, and I would suggest that we proceed 18 with the hearing.

19 MR. PIRFO: The staff has nothing further to 20 add, just simply wanted to respond to Mr. Sinkin's 21 position.

22 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Pirfo, why don't you 23 have Mr. Taylor call one of the people who were supposed 24 to be attending that meeting or might know something 25 about the meeting just to find out if it is closed, O

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!3 k' 1 because if it is not, then Mr. Sinkin can call his 2 representative. She would not be able to to go the whole 3 meeting probably but she'd presumably could sit in most 4 of it.

5 MR. PIRFO: That was my initial reaction, I 6 could have Mr. Taylor do that. But in retrospect, I'd 7 rather make that call myself and talk to Mr. Brown 8 and/or Mr. Reis.

9 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We were thinking so we

, 10 wouldn't delay. Could you do it in five minutes?

11 MR. PIRPO: I don't see why not. The meeting 12 starts at 9:30 so I have to do it in five minutes. I p3 13 understand my charge here is to simply find out whether G

14 the mission --

15 MR. SINKIN: Whether the mission should be 16 scrubbed?

17 MR. PIRFO: -- whether the meeting is closed, 18 not to direct the holders of the meeting to open it.

19 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: No, no.

20 MR. PIRFO: Just simply ascertain the facts.

21 MR. SINKIN: If you could ascertain two things:

22 If the meeting is closed; if it is closed, are they going 23 to transcribe it.

24 MR. PIRFO: I'm sure they're not going to 25 transcribe it, there's no need to ask that question.

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If y v 1 JUDBE BECHHOEFER: There are bundreds of these 2 meetings and they're never transcribed.

• 3 MR. SINKIN: I beg to differ. On Comanche 4 Peak, they're all being transcribed.

MR. AXELRAD:

5 Mr. Chairman, this is a meeting.

6 All I can was look at that notice, I'm not -- there le .

7 hasn't even been being established that that beeting 8 relates to the matters before this Board or anything. I ,

9 can appreciate the concern, he's raised it before the 10 Board I think it's unfortunate we're going to take t!1me 11 for even telephone call to the made. But if it is the 12 Board's wishes, let's take the --

13 MR. PIRFO: Whatever the Board orders me to do 14 within reason; you order me to go make that phone call.

15 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: As I say, either you ortMr./ ,

16 Taylor can do it.

/ N 17 MR. PIRFO: I'll make the call.

18 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Recess briefly.

19 (Recess.)

20 JUDBE BECHHOEFER: Back on the record.

21 MR. PIRFO: I made the call that the Board 22 requested and spoke with William Biown, regional counsel.

23 I was told that Ms. Ellis informed last night that the 24 meeting was closed. However, that policy changed this 25 morning, Ms. Ellis was told over an hour ago that the O

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13427 K/ 1 meeting would be open and she would send a

,t 1 27 representative. The meeting has yet to start and I don't 3 know whether Ms. or Mrs. Ellis is there or representative 4 is there yet. But at any rate the meeting has yet to 5 start, the meeting is open.

6 MR. SINKIN: Thank you, very much.

7 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Thank you.

8 MR. PIRFO: You are welcome.

9 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Anything further before we 10 proceed with the witnesses panel?

11 MR. SINKIN: No, Mr. Chairman.

12 JUDBE BECHHOEFER: Would you like to take care 13 of those minor c6rrections.

7-)

U 14 MR. FRANTZ: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

15 Whereupon, 16 17 SIDNEY A. BERNSEN AND FRANK LOPEZ, JR.,

18 testified further upon their oath as follows:

19 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED 20 21 By Mr. Frantz:

22 0 I'd like Dr. Bernsen or Mr. Lopez to refer to 23 two minor corrections to their testimony. First one on ep 24 page 11, line 14, yesterday you inserted the words "to

,, 25 some of" between the words "except" and "those." Do you

()

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1 wish to make any change to that insertion?

2 A (By Mr. Lopez) Yes, to be grammatically 3 :orrect, it should say except some of those actually 4 reported.

5 Q Thank you. .I would also like to refer your l

6 attention to page 26, line 13.

7 A (By Mr. Lopez) Yes.

l 8 0 Would you like to make any changes in that 9 line?

10 A Yes, in reviewing it, it appears that there is 11 one too many -- the word "as." The first "as" in the I 12 sentence should be deleted so that it would read "but not 13 be performed as efficiently or consistently."

O 14 JUDGE SHON: While we're on this kind of little i

l l

15 thing, on page 24, line 3, the thing says the "two 16 ser.tences quoted by Quadrex," I think should be " quoted 17 from Quadrex" or "from the Quadrex report."

18 MR. BERNSEN: Quoted from the Quadrex report.

19 MR. FRANTZ: I th!.nk that may be " quoted by 20 CCANP."

21 JUDGE SHON: Or " quoted by CCANP," either one.

22 MR. AXELRAD: I believe if we insert the word 23 "CCANP" for the' word Quadrex, that would be correct. Is 24 -that correct, Mr. Lopez?

25 MR. LOPEZ: Yes.

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l 13429 L

( 1 JUDGE BECBHOEFER: Mr. Sinkin, you have, you 2 said, voir dire?

3 MR. SINKIN: Yes, I have some preliminary 4 question, Mr. Chairman.

5 As I understand where we stand, is you've moved 6 to admit the testimony.

7 MR. FRANTZ: That's correct.

8 MR. SINKIN: And I have objected.

9 10 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 11 By Mr. Sinkin:

12 0 I'll ask this of you, Mr. Bernsen, is the 13 purpose of this testimony to provide your evaluation of 14 whether the findings you identify in your testimony were 15 potentially reportable or May 8th, 1981?

16 A (By Dr. Bernsen) The purpose of the testimony 17 is to provide my or our position or judgment on whether 18 the statements in the Quadrex report were reportable.

19 And particularly as stated in the testimony, addressing 20 the question of whether these are representative of a 21 significant quality assurance program breakdown.

22 Q So then the answer to my question is no. Let 23 me state my question again. Listen very closely, please.

24 Is the purpose of your testimony to provide your 25 evaluation of whether the findings you identify in your  !

Os TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

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(_/ 1 testimony were potentially reportable on May 8th, 19817 2 A As I understand the common usage of 3 "potentially reportable," yes, our testimony does embrace 4 that concept as well.

5 0 And does it embrace that concept as it would 6 apply to May 8th, 1981?

7 A In the sense that I'm not aware of any change 8 in the regulatory guide answer, the I&E guidance with 9 regard to that subject or the project practices, yes, 10 that's true.

11 Q And just to be clear, on page ten of your 12 testimony, line 12 through 16, sentence beginning 13 " finally." .

I

' (-) 14 A Yes.

15 Q Should that sentence read " finally in a few 16 cases, we are aware of information which Quadrex may not 17 have possessed when it performed its review which would 18 indicate that Quadrex findings were not potentially 19 reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e)1(1) on May 8th, 1918"?

20 A I believe you could read that into the 21 , statement as well.

22 O When you say as well, you are including 23 something else in the statement?

24 A As well as the statement that's contained in 25 the testimony. In other words, let me explain. We O

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_ - .-_ _ - - - _j

13431 1

1 relied on underlying information which was available to 2 the project at the time the Quadrex review was performed 3 that didn't appear in all cases in the Quadrex 4 documentation.

5 0 What effort did you make in p;eparing your 6 testimony to ensure that the only information reviewed by 7 the task force, by the panel, excuse me, was information 8 available at the project as of May and April, 1981, when 9 Quadrex was performing its review? That's when the 10 information was available, they went and wrote their 11 review at the end of April and delivered it in May.

12 MR. FRANTZ: I'm not sure now what Sinkin's 13 question is.

O 14 MR. SINKIN: The Chairman appeared to have a 15 question.

16 JUDBE BECHHOEFER: I have a question why May 17 wasn't included because May is what affects 18 reportability.

19 MR. SINKIN: Okay, well include May.

20 A (By Dr. Bernsen) In preparing the testimony as 21 we've indicated, we tried to rely primarily on the 22 Quadrex report. In some cases, as we've indicated, we 23 relied on underlying information. We have made a rather 24 thorough review of the testimony and conclude that with 25 very few. exceptions, if any, the material that we relied O

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r~s -

(_) 1 on pre dated the Quadrex investigation.

2 O What effort did you make in preparing your 3 testimony to determine what Mr. Goldberg Dr. Sumpter and 4 Mr. Robertson knew on May the 8th, 1981?

5 A I did not make a specific effort to determine 6 what Mr. Goldberg, Sumpter, Robertson knew on May '81 in 7 preparing the testimony.

8 A (By Mr. Lopez) I may add a comment that we did 9 have available to us copies of the review sheets that i 10 were prepared, I understand, by Brown & Root and were a 11 part of the information that at least Dr. Sumpter and Mr.

12 Robertson had available to them in their reviews on I 13 believe the evening of May 7th, and I also understand was O 14 utilized in their meetings on May 8th, as information 15 that they had available to them.

16 MR. FRANTZ: For the record Mr. Lopez, is that 17 Applicants' Exhibit 62 you were referring to?

18 MR. LOPEZ: Yes, it is.

19 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Did you have available to you 20 any records that Mr. Goldberg, Dr. Sumpter, or Mr.

21 Robertson kept of their deliberations?

22 A (By Mr. Lopez) I did notes.

23 A (By Dr. Bernsen) No.

24 A (By Mr. Lopez) I should make one other 25 clarification. Clearly in the intervening years, there r

V 4

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. l l= have been numerous instances where information came 2 .available to us that we were aware of preexisted May '81.

l 3 In some instances, you know, when we were trying to 4 investigate and did not find what we felt was enough 5 information in the Quadrex report to make a complete 6 determination, went back and checked the availability of 7 some of those documents.

8 I make specific reference to information that 9 was either made available -- made available to us have 10 via the transition process that occurred in early '82 11 two, and other documents which indicated that either HL&P 12 or Brown & Root.was aware of certainly the status of 13 certain design activities, which may or may not have been

() 14 -

identified in the Quadrex report. And often -- and in a 15 few instances, we went back and investigated those. We 16 did not get that information from these briefing sheets.

17 (No Hiatus.)

18 19 20 21 22

-23 24 25 O

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

_ 13434 1 Q But you did not make an effort to determine

([ )

2 whether the HL&P review team -- let me use that as a 3 generic term. The HL&P review team will be the three 4 people so I don't have to name them all the time.

5 A Right. Right. Right.

6 Q You did not make an effort to determine 7 whether the review team had that same information on May 8 the 8th, 1981?

9 A No, other than if we found something that, at 10 least I did, took a new look at the review sheets to see 11 whether or not there might be some reference to it. I g- 12 didn't make any effort in terms of trying to, you know, (S /

13 expand on information I had as to what they had 14 available to me other than that.

15 0 Other than the review sheets?

16 A Other than the review sheets themselves.

17 Q Did you at any time visit with Mr. Stanley 18 about the Quadrex report?

19 A I have had -- since these hearings began, I 20 have had --

21 Q I should say in preparation for your 22 testimony.

23 A In preparation for the testimony, no, no.

24 Q Let me carry on for just a minute. In your 25 testimony at page 32, line 23, the sentence beginning TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e - _ _- _

13435 1 "with." To accurately reflect what you're testifying

([ ])

2 to, should that sentence read "With the exception of the 3 deficiencies which were reported to the NRC on May 8th, 4 1981, no design errors with potential adverse safety 5 implications were identified by Quadrex?"

6 MR. FRANTZ: Mr. Chairman, I don't see why 7 this is an appropriate question for voir dire.

8 MR. PIRFO: I have the same problem. I've 9 been having it since we started. It seems like just 10 typical cross-examination. I don't understand how we're 11 in voir dire here.

12 MR. SINKIN: I'm trying to get at -- the way bx 13 the testimony is worded, I think the testimony does'not 14 address contention 9. It seems that maybe it does. I'm 15 trying to get that nailed down that it indeed does 16 address contention 9. Contention 9 is very specific, 17 50.55 (e) (ii) , 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. It is not about whether the 18 finding was reportable, which' their testimony says over 19 and over and over again.

20 MR. FRANTZ: Mr. Chairman, the contention 21 clearly states the Applicants' failure to notify the NRC 22 of the Quadrex report and the many findings belonging to 4

23 those who actually report it within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at the time O

V 24 HL&P became aware of the findings violates 10CFR 25 50.55 (e) . Well, we have to determine whether or not, TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

are 13436

() 1 first of all, whether any of the findings were, in fact, 2 reportable. If none of the findings were reportable, 3 then there was no violation.

4 MR. SINKIN: Well, you're missing my 5 distinction. When I see them testify that the purpose 6 of our testimony is to say whether this item was 7 reportable, that could well mean af ter three interim 8 reports a final report's been issued and he decides it's 9 not reportable. That's not the contention.

10 MR. FRANTZ: Mr. Sinkin, as we had discussed 11 yesterday, it is clearly relevant whether or not a 12 finding is reportable whether that evaluation takes 24 0- 13 hours, thirty days or three months. If it is determined 14 that the finding is not reportable, I think that 15- information is clearly relevant to the character and 16 competence of HL&P, one; and, two, whether or not there 17 was any failure to report. And, in fact, if you look at 18 the very language of 50.55(e) (ii) , that language talks 19 in terms of, quote, reportable deficiency, end quote.

20 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Mr. Bernsen, you're 21 familiar --

22 MR. PIRFO: If I may be heard -- if the Staff 23 may be heard. The problem I have is I don't see where

~0 24 we're going with this voir dire. What is it geared 25 toward? Is this a renewed motion to strike the TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e - ____

13437 I(} 1 testimony? Is he challenging the qualifications of the 2 witnesses or are we just in cross-examination? That's 3 the problem I'm having.

4 The objections you would make as to relevancy 5 are a little bit different when you're in voir dire as i

6 opposed to when you're in cross and I don't know where 7 he's going with is voir dire. Unless I missed 8 something.

9 MR. SINKIN: No, no. I mean, I didn't say why 10 I was doing it. Why I was doing it was to determine 11~ whether to renew the motion to strike after looking at 12 the stated purpose of the testimony and then looking at O 13 the various lines in the tsstimony where this issue was 14 addressed.

15 MR. PIRFO: I at least know where we're 16 going.

17- JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Sinkin, how do you 18 ~ construe the word reportable in 50.55 (e) (ii) ?.

I 19 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, I'm construing it 20 in light of, which was going to be my next question, in )

21 light of the I&E guidance where the term potentially 22 -reportable was introduced as a different concept than j 23 reportable.

.O L 24 MR. FRANTZ: Mr. --

25 MR. SINKIN: What I was trying to get clear TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

su , ,

13438

() 1 with the witness is whether they have in their mind that 2 within the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> you make a determination of 3 something that's potentially reportable, then you decide 4 if it's, in fact, reportable or are they testifying to 5 whether the finding in the Quadrex report was ultimately 6 reportable?

7 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, the way I construe 8 this it could be either one. If they knew it was 9 reportable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, they don't have to call it 10 potentially reportable.

11 MR. SINKIN: I understand that. But it's not 12 certainly limited within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to only things you 13 know for a fact are reportable. There's a group called 14 potentially reportable.

15 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: But given this use of the 16 language, isn't their testimony at least in the terms of 17 which it's phrased, at least attempting to meet this?

18 Because in order to make this appropriate for voir dire, 19 you'd have to show that either the entire testimony or 20 very large segments of it have no bearing on the 21 contention and --

22 MR. SINKIN: Well, that's precisely what I was 23 doing. That's why I said it was voir dire. If they 7_s O 24 gave the wrong answers in my view, I was going to move 25 to strike. But I'm not -- I think they've given answers TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 13439 1

(]}' that indicate they do have in their mind looking at May 2 the 8th, 1981, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> reporting potentially or 3 notifying potentially reportable items, that that is in ll their mind.

5 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: But the point is shouldn't 6 further questioning of this be reserved for regular 7 cross-examination, which it's certainly an appropriate 8 subject for cross-examination?

9 MR. SINKIN: That's fine.

10 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: So, I think that would be 11 better.

12 MR. SINKIN: There is one other item about

13 this testimony that we find objectionable, Mr.

l 14 Chairman.

15 Beginning at page 92, question 106, and 16 continuing to page 107, answer 141, Mr. Lopez and Mr.

17 Bernsen are testifying about precisely the same findings 18 Mr. Goldberg testified to. This testimony is both 19 duplicative and cumulative. Mr. Goldberg has told his i

20 story. There is no need for a parade of witnesses to

[ 21 come forward to say they agree with Mr. Goldberg. I l

i 22 think about the witnesses that CCANP has been denied and i

l 23 none of them were to be called to testify precisely on

() 24 the points another witness had already testified to.

25 So, we would move to strike the testimony from TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

Mro 13440

() 1 question 106 on page 92 through answer 141 on page 107, 2 MR. FRANTZ: Mr. Chairman, I am at a loss to 3 understand this objection. If Mr. Sinkin is conceding 4 everything that Mr. Goldberg said regarding the 5 reportability of these findings, I guess we can almost 6 go home right now. I assume Mr. Sinkin does not concede 7 that.

8 This testimony is introduced to present the 9 expert opinion of our witnesses regarding whether or not 10 these findings are reportable. It certainly is relevant 11 and material. I think it's important that the Board es 12 have this type of expert opinion so that the B'*oard has U

13 additional information on which to judge whether or not 14 results reached by HLftP on May 8th were correct or 15 improper.

16 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The Board thinks this 17 testimony should stay in, so we will overrule the 18 objection.

19 MR. SINKIN: Other than those items, Mr.

20 Chairman, we're more than happy to have this testimony 21 come in.

22 MR. PIRFO: The Staff has no questions on voir 23 dire, if that's the point we're at.

3 24 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes, we are.

25 MR. PIRFO: Well, we just passed it then.

TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

Aro j i

13441

() 1 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: And you have no objection 2 to the testimony --

l 3 MR. PIRFO: No, sir.

4 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: -- being admitted?

5 MR. PIRFO: No, sir.

6 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The testimony will be 7 admitted with the exception of the few lines that we 8 struck.

9 MR. FRANTZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: And it will be bound .in the 11 record at this point as if read.

~ '

(:)

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 l 22 23

} (2) l 24 25 TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

i.

A

.(3 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

\_) NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 3

4 In the Matter of )

5 )

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER ) Docket Nos. STN 50-498 OL 6 COMPANY, ET AL. ) STN 50-499 OL

)

7 (South Texas Project, Units 1 )

and 2) 8 9 TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, ET AJ:., ,

10 OF SIDNEY A. BERNSEN AND FRANK LOPEZ, JR.

11 12 01 Dr. Bernsen, please state your name.

13 A.1 My name is Sidney A. Bernsen.

. ) 14 15 02 Mr. Lopez, please state your name.

16 A.2 My name is Frank Lopez, Jr.

17 18 Q.3 Dr. Bernsen, please identify your present employment.

19 A.3 I am employed by Bechtel Power Corporation as the 20 Corporate Manager of Quality Assurance.

21 22 23 24 25

~

• / Dr. Bernsen is sponsoring the answers in A.1, A.3, A.5, i 26 A.8, A.10, and A.ll. Mr. Lopez is sponsoring the answers in A.2, A.4, A.6, A.9, A.12, and A.13. Both Dr. Bernsen 27 and Mr. Lopez are sponsoring all of the remaining answers.

28

( .-'

' [D

.f (_) 1 04 Mr. Lopez, please identify your present employment.

2 A.4 I am employed by Bechtel Energy Corporation (Bechtel) as 3 an Assistant Project Engineer assigned to the South 4 Texas-Project (STP).

5 6 05 Dr. Bernsen,.please describe your professional 7 qualifications.

8 A.5 My professional qualifications are described in the 9 Statement of Professional Qualifications of Sidney A.  ;

10 Bernsen, which is attached hereto and incorporated by 11 reference.

~12 13 06 Mr. Lopez, please describe your professional O 14 qualifications.

15 A.6 My' professional qualifications are described in the 16 Statement of Professional Qualifications of Frank Lopez, 17 Jr., which is attached hereto and incorporated by 18 reference.

19 Q.7 What is the purpose of your testimony?

20 A.7 The purpose of our testimony is to address Citizens.

21 Concerned About Nuclear Power (CCANP) Contention 9, as 22 set forth at page 24 of the Licensing Board's Memorandum 23 and Order of February 26, 1985, which states:

24 The Applicants' failure to notify the NRC (Region IV) of the Quadrex Report, and of 25 many findings beyond those actually reported, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from the time

() 26 HL&P became aware of the findings or prospective findings of the Report 27 -

(including drafts), violates 10 C.F.R.

S 50.55(e)(2) and reflects adversely on 28

( ,

("T 1 the character and competence of the IA J Applicants and on their ability to manage 2 the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant.

3 More specifically, our testimony discusses whether the findings in the " Design Review of Brown and Root 5

Engineering Work for the South Texas Project" (Quadrex 6

Report) (May 1981), as identified by the Licensing Board 7

in its Memorandum and Order of February 26, 1985, its 8

Sixth Prehearing Conference Order of May 17, 1985, and 9

its Memorandum and Order of May 24, 1985, represent a 10 significant breakdown in any portion of the quality 11 assurance (OA) program within the meaning of 10 CFR 12 S 50.55(e)(1)(i).

13 .

.sO'w ) 14 08 Dr. Bernsen, please describe any experience you may have 15 in applying or interpreting 10 CFR S 50.55(e) and in 16 applying or interpreting 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B.

17 A.8 As Manager of Nuclear Standards and Quality Assurance 18 for the Power Industrial Division of Bechtel Corporation 19 during 1969-72 and Manager of Quality Assurance for the 20 Thermal Power Organizaiton of Bechtel Power Corporation, 21 I coordinated the corporate review of proposed 10 CFR 22 5 50.55(e) and developed Bechtel Power Corporation's 23 initial procedures for implementing 10 CFR S 50.55(e).

24 Subsequently, I provided guidance to various divisions 25 of Bechtel Power Corporation and their projects on f( ) 27 specific reportability questions. Furthermore, as the 28

_4_

~.

.( l Project Licensing Manager and Assistant Project  !

2~ . Manager-Systems for STP during 1982-83, I served as the '

3 Bechtel project management representative for '

4 determining the reportability of a number of Bechtel- -

5 identified design deficiencies.

6 I have also served for more than 14 of the last 16 L 7 -years as Chairman or.a member of the Nuclear Quality 8 Assurance Standards Committees that produced various 9 ANSI QA standards adopted in the NRC regulatory guides.

10 Furthermore, I was responsible for developing Bechtel 11 Power Corporation division,and corporate QA programs 12 which implement NRC requirements. Additional relevant

13. QA experience is described in my statement of 14 professional qualifications. . >

15 16 Q.9 Mr. Lopez, please describe any. experience you may.have i 17 in applying or interpreting 10 CFR S 50.55(e) and in -

18 applying or interpreting 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.  !

19 A.9 For the past eleven years, I have worked in various i -

20 assignments on nuclear power plant projects. These 21 include three domestic nuclear projects and two foreign

~ 22 projects. All of these projects were committed to the 23 application of these U.S. federal regulations to the 24 conduct of activities with which I was involved j 25 (although the foreign projects had no formal requirement 26 to report deficiencies to the NRC).

( }: As a member or i( 27 supervisor of the Nuclear Engineering discipline on l 28 l

/( ) I these projects, I was trained in the process of 2 identifying, evaluating and dispositioning reportable 3 deficiencies in accordance with 10 CFR S 50.55(e). In 4 addition, each of these projects worked under the 5 procecures established in its quality assurance program 6 to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, 7 and I was often called upon to assist in the 8 determination of acceptable compliance with this 9 regulation. In particular, on the South Texas Project, 10 my duties have included supervision of the Quality 11 Engineering discipline which is responsible for the 12 development, monitoring and maintenance of all 13 Engineering Department procedures related to meeting the 14 project's OA commitments. This supervisory 15 responsibility also included acting as the primary ,

16 representative of the Bechtel Project Eng!neering 17 Manager (PEM) in interfacing with other.dep.nrtments 18 relative to quality matters, including the Bechtel and 19 HL&P Quality Assurance Departments. With respect to 20 reportability determinations under 10 CFR S 50.55(e),

21 the Bechtel PEM designated me to act as his primary 22 representative in reviewing, evaluating and-23 dispositioning all Deficiency Evaluation Reports 24 generated by the Project in order to assure complete and 25 consistent application of the Project's procedures on 26

([)

' \, - 27 .

28

.. - . . . - . . .- = -. - . . . _ - . . . - .- - - _ - - - . . . _ - - _ _ . _ _ . -

l i ..

p.

,[(} 1 reportability. I' held this responsibility from the 2 beginning of the Bechtel involvement on the Project 3 until approximately one year ago.

4 ,

5 Q.10 Dr.'Bernsen, in addition to the work you have done to 6 prepare this testimony, have you conducted any reviews

.7 of the findings in the Quadrex Report?

8 A.10 Yes. In 1982, the Bechtel Power Corporation Task Force 9- conducted an assessment of the findings in the Quadrex 10 Report in order to recommend management and design

, 11 actions to resolve the findings in a timely manner. The -

12 results of this assessment were presented in "An 13 Assessment of the Findings in the Quadrex Corporation yf ) 14 , Report" (March 1982) (Applicants' Exhibit 63). Among 15 other things, this report identified the discipline 16 findings in the Quadrex. Report which the Bechtel Power 17 Corporation Task Force thought may be potentially

< i 18 reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e). I participated in a 19 Bechtel Power Corporation management review of the draft  ;

20 report prepared by the Bechtel Power Corporation Task 21 Force to confirm the accuracy and reasonableness of the 22 conclusions presented in the draft. I also served as a l' 23 member of.the Bechtel STP Project management team with l 24 overview responsibility for EN-619, the " Review of the i

25' Quadrex Report" (Applicants' Exhibit 64).

l (:) -

l s_ 22 28 r

l

l 1 0 11 Dr. Bernsen, was the Bechtel Power Corporation Task

(]

L.

Force report (Applicants' Exhibit 63) true and correct 2

3 to the best of your knowledge, information and belief 4 when the report was issued?

5 A.ll Yes. It may be noted that Bechtel has learned of 6 additional information since the issuance of the Bechtel 7 Power Corporation Task Force Report which has led 8 Bechtel to a different conclusion with respect to 9 findings 4.3.2.l(a) and 4.8.2.1(a) than is stated in the 10 Report, as we discuss below.

11 12 0 12 Mr. Lopez, in addition to the work you have done to 13 prepare this testimony, have you conducted any reviews

() of the findings in the Quadrex Report?' ~

14 15 A.12 Yes. In 1982, I was employed by Bechtel as the Nuclear 16 Engineering Group Supervisor at STP. My 17 responsibilities in this position included direction and 18 supervision of preparation of various work packages 19 associated with the transition from Brown & Root (B&R) 20 as architect-engineer / constructor to Bechtel as 21 architect-engineer / construction manager and Ebasco as 22 constructor. Among those work packages was EN-619, 23 entitled " Review of the Quadrex Report" (Applicants' 24 Exhibit 64).

25 The purpose of EN-619 was to establish a program for i

26 the evaluation and disposition of the findings in the 27 Quadrex Report. The primary purpose of EN-619 was not 28

~~ ,

- /~' 1 to review the Quadrex findings to determine their i

' (_)

2 reportability. However, Bechtel, in its overall design 3 review, was alert to identify any reportable deficiency 4 arising from the Quadrex Report (and in fact, EN-619 5 identifies relevant Deficiency Evaluation Reports).

6 EN-619 did not focus upon Quadrex's comments on the 7 practices, policies, and procedures of B&R because they 8 were not applicable or germano to Bechtel's activities.

9 10 In some cases, the practices identified in the 11 Quadrex Report were adopted by Bechtel. However, in 12 other cases, EN-619 shows that Bechtel has not adopted 13 the types of design practices apparently suggested by

'( ) 14 Quadrex but instead utilizes reasonable alternatives.

18 Thus, EN-619 helps to indicate that a number of the 16 findings in the Quadrex Report essentially state 17 Quadrex's opinion as to good practice in accomplishing 18 an efficient engineering process but do not identify 19 practices which are required under Appendix B to 10 CFR 20 Part 50.

21 22 0 13 Mr. Lopez, was EN-619 (Applicants' Exhibit 64) true and 23 correct to the best of your knowledge, information and 24 belief when it was issued?

25 A.13 Yes. However, it should be noted that, among other g3 26 things, EN-619 describes substantive activities to be (f 27 undertaken by Bechtel to correct, prevent or address the 28

+

,r- 1 matters identified in the Quadrex Report. In a few U) 2 cases, as the design has evolved, Bechtel's design 3 activities and technical resolutions addressing matters 4 raised in the Quadrex Report have been different than 5 those projected in EN-619. None of these differences 6 has any significance with respect to the reportability 7 of the findings in the Quadrex Report.

8 9 0.14 Please identify the Quadrex Report findings as to which 10 you will be testifying.

11 A.14 The Quadrex Report findings on which we will be testi-12 fying may be divided into two groups. The first group 13 consists of certain generic findings which the Licensing

( ) , 14 Board accepted for litigation at pages 12-13 of its 15 Memorandum and Order of February 26, 1985, page 10 of 16 its sixth Prehearing Conference Order of May 17, 1985, 17 and pages 1-2 of its Memorandum and Order of May 24, 18 1985. These findings are numbered 3.l(a) through 19 3.1(j). The second group consists of certain discipline 20 findings identified in the Quadrex Report as "most 21 serious" which the Licensing Board accepted for 22 litigation at pag'es 13 and 16 of its Memorandum and 23 Order of February 26, 1985, page 12 of the Sixth 24 Prehearing Conference Order of May 17, 1985, and pages 1 25 and 2 of its Memorandum and Order of May 24, 1985.

26 These findings are numbered 4.1.2.1(b), 4.3.2.l(a),

O 27 28

10 -

v'N 1 4.3.2.l(d), 4.3.2.l(n), 4.5.2.1(b), 4.6.2.l(n),

-tg 2 4.7.3.1(a), 4.7.3.1(b), 4.7.3.l(k), and 4.8.2.1(a) 3 through 4.8.2.1(g).

4 5 0.15 In. performing your review for reportability under 10 CFR 6 5 50.55(e), what information did you rely upon?

7 A.15 In a number of cases, we were able to determine that the 8 findings, on their face, were not reportable under 10 9 CFR 550.55(e)(1)(i). In some cases, we also took into 10 account the material in the Quadrex Report in 11 determining whether the findings were reportable under 12 10 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i). Finally, in a few cases, we 13 are aware of information, which Quadrex may not have

() 14 possessed when it performed its review, which would 15 indicate that Quadrex's findings were not reportable 16 under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i).

17 18 0 16 What criteria did you utilize to determine whether the 19 findings identified by the Licensing Board were

,20 reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i)?

21 A.16 A matter is reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i) 22 only if it satisfies each of the following three 23 criteria:

24 (1) a deficiency in design or construction must be 25 identified;

{( 27 28

( l (2) the deficiency must have the potential, if 2 left uncorrected, to affect adversely the 3 safety of plant operations; and 4 (3) the deficiency must represent a significant 5 breakdown in any portion of the quality 6 assurance program conducted in accordance with 7 the requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 8 50.

9 In response to the Licensing Board's request to 10 determine whether the findings identified by the Board 11 identify a significant breakdown in any portion of the 12 QA program for STP, we have focused primarily upon the 13 third criterion listed above and have determined that

.(( ) 14 none of the findings (except those actually reported to 15 the NRC) identified by the Board satisfies this 16 criterion. Consequently, we have concluded that no 17 additional findings would be reportable under 10 CFR 18 5 50.55(e)(1)(i). Finally, it may be noted that there 19 may be reasons in addition to those discussed in this 20 testimony why a particular finding is not reportable 21 under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i).

22 In determining whether a finding indicates the 23 existence of a significant breakdown in any portion of 24 the QA program for STP which may be reportable under 10 25 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i), it is important to keep the 26 following consideration in mind. Appendix B to 10 CFR 27 Part 50 sets forth general criteria governing quality 28

i i

?1 . . assurance for design, construction, and operation of

((])

2 structures, systems, and components which perform 3 safety-related functions. Thus, while Appendix B 4 identifies measures which must be established and 5 -implemented, it allows a licensee to exercise discretion 6 in deciding which specific practices are most 7 ' appropriate for-its project. Accordingly, as long as a 8 ' licensee has acceptable controls in place, the fact that 9 a licensee does not utilize a particular procedure, 10 document, or other specific method for controlling 11 design activities does not indicate a significant 12 breakdown in the quality assurance program.

13 It is also noted that the determination of whether a

'I) 14 si nificant breakdown exists in any porcion of the 15 quality assurance program that could lead to a report to 16 the Commission under 10 CFR 1 50.55(e)(1)(i) is not a 17 straight-forward process, since there are no firm 18' criteria available-for making this determination.- It-is 19 particularly difficult to make this determination with 20 respect to deficiencies related to design, because of 21 the iterative nature of the design process, the need to 22 rely on preliminary assumptions or judgment that 23 occasionally may be found nonconservative, the changing 24 standards of performance, and the evolution of 25 analytical techniques and documentation that have 26 occurred over the past decade or more. If conditions 27 are found where an explicit requirement of 10 CFR Part 28 l

r

! 1 50, Appendix B or an applicant's quality assurance j

-/, _T i ~ 'L,)

[ 2 program are clearly and significantly not implemen ted ,

3 or where required verification or checking processes are

! 4 repeatedly ignored, the determination can be rather 5 obvious. In other areas, such as questions regarding 6 the adequacy of preliminary assumptions, the level of 7 detail in criteria, the timeliness or degree of 8 sophistication in analysis, or the relative l

9 effectiveness of organizational relationships, the L

10 determination is much more complex. We would recommend 11 reporting questionable cases involving any deficiencies 12 in the process of design that could adversely affect the 13 safety of operations as measured by sound , engineering 14 judgment, whether or not the design had been released

~'

{'} ,

15 for construction. We believe this hafs been and 3

16 continues to be the general philosophy applied on the

.17 South Texas Project and has formed the basis for our 18 testimony.

i 19 Q.17 Please describe the format you will use 'in addressing 20 each generic finding.

21 A.17 First, we will identify the primary concerns contained 22 in the finding. Next, we will discuss whether these 23 concerns indicate the existence of a significant 24 breakdown in the OA program for STP. Finally, we will 25 address the statements of CCANP with respect to the 26 finding.

27

~

28

(~l v

1 0.18 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.l(a)?

f 2 A.18 Finding 3.l(a) primarily expresses two concerns of t

PJ , Quadrex. First, Quadrex was concerned that an effective 4 systems integration and overview function and systems 5 engineering function may-not exist at the STP. Second, 6 Quadrex was concerned about the absence of 7 multidisciplinary design guidance at STP for separation

'8 and the single failure criterion and that each 9 discipline was providing its own interpretation and v '

10 acceptance criteria.

~ v 11 12 0 19 What are a systems integration and overview function and 13 a systems engineering function?

78 -

' T) g m A y 14 A.19 A systems integration and overview function generally 15 refers to the responsibility for assuring that factors 16 such as system interactions, the impacts which one 17 system may have upon another system, and the

\

18 compatibility of one system with an interfacing system 19 are accounted for. For example, one systems integration 20 function which nuclear projects address by one method or 21 another is an analysis of the potential interactions 22 which.might exist between non-safety related systems and 23 safety-related-systems. In such an analysis, one might

< [24 evaluate the safety impact of the failure of non-25 seismically supported components as a result of L 26 postulated earthquakes. In order to perform this L( 27 evaluation, the analyst would need to become familiar kg 28

I with the design and relative locations of both safety-2 related and non-safety-related systems and' components.

3 Such an evaluation necessarily goes beyond the level of 4 understanding needed to designi an individual system or 5- component.

6 Another example of a systems integration function 7 which is common in power plant design is the 8 interdisciplinary coordination which is needed to 9 identify, design and verify the relationship between 10 primary process systems and their support systems, such 11 as HVAC, lighting, power supply and other services. In 12 the initial phases of design activity, the required l

l 13 support services are identified and, in normal practice, c0 14 eseumatione ere mede escut interfece reuuirements euch es 15 heat loads, service conditions, and power requirements.

l 16 As design of both the primary and support systems l

17 progresses, the need increases to confirm the validity of 18 the assumptions made in the preliminary stages of design.

19 That need is fulfilled by some method of l 20 interdisciplinary coordination, often referred to as a 21 systems integration or systems engineering function.

22 Common between these two examples are the multi-23 disciplinary aspects of the design activity, and the 24 iterative nature of the approach which involves some set 25 of preliminary interfacing assumptions coupled with

! 26 activities in the latter stages of design or construction v 27 to confirm the validity of the assumptions.

28

r __ _ _ ._- _ _ - _ _ -____ __ _- __-_- -_ - _ _ -

1 A systems. engineering function generally refers to 2 the responsibility for determining multidisciplinary

~

3 designLre^quirements' applicable to a particular system.

4 For example, individuals performing a systems 5 engineering function would have responsibility-for 6- ensuring specification of the functional requirements 7 applicable to a system, such as the operating 8- temperatures, head-requirements, and instrumentation 9 requirements for a fluid system.

10 11 Q.20 Did B&R have a systems integration and overview 12' function?

13 A.20 Yes. Among other things, we understand that B&R

./ ) 14 established a Systems Design Assurance Group at STP in p 15 February of 1980 to provide a systems-integration and 16 overview function. As' indicated by'Quadrex to the 17 Bechtel Power Corporation Task Force, the Quadrex Report 18 did not include-a review of the activities of this

.19 group. The activities performed by the group may not 20 ~

have been evident to Quadrex because we understand that 21 most of the reviews performed by the group had not yet 22 been factored into revisions of the design documents

23. 'being reviewed by Quadrex.

24- Q.21 Does the fact that B&R did not establish the Systems 25 Design Assurance Group until 1980 indicate a significant 26 breakdown in any portion of the QA program for STP?

i. 27 28

17 -

f l

1 l

/^% 1 A.21 No. Such a group is not a necessary element of a design 1 Q) 2 control process. Other measures to assure adequate 3 systems integration are often used. The need for a ,

4 systems integration and overview function becomes more 5 important as the design of a plant progresses. During 6 the early stages of design, systems interactions are not 7 well-defined due to the preliminary nature of the 8 design. Consequently, at this stage of design, systems 9 integration does not play a significant role, and the 10 measures that we understand were employed by B&R (e.g.,

11 use of System Design Description (SDDs), Technical 12 Reference Documents (TRDs), and multidisciplinary review 13 and comment) provide appropriate methods of integration

.m

( t, )

14 controls. As the design evolves and systems 15 interactions can be determined with greater precision, 16 the need for controls for systems integrati'on becomes 17 more acute since this function plays a greater role ~in 18 design. B&R recognized this, and its approach to 19 handling this need was the establishment of the Systems 20 Design Assurance Group in 1980. The fact that this 21 group was not established before that time does not 22 indicate a significant breakdown in any portion of the 23 QA program for STP, but simply reflects the iterative 24 nature of the design process.

25 es 26 l )s i ]^ 27 ,

28  !

, (% '~j ~ 1 Q.22 Did B&R have a systems engineering function?

2 A.22 Yes. We understand that B&R did have a systems 3 engineering function at STP. This consisted of such 4 measures as designating engineers within various  !

5 disciplines to coordinate the development of system 6 descriptions, including System Design Descriptions 7 (SDDs), Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P& ids), and 8 other documents which specified multidisciplinary 9 requirements applicable to a system. These documents 10 provide evidence of the existence of that function.

11 Furthermore, B&R enhanced the systems engineering 12 function through multidisciplinary review of and comment 13 on design documents. These measures are typical of

-( ) 14 those used by the industry at that time.

15 In recent years, some architect-engineering 16- companies have begun to establish systems engineering 17 groups to signi,ficantly augment the systems engineering 18 function. The Systems Design Assurance Group 19 established by B&R in 1980 was in accord with this 20 movement. However, Quadrex did not review the 21 activities of this group.

22 23 0.23 Does the Quadrex Report identify significant 24 deficiencies in design related to B&R's systems 25 integration and overview function and systems r~s 26 engineering function?

i k-]

(. 27 28

6

't 1 A.23 Yes, but the deficiencies were limited those reported to

- (Q 2 the~NRC. We have reviewed the information in the 3 Quadrex Report to determine whether Quadrex identified 4 any other deficiencies in design related to systems 5 integration and systems engineering. Quadrex did not 6 identify any significant deficiencies in design with the 7 exception of those which were reported to the NRC.

8 Consequently, we conclude that the Quadrex Report does 9 not identify a significant breakdown in B&R's systems 10 integration and systems engineering beyond the 11 deficiencies which were reported.

12 13 0.24 In general, did B&R have multidisciplinary design

[( ) 14 guidance for STP?

15 A.24 Yes. We understand that, in general, B&R did have a 16 program to provide multidisciplinary design guidance.

17 In addition to its System Design Descriptions (SDDs),.

18 which pertained to individual systems, B&R.also utilized 19 Technical Reference Documents (TRDs), most of which 20 applied across systems and disciplines. Additionally, 21 B&R procedure STP-SD-005-B required the Systems Design 22 Assurance Group to perform reviews encompassing several 23 systems and disciplines in order to assure the compati-24 bility of the design work performed by the various 25 disciplines, p 26 ~ )

'\J l

(_ 27 .

28

.. /T 1- 0.25 Please explain whether Quadrex's concern about the

'V 2 absence of multidisciplinary. design guidance for 3 separation and-single failure criterion indicates a 4 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA program l 5 for STP.

6 A.25 Criterion III of Appendix B requires that measures "be 7 established to assure that applicable regulatory 8 requirements and the design basis... are correctly 9 translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, 10 and instructions." There are many acceptable methods of 11 satisfying this requirement, including the use of 12 multidisciplinary design guidance or the use of guidance ,

13 applicable to a specific discipline. However, Appendix

( 14 B does not require the use of multidisciplinary design 15 guidance, nor does it require that each discipline 16 utilize the same oesign criteria for its work as are 17 being used by other disciplines on their work. As long 18 as the criteria being utilized by each discipline are 19 appropriately conservative for the work it is doing, and 20 as long as the final designs of the systems are 21 compatible, as confirmed during verification activities, 22 the lack of multidisciplinary design guidance would not 23' be indicative of a significant breakdown in any portion 24 of the OA program.

25 We have reviewed the information in the Quadrex 26 Report to determine whether Quadrex identified any (v~)

~e 27 deficiencies in design related to separation or the 28 l

,- ( 1 single failure criterion. Quadrex did not identify any 2 concerns in this regard with the exception of 3 questioning the design of the common instrument air line 4 in the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) HVAC system.

5 Similarly, the Bechtel review of the B&R design during 6 the transition period did not identify any significant 7 Problems related to separation or the single failure 8 criterion. Consequently, we conclude that there was no

• 9 significant breakdown concerning the design guidance 10 Provided by B&R related to separation or the single 11 failure criterion.

12 13 0.26 " Citizens Concerned About Nuclear Power Motion To File

< (~

LA_,) 14 Additional Co'ntentions Based On New Information And To 15 Establish A Discovery And Hearing Schedule With Respect 16 To New Contentions" (November 21, 1981) (CCANP's 17 Motion), pp. 16 and 41, quotes three sentences from 18 finding 3.l(a) as identifying a violation of Criterion 19 III of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50. These sentences 20 are as follows:

21 "There is no indication that an effective systems integration and overview function 22 exists within the B&R design process."

23 "HL&P has indicated that their organizational structure is closely 24 aligned with that of B&R, and that no systems engineering function exists 25 within the utility either."

26 "A working interface relationship among

()N v the disciplines is not routine 27 Particularly regarding follow-through at the discipline input-output interface."

28 l

22 - I 1 In particular, CCANP states that these sentences 2 identify a violation od the requirement in Criterion 3 III, which states that "[m}easures shall be established 4 'for the identification and control of design interfaces 5 and for coordination among participating design 6 crganizations." See CCANP's Motion, p. 16. Did B&R 7 have measures for controlling design interfaces?

8 A.26 Yes. For example, B&R had several procedures intended 9 to control the interfaces that exist between various ,

10 organizations. These included STP-SD-004, Engineering 11 Procedure for Design Reviews, STP-SD-005, System Design 12 Assurance Reviews, and'STP-DC-014, Document Review 13 Comment Procedure. In combination, these procedures 34 established formal requirements for conducting.

15 interfacing activities, including a review and comment 16 Process for design and vendor documents and a process 17 for conducting design review meetings. A separate 18 Process for performing design assurance' reviews designed 19 to assure that system design requirements and interfaces 20 were Properly identified and implemented was a part of 21 this interface control. Each of these processes 22 included requirements for documentation of the 23 activities undertaken.

24 25 0 27 Please explain whether the first two sentences quoted by 26 CCANP indicate a significant breakdown in the interface

(, 27 controls for STP?

28

'() 1 A.27 Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 requires 2 that' design interfaces be controlled. However, with the 3 exception of requiring " procedures among participating 4 design organizations for the review, approval, release, 5 distribution, and revision of documents involving design 6 interfaces," Criterion III does not specify how design 7 interfaces shall be controlled. Thus, the means by 8 which design interfaces are controlled is left to the 9 discretion of the licensee and its contractors.

10 Design interfaces may be controlled by various 11 methods, such as assigning discrete responsibilities to 12 various individuals and organizations, establishing

~

13 lines of communication which, identify responsibilities

.Q

' yy- 14 for decision-making and resolution of problems, and 15 establishing procedures to control the flow and review 16 of design information. Thus, a systems integration 17 function and a systems engineering function in the form 18 of discrete functional groups are not necessary means of 19 controlling design interfaces.

20 As we have discussed above, B&R did have appropriate 21 Procedures to control design interfaces. Furthermore, s 22 B&R did have a systems integration function and a 23 systems engineering function, and it had taken action to

. 24 strengthen these functions by establishing the Systems 25 Design Assurance Group (the activities of which Quadrex j

(}

'( .

26 did not review). With the exception of the reported deficiencies, Quadrex did not identify any significant 27 28 u I

I q

1 E

1 deficiencies in design attributable to B&R's process for

_[)

2 design interface control. Consequently, the two 3 sentences quoted by Quadrex do not indicate a 4 signifi'c ant breakdown in the control of design 5 interfaces for STP beyond the deficiencies actually 6 reported.

7 8 0 28 What is the basis for the sentence which states that 9 "[a] working interface relationship among the 10 disciplines is not routine particularly regarding 11 follow-through at the discipline input-output 12 interface"?

13 A.28 This sentence is part of a paragraph which pertains to g&T 14 systems engineering. It appears that Quadrex was V '

15 '

seeking greater informal communication among disciplines 16 designing a system so that each discipline knew what the 17 other disciplines were doing. In particular, Quadrex 18 observed that a discipline supplying data to another 19 discipline was not checking to see that the data were 20 being properly used.

I 21 l

22 0 29 Does this indicate a significant breakdown in the design 23 interface controls for STP?

24 A.29 No. As we discussed previously, B&R had appropriate 25 procedures to control interfaces and had a systems 26 engineering function, including the Systems Design

) 27 Assurance Group which Quadrex did not review. There are 28 l

L

1

~

25 -

j'] 1 benefits in terms of efficiency in routine informal a

2 communication among disciplines. However, the OA 3 Program contained appropriate measures (such as design 4 review meetings, document review and comment, reviews 5 Provided by the Systems Design Assurance Group, and 6 design verification) designed to provide assurance that 7 the multidisciplinary aspects of a system were properly 8 accounted for and coordinated. In particular, it is not 9 normal practice for a discipline supplying input data to 10 ensure that the recipient of the data uses it correctly, 11 although the discipline which supplies data may review 12 the other disciplines' design output documents as part 13 of the coordination process.

f) 14 15 0 30 CCANP's Motion, p. 42, quotes the following sentence 16 from finding 3.1(a) as identifying a violation of 17 Criterion VI of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50:

18 "A major concern is with the achievement of internal consistency among various 19 design documents and the maintenance of that consistency over time with personnel 20 turnover."

21 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure 22 "to adequately control the issuance of documents, such

, 23 as instructions, procedures, and drawings, including 24 changes thereto." Id. What was the nature of the 25 concern expressed in this sentence?

. ,em 26 iL) 27 28

A.30 As is apparent from.the context in which it arises, this

~() 1 2 sentence relates to system integration. Additionally, 3 this sentence appears to relate to Quadrex's concern 4 that there was not a single set of multidisciplinary 5 design criteria applicable to all disciplines, and that 6 each discipline was establishing design criteria 7 applicable to the work it was doing.

8 9 0 31 Do these concerns indicate the existence of a 10 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA program 11 for STP?

12 A.31 No. It appears to have been Quadrex's concern that 13 future design activities might not be as performed as n)

(_ 14 efficiently or as consistently as they might be with a 15 more effective systems integration and overview 16 function. As we discussed previously, Quadrex's concern 17 in this area did not indicate a significant breakdown in 18 any portion of the QA program for STP.

19 Similarly, as we explained previously, use of 20 multidisciplinary design guidance is not required by 21 Appendix B. Furthermore, Criterion VI of Appendix B is 22 not relevant to this concern, since Criterion VI only 23 applies to the control of issuance and distribution of 24 documents which prescribe activities affecting quality.

25 Criterion VI does not require the issuance of a 26

' CE) 27 28

.i; jf g -1 particular type of design criteria, nor does it_ require that each design discipline use the same design

-2 3 criteria.

4 I 5 Q.32 CCANP's Me'; ion p. 40, quotes the following sentences 6 from finding 3.1(a) as identifying a violation of 7 Criteria II and XVII of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50:

8 "There is no indication that an effective systems integration and overview function 9 exists within the B&R design process . . . . A major concern is with 10 the achievement of internal cons;stency_

among various design documents and the 11 maintenance of that consistency over time with personnel turnover."

12' 13 CCANP states that these sentences demonstrate a failure j'

14 "to assure adequate documentation in an identifiable and 15 retrievable manner of the safety-related design and 16 engineering work" at STP. Id. What relevance, if any, I~

17 do these sentences have to Criterion XVII?

18 A.32 These sentences do not relate to the maintenance of 19 quality assurance records, which is the subject of 20 Criterion XVII. In particular, these sentences do not

21 indicate that B&R failed to maintain records for l 22 activities affecting quality. Consequently, these l

23' sentences do not establish that any violation of

[

t 24 Criterion XVII occurred.

25 26 rk g,y 27 28-

I

,, .(~}- 1. Q.33 Do these sentences indicate a significant breakdown in 2 any portion of the quality assurance program for STP 3 under Criterion-II of Appendix B?

4 A.33 No. B&R had various procedures designed to provide a 5 ._ system integration function, including its newly 6 established System Design Assurance Group. However, 7 most of the activities of this group had not yet been

-8 factored into the design documents reviewed by Quadrex.

9 As we discussed previously, this fact does not identify 10 a significant breakdown in any portion of the quality 11 assurance program for STP but only indicates that B&R 12 had not yet completed this activity.

13 Similarly, when read in context, the statement w,

() 14- regarding consistency among design documents also 15 reflects a concern about the lack of multidisciplinary 16 design guidance. As we discussed previously, none of 17 the criteria of Appendix B (including Criterion II) 18 specifically requires the use of multidisciplinary 19 design guidance, provided that other appropriate 20 measures exist to ensure that applicable requirements 21 and design bases are correctly translated into 22 specifications, procedures, and instructions.  ;

23 24 Q.34 Does finding 3.l(a) identify a significant breakdown in 25 any portion of the QA program for STP?

{} 26 27 s-28

29 -

/*

1 A.34 No. As we have discussed previously, finding 3.l(a) 2 does not identify a significant breakdown in any portion 3 of the OA program for STP.

4 5 0 35 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.l(b)?

6 A.35 Finding 3.l(b) primarily expresses four concerns.

7 First, Quadrex was concerned that calculations 8 containing errors were being verified as correct with a 9 higher frequency than should be encountered. Second, 10 Quadrex was concerned that design input was not being 11 consistently reviewed for reasonableness by the 12 recipient and that the use of design output was not being consistently checked by the grcup providing it.

/

3V~

p 13 Third, Quadrex was concerned that B&R was not providing 14 15 adequate guidance to vendors relative to acceptable .

16 analysis and testing methods, required data, and report 17 format. Finally, Quadrex was concerned that B&R was not 18 verifying work performed by subcontractors and vendors, 19 was not reviewing and approving the analysis methods 20 used by subcontractors and vendors, and did not have 21 documented criteria governing the evaluation process for 22 vendor reports.

23 24 25

, (O_) 26

~'

27 28

o ,

1 0 36 Please explain whether Quadrex's finding that

(~)h 2 calculations containing errors were being verified as 3 correct with a higher frequency than should be l 4 encountered indicates a significant breakdown in any 5 portion of the QA program for STP.

6 A.36 In order to determine the extent of this Quadrex 7 concern, we hav,e reviewed the information cited by 8 Quadrex as support for its statement that calculations 9 containing errors were being verified as correct with a 10 higher frequency than should be encountered. The 11 Quadrex Report cites Questions C-16, H-15, N-1, and N-12 178 13 o Quadrex's assessment in C-16 states that B&R's

.O

'( ) , 14 design verification procedures " appeared to be 15 adequate or above industry standards on paper."

16 Nevertheless, Quadrex noted that it was " unable 17 to evaluate the effectiveness of their 18 procedure" and that there was " evidence" that a 19 "significant number of mistakes" passed through 20 the verification process.

21 o Quadrex's assessment in H-15 states that the 22 reactor cavity cooling system pressure drop 23 calculation "does not take into account the 24 effects of restrictions to air flow within the 25 reactor cavity."

26 i()

27 28

- 31 _

/~3 1 o .Quadrex's assessment in N-1 is critical of B&R U

2 for accepting an analysis of a main steam line 3 break (MSLB) which it knew had a large 4 conservative error. With this exception, 5 Quadrex found that the " verification sheets 6 showed proper verification procedures."

7 o Quadrex's assessment in N-17 states that 8 "[t]here appears to be either an error in the 9 calculation of ECP [ essential cooling pond) 10 initial temperature or an inconsistency with 11 Heavy Civil calculations."

12 H-15 identifies only one error; however, this error had 13 been identified prior to the Quadrex review and in fact

( ) 14 was in part the subject of an earlier 50.55(e) report 15 (see letter from G.W. Oprea to Karl Seyfrit (November 16 11, 1980)). N-1 also identifies only one error, but it 17 was previously identified and was accepted because it 18 was conservative. Quadrex was not able to determine in i

19 N-17 whether any error existed in a calculation (in 20 fact, N-17 did not involve an error but only the use of 21 different but conservative assumptions by different 22 disciplines). C-16 does state that there was evidence 23 of a "significant number" of mistakes, but Quadrex does 24 not identify these mistakes, their number or the number 25 of verified calculations it reviewed, nor does it 26 describe the nature or significance of the mistakes it (J)

\~

Furthermore, in C-16, Quadrex states that

- 27 discovered.

28

m

-:4 32 -

l_ :it was unable to evaluate the effectiveness of B&R's J(])

2 verification procedure. Thus, the information provided 3 by Quadrex in-the C-16, H-15, N-1, and N-17 is not 4 sufficient to.suppokt an independent determination that

~

5 a significant breakdown occurred in verification of 6 design at STP.

7 In this regard, it should be noted that, during the

8 courne of design and construction of any project as 9 extensive and complex as a nuclear power plant, some 10 calculational errors will inevitably occur. Quality 11 assurance programs are designed to catch, minimize, and 12 control calculational errors in design through such

13. measures as checking, verification, inspections, tests,

(( ) 14 and audits. However, it is unreasonable to expect a'QA 15 Program to preclude all calculational errors.

16 Consequently, the fact that a few calculational errors 17 are identified does not necessarily establish that there 18 was a significant breakdown in any portion of the 19 quality assurance program.

20 Furthermore, we have reviewed the Quadrex Report to 21 identify whether other information in the report might 22 indicate a significant breakdown in the process of 23 Performing or verifying calculations at STP. With the 24 exception of the deficiencies which were reported to the 25 NRC, no design errors with adverse safety implications g-5 26 were identified by Quadrex.

V

\- 27 -

28

(~% 1 Finally, with respect to calculations in the civil O

2 area addressed in Question C-16, the civil / structural 3 aspects of design and construction were the most 4 advanced at the time of the transition from B&R to 5 Bechtel. As a result, Bechtel civil / structural 6 engineering personnel reviewed the existing B&R 7 calculations to determine their technical adequacy to 8 support the design of structures. These personnel 9 generally observed that, although the analytical methods 10 utilized by B&R were not the same as normal Bechtel 11 practice, the relatively high degree of conservatism 12 used in the B&R analyses produced en end product in the 13 design which was technically acceptable without redesign 14 or reanalysis.

15 16 0 37 Does Quadrex's concern that a recipient does not 17 consistently review the reasonableness of input data

'18 provided to it or that the provider of output data does 19 not consistently check the use of that data indicate a 20 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA program 21 for STP?

22 A.37 No. The adequacy of data provided across design 23 interfaces is assured through such measures as l 24 interdisciplinary document reviews and through design 25 verification. As we discussed previously, B&R did have 1

26 appropriate procedures for conducting these activities, i

! 'T' 27 28 l

i L

. s-l l and.Quadrex did'not identify any significant.

{}

2- deficiencies.related'to' interfaces controls which were 3 not. reported to the NRC.

.It is not normal industry practice to require a I 4

5 supplier of data to perform a formal review of the use 6 of that. data by the recipient, although the discipline 7 which supplies data may review the other disciplines' 8 design output documents'as part of the coordination

'9 process. Although it is good practice to have the 10 recipient of data perform an informal review of the 11 reasonableness of input data, in many cases the 12 recipient'does not have either the knowledge or 13 experience necessary to conduct such reviews.

(I ) -14 'Accordingly, such reviews of input data are generally 15 not part of a licensee's QA program.

16 17 Q.38 Does the absence of guidance to vendors relative to 18 acceptable analysis and testing methods, required data, 19 and report format indicate a significant breakdown in 20 any portion of the QA program for STP?

21 A.38 No. Criterion IV of~ Appendix B requires that procure-22 ment documents include or reference " applicable 23 regulatory requirements, design bases, and other 24 requirements which are necessary to assure adequate 25 quality." In general, the "other requirements" may 26 include reference to specific drawings, specifications,

)

3 27 codes, or test, inspection, and acceptance requirements.

28

() 1 Detailed guidance on " analysis and testing methods, 2 required data, and report format," may be, but are not 3 required under Criterion IV to be, included in 4 procurement documents. Such details may be left to the 5 discretion of the vendors since the vendors are often in 6 the best position to know which types of methods or 7 reports best satisfy the quality requirements of the 8 purchaser. In other words, procurement documents 9 generally specify the criteria which a product must 10 meet, and the vendor usually has discretion to determine 11 how to satisfy those criteria.

12 Specifically, B&R procedure STP-DC-005, Preparation 13 and Control of Specifications, provided guidance to

( 14 personnel responsible for developing the design 15 documents which are issued for the purpose of 16 identifying the technical requirements to be met by 17 vendors and subcontractors. This procedure describes 18 the types of information requirements which B&R 19 engineers should provide to the vendor / subcontractor and 20 the types of documents which are to be required from the 21 vendor / subcontractor. The procedure provides the 22 following the specific guidance with respect to special 23 or unusual interface requirements or conditions for 24 subcontracted engineering services: "Unless the 25 requirement is essential to the performance of that 4

{} 26 27 task, the requirement should not be included." (Emphasis in Original) In our experience, the type of practice 28 i

-+

(_) 1; embodied in this procedure has proven a generally 2 satisfactory means of obtaining appropriate products in 3 a cost-effective manner.

4 It may be noted that, in addition to the 5 requirements specified in the procurement documents, for 6 some types of procurements purchasers often provide 7 guidance to vendors identifying one or more acceptable 8 means by which the requirements in the procurement 9 documents may be satisfied. Although such guidance is 10 not required, it helps avoid a situation in which a 11 vendor may satisfy all of the quality requirements in 12 the procurement documents and yet not provide a product 13 , or service in a form that is useful to the purchaser.

(~)

( 'f' 14 15 0.39 Does Quadrex's concern that B&R was not verifying work 16 performed by subcontractors and vendors, was not 17 reviewing and approving the analysis methods used by 18 subcontractors and vendors, and did not have documented 19 criteria governing the evaluation process for vendor 20 reports indicate a significant breakdown in the OA 21 program for STp?

22 A.39 No. It appears that Quadrex was concerned with the 23 extent to which B&R was performing these functions 24 rather than their total absence. Review of work 25 performed by vendors and contractors is encompassed

() 26 within the scope of Criterion VII of Appendix B.

27 Criterion VII requires that measures be established to 28

l.

T~1 l

'q_j 1 assure that purchased services conform to procurement 2 documents. Other than stating that "[t]hese measures 3 shall include provisions, as appropriate, for source 4 evaluation and selection, objective evidence of quality 5 furnished by the contractor or subcontractor, inspection 6 at the contractor or subcontractor source, and 7 examination of products upon delivery," Criterion VII 8 does not identify which measures must be used to assure 9 that purchased services conform to procurement 10 documents, but instead allows the purchaser to select 11 the measures it deems appropriate.

12 Typically, purchasers confirm the adequacy of the 13 activities of their suppliers by conducting reviews of

((7,)

14 selected procedures, audits, surveillances, and reviews

, 15 at vendor shops and inspections of products upon 16 delivery. Suppliers of safety-related services are 17 required to provide an approved quality assurance 18 program to the extent necessary for their activities 19 which affect quality. In general, review and monitoring 20 of a supplier's OA program provides confidence in the 21 quality of the work of the supplier.

22 Criterion VII does not require a purchaser to verify 23 (in the sense of a detailed check or design review) work 24 performed by subcontractors and vendors. Verification 25 by the purchaser could be used as one means of )

() 26 satisfying Criterion VII. However, in many cases, it

- 27 would not be possible for a purchaser to verify the work 28 l l

f] 1 Performed by a subcontractor or vendor. Subcontractors or vendors often possess specialized knowledge and 2

3 abilities which-are necessary for verification but are 4 lacked by the purchaser (which may be the very reason 5 why the purchaser did not perform the design activities 6 itself). In such cases, the subcontractor or vendor 7 typically would verify its own work in accordance with 8 its own QA program, and the purchaser would rely upon 9 other measures to assure that the work satisfies the 10 requirements in the procurement documents. In short, a 11 Purchaser is only required to assure that purchased 12 services conform to procurement documents; the purchaser 13 is not required to perform design verification of the work performed by subcontractors and vendors and in most

( 14

-15 cases it would be impracticable to do so.

16 Similarly, neither Criterion VII nor Appendix B in 17 general requires that a purchaser review and approve the 18 analysis methods used by subcontractors and vendors. As 19 explained previously, purchasers are not required to 20 specify analysis methods in procurement documents, and 21 in many cases purchasers (including B&R) do not do so.

22 Furthermore, although a purchaser may rely upon a review 23 of a supplier's analysis methods as a means of assuring 24 that purchased services conform with procurement 25 documents, there are other acceptable alternatives for 26 Providing this assurance. These measures include the b._ 27 use of audits and surveillances and review of objective 28 l

i; I evidence of conformance with the procurement document '

2 requirements, such as certificiations by appropriate 3 registered engineers.

4 Finally, it may be noted that B&R did have 5 documented procedures governing the reviews of vendor 6 reports. B&R procedure'STP-DC-004 required that 7 vendor reports be reviewed in accordance with 8 procedure STP-DC-014. Addicionally, among other 9 things, STP-DC-004 required that such reviews include 10 a determination of whether the vendor has met the 11 requirements of the procurement documents. This  :

12 procedure is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 13 Appendix B. Also, it may be noted that the Quadrex

,- 14 Report did not identify significant safety [

(k/ J 15 deficiencies in the work performed by subcontractors -

16 and vendors. However, we would agree with Quadrex 17 that it is good practice to provide additional 18 guidance for the review of vendor reports.

19 L

20 0 40 CCANP's Motion, p. 39, quotes the following sentence 21 from finding 3.1(b) as identifying a violation of 22 Criteria I and XVIII of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part

+

23 50:

24 " Input data to a technical group does not appear to be consistently reviewed 25 by that group for its reasonableness prior to use."

26

,( ) 27 if

!~' 28 l

1 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure  !

2 "to adequately verify safety-related design and 3 engineering work" at STP. Id. What relevance, if 4 any, does this sentence, or design verification in 5 general, have to Criteria I and XVIII?

6 A.40 This sentence, and design verification in general, are 7 not relevant to Criteria I and XVIII. Criterion I 8 requires the responsibilities of organizations ,

9 performing activities af fecting quality to be 10 established in writing, and it sets forth certain 11 requirements with respect to those responsibilities.

12 Criterion I does not specify which organization shall 13 verify or review design input. Similarly, Criterion 14 XVIII recuires that a comprehensive system of planned 15 and periodic audits be carried out to verify 16 compliance with and the effectiveness of the quality 17 assurance program. Criterion XVIII does not impose 18 any requirements with respect to verification or 19 review of design input. Tc the extent any question 20 about verification of design can be inferred from this 21 sentence quoted by CCANP, it would be encompassed 22 generally within Criterion III, not Criterion I or 23 XVIII.

24 L 25 As is discussed above, the sentence quoted by 26 CCANP does not indicate a significant breakdown in any

, ) 27 portion of the QA program for STP. While Criterion 28

J' 5 ,

t 1 III requires that measures shall be established for

/~3 .

I ' (_) 2 verifying or checking the adequacy of design; it does t 3 not prescribe who shall perform the verification or 4 check. Thus, under' Criterion III, the organization ,

5 which provides the design input may, and often does, 6 verify the adequacy of the i'nput without additional 7 verification by the recipient organization.

8 9 0 41 CCANP's Motion, p. 41, quotes the following sentence 10 f rom findi ng 3. l( b) as identifying a violation of l 11 Criterion IV of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50:

l 12 - " Brown and Root does not provide

"' adequate guidance to vendors stipulating 13- " acceptable analysis and t? sting methods, required data, and report tocmat."

s 14 (U 15 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a fallute  ;

16 "to assure that applicable regulatory requirements, 17 design bases, and other requirements for design and -

18 engineering of the South Texas Project were included 19 or referenced" in procurement documents. Id. Does "

20 the sentence quoted by CCANP indicate that BER failed 21 to specify applicable regulatory requirements, design 22 bases, and other requirements in the procurement 23 documents?

24 A.41 No. The sentence quoted by CCANP only provides 25 Quadrex's view regarding guidance given to vendars.

26 As we discussed previously, this sentence does not 27 i.(-)

~

28 l

1 identify any failure to specify applicable regulatory

.p

'\. 2 requirements, design bases, and other requirements in 3 procurement documents.

4 5 0 42 CCANP's Motion, p. 43, quotes the following sentences J

6 f rom finding 3.1( b) as identifying a violation of 7 Criterion X of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50:

8 "No documented criteria exists governing the evaluation process for vendor 9 reports."

10 " Brown and Root continues to pursue a

, policy that work performed by major s 11 subcontractors or suppliers, such as EDS Nuclear and Westinghouse, is design s 12 verified by these firms and can therefore be assumed to be correct."

13 14 CCANP states that these sentences demonstrate a 15 failure "to establish and execute ef fectively a 16 program for inspection of safety-related design and 17 engineering work." Id. Please explain whether these 18 sentences indicate a significant breakdown in

,19 inspection of design work under Criterion X.

20 A.42 Inspection refers to examinations, observations, 21 measurements, or tests to determine whether the s 22 physical characteristics of a material, structure,

% 23 component, system, or process coraply with applicable 24 requirements. Consequently, Criterion X is generally 25 understood to identify requirements pertaining to 26 inspections of fabrication and construction activities (A_) 27 and not to design activities.

i

~

28

1 The criteria of Appendix B which are most O 2 epp11cebte to the stetement by CCANe ere Criterie 11I 3 and VII. The conformance of a design with applicable 4 criteria is determined by means of verification under 5

Criterion III and review of vendor-f ornished 6 information under Criterion VII. As we previously 7 explained, the sentences quoted by CCANP do not 8 identify a significant breakdown in the OA program for 9 STP under Criterion III and VII.

10 11 0 43 Does finding 3.1( b) identify a significant breakdown 12 in any portion of the OA program for STP?

13 A.43 No. As we have discussed previously, finding 3.1(b) 14 does not identify a significant breakdown in any LO 15 portion of the cuality assurance program for STP.

16 17 0.44 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.1(c)?

18 A.44 Finding 3.l( c) primarily expresses three concerns of 19 Quadrex. First Quadrex was concerned about the lack 20 of consistent treatment of plant operating modes and 21 environmental conditions and noted the absence of 22 written design bases to guide designers in what 23 combination of events and plant modes must be 24 considered. Second, Quadrex was concerned that the 25 design criteria for STP appeared to reflect industry 26 issues in the 1973-75 time frame but not more recent j O

~

27 i 28

i 1 issues. Finally, Quadrex was concerned that analyses l() 2 of certain systems did not reflect appropriate plant 3 operating modes and environmental conditions.

4 5 Q.45 What is the source of Quadrex's first concern?

6 A.45 Although the Quadrex Report does not specify the

'7- source of this concern, it appears to be predicated 8 upon finding 4.3.2.1(i), which states that "there is 9

no project-wide documented basis for [ plant operating 10 and environmental) conditions and their use."

11

'12 0.46 Would the absence of a project-wide documented banis 13 for plant operating and environmental conditions 14 violate the requirements of Appendix B?

c0 15 A.46 No. There is no requirement in Appendix B that plant 16 operating and environmental conditions be specified in 17 a project-wide document. At STP, the design bases

-18 were provided for individual systems or disciplines by 19 System Design Descriptions (SDDs) and Technical 20 Reference Documents (TRDs) . In fact, B&R procedure 21- STP-SD-002-B required SDDs to address off-normal and 22 post-accident operating conditions and to list the 23 casualty events considered in the design of systems.

24 This practice-i.s sufficient to satisfy the 25 requirements of Appendix B.

In this regard, it should 26 be noted that B&R had established the Systems Design

,()27 Assurance Group to assure, among other things, that t

28

~

1 plant operating modes and environmental conditions

()- 2 were being properly accounted for from system to 3 system.

4 5 Q.47 Does Quadrex's concern that the design criteria for 6 STP appeared to reflect industry issues in the 1973-75 7 time frame but not more recent issues identify a 8' significant breakdown in any portion of the OA program 9 for STP?

10 A.47 No. Based upon our review of the Quadrex Report and 11 Bechtel's review of B&R design work during the 12 transition period, we have determined that B&R was 13 reviewing regulatory and industry developments since 14 1975, but that in some cases B&R had not yet performed i

.. 15 the work necessary to revise its design criteria.

16 Thus, Quadrex's observation that the design criteria I

'17 did not account for more recent developments does not I 18 indicate that the controls provided by the OA program 19 were not being properly implemented but instead 20 indicated that B&R had not yet updated its design 21 criteria -- which at.most could be considered a 22 productivity and scheduling concern. This is 23 particularly true since Quadrex did not identify 24- significant deficiencies in design output traceable to 25 out-of-date criteria.

-26 j() 27 n 28

1 0 48 What is the basis for Quadrex's concern that the rs

(-) 2 analyses of certain systems did not reflect 3 appropriate plant operating modes and environmental 4 conditions?

5 A.48 Quadrex relied upon three examples in support of its 6 conclusion. First, Quadrex pointed to deficiencies in 7 the design basis for the HVAC system. These 8 deficiencies were reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 9 CFR S 50.55(e). The other examples involved a 10 purported failure to consider the worst case 11 conditions ( i.e. , simultaneous shutdown of two units) 12 in the assumptions used in the design of the Essential 13 Cooling Pond (ECP) and the absence of postulated line

- 14 cracks and breaks outside of containment. However, O,s 15 the design of the ECP did in fact consider two units 16 shutdown as reflected in FSAR Section 9.2.5., and we .

17 understand that B&R had not yet begun design 18 activities associated with line cracks and breaks 19 outside of containment.

20 21 0 49 With the exception of the HVAC system design 22 deficiency which was reported to the NRC, do these 23 examples indicate a significant breakdown in the OA 24 program for STP?

25- A.49 No. The questions about the ECP and the pipe break 26 analysis were of a different nature than the O

A_) 27 deficiency in the HVAC system and do not suggest any 28

1 systematic deficiency in the controls provided by the  ;

./,

2 QA program or in the implementation of those controls.

3 Thus, these examples do not indicate the existence of 4 a significant breakdown in any portion of the QA ,

l 5 program for STP.

6 7 0 50 CCANP's Motion, p. 42, quotes the following sentences 8

from finding 3.1(c) as identifying a violation of 9' Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50:

10 "No written design bases are provided to guide the designer in what combinations of events and plant 11 modes must be considered."

12 " Consideration of degraded equipment performance i was also not evident."  !

13 14 CCANP states that thdse sentences demonstrate a 15 failure "to adequately prescribe by documented 16 instructions, procedures, or drawings the safety-17 related design and engineering activities at the South 18 Texas Project." Id, . Please explain whether these

. 19 sentences quoted by CCANP identify a significant

-20 breakdown in any portion of the QA program for STP.

21 A.50 Procedure STP-SD-002-B required that SDDs provide 22 design bases for of f-normal and post-accident 23 conditions and list casualty events to be considered 24 in the design of systems. As explained previously, 25 Quadrex was apparently seeking a project-wide document 26 which provided design bases for plant operating modes f( and environmental conditions. Neither Criterion III 28

,c .-,,--m-- ,__..-__.------.-_.--,_m- ---__--c._

. - 48 _

1 nor Criterion v requires that a project-wide document

( 2 specify the design basis for all systems or 3 disciplines; both criteria permit the design basis to  ;

'l 4 be identified on a system or discipline level.

b 5 Additionally, the degraded equipment performance 6 identified by Quadrex refers to matters that had not 7 yet been the subject of design activities at STP.

8 Thus, the sentences quoted by Quadrex do not identify 9 a significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 10 program for STP.

11 12 0.51 CCANP's Motion, p. 42, quotes the following sentence 13 from finding 3.l( c) as identifying a violation of

, _ 14 Criterion VI of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50:

V 15 " Design criteria provided in issued

[ System] Design Descriptions (SDDs) and 16 Te.chnical Reference Documents (TRDs) . . . do not adequately address 17 more recent developments," particularly developments in the post-1975 period.

19 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure 20 "to adequately control the issuance of documents, such 21 as instructions, procedures, and drawings, and changes 22 thereto, which prescribed safety-related design and 23 engineering." Id. Does the sentence quoted by CCANP 24 identify a violation of Criterion VI?

25 A.51 No. Criterion VI pertains to document issuance to 26 assure that when design documents and any revisions

() 27 are updated, the revision process be appropriately 28

1 controlled by assuring that the revisions "are d

Am) 2 reviewed for adequacy and approved for release by 3 authorized personnel and are distributed to and used 4 at the location where the prescribed activity is 5 pe r fo rmed . " The sentence quoted by CCANP relates to 6 the engineering design process of updating design 7 documents relative to changing regulatory 8 requirements, not the control process of issuing 9 documents. Quadrex was expressing its view of the 10 efficiency of B&R's design process in implementing new 11 requirements.

12 13 0 52 Does finding 3.l(c) identify a significant breakdown 14 in any portion of the OA program for STP? .

O 15 A.52 No. As we have discussed previously, finding 3.1(c) 16 d'oes not identify a significant breakdown in any 17 portion of the quality assurance program for STP.

18 19 0 53 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.1(d)?

20 A.53 Finding 3.l(d) primarily questions whether some design 21 activities that were classified as non-safety-related 22 should have been classified as safety-related, and it 23 identifies seven examples in support of this 24 conclusion.

25 26 0.54 What were the seven examples identified in finding

, () 27 3.l(d)?

28

1 A.54 The first example was stated as being "a lack of

/ ~$ 2 awareness of high energy piping in the MAB [ Mechanical V

3 Auxiliary Building] (see Questions M-3, N-3, N-15, and 4 R-5)." A review of the cited questions indicates that 5 Quadrex was concerned that B&R had not analyzed 6 postulated breaks in high energy lines in the MAB.

7 This example does not involve an improper 8 classification of a safety-related system but rather 9 an activity which had not yet been performed by B&R.

10 The second example referred to shielding 11 calculations that were not classified as safety-12 related. The NRC was notified that this was a 13 potentially reportable deficiency under 10 CFR S 14 50.55(e). However, HL&P later determined that this (s_) 15 was not reportable because the shielding calculations 16 were not generally classified as safety-related in the 17 industry and, more importantly, the shielding  ;

i 18 calculations were internally processed by B&R in the 19 same manner as a safety-related calculation with 20 respect to checking and verification of adequacy. j The_ third example involved "HVAC system 1

21 l

22 requirements for off-normal conditions." Ouadrex was 23 concerned that B&R had not provided safety-related 24 HVAC systems to account for off-normal conditions.

25 This was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR S 26 50.55(e).

27 28-1 l

l

1 The fourth example involved "[c]omputer code CPVR

() 2 status." Quadrex was concerned that users of computer 3 codes could not determine whether the codes were 4 safety-related or non-safety-related because some i

5 ':omputer program verification reports (CPVR) were not 6 in iblace. This was also reported to the NRC pursuant 7 to 10'CFR S 50.55(e).

8 The fifth example involved " support systems (see 9 Questions E-3, E-15, H-4, H-13, M-5, M-25, N-10, N-17, 10 and R-6)." A review of the cited questions does not 11 indicate any problem with safety-related 12 classifications (with the exception of the HVAC 13 problem mentioned previously) , but instead generally 14 indicates that Quadrex was concerned about various 1 15 types of analyses which had not yet been completed or 16 with analyses which Quadrex believed may have 17 contained errors.

18 The sixth example involved "[o] perations performed 19 at remote panels (see Ouestions E-13 and R-10)." A 20 review of the cited guestions does not indicate any 21 problem with safety-related classifications of 22 operations at remote panels but on1y a concern that 23 environmental conditions ( temperature , humidity, and 24 radiation) at the remote panels may not have been 25 properly accounted for. This example is related to 26

('T 27 V

28

.. I i

1 1 the reported deficiency in the HVAC systems, and l i

2 pertained to activities which we understand had not

( })'  ;

1 3 yet been completed by B&R. '

4 The final example involved "[s]ystems interaction 5 (see Questions H-18, H-23, M-3, M-10, M-50, P-20, and 6 R-12)." A review of the cited questions indicates 7 that, with one exception (H-23), the questions do not 8 involve improper safety-related classifications but 9 instead analyses which we understand had not yet been 1

10 completed or concerns by Quadrex regarding the 11 adequacy of certain analyses. In Question H-23, 12 Queirex was questioning whether the leak detection 13 instrumentation and sump pumps in the essential 14 cooling water pump rooms should be. classified as

~%

((A_) 15 safety-related. 'I Bechtel's review of this question '

16 /

revealed that level instrumentation was not the sole l

17 means of identifying leakage in the ECW system and as i

1 18 i such did not have to be classified as safety-related.

19 Furthermore, the operation of the sump pumps is not 20 relied upon to mitigate against the consequences of 21 postulated ECW system line breaks in such a way as to l

22 require their classification as a safety-related ,

23 component. Th" ' ' 9,

,/', -

m 24 4 4 4. l 25 0 55 Do these seven examples indicate a significant 26 breakdown in the safety-related classification system A 27 for STP?

\_)'

28 I

l

1 A.55 No. Of the seven examples, only the one related to

[) 2 the HVAC system clearly involved a safety-related 3 design activity that was improperly classified as 4 non-safety-related. The other examples included 5 analyses which we understand had not yet been 6 completed and concerns about the adequacy of certain 7 analyses. The isolated example involving the 8 classification of portions of the HVAC system does not 9 indicate a significant breakdown in the safety-related

. 10 classification system for STP, and this example was in 11 f act reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR S 12 50.55(e).

13

. 14 0.56 CCANP's Motion, pp. 39 and 41, quotes the following (i) 15 two passages from finding 3.1(d) as a basis for its 16 contention that finding 3.1(d) violates Criteria I and l

17 II:

18 "It was observed on many occasions that B&R uses a very sharp distinction between 19- .S/R and non-S/R categorizations for both equipment and calculations. A non-S/R 20 designation results in the design outputs not being subjected to design 21 verification. In several instances, design activities that affected plant 22 safety were designated as non-S/R."

23 "It was frequently stated during the design review that only NRC requirements 24 must be met whether or not those requirements are accurate, reasonable, or 25 even meet the intent of the regulations."

! ( Emphasis as in the Quadrex Report) .

26 h

28

L 4

1 CCANP states that these passages demonstrate a failure

!)'

2 "to establish and effectively execute an acceptable 3 quality assurance program" and a failure "to properly 4 identify safety-related versus non-safety-related 5 aspects of the design." Id. Do you have any comments 6 regarding this contention?

7 A.56 Yes. Initially, it should be noted that drawing a 8 sharp distinction between safety-related and non-a safety-related classifications and failing to verify 10 non-safety-related designs do not indicate any 11 violation of Appendix B because Appendix B only 12 applies to activities affecting the safety-related 13 functions of structures, systems, and components.

14 Furthermore, Criterion I of Appendix B is inapplicable yg k/ 15 to the quoted passages, since Criterion I only sets 16 forth quality-related requirements for the organiza-17 tions of a licensee and its contractors and does not 18 specify any requirements regarding safety-related 19 classifications._ The criterion most directly 20 applicable to the quoted passages is Criterion II, 21 which requires among other things, that the " applicant 22 shall identify the structures, systems and components 23 to be covered by the quality assurance program. . . ."

24 25 0 57 Do the passages cited by CCANP indicate a significant 26 breakdown in quality assurance under Criterion II?

27

([)

28

1 A.57 No. As previously explained, since Quadrex identified r

(J~T 2 only one example of an improper designation of 3 safety-related activities which was in fact reported 4 to the NRC under 10'CFR S 50.55(e), there was no I

5 reasonable basis for notifying the NRC of a 6 significant breakdown in any portion of the quality l

7 assurance program for STP.

8 9 0 58 Does finding 3.1(d) identify a significant breakdown 10 in any portion of the OA program for STP beyond the 11 reported deficiency in the HVAC system?

12- A.58 No. As we have discussed previously, finding 3.l(d) 13 does not indicate a significant breakdown in any 14 portion of the quality assurance program for STP P)

(m 15 beyond the reported deficiency in the HVAC s,ystem.

16 17 0 59 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.1(e)?

18 A.59 Finding 3.l(e) primarily expresses Quadrex's concern 19 that written guidelines do not exist for the conduct 20 of f ailure mode and ef fect analysis ( FMEA) and that 21 there is no documented evidence of satisfaction of the 22 single failure criterion. Additionally, finding 23 3.1(e) identifies one case, involving the common 24 instrument air line, which Quadrex indicated as a 25 violation of the single failure criterion.

26.

(:)

28

1 0 60 Does this finding indicate a significant breakdown in

() 2 any portion of the quality assurance program for STP?

3 A.60 No. First, it should be noted that, as we understand 4 it, B&R had not begun to perform FMEAs for key systems 5 (except for preparation of tables on single failures 6 in the FSAR). Consequently, documented guidance for 7 performance of FMEAs was not yet necessary, and 8 therefore the absence of such guidance would not 9 indicate a significant breakdown in any portion of the 10 quality assurance program for STP.

11 It appears to have been Quadrex's opinion that a 12 project-wide document should exist to provide guidance 13 for the conduct of failure mode and effect analyses. .

14 See finding 4.3.2.l(i). As we explained previously

) 15 with respect to finding 3.1(c), a project-wide 16 document is not necessary as long as each discipline 17 or group uses appropriate guidance for its specific 18 type of work. Similarly, it is not necessary to have 19 documented evidence solely for the purpose of demon-20 strating satisfaction of the single failure criterion 21 provided that satisfaction can be determined from 22 other documentation.

23 Finally, with respect to the single failure 24 criterion violation reported by Quadrex in the common 25 instrument air line, nothing in the Quadrex Report 26 indicated that the situation involving the common 27 instrument air line was attributable or related to a 28 f

. .57 -

i

~

1- significant breakdown in any portion of the OA program

(]}

2 for STP. This matter is also the subject of findings

, 3 4.3.2.l(a) and 4.8.2.1(a), which are discussed below.

4 5 0 61 CCANP's Motion, p. 42, quotes the following sentence 6 as-the basis for its contention that finding 3.1(e)

, 7 identifies a violation of Criterion V of Appendix B to '

8 10 C.F.R. Part 50:

9 "No guidelines exist on what types of failures should be considered for

, 10. various types of equipment."

11 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure l

12- "to adequately prescribe by documented instructions,

13 procedures, or drawings the safety-related design and 14 engineering activities at the South Texas Project."

. 15 Id . - Does the sentence quoted by CCANP identify a j 16 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA program i 17 under Criterion V?

18 A.61 No. As explained previously, Quadrex apparently was 19 seeking a project-wide document which provided 20 guidance for conducting FMEAs. Such a project-wide 21 l doc umen t is not required under Criterion V or under 22 Criterion III. In any case, B&R had not yet begun to 23- perform FMEAs for key systems. Consequently, guidance 24 for this effort was not yet required to be in place.

25 26 0.62 Does finding 3.l(e) identify a significant breakdown 27 in any portion of the OA program for STP?

}

28 3

, - ~ , - . - - - , . , , . , . . - _ . - ,-

, - , - - - - - , . - , . - , - - , . - _ _ . __,-,.-c.. ,,. -m-.-,m- - - - , . - , , y-- --

1 A.62 No. As we have discussed previously, finding 3.l(e)

(2,) 2 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 3 portion of the quality assurance program for STP.

4 5 0 63 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.l( f)?

6 A.63 Finding 3.1(f) primarily expresses three concerns by 7 Quadrex. First, Quadrex was concerned that there was 8 no documented evidence for assuring that commitments 9 in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) were being 10 systematically implemented. Second, Quadrex was 11 concerned that there were inconsistencies between the 12 FSAR and design documents. Finally, Quadrex was 13 concerned that there did not appear to be any method 14 to assure the timely updating of the FSAR.

(')

\s 15 16 0.64 Did B&R have a method designed to assure that FSAR 17 . commitments were implemented?

18 A.64 Yes. We understand that coordination of 19 implementation of the FSAR commitments was the ,

20 d

responsibility-of the B&R Licensing Group (the 21 activities of which Quadrex did not review), and i

22 implementation of the commitments was the l

23 responsibility of the individual design disciplines.

24 Additionally, we understand that the B&R Design l l

25 Assurance Group had responsibility for reviewing the 26 n

22 4J 28

- j

l l

1 design to assure ;that FSAR commitments were met. This  !

()

2 is a reasonable' method for assuring implementation of 3 FSAR commitments.

4 B&R had 'two measures designed to assure that FSAR 5 commitments were implemented. First, in accordance 6 with the review and comment process described earlier, 7 B&R issued design documents such as SDDs that 8 reflected those regulatory and code requirements which 9 the design organizations were to meet. Secondly, B&R 10 committed to a formal design assurance process in 11 accordance with procedure STP-SD-005 which, among 12 other things, was intended to assure that 13 regulatory / licensing commitments were fully 114 implemented as reflected in the FSAR upon design

-15 completion.

16 In addition, B&R procedure STP-DC-015 required 17 design verifiers to confirm -that the designs being 18 verified conformed with FSAR requirements and to 19 initiate FSAR change notices for designs which did not 20 conform. This procedure provided an additional method 21 for assuring that the design conformed with the FSAR.

22 23 0 65 What was the basis for Quadrex's concern that B&R did 24 not have a method for assuring that FSAR commitments l

25 were systematically implemented?

'26 27

)

28 i

l

1 A.65 Ouadrex's concern in finding 3.1(f) is essentially the (n) 2 same as the concern in finding 4.3.2.1.(g), which 3 states that a " systematic method to assure that FSAR 4 commitments are implemented in the design does not 5 appear to exist...." In turn, finding 4.3.2.1(g) 6 cites four questions, none of which provides adequate 7' information to support the conclusion that there was 8 no documented method for assuring that FSAR 9 commitments were being systematically implemented.

10 11 0 66 Please explain whether Quadrex's concern that there 12- were inconsistencies between the design and the FSAR 13 indicates a significant breakdown in any portion of 14 the OA program for STP. ,

15 A.66 In many projects, such as STP, the FSAR is not used to 16 control design activities but instead is used to 17 summarize pertinent information in the design .

18 documents which do govern the design activities.

19 During construction, the design of a project evolves, 20 as reflected by revisions to the controlled design 21 documents, and the FSAR is of ten amended to 22 incorporate these revisions. Since there is 23 inevitably some delay between the time that the design 24 is changed and the FSAR is amended to reflect that 25 change, it is not unusual for some inconsistencies 26 between the design and the FSAR to exist. As long as

) 27 the differences between the FSAR and the design are 28

, 4 h 1 identified and controlled, and as long as design

(_) 2 activities are being controlled by the appropriate 3 design documents, inconsistencies with the FSAR do not 4 Pose a significant quality problem.

5 In the case of STP, B&R did have a procedure 6 (STP-DC-012) for controlling changes to designs which 7 necessitated amendments to the FSAR. Among other 8 things, this procedure required that any changes in 9 design which differed from the FSAR be documented on a 10 change notice describing the change and identifying 11 affected pages of the FSAR, and it required that a 12 control log be maintained for these change notices.

13 This is an appropriate procedure to control 14 inconsistencies between the FSAR and. design documents.

O 15 16 0 67 Please explain whether Quadrex's concern that there 17 was no method to assure the timely updating of the 18 FSAR indicates a significant breakdown in any portion 19 of the OA program for STP.

20 A.67 Failure to update the FSAR in a timely manner may 21 result in soma temporary inconsistencies between the 22 FSAR and the design documents governing the design 23 activities. As we explained in response to the 24 previous question, such inconsistencies do not pose a 25 significant quality problem as long as the entire 26 Process is controlled. However, timely updating of

() 27 the FSAR is important in order to provide the NRC 28

1 Staff with proper information for the conduct of its

%)_

( 2 functions. In this regard, B&R had a procedure (STP-3 DC-012) for control and processing of changes to the 4 FSAR.

5 6 0.68 Is there any other reason why Quadrex's concerns 7 regarding inconsistencies between the FSAR and various 8 design documents and regarding the need to update the 9 FSAR would not be reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)?

10 A.68 Yes. We have reviewed the Quadrex Report to identify 11 examples related to Quadrex's concerns. The examples 12 we identified generally involved a design or design 13 practice which was technically adequate but which was 14 either inconsistent with the FSAR or not reflected in 15 the FSAR. In fact, in many cases, the Quadrex Report 16 states that the design or design practice in question 17 was acceptable or consistent with industry practice 18 and NRC guidance. Consequently, Quadrex's concern 19 also would not be reportable because it does not 20 identify a condition which, if left uncorrected, could 21 have adversely affected the safety of operations.

22 23 0.69 CCANP's Motion, pp. 42-43, quotes the following 24 sentences from finding 3.1( f) as a basis for its 25 contention that finding 3.1( f) identifies a violation 26 of Criterion VI:

)

28

1 "There [were] many inconsistencies noted

/ "E between the FSAR and other design and

(-) 2 procurement documents."

3 "There did not appear to be any method to as ure that timely updating of the 4 FSAR was being accomplished."

5 "In a number of areas, the FSAR is now out-of-date."

6 7 CCANP states that these sentences demonstrate a 8 f ailure "to adequately control the issuance of 9 documents, such as instructions, procedures, and 10 drawings, including changes thereto, which prescribed 11 safety-related design and engineering." Id. Do these 12 sentences identify a violation of Criterion VI of 13 Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 507

- 14 A.69 No. As previously expla.ined, Criterion VI requires y

15 that, if a document is issued or revised, it be 16 accomplished in a controlled manner. Criterion VI 17 does not require that any particular document, 18 including the FSAR, be updated, nor does it prohibit 19 inconsistencies between the FSAR and other types of 20 documents as long as those inconsistencies are 21 controlled. Furthermore, as we explained previously, 22 the matters raised in these sentences do not indicate 23 a significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 24 program for STP.

25 26 I) a 27 28

.r- - ,., _ . , _ - , _ . _ _ .

I 1 0 70 CCANP's Motion, p. 43, quotes the following sentence 2 from. finding 3.1(f) as a basis for its contention that 3 finding 3.1(f) identifies a violation of Criterion X 4 of Appendix B to'10 CFR Part 50:

5 "These were numerous differences between EDS practices and FSAR promises."

\

7 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure 8' "to establish and execute ef fectively a program for 9 inspection of safety-related design and engineering 10 work." M. Please explain whether this sentence 11 quoted by CCANP indicates a significant breakdown in 12 inspection of design work under Criterion X.

13 A.70 As we explain previously, Criterion X is generally 14 understood to apply to inspection of fabrication and 0s 15 construction activities rather than design or 16 engineering work. Thus, the sentences quoted by CCANP 17 would not indicate a significant breakdown in the OA 18 program for STP under Criterion X.

19 Furthermore, as part of its subcontract 20 responsibilities, EDS was directed by B&R to conform 21 its design activities to the same Technical Reference 22 Documents which were being used by B&R personnel in 23 the performance of their duties with regard to piping 24 stress analysis and pipe support design. These TRD's 25 represent the primary method used by B&R to implement 26 licensing commitments with respect to analytical O 27 methods.

28

1 Finally, it may be noted that while Quadrex

() 2 identified differences between'some of EDS's design 3 activities and the then-current revision of the FSAR, 4 Quadrex confirmed that these activities were 5 technically adequate. See Quadrex's assessment of 6 EDS's responses to Questions P-7, P-9, and P-24.

7 Thus, the existence of these difference would not have -

8 adversely affected the safety of operations.

9 10 Q.71 Does finding 3.1( f) identify a significant breakdown 11 in any portion of the OA program for STP?

12 A.71. No. As we have previously discussed, finding 3.1( f) 13 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 14 portion of the OA program for STP.

() 15 16 0 72 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.1(g)?

.17 A.72 Finding 3.1(g) primarily expresses Quadrex's concern 18 that there was very little evidence of a well-19 thought-out and consistent basis for design, that much 20 of the plant design basis was solely rooted in i 21 engineering judgment, and that the rationale for this 22 judgment was not documented in a retrievable manner.

23 Quadrex provided several observations in support of 24 its concern. Some of these observations were also the l

25 subject of findings we have discussed previously.

26 Others included observations that much of the design

() 27 was based upon unverified preliminary data; that a 28

1 number of key front-end criteria documents had not yet

( )s

, 2 been prepared; that work performed by one contractor <

3 was not being reviewed by other contractors; that B&R

.4 did not have a consistent requirement for design 5 margins and allowed individual engineers to make this 6 determination; and that B&R did not require the use of 7 either design manuals that provide guidance on 8 acceptable practices,or individual engineer log-books.

9 10 0 73 Please discuss whether the concern expressed by 11 Quadrex in finding 3.1(g) identifies a significant 12 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP.

13 A.76 When read in context, it appears to have been 14 Quadrex's concern that each discipline was

(~%

\-)

t 15 establishing its own design basis, that much of the l 16 design bases were rooted solely in engineering 17 judgment, and that because the rationale for this 18 judgment was not documented, new project personnel 19 were not familiar with the reasons why their 20 predecessors had selected certain design bases.

21 However, as we explained previously with respect to 22 findings 3.l(a), 3.1(b) and 3.l(c), it is acceptable 23 for each discipline to develop its own design basis j 24 rather than relying upon a project-wide document or 25 multidisciplinary guidance. Furthermore, use of l 26 engineering judgment in development of the design I

L

() 27 basis is appropriate, and the rationale for that 28 l

~

1 judgment need not be documented as long as the design

/r

'q_) 2 basis itself is documented. Although we agree that it 3 would have been beneficial if new project personnel 4 were fdmiliar with the rationale for the design basis 5 established by their predecessors, the absence of such 6 familiarity does not present a problem as long as the 7 design basis is documented. In any case, Bechtel's 8 own review of B&R's design basis indicated that the 9 design basis was primarily rooted in the Safety 10 Analysis Reports, regulatory guides, industry codes, 11 and other standard sources for design bases.

12 Consequently, Quadrex's concern does not indicate a 13 significant breakdown in any portio 6 of the OA program 14 for STP.

-) 15 The examples provided by Quadrex in finding 3.l(g) 16 also do not identify a significant brea'kdown in any 17 portion of the OA program for STP. Basing the design 18 upon unverified preliminary data is generally 19 necessary at the start of design and does not identify 20 any quality assurance problems. Quadrex's concern in 21 this area generally pertained to the over-conservatism 22 incorporated in this data. Similarly, while it may 23 have been desirable for B&R to have produced the key 24 front-end criteria documents mentioned by Quadrex, 25 many of these documents were not yet needed at that 26 time given the ctatus of design. More generally, many

() 27 plants have been successfully completed without using 28

1 these types of documents in the design process.

/ ) 2 Additionally, as we have explained previously,  !

3 Appendix B does not require that design assumptions 4 (including the design margins) be concistent from 5 discipline to discipline, nor does it require that one 6 contractor review the work of other contractors, 7 provided there is review to assure conformance with the procurement documents and compatibility at inter-8 9 faces. Finally, there is no requirement that design 10 manuals be prepared to provide uniform guidance to 11 disciplines or designers or that designers use 12 " individual engineer log-books," provided that other 13 acceptable means of identifying the design input and 14 assumptions are used in preparing a design. It may be

[ 15 .

noted that B&R in fact treated its collection of SDDs 16 and TRDs as a design manual and had a procedure (STP-17 S D-001 ) to this effect.

18 19 0.74 CCANP's Motion, pp. 39-40 quotes the following two 20 sentences from finding 3.1(g) as identifying a 21 violation of Criteria I and XVIII of Appendix B to 10 22 CFR Part 50:

23 "Significant quality variations were also observed in the design review 24 comments provided for internal documents prior to their initial issue or their 25 subsequent revision."

26 The current design includes design details "obtained from other PWR plants

[]'

27 and used without confirming their" appropriateness for this application.

28

F' I I 1 CCANP states that these sentences demonstrate a I

= '

i)

s. _

2 failure "to adequately verify safety-related design 3 and engineering work at the South Texas Nuclear 4 Project." Id. What relevance, if any, do these 5 sentences, or design verification in general, have to 6 Criteria I and XVIII? ,,

7 A.74 These sentences, and design verification in general, 8 are not relevant to Criteria I and XVIII. Criterion I 9 requires that the responsibilities of organizations 10 performing activities affecting quality be established 11 in writing, and it sets forth certain requirements 12 with respect to those responsibilities. Criterion I 13 does not specify any requirements for reviewing, ,

14 verifying, or commenting upon design documents or (3

x) 15 design details. Similarly, Criterion XVIII requires 16 that a comprehensive system of planned and periodic '

17 audits be carried out to verify compliance with and 18 the effectiveness of the quality assurance program.

19 Criterion XVIII does not impose any requirementc with 20 respect to comments on or verification or review of 21 design. Design verification is encompassed within 22 Criterion III, not Criteria I or XVIII.

23 24 0 75 Does the first sentence quoted by CCANP identify a 25 violation of the verification requirements of 26 Criterion III?

27 C) 28

{ l A.75- No. Providing comments on internal documents prior to

() 2 their issuance-is not encompassed within design 3

verification as that term is used in Criterion III.

4 Moreover, finding 3.l(g) only states that " quality 5 variations" were observed in the comments. We assume 6 this means that some comments were not as thoughtful 7 as others and that the finding was not intended to 8 identify a deficiency in the comments or in any 9' quality assurance control measures required by i

10 Appendix B.

11 12 0.76 What is the basis for the second sentence quoted by 13 CCANP?

14 A.76 The statement that design details from other plants 15 were used without confirming their applicability at '

16 STP appears to be based upon Quadrex's assessment of 17- B&R response to Questions P-2 and M-28. Quadrex's 18 l assessment in P-2 explicitly states that reliance upon )

19 information provided by Westinghouse is "probably 20 satisfactory" but that B&R "should be more involved in 21 understanding similar plant operating experiences" to jl 22 assure that components have adequate duty cycle life.

23 Similarly, in its assessment of B&R's response to 24 Ouestion M-28, Quadrex observed that B&R had directly 25 used Westinghouse plant design events without review 26 for plant availability or economic considerations.

27 C:)

28 l

. 1 0.77 Did these Questions indicate a significant breakdown 2 in the verification process for STP?

3 A.77 No. Quadrex's concern in this area does not appear to l

.i .

4 be safety-related but instead related to matters of 5 plant availability.

6 7 0.78 CCANP's Motion, p. 40, quotes the following two 8 passages from finding 3.1(g) as identifying a 9 violation of Criteria II and XVII of Appendix B to 10 10 C.F.R. Part 50:

11 "Much of the plant design basis is rooted solely in engineering judgment and the 12 rationale for this judgment, has not been documented in a retrievable manner."

13' "B&R does not require use of . . .

14 individual

• engineer log-books to record O 15 xev bese e=="=9'io"= or decisions. . . . Consequently, fundamental background information 16 regarding the STP design is dif ficult to retrieve since many current B&R engineers 17 are not sufficiently familiar with the STP design or its bases."

18 19 CCANP states that these passages demonstrate a failure 20 "to assure adequate documentation in an identifiable 21 and retrievable manner of the safety-related design 22 and engineering work at the South Texas Nuclear g

23 Proj ec t . " d. Is Criterion II relevant to these l <

l 24 passages?

25 l

26 O 27 28

1 A.78 No. Criterion II requires that licensees establish

) 2 and implement a written quality assurance program.

3 Criterion II does not identify any specific 4 requirements applicable to the maintenance of records 5 or documents.

6 7 0 79 Do these passages identify a violation of Criterion 8 XVII?

-9 A.79 No. Criterion XVII establishes requirements for the

! 10 preparation and maintenance of records that " furnish 11 evidence of activities affecting quality." Criterion 12 XVII also identifies various types of records which l

13 .

must be maintained. Engineer log-books and 14 documentation of the rationale for engineering

O i J 15 judgment are not explicitly identified as types of 16 records which must be maintained under Criterion XVII.

17 Furthermore, lack of documentation of the rationale 18 for judgment in the selection of the design basis (as 19 distinct from documentation of the design basis

20. itself) is not inconsistent with the provisions of 21 Criterion XVII. Finally, although engineer log-books 22 may be one method by which the requirements of 23 Criterion XVII can be satisfied, there are acceptable 24 alternatives to the use of engineer log-books for 25 recording design bases, assumptions and decisions, l

(- 26 such as preparing a separate document for each

) 27 calculation or design activity. For example, B&R 28

l-1 issued SDDs and TRDs and documented calculations on

() 2 -separate documents. Consequently,-the absence of u 3 engineer log-books does not identify a violation of 4 Criterion XVII.

5 6 aQ.80 CCANP's Motion, pp. 41-42, quotes the following 7 sentences from finding 3.1(g) as identifying a 8 violation of~ Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. 9 Part 50:

10 "There was little evidence of a well-thought-out and consistent basis for 11 d e s ig n . "

12 "A number of key front-end criteria documents are missing [for] STP."

13 "A plan to identify and develop these 14- TRDs on the project was not evident." ,

?-)/

15 CCANP states that these sentences demonstrate a 16 f ailure "to adequately prescribe by documented 17 instructions, procedures, or drawings the safety-18 related design and engineering activities at the South 19 Texas Nuclear Project." Id. -Please explain whether 20 these sentences quoted by CCANP identify a significant 21 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP.

22 .A.80 As we explained previously, the first sentence quoted 23 by CCANP does not indicate a significant breakdown in 24~ any portion of the OA program for STP. Furthermore, 25 with respect to the other sentences quoted by CCANP, 26 we have previously explained that Appendix B does not

.(}

27 . require the type of project-wide document sought by 28

1 Ouadrex. Although such documents may be used to 2 provide guidance to designers, there are other 3' .

acceptable methods of communicating such guidance.

4 Thus, for the reasons previously discussed, these 5 sentences quoted by Quadrex do not indicate a 6 violation of either Criterion V or Criterion III.

7 8 0 81 CCANP's Motion, p. 43, quotes the following sentence 9 from finding 3.1(g) as identifying a violation of 10 Criterion VII:

11 "It was noted that the Materials Group does not review subcontractor material 12 selection [s]."

13 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure 14 "to adequately establish measures to assure that "O ,

'w/ 15 purchased safety-related engineering and design 16 services conformed to procurement documents." Id.

17 What is the nature of the concern expressed by Quadrex 18 by this sentence?

19 A.81 This sentence in finding 3.1.(g) appears to be based I 20 upon Quadrex's assessment of B&R's response to 21 Question C-39, which states that " Brown & Root 22 Materials Group does not review material selections by 23 [ design} contractors prior to vendor release for 24 manufacture." In other words, B&R would hire a I 25 subcontractor, such as EDS, to perform design work and 26 to select the material type, and the vendor would be 27 C:)

28

1 authorized to commence manufacture of the item using j

2 that material type without any provision for prior 3 review by the B&R Materials Group.

4 5 0 82 Does such a practice identify a violation of Criterion 6 VII?'

7 A.82 No. Criterion VII requires that measures "be esta-8 blished to assure that purchased material, equipment, 9 and services, whether purchased directly or through 10 contractors and subcontractors, conform to the 11 procurement documents." A review by B&R of the 12 material selections of its subcontractors was not the 13 only acceptable means to assure that the 14 subcontractors' design work satisfies the procurement O

\> 15 documents between B&R and the subcontractors.

16 It should be noted that the absence of a review of 17 the materials selections of its subcontractors by the 18 B&R Materials Group does not mean that the materials 19 selections were going unreviewed. Criterion III 20 requires that these selections be reviewed and 21 verified. Review and verification by the subcon-22 tractors satisfies the requirements of Appendix B and 23 assures that the materials selection is appropriate.

24 Our discussion with respect to finding 3.l(b) provides 25 additional information regarding the controls for 26 assuring conformance with procurement documents.

() 22 28

1 In fact, the procedures for reviewing pipe support iA) 2 subcontractor documents did not require review by the 3 Materials Group. It is our understanding that 4 material selections (even those made by B&R S disciplines) were not, as a normal practice, required 6 to be reviewed by the Materials Group. This group was 7 utilized by B&R as a specialized technical support 8 staff whose primary function was to assist the design 9 disciplines in establishing general material 10 requirements and in resolving specific material 11 problems. The group did not function as a reviewer of 12 all material selections, but rather only of those 13 material guestions directed to it.

14 15 0.83 Does finding 3.1(g) identify a significant breakdown 16 in any portion of the OA program for STP?

-17 A.83 No. As we have discussed previously, finding 3.l(g) 18 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 19 portion of the OA program for STP.

20 21 0 84 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.1(h)?

22 A.84 Finding 3.1(h) primarily expresses Quadrex's concern 23 that reliability requirements had not been established 24 for equipment.

25 26 0.85 Does this concern indicate a quality assurance

(~)

w/

27 problem?

28

1 A.85 No. There is no explicit requirement in Appendix B to r 's

(_) 2 10 CFR Part 50 that the procurement documents for 3 equipment include specific reliability requirements.

4 Furthermore, it is not general industry practice for 5 procurement documents to include specific reliability 6 requirements for all equipment. B&R's program for 7 obtaining satisf actory performance of most equipment 8 consisted of such measures as specification of a 9 quality level consistent with the intended function of 10 the equipment, reliance on historical data and 11 experience, and qualification tests or analysis. This 12 is consistent with industry practice. Additionally, 13 for certain components, such as the ESF sequencer, 14 requirements for performance of reliability analyses O

V 15

• or demonstration tests may also be specified (which is 16 what B&R had done for the ESF sequencer).

17 18 0 86 CCANP's Motion, pp. 15-16, 39, and 40-41, quotes the 19 following sentence as identifying a violation of 20 Criteria I and II:

21 "The absence of specific reliability requirements in both mechanical and 22 electrical equipment specifications, and the inability to produce a standard 23 checklist of postulated failures to be considered casts doubt on the rigor of 24 the safety-related evaluation process."

25 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure 26 "to establish and effectively execute an acceptable

() 27 quality assurance program" and a failure "to properly 28

1 identify safety-related versus non-safety-related (jrR.l 2 aspects of the design." Id. Does this sentence 3 identify a violation of Criteria I or II?

4 A.86 ENo . Criteria I and II are obviously inapplicable 5 since they only set forth quality-related requirements 6 for the establishment of a OA program and for the 7 organizations of the licensee and its contractors.

8 Neither specifies reliability requirements or 9 requirements for the use of standard checklists of 10 postulated failures. Furthermore, as we have 11 explained previously, it is not necessary that 12 reliability requirements be explicitly specified.

13 Although a standard checklist of postulated failures 14 can be useful in the safety-related evaluation 15 process, this process can be successfully completed 16 without such a checklist.

s 17 18 0 87 Does finding 3.1(h) identify a significant breakdown 19 in any portion of the OA program for STP?

20 A.87 No. As we have discussed previously, finding 3.l(h) 21 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 22 portion of the OA program for STP.

23 i 24 0.88 What concerns are expressed in finding 3.1(i)?

25 A.88 Finding 3.1(i) (which mistakenly is designated as 26 3.1(j) in the Quadrex Report) primarily expresses two

(~} 27 concerns by Ouadrex. First, Quadrex was concerned s-28 i

I l' about the fact that certain nuclear-related analyses

)) 2 _had not yet been completed, about the technical )

'3 adequacy of-the nuclear-related analysis methods and  !

4 assumptions, and about the high error rate in these 5- calculations. Second, Quadrex was concerned that a 6 large amount of nuclear-related analysis was 7 subcontracted and that the technical guidance provided 8 to the subcontractors and the review of the 9 subcontracted analyses by B&R did not appear to be

-10 adequate.

11 12 0 89 Does the first concern indicate a significant

'13 breakdown in any portion of the quality assurance 14 program for STP?

.15 A.89 No. The thrust of Quadrex's concern regarding ,

16 analyses which had not yet'been completed was to 17 indicate a productivity or scheduling problem and not 18 a significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 19 progt m.

20 The concerns raised by Quadrex regarding 21 inadequate analysis methods or high error rates could

22. relate to quality assurance matters. We have reviewed 23 the discipline findings cited by Quadrex as support 24 for its finding that B&R nuclear-related analysis

~25 methods were inadequate and contained a high error 26 rate. The discipline findings do not identify a large

( )' 27 number of inadequate calculations and , with the 28

i 1 exception of the deficiencies which were reported to 2 the NRC, the findings do not identify any safety-3 significant deficiencies. Consequently, Quadrex's

~4 finding does not support a conclusion that there was a 5 significant breakdown in any portion of the QA program 6 for STP.

7 Some of the " errors" related to calculations which 8 were not inadequate, but needed to be updated. For 9 example, Quadrex cited as an inadequacy in the methods 10 .used by B&R's Nuclear Analysis Group the use of a 11 computer code, RELAP3, which at the time of the 12 Quadrex review was being replaced in general usage by 13- the NRC and the industry with later, more realistic I (i.e., less conservative) modelling methods. Quadrex A) 14 15 indicated that BGR and its subcontractor, NUS, were 16 using these modern methods, but cited as an inadequacy 17 the use of RELAP3 in older calculations.

18 In general, Quadrex's concerns regarding Nuclear 19 Analysis calculations appear to be largely based, not 20 on specific errors, but on the impression that Nuclear 21 Analysis personnel were not as knowledgeable of 22 certain design assumptions or factors as Quadrex 23 believed they should have been. In fact, Quadrex j 24 assessments of the B&R responses in the Nuclear 25 Analysis area often explicitly pointed out that no 26 errors had been found, although they did indicate a O .27 concern about the relative lack of understanding by 28 i

1 some B&R personnel of the factors affecting these 2- analyses. Where specific errors or inconsistencies in 3 calculations were noted by Quadrex, a complete reading 4 of the Quadrex assessment and an understanding of the 5 related circumstances reveals that Quadrex was mostly 6 concerned with the timeliness of certain analyses the 7 changing regulatory acceptance of certain analytical 8 methods or the overconservatisms to be found in some 9 older calculations.

10 The disciplines mentioned in this finding other 11 than Nuclear Analysis were HVAC, Piping and Supports 12 and Special Stress. The significant deficiencies in 13 the HVAC area were covered by HL&P's 50.55(e) report.

14 In the pipe support analysis area, Quadrex appears

}

~

15 to have been primarily concerned about what they 16 believed were inappropriate methods. For the most 17 part, the " inappropriate methods" consisted of 18 differences between methods used by B&R and its 19 subcontractors, differences between the methods being 20 used and those described in the FSAR, and differences 21 between the methods being used and those currently 22 being recommended by the NRC Staff. In general, the 23 " inappropriate methods" did not involve actual errors 24 in calculations. In the area of pipe rupture 25 analysis, Quadrex expressed similar concerns regarding 26 the analytical methods being used and identified 27 analyses which had not yet been completed, but in 28 w e , , _ - - - . ,

1 - general it did not identify actual errors in Ps

(,) 2 calculations. In fact as to the Piping and Supports 3 and Special Stress areas, Quadrex found that the EDS 4 design analysis appeared to be " technically adequate,"

~

5 that a " limited amount of actual STP piping design and 6 analysis work" had been accomplished by B&R, and that 7 "[m] any of the design practices and analytical methods 8 examined were . . . consistent with industry 9 practice." See Quadrex Report ( Applicants' Exhibit 10 60), pp. 4-74 and 4-77. Since the few errors 11 identified by Quadrex were either of limited scope 12 (i.e. HVAC) or did not represent safety significant 13 design errors, this concern does not represent a

, , , 14

• significant breakdown in any portion of the quality 15 assurance program for STP.

16 17 0.90 Please explain whether the second concern indicates a 18 significant breakdown in any portion of the quality 19 assurance program for STP?

20 A.90 Initially, it should be noted that Appendix B to 10 21 CFR Part 50 does not prohibit a licensee from 22 contracting or subcontracting for design work. In 23 fact, Criterion I of Appendix B explicitly authorizes 24 the delegation of the work of establishing and 25 excuting the OA program as long as the licensee 26 retains responsibility. Thus, Quadrex's finding that 22 C) 28

1 B&R had subcontracted a large amount of nuclear-

); 2 related analysis does not identify a significant 3 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP.

4 We have already addressed Quadrex's concern about 5 -

the technical guidance provided by B&R to 6 subcontractors and vendors and the review of their 7 analyses by B&R with respect to finding 3.1( b) . For 8 the reasons which we previously stated, this concern 9 does not identify a significant breakdown in any

-10 portion of the OA program for STP.

11 12 0 91 CCANP's Motion, p. 39, quotes the following sentence 13 from finding 3.1(i) as identifying a violation of 14 Criteria I and II of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50:

b)

\' 15 An " abnormally high error rate was observed" in Brown & Root calculations 16 for the nuclear, as opposed to the conventional, aspects of the engineering 17 work.

18 CCANP states that this sentence demonstrates a failure 19 "to establish and effectively execute an acceptable 20 quality assurance program." Id. Does this sentence 21 identify a significant breakdown in any portion of the 22 OA program for STP?

23 A.91 No. As we have previously discussed, the 24 calculational errors or inconsistencies identified by 25 Quadrex do not represent a significant breakdown in 26 any portion of the OA program for STP.

28

1 0 92 CCANP's Motion, p. 43, quotes the following passage

() 2 from finding 3.l(i) as identifying a violation of 3 Criterion VII of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50:

4 "The amount of nuclear-relcted analysis that is subcontracted by BAR is higher 5 than a typical A/Es practice. The technical guidance provided by some of 6 these Groups for subcontracted consultants, such as EDS and NUS, does 7 not appear to be adequate."

8 CCANP states that this passage demonstrates a failure 9 "to adequately establish measures to assure that 10 purchased safety-related engineering and design 11 services conformed to the procurement documents." Id.

12 Does this passage quoted by CCANP identify a violation 13 of Criterion VII?

14 A.92 No. What " technical guidance" must be .provid*ed to 15 suppliers is not the subject of Criterion VII, which 16 pertains to the purchaser's measures to verify 17 conformance of supplied material, equipment, and -

18 services with procurement documents. The criterion of 19 Appendix B which is most relevant to this passage is 20 Criterion IV, which pertains to procurement document 21 control. As we previously explained with respect to 22 finding 3.1(b), Criterion IV does not require that 23 procurement documents include the type of detailed 24 guidance suggested by Quadrex, especially for 25 experienced contractors such as EDS and NUS.

26

(

28

1 0 93 Is finding 3.1(i) reportable under 10 CFR ffj

!s -2 S 50.55(e)(1)(i)?

3 A.93 No. As we have expressed, finding 3.l(i) would not be 4 reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i) because it 5 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 6 portion of the OA program for STP.

7 8 0 94 What is the subject of finding 3.1(j)?

9 A.94 Finding 3.1(j) primarily expresses four concerns of 10 Quadrex regarding the design verification process.

11 First, Quadrex was concerned that B&R's design 12 verification process permitted the use of preliminary .

13 data up to the point of fuel loading. Second, Quadrex 14, was concerned that there were no documented standards 15 regarding the minimum qualifications for a design 16 verifier. Third, Quadrex was concerned that the only 17 evidence of a completed design verification was a 18 signature. Finally, Quadrex was concerned that errors 19 were not detected by design verifiers.

20 21 0.95 Does the fact that B&R permitted use of preliminary 22 data,up to the point of fuel loading indicate a 23 quality or safety concern?

24 A.95 No. Initially, it should be noted that, while B&R did 25 not plan to perform final verification of a design 26 until final input was available and design was nearing

() 27 completion , B& R's procedure ( STP-DC-015 ) required a 28

r. >

I check of preliminary designs prior to release for

,-k

!, ) 2 construction or procurement. This check was intended 3 to confirm that the preliminary designs were 4 acceptable based upon the preliminary input then 5 available.

6 Design verification is encompassed within the 7 scope of Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 8 50. Criterion III does not include specific 9 requirements regarding the timing of verification 10 activities. Nevertheless, when possible, it is good 11 practice to verify a design prior to release for 12 construction or procurement.

13 It is not uncommon to defer final verification of 14 some types of structures, systems, and components

[^) .

15 until after construction is well-underway or in some 16 cases completed. For example, plant structures are 17 often built in accordance with a preliminary design 18 which is based upon conservative estimates of expected 19 loads. As design and construction of the structure 20 are completed, it becomes possible to determine the 21 actual loads on the structure, and the design of the 22 structure is then verified using these loads. By 23 using a conservative preliminary design subject to 24 later verification, the possibility for design changes 25 to account for final loads is minimized, construction 26 can proceed in a timely manner, and the design is

(~s) x 27 confirmed to be acceptable.

28.

I

1. l0.96 Does the absence of documented standards for the I 2 qualifications of design verifiers indicate a

_3 significant breakdown in any portion of the QA program 4 for STP?-

5 A.96 No. Criterion III only states that design

~6 verification "shall be performed by individuals or 7 groups other than those who performed the original 8 design, but who may be from the same organization."

~9 As long as the verification is performed by 10 individuals who are competent, apprcpriately trained, 11 and qualified, Criterion III and Appendix B in general 12 do not require that the specific qualifications of a 13 verifier be spelled out.in a document. Quadrex itself 14 acknowledged this-fact in finding 3.1(j) and stated

<O 15 that B&R's approach (as embodied in procedure STP-DC-16 015) of having the Discipline Project Engineer select 17 -the design verifier from within the discipline "does 18 not violate NRC requirements." In~ fact, this approach 19 was consistent with industry practice.

20 21 0 97 Does Quadrex's concern that the only evidence of a ,

22- completed verification was a signature and that B&R 23 did not require the use of a design verification 24 checklist indicate a significant breakdown in any 25 portion of the QA program for STP?

26

( ) 27

~

28 ,

I l

l 4

1 A.97 No. There are many acceptable methods for. satisfying

_ ()' 2 the requirements in Criterion III for suitable design

'3 controls governing verifications. One method includes 4- the use of design verification checklists; other 5 acceptable methods include the use of procedures to 6 prescribe how the verification shall be conducted and

'7 what elements should be addressed (which. was the 8 method discussed in B&R procedure STP-DC-015) or the

! 9 use of individually-prepared documents which record

., 10 how the verification was conducted. Consequently, use -

11 of design verification checklists is a permissible, 12 but not a required, means'of providing an auditable 13 record of design verifications. Furthermore, B&R's i , 14 procedure for design verification does identify

) .

15 documentation requirements (i.e. , comment forms and 16 input list) in addition to the verifier's signature on 17 the design document.

18 19 0.98 What was the basis for Quadrex's concern that errors 20 were not detected by design verifiers?

I 21 A.98 Quadrex cites its assessment of B&R's response to l 22 Question C-16 as a basis for its conclusion that 23 errors were not detected by design verifiers.

' 24 Although this assessment does state that a

~25 "significant number of mistakes" passed through the ,

[ 26' verification process, it does not identify the i

27 significance or the number of those mistakes or the

(])

28

(

I number of calculations reviewed by Quadrex.

()' 2 Furthe rmore , the assessment states that Quadrex was 3 " unable to evaluate the effectiveness" of the B&R 4 design verification procedure, which Quadrex found to 5 be adequate on paper, 6

7 0 99 Does this indicate a significant breakdown in the OA 8 program for STP?

9 A.99 As we discussed prevously with respect to finding 10 3.1(b), the information provided by Quadrex in C-16 is 11 not suf ficient to support an independent determination 12 that a significant breakdown occurred in the 13 verification process at STP.

14 15 0.100 CCANP's Motion, pp. 39-40, quotes the following 16 passages from finding 3.1(j) as identifying a 17 violation of Criteria I and XVIII of Appendix B to 10 18 CFR Part 50:

19 "There [are] no documented standards t

regarding the minimum qualifications 20 required for a design verifier."

21 "The only evidence of a completed design verification is a signature, since B&R 22 does not require either the use or completion of design verification 23 checklists. Consequently, there is evidence that the key design verification 24 questions are not being adequately (considered)."

25 26 22

(~)

28

-1 CCANP states that these passages demonstrate a g

(_) 2 failure "to adeguately verify safety-related design 3 and engineering work at the South Texas Nuclear 4 Project." ' Ij{. Do these quoted passages, or design S verification in general, have any relevance to 6 Criteria I and XVIII?

7 A.100 No. Criteria I and XVIII do not specify requirements 8 that directly relate to these passages or design 9 verification in general. Criterion I requires that 10 the responsibilities of organizations performing 11 activities affecting quality be established in 12 writing, and it sets forth certain requirements with 13 respect to those responsibilities. Criterion I does

,s

, 14 not contain any requirements regarding design verifi-15 cation. Similarly, Criterion XVIII requires that a 16 comprehensive system of planned and periodic audits 17 be carried out to verify compliance with the 18 effectiveness of the quality assurance program.

19 Criterion XVIII does not impose any requirements with 20 respect to verification or review of design. Design 21 verification is encompassed within Criterion III, not 22 Criteria I or XVIII.

23 24 0.101 Please explain whether these passages identify a 25 violation of Criterion III?

26

() 27 28 L

o

_ 91 -

t *

, 1 A.101 Quadrex does not provide support for its conclusion

() 2 that key design verification questions were not being 3 adequately considered. We have previously explained 4 that the remainder of these passages do not identify 5 any violation of Criteria II and III.

6 7 0 102 Does finding 3.1(j) identify a significant breakdown 8 in any poriton of the OA program for STP?

9 A.102 No. As we have previously discussed, finding 3.1(j) 10 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 11 portion of the OA program for STP.

12 13 0 103 What does finding 4.1.2. l( b) state?

14 A.103 Finding 4.1.2.1(b) states as follows:

(q

_/ 15 There was no evidence of Civil / Structural evaluation of the reasonableness of 16 postulated internal missiles or that the criteria for internal missiles presented 17 in TRD IN209RQ013-A had been implemented in the design ( see Question C-9) .

18 19 0.104 Does finding 4.1. 2.1( b) identify a significant 20 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?

21 A.104 No. Tnis finding does not identify a significant 22 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP.

23 Evaluation of internal missiles is generally deferred 24 until late in the desigr process after the design is 25 largely complete. Thus, the f act that B& R had not 26 yet evaluated the criteria for internal missiles or

{} 27 28 implemented the criteria into the design was

I consistent with industry practice. Additionally, it 2 should be noted that Quadrex found in its assessment (G~)

3 of the B&R response to Question C-9 that 4 Civil / Structural "was handling the missile 5 penetration problem in accordance with industry 6 practice and the state-of-the-art." In short, 7 find ing 4.1. 2. l( b) does not identify any problem or 8 deficiency in the work being performed by B&R or a 9 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 10 program for STP.

11 12 0 105 Does finding 4.1.2.1(b) identify a significant 13 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?

14 A.105 No. As we have discussed above, finding 4.1.2.1(b) 15 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 16 portion of the OA program for STP.

1,7 18 0 106 What does finding 4.3.2.1(a) state?

19 A.106 Finding 4.3.2.1(a) states as follows:

20 The common instrument air line, as depicted in FSAR drawing 9.4.2-2 21 attached to Question R-6, does not meet the single failure criterion required 22 by IEEE 279-1971 and 10 CFR 50 (see Question E-15). The occurrence of this 23 design error in the late 1970's in concert with the B&R response to other 24 single failure criterion questions 25 suggests that B&R is not sufficiently experienced in the performance of a 26 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis that crosses discipline boundaries. (5) In 27 most organizations, the I&C discipline

.(~}

\s would detect and immediately correct 28 this type of design error by performing

1 a rigorous examination of the separation provided between redundant f~]/

x- 2 divisions in the safety-related portions of the plant for all involved 3 disciplines.

4 5 (5) Instrument line blockage was identified as a potential concern for 6 single failure analyses in the 1970 period when an early B&W plant had 7 three instruments connected to two piping taps. Technicians repeatedly 8 replaced the instrument connected to one tap because it read differently 9 than the other two instruments connected in common to the other tap; 10 only later did they discover that a blocked instrument line was causing the 11 two common instruments to read erroneously.

12 13 0 107 Does this finding indicate a significant breakdown in 14 any portion of the OA program for STP?

^'

15 A.107 No. Although this finding does identify a design 16 feature as a violation of technical requirements 17 applicable to the common instrument air line, there 18 is no indication in the finding itself or in the 19 questions which it cites taat the selection of this 20 design feature was related to or caused by a 21 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 22 program for STP.

23 It should be noted that, after Bechtel reviewed 24 the Quadrex Report in 1982, the NRC was notified that 25 the subject of this finding was potentially 26 reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(c) as a deficiency in

() 27 design. It was later determined that failure of the 28

1 air line would not result in a safety hazard and that 2 the design of the common instrument air line had not '

[u')

3 been released for construction. Accordingly, the NRC 4 was informed that this was not a reportable 5 deficiency.

6 As a result of the evaluation of this finding, a 7 review was conducted by Bechtel of all safety-related 8 piping and instrumentation diagrams (P& ids) for 9 application of the single failure criterion to 10 instrument air lines. Based upon the results of this 11 review, Bechtel determined that find ing 4. 3. 2. l( a) 12 did not reflect a generic condition or a significant 13 safety issue.

14 -

pm,

• im) 15 0 108 Does this finding identify a significant breakdown in 16 any portion of the OA program for STP.

17 A.108 No. As we have discussed above, finding 4.3.2.l(a) 18 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 19 portion of the OA program for STP.

20 l 21 0.109 What does finding 4. 3. 2. l( d) state?

)

22 A.109 Finding 4.3.2.l(d) states as follows:

23 No formal methodology or documentation exists to verify adequate separation or 24 the single failure criterion (see Questions E-1, E-8, and E-19).

25 26 28 p-- w < v

1 0 110 Did B&R have a formal methodology for performing and

') 2 documenting verification of separation requirements 3 and the single failure criterion?

4 A.110 Yes. B&R had a procedure for design verification 5 (STP-DC-015) which required that designs be verified 6 for failure analysis and separation and that this 7 verification be documented. This procedure satisfied 8 the requirements of Criterion III for design 9 verification.

10 11 0 111 Did B&R have a formal methodology for demonstrating 12 how design documents incorporated separation 13 requirements and the single failure criterion?

14 A.111 No. However, it may be noted that many projects have

(_) 15 been successfully completed without this type of 16 methodology (although Bechtel does have such a formal 17 methodology for STP). Instead, it is common practice 18 for each designer or design group to determine how to 19 document incorporation of the separation requirements 20 and the single failure criterion in its design 21 documents. Tris practice is acceptable.

22 Furthermore, a uniform methodology or approach for 23 demonstrating satisfaction of separation requirements 24 or the single failure criterion is not required even 25 though it may be desirable.

26

() 28

1 0 112 Does finding 4.3.2.1(d) identify a significant

) 2 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?

3 A.112 No. As we have discussed above, finding 4.3.2.l(d) 4 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 5 portion of the OA program for STP.

6 7 0 113 What does finding 4.3.2.1(n) state?

8 A.113 Findir.g 4. 3. 2.1( n) states as follows:

9 It is planned that various types of isolation devices will be used. Act 51 10 devices are still under evaluation ar.d qualification. There is no existing 11 document that provides guidance to the designers on the circuit application of 12 these various types (e.g., optical couplers vs. fuses vs. relays, etc.).

13 ,

It is our opinion that lack of such a documen t (TRD) could result in design 14 errors and licensing problems (see I"N Ouestion E-14).

A-] 15 16 0 114 Does finding 4.3.2.1(n) identify a significant 17 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?

18 A.114 No. As this finding explicitly states, the use of 19 isolation devices was still under evaluation when 20 Ouadrex conducted its review, and isola ion devices 21 had not yet been designed, purchased, or installed.

22 Consequently, the type of document identified by l

23 Ouadrex was not needed at that time. Such a document 24 could be useful when selection of the isolation i 25 devices was actually being made.

26

/~T 27 l O

! 28 i

p , ,

1 0 115 What does finding 4. 5. 2.1( b) state?

o ij 2 A.ll5 Finding 4.5.2.1(b) states as follows:

l-

! 3 EDS did not perform a design review or

! design verification of preliminary 4 loads transmitted to B&R; these loads have, however, been used as a basis for 5 plant design ( see Questions C-4 and M-8).

6 .

7 0 116 Does finding 4.5.2.l(b) identify a significant 8 breakdown in any portion of the QA program for STP?

9 A.116 No. As we explained previously with respect to l 10 finding 3.l(j), use of preliminary loads is 11 acceptable and not uncommon. Furthermore, it may be 12 noted that, in the questions cited in finding 13 4.5.2.l(b), Quadrex itself stated that the ,

14 preliminary loads transmitted by EDS were k- 15 conservative. In fact, a " major concern" of Quadrex 16 was the " potential overconservatism in the design" of EDS. See Quadrex Report ( Applicants' Exhibit 60), '

17 1

I 18 p. 4-38.+

19 20 0 117 What does finding 4.6.2.l(n) state?

l 21 A.ll7 Finding 4. 6. 2.1( n) states as follows:

22 Assumptions regarding the availability of various heat sinks under varying 23 plant conditions should be re-examined (see Question N-17).

24 l Ouestion N-17 provides further details, stating that l 25 l

B&R should have analyzed the temperature of the water 26 in the Essential Cooling Pond (ECP) under conditions i \- of normal shutdown of two units as well as the 28 l

L

I condition which Quadrex believes was the only one 2

f )) analyzed by B&R (normal shutdown of one unit and a 3

loss of coolant accident (LOCA) in the other unit).

4 5 0 118 Does finding 4.6.2.1(n) identify a significant 6 breakdown in any portion of the QA program for STP?

7 A.118 No. Finding 4.6.2.l(n) does not identify a 8

significant breakdown in any portion of the QA 9 program for STP. In fact, an analysis of the ECP had 10 been conducted under conditions of normal shutdown of 11 two units. This analysis was reflected in FSAR 12 .Section 9.2.5. Consequently, finding 4.6. 2.l( n) does 13 not identify a deficiency.

14 O) k- 15 0 119 What does finding 4.7.3.lla) state?

5 16 A.119 Finding 4.7.3.1(a) states as follows:

17 B&R has not yet developed a criteria for jet impingement protection on 18 unbroken piping systems (see Ouestion P-20). A future TRD is planned.

O.120 Does finding 4.7.3.1(a) identify a significant (

20 i breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?

A.120 No. B&R had not yet begun design analysis of jet impingement on unbroken piping systems. Since this analysis had not begun, there was no need for B&R to j have in place criteria to govern this analysis.

l l

26

() 27 28 r l l

l l _ _ _ _

l i

1 0 121 What does finding 4.7.3.l(b) state?

h 2 A.121 Finding 4.7.3.l(b) states as follows:

. 3 Approximately 50% of the reviewed SDDs do not yet contain system operating 4

• temperatures (see Question P-1).

5 Question F-1 provides further details in support of 6 this finding. Question P-1 states that, of the 7

sixteen SDDs which were reviewed by Quadrex, eight -

8 identified system design temperatures, seven did not 9 identify a design temperature directly but did 10 provide a cross-reference for enabling the designer 11 to determin.e the temperature, and one did not 12 identify either a system design temperature or a 13 cross-reference for obtaining the temperature. These 14 temperatures were used in performing preliminary 15 stress analyses.

16 17 0.122 Does finding 4.7.3.1(b) indicate a significant 18 breakdown in any portion of the QA program for STP?

19 A.122 No. As Question P-1 states, all but one of the 20 sixteen SDDs reviewed by Quadrex either identified a 21 design temperature or identified a cross-reference 22 for obtaining the temperature. Either approach is an 23 acceptable means of providing guidance to designers 24 for the performance of preliminary stress analyses.

25 Consequently, finding 4.7.3.l(b) and Question P-1 do 26 not identify any pattern of deficient SDDs, but 27 instead identify only an isolated case where an SDD 28

- 100 -

l l

I did not yet provide guidance regarding design

/~

(_) 2 temperatures. Furthermore, this SDD was still in 3

draft form and had not yet been issued for control of 4 design activities.

5 6 0.123 What does finding 4.7.3.1( k) state?

7 A.123 Finding 4.7. 3.1( k) states as follows:

8 B&R assumptions for seismic to nonseismic bouradary anctors are 9 probably unconservative and difficult to technically justify as adequate (see 10 Question P-29).

11 0 124 Does finding 4. 7. 3. l( k) identify a significant 12 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?

13 A.124 No. Bechtel agrees that the boundary anchor design k 14 should be analyzed with o different approach than X) 15 that taken by B&R. However, it is common when one 16 engineer reviews the work of another, that 1

17 differences in approach will occasionally arise.

18 Such differences, while generally requiring 19 resolution particularly with respect to degrees of 20 conservatism of the analytical methods, do not 21 i indicate the existence of a significant breakdown in 22 any portion of the OA program.

, 23 24 0 125 What does finding 4.8.2.1(a) state?

! 25 A.125 Finding 4.8.2.l(a) states as follows:

I

) 26 The instrument air piping, between the valves actuated by redundant radiation 27

-( ) monitors and the valves that divert air flow through safety-related filter 28

- 101 -

I trains in the FHB HVAC exhaust j-s subsystem, does not meet the single

(_) 2 f ailure ~ criterion ( see Question R-6) .

3 0 126 Does this finding indicate a significant breakdown in 4 any portion of the OA program for STP?

5 A.126 No. Finding 4.8.2.1(a) is the same as finding 6 4. 3. 2.1( a) . As we have previously discussed with 7 respect to finding 4.3.2.l(a), finding 4.8.2.1(a) 8 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 9 portion of the OA program for STP and therefore would 10 not be reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)(1)(i).

11 12 0.127 What does finding 4.8.2.1(b) state?

13 A.127 Finding 4.8.2.1(b) states as follows:

, 14 No procedures exist that define the minimum qualification requirements for

[_]

' 15 ALARA reviewers. Some design drawings l

have been reviewed and signed off for i 16 ALARA. There is limited evidence that proper follow-up has occurred to verify 17 incorporation of ALARA specified designs (see Question R-1).

18 19 0 128 Does the absence of a document defining minimum l

l 20 qualifications for ALARA reviewers indicate a l l

21 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 22 program for STP?

23 A.128 No. Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 only applies to 24 activities,affecting the safety-related functions of

25. structures, systems and components. A safety-related 26 activity is an activity which assures the integrity 27 Lc:) of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the 28

- 102 -

I capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it

.e

(_) 2 in a safe shutdown condition, or the capability to 3 prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents 4

which could result in potential offsite exposures 5 comparable to those specified in 10 CFR Part 100.

6 ALARA activities are obviously not activities which 7 affect these safety-related functions. Consequently, 8

ALARA activities are not encompassed within Appendix 9

B, and therefore failure to apply the OA program 10 under Appendix B to ALARA would not be reportable 11 under 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(e)(1)(i). However, for the 12 purpose of this testimony, the findings were analyzed 13 the same as if Appendix B was applicable to ALARA.

14 Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 does not require O) k- .15 documentation of specific requirements for reviewers.

16 However, it should be noted that B&R did have a 17 procedure (STP-DC-016) which required the Engineering 18 Project Manager to designate a qualified individual 19 to perform ALARA reviews. This provision would be 20 sufficient under Appendix B.

21 22 0 129 Does the fact that design drawings were reviewed and 23 signed of f for ALARA with limited evidence of 24 follow-up to verify incorporation of ALARA specified 25 designs indicate a significant breakdown in any 26 portion of the OA program for STP?

() 27 28

- 103 -

1 A.129 No. Apparently, Quadrex was concerned that, with the

>s 2 exception of a drawing sign-off, there was an absence

(_)

3 of documented evidence that the comments of the ALARA 4 reviewers were in fact incorporated into the 5 applicable design drawings. Although such 6 documentation is one means of satisfying the 7 requirements of Criterion III for assuring that 8 regulatory requirements and design bases are 9 correctly translated into specifications, drawings, 10 instructions, and procedures, there are other means 11 of satisfying this requirement. For example, B&R 12 identified requirements of the ALARA review in a 13 procedure (STP-DC-016) which required the ALARA 14 reviewer to provide comments to the cognizant G 15 C

L/ engineer and then sign-off on the relevant drawings 16 verifying compliance with the procedure. This is a 17 reasonable measure for documenting acceptable 18 incorporation of the ALARA reviewer's comments.

19 20 0.130 Does finding 4.8.2.l(b) identify a significant 21 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?

22 A.130 No. As we have discussed above, finding 4.8.2.l(b) f 23 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 24 portion of the OA program for STP.

25 26

(:)

N 28 i

- 104 -

1 0 131 What does finding 4.8.2.l( c) state?

() 2 A.131 Finding 4.8.2.1(c) states as follows:

3 Modification of the MAB HVAC system to  !

eliminate filter media need to be re- l 4

examined (see Questions R-5 and R-29).  !

l 5 0 132 Does finding 4.8.2.l(c) identify any deficiency? 1 2

6 A.132 No. With the exception of the Radiochemistry Lab and 7 the Sample Room, exhaust filter media were not 8 provided in the HVAC design for the Mechanical 9 Auxiliary Building ( MAB) . Finding 4.8.2.1(c) simply 10 expresses Quadrex's recommendation that this design 11 be re-examined. However, the design complied with 12 the requirements of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50.

13 Consecuently, there was no deficiency in the design, 14 and finding 4.8.2.l(c) does not indicate anything to Os 15 the contrary. .

16 17 0.133 Does finding 4.8.2.l(c) identify a significant 18 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?

19 A.133 No. As we have discussed above, finding 4.8.2.1(c) 20 does not identify a significant breakdown in any 21 portion of the OA program for STP.

22 23 0.134 What does finding 4.8. 2. l( d) states?

24 A.134 Finding 4.8.2.1(d) states as follow:

25 B&R's position that shielding calculations are not-safety-related i 26 needs to be re-examined (see Question l R-7). Several shielding analyses were

(~ 27 performed by NUS; however, there is no indication that B&R has verified this i l

- 105 -

I work. Standard models and codes have T been used in analyses performed by B&R, f"'/

\_ 2 yet B&R exhibited a lack of f amiliarity with and understanding of the codes. A 3

3 re-review of plant shielding is necessary to ensure that analysis 4 results are properly reflected in design ( see Questions R-ll, R-12, and 5 R-14).

6 0.135 Was the NRC notified that finding 4.8.2.l(d) was 7 potentially reportable?

8 A.135 Yes. On May 8, 1981, the NRC was notified that the 9 substance of finding 4.8.2.1(d) was potentially 10 reportable. Subsequently, this finding was 11 determined not to be reportable for the reasons 12 discussed with respect to finding 3.1(d).

13 f-14 0 136 What do*es finding 4. 8. 2.1( e) state?

%d 15 A.136 Finding 4.8.2.l(e) states as follows:

16 B&R has not correlated radiation zones to the shielding design and shielding 17 design has not adequately considered ISI requirements or the potential 18 locations for temporary shielding ( see Question R-10).

19 20 0 137 Does finding 4.8. 2. l( e) identify a significant 21 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP?

22 A.137 No. It should be noted that the shielding design was 23 subject to ongoing reviews by B&R and that in-service 24 inspection (ISI) requirements were still being 25 developed at the time Quadrex conducted its review.

26 Thus, this finding simply identifies an activity

()

27 28 I

- 106 -

I which had not yet been performed by B&R and not a k,) 2 significant breakdown in any portion of the OA 3 program for STP.

4 5 0 138 What does finding 4.8.2.l( f) state?

6 A.138 Finding 4. 8. 2. l( f) states as follows:

7 Radiation zone drawings based on accident conditions have not been 8 prepared (see Question R-30).

9 0 139 Does finding 4.8. 2.1( f) identify a significant 10 breakdown in any' portion of the OA program for STP?

11 A.139 No. The need for radiation zone drawings based on 12 accident conditions is an outgrowth of the NRC's 13 position in Item II.B.2 of NUREG-0737, "Clarif'ication

,3 14 of TMI Action Plan Requirements" (November 1980).

\)^

15 B&R had not yet prepared these drawings at the time 16 Quadrex conducted its review. Thus, finding 17 4. 8. 2. l( f) does not identify a significant breakdown 18 in any portion of the OA program for STP but only a 19 matter which needed to be completed.

20 21 0 140 What does finding 4.8.2.1(g) state?

22 A.140 Finding 4.8.2.l(g) states as follows:

23 A design basis governing removable concrete block walls was not evident 24 (see Question R-ll).

25 0 141 Does finding 4.8.2.l(g) identify a significant 26 breakdown in any portion of the OA program for STP? l

.( )

27 28 1

- 107 -

1 A.141 No. At the time Ouadrex conducted its review, the

() 2 design basis for removable concrete block walls was 3 still being developed by B&R. Thus, finding 4 4.8.2.l(g)'does not identify a significant breakdown 5 in any portion of the OA program for STP but only a 6 matter which needed to be completed.

7 8 0 142 Please explain whether the Quadrex Report as a whole 9 would be reportable under 10 CFR S 50.55(e)?

10 A.142 The Report itself is not an analysis of the adequacy 11 of the design OA program for STP nor does it conclude 12 that there is a widespread breakdown in the design OA 13 program. Although the Report is critical of B&R's

.14 engineering practices and includes suggestions for .

O: . 15 their improvement, Quadrex identified relatively few 16 significant deficiencies in the design product or 17 significant failures of the design process to meet 18 NRC requirements. Our review of the findings has not 19- identified a significant breakdown in any portion of 20 the OA program for STP, except to the extent 21 previously reported to the NRC. Having reviewed the 22 report as a whole, as well as its individual 23 findings, we do not regard the Report itself as 24 " reportable" under 10 CFR S 50.55(e).

25 26 27

-(Z) 28  !

(3 O .

STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF SIDNEY A. BERNSEN POSITION Corporate Manager of Quality Assurance, Bechtel Power Corporation /Bechtel Construction, Incorporated Manager, Division Quality Assurance Eastern Power Division, Bechtel Power Corporation EDUCATION BSME, Purdue University MSME, Purdue University PhD, Purdue University

SUMMARY

7 Years Quality assurance management 3 Years Project management 11 Years Engineering management 4 Years Chief engineer, nuclear and other disciplines -

_s 5, Years Engineering supervision U,-

3 Years Nuclear and mechanical engineering EXPERIENCE Dr. Bernsen has been employed by Bechtel for 23 years. He is currently the corporate manager of quality assurance, Bechtel Power Corporation and Bechtel Construction, Incorporated. He also holds the position of manager of division quality assurance for the Eastern Power Division. He is responsible for overall Bechtel Power Corporation quality program policy and management of Eastern Power Division quality assurance. Activities under his cognizance include quality assurance functions associated with design, construction and operation support services.

Dr. Bernsen previously served as assistant project manager for quality activities on the Midland

, Project and manager of quality on the Zimmer Project. The Zimmer Project assignment included responsibility for all Bechtel quality assurance, quality control, quality engineering and supplier quality functions associated with the verification 7s and construction completion programs. Earlier, Dr.

' () Bernsen served as assistant project manager-technical, for the South Texas Project. In this capacity, he had management oversight over the

O licensing, systems design, p.sject procedures and coordination with the project quality assurance group.  !

L As a member of the Bechtel power management group, Dr. Bernsen held a number of assignments including manager of nuclear engineoring, chief nuclear engineer and manager of quality assurance. Earlier, Dr. Bernsen served as an engineering manager and manager of quality assurance in the San Francisco Power Division of Bechtel Power Corporation and held a number of project. management, engineering manage-ment and chief engineering assignments in the Scientific Development Department. In addition, he has had experience in quality assurance, nuclear power plant design and. construction, plant siting and engineering on a variety of power, aerospace and other advanced technology projects.

Prior to joining Bechtel Power Corporation Dr.

Bernsen participated in and managed analysis, design and experimentation associated with boiling, pressurized and gas cooled reactors while at the Advanced Technology Laboratory of American Standard, General Atomic and Argonne National Laboratory.

Dr. Bernsen has actively participated in codes and standards activities serving as the initial chairman of: American National Standards Institute (ANSI)

N45 Working Group 7, in preparing the initial version of ANSI N45.2 pertaining to quality assur-ance requirements for nuclear facilities; N45 Subcommittee 2, the committee responsible for N45.2 and the daughter QA standards; and the ASME Nuclear Quality Assurance Committee. He served as the vice chairman of ANSI Committee N45 on reactor plants and their maintenance and is currently chairman of the Nuclear' Technical Advisory Group reporting to the American National Standards Institute Nuclear Standards Board. He participated on the Inter-national Standard Organization's Committee TC-85, Subcommittee 3, Working Group 8, in preparation of IS06215, " Nuclear Power Plants - Quality Assurnce" and the special task group formed under ANS 3 for the preparation of the revision of the N18.7 Standard to incorporate quality assurance provisions for operation. He was the U.S. technical expert in the drafting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Guide on OA for operation.

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Dr. Bernsen has participated in a number of industry activities. He served as a member of the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) Committee on Reactor Licensing and Safety, organized and served as the initial chairman of the Subcommittee on Cost Impact,

.and as chairman of the Subcommittee on Load Combinations. He is the Bechtel Power Corporation member of the IDCOR Policy Committee and served as a member of the IDCOR Steering Committee.

PROFES1IONAL i

MEMBER. HIPS American Society of Mechanical Engineers American Nuclear Society - Past member of the Board of Directors

American Society for Quality Control REGISTRATION Registered Nuclear Engineer, California PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS Dr. Bernsen has published or presented a number of

() pertinent papers on a variety of subjects. The following lists some of these in the area of quality

~

assurance:

" Nuclear Codes, Standards, and Quality Assurance in the United States," paper published in British Nuclear International, August 1971

" Nuclear Power Plant Quality Assurance Standards -

the Status and Application of ANSI N45.2 Standards,"

a special report published by Nuclear Standards News, January 1973

" Quality Assurance in the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants," paper published in Nuclear Safety, March-April 1975

" Quality Assurance Education Requirements in the Engineer / Constructor Organization," presented at 21st Annual Meeting, American Nuclear Society, New Orleans, L.A., June 8-13, 1975

" Nuclear QA Standards: A Coordinated Effort,"

article published in Nuclear News, March 1976

() " Quality Assurance Experience and Viewpoint From the U.S. Industry," presentation to Norwegian Petroleum Society, Oslo, Norway, April 1978

"The Consolidated U.S. Nuclear Quality Assurance Standard - Present Status and Application," prepared for presentation at Europeon Nuclear Conference, April 1979 3

LO.

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1

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>\

U STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF FRANK LOPE 2, JR.

Education B.A., Mathematics and B.S.,

M.S., Physics, Texas A & M University Studies:Nuclear Engineering, Texas A& M University Graduate UniversityIndustrial of Houston Engineering Management, M.B.A.,

West CoastProgram University and Management and Financial Management, Employer Mr.

Lopez has been employed by Bechtel Power Corporation or Bechtel Energy Corporation since graduation from college.

Summary es Present:

(_) Project Engineer, Material & Configuration Management 3 Years: Project Engineer, Systems / Licensing 5 Years:

Engineering Supervisor in analysis, design licensing, stations, and evaluation of nuclear power, international and domestic 3 Years: Engineer, Nuclear Analysis Employment Experience In his Lopez current assignment on the South Texas Project, Mr.

is responsible for project coordination of the Configurat'on Management Program including interface between the Engineering Department and other entities with respect to design freeze activities leading to systems and area  !

completion, configuration control of design document .i releases, and startup interfaces. In addition, he is '

responsible for for the Engineering Department scope of services material management including material delivery require-ments in the field. support of system and area completion activities in

, As an additional duty, he supervises design office Engineering personnel responsible for ASME Code activities.

l l

l l t .

)

Mr. Lopez previously served as the Assistant Project  !

Engineer, Systems / Licensing on the South Texas Project. His  !

duties have involved direct managment of design, licensing I and quality activities for the project, including the transition of responsibilities from the previous i architect / engineer. He has directly supervised the l' Mechanical, Nuclear, Architectural, Quality Engineering and Codes and! Standards disciplines on the project, and been directly responsible for the development of the FSAR and

~

project Design Criteria Manual.

Mr. Lopez was previously assigned as the Nuclear Engineering Group Supervisor on the Korea Nuclear Units 5 and 6 project-being designed by Bechtel Power Corporation for the Korea Electric Company. His duties included the planning and administration.of all nuclear-related design and procurement support activities within the Bechtel Power Corporation scope of services for the project, as well as the coordina-tion of all project licensing activities. In this position, he supervised assigned Bechtel Power Corporation nuclear engineering personnel as well as assigned Korean trainees participating in a technology transfer program.

Mr. Lopez was previously assigned as the Deputy Nuclear

) Group Supervisor on the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station project. This project consisted of three nuclear units under construction by Bechtel Power Corporation for the Arizona Nuclear Power Project, a group of participating t

utilities. In this assignment, Mr. Lopez had the primary responsibility for the development of the Final Safety Analysis Report, which was submitted to the NRC.

Mr. Lopez was previously assigned as the Nuclear Analysis Group Supervisor for the Los Angeles Power Division. His responsibilities included supervision of a technical staff of engineers and specialists in nuclear and environmental assessment. Further, he was responsible to the Chief Nuclear / Environmental Engineer for the technical adequacy of t

nuclear analysis tasks performed on all nuclear projects in the LAPD scope, representing twelve domestic and foreign l projects.

Mr. Lopez was previously assigned as an Engineer responsible for shielding and dose assessment analysis on both foreign 1

and domestic nuclear power projects. These included the Maanshan Nuclear Power Station project for the Taiwan Power i

Company and the Blue Hills Station for Gulf States j

Utilities. He also had responsibilities with respect to the

preparation of pertinent portions of the Preliminary Safety l () Analysis Reports (PSAR), and for numerous environmental analysis performed for inclusion in Environmental Reports (ER).

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6 Professional Affiliations <

Registered Professional Engineer, Texas y Member, American Nuclear Society l

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e 13442 ,

1

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\_-

1 MR. FRANTZ: I'd now like to have marked for  !

l 2 the record Applicants' Exhibit 63 which is entitled An -

3 Assessment of the Findings in the Quadrex Corporation l 4 Report, dated May 1981, prepared for Houston Lighting &

5 Power Company by Bechtel Power Corporation in March 6 1982. It's a rather extensive volume.

7 (Applicants' Exhibit No. 63 marked for 8 identification.)

9 10 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Cont'd) 11 BY MR. FRANTZ:

12 Q Dr. Bernsen, is Applicants' Exhibit 63 the

./

O-13 same document which ou identified as Applicants' 14 Exhibit 63 in your prefiled testimony at pages 6 and 7?

15 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Yes, it is.

16 MR. FRANTZ: The Applicants move the admission 17 into evidence of Applicants' Exhibit 63.

18 MR. SINKIN: Objection. And we have a bit of 19 voir dire on this item, too.

20 MR. FRANTZ: Judge Bechhoefer, I'm not sure 21 you can have voir dire on an exhibit.

22 MR. SINKIN: Well, as to the -- well, let me 23 think about that.

h). 24 MR. PIRFO: Well, I think he can, for all it's 25 worth, if we're voting on it. j TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442  ;

13443 i~ 1 MR. SINKIN: I think you can. If you're

\}

J 2 moving to strike the exhibit, there are some basic 3 questions you can ask. i 4 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. l 5  ;

6 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 7 BY MR. SINKIN:

8 Q Excuse me, Mr. Bernsen, are you the sponsor on 9 this exhibit?

10 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Yes.

11 Q You' re the sponsor.

12 What effort was made during the Bechtel task l

() 13 force report review to ensure that the only information 14 reviewed by the task force was the same information 15 reviewed by Quadrex?

16 A Mr. Sinkin, I believe the report stands as l

l 17 indicated in the report. The task force did not intend 18 or make an effort to limit their review to the

19 information that was available at that time. And their 20 primary purpose was not to assess the, let's say, the 21 quality of the May review, but rather to look at the l

l 22 issues stated in the report for those that they obtained 23 in their interactions with Brown & Root and Quadrex and O 24 provide guidance to the project with regard to how to 25 deal with these findings.

TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 13444 (j 1 Q What effort was made in the task force review 2 to determine what Mr. Goldberg, Dr. Sumpter or Mr.

3 Robertson knew related to the Quadrex report on May the 4 8th, 1981?

5 A I do not believe that was an objective of the 6 task force report. I might add, clearly based upon the 7 level of engineering that had been completed at that 8 time and the small amount that was done subsequently, 9 one could presume that most of the information relied on 10 predated the May period.

11 Q Do you have personal knowledge of the amount 12 of engineering that Brown & Root completed.between May 13 of 1981 and March of 1982?

14 A No, I do not.

15 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, we're going to ask 16 that the admission of this document be limited in its 17 purposes. A review of my questioning of Mr. Stanley, 18 particularly on CCANP 104 I believe it is, will reveal 19 that I pursued three lines of questioning.

20 First, where there were disputes or 21 differences between Bechtel and Mr. Stanley, I clarified 22 his criticisms so the record would be available for 23 judging whether his criticisms were valid. This record O

V 24 is useful on the issue of the current competence of 25 Bechtel in the 50.55(e) area and the document is useful TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

-w--

I 13445

f. ' 1 in that sense. ')

L]J 2 Second, I used his' comments as a vehicle for 3 illuminating the specific Quadrex findings in his 4 comments. That record is useful for determining whether 5 the findings should have been notified to the NRC.

6 Third, I linked, wherever possible, the -

7 discipline findings to the generic findings, and that 8 record is useful for determining whether the generic 9 findings should have been notified to the NRC.

10 Both of the latter inquiries could have been 11 conducted without using the Bechtel task force report, 12 but I believe Mr. Stanley's recorded observations to be U,~~

13 a.useful starting point for sampling the many different 14 findings that exist in the Quadrex report.

15 CCANP's examination based on CCANP 104 was not

, 16 based on the Bechtel task force report being a 17 legitimate, admissible or relevant document on the issue 18 of whether specific discipline or generic findings 19 should have been notified to the NRC. The only inquiry 20 specifically tied to the report was examining Bechtel's 21 50.55(e) decision making process.

22 CCANP did not ask Mr. Stanley to respond to 23 every task force assessment, only those he specifically O 24 commented on. And again, CCANP believed those items 25 provided a good sample of how Bechtel makes 50.55(e)

TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

. -u -

13446 1 determinations.

)

2 CCANP opposes the admission of this report as 3 relevant to any issue other than Bechtel's competence.

4 Furthermore, from various comments by Mr. l 5 Stanley, it is apparent that the Bechtel task force 6 report is based on different information provided to the 7 task force by Brown & Root than was provided to the 1

8 Quadrex review team. The task force made no specific  ;

9 effort to limit the information it reviewed to the 10- infccmation provided Quadrex, to the information 11 available in March and April of 1981, or the information l l

12 available to the HL&P review team that made the 50.55(e) 13 notification decisions. The Bechtel task force report 14 is, therefore, based on different information than was 15 presented to Quadrex, available at the time of the .

l 16 Quadrex study, or known to the HL&P review team.

17 Under the relevance doctrine proposed for this j i

18 document coming in, it is not hard to imagine Brown &

19 Root still on the job today, although for some people 20 I'm sure that is hard to imagine, Bechtel doing a review 21 before this hearing and a Bechtel report telling us that 22 Brown & Root has told them the crack / break analysis has 23 been performed because four years later it was O* 24 performed.

25 CCANP's response to this document in terms of i

TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 13447

(}

1 whether the findings should have been notified to the 2 NRC is basically "so what?" The document is not 3 . relevant.

4 The inquiry is whether on May 8th, 1981, based 5 on their knowledge, should the HL&P review team have 6 notified the NRC of the entire report or more than three 7 of the three hundred findings. The Bechtel task force 8 report proves nothing regarding that question one way or 9 the other.

10 In addition, we direct the Board's attention 11 to Mr. Stanley's comment 20 in CCANP 104 in which he 12 says the task force report provides very little O 13 information regarding Bech'tel's evaluation of the 14 Quadrex generic findings at the time Quadrex did the i

15 study. He says, and I quote, "The majority of the 4

16 Bechtel evaluations state how Bechtel will address these 17 generic findings in the future," how Bechtel will 18 address the generic findings. A review of the task 19 force report confirmed Mr. Stanley's observation. The 20 generic findings in terms of what Quadrex found are not 21 addressed. They're responded to with how Bechtel will 22 perform in the future.

23 So, the only possible relevance of the report O 24 is to the notification issue on specific discipline 25 findings at issue in this proceeding. Mr. Goldberg and TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13448 1 Dr. Sumpter were presented by the Applicants on that 2 issue. The task force report is merely cumulative 3 evidence of far less probative value than the testimony 4 of those who made the decision.

5 Loading the record with marginal cumulative 6 evidence, particularly since it will require CCANP to i

7 conduct extensive cross-examination on the document, 8 will only burden the record with unnecessary material 9 and lengthen the hearing inordinately.

10 Again, we don't object to the admission of the 11 document for the limited purpose of being relevant to

- 12 the issue regarding the competence of Bechtel in the 13 area of 50.55 (e) . We do object to the document coming 14 in on the issue of whether the specific findings should 15 have been notified to the NRC.

16 MR. FRANTZ: Mr. Sinkin again is raising some 17 of the same arguments he's raised previously and the 18 j Board's rejected.

19 I'd like first to directly address Mr.

20 Sinkin's statements and then go into more general 21 arguments on why this document should come into 22 evidence.

23 First of all, Mr. Sinkin claims that this 0', 24 document should be in evidence only for the purpose of 25 testing Bechtel's current competence. I fail to see how TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 13449 5 1 that is at all relevant. The Bechtel task force report

[O 2 was prepared by a special task force, not the project 3 team that's now at the site; therefore, it has no l

4 relevance to the current competence of HL&P and its 5 contractors to report 50.55(e) matters.  !

4 6 Mr. Sinkin also said that the report should l i

7 not come in because it addresses more information or l l

8 parts of the design than were directly reviewed by l 9 Quadrex. Again, I fa}.1 to see why that is a grounds for 10 objection to the document. If further information not l

11 possessed by Quadrex demonstrates that the finding was 12 not reportable, that's clearly probative of whether or 13 n'ot the finding was reportable.

14 Similarly, the mere fact that the information 15 may have been available on May 8th -- or, I'm sorry, the 16 mere fact that the information may not have been 17 directly presented to the HL&P review team on May 8th is 18 also not relevant to the issues here. The HL&P review 19 team had the benefit of the experience and knowledge of l

20 the Brown & Root people, had the benefit of its own 21 experience and knowledge of the project. That 22 experience and knowledge encompasses I think in large 23 part some of the same types of information that were 24 reviewed by the Bechtel task force report. But to claim 25 that there has to be an exact equivalence, again, I TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13450 9% 1 think that is not necessary under any standards of U

2 evidence.

3 Again, we have experts -- this document 4 essentially represents expert opinion as to whether or 5 not the findings were reportable. And as long as the 6 information at the very least is based upon information 7 available as of May 8th, I can't see any grounds for 8 keeping it out.

9 I'd like to go on to some more general 10 arguments as to why this report should come in.

11 Back in 1982, the Licensing Board deferred 12 hearings on the Quadrex report in order to consider both

() 13 the Bechtel reviewa and the staff analysis.

14 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Sinkin strongly 15 objected to that, by the way.

16 MR. FRANTZ: Well, I'm just pointing it out 17 for the record that that's what happened. And I can 18 cite the fourth prehearing conference order at pages 4 19 and 5.

20 It would seem to be anomalous now that we have 21 waited several years to get this report to conduct 22 discovery on it and now claim that it should not come 23 into evidence. It just is completely inconsistent with 4

24 the Board's prior rulings.

25 In terms of the report itself, the report TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13451 1 clearly states that it's based upon the Quadrex report, 2 information provided by Quadrex. As Mr. Stanley 3 testified, that was information that he had developed 4 prior to Ma'y 8th, information provided by Brown & Root 5 as to why the findings were not reportable. These 6 analyses are based upon information that were available 7 at the time HL&P conducted its reportability review on 8 May 8th. Therefore, there's absolutely no basis for 9 keeping the report out on the ground that the report 10 somehow might be based upon after the fact developed 11 information.

- 12 Additionally, the report is clearly relevant 13 and material to the issues in the proceeding. The -

14 report reviews all of the findings in the report. It 15 makes reportability determinations on all of the 16 discipline findings. It concludes that none of the 17 findings are potentially reportable with the exception 18 of those actually reported and with one additional 19 matter. Thus, the report confirms BL&P's overall 20 conclusions regarding the report, especially HL&P's 21 determination that the Quadrex report need not be 22 submitted as a whole under 50.55 (e) . Again, this 23 information is clearly relevant and material to the 24 issues the Board has to address here.

25 Additionally, the Bechtel task force report TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13452 1 directly addresses each of the findings at issue in this

/C) t wJ 2 proceeding as called out in the various Board orders.

3 The Bechtel task force report provides the opinions of 4 experts who have extensive experience and knowledge.

5 That information provided by these experts would clearly 6 be helpful to the Board in deciding whether or not these 7- findings are reportable.

1 8 I'd like to make one further point because Mr. l 9 Sinkin keeps coming back to this. The Applicants' case 10 is really a two-part case on the Quadrex report. First 11 of all, we've presented the testimony of Mr. Goldberg

, 12 and Dr. Sumpter on what HL&P did back on May 8th and why 13 on May 8th HL&P determined that the various findings 14 were either reportable or not potentially reportable. {

l l 15 The second part of the' Applicants' case on {

16 this issue is to present the testimony of Dr. Bernsen, 17 Mr. Lopez to present Applicants' Exhibit 63 to provide 18 confirmation of the results reached by HL&P back on May 19 8th. The type of analysis provided in Dr. Bernsen and 20 Mr. Lopez' testimony and in these exhibits is often the 21 type of information provided to the NRC Licensing Boards 22 in these types of hearings. It's simply expert opinion I I

23 to corroborate decisions made at a previous time by the i 24 Applicant.

1 25 It would be totally unfair and unreascnable to I TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13453 1 the Applicants to exclude this type of overwhelming

}

2 evidence that the findings in the report were not 3 reportable. And the Applicants, therefore, suggest that 4 Mr. Sinkin's motion should be denied.

5 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Does the Staff have a 6 position?

7 MR. PIRFO: We have no objection to admission 8 of the report. I point out to the Board, though, the 9 Staff did not rely on the report in any way in its 10 testimony. To that extent we do not support Mr.

11 ,

Sinkin's motion, nor do we have any objection to the

- 12 admission of the document.

O- 13 MR. SINKIN: If I night respond to some of 14 what was said, Mr. Chairman.

15 If I heard counsel correctly, he said that the 16 task force report was based on information available at 17 the time of the review on May 8th, not after the fact.

18 But when I asked that very question of Mr. Bernsen, he 19 said the report stands as indicated.

20 We did not make an attempt to limit the review 21 of the information available at that time. That was the 22 basis for my statement that it was not limited to the 23 information available at that time.

24 Now, if Mr. Bernsen and counsel have a 25 disagreement over that, maybe we can find that out. But TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13454 I the testimony in the proceeding is that it was not

)

2 limited to the information available at that time and, 3 therefore, some of the information is after the fact and 4 would clearly not have been available to the HL&P review 5 team.

6 MR. FRANTZ: I think Mr. Sinkin is 7 mischaracterizing what both I have said and the 8 witnesses have said. The witnesses said there was no 9 effort made to exclude information. That does not mean 10 that the information, in fact, was reflected or 11 developed after May 8th.

12 The report itself states, I'm not sure we even O 13 need to have any statements by myself or by the 14 witnesses, as to what it's based upon. It's based upon 15 the Quadrex report itself, upon what was told to the 16 task force by Mr. Stanley, and upon what was told to the 17 tas;t force by Brown & Root and HL&P, I guess, also. I 18 am not aware of anything that would indicate that the 19 information provided by any of those parties was 20 information that was solely developed af ter May 8th.

21 MR. SINKIN: I wasn't saying solely.

22 MR. PIRFO: If I may be heard. I should note 23 for the record I misspoke in the sense of saying just O 24 our testimony. Of course, NUREG 0948, which is a staff i 25 exhibit, does refer to the Bechtel asJessment. But now l

TATE REPORTING (713) 493-8442

13455 1 the Staff has simply viewed those as questions of weight 2-or however Mr. Sinkin or intervenor chooses to j 3 characterize af ter the fact assessments as he's put it.

4 I just wanted to make the record clear on 5 that. We said that we do not. rely on it in our direct 6 testimony, but the Staff exhibit does refer -- at least 7 one of the Staff exhibits does refer to it.

8 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Stanley did --

9 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Pirfo, does it refer --

10 I don't recall, I thought it only referred to EN-619, 11 but I'm not sure about that. ,

. 12 According to the executive summary, it refers 13 to EN-619, but there is a general reference to 14 transition program documents, but I'm not sure that --

15 MR. PIRFO: Well, this other reference --

16 well, I don't want to get into a discussion now of NUREG 17 0948, with all due respect. I mean, we can cross that 18 bridge --

19 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I just wanted to make sure

[ 20 the record is clear.

21 MR. PIRFO: Yeah. But it's referred to -- I l 22 was looking at various places while we were talking and 23 looking at various references and I'm not -- didn't have 24 a chance to talk with Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor, as long l l

25 as he's here I might as well bring him up, did not use TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13456

(} l this in preparation of his testimony, but that's not to 2 say that it's not part and parcel of NUREG 0948 which is 3 another issue. l l

4 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Right.

l 5 MR. PIRFO: But I just wanted to make the 6 Staff's position clear with regard to admission of )

l 7 Applicants' Exhibit 63 -- j l

8 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: And EN-619 itself has 9 substantial references to the task force report, quotes 10 of lots of it.

11 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, there is no 12 question that Mr. Stanley assisted the Bechtel task

()

! 13 force. CCANP 104 is Mr. Stanley's response to their 14 report and in that response he says in many instances 15 these Bechtel assessments appear to reflect modified 16 designs subsequently accomplished by Brown & Root rather 17 than the actual state of design reviewed by Quadrex in 18 March 1981. Now, that's Mr. Stanley's view of whether 19 the Bechtel task force report mirrors what Quadrex was 20 doing. He views that there were modified desiga6.

21 Mr. Chairman, I do have further response.

h 22 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Sinkin?

L 23 MR. SINKIN: Yes. Our further response, Mr.

24 Chairman, was on at least two points.

25 First of all, given the Applicants' i

TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13457

(*N, 1 representation that the special task force is not part V

2 of the project team, therefore their competence doesn't 3 relate to the competence of Bechtel, I think we would 4 change our position from admitting it for a limited 5 purpose to striking it altogether.

6 The second thing is that there's a position 7 being put forward here by the Applicants that I think we 8 need to look at very closely and that is that if someone 9 comes along later and with further information 10 determines that a finding is not reportable, that that 11 somehow is probative of whether the person who made the aq 12 decision on potential reportability made the correct b 13 decision. I don't think that that's the kind of inquiry 14 we should be making.

15 What you want to know is when that person made 16 the decision it was not potentially reportable, what did 17 they know? That's the only criteria, what did they 18 know? If they knew absolutely nothing and took a guess 19 and said it wasn't reportable without doing a thing l

20 about it and later on the information comes in that it's 21 not reportable, that doesn't make the fact that they 22 took a guess more credible.

23 And I see that that's the basic problem we O

kl 24 have with all of these documents marching into the 25 record here. They're all coming in to say, well, we TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

l 13458

() 1 looked at it later and we looked at some stuff that 2 Quadrex didn't see and probably Jerry Goldberg didn't 3 even have available on May the 8th, but that tells us 4 that it wasn't reportable and, therefore, we made the l

5 right decision on May the 8th.

6 That's not the way the inquiry goes. It ,

7 doesn't go backwards in time. It's fixed in time to l l

8 that 24-hour period. What did he know? What did ne l 9 decide? Based on what he knew, did he make the right 10 decision?- I don't think that these kind of reports are 11 relevant to that inquiry and I think that is 12 specifically the inquiry in the contention.

13 When you' re citing 50.55 (e) (ii) and talking 14 about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, that's the contention. That's what 15 we're talking about. In terms of why these reports were 16 going to come in and why we didn't have a hearing in 17 1981 or 1982 about Quadrex, what the Board was saying 18 was they didn't think that the handling could be 19 separated easily from the substance, so we'd have the 20 handling and the substance all at the same time.

21 Well, we reached the point where the Board 22 said Brown & Root's no longer on the job and we're not 23 interested in the substance. The substance went by the

\

24 wayside. And that's what these reports were primarily 25 designed to address was the substance of Cuadrex, not TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 _ _

usro ,

13459

(]) 1 the handling.

1 2 As a matter of fact, the EN-619, which is l l

3 coming along next, wasn't even addressing the 4 reportability at all directly. Tangentially it might, 5 but that wasn't even the purpose of that study. What 6 was going to be coming in was evidence on whether the 7 resolution of the Quadrex findings was adequate or 8 inadequate. As far as we're concerned, we were not on 9 notice that what we were litigating here in this 10 proceeding was the adequacy of the resolution.

11 So, every time they come up and say, yes, but s 12 later evidence showed that it wasn't reportable, we're (d 13 put in the position of having to challenge that evidence 14 or let it go and be used as proof you didn't have to 15 find a potential reportable. That means we were 16 supposed to be prepared to litigate whether the 17 resolution of the Quadrex findings, how they were 18 resolved by Bechtel and Houston Lighting & Power was 19 adequate. That issue was specifically excluded from 20 this proceeding, but now these documents are coming in 21 and raising it again.

22 (No hiatus.)

23

(

25 TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 _ _

j

13460 k_/q- 1 MR. FRANTZ: I'd like to correct several 2 misstatements --

3 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well --

4 MR. FRANTZ: Okay.

5 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The Board has decided that 6 we will let the document in. We do note that the weight 7 of the particular -- the weight of the discussion of 8 particular findings in terms of our contention may depend 9 on what information in fact was relied on to reach that 10 conclusion. And that, of course, is open for examination 11 of the witnesses. And irrespective of -- I mean, we 12 agree that the information that HL&P had to act on 13 information known to them in May, and that's a subject e .

O 14 that can be inquired into. So we will allow this ,

15 document in.

16 (Applicants' Exhibit No. 63 i 17 admitted in- evidence.)

18 JUDGE SHON: One more thing I would like to 19 know about the document, perhaps somebody can direct me 20 to the proper page in it. In almost every task force 21 report I've ever seen, the task forces identify by name 22 and usually by profession; I can't find the list of who

23 the people are who did this in the report. Is it there 24 and I'm juct missing it?

25 DR. BERNSEN: I don't believe it's in the TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13461

,. l 1

~

report.

2 JUDGE SHON: Isn't that kind of strange, an 3 anonymous task force? Usually they put their names on

-4 their reports.

l 5 DR. BERNSEN: I don't know whether it's strange '

6 or not. Typically,-and I wouldn't say this is always the

7 case, but typically in our reports, we don't identify the i

8 members of the team. It really reflected as the report l

9 indicates, the effort of this group of nine people plus i

l 10 their interaction with and a lot of review by other

, l i

11 senior members of the Bechtel organization to corroborate 12 their determinations with regard to industry and current

_.. 13 practice. So that it the task force did not operate O 14 entirely in an isolated environment and therefore there j 15 were other people involved.

l 16 But as far as I know, it's not our normal l

17 practice to identify all the players in a review of this 1

18 sort. '

19 JUDGE SHON: Did you actually head up the task

'20 force, Mr. Bernsen?

21 DR. BERNSEN: No, I did not.

22 JUDGE SHON: I see. What sort of person did; 23 was he a lawyer or a physicist or an engineer or a --

-24 DR. BERiiSEN: He was a, nuclear engineer, Ray 25 Ashley, has been a chief nuclear engineer in one of our O

TATE REPORTING CERVICE, 498-8442

13462 1 divisions for many years, very knowledgeable nuclear 2 licensing, radiation shielding protection, and nuclear 3 systems analysis and project engineering experience 4 besides.

( 5 MR. FRANTZ: Judge Shon, I'm sorry to interrupt 6 but you may not have seen this before. But in the

'7 Applicants' answer and objections to State of Texas' 8- first set of interrogatories to Applicants or Quadrex, 9 the answer to Interrogatory 36, we identify the members 10 of.the task force.

11 JUDGE SHON: Thank you. That's the kind of 12 _ thing I wanted, somebody to tell me about.

13 MR. FRANTZ: Is Ray Ashley, Paul Speidel, Mario 14- Alvarez, Steve Case, Rick Ellis,'Orhan Gurbuz, 15 G-u-r-b-u-s, b-u-z, I'm sorry; Dave Haught, Subash 16 hhurana and I'm not sure how that's pronounced.

17 MR. PIRFO: Can I ask that that be spelled?

-18 MR. FRANTM: S-u-b-a-s-h, the last name is 19 K-a-h-u-r-a-n-a; and Larry Johnson.

20 JUDGE SHON: This Ray Ashley, did he work for 21~ Atomics International some years ago?

22 DR. BERNSEN: Yes.

23 JUDGE SHOP: I think I know him personally.

24 MR. FRANTZ: I'd now like to identify for the 25 record, Applicants Exhibit 64, which consists of a letter O

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13463

( l from HL&P signed by George W. Oprea to John T. Collins, 2 regional administrator of Region IV; attached to that is )

l 3 a letter to Houston Lighting & Power, Mr. -- to the 4 attention of Mr. S.M. Dew from Bechtel Power Corporation, 5 and signed by R.L. Rogers. Attached to that letter is 6 work package title review of the Quadrex report, log No.

7 EN-619.

8 (Applicants' Exhibit No. 64 marked 9 for identification.)

10 MR. FRANTZ: I believe the Board and the 11 parties have already been provided copies of this exhibit 12 and I've given copies to the reporter.

. 13 14 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED 15 16 By Mr. Frantz:

l 17 Q Mr. Lopez, do you have a copy of this exhibit 18 before you?

19 A (By Mr. Lopez) Yes, I do.

20 0 Is this exhibit the same exhibit that you 21 identified as Applicant Exhibit 64 on pages 7 through 9 22 of your prefiled testimony?

23 A (By Mr. Lopez) Yes, it is.

24 MR. FRANTZ: The Applicants move the admission 25 into evidence of Applicant Exhibit 64.

O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

)

13464 O(_/ 1 MR. SINKIN: Objection. Mr. Chairman, EN-619 l

2 is even more clearly based on different information than l

3 Quadrex relied on than is the Bechtel task force report.

4 Furthermore, as stated in the testimony of these 5 witnesses at page 7, 11, 28, the primary purpose of 6 EN-619 was not to review the Quadrex report to determine 7 reportability.

8 Mr. Lopez so testifies at page 7. line 27, 9 going over to Page 8. Furthermore, Mr. Lopez testifies 10 at Page 8, line 6, that EN-619 did not focus upon 11 Quadrex's comments on the practices, policies and 12 procedures of Brown & Root because they were not 13- applicable or germane to Bechtel's activities.

O

\-'# 14 Well, that phrase is the essence of how Quadrex 15 describes their generic findings at 2-15 of the Quadrex 16 report, which says, regarding the generic findings, that 17 these are a clear indication that certain practices, 18 policies and procedures adopted by Brown & Root continue 19 to have a generic impact on most if not all of the 20 technical disciplines.

21 So if EN-619 was not focused on the practices, 22 policies and procedures of Brown & Root, it was not 23 focusing on the generic findings.

24 Again, the only basis for entering the document 25 would be some supposed relevance to the specific O

yJ TATB REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13465

) 1 discipine findings, and again all we're doing is loading 2 up the record with somebody else coming along still later 3 with more information available with Bechtel having been 4 on the job for a long time, with people working with far 5 more knowledge than the Quadrex reviewers ever had, now 6 writing a report and saying what they think the real 7 situation was. And what we're setting up here is in some 8 senses, Quadrex versus Bechtel; when that's not the I

9 inquiry.

10 The inquiry is what did the Houston Lighting &

11 Power review team know on May the 7th and May the 8th 12 from Quadrex; Bechtel wasn't even on the job and was 13 nowhere around. .

( 14 But here comes another document.

We'll make l i

15 our standard objection that the record is being loaded up l 16 with these kinds of documents and that it's not -- it's 17 not the issue in the proceeding. Furthermore, I note in 18 EN-619, that perhaps it's not even EN-619 that we should 19 be looking at.

20 In the front of EN-619 there's a document, it's 21 the summary of the UN-619 study, page 14 of 17, talks 22 about related work. And it says that many of the 23 compliance work packages include evaluations and status 24 appraisals on concerns which are also the concerns of 25 Quadrex findings. And then it lists the work packages O

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13466

() 1 that are related to this work package and the subjects 2 that they contain.

3 EN-600, item B, Incident Review Committee 4 issues. Now those might be relevant to this proceeding; 5 items from the Quadrex report that were referred to an 6 Incident Review Committee later by Bechtel as potentially 7 reportable. But a whole two volume report that doesn't 8 even purport to be addressing reportability simply cannot 9 be worth putting into the record of this proceeding.

10 JUDGE BECBHOEFER: Mr. Frantz --

11 MR. FRANTZ: Yes, Mr. Chairman, again, I think 12 as the Board has ruled with respect to the previous 13 exhibit, Mr. Sinkin's arguments largely go to the weight

) 14 to be given to this exhibit, not to its admissibility.

15 Mr. Sinkin is free to argue in his proposed 16 findings of fact and conclusions of law that this 17 document should not be given much weight because it does, 18 in some cases, include after the fact information, 19 information developed after May 8th, 1918, in a very few '

l

,20 cases. But that doesn't again preclude us from 21 presenting our case on reportability; we're entitled to 22 have in the record information which we feel is relevant 23 and probative to the case we're trying to prove; and Mr.

24 Sinkin can argue later on during the proposed findings 25 and fact and conclusions of law that that information O

l l

l l

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 )

l

13467 1 should really not be given much weight.

2 If report, itself, I think is clearly relevant

, 3 and material; it addresses each of the Quadrex findings, 4 although the primary purpose of the report was not to j 5 determine reportability of the findings.

6 If Bechtel, during the preparation of this 7 report and during its evaluations to support preparation 8 of the report, had found anything that was reportable, a 9 report would have been submitted; this document indicates 10 that no such things were found; that's clearly again i

11 relevant and probative to the issues in this proceeding.

12 Many of the discussions of the findings here

,13 indicate that Quadrex was merely supplying

{

14 recommendations for improvements and in Brown & Root's 15 practices and policies and not indications of 16 deficiencies i

\

17 That, again, I think is clearly relevant and 18 material to reportability.- Therefore, we think the 19 exhibit should come in.

20 MR. PIRFO: Staff has no objection to its 21 admission. We point out again that we do rely, as the 22 Board pointed out, that we do rely on NUREG 0948.

23 I, Mr. Chairman, if I can make something clear.

24 By pointing out to the Board NUREG 0948, I'm not making 25 clear. My feeling is that that information that we O

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13468 (q/

1 viewed it as the Staff viewed is as relevant is contained 2 in 0948 will and has been relied on, so to the extent 3 that the Board would -- how should I put this. If we get 4 caught in the catch the two of striking 619, and then 5 striking NUREG 0948, we have problems with that.

6 What I'm saying is that the reason we have no 7 objection -- I should say the reason we do not have 8 strenuous support for the admission of 619 because we 9 feel it's contained to the extent relevant in 0948, 10 that's our position.

11 Have I made myself clear? Our position is that 12 it is probative and relevent. Of course, in a voluminous r) 13 14 document like that, there are are a number of things which are not probative and relevant, of course. But to 15 the extent there is probative and relevant material in 16 619, it's contained in 0948; but that's not an arguement 17 for striking 619.

18 I'd rather respond to questions now.

19 JUDGE SHON: If we did strike 619, in yous 20 opinion, would there then be a substantially diminished 21 basis for the actual material in the NUREG document?

22 MR. PIRFO: I'm not sure those are -- I'm not 22 sure that examination is co-extensive. I'm not sure if 24 you can, the fact that 619 were stricken means that NUREG 25 0948, which is based in part on 619, by definition, is

)

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

4 13469 1- stricken, or is undercut-because the underlying documents 2 were stricken.

i 3 I mean, draw an example. A witness may base 4 their personal knowledge on a number of documents that is

5 competent to come into court, whereas the documents 6 themselves cannot come in and because they're not 7 relevant to the proceeding but the facts that the 8 witnesses testimony is cased on the documents would still 9 come in.

10 JUDGE SHON: If, for example, NUREG 0948 used 11 numbers derived in part from the Chemical Rubber 12 Publishing Company's Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, I 13 would not think it necessary to admit the Handbook of

) ,

14 Chemistry and Physics in the case in order to 15 substantiate those portions of NUREG 0948 that were based 16 on it.

17 Is this a similar thing, that it's based in 18 part on that, but that that is because its authors accept 19 this as true and we don't need it in the case?

20 MR. PIRFO: I'm not sure that's the same thing.

21 Of course we can't -- I want to avoid the situation where 22 we're arguing too strenuously for 619 when we've 23 relied -- but we have relied on 619.

24 I mean, it's our position that NUREG 0948 to 25 -the extent we needed 619 we've relied on it. But I think O 9 TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13470

.(_/

r') 1 that it is -- the entire document, giving the certain i

2 exceptions I alluded to before, is probative and relevant j l

3 to whether these things were reporteble, potentially 4 reportable, at that time. And as you have ruled with I 5 regard to Applicants' Exhibits 63, this merely goes to 6 weight.

7 And Mr. Sinkin, of course, is free to qualify 8 particular findings as he goes through.

9 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We've decided not to admit 10 that document. We will not admit Applicants' Exhibit 64, 11 MR. FRANTZ: May I suggest, Judge Bechhoefer, 12 that this is a good time for a break?

13 MR..SINKIN: That's fine.

O 14 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes, fifteen minutes.

15 MR. FRANTZ: Before I do that, maybe we should 16 just mark for identification one additional exhibit which 17 will hopefully be admitted after the break just so that 18 they may see the exhibit beforehand. It's not been 19 previously shown to the parties or the Board.

20 I'd now like to mark for identification 21 Applicant Exhibit 72.

22 (Applicant Exhibit 72 marked 23 for identification.)

24 MR. FRANTZ: For the record, Applicants' 25 Exhibit 72 con'aists of a interoffice memorandum from O

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13471 rs -

t (,) 1 Bechtel Power Corporation to B.L. Lex, from R.L. Ashley, 2 dated November 24, 1982. Attached to that letter is a 3 document with a cover sheet entitled " Disposition Of 4 Brown & Root And Quadrex Comments On The Bechtel Task 5 Force Draft Report," quote "An Assessment of the Findings 6 in the Quadrex Corporation Report," dated November 1982.

7 Attached to that are 30 pages. I may note 8 also, for the record, that what Applicants Exhibit 72 is 9 an exerpt from a longer document. We have not included 10 pages which address the Brown & Root comments on the 11 draft task force report.

12 The exhibit which we have here only addresses 13 i

') 14 the Quadrex comments on the draft task force report, which CCANP, by the way, has moved into evidence and was 15 accepted into evidence and accepted into evidence A CCANP j 16 104.

l l 17 The parties have a chance to review this over l

~

18 the break and perhaps we can come back and do some 19 further questions with the witnesses and move this into 20 evidence.

l 21 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: All right. Let's break 22 fifteen minutes.

23 (Recess.)

24 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay. Back on the record.

25 Mr. Frantz.

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

1 13472 O(s 1 MR. FRANTZ: Thank you.

2 Q (By Mr. Frantz) Dr. Bernsen, are you familiar 3 with Applicants' Exhibit 64?

4 A (By Mr. Bernsen) Yes, I am.

5 Q 72, I'm sorry.

6 A 72.

7 MR. SINKIN: Still trying.

8 Q (By Mr. Frantz) Would you please describe what 9 Applicants Exhibits 72 represents?

10 A (By Mr. Bernsen) The Applicants' Exhibit 72 is 11 Jeport from the members of the Bechtel task force 12 describing how they dispositioned the Quadrex comments on 13 the draft task force report.

O 14 Q The Bechtel task force report was issued in 15 March of 1982. Would you please explain why this 16 document was not issued until November 24th, 1982?

17 A As I recall, project management, the Bechtel 18 South Texas Project management, in reviewing -- in 19 looking at the task force report, concluded that there 20 was not a complete trail to indicate how the draft task 21 force comments, how the Quadrex comments were dealt with 22 in completing the Quadrex report, and we felt it would be 23 desirable for record purposes to have the task force 24 compile in one location the reasons for their specific 25 dispositions on the Quadrex comments.

O  ;

I TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13473 1 Q Do you agree with the task force dispositions 2 of the Quadrex comments in Applicants' Exhibit 72?

3 A Yes, I do.

4 MR. FRANTZ: Applicants move into evidence 5 Applicants Exhibit 72.

6 MR. SINKIN: No objection.

7 MR. PIRFO: No objection.

8 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Applicantr,'

z Exhibits 72 will 9 be admitted into evidence. i 10 (Applicant's Exhibit No. 72 11 admitted into evidence.)

12 MR. FRANTZ: I do have a few additional

{) 13 14 questions on direct examination.

~

(By Mr. Frantz) The testimony of Robert J.

Q 15 Taylor, pages 44 and 45, states that HL&P notified the 16 NRC of a potentially reportable deficiency related to the 17 essential cooling pond on October 19th, 1982, and that 18 HL&P withdrew this report on December 9th, 1982.

19 Did this potentially reportable deficiency 20 involve the same concern expressed in question N-17 and 21 finding 4621 N in the Quadrex report?

22 A (By Mr. Lopez) I think I can address that.

23 Question N-17 deals with Quadrex's concern that in their 24 discussions with brown & Root, they had not been able to 25 identi.y that a calculation involving simultaneous O

(a TITE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13474

(')s

(_ 1 orderly shutdown of both plants had not been violated --

2 or had not been analyzed by Brown & Root, and were 3 raising that question.

4 They were also asking questions relative to 5 calculations relative to the civil calculations for the 6 sizing of the pond. The matters that were under 7 discussion, under investigationmin the potentially 8 reportable item that you addressed earlier and that I 9 have seen in the NRC testimony, dealt with matters 10 dealing with the essential cooling pond but would not --

11 not these issues here.

12 Those matters were based upon an early 1982 NUS 13 analysis of the essential cooling pond, which had 14 demonstrated and which had been developed because of 15 changing heat loads.

16 One of the matters coming out of the HVAC 17 deficiency that we have discussed in the direct testimony 18 was that certain safety related HVAC needed to be added..

19 The process of looking at that and dispositioning that it 20 was determined that a additional heat loads, safety 21 related heat loads, as loads to the essential cooling 22 pond.

23 NUS performed that re-analysis. And in so 24 doing, had identified that for a short period of time, 25 something on the order of four hours or less, the

()

1 l

l \

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

s 13475

) 1 predicted temperature of the essential cooling pond would 2 be higher than the values that were specified in the 3 procurement of some safety related equipment which was to 4 be served by water coming from that essential cooling 5 pond.

6 So the issue that was being raised at that time 7 was whether or not that equipment, which was being 8 serviced by that essential cooling pond water which was 9 being predicted to be in excess of the specified values 10 for approximately four hours, a little~ bit less than four 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />, was in any way, that equipment in any way been 12 delayed by that increased temperature.

13 So the matters that Quadrex were raising were b 14 not related to that NUS analysis or that particular -

15 problem. It was later determined, I should note 16 parenthetically and the reason why it was withdrawn that 17 in evaluating that equipment, the equipment vendors who 18 happened to be Westinghouse and some vendors of some 19 heating ventilating and air conditioning equipment, 20 determined that that short period of time for those 21 temperatures had no safety implication to the either the 22 performance of that equipment or its equipment 23 qualification.

24 0 Thank you. Mr. Lopez, I would like to refer 25 your attention now to question, answer and assessment O

V TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13476

.f).

\m/ 1 H-23 in the Quadrex report.

2 MR. SINKIN: I'm sorry, what are you referring 3 to.

4 MR. FRANTZ: H-23.

5 MR. SINKIN: In the Quadrex report?

6 MR. FRANTZ: In the Quadrex report, yes.

7 Q (By Mr. Frantz) Did you review this question 8 answer and assessment in preparing your testimony?

9 A (By Mr. Lopez) Yes, I did.

10 0 Would you briefly describe the subject of that 11 question answer and assessment?

12 A Okay. I reviewed this in particular looking at 13 the statements made by. Quadr &x under -- in their O 14 assessment, indicating that Quadrex was raising a 15 question as to whether or not, this is under I guess item 16 A on the Quadrex assessment portion of that question, in 17 which Quadrex was raising the question of whether or not 18 the -- if I can find it, if the only -- if the drainage 19 system and its level indication was the only means for 20 leakage detection in this safety related fluid process .

21 system, that is the essential cooling water system, then 22 it would be their opinion that standard review plan SRP 23 9.33 would require that that drainage system and 24 instrumentation be safety related.

25 They did not identify that that was in fact the O

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13477 1 case; that-they had any reason to believe that that was

'2 the only means. They simply indicated that if it were 3 -the case, that would be there -- that would be their  :

t I

4 conclusion.

5 So in the first place, you know, that  !

6 identified that to my satisfaction that no deficiency was j 7 in fact being identified by Quadrex. f 8 Further, from my past experience, in review of 9 this standard review plan and the way that that is  !

10 normally dealt with in designs, at least those to which I 11 am familiar, you know, I find that it is uncommon for 12 that particular standard review plan position to be 13 implemented in the manner that Quadrex was proposing, O 14 that is to qualify as safety related drainage systems.

15 That's not the normal practice.

16 Typically, there is no reliance on drainage 17 systems as the only means of identifying breakage from 18 safety related fluid process systems. I 19 So I will admit that I simply initially assumed 20 that that would not be the case. I went further, however 21 to try to determine whether or not in the specific 22 instances that were being addressed by Quadrex that might 23 in fact be the case. What I did was look at process and

)

instrumentation diagrams, the acronym we use M&ID's, as 24 25 well as system design descriptions which were in place at O.

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13478

,L ) 1 the time of the Quadrex review; I looked at particularly 2 the process and instrumentation diagrams for the 3 essential cooling water system and for the drain system

, 4 as well as the system design description for the 5 essential cooling water system, to see whether or not in 6 those. design documents, I found evidence that Brown &

7 Root was had the design such that it was relying upon the

! 8 drainage system as the sole means of identifying possibly 9 leakages from that system. I found that not to be the 10 case, as I had originally suspected that it might.

11 Q And what results did you reach regarding 12 whether or not that instrumentation needed to be safety

,,- 13 related?

) 14 A Based upon the information that I just 15 provided, it was my determination that the standard i

16 review plan, 9.33, requirement for safety relatedness of 17' that drainage system did not apply and as such need not 18 be safety related.

19 Q That includes also the sump pumps?

1 20 A Yes.

Thank you.

21 0 Now I'd like to refer to your 22 attention to finding 4.3.2.1.(h). l 23 Dr. Bernsen, is a procedure requiring the j 24 identification of support systems necessary to satisfy 25 that criteria in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 507 t

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13479

~]

(

1 A (By Mr. Bernsen) No, it's not.

2 (No hiatus.)

3 4

5 6

7 8

9 10 11 12

,. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 O

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13480 1 Q Mr. Lopez, did BER, in fact, have a procedure 2 requiring the identification of support systems?

3 A (By Mr. Lopez) Yes, they did.

4 Q Would you please describe that procedure? -

5 A The procedure in particular that I'm making 6 reference to is the procedure that described how 7 personnel at Brown & Root should prepare system design 8 descriptions. That procedure was in place at the time 9 of the Quadrex review and indicated the requirement for 10 personnel preparing system design descriptions to 11 identify the support systems needed to support that

- 12 particular system. It turns out that it made no 13 distinction as to whether or not this applied to all 14 systems, whether they be safety-related or not, but it 15 indicated that support systems should be identified in 16 the SDD.

17 Q Have you conducted a review to determine 18 whether the SDD's did, in fact, identify support 19 systems?

20 A Yes, I did.

21 Q Would you please describe the results of that 22 review?

23 A I reviewed SDD's, mechanical fluid process, 24 electrical and instrumentation type SDD's which were in 25 place at the time of the Quadrex review and determined TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13481 1 that this requirement of the SDD procedure was, in fact, 2 being met with regard to the SDD's.

3 Q Thank you.

4 I'd now like to refer you to finding 5 4.1.2.1 (e) .

6 MR. SINKIN: Would you do that again?

7 MR. FRANTZ: What?

8 MR. SINKIN: The number.

9 MR. FRANTZ: 4.1.2.1(e).

10 Q (By Mr. Frantz) Did you take into account the 11 subject of this finding in preparing your testimony with

- 12 ' respect to finding 3.1(d)?

O 13 A (By Mr. Lopez) Yes, I did.

14 Q Now I'd like to refer you to finding 15 4.3.2.1 (c) .

16 A Okay.

17 Q Did you take into account the subject of this 18- finding in preparing your testimony with respect to 19 finding 3.1(g)?

20 A Yes, I did.

21 Q All right. I'd now like to refer your 22 attention to finding 4.5.5.1(c) .

23 MR. PIRFO: I'm sorry, what was that again?

24 MR. FRANTZ: 4. 5. 5.1 (c) . i

)

25 A (By Mr. Lopez) All right.

TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13482 1 Q (By Mr. Frantz) Did you take into account the 2 subject of this finding in preparing your testimony with 3 respect to finding 3.1(b)?

4 A 3.1(b)?

5 0 Yes.

I 6 A As in bullet?

7 No, I did not.

8 0 I'd like to perhaps refresh your recollection,

)

9 Mr. Lopez. If you'll refer to finding 4.5.5.1(c) 10 A Oh, I'm sorry, you said C?

11 0 Yes. .

12 A I was referring to 4.5.5.1(d) .

b. 13 Q Oh, okay.

14 A I'm sorry.

MR. SINKIN:

15 Articulate clearly.

16 DR. BERNSEN: We heard D.

17 Q (By Mr. Frantz) With respect to finding 18 4.5. 5.1 (c) , did you take this finding into account in 19 preparing your testimony with respect to finding 3.1(b) ?

20 A (By Mr. Lopez) Yes.

21 Q I'd now like to refer to finding 4.6.2.1(d) as 22 in dog.

23 A I found 4.6.2.1(d).

24 Q Did you take into account the subject of this 25 finding in preparing your testimony with respect to TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

- -~

13483

/N 1 finding 3.1(c)?

1.J 2 A I note that the discipline finding takes 3 particular raference to question N-1. And in preparing 4 my testimony relative to 3.1(c) , I took into account the j 5 relevant portions of that question.

6 Q Thank you.

7 I'd now like to refer you to finding 8 4.6.2.1(j).

9 A Yes.

10 Q Did you take into account the subject of this 11 finding in preparing your testimony with respect to 12 finding 3.1(b)?

(3

\)

13 MR. SINKIN: 3.1 --

14 MR. FRANTZ: B as in boy.

15 A (By Mr. Lopez) Yes, I did.

16 I would also comment that that particular  :

17 reference to a portion of 3.1(b), the question of 18 calculations containing errors, was also a subject of a

19 later generic finding. I believe it was the one that 20 was mislabeled, I believe.

l 21 MR. SINKIN: 1.

22 A (By Mr. Lopez) Yes, the one on nuclear i

23 related analysis, I took it into account in reviewing O- 24 the question of calculations containing errors in both l

l 25 of those.

l .

TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13484 h

V 1 Q (By Mr. Frantz) Would you please explain why 2 finding 4.6.2.1(j) does not lend support to a conclusion 3 that finding 3.1(b) is reportable?

4 A Okay. It's going to take a little time. Let 5 me see if I can try to express this as best I can.

6 The Quadrex concern, and it's summarized at 7 the bottom of their assessment, was that with regard to 8 an analysis in the isolation valve cubicle, so-called 9 subcompartment analysis, relative to environmental 10 conditions in that specific structure, the Quadrex 11 assessment was, in my cpinion, fairly sweeping. They

. 12 summarized that the wrong problem had been solved, that O

13 the wrong methodology had been used, and that the input 14 data which was used was incorrect.

15 Further, in their discussions of the 16 assessment, they further indicate that the design 17 verifier for that work had accepted these, in their 18 view, errors or omissions and accepted that calculation.

19 My own review of this situation does not 20 support that, those particular conclusions. And let me 21 try to explain why I feel that.

22 In reviewing this information, Quadrex was

! 23 indicating that they felt the wrong problem had been 24 solved because they made reference to what they felt was 25 an analysis different from what had been committed to in TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

)

13485

[3

\_)

1 the FSAR. I investigated that by looking at the FSAR as 2 it existed at the time Brown & Root was being questioned i

3 by Quadrex relative to this matter. My own review of 4 the FSAR indicates that contrary to the statements 5 included in the Quadrex assessment, the analysis that 1

6 was being reviewed was, in fact, the analysis which HL&P 7 in Amendment 2 to the FSAR in October of 1978 indicated

! 8 that it would perform.

9 So, I don't agroe, in the first place, that 10 the wrong problem was being solved. It was, in fact, 11 the problem that had been committed to as a result of 12 some fairly lengthy meetings with the NRC as to how the

() 13 South Texas Project would deal with an evolving -

14 technical issue which is -- which was the proper l

15 treatment of environmental conditions in areas which 16 normally are treated as so-called super pipe regions; 17 that is areas where full dynamic effects of pipe 18 ruptures are not normally postulated.

19 The FSAR identifies the resolution of that 20 problem by HL&P's coramitment to perform this analysis.

21 The analysis that's being referenced here appears to be 22 that analysis, i 23 Secondly, there was a concern expressed by l [ '- ~) 24 Quadrex relative to the use of the RELAP 3 model as the i

25 method for performing this analysis. And I believe that TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

r ._

13486 l

1 to be the basis for their concern that the wrong 2 methodology had been used. This analysis was prepared 3 in the '77-1978 time frame utilizing the code which in t

4 that tire frame was considered to be an acceptable 5 methodology for performing this work. And in my l 6 opinion, for the particular application that it was 7 being used, was probably still acceptable. Furthermore, 8 in their correspondence to the NRC indicating that they 9 would perform this analysis, the South Texas Project had 10 indicated their intent to use RELAP 3 for performing 11 that analysis. So, they had clearly identified that 12 they were usistg or intended to use this RELAP 3 model.

' O 13 So, I also feel that the assessment that the 14 wrong methodology had been used was inappropriate or not l

15 fully justified. Clearly,' the point that Quadrex was 16 attempting to make was that in the 1981 time frame, the 17 NRC was questioning on a case by case basis the use of l 18 the RELAP 3 model for doing some subcompartment analyses l

19 and for some particular applications, particularly 20 inside containment analyses had indicated that a more 21 modern, if you will, more sophisticated analysis using 22 later computer programs was their methodology of 23 preference. I don't believe that and it's not my O

24 opinion that that necessarily would have found that this 25 analysis would have had to have been redone. But once TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

utes 13487 1 again they had clearly identified what their intent had

( ')

2 been and what they had followed up on.

3 And, lastly, the comment relative to the input 4 data having been used as being incorrect. The 5 resolution of the discussions with the Nuclear 6 Regulatory Commission as to what analysis should be done 7 indicated, and there may be some confusion with the way 8 it's described in the Quadrex description of the B&R 9 response, that this area, that is so-called super pipe 10 where we do not normally assume dynamic effects of pipe

- 11 break, that the NRC established that their requirement 12 that in spite of the normal at that time philosophy, 13 that they required that an analysis be done of that pipe 14 rupture nonmechanistically. That is to say a break of 15 some sort and a release of the mass energy from that 16 piping system into the compartment needed to be 17 evaluated to determine the environmental conditions that 18 would occur an a result of that break.

19 When I say nonmechanistically, what I'm saying 20 is that in a normal pipe rupture analysis, that if you l 21 assume a break in the pipe, you also deal with the whip 22 and jet impingement effects of that break. They were t

- 23 not requiring that that be done, they were simply V 24 requiring that the mansive energy of that steam line be 25 assumed to occur and go into that room.

l TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

y . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - _ _ - - - -

13488

^ *

(] 1 Now, in reality, to describe a crack analysis R/

2 ver,gus an analysis as agreed to with the NRC, the only 3 rea). difference we're talking about here is the size of 4 f.ne crack. A normal crack analysis is not nearly as 5 large as the one that the NRC required to be performed 6 here.

7 So, I believe that Quadrex in identifying a 8 main feed -- main steam and main feedwater crack 9 analysis in this reference was dealing with a 10 nonmechanistic analysis of blowdown into that room 11 without having to deal with the so-called jet 12 impingement or dynamic effects. .

73

( )

13 In any event, the response from STP relative 14 to that analysis was that they would, in fact, perform 15 that analysis, that they were going to une the blowdown 16 data that was available to them at that time, which 17 happened to be blowdown data generated at the stage of 18 the PSAR for a double-ended main steam line break. It 19 was very conservative to do so because the analysis that 20 the NRC was requiring did not require that large amount l 21 of blowdown into the compartment.

l 22 And I believe that Quadrex is commenting here

! 23 ao to the incorrectnoco of that decision based upon l

/)' their judgment that an over-conservatism was 24 25 inappropriate, not that the renuits woro inadequato an a TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13489

() 1 result, only that they were more conservative than they 2 needed to be.

3 Once again, the statement in the 4 correspondence with the NRC by the South Texas Project 5 clearly identified their intent to utilize this blowdown  !

6 data, making particular reference to the tables in the 7 PSAR where it was derived, the fact that it was based 8 upon an even larger break than had been required by the 9 NRC, and that it was based upon a double-ended break 10 rather than a single-area break. So --

11 Q Thank you, Mr. Lopez.

fs 12 JUDGE SHON: Could I ask you one question, Mr.

O 13 Lopez.

14 MR. LOPEZ: Sure.

15 JUDGE SHON: One or two, at any rate.

16 The Quadrex assessment refers to what it calls 17 an obvious error in that a highly super-heated steam 18 with an enthalpy of 1306 DTU per pound was used as input P

19 to RELAP 3 when, in fact, they say RELAP 3 must start 20 with an all steam 212 degree fahrenheit environment.

21 Did you consider that, that the code might not have been 22 capable of handling start with a super-heated steam of 23 that high an enthalpy?

O

'~

24 MR. LOPEZ

No, I would not.

25 Mr. Bernoon may want to comment as well.

TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13490 1 DR. BERNSEN: I don't think that would be a

. (]

2 significant issue in this case. We're not really sure 3 what they mean by starting with 212 because the steam 4 conditions would be normal secondary pressure conditions 5 which would be in the range of 1,000 PSI and the 6 blowdowns typically from steam lines would initially be 7 super-heated a little bit.

8 JUDGE SHON: Secondly, we had Mr. Stanley here i

9 on the stand yesterday and I asked him specifically 10 whether the conditions were grossly conservative because 11 it seemed intuitively that a double-ended pipe break 12 would be a more rigorous environment than a crack. And O 13 he seemed to believe that the thing was counter-14 intuitive, that the double-ended pipe break for some 15 reason or other was less severe than the crack.

16 I don't have the exact transcript reference, 17 but -- '

18 MR. LOPEZ: I recall that discussion. I'd 19 like to begin the response to that by pointing out  !

20 several things.

21 In standard NRC practice with regard to pipe 22 rupture, particularly with regard to environmental 23 conditions, the NRC han ostablished that, you know, the 24 limiting case is the one that should be used. They 25 opecifically have identified in their standard review i l  ?

TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442  :

m m- -- -

13491

('] 1 plans, and in particular STP had taken note of that in J

2 the FSAR, that in areas where a, if you will, a full 3 area type or double-ended type break was used, that 4 there was no need to do further less limiting cases like 5 moderate energy or leak crack type breaks. And that had 6 been particularly noted in the FSAR and is common 7 practice.

8 It is generally understood that if you are in 9 an area in which the only pipe ruptures that you have to 10 postulate are, in fact, leakage cracks, they may, in 11 fact, become the limiting caso. I'm not aware of an

,~ 12 instance where one must postulate a full-ended break and

~

13 find that -- would find that the moderato cnt egy or 14 leakago type crack break would be more limiting.

15 JUDGE S!!O!!: In your opinion he was simply 16 wrong?

17 MR. LOPEz: I would not have characterized the 18 doacription of having to do both analyson an being 19 correct.

20 JUDGE S110!!: Thank you.

21 That's all I wanted to ack, Mr. Frantz.

22 tm. LOPEz: I want to mako one other point.

23 Although it was not in the nummary, it was discuocod

[_)

24 youtorday that the renulta of all of thoco thingo had 25 boon reviewed by a donign verifior and ho had accepted TATE REPORTING (713) 490-0442

13492 1 all of these items which Quadrex felt were in error.

)

2 You know, I think based upon what I have described, my i

3 feeling is that the verifier, assuming he understood all 4 of these things, both the FSAR commitments and the 5 conservatisms in the inputed numbers and the like, would 6 have been expected to accept those as correct. At least 7 I would have expected them to have done so.

8 Q (By Mr. Frants) I'd now like to refer you to i 9 finding 4.6.2.1(b) as in boy?

10 A (By Mr. Lopes) Okay.

11 Q Did you take into account the subject of this

, 12 finding in preparing your testimony on findings 3.1(b),

la 3.1(d) and 3.1(1) ?

14 A 3.1(d) was the second one7 15 0 Yes.

16 A 3.1 (1) .

i 17 Yes, I did.

18 Q Would you please explain why finding 19 4.6.2.1(b) does not lend support to a conclusion that 20 findings 3.1(b), 3.1(d) and 3.1(1) are reportable?

21 A I'll try. There's a lot of information in l 22 this finding. Let me try to take them piece by piece, i 23 The first significant comment that I find is j 24 the one that I just discunced that deals with question l 25 N-13, the. statement that the only onvironmental analysis l

TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

]

r -

se, s, -

13493

~

t 'l 1 performed by B&R contained a gross error. I made the v

2 comments that I feel are appropriate to that.

3 The second independent ansessment there is 4 that obvious errors were also discovered in an NUS 5 analysis for inside containment at question N-1. As 6 Quadrex points out in question N-1, what they were 7 questioning once again was an over-conservatism. They 8 were referencing an NUS analysis that had been performed 9 for main steam line breaks inside the containment and 10 felt that that analysis was overly conservativo.

11 The next major item, once again at N-1, was

,~s 12 that the only NUS analynic currently valid is the

~

13 containment environmental analynis for LOCA. I didn't 14 particularly find that as anything other than an 15 observation.

16 And the next nignificant thought there, 17 there's a statomont that there in no currently valid 18 mann energy reloano or environmental analynic for 19 outsido containment. It referencon quantion N-3. In 20 the firnt placo, I do not agroo that that in truo. Tho 21 discunnion I just had relativo to quantion H-13 was a 22 cpocific analynin which Quadrox reviewed which whoso 23 primary purpoco was to octablich mann onorgy reloacon O

24 and environmental analynia for a location that wan 25 outsido the containment. So, on ito faco it's not TATE RCPORTING (713) 490-0442

m------------

13494 f'i 1 true. I think the point that Quadrex was attempting to 0

2 make was that they expected to see more and they did not 3 find them.

4 Okay. The next thought there is really a 5 continuation of that. The few analyses previously 6 performed were not for currently postulated breaks or 7 contained errors, referencing N-3 and N-13 again. I 8 think I've dealt with those quantions or at least in my 9 belief neither were for the currently pontulated breaks 10 and did not contain errors at least in the sence that 11 they might have some reportability or safety 12 significanco.

13 The next major item was that Drown & Root was 14 uncertain of any need to perform analyson for the high 15 energy linen in the HAB. The documento in the FSAR 16 which I reviewed clearly indicato the knowledge on the 17 part of the project that thoro woro high enorgy linen 18 outsido of the containment building and committed to the 19 performance of high onergy lino analynia for thono. I 20 recognizo that in their Quadrox annonament, Quadrox 21 points out that they noom to have corao dif ficulty, at 22 loant in the discuncionn that they had with particular s

23 poopic that woro boing interviewed, an to whethor or not 24 thone individuale recognized that nood. And that upon 25 boing prompted by Quadrox, at least in the Quadrox TATE REPORTIlla (713) 490-0442

! 13495  :

t l

i O 1 statement of that, they acknowledged the fact that there 2 were, in fact, lines outside that needed to be ,

j 3 evaluated. '

4 Okay. The next major comment once again is 1

5 one relative to the timeliness of the environmental l 6 analyses outside containment. And, once again, I do not 7 believe that there was a question of safety significance 8 other than the -- well, there was no question of safety i

l 9 significance. The question that was being raised was as i l 10 to whether or not analyses should have already been l

11 performed to assist other activities going on. '

O 12 Okay. There are some specific analyses, some

(  ;

13 of which have already been discussed at other points ,

14 relative to particular analyses, performed by the 15 nuclear analysis group indicating a general feeling on 16 the part of Quadrex of concerns of potential for ,

l 17 problems. In reviewing the sections, the general l 18 section on nuclear analysis, the, if you will, N series t I

19 questions in Quadrex, I found that most of the concerns  !

l 20 that were raised were based upon a concern that the  !

?

21 individual analysts that were being talked to in [

22 Quadrex' view did not seem to possess the knowledge that  ;

23 the Quadrox reviewers expected that they might as O 24 opposed to a situation in which there were, in fact, 25 problems in which thone personnel were performing I

' TATE REPORTING _713)

( _498-8442

13496  !

1 calculations or had performed calculations that were, in C]

2 fact, incorrect.

3 And then I guess at the end there is a  !

4 statement to the effect that other analyses were either  ;

5 obsolete, insufficient in basis or contained errors, r 6 And I think -- and it makes some specific references. l l

7 In reviewing those, as I've stated before, I think the l

8 general philosophy on the part of the Quadrex reviewers,  !

9 which I believe I recall Mr. stanley testified to 10 yesterday, included in their judgment that an error i i

11 included in their mind over-conservatisms, included in 12 their mind differences between the analysis that was  !

i 13 being performed versus that which might be expressed or i 14 described in the FSAR, whether or not that analysis was, 15 in fact, technically adequate. So, given that judgment, 16 I believe I understand what Quadrex was getting at and ,

17 that was addressed in my response.  !

18 0 Thank you.

l P

19 I would now like to refer you to finding 20 4.1.2.4(q).

l l

21 A Yes, I found it. I'm sorry.  !

l 22 0 Did you take into account the subject of thia l l 23 finding in preparing your tantimony on findings 3.1(b) l O 24 or 3.1(1)?

25 A 1 did not take into account the specific l TATE REPORTING (713) 498-0442 ___

l

13497 1 discipline finding.

(') , 2 Q If you had taken into account this finding, 3 would it have affected your conclusions with respect to 4 the reportability of findings 3.1(b) and 3.1(1) ? 5 A Lot me review, if I may, question C-12. 6 Okay. Apparently the portion of C-12 that is 7 captured in that discipline finding reads that the 8 original duct ring calculation did not include the 9 appropriate pressure load. The seismic loading on the 10 return air riser was not analyzed, however, Brown & 11 Root's plan for the reanalysis was acceptable. Both of 12 these problems could be a result of inadequate 13 communication between technical disciplines, IIVAC and 14 structural. 15 I did -- I am aware of the background behind 16 that particular disciplino finding or at leant the 17 annosament of it in quantion C-12. The question that 18 was being rained was that the preneure analysis that van 19 dono for this, if you will, IrvAC duct ring innido of the 20 containnont, was a preliminary calculation an reflected l 21 in the cyntom donign doncription for the reactor 22 containment fan coolorn and ring ducts which was t 23 available or van in offect at the time of tho Quadrox  ; l() l 24 review. C 25 That nyctem donign doncription identifies tho T A T E It t r o tt T Ili o (713) 490-8442

e 13498 () 1 various pressure loads, differential pressure loads that 2 are to be used in the design of the ring duct and doen 3 it at various locations throughout the containment since ! 4 the ring duct is a fairly large structure throughout the 5 containment. Each of those points within the system 6 design description is clearly identified by an asterisk 7 and a footnote that that information is preliminary and 8 will, you know, as a result of the Brown & Root process 9 of confirming preliminary information in various design 10 documents, including DDD's, would have required 11 reanalysis. 12 I'm also awaro that in the timo frame of 1980, 13 the fall of 1980, now analyses were, in fact, being 14 proposed and initial analyses had already begun in that 15 time frame. 16 Do, I assumo that in looking at that 17 information, Quadrox wan pointing out that that analysis 18 was being redono, the preliminary analysis was boing 19 redono and that nooded tn Lo' factored into the 20 structural design of the ring duct. 21 0 Why would that have not affected your 22 conclunion with ronpoet to reportability of finding 23 3.1(b) or finding 3.1(1)? b 24 A Okay. In 3.1(b), one of the Atomo under 25 there, and probably the one that'a probably the most TATE HCPORTING (713) 400-8442

mtrv 13499 {} 1 closely related to this issue, is whether or not 2 calculations containing errors are being reviewed and 3 verified as correct with a higher frequency than should 4 be encountered. The information that was being relied 5 upon was clearly identified as preliminary, clearly 6 identified for roanalysis and had been -- and the 7 reanalysis had begun prior to the time that Quadrex 0 began their review. 9 So, I don't believe that this is an instance 10 in which an error was found as much as the fact that, as 11 committed to, a preliminary analysis was being redone 12 and now values would be availabic and.forthchming from 13 that. 14 Q Thank you. 15 I'd like to refer you now to finding 16 4.5.5.1(d). 17 A D as in dog? 10 0 Yen. 19 A Okay. 20 0 Did you tako into account the cubject of this 21 finding in preparing your tontimony on finding 3.1(d) as 22 in dog? 23 A flo, I did not. l I) 24 0 If you had takun into account finding 25 4.5.5.1(d), would it havo affected your concluniono with l , l _ _ _ - TATc neronTItto (713) 490-o442

13500 (]) I respect to the reportability of finding 3.1(d)? 2 A okay. In reference to question M-47, which is 3 apparently the basis that Quadrex used for that 4 particular discipline finding, the question that was 5 being raised there was relative to an analysis that was 6 performed for the ventilation stack from the main steam 7 safety relief valvo. The concern that Quadrex appeared 8 to be raising was that the analyJis for the sizing of 9 that vent stack had been performed using a computer  ! 10 program identiflod in all caps V E N T S T A C E, 11 VENTSTACK, that had not boon verified.

   . 12                                     My review of this indicates that I do not 13              believe that it would influence my testimony relative to 14               the safety classifications for the following reasons:

15 The calculation that was being performed was 16 being performed to size a non-safety-related component. 17 Apparently what Quadrex was questioning was that this 18 *was a non-safety-related component that was the primury 19 meanc of venting the relief from a safety-related 20 component to the atmosphere. Do, they woro quantioning 21 whether or not it would be appropriate to clannify that 22 calculation of the nizing of the non-safety-related 23 componont no being safety-related. O, 24 For coveral rannona I don't believe that's ' 25 appropriato. In the first placo, the computer program _._____ TATE REPORTING (713) 490-0442

13501 (} 1 and that particular methodology of identifying and l 2 sizing the vent stack is quite common. It was a clear 3 safety-related and code break indicating that this vent 4 stack was not safety-related and its sizing would not be 5 a safety -- did not affect the safety function of the 6 safety-related component that it was allowing to  ! 7 discharge. 8 so, I would not agree that the calculation in 9 tt.o first place needed to be designated as 10 safety-related, and as a result that the computer  : 11 program that was used to perform that calculation needed 12 to be c9mputer verified or safety-related in itself. O 13 So, I guess, in summary, I do not believe that 14 it would change my -- even though I did not review it 15 specifically with regard to 3.1(d), I don't believe that j 16 it would change my conclusions. 17 (No hiatus.) i 18 19 l 20 ( 21 22 23 .

                   ~

24 25 l TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 '

13502 (]) 1 0 I would now refer you to finding 4.4.2.2(h) . 2 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Lopez, is there a 3 typographical error in Quadeex -- 4 MR. SINKIN: Yeah. It's labeled 4.2.2.2(h), 5 that is the only one that seems to be in the right place. 6 MR. FRANTZ: I believe that is a typographical 7 error, it's on page 4-32, for the record. 8 JUDGE SHON: Before we go on, we were 9 wondering, this matter that you just got through with, 10 the vent stack -- 11 MR. LOPEZ: Yes sir. 12 JUDGE S!!ON: Would HL&P have known at that time 13 that the only difficulty with the main steam safety (~ (;) 14 relief valvo calculation van with a non-safety related 15 component downstream of that, from what Quadrox told 16 them? 17 MR. LOPEZ: From what Quadrox told them or -- 18 JUDGE SHON: Or what they had availabic at the 19 timo. Did they know that? 20 MR. LOPEZ: I can't directly toctify as to 21 whether or not they know that. The only thing that I can 22 tentify to is that there van cortain information 23 available to clearly identify and Quadrox did identify in 24 their renponne that there wan, in fact, a codo break. 25 They recognized that the vent etack was not 1 O () TATE REPORTING DERVICE, 490-0442

13503 [x ' () 1 safety related. As a matter of fact, of course, they 2 even made a point of stating that if it had been upgraded 3 to an ASME safety class device, that other kinds of 4 designs could, in fact, have been used. 5 So they had information from Quadrex indicating 6 that Quadrex recognized that it was a non-safety related 7 device. I assume from looking at process and 8 instrumentation diagrams that were available at that time 9 and clearly indicated that code break should have also 10 had that information from that source, although I have no 11 direct knowledge that they, in fact, used those. 12 MR. FRANTZ: I would like to refer you to , 13 Applicants Exhibit 26, this finding, this exhibit with k-) 14 renpoet to this finding clearly indicaten that Brown & 15 Root informed !!L&P back on May 7th or May 8th that the 16 vent piping is non-safety related, so llL&P was aware of 17 that. 18 JUDGE S110N: Thank you. 19 A (Dy Mr. Lopez) I guean we were on page 3432 of 20 the -- that's the correct -- 21 Q (Dy Mr. Frantz) That's correct. 22 A (By Mr. Lopez) In labled at 4.2.2.1 and the 23 question won -- would you repeat it? 24 0 I haven't asked a question yet. 25 A I'm norry. O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 490-0442 L

13504

     ,1 ts_j                                                              1      Q                           In the answer to my questions please focus on 2 that part of the finding which relates to finding or 3 question and answer and assessment H-3 which is 4 referenced in the finding.

5 Did you take into account the subject of this 6 finding as reflected in H-3 in preparing your testimony 7 on finding 3.1(c)? 8 A Yes, I did. 9 MR. FRANTZ: Chairman Bechhoefer, this 10 completes the Applicants' direct testimony of Dr. Bernsen 11 and Mr. Lopez. 12 Can you complete your cross-examination before 13 lunch? 14 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Just off the record.

                                           .                 15                                           (Discussion off the record.)

16 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Let's break now until, I 17 guess, about 1:30. 18 (Luncheon recess.) 19 MR. AXELRAD: Yes, I have one preliminary 20 matter Mr. Chairman. I had indicated that we would be 21 providing to the Board and to the parties, some material 22 relating to the soils audit and I had handed out a 23 package to the parties and to the Board members. 24 The first item in that package is a letter 25 dated July 30, 1985, from Mr. Goldberg to Mr. Martin in O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

1 13505 r - { 1 2 Region IV, which forwards the revised version of the response to the previous notice of violation, inspection 4 3 report, 83-24. ' 4 And as I indicated earlier today, this will be 5 the substituted exhibit when the soils panel testifies 6 tomorrow. The remaining materials which I have provided 7 are a variety of audit reports which I will just briefly 8 identify. 9 The firct one is audit report C-13-401, which 10 was conducted in July 1984, and which is an HL&P audit of 11 Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory, PTL. The next item is 12 audit report C-11-401, which was conducted during August _ 13 and September of 1984, and is an HL&P audit of the EBASCO 14 civil / structural activities. We've included the entire 15 audit report. 16 But with respect to the attachments, we have 17 provided only the soilc related additional information, 18 CAR G-508 and the close-out documentation on that, 19 including Bechtel's responses to concerns on soil. 20 The next one is audit report EQA-113, which was 21 conducted during September and October 1984, and which is 22 an EBASCO audit of EBASCO soils activities. 23 Can you read back the last one I just gave to 24 you? 25 (The requested material was read back O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13506 () 1 by the reporter.) 2 MR. AXELRAD: The next one is audit report 3 ESI-21-84, which was conducted in 1984, and is a Bechtel 4 audit of EBASCO including back-up documentation on the 5 one identified deficiency. 6 Next is audit report C-13-501, which was 7 conducted in February of 1984 and is a Bechtel audit of 8 the Bechtel and PTL soils activities, including close-9 out documentation of SDRB-014 and concerns. 10 Next is audit report C 16-501 which was 11 conducted in February of 1985 which is an HL&P audit of 12 Bechtel and EBASCO soils activities including close-out 13 documentation of four SDR's and some concerns. () 14 , Next is audit report S20-501 which was 15 conducted in June 1985 and is an HL&P audit of Bechtel 16 and PTL soils activities. 17 And finally is audit reports S25-501, conducted 18 in July 1985, which is an HL&P audit of Bechtel, EBASCO 19 soil activities. 20 MR. SINKIN: Did you say there was a June 21 document? 22 MR. AXELRAD: Audit report S20-501, the cover 23 letter is dated July 9, 1985, but the audit, itself, was 24 conducted in June. And those are all of the audits of j 25 soils activities at the site which were conducted from O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13507 f]) 1 March 1984 to the present. That concludes that 2 preliminary matter, Mr. Chairman. 3 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Any other preliminary 4 matters? Otherwise, Mr. Sinkin can begin 5 cross-examination. 6 7 CROSS-EXAMINATION 8 9 By Mr. Sinkin: 10 Q Dr. Bernsen, if you would turn to your 11 statement of professional qualifications, in the back of 12 your testimony. I just want to try and get some times on , 13 these various positions that you've held. () 14 Starting with the second paragraph, when you 15 arrived as assistant project manager for quality 16 activities on Midland. 17 A (By Mr. Bernsen) That was in the period from 18 February through June of 1984. 19 Q And as manager of quality on the Zimmer 20 Project? 21 A Approximately September through January, 22 September '83 through January of '84. 23 Q And as assistant project manager, technical, 24 for South Texas? 25 A My approximate starting time on the South Texas O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13508

 .()  1  Project as manager for licensing was, I believe, February --

2 let's see, '82, and then I don't recall exactly when the 3 position changed to assistant project manager. I think 4 it was about four to five months thereafter, and I 5 completed work essentially completed work full-time on 6 'the project in September of '8 -- let me make sure I get 7 the dates right. September '83. These are approximates. 8 There was some overlap in these assignments. 9 Q Okay. At the very -- on page 3, at the end of 10 the third -- at the end of the first paragraph, if you 11 would just remind me what the initials IVCOR stand for? 12 A This is the Industry Degraded Core Rulemaking 13 Program. ( 14 Q Mr. Lopez, if we could do the same for you, get , 15 some times. How long have you been in your assignment on 16 South Texas? 17 A (By Mr. Lopez) Talking about my current' 18 assignment? 19 Q Current assignment. 20 A In my current assignment, a little bit over a 21 year. Now, I had other assignments on the South Texas 22 Project prior to that. 23 Q All right. June or July of '84? 24 A Yeah. Yes, sir. 25 Q Now, I see the phrase in your employment O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13509 C(L) 1 experiences, " design freeze activities." were you here 2 when Mr. Stanley testified about a design freeze? 3 A On yesterday's testimony. 4 Q Yes. 5 A Yes, I was. 6 Q Is that the same as your referring to here? 7 A It's essentially the same. I did not hear him 8 characterize it in great detail. But assuming he was 9 dealing with that aspects of it as covered in the Quadrex 10 report, I believe it's essentially the same. 11 Q What he was talking about was a process whereby 12 you pull all the disciplines together, you pull in all 13 the drawings, you say, "We're going to fix it like it is

  ) 14 now and if anyone wants to change it, it's going to be 15 hard because they're going to have to go through all of 16 us."   That's sort of how he described the freeze.

17 A I think certainly the last aspect of what 18 you're saying is common to that understanding. The 19 specific methodology of establishing what, in fact, is 20 frozen varies from organization to organization. 21 However, the concept that once frozen, changes 22 become extremely difficult and require significantly 23 greater management oversight before they are approved, 24 that's the sort of commonailty there is between what was 25 described in Quadrex and these activities. /~ l kTJ \ TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

                                        . _.     --._. _     _ ._ A

13510

      )  1      Q    And then as assistant project engineer for 2 systems licensing on South Texas, what was the time 3 period for that?

4 A The time period was July of 1982 until 5 approximately a year ago. 6 0 And then your Korean experience? 7 A Okay, that began in approximately either late 8 November or early December of 19 -- let me see if I 9 remember, 1979. And continued in terms of my actual 10 completion of those activities, until the July 1982 time 11 frame. 12 I should point out, however, that from

  ~ . . 13 September of 1981 until July of 1982, I was physically 14 here in Houston acting as the nuclear engineering group 15 supervisor on a temporary assignment. I had at that time 16 not had my duties on the Korean Nuclear Project 17 terminated; my deputy was fulfilling my duties for me.

18 So there was an overlap. 19 Q And at Palo Verde? 20 A Palo Verde was from approximately September of 21 1978 until November of 19 -- did I say '78. Until 22 November of '79, yes. 23 Q And then the nuclear analysis group supervisor 24 for the Los Angeles Power Division, I-assume that's 25 Bechtel? TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 -

13511 l 1 A Yes. February of 1977 until October of 1978. 2 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Where are each of you 3 located? 4 MR. LOPEZ: Currently? 5 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Currently. 6 MR. LOPEZ: I'm currently located here in 7 Houston. I'm a permanent employee of Bechtel Energy 8 Corporation assigned to the Houston area office. So, you 9 know, I physically live here as well as. 10 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Dr. Bernsen? 11 DR. BERNSEN: I'm physically located in 12 Gathersburg, Maryland in our Eastern Power Division 4 (By Mr. 31nkin) The Eastern Division Power 15 Division or the South Texas or the Western. 16 A (By Mr. Bernsen) That's the Western. 17 Q Dr. Bernsen, on page 7 of your testimony, 18 question and answer 11, you state that "Bechtel has 19 learned additional information since the task force 20 report which led to a different conclusion with respect 21 to two findings." Are those findings associated with the 22 common instrument air line drawing? 23 A Yes. 24 Q And what do you mean by " led to a different 25 conclusion"? O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13512

  )  1      A    Well, in the task force report, it was 2 indicated that this may be potentially reportable. And I 3 really should refer it to. But I think that is the case.

4 Let me confirm. Yes, these two were identified as items 5 that -- essentially the same item. But these two 6 continued findings were identified as items that may be 7 potentially reportable and as indicated, they were 8 reported at that time by HL&P. 9 Since that time, of course, the project learned 10 of other information that changed their conclusion. 11 Q Was the change in conclusion a change from your 12 assessment that they were potentially reportable or was ._ 13 it a change that concluded they were not in fact ( 14 reportable, if you understand my distinction? 15 A I think I would prefer to let Frank explain 16 that, because he's familiar in detail with the IRC 17 process that went along with the consideration of that. 18 Q Okay. 19 A (By Mr. Lopez) The identification in the 20 Bechtel task force report of those items as being 21 potentially reportable was based upon their review of 22 Quadrex report, itself, and information which they 23 obtained by interviews with personnel of Brown & Root, 24 the Quadrex Corporation and HL&P. 25 They looked at that item, in particular O) TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

l 13513 l

   ,-                                                                  .l

(]) 1 reference to the potential existance of a problem 2 relative to single failure analysis, felt that that 3 required further investigation, and identified it to HL&P 4 and to the project for further investigation. The 5 project initiated, you know, under our procedures, a 6 deficiency evaluation report, to begin that 7 investigation, and upon discussing that item with the 8 Incident Review Committee of HL&P, it was determined that 9 information which the Bechtel task force personnel did 10 not -- apparently did not have, was known to the Incident 11 Review Committee and apparently was also known to I guess 12 what you call the HL&P review team, as indicated in the

   . 13 Brown & Root status sheets that were prepared and           .

( 14 available to them; that information essentially dealing 15 with the release for construction status of that 16 particular design. That was not something that 17 apparently the Bechtel task force had available to them. 18 So from that perspective, they recommended 19 further investigation; that investigation did not take an 20 extensive amount of time as that information was already 21 available. The Incident Review Committee was able to 22 determine that it was not, in fact, a reportable 23 condition. 24 However, they did process it under the Incident l l 25 Review Committee procedures, notified the NRC of that l TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13514 (} l ongoing investigaticn and within the time frame alloted, 2 we were able to both the project, I say the Bechtel 3 project personnel as well as the Incident Review 4 Committee ascertain the other information. 5 0 At one point, you said they recommended further 6 investigation. Were you saying IRC? 7 A No, the Bechtel task force. 8 Q The Bechtel task force recommend -- 9 A Their categorization of that entire series of 10 category one items was that they either felt they were 11 potentially reportable or required further investigation. 12 And they recognized in -- I believe they even state in , 13 the report that they recognized that since they were not -- i 14 did not have access to and were not really reviewing the 15 direct documents themselves, were not in the best 16 position of completing a safety evaluation, only 17 recognizing a deficiency or a potential one at least that 18 needed to be determined by someone that did have $ccess 19 to those documents. 20 0 Well, it wasn't really the responsibility of 21 the Bechtel task force to make a 50.55(e) report. Is 22 that correct? 23 A That's correct. They had the responsibilities 24 as all Bechtel employees working under our procedures, l l 25 when they had information which may have that character, (:) - l TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

l 13515 r ~ 1 if we have information available, you know, to initiate (}) 2 that process or to identify that to the appropriate 3 personnel, particularly the project or the client 4 organization. 5 But you are correct in characterizing that that  ; 6 was not -- it was not their charter specifically to make 7 the evaluation, only to report what they found. 8 Q And in this instance, did the task force, 9 itself, do anything more than report to HL&P that they 10 considered this potentially reportable? 11 A I do not know. I have no direct knowledge of 12 that. - 13 A (By Mr. Bernsen) I don't know.

 ) 14

• Q Do you know if it was specifically the released 15 for construction aspect which changed it from potentially 16 reportable to non-reportable?

17 A (By Mr. Lopez) That was not the only 18 consideration that went into the evaluation. It was the 19 only one that I saw that was specifically identified in 20 the Brown & Root sur Ery sheets of that time. 21 In reviewing it in the time frame that is 22 allowed, you know, after the telephone call, if you will, 23 the notification, we found, you know, other reasons to 24 determine non-reportability. But as best I can j l 25 determine, simply from looking at the Brown & Root  ! O i TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 I

13516 1 sheets, that was not identified as a reason on that date. 2 Q Let me -- 3 A At least not in writing. 4 Q Let me be clear about your position in this 5 event. You say "we found more information." Are you 6 actually involved in this event? 7 A Yes, I am. 8 Q You were involved in the evaluation of this for 9 Bechtel? 10 A Yes, that's right. I was one of the parties, 11 there were a number of the people involved. 12 Q So then the task force didn't do any further

 ,            13 evaluation, but Bechtel personnel did further evaluation?

r ) 14 A Bechtel personnel on the project performed all 15 the detailed investigations. 16 Q That drawings was what I think you've already 17 referred to as a P&ID drawing. 18 A Which drawing are you referring to? 19 Q The one that had the single failure problem in 20 it. 21 A The drawing that was in the Quadrex report? 22 Q Right. 23 A It's my understanding that that was an exerpt 24 of a drawing from the FSAR section 9.4, and from its 25 appearance, you know, granted it's an exerpt. It appears TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13517 1 to be a copy of an P&ID that was converted into an FSAR

   '({}

2 figure. - 3 It has all the style of a P&ID. There's no -- - 4 at least the exerpt does not show a full signature block 5 and margins so I can, you know, but it looks very much 6 like a P&ID. 7 0 As this event has been testified about in the-8 hearing, it seemed to me that this P&ID if it was -- we 9 will call it a P&ID and trust that it was -- was found in 10 two different disciplines by Quadrex, provided to Quadrer 11 by two different disciplines. 12 Does that, in your mind, raise a problem even

    ,_  13  if it hadn't been released for construction?

g() 14 A As I recall Mr. Stanley's testimony, he 15 indicated that they asked for some of the information 16 from one discipline and it was not provided to them, and 17 that in another discipline, I believe when they were 18 looking at the radiological protection area, this figure 19- as I recall, I could confirm that, I believe, is attached 20 to one of the questions in the -- ] 21 Q It's R-6. 22 A R-6, okay. I believe that's correct. And-that 23 that's where they identified the problem. Because it j 24 was, you know, not or I assume, this is making -- this is ! 25 a presumption on my part, because it dealt with both the () 4 TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 i-_

13518 I ( 1 design of an instrumentation and control system as well 2 as as dealing with, you know, potential radiological l 3 releases they identified it in both places in the report. l 4 I don't believe that, and this is common to 5 other situations I found within Quadrex, that they were 6 attempting to identify them as separate concerns, 7 separate issues. There were several places within the 8 Quadrex report where the same finding is repeated from 9 discipline to discipline, where the particular area of 10 issue really relates to more than one discipline's 11 activity. So I don't believe that they dealt with them -- 12 - 0 Okay, let me abstract the question, then, to 6 : " " :" "" :;" " 15 0 Your thinking of this kind of -- looking at 16 design documents and you see this kind of drawing, with 17 the single failure not met in a drawing. And you find it 18 in two different disciplines, let's say HVAC is using it, 19 I think there's some exhaust fans involved in that 20 drawing. 21 A Well, the drawing, itself, is an HVAC drawing 22 if, in fact, is a P&ID. 23 Q Okay. Granted all of those ifs. 24 A Right. 25 0 You find it in HVAC and you find it in TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13519 instrumentation and control, as a base drawing that . ]) 1 2 they're using. It doesn't -- 3 MR. FRANTZ: What do you mean by " base 4 drawing." 5 MR. SINKIN: It's being used as a P&ID would be 6 used. Are you with me up to that point? 7 A (By Mr. Lopez) I guess I'm not sure what you 8 mean by being used as a P&ID. 9 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Well, maybe we get that into 10 the record. How would this document have been used by l 11 the HVAC discipline? 12 A The standard practice with such a drawing is 13 that it is usually the responsibility of one particular > g-) ( 14 discipline, to prepare, you know, if you will, the 15 initial sketches, the initial drawings of such, and 16 provide that drawing for its coordination amongst other 17 disciplines that may have either direct input to it as 18 drawing or may have some need for the information that's 19 going to be put on that drawing for other activities. 20 And under a review and comment process, in 21 essence get that interdisciplinary input, incorporate 22 that commentary, if you will, and then issue the drawing. 23 Then that one drawing is then available as an issued 24 document depending upon the various status points that 25 they've established for releasability, if you will, O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442  ;

13520 c, 1 (_) release for use, release for construction, or the like; 2 is available.to the potential users of that document for, 3 you know, either later design activities or as a 4 reference, you know, for -- so in that sense, if that's 5 'what you are getting at relative to being used by more 6 than one discipline. 7 (No hiatus.) 8 9 10 11 12 - 13

  )  14 15 16 17
    -18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25                          -'

O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

I 13521 l l i This 1 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Let me explain.

  )

2 drawing describes a single plant design detail. It's a l 3 specific system and that drawing defines exactly how 4 that system is arranged. What we're talking about is a 5 single detail. It's not a generic thing that's repeated 6 over and over again, it's just one single feature in the 7 design, even though it was picked up by two discipline 8 reviews. 9 0 Okay. It's a unique drawing. 10 A One unique -- 11 0 The numbers on the various components will

-     12 trace directly to that component in the plant?

13 A Essentially it is a single design feature. 14 A (By Mr. Lopez) Right. 15 Q Okay. 16 In discussing that iterative process that goes 17 on where it makes its way out to construction, what I'm 18 looking for is at what point in that process, if you 19 were to find this single failure still not being met, 20 would you have a quality assurance concern as opposed to 21 when it was released for construction or not? 22 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Let me try to answer that. 23 I think that we recognize that there are going to be, 24 not necessarily this is one of them, cases where you 25 will find a design error. And single instances, so long TATE REPORTING (713) 598-8442

13522 1 as there's reasonable evidence that they're not the

    }

2 result of a generic situation, are expected and would be l i

-3 treated as a single cace of an error and not really 4 evidence of a quality assurance -- significant quality  ;

1 5 assurance problem. And that's really how we would view i

• 6 this. If there were many instances and things of that j i

7 sort, then that might be a different situation. i i 8 Q This drawing is a fairly developed drawing, is 9 it not? I mean, it's fairly close to being released for 10 construction? 11 You do have to say something so we get it on 12 the record as opposed to nodding your head. 3p)- I (m i 13 MR. FRANTZ: Excuse me, Mr. Sinkin. What do 14 you mean by close to being released for construction? ) 15 MR. SINKIN: Well, let me start with the first  ; 4 16 question. 17 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) There's been a great deal of 18 input to this drawing already; is that correct? l 19 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Well, we certainly can't i l 20 tell the status of the drawing from the figure that's in r 21 the Quadrex report because, as Frank mentioned, the 22 title block, the date, the revision status isn't known. l i 23 So, you really can't tell what the stage of design is. 3 s 24 It may be a very preliminary thing or it may be a fairly 25 well advanced thing. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 -

13523 fis 1 Q I was really going by the number of unique (J 2 items identified in the drawing suggesting a lot of work 3 had already been done. Perhaps that's my lack of 4 experience with these kind of drawings. 5 A (By Mr. Lopez) Well, there's no question 6 there's a lot of design detail shown on that drawing. 7 But without something separate, it would be difficult to 8 determine whether or not that particular drawing, you 9 know, as an FSAR figure -- you know, at what particular 10 stage in its release status of the P&ID it was taken

         .                   11        from.           For all we know, it may be a simple
    .                        12        reconstruction of one particular version that was O

kl ( 13 issued. But I have no way of knowing which particular 14 version it was at the point of work -- 15 Q I understand. Let me try a question, 16 recognizing that I am not an engineer and I'm an amateur 17 at this. 18 You have an area outlined in dark black on the 19 drawing. If you want to get the drawing in front of 20 you, R-6 is the question. 21 A We found it. 22 0 You have the area outlined in a darker thicker 23 line. That's where the problem is. That's the line kJ 24 that's a problem. 25 A (By Dr. Bernsen) That's the line that Quadrex TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13524 1 refers to, yes. 2 Q Now, right above the circled area there are i 3 two boxes that have dashed lines coming out of them. 4 Are those information signals in this particular  : 5 drawing? Do you see the dashed lines? l 6 A (By Mr. Lopez) Based upon -- and then this is 7 because my copy is illegible relative to that, but based  ! 8 upon the symbology that I was used to on P&ID's that 9 Brown & Root produced, I think that's correct. The l l 10 symbology of a dashed line with a box tended to be some 11 tie back to some input, some -- like a signal, you know,

  ,,                  12                  an instrumentation signal.       But I can't read what it is,                  ;

13 so I'm not really sure that that's the case. 14 Q Right. Okay. My question really goes to the 15 box that's on the lower right side of the d'rawing. L t 15 There's a sort of rectangular box and in the bottom part 17 of that box I think there are three solenoids, one next  ! 18 to the other across the bottom. !' 19 Do you see what you would think were three l L 20 solenoids? 21 A It looks like -- once again, it's somewhat 22 illegible. But it looks like at least three l l i l 23 instruments -- you're talking about the lower right-hand l 24 corner of -- 25 Q The lower right-hand corner are these j (- TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 i

i l 13525 l 1 rectangular boxes and in the bottom half of the box 2 there's six circles closa to each other in pairs. 3 A Yes, I think I'm looking at the same area. j i 4 Q Okay. My question was should there be an i 5 information signal coming to those as well? Is there an 6 error on that? 7 MR. FRANTZ: Mr. Chairman, I'm going to object 8 at this point. I'm not sure where we're going with all 9 this, why it's at all relevant.  ! e 10 MR. SINKIN: I was just trying to establish if i 11 there was a second error in this drawing that had not l 3 MR FRANTZ: That's not a subject of the I -

14 Quadrex finding. I'm not sure why we're discussing it.

I i 15 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Sinkin, what's your 16 purpose on that one? l 17 MR. SINKIN: Well, the Quadrex reviewers found 18 one error in the drawing. If there's a second error in f ! 19 the drawing that they didn't find, it's some evidence ' i 20 that there are other errors that were not detected and i 21 that they were more pervasive than perhaps Quadrex 22 thought. 23 MR. FRANTZ: Mr. Chairman, again, our purpose '() l 24 here is not to attempt to find what may or may not be . l 25 errors in various drawings in the Quadrex report. Our * [ ? TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

l. - . . - ._ - - - _ - - - .

i 13526 IA 1 purpose here is to address the reportability of certain O 2 specific findings. i l 3 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We will sustain that 4 objection on the relevance ground. 5 MR. SINKIN: Okay. 6 JUDGE BECHEOEFER: Just for some background, 7 I'd like to ask a question. 8 MR. LOPEZ: Sure. 9 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Now, I'm reading from 10 something which happened to have been produced a long 11 time ago, but would you agree with the following and c 12 could you explain if this is true?

 )  13             "The designs," this is Brown & Root's designs, 14   "were indicated as issued preliminary, issued for use, 15   issued for construction or issued for review.                      The use 16   of a drawing was dependent on its status.             To be 17   involved in construction, drawings must have been 18   designated as ' issued for construction.'"

19 MR. LOPEZ: Pardon me. Can you repeat that 20 last sentence or last phrase? I 21 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The last sentence said, 22 "The use of a drawing was dependent on its status. To 23 be involved in construction, drawings must have been O- 24 designated as ' issued for construction.'" 25 MR. FRANTZ: Judge Bechhoefer, could you tell TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 '

   -v i

13527 1 us where you're reading that from, please? l 2 JUDGE BECHROEFER: I'm reading from the ! 3 staff's brief dated August 24, 1984, where it said l l 4 regarding the reportability of the Quadrex report, at 5 page 9. 6 MR. PIRFO: What was the page? 7 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Nine. l 8 I wondered if these witnesses could comment on 9 their observations as to how -- 10 MR. LOPEZ: I can certainly comment on it. 11 I don't know particularly the context that , i 12 that was being used in, but if you're interested l0 13_ relative to the various types of releases that Brown & 14 Root used for various types of drawings, they identified 15 in their procedures the level of, if you will, checking 16 and verification that was required for different kinds 17 of documents, including drawings based upon, if you 18 will, the intended use. l 19 There were some drawings issued which were t 20 called released for use which were not to be used for 21 construction and a certain level of checking and 22 verification required before they were issued at that 23 stage. There were different levels, if you will. O 24 In the case of drawings that were going to be

25. . issued for construction, they required a higher level of TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

4

                                                                                                                                                                                                -                     13528   t t

I checking and verification. So, they distinguished the

;           2                     level of checking and verification that they were 3                     using. I'm distinguishing those two terms because in 4                      the Brown & Root terminology there was a distirction                                                                                                                                       i 5                     between checking and verifying.                                                                                                                                      But they did a         t

] i f j 6 preliminary verification on drawings that were to be 4 l 7 issued for construction. They still required final i

8 design verification at some later date, but they l 9 required as a minimum certain preliminary verifications

' l 10 to be done before they could be issued for i i . ! 11 construction. > I l

i. 12 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Now, if -- were drawings  !

l 13 actually stamped with terms such as released for use, 14 released for construction? 15 MR. LOPEZ: There was typically in the 16 revision block of the drawing the terminology of its 17 issuance. If it was issued for use, that term would t

18 normally be put aside the revision number and the date l i t i- 19 of that issuance. .If it was later, say, issued for

? 20 construction, then that next revision -- it would change 21 the revision number of that drawing and so indicate as l 22 the, if you will, the rationale, the reason for that i . 23 particular revision. !O l i 24 So, I don't recall a separate stamping, you , !- 25 know, visible bold-faced stamping as much as an f TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        -_a

13529 /~3 1 indication in the revision block of the drawing. V 2 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Would all the users be 3 aware of what those revision numbers meant? 4 liR. LOPEZ: Well, they should be. The 5 procedures relative to use of various documents were 6 identified to end users relative to what revision status 7 that they should expect a document to be in before it 8 could be used for various of their activities. You 9 know, and I certainly -- and I don't know whether or not 10 all personnel were aware of that, but the procedures 11 relative to them doing their -- performing their 12 functions, you know, identified to them the need for 13 them to confirm the actual issue status of documents. 14 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: How would that be reflected 15 in a situation where preliminary data was being used? 16 Would the documents be marked differently or would there 17 be -- 18 MR. LOPEZ: Which documents? The documents -- 19 the drawings, as an example? 20 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes, yes. 21 MR. LOPEZ: You're saying the documents that 22 would have been relied upon in that sense? 23 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: For construction. If a 24 document were being relied upon for construction but 25 included only preliminary data, would the marking system TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13530 1 or the code system perhaps --

  )

2 MR. LOPEZ: Whatever, yeah. 3 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: -- indicate something to 4 that effect? 5 MR. LOPEZ: Would it indicate that there 6 was -- you're talking about for drawings would it 7 indicate that it was preliminary? 8 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, that preliminary data 9 was used to develop the drawings, subject to 10 verification later. 11 MR. LOPEZ: That, from my experience in 12 looking at Brown & Root drawings, was not typical for O 13 drawings. It was typical for certain other types of 14 documents that were issued in a preliminary fashion, but 15 not for drawings. 16 In<other words, I would not expect, as an 17 example, to have seen or did not -- I do not recall 18 seeing drawings that were, say, issued for construction 19 which may have had some-preliminary information on them 20 that specifically highlighted on that drawing that that 21 particular information was preliminary. That was not 22 common in the drawing practice. 23 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Then how is the fact that 24 some verification had to be performed, how was that 25 indicated or wasn't it? TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13531 i 1 MR. LOPEZ: As I said, I don't believe it was

   }

2 indicated on the drawings. The way that the procedures 3 dealt with that situation was that the design 4 verification process of Brown & Root required all the 5 documents that were subject to design verification to go 6 through this process. And in the process of taking, 7 say, any drawings, even those issued for construction, 8 and providing the final design verification, then there 9 would be the review by the personnel assigned that 10 responsibility, the design verifiers, to assure the 11 final status, if you will, of the information that was 12 on that drawing and in all subsequent documents that O 13 were relied upon wouldn't in essence have to go through 14 that same, if you will, cascading type verification 15 process, 16 If, as an example, a drawing was issued that i i 17 relied upon preliminary information, and I don't know -- 18 as a matter of fact, I don't believe that I've seen 19 instances where most of the P&ID's in particular had 20 gotten to that final design verification status. But 21 the way the procedure would have indicated that, if in 22 doing a final design verification the verifier 23 determined that all the information was confirmed, even ( 24 though it may have been preliminary, he would simply, i j 25 you know, indicate that by the issuance of a final 1 TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13532 1 design-verification of that document. There would be no 2 further action particularly ' required. 3 If, on the other hand, the document itself 4 indicated that there was some change, then in verifying 5 the documents that relied upon it, and one of the 6 elements in the Brown & Root procedure was that there 7 should be in essence single-tier referencing, in other 8 words, not a whole line of documents all in a row, but 9 there should be a reference to the next document. In 10 verifying that second document when it came time to do 11 the final design verification for, say, a calculation 12 that may have relied upon it, they would have identified O. 13 whether or not that drawing had gone through final 14 design verification. And if the answer was no, then in 15 doing the final design verification of that later 16 document, they would have to go back and determine what 17 the status was. If there was no change or no action 18 required, they could then proceed with the final design 19 verification of the latter document. If not, they would 20 have to determine what had changed and see if there was 21 any impact at all relative to the assumptions they may 22 have made in their work. 23 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Now, if Quadrex was R24 reviewing some of those types of documents, how would 25 Quadrex have known whether preliminary or final data was TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13533 1 being used?  ! 2 MR. LOPEZ: One of the elements of -- as I 3 mentioned, in the Brown & Root process there were, if 4 you will, iterative design verifications, design 5 verifications that were done in order to allow 6 preliminary information to proceed and be used by -- you 7 know, by various organizations and entities. As part of 8 that, if you will, early design verification were 9 records indicating which references, which documents, 10 other documents had been used as input to that document 11 with an indication of whether or not the information was 12 considered to be final or considered to be preliminary. Q 13 In looking at the complete document in the 14 Brown & Root system, you would look at not only the 15 document proper, but the attached sheets indicating what 16 the preliminary or final status was of input. It's in a 17 separate form, I don't recall the number offhand, but in 18 their process they had a separate form that indicated 19 all the references and an indication of whether or not 20 that reference was preliminary or final in nature. 21 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Now, when Quadrex reviewed 22 a document, would they have been given the whole package 23 that you just described with the attached sheets or

  )   24 would that vary?

25 HR. LOPEZ: I really don't know. The only way TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13534 f* that I can reach that judgment, and this is strictly a b' 1 2 judgment, is that in a number of instances I saw a 3 reference in Quadrex to what they considered to be the 4 verification status of a particular document. About the 5 only -- if they had that information, then I would 6 assume they would also have the backup documentation 7 that indicated that that verification had been 8 performed, which would include the sheets that indicated 9 what was considered to be preliminary, what was 10 considered to be final. 11 But I don't -- I have not seen the specific

  -   12 documents that were given to Quadrex, so I really -- I 13 mean, you know, I'm just judging that thei received 14 that, particularly in those instances where they were 15 trying to determine verification status.

16 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Back to you. 17 MR. SINKIN: Okay. 18 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) I missed a word or two you 19 said. What is it that the design verifier does if when 20 he gets the package everything is in final form? 21 A (By Mr. Lopez) In other words, he confirms l L 22 the correctness of the preliminary assumptions and 23 whatever else? Is that -- ! 24 0 Well, let's just try it however you're 25 comfortable trying it. I'm the design verifier. In TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 13535 comes.the package and some of it's already been j} 1 2 confirmed, some of it hasn't been confirmed. What do I 3 do? 4 A You're asking what would you do to complete 5 the verification? 6 Q As the design verifier. 7 A As the design verifier? 8 I guess to describe the process, the document 9 is reviewed in accordance with some existing procedures 10 that describe for the type of document what sorts of 11 things need to be evaluated. The primary emphasis of 12 the verification is to look at the document itself to O 13 determine, you know, whether or not the assumptions and 14 the methodology and those kinds of things that went into 15 the development of that document were still valid. And 16 if -- particularly if they relied upon preliminary 17 information, to confirm that that information was still 18 adequate and correct and could be relied upon in some 19 final sense. 20 I'm speaking now about the final design 21 verification. And, as I said before, I am not aware 22 that very much, if anything, had gotten to that last, 23 you know, final design verification. So, I'm O 24 essentially describing what I understood the procedure 25 to say. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13536 , l' So that he would try to determine, 1 2 particularly if there was -- if there was an identified j 3 preliminary piece of information in there, he would have 4 to go back and determine whether or not that 5 information -- you know, let's say, as an example, that 6 there was an indication that they made an assumption 7 about a motor size and they were waiting for the vendor 8 to complete his work and say, well, the motor is 9 actually this particular rating. He would have to go i 10 back to determine whether or not they had, in fact, l l . 11 final information from the vendor indicating that the ' 12 actual size is the following, compare that to the 13 particular document to see whether or not that value was 14 either acceptable as is or some change had to be made, 15 you know, in the document. , f 16 So, that would be the process he would go l l 17 through in essence to check off all the items that were 18 preliminary in nature. 19 Q When he's finished, what does he put on the 20 drawing that tells anyone else he's done the job? 21 A He attaches a -- prepares a design 22 verification package which includes, you know, the 23 backup information that he used to try to determine the 24 status. It includes these forms that indicate 25 presumably, if he's finished, everything now being TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

   +

13537 (^] v 1 final, it includes his signature on the issue of that 2 document, and typically it would be a reissue of that 3 document, you know, identifying it as now having, you 4 know, completed that review. - 5 Q Does he work from a list of tasks he's 6 supposed to perform and initial the tasks as he performs

   -  7 them or does he just initial the document?

8 A He does work from a procedure that describes 9 those elements that he's supposed to verify. There is, 10 in addition to text describing that, some check lists. 11 And I don't recall whether or not the package includes 12 the check list, a copy of the check list with check - O 13 marks out by the side or not. I just don't recall that 14 part. But, yes, he does work from an established list 15 of things to look for. 16 0 on page 13 in your testimony, at line 10, you 17 state that we would recommend reporting questionable 28 cases involving any deficiencies in the process of 19 design that could adversely affect the safety of 20 operations as measured by sound engineering judgment, 21 whether or not the design had been released for 22 construction. And then you state that you believe this 23 has been and continues to be the general philosophy ( 24 applied on the South Texas Project. 25 Is that the general philosophy since Bechtel TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

             -sc ,

13538 f3 1 came on the job that you're referring to or are you V 2 referring to the general philosophy since 1973 or what 3 is the time frame for that statement? 4 A (By Dr. Bernsen) It's -- 5 0 Whose statement is it? I believe it's both of 6 yours. 7 A (By Mr. Lopez) It's both actually. 8 A (By Dr. Bernsen) It's both. 9 I think I would say that it's been my 10 observation in association with the South Texas Project 11 that the project has a very low threshold for reporting,

          ,. 12  substantially lower than I've seen on many other V         13  projects that we work on; that they have exercised good 14  judgment and they have been quite responsive to the 15  desires of the NRC inspection and enforcement region in 16  this area.

17 So, in other words, this observation is one 18 that carries from my original contact with senior 19 members of the project team in late '81 on. 20 Q Do you have any different observation? 21 A (By Mr. Lopez) No, I agree with that. 22 Q On page 13, still line 21, you say first you 23 will identify the primary concerns contained in the 24 finding. That is your interpretation of what you think 25 Quadrex' primary concerns were, is it not? You're not TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 13539

 'N      saying that you went to Quadrex and said what was your

[d I 2 primary concern with this finding? 3 A (By Dr. Bernsen) That's correct. 4 Q It's your interpretation? 5 A Our interpretation of their primary concerns. 6 Q Page 16, answer 20, the first sentence you 7 say, among other things, we understand that B&R 8 established a system design assurance group, et cetera. 9 When you used the phrase we understand, how did you come 10 to have that understanding? 11 A (By Mr. Lopez) Several sources. One source 12 is the Quadrex report itself. But in reviewing O 13 information provided to us as part of the transition, we 14 also saw evidence of the existence of that group's 15 procedures and some of the early work, if you will, in 16 terms of documentation of the design -- system design 17 assurance group function. 18 A (By Dr. Bernsen) I guess the other input was 19 the information provided to the Bechtel task force in 20 their interaction with HL&P and Brown & Root. 21 I might add also that they're shown on the 22 organization chart that's in the Quadrex report. The l 23 date, of course, would not be.  ! ( 24 0 I think that's at page 2-11? That's the chart l 25 you're referring to? l TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13540 1 A Yes.

  )

2 Q And you're referring to Mr.. Pinto and Mr. 3 Grimes? 4 A Yes. 5 Q And where did you get the information that 6 this group was established in February of 1980? 7 A I believe that comes primarily from the 8 information provided the Bechtel task force. 9 Yes, it's on page 2-7, at the top, of 10 Applicants' Exhibit 63. 11 Q You said that from the transition you saw

-     12 evidence of existence of their procedures in the early       *

(~h 13 work. What was the nature of the early work that you 14 saw? 15 A (By Mr. Lopez) Under the procedures there 16 were requirements for certain of the activities of the 17 design assurance group to be documented by reviews and 18 marking on various documents. Someofthedr[cuments 19 that were turned over during transition bore those 20 markings. And I also looked at at that time the 21 procedure itself, you know, to see if I could understand 22 what the function of the group was intended to be. 23 0 I guess what I was trying to get to is what O \ 24 did the markings tell you that they had actually done? 25 A The procedures called for at completion of a l I TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 J

13541 A 1 / specific activity under the -- into the design \_b 2 assurance, like a Phase I design assurance review, that 3 that notation be, say, on a particular drawing stamped 4 on the drawing saying design assurance review date and 5 initials and everything else. 6 So, that's what -- it didn't describe the 7 specific action, it was the marking to indicate that the 8 action had been taken in the course of the procedure. 9 Q I see. 10 At the time that Quadrex did its study, the 11 design assurance group was not fully integrated into the 12 Brown & Root system; is that correct? '~'

• 13 A I don't believe that's the case. I believe 14 that, in fact, they had -- well, they had been in 15 existence presumably, if we believe the information that 16 was provided, for a little over a year. They were 17 performing tasks and there was evidence of that.

18 I'm not sure how to characterize fully 19 integrated in terms of whether or not they had been 20 functioning long enough to have a major impact in terms 21 of the physical reviews of much of the work that had 22 already proceeded. So, frcm that perspective, I don't 23 think that they had accomplished a major function of 24 their total scope of responsibility. But I believe they 25 were fully functioning. I'm not aware of any aspect of TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

_n . 13542 f') 1 their work that was not functioning either because of -- v 2 or for'any reason. Just that they had only begun to do 3 the large scope of the work ahead of them. 4 MR. SINKIN: I'll just change the arrangement 5 slightly. I seem to be getting Al instead of you. 6 MR. LOPEZ: There's been a little problem 7 trying to maintain eye contact with counsel and the 8 Panel as well. 9 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Lopez, just to add, do 10 you know whether any of the documents reviewed by 11 Quadrex had that DAG stamp on it or whatever it would 12 have been? I realize Quadrex didn't look into the group 13 itself, but did the documents they reviewed, any of that 14 have the stamp on it that you referred to? 15 MR. LOPEZ: I can't recall, Judge Bechhoefer. 16 I just can't. I don't know of any specific instance 17 where they were marked in such a way. 18 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Do you know in the areas 19 where Quadrex complained that there was not sufficient I 20 guess the word might be integration of activities 21 between disciplines, do you know that in those cases the . 22 stamp was not on the documents they reviewed? 23 MR. LOPEZ: I don't know that either.

<    24            JUDGE BECHHOEFER:   Okay.

25 0 (By Mr. Sinkin) It seems to me when I read TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13543

    ~

1 the Quadrex report and I read some of your questions and 2 answers that I'm getting two different impressions. If 3 you look at, for example, question 21 and answer 21, 4 which is a rather lengthy answer so let me give you a 5 chance to familiarize yourself with it. 6 Okay? 7 A (By Mr. Lopez) Okay. 8 0 I guess it seems to me like trains going in 9 different directions. Quadrex to me says we look at -- 10 they say at the very beginning of their report what 11 we' re going to look at are system design descriptions,

 ..       12 technical reference documents, that sort of item. So,

' () 13 we perform our review and we look at them and we don't 14 find what we want to find in terms of interdisciplinary 15 coordination, systems engineering. So, we say, well, 16 maybe these folks really need an independent systems 17 engineering group to perform that function. But then 18 you come along and you say Quadrex says you have to have 19 a systems engineering group to perform this function. 20 You don't, you can do it with SDD's and TRD's and all of 21 that. 22 It seems to me your response is not responsive 23 to Quadrex' concern which is an implementation concern 1 O' 24 as opposed to a methodology concern, and I'd like:to get 25 your response to that observation. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13544 [ 1 A (By Dr. Bernsen) It might be useful for each G] 2 of us to comment a little bit and perhaps we can 3 speculate. 4 What we're saying is that these -- the 5 existence of these documents and the fact that they did 6 contain the type of information that we observed 7 indicates that there was a systems function being

                                                                                         )

8 carried out by the project. The fact that in general 9 the work was found to be adequate, there weren't a lot 10 of significant deficiencies in the design, testifies to 11 the fact that somehow these things were happening. . ,. 12 We are looking at the design perhaps from a 0 13 little different perspective, recognizing a different , 14 status of completion than Quadrex assumed when they 15 entered the process. And, so, perhaps the difference is 16 that Quadrex was expecting to see a lot more detailed 17 information, perhaps a lot more completion than we saw. 18 But we recognized the status of engineering, so that 19 perhaps is one of the reasons for the difference. 20 (No hiatus.) 21 22 23 24 25 TATE REPORTING (713) 498 8442

13545

 ')          1           Q           Do you want to comment on that, Mr. Lopez?

2 A (By Mr. Lopez) I think so. We believe that 3 these types of documents, system design descriptions, 4 technical reference documents, and the reviewing and 5 comment process, in particular, are, if you will, the 6 work products of interdisciplinary coordination, which 7 is, you know, in the looseness of the terminology, often 8 described in different ways, a multi-disciplinary 9 coordination, systems integration, systems engineering, 10 those kinds of functions, those are the work products. 11 It's my belief, at least, from looking at what 12 Quadrex was saying was that in them not finding sone 13 things that they expected to find, they were suggesting 14 one methodology for achie'ving and quickly getting to some 15 of the things that they found, that they found wanting in 16 their own opinion. And they proposed that the formation 17 of a systems engineering function as a separate 18 organization, if you will, at least that's the 19 implication I read from Quadrex, was one appropriate 20 method. 21 It's my own experience that that is one way of 22 doing that particular activity; it is not the one that I 23 am most used to seeing. And I have seen many projects 24 completed utilizing these very same kinds of documents 25 and these very kind of review and comment processes and O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 -

k 13546

        )  1  ~ disciplinary coordination processes as a means to achieve 2   that interdisciplinary coordination.

- 3 And one further comment if I might, the review 4 and comment process, in particular the interdisciplinary 5 coordination, design review procedures and review and 6 comment process, the system design assurance procedures 7 and all those kinds of things, had within them, I felt, 8 the essential elements of accomplishing the very things i 9 that Quadrex was suggesting needed to be accomplished.

10 The only concern that I saw personally relative 11 to that process was that I had concerns, I think, which I 1 12 share with Quadrex, whether or not that process was going , 13 to be timely in accomplishing those necessary activities. 14 So I don't wish to characterize that we did not 15 agree with Quadrex, or at least that I didn't agree with i 16- Quadrex, that these were not significant issues, 17 significant timing concerns, significant concerns 18 relative to the completion activities for the project; 19 only that we did not necessarily agree that the approach , 20 that they selected was the one and only or for that 21 matter even the preferred matter for accomplishing that. 22 0 Now I'm a little puzzled. You're talking as if 23 you actually observed Brown & Root performing review and 24 comment process. Were you at the project while Brown & 25 Root was still on the project? o 5 i TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13547

  )  1       A     (By Mr. Lopez)   Let me answer. You've asked 2  two questions. The first -- the answer to your last 3  question first. I was on the project when Brown & Root s  was still on the project. That was in the transition 5  period. Some of those elements probably were going on.

6 To answer your first question, I did not -- I 7 did not perform any audits, I did not personally go to 8 Brown & Root and walk through their process. I'm 9 strictly relying upon the procedures and the evidence of 10 those activities going on for the judgments that I've 11 reached.

• 12 Q The evidence that they were going on.

13 A Right. And my comments really relate to my I) 's 14 view of the process, of course, as a timely process. 15 0 Let me back up and ask you. In the preparation 16 of this testimony, did you, Bechtel, put together a team 17 of people to do this or did the two of you, are you the 18 only two that worked on this or -- 19' A The direct testimony? 20 Q Yes. 21 A (By Dr. Bernsen) It's ours. 22 O The two of you put this together? 23 A We did rely, of course, on some of the back-up 24 you see for let's say technical guidances on issues that 25 we're not as familiar with, but this was all existing O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13548 () 1 documentation. 2 A (By Mr. Lopez) I would further add that I did 3 discuss some specific questions with personnel on the 4 project that I was aware had participated in either some 5 of the EN-619 preparation and/or some specific transition 6 activities as an aid in directing my attention to 7 particularly the documents that existed, you know, in the 8 time frame prior to May of '81. 9 0 When you say " personnel on the project," 10 Bechtel personnel -- 11 A Yes. 12 0 -- now on the project? 13 A Yes. . O 14 0 or at least when they were preparing this, they 15 were on the project? 16 A Yes. - 17 Q Now, going back to what I was talking about a 18 minute ago, maybe I have a better example. On page 25, 19 there's question 30. And on page 26 is the answer. 20 JUDGE LAMB: What were those page numbers, Mr.

  , 21  Sinkin?

22 MR. SINKIN: 25 and 26. 23 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Let me just be sure I 24 understand the wording of your answer. The sentence 25 starting " additionally," you refer to the sentence quoted TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13549 ?' ' \-)> 1 on the previous page by CCANP from the Quadrex report. 2 And you say -- excuse me, this sentence appears to relate 3 to Quadrex's concern that there was not a single set of 4 multi-disciplinary design criteria applicable to all 5 disciplines, and that each discipline was establishing 6 design criteria applicable to the work it was doing. 7 Is the "and that" a second concern you 8 perceived Quadrex had? In other words, there was one 9 concern that there was not a single set of 10 multi-disciplinary criteria and the second concern that 11 each discipline was establishing its own criteria? 12 A (By Dr. Bernsen) We collectively agree that 13 they're two separate but related observations, one that 14 in the sense they're recommendation that it sure would 15 help to integrate things if you had one single set. 16 And two, that they were concerned that each 17 discipline was establishing criteria applicable to its 18 own work. 19 A (By Mr. Lopez) Further to that. The specific 20 discussion in Quadrox, at Page 3-2, where, if you will, 21 we've paraphrased sorae of the concern, again by talking 22 about internal consistency, gives an example of, for 23 separation schemes; and then says this guidance in the ) 24 form of a TRD does not exist, consequently each

                                                                                          ~

25 discipline now provides their own interpretation. l (2)  : TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 1

13550 l (}_/ 1 So they were building, if you will, on a logic 2 trail that said in their view, the non-existence of what 3 they viewed as multi-disciplinary design guidance had the 4 consequence that the disciplines, you know, were 5 developing their own. 6 Q And their concern was that the disciplines in 7 developing their own were not doing that adequately to 8 address the particular criteria such as separation or 9 whatever? Is that how you perceived Quadrex? 10 A The way I perceived them in the total thought 11 process was that by having them do it independently, 12 there might not be -- they use the term " consistency," 13 and I believe, in my own judgment, that what they were O 14 getting at was compatability as opposed to consistency. 15 As we point out in our testimony, different 16 groups may not use the same assumptions, if you will, 17 because the work they're doing may not depend upon them 18 having the same information. There's a need for the 19 final design product however to be compatable. 20 And so in that sense, I think their concern was 21 that they might not be that compatable. 22 0 One of the documents that Quadrex sought was a l 23 top level document on failure modes and affects analysis. 24 Is that correct? 25 A (By Mr. Lopez) That's correct. O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 L

13551

  )  1      A     (By Dr. Bernsen)   That's correct.

2 Q And are you aware of the instance where Quadrex 3 asked for separate disciplines to provide them with a 4 list of what was being treated under the failure mode and 5 affects analysis and none of the disciplines could give 6 them a' list? 7 A (By Mr. Lopez) I'm aware of the testimony by 8 Mr. Stanley that they asked for that information and did 9 not receive it. I am also aware of the language in the 10 Quadrex report that restates that in written language. 11 I'm not aware that it was based upon their 12 inability to do so, only where the statements of fact by 13 Mr. Stanley in Quadrex that they did.not receive them. 14 0 I guess what I'm looking at is what I see in 15 Quadrex is that happens and they say somebody's got to 16 tell these disciplines that this is how you do this. So 17 they do it, so let's create this document up here that 18 says here's how we shall go forth and do it and then 19 maybe next time we come ask the disciplines they'll say 20 "Oh, okay, here it is." 21 MR. FRANTZ: I'm not sure that question has any 22 foundation in the Quadrex report. 23 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Was there a question? 24 0 (By Mr. Sinkin) I'll be happy to hear your 25 response to that. O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13552 () 1 MR. FRANTZ: There's an objection on the floor. 2 MR. SINKIN: Oh, there's an objection in that 3 you don't think I've accurately -- 4 MR. FRANTZ: I don't see any foundation in the 5 Quadrex report for some of the statements you made in 6 that question. 7 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Well, we established that 8 Quadrex had recommended a top level document for FMEA, 9 right? 10 A (By Mr. Lopez) That's correct. 11 Q And that they had gone to four disciplines and 12 asked for their FMEA list and not received it for 13 whatever reason. CE) 14 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Yes. 15 0 Is that your understanding of what happened? 16 A (By Mr. Lopez) I think they asked for their 17 single failure -- 18 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Single failure -- 19 A (By Mr. Lopez) As I recall. 20 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Maybe we should look at that. 21 Do you recall where that is in the -- 22 Q Actually it's both; they asked them for FMEA 23 and the postulated single failure list and didn't get 24 either one. I guess I'm linking those two events in my 25 mind as cause and effects. They go to the disciplines, O - TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13553 t ] f) I they don't get the documents, and therefore they call for 2 the top level document. Do you perceive it that way or t 3 do you perceive it differently?

;      4               A (By Dr. Bernsen)      I can give you my perception.

5 Frank may have his own and this is somewhat an 6 observation based on Mr. Stanley's testimony. He kind of - 7 described an ideal world, where things like this would be , 8 done by each of the disciplines at the working level as 9 the designs of the systems are produced, and that's 10 certainly is, in fact, the most efficient way that one l I 11' could think of to have engineering done. But in the real 12 world, you find that a lot of these things are 13 specialized and in fact you need special groups or f 14 specific individuals on the project who are more 15 competent to perform these functions, and in fact you may 16 do them later on in the design process. It's the i 17 iterative process, you make some designs and then you 18 have them reviewed. f 19 Now, it was our understanding that one of the i 20 responsibilities of this systems assurance group was to

21 either perform or review this type of analysis. And it's i

22 also indicated, I'm not sure in our testimony or the

\ 23 Bechtel task force, that we didn't -- we don't feet that 1 24 a top level document of this nature is essential for 25 qualified people, competent experienced people, to ! '( ) l 4 k l TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

c i 13554 l ()_ 1 perform these functions. 2 Now, I think this what's -- say your 3 characterization of what Mr. Stanley was thinking is that I 4 if the groups are supposed to do this and he wasn't sure 5 who was, and if they didn't seem to have any tools for 6 doing it, then it sure would be a good idea to give them 7 tools before they began the task ~. 8 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) And you talked about something 9 that could be done without a top level document by 10 qualified, experienced, well-trained engineers. Is part 11 of what we're seeing here Quadrex doesn't find a great 12 depth or breadth in the Brown & Root engineering program 13 and feels that maybe more top down kind of direction is t 14 needed to a younger,. inexperienced, not as qualified 15 group? 16 A (By Mr. Lopez) I don't think I would go that 17 far. I would like to comment as to and I believe we do 18 in our direct testimony, if I recall correctly, that  : 19 although they were not provided with a, if you will, a 20 single failure list, whatever that term is intended to 21 mean, there were failure modes and affecta analysis in 22 the form of single failure analyses represented in the 23 TSAR. i 24 In addition, the system design descriptions for 25 the various systems including particularly the safety O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

l 13555 l l 1 related systems, indicated the single failures and, you ({} 2 know, the necessity for looking at single failure 3 criteria and looking at various abnormal events and 4 various kinds of casualty events as.the terminology was  ! 5 used in Brown & Root, that needed to be addressed. 6 So there were, in fact, single failure 7 considerations in the design as reflected in the system 8 design descriptions and as reflected in information 9 provided in the FSAR. 10 What one of the things that apparently Quadrex 11 was after was that in the evolution of regulatory 12 practice, the NRC was asking for more sophisticated

   . 13 analyses than was typical of what was in the FSAR at that 14 time.,

15 Brown & Root apparently was aware of that but 16 had not begun those more sophisticated analyses yet. So 17 there was no, if you will, at least that I'm not aware of 18 a failure modes and affects analysis list above and 19 beyond the single failure work that had been done 20 previously. 21 MR. FRANTZ: Mr. Sinkin, have we reached a good 22 stopping point, a good time for a break? 23 MR. SINKIN: Yes. 24 (Recess.) 25 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Back on the record. Before O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 u

13556 () 1 Mr. Sinkin resumes, we have one or -- or I have one 2 question I want to ask. I think Dr. Bernsen is the 3 appropriate person to ask. 4 Yesterday Mr. Stanley testified that during his 5 consultation with the task force, at the time, I believe, 6 in November, I think it was November '81, he prepared a 7 list which correlated generic findings with the questions 8 and answers in Volumes II and III of the Quadrex report 9 which related to those generic findings. 10 Are you familiar with that list? 11 DR. BERNSEN No, I'm not. 12 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: He said it was basically a 13 handwritten list which he provided to Bechtel. j O 14 DR. BERNSEN: I'm not aware of that. 15 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I was going to ask you if 16 you had it, to bring it, to let us look at it and help 17 us, but you don't, so be it. 18 DR. BERNSEN: It would be useful. I'm not 19 aware of it. 20 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay. Back to you. 21 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) When you sat down to prepare 22 your. testimony, did you create your own list of 23 discipline findings that you thought were represented in 24 a generic finding? 25 A (By Mr. Lopez) Well, are you talking about

   ~s (d
 \

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13557 1 i 1 developed a, if you will, a cross reference list? j 2 Q A cross reference. 3 A I didn't prepare any such list. Now, by the 4 4 time I was advised that, you know, I would be requested 5 to, you know, potentially testify in this hearing, I had

6 identified to me the specific generic findings and i 7 specific discipline findings that would be, you know, the 8 subject of the testimony.

9 I looked at those and attempted -- in the case

                      ~10             of the discipline findings, it was reasonably straight-11               forward because there was a relatively simple statement                                                                                                                      ;

. 12 of, you know, their judgments, and then typically one or L

 ,.                   13              more references to questions.                                                                                           So that was relatively

!O 14 seraigheforward. . 15 In the case of the generics, what I attempted 16 to do was to go down and look at the key -- what I 17 thought were the key summary statements and try to j 18 determine whether or not there was a tie that I was aware

19 of. And in most cases what I found was that the language l 20 that was used in the summary was almost a direct 21 paraphrase of language that existed in certain discipline

22 findings. And particularly where there were citations to 23 questions, you know, there was, if you will, a trail 24 going through the questions to try to -- to try to get at 25 it that way. t O A l + TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 '

13558 1 I didn't prepare any specific list. As I went 2 down, I tried to highlight to myself that that appeared 3 to be discipline finding number so-and-so, question 4 number so-and-so, and I intended as much as possible to 5 rely on the questions rather than the findings, other 6 than the fact that I used the discipline findings as an 7 added assurance that I was really capturing right the 8 same thought. 9 So I guess the direct answer to your question, 10 I didn't prepare any separate list, you know, for that 11 purpose. 12 0 You may have answered it, but there's one extra

 . - . 13 step that I'm not pure if you took or not, of taking a

(} C 14 generic and then just running with it through all the 15 discipline findings and seeing how many of them you 16 thought supported that generic; did you do that process? 17 A (By Mr. Lopez) No, I did not. What I was 18 alluding to was that I went through the language of the l 19 generic finding to try to capture, if you will, 20 independent thoughts and then based upon my prior 21 knowledge of the Quadrex report, try to determine where l 22 that was. You know, in some cases, it was, you know, it 23 was relatively clear trail, they were talking about l 24 nuclear related analysis, I know where to look, because i 25 there was a complete section and a whole section of O

                                     ~

1 l TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13559 g . '( 1 questions in that area. 2 Where the statements were more broad, that 3 wasn't always easy to do and sometimes I just had to -- 4 he just had to sort of rifle through and try to find the 5 equivalent language. 6 0 Okay. Turning to page 18, question 23, and 7 answer 23, your answer says that Quadrex did identify 8 significant deficiencies in design related to B&R's 9 systems integrations and overview function and systems 10 engineering function. 11 And first of all, you say the deficiencies were 12 limited to those reported to the NRC. By your answer, do

- 13 you mean those reported on May 8th, 1981, or are you

\l 14 including those that were subsequently reported after May 15 8th? 16 A (By Mr. Lopez) Let me make sure I'm with you. 17 You're talking about our response to the top of at Page 18 19. 19 Q Right, to the question at the bottom of page 20 18. 21 A (By Dr. Bernsen) My answer to this is that had 22 in mind the specific items reported to the commission in 23 May, essentially the HVAC area, and perhaps computer code 24 verification. 25 A (By Mr. Lopez) That was also my feeling, those TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

I 13560 , n i) s_ I two were the ones where I thought there might be some 2 relationship; more directly the one on HVAC. 3 Q Some relationship to the 3.1(a) generic finding 4 on systems integration. 5 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Yes. 6 A (By Mr. Lopez) Yes. 7 Q Fine. In question 24, answer 24, you refer to 8 a B&R procedure which required systems design assurance 9 group to perform certain reviews. Had that procedure 10 been implemented as of May 8th 1981? 11 A Yes, the version that I looked at had been. 12 Q And the version you looked at was the May 1981 13 version? I mean not that it would say May 1981 on it, O 14 but it was the version in place in May 1981? 15 A Yes.

        '16       Q   And do you know if the Houston review team was 17 aware of that procedure on May 8, 1981?                         ,

18 A May I see the Applicants' exhibit relative to 19 the Brown & Root -- 20 Yes, I think that in looking at the Brown & j 21 Root review sheets that were used apparently on May 8th j 22 for some of these reviews, I found references to design 23 assurance group. I don't recall whether or not and I'd 24 have to look through the entire list to determine whether  : 25 or not there was a reference to the procedure per se -- a -- () ' ! TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13561

 #N                                                                  -
 %s)  1 Counsel has pointed out to me that line item No. 4641(a) 2 does specifically reference the A005 procedure.

3 0 What was that line item? Oh, I'm sorry. 4 A It was in the 46 series. 5 Its 4641(a) and also turns out 4641(c), both 6 reference the procedure. 7 MR. SINKIN: Thank you. 8 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) In your answer to question 25, 9 again it's a rather lengthy answer so let me give you a 10 moment to familiarize yourself with it. 11 A (By Mr. Lopez) Okay. 12 Q In your answer, you seem to say that the only-13 concern that Quadre:: had in the area of deficiencies in [')

   14 design related to separation or the single failure 15 criteria was the common instrument air line that we 16 looked at earlier this afternoon. Am I reading your 17 testimony correctly?

l 18 A I think at the bottom of page 20, the beginning 19 of Pege 21, we do indicate that relative to deficiencies i 20 in design related to separation or single failure 21 criteria, it was our belief that Quadrex was identifying 22 that common instrument air line problem as the primary 23 example of that problem. 24 Q Your statement is: Quadrex did not identify 25 any concerns in this regard with the exception of that ( TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

i 13562 1 O(- 1 one. Seems to be saying that that's the only~ concern 2 Quadrex had in this regard. I 3 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Perhaps it's important to 4 recognize the emphasis on our testimony is toward the 5 question of significant breakdown and things of the 6 nature that could be reportable. It's difficult, of 7 course, to avoid making judgments or overlooking things 8 that relate to efficient and effective ways of doing 9 engineering, recommended good practices. 10 Now, it's my view that Quadrex had some 11 observations on ways that Brown & Root could in: prove the 12 process. And that -- we really were not addressing that 13 as the -- the absence of that as a significant deficiency O 14 or breakdown in the QA program, that would be considered 15 reportable. 16 So what we're really saying here is looking 17 over the Quadrex report, we only find that one particular 18 item. 19 Q Let me ask you to look at question E-15, the 20 first paragraph in the Quadrex assessment. I'm referring 21 at this point particularly to the first paragraph of the 22 Quadrex assessment. 23 A (By Mr. Lopez) Of the assessment -- l 24 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Oh, okay. i 25 (No hiatus.) ( TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13563 1 Q I guess it's a long question. 2 As I read that question, Quadrex asked Brown & 3 Root to respond to various criteria and Brown & Root 4 responded on the separation criteria by its position 5 that it had recommended HL&P specify Class 1-E devices. 6 And that's all right in Quadrex' view that they did 7 that, but that's not sufficient to achieve separation. 8 And the concern I see expressed by Quadrex is 9 that if Brown & Root was assuming someone else was going 10 to do work and that's why they didn't cover a11 aspects 11 of separation, then you would have a potential interface 12 problem that could be serious. '-- 13 MR. FRANTS: Mr. Chairman, the document speaks 14 for itself. I'm not sure why Mr. Sinkin has to go 15 through and characterise what's written here. 16 MR. SINKIN: All right. 17 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Is separation a 18 safety-related concern, Dr. Bernsen? 19 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Separation is a l 20 safety-related requirement for safety-related systems. j 1 21 Q And if a system does not adequately address 22 separation, then has the system adequately met the needs 23 of being a safety-related system? ( 24 A Well, you're asking sort of a generic 25 question. We're not talking about this specific, right? TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

1 13564 1 Q We'll tie it to this in a minute. l 2 A If the system doesn't satisfy separation or l 3 alternative criteria. 4 Q By alternative criteria, you mean criteria i 5 other than separation? 6 A There are alternative ways of satisfying 7 single failure and separation criteria. This is not 8 necessarily a black and white thing. The important 9 thing is to be able to show that a postulated event will 10 not prevent the capability to safely shut down the plant 11 using safety-related systems. It may be that this 12 capability is achieved by some alternative system so 13 that there are instances where separation is not 14 absolutely required. 15 Q Turning to question E-15, that paragraph. 16 Apparently the question asked is for Brown & Root to 17 describe how interaction, single failure criteria and 18 separation are achieved for turbine trip causing reactor 19 trip and reactor trip causing a turbine trip. 20 MR. FRANTZ: Is there a question? 21 A (By Mr. Lopez) Is there a question? 22 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) As I read this, this is an 23 instance where Brown & Root was not adequately . 24 demonstrating to Quadrex that they were achieving 25 separation. Is that how you read it? TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13565 [' 1 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Yeah. The concern they V) 2 state is that B&R did not cover this aspect in their 3 response period. 4 Q Actually it's a comma. 5 A Oh, sorry, comma. 6 Q And may be assuming that others are doing it? 7 A Well, that's a presumption. I mean, I think 8 the statement of more or less fact is that they didn't 9 cover something in their response. 10 0 Well, Quadrex in general in their report when 11 they don't get a response give that fact a meaning; is

-   12 that not correct?   They interpret the fact that they O

V I3 don't get a response? 14 A That's one of the problems with the report, 15 yes, 16 Q And why do you say that's a problem with the 17 report? 18 A Because they're drawing conclusions without 19 support. 20 Q It seems like a Catch 22 to me. If you go to 21 a discipline and you say show me how you achieve 22 separation and they don't provide you enough information 23 to show you that they can achieve it, are you then to 24 assume that they can but they just can't show it? 25 A Well -- TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

     -v ~

13566 P'N 1 MR. PIRFO: I will object to that because I (_) . 2 think it's about as close to being argumentative as it 3 can be without being actually argumentative. He said it 4 real nicely, but he's still arguing with the witness. 5 MR. SINKIN: I'm really trying to clarify what 6 the witness is telling me in terms of you go to a 7 discipline, you ask for something, they don't deliver 8 it. 9 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) If you went to a discipline 10 and you asked them to show you how they achieved 11 separation and they came back and said here's how we do

s 12 it and what they showed you only achieved part of it --

13 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I think we'll overrule the 14 objection. 15 MR. SINKIN: Okay. 16 MR. AXELRAD: What's the question? 17 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Well, now -- 18 MR. FRANTZ: Excuse me. What is the qu stion, 19 Mr. Sinkin? 2.0 MR. PIRFO: That was my problem. Not so much 21 the way he said it, I didn't hear a question in there. 22 That's the reason for my objection, but it's been 23 overruled. Maybe we can -- 24 MR. SINKIN: Maybe we can try again? 25 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Do you want the reporter to TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13567 I' T 1 do it? b 2 MR. SINKIN: I wouldn't mind, if the reporter 3 doesn't mind. 4 (The preceding question was read back by the 5 Reporter.) 6 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) What would you think -- would 7 you think that something was wrong? Let's try starting 8 there? 9 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Okay, let me put my QA hat 10 on. 11 Q Please.

 -      12      A     The first thing I would do is find out what O      13 the concern was and carry that back to the discipline 14 and say, hey, we notice in your response that you didn't 15 address the subject, is this a problem. And through an 16 iterative process, I would find out whether or not I 17 understood what they were doing, whether what they were 18 doing was adequate and met requirements or not. And 19 until I finished that transaction, I wouldn't call it a 20 finding.

21 The only part of this that's a finding is the 22 statement that they didn't give them a complete i 23 response. I can't draw any conclusion from that. l h' 24 Perhaps the question wasn't clear. l 25 Q Well, we have the question in the Quadrex TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13568 1 report in this particular E-15. It's on the first page 2 of the E-15 documentation. The third area of example is 3 what they asked them to produce and in response -- they 4 responded by saying they recommend HL&P specify Class 5 1-E devices. 6 MR. FRANTZ: I still haven't heard a 7 question. 8 MR. SINKIN: He was talking with the other 9 witness. I was just giving him a chance to catch up. 10 A (By Mr. Lopez) It might be worthwhile -- 11 A (By Dr. Bernsen) I think it might be 12 worthwhile for* Frank to clarify it because I think that O 13 we don't have the same concern. 14 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Fine. 15 A (By Mr. Lopez) The issue that Quadrex was 16 addressing, at least particularly with regard to the two 17 line items in the question itself, turbine trip causing 18 reactor trip, reactor trip causing a turbine trip or 19 main generator trip, which is essentially equivalent, 20 was an issue that the NRC had been identifying as a 21 specific question on numerous projects in and about this 22 time frame. 23 The concern is this: The turbine generator O 24 system of the plant is non-safety-related and by design, 25 and at least in all the applications I've ever seen, is TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13569 1 so designated. It's also in common practice located in (2] V 2 a non-seismic Category 1 building. The turbine 3 generator buildings of most plants that I'm aware of 4 have typically not been seismically analyzed, the 5 primary rationale behind that being since there is no 6 safety-related equipment in that building, the building 7 need not be considered safety-related and seismically 8 qualified. 9 The scenarios for how the reactor will shut 10 down in the event of various kinds of transients have

     , 11 always accounted for and included the consideration that 12 one of the sources for a reactor tripping might, in 13 fact, be that the source of the problem, if you were, 14 that caused the reactor to trip would be the turbine 15 tripping itself. The design for most projects has 16 always accounted for that primarily on the basis that 17 the process conditions in the event the turbine should 18 trip will lead to the reactor tripping just as a 19 function of, if you will, the reaction of the secondary 20 system to that turbine trip. The loss of the turbine, 21 initiation of auxiliary feedwater, those kinds of things 22 would lead to a condition that would eventually cause 23 the reactor to trip on its own and by design to safely N

24 shut down. 25 The concern that the NRC was raising was that TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13570 I here was an instance where it might be appropriate to

  )

2 consider what they call'an anticipatory trip, to not 3 wait for the conditions of the plant shutting itself 4 down, if you will, to react, but to install some sort of 5 devices on the turbine generator that would send a 6 signal, if you will, immediately or, you know, not 7 immediately, that's too severe, within the time response 8 of instrumentation to cause the reactor to trip and 9 begin that orderly shut down of the reactor in 10 anticipation of those conditions rather than letting 11 those conditions arise. 12 Now, there's a difficulty with that which the , 13 NRC recognized and that is that if you're going to put, 14 quote, safety-related actuation devices in a non-seismic 15 Category 1 non-safety-related building attaching it to 16 non-safety-related non-seismically qualified devices 17 like the turbine generator, there's going to be some 18 difficulty in being able to, quote, in full pedigree 19 call that a safety-related actuation system. And what 20 they have recognized and having recognized that as a 21 problem, they have adopted on numerous projects the 22 concept that licensees should include such 23 instrumentation and that, if you will, the normal O 24 pedigree for safety-related devices would be waived in 25 lieu of somehow attempting to, if you will, upgrade the TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13571 1 whole turbine generator building to a seismic Category 1 2 building. 3 They felt that the benefit to be derived from 4 having this anticipatory trip, even though the plant can i 5 safely shut down without it, outweighed any argument 6 that might be made against it being extremely, you know, 7 or not cost effective to accomplish that. So, they, in 8 essence, established rulings. I think the specific 9 instance where it was dealt with in their safety , 10 evaluation report for the first time that I recall was 11 the Byron-Braidwood Project and it's been applied in

    , 12 numerous other instances since then.
                      ~
 -(

13 So, the issue that Quadrex was getting at was,

14 in essence, are you aware of this concern, have you 15 started looking at whether or not you ought to have, 16 quote, and I'm putting quotes, safety-related 17 instrumentation. And the way that most plants have 18 attempted to do that is to provide 1-E electrical power, 19 that.is reliable, typically diesel generator backed 20 power supplies to that instrumentation so that you might 21 be able to implement this anticipatory trip.

22 It's apparently Quadrex' concern, one, to 23 identify whether or not this was recognized. It 24 apparently was recognized. The recommendation had been 25 made by Brown & Root to install Class 1-E devices. This TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13572 I l ~ b l' 2 decision at that time frame was still premature. was no design. There As a matter of fact, my recollection was 3 at the time we, in fact, started receiving transition 4 documents from Brown & Root, that design had not yet 5 proceeded beyond, you know, the agreement that it was 6 something that needed to be added to the design. So, 7 they had not dealt with the physical layout of how that 8 was to be accomplished. 9 Another thing I should add, that in agreeing, 10 if you will, to waive some of the aspects, primarily the 11 seismic qualification, seismic support aspects for that, .- 12 the NRC has directed. licensees to, if you will, make a 13 best effort to make those devices as safety-related as 14 is reasonable without their qualification as, if you 15 will, seismic Category 1 devices. Provide 1-E power, 16 provide protection from hazards like missiles, and 17 provide separation where that's appropriate. 18 The specific instance here is that the 19 decision was just being made to add it. I don't think 20 at this point -- I'm certain at this point there was no 21 physical layout yet. Clearly separation would have been l 22 one of the things that I would believe the NRC would 23 have expected to see in the final layout of these 24 devices, you know, once an agreement was reached to put 25 them in place. TATE REPORTING (713). 498-8442

i

                                                                           )

13573 l 1 One further comment. The other item relative 2 to turbine trip based upon a reactor trip the NRC has 3 not required to be safety-related. That does not have 4 the same anticipatory aspects to it that the other 5 does. So, the only one where there was an NRC interest, 6 if you will, in upgrading to safety-related this 7 circuitry, was the circuitry that would have caused an 8 anticipatory trip of the reactor based upon some 9 indication that the turbine was tripping. The other was 10 not considered to be safety-related, although some 11 licensees have, you know, gone ahead and, once again, 12 provided 1-E power to those devices, it wasn't s [~m 13 considered to be safety-related, nor do I believe the 14 NRC has forced anyone to make that safety-related 15 application. 16 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Lopez, is this one of 17 the areas where the NRC staff has designated the 18 component or the structure as important to safety and is 19 trying to apply Appendix A rather than B criteria? 20 MR. LOPEZ: I'm not -- I don't ever recall 21 this particular item having specifically been identified 22 as one of the items, you know, at issue in some of these 23 industry discussions with the NRC as important to 24 safety. It clearly falls into the generic description, 25 though, in my mind of those kinds of situations. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13574 1 What they were looking at in those instances 2 were, if you will, failures of non-safety-related 3 equipment or events of, you know, of non-safety-related 4 failures having some potential impact on safety and, 5 therefore, the NRC was looking at whether or not 6 additional quality assurance requirements that would not 7 normally apply under Appendix B should be applied to 8 that particular design, that particular component. 1 9 I think it's consistent, but I don't 10 personally recall that in the list of things that they 11 were talking about, that reactor trip circuitry might

   -   12 have been.

13 Although, do you recall in the -- 14 DR. BERNSEN: No, I don't recall any 15 specific. I guess in terms of the -- in the generic 16 sense, it probably would be one of those items. 17 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Thank you. 18 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Turn, if you will, to 19 question H-6. 20 A (By Mr. Lopez) H-6? 21 Q H-6. The Quadrex assessment. 4 22 As I read this, we do have Quadrex here 23 expressing a concern about separation in the first 24 paragraph. 25 A c(By Dr. Bernsen) As I read it, it's quite , TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13575

                                                                     ~

61s 1 consistent with their generic concern. U 2 That would be 3.1(e), I believe. Q 3 A On separation. 4 Q Well, maybe not. 5 A Yeah. 6 Q You're saying yes to what? 7 A Yes, (e). 8 Q 3.1(e). 9- What I'm focusing on is the word "was" in the 10 second sentence, the responsibility to determine the 11 adequacy of separation was shared by reviewers. This 12 suggests to me that this was a. task that had been 13 completed in this instance as opposed to something yet 14 to be done. Is that your understanding of the state of 15 the design for physical separation of HVAC components on 16 May 8th, 1981? 17 A (By Mr. Lopez) Let me address it this way: 18 The South Texas Project from its -- apparently from its 19 early inception, as I can determine from the PSAR, has 20 embraced the concept of phytt. cal separation to a greater 21 extent than most plants I'm used to having seen. That 22 is, rather than relying upon, if you will, reviews to be 23 performed after physical layout has been performed and 24 then determining whether or not there are needs to add 25 additional physical barriers, or in the case of fire TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 13576

 )      1   fire wrapping or in the case of missiles, you know,
   }

2 missile protection, those kinds of things, rather than 3 rely upon them, they very early on adopted the 4 philosophy of trying to physically separate in different 5 areas behind various kinds of barriers that account for 6 physical separation types of considerations into the 7 base design. And my view of the work that was 8 accomplished to date relative to separation was relative 9 to that. 10 On the other hand, the specific review of s j 11 separation and fire hazards and other types of physical 12 interactions or systems interactions that occur as

   )

13 hazards and is the hazards analysis that is performed 14 had not yet been performed. I think there's other 15 discussion within Quadrex about the fact that some of l l 16 that hazards analysis was just beginning. 17 So, I think it's consistent for them to say 18 that there had been some separation work done; that is, 19 trying to locate safety-related components as far away I l 20 from each other or separated by physical barriers to the 21 extent that once a detailed hazards analysis was t 22 performed, the likely finding of unacceptable locations, l 23 if you will, would be lessened. 24 So, yes, they had already begun some 25 separation work. Detailed separation analyses relative TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13577 (} 1 to hazards. -There was, you know, various levels of work 2 begun, but very little complete. A lot yet to be done. 3 Q Well, you have tied together the first 4 paragraph and the second paragraph in the Quadrex 5 assessment. As I read the first paragraph, Quadrex 6 fully expected to find the criteria for physical 7 separation to protect against postulated fires and high 8 energy line breaks. But what you're saying is the 9 second paragraph says that that work hadn't been done or 10 had not been incorporated? 11 A 'I'm not reading that second sentence to say 12 that. That was my own statement of, you know, based Q 13 upon my knowledge plus other things in the Quadrex 14 report relative to their questions about the timing, the 15 timeliness, if you will, of some of those hazards 16 evaluations having been performed. 17 Q I guess the thing that's puzzling to me is 18 when you read the first paragraph, they very clearly 19 ' state that someone had the responsibility to do this and 20 when they looked for it, it wasn't there. 21 A (By Dr. Bernsen) I don't read it that way. 22 Q You don't read it that way? 23 A No. O 24 Q The "was" doesn't mean to you the 25 responsibility to determine the adequacy of separation TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

  -u--

13578 1 was shared by --

}

2 A Well, first of all, I don't see anything  ! l 3 particularly wrong with that, so I don't consider it a 4 deficiency. 5 Q With the absence of the criteria, you don't 6 see anything wrong? 7 A No, the assignment of that responsibility to 8 the people -- well, no, determining the adequacy, sorry, 9 assuring the adequacy to the reviewers. 10 Q Do you see anything wrong -- as I read the 11 paragraph, Quadrex is saying that there were reviewers 12 who had a certain responsibility and that's fine that 13 they have that responsibility, we're not criticizing 14 that. But they did not fulfill that responsibility 15 because when Quadrex looked for the written criteria for 16 physical separation, it wasn't there. 17 A Okay, that's -- 18 MR. FRANTZ: There's no question. 19 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Is that how you understand 20 what you're reading there? 21 A (By Dr. Bernsen) That's not how I understand 22 it because you're assuming that in order for reviewers 23 to perform this function, there would have to be some O 24 written criteria. In fact, there were commitments in 25 their FSAR to provide separation to meet the regulatory TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

l

            ,                                                      13579     l
                                                                           ~

1 requirements. The reviewers can perform the review 2 relying on that and their knowledge of these 3 requirements. It isn't essential that they have a 4 cookbook to use in performing that function. 5 In other words, you don't have to have this j l 6 written specific criteria essentially. It may be good 7 practice and desirable, but it ain't essential to have 8 the criteria in order to perform the review. 9 Q Do you know if this criteria was in the FSAR 10 in May of 1981? 11 A (By Mr. Lopez) Commitments for physical 12 separation for safety-related equipment against fires (~s

'-     13 and high energy line breaks was. I'm not sure which --

14 you know, there was no -- no, I should say there were 15 des'criptions of certain separation criteria such as 16 electrical separation to meet both Reg Guide 1.75 type 17 criteria which -- some of which had been embodied and i 18 expanded upon relative to fire protection. 19 There were criteria relative to the idea of 20 high energy line break postulated rupture analysis and 21 the methodologies that are used to prevent against 22 unacceptable consequences of those things, including 23 reference to separation as one means of accomplishing 24 that. Similar references relative to fire protection, 1 25 missile protection, other types of hazards. l l TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13580 f s. 1 So, in that sense, yes, there were commitments V 2 in the PSAR to provide adequate separation between 3 safety-related components and as well away from 4 unacceptable hazards from non-safety-related components, 5 you know, for the plant. 6 I think the way I view this sentence that 7 you're particularly addressing was that at the time that 8 these reviewers, and I'm assuming when they're saying 9 reviewers they're talking about reviewers of design 10 documents that may reflect the system routing and the 11 layout of the plant, that amongst the things that they 12 would be looking for, as I previously stated, was to try U 13 to preclude a large number of unacceptable interactions 14 resulting from such things as later analyses to be 15 performed for fire hazards, later analyses to be 16 performed for pipe break. And the way to do that in the 17 review is to assure that physical separation is 18 maintained wherever possible. 19 So, the commitment was made very early on by 20 this project to use physical separation. It turns out 21 that physical separation typically by concrete barriers, 22 if you will, is usually the best way, once you're facing 23 that consideration of these hazards, to solve the 24 problem. Not all projects commit to do it by putting in 25 concrete barriers. Many of them simply say I recognize TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

  ~                                 -   .

13581 h1 1 I have to address that hazard, I lay out the plant as 2 best I can hopefully trying to keep things as separated 3 as I can. And then I go through the analysis and if I 4 find unacceptable hazards because I put things too close 5 to each other and I have not put some interposing 6 barrier between them, then I may have further work to 7 do. 8 I may have to -- I may be able to do a 9 so-called facility response analysis and demonstrate 10 that it's really acceptable and there is no effect on 11 safe shut down. I may have to put in barriers. I may 12 have to reroute some of the equipment.,

• O 13 So, it's kind of a risky business. The South 14 Texas Project attempted to try to resolve as many of 15 those in advance by designing in physical barriers so 16 that when they did the analyses, you know, the question 17 is asked can a missile from this component strike its 18 counterpart in another safety-related -- you know, the 19 other train of that safety-related system. If the 20 answer is no because there's a physical concrete wall 21 between them, it makes that analysis very easy. If, on 22 the other hand, they're side by side, you have more work 23 to do, maybe an analysis to say that it really wouldn't n)

(- 24 hurt it or maybe an analysis to say that it really 25 wouldn't affect safe shut down. TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

l I 13582 1 So, I guess the point I'm making is that it

  )

2 was the responsibility of the people responsible for  ! i 3 system routing and for layout, the physical layout of l l 4 the systems to try to achieve as much of that as they l l 5 possibly could within-the reason of, you know, living l 1 6 within the constraints, if you will, of the physical l 7 boundaries of the buildings and the structures they were , 8 working with. So, I don't think there's anything 9 inconsistent with that. 10 Q But if there was no criteria, no written 11 criteria for how to achieve that physical separation to 12 protect against postulated fires and high energy line '() 13 breaks and you were the reviewer, would you feel there 14 was a problem in that you don't have a criteria to even 15 evaluate the drawing with? 16 MR. FRANTZ: Asked and answered, Mr. Chairman, 17 of Mr. Bernsen about two or three questions ago. Mr. 18 Sinkin has been trying to get the witnesses to agree 19 with this particular interpretation of this assessment. 20 They have not. I'm not sure.why he keeps persisting. 21 JUDGE SHON: You know, it seems to me that 22~ we're simply fighting over possibly a sloppy sequence of 23 tenses in two verbs in two sentences. If it said there 24 were no written STP criteria for physical separation and 25 the responsibility to determine the adequacy of l TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13583 1 separation was shared by the reviewers, I think we'd fE'S J 2 have essentially the interpretation that the witnesses 3 have been giving. 4 Isn't that what you were saying? 5 MR. LOPEZ: That's the way I'm reading it. 6 Now, I maybe mischaracterizing it. 7 JUDGE SHON: If both of these words were in 8 the present tense, everything would be fine. But 9 someone wrote a little sloppy and I think it's tied a 10 lot to the logic. 11 We've spent an awful lot of time on this I

-   12 think, don't you?

D 13 JUDGE LAMB: Yes. 14 JUDGE SHON: I think the question has been 15 asked and answered myself. 16 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I think so, too. I think 17 we'll sustain the objection. 18 Mr. Lopez or Dr. Bernsen, either one, is there 19 anything wrong with the sharing of responsibility that's 20 referenced here, the fact that more than one person or 21 group has it? Either of you can answer it. 22 DR. BERNSEN: From what perspective? I 23 think -- it's usually good practice to have single O Nl 24 responsibilities. Unfortunately, in the real world you 25 frequently find that that isn't always practical or TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13584 1 possible, and, so, you sometimes have to divide 2 responsibilities. 3 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I was referring to the 4 particular sharing referenced here. 5 MR. LOPEZ: I think to amplify what Dr. *

      '6 Bernsen has said, you know, it's, wherever practical,                '

7 best to assign specific responsibilities to specific 8 individuals to assure that they don't assume the other 9 fellow's going to do it. But more than one discipline, 10 more than one group, more than one individual will be 11 reviewing these layout drawings. 12 I would. expect that, as an example, a 13 licensing group reviewing drawings and recognizing that 14 coming downstream are some hazards analyses that are 15 going to have to deal with some of these tough issues 16 and you're likely to try to want to avoid any hardware 17 modifications necessary to make the plant, you know, 18 safe and presumably licensable, that one of the things 19 that they would say is if they saw something that looked 20 like it could be a problem, to recommend during their 21 review that physical separation be provided, assuming it 22 was a practical thing to do. 23 But, you know, I would share Dr. Bernsen's 24 opinion that, you know, sharing in itself is not a 25 problem as long as it doesn't dilute responsibility as a TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13585 0m 1 result. 'l b 2 DR. BERNSEN: Yeah. And to point out further 3 the ambiguity of that sentence, I don't know whether the 4 sharing is between the doer and the reviewer, the ' 5 sharing is between the reviewer of rou*ing and the l 6 reviewer of layout drawings were different or the 7 multiple reviewers of all the drawings. 8 So, it's not at all clear what the concern is 9 here. And we find that, in fact, you've got to have 10 multiple groups of people with different viewpoints 11 looking at things to make sure all these requirements 12 are, in fact, incorporated. O 13 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Looking at your question 26 14 and answer 26. Were the procedures identified in answer 15 26 provided to Quadrex during its study in 1981? 16 A (By Mr. Lopez) I don't know for these three 17 procedures. I'd have to go back and check. 18 Q Was it not true that Quadrex did not primarily 19 look at procedures? Weren't they looking at actual 20 design output documents? 21 A (By Dr. Bernsen) That's what they stated. 22 A (By_Mr. Lopez) With the exception of some 23 particular ones, I think they refercnced the design 24 verification procedure and possibly I believe also the 25 computer program procedure, you know, as something that TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13586 1 they were looking at in particular. The ALARA f v l 2 procedure, they reference that. 3 So, they were looking at some procedures, I 4 just don't know whether or not these were ones that they 5 specifically addressed. 6 0 When you looked at these -- 7 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: On 005 you testified a 8 couple pages back -- 9 MR. LOPEZ: But that was Brown & Root in their 10 May 8th response. He asked whether or not, I believe, 11 whether or not Quadrex was given these to review.

  -      12           JUDGE BECHHOEFER:   Oh, I'm sorry.

13 MR. LOPEZ: And that I don't know. 14 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) And in your -- did you review 15 each of these procedures? 16 A (By Mr. Lopez) Yes, I did. 17 Q And were you reviewing the 1981 version? 18 A I was reviewing the procedures that were in 19 place in the May '81 time frame, yes. 20 Q And do you have any knowledge as to whether 21 those procedures were being effectively implemented in 22 May of 1981 by Brown & Root? 23 A Well, once again, I think, as I testified 24 earlier, I made no -- participated in no audits, made no 25 formal review in the sense of going over and reviewing TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

W' 13587

  ?-     1 that in place. I reviewed the procedures to see whether l._)s 2 or not, particularly with regard to the questions that 3 were being asked relative to quality assurance 4 implementation, whether or not I felt it met those 5 essential elements. I reviewed and was aware of 6 documents showing evidence of the fact that these 7 reviews were, in fact, being performed.

8 Q You state that Brown & Root had several 9 procedures intended to control the interfaces that exist 10 between the various organizations. Did HL&P have such 11 procedures?

  ... 12           MR. FRANTZ:    I object. That's outside the O      13 scope of this proceeding.    -

14 MR. SINKIN: Well, if it's outside the scope 15 of this proceeding, why is it quoted on the previous 16 page? 17 MR. FRANTZ: We discussed this very finding a 18 day or two ago and -- 19 MR. SINKIN: I think the objection was 20 erroneously sustained at that time because I had 21 forgotten that this was indeed quoted as a finding in 22 this review. 23 MR. FRANTZ: It's undisputed that Quadrex did 24 not review HL&P's design activities. There was a review 25 of the Brown & Root activities. This appears to be an TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13588 l 1 offhand statement at best. 2 (No hiatus.) l 3 l 4 5 6 7 i 8 9 10 11 . 12 ' 13 14 15 16 17 j 18 19 20 21 22 23 O 24 1 25 L-TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13589 zu) ( 1 MR. SINKIN: I've seen at least two Quadrex 2 observations, one was that Brown & Root was not handling 3 input data from HL&P very well, that was one relationship 4 between the two of them. Now we have an actual Quadrex 5 observation of HL&P's systems function, and it's here. I 6 mean, it's in the contention, essentially. 7 A (By Mr. Lopez) Is there a question -- 8 MR. SINKIN: There's an objection pending. I 9 don't believe there was any parsing of the generic 10 findings to which sentences were in and which sentences 11 were out when they were identified by the Board. They 12 were identified simply by their number. And finding

;z 13 3.1 (a) is one of the generic findings at issue and 14 whether that should have been notified to the NRC.

15 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We're going the overrule the 16 objection. It is in Quadrex and it is in the testimony. 17 I can't remember whether we ruled correctly or 18 incorrectly before, but this one we'll let be answered. 19 MR. SINKIN: I'll repeat the question. It has 20 been a while. 21 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) In your answer, you answered 22 Brown & Root having several procedures intended to 23 control the interface that is exist between various 24 organizations. The question ist Did HL&P have similar 25 procedures to control the interface between various () , TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13590 1 disciplines? 2 A (By Mr. Lopez) I don't know whether or not 3 they had similar procedures. In responding, we took 4 particular note of the fact that Quadrex stated that HL&P 5 had indicated their close organizational structure with , 6 Brown & Root; we also were aware of that, that the Brown 7 & Root procedures that I have noted in this response also 8 include those HL&P reviews and comments that they would 9 send, you know, as part of this process. 10 That would be done with those people that were 11 a part of the HL&P engineering team assigned with the 12 project. So we felt that that addressed the question 13 that Quadrex seemed to be getting at. p k- 14 Q You are saying that the Brown & Root procedure 15 governed the activities of Houston Lighting & Power? 16 A No, I did not. 17 Q Okay. 18 A What I said was -- what I meant to say, if I 19 didn't say it specifically, was that the Brown & Root 20 procedures included requirements for review by HL&P as 21 part of the activities covered by these procedures. 22 In other words, they would send to HL&P for 23 review and comment as an example, a document that under 24 their procedures required HL&P, if you will, concurrence 25 prior to issuance, review and comment, those kinds of O TATE REPORTING SERVICC, 498-8442

13591 1

  )    things.

2 Q Do you know if HL&P had procedures for 3 receiving and addressing those documents that would 4 achieve systems integration? 5 A I do not know whether or not they had 6 procedures. The only evidence that I'm aware of is that 7 I had seen BL&P review and comment forms indicating that 8 they were performing such reviews and putting their 9 comments on a documented sheet of paper. But I never 10 reviewed their procedures. And I don't even know if one 11 existed at that time. 12 Q On page 23, your answer 27, the first line, 13 criterion 3 of Appendix B, when criterion 3 requires that p) (_ 14 design interfaces be controlled, do you read that as . 15 having two components, one that there be a procedure for 16 controlling and two that the procedure be effectively 17 implemented? 18 A (By Mr. Bernsen) I think that it's the general 19 intent of Appendix B that you have procedures and they be 20 implemented. 21 Q Question 28, answer 28, why does it appear to 22 you that when they made the statement quoted in question 23 28, Quadrex was seeking greater informal communication 24 among the disciplines? 25 A (By Mr. Lopez) The language selected by O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13592

         )  1 Quadrex indicating -- indicated to me the use of the 2  terminology working interface relationship and routine 3  follow through discipline input / output interface, 4  indicated to me that Quadrex was seeking better 5  communication; that's obviously a desirable goal in any l            6  situation.

7 The procedures that I alluded to in earlier , 8 questions were formal, written procedures with formal 9 documentation, official forms, letters, and processes to 10 assure, you know, both traceability and administrative 11 controls and those kinds of things. i 12 That's not, even when such a system exists, _ 13 and, if you will, meets all the essential elements or i i O' 14 .maybe even goes beyond meeting the essential elements of I 15 the quality requirements for interface, it's not always 16 the best way of doing business. . 17 I would also agree that independent of how good 18 one's formal lines of communication maybe, how defined 19 they may be, how standardized they may be relative to the 20 forms and methods and sequence, those kinds of things, a 21 lot of work can be done and and a lot better information 22 flow can occur when informal routine communications are 23 addressed. And some of the discussions in the specific I 24 discipline findings or particularly in the question and 25 response, there seemed to be some concern on the part of O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13593 () 1 Quadrex relative to whether or not enough of that 2 communication seemed to be occurring. And for that 3 reason, you know, I characterized that as being their 4 suggestion that better means might be available to 5 encourage more and better informal communications. 6 A (By Mr. Bernsen) I think to amplify that, that 7 it seemed like the only logical way to interpret the 8 comment, because there wasn't evidence that formal 9 procedures weren't being followed or anything of that 10 sort. There wasn't any questioning that they didn't see 11 people who were supposed to perform functions. The 12 . people who were supposed to perform functions seemed to 13 be performing them so that all we were really left with b,_

'- 14  was that area of informal interaction that's nice to 15  have, certainly, but it's below a level of a formal 16  requirement.

17 Q Let me ask you to look at question C-1, Quadrex 18 assessment, items A and B. 19 A (By Mr. Lopez) A and B, you say? 20 Q 'Yes. 21 Q Do you see those findings as perhaps related to 22 question -- the notations in question 28? The quoted 23 sentence in question 28? 24 A (By Mr. Lopez) Well, in one sense, I believe 25 so. We discussed in our -- in another part of our () ' TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13594

       )

1. written testimony the question of this input / output 2 interface question about whether or not -- you know, who 3 has the responsibility, if you will, for a review of the

         -4  use of data that's transferred from one organization to 5 another and seeing to it that it's properly applied.

6 You know, in a formal sense, it's quite 7 possible to rely upon informal procedures and review and 8 comment. I think as we pointed out in'our written 9 testimony it's always desirable and we would certainly 10 highly encourage any organization that has, one, 11 qualified individuals who know the potential uses of 12 their information, two, as best they can, help support

     -   13  the proper use of that.

A

    ')   14             It is very difficult to establish formal 15  procedures that will always guarantee that because of the 16  variabilities that exist in both experience level of 17  individuals and as well as, you know, the varying 18  applications that can be applied to input data.

19 So in a formal sense, it's very difficult to 20 impose a requirement as an example, that one discipline 21 be responsible for the correct use of its data always

,'.      22  because they may not -- either may not have the right 23  people with the right experience to know that; or 24  secondly, they may not know all uses that are intended 25  for it and it would be very difficult to accomplish that O

TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442 l

13595

   )       1 by formal procedures.

2 So it's always a good idea to have informal 3 communications where that's appropriate, given the 4 experience of the people involved. So I think in that 5 sense, it seems as if in particular in question C-1, 6 Quadrex was getting at in those two items, that sort of 7 discussion, if you will, an understanding by a supplying 8 discipline of how the input that they're providing is 9 going to be used by others. 10 0 Would it be difficult to achieve what Quadrex 11 seeks in finding F in the same question? 12 A (By Mr. Lopez) Same question being C-1? .

 .        13      Q    Yes, whether it would be difficult to achieve
                                  ~

f'/T A- 14 at least a receipt of really important data transmitted 15 to a discipline acknowledging back the discipline that 16 sent it that you had gotten it. 17 A What do you mean "would it be difficult to 18 achieve that." 19 0 The discussion we just had, Mr. Lopez' 20 testimony was that A and B are a bit difficult to achieve 21 because it's hard to define, there's so much variability, 22 that sometimes you send instructions, sometimes you don't 23 send instructions, so setting up the procedure on when 24 you sen them, when you don't is not easy. That was his 25 testimony, if I'm correct. O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

                                    -    -          .- ~

13596 I 1 A .(By Mr. Lopez) That's essentially correct. 2 Q Simplification of your testimony. Whereas item i 3 F seems to be something fairly straight- forward that 4 could be achieved. 5 A (By Mr. Bernsen) It is and could be -- it 6 isn't -- within a-single organization, it isn't normally 7 considered necessary to be that formal. And in fact, l 8 this has been recognized in the QA standards, that the 9 level of formality in the transmittal and acknowledgment 10 of information can vary. 11 A (By Mr. Lopez) To further amplify that, it is l l 12 different from what I was discussing earlier relative to 13 the variablities, a mere acknowledgment is not a major .! .() 14 issue that would vary much. But as Dr. Bernsen has 15 pointed out, it's also not that common practice. 16 Q Staying in answer 28 for a moment, I think if 17 you reference back, you'll see that we're still in 18 3.1 (a) , if I'm correct. 19 For example, question 26 is the closest 20 reference to this question of a generic -- are you with 21 me on that observation? 22 A (By Mr. Lopez) I'm trying -- 23 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: You don't get the 3.l(b) 24 until.you get to page 29. 25 MR. SINKIN: That's right. O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442-

I 13597 1 l l 1 A (By Mr. Bernsen) Okay. 2 A (By Mr. Lopez) Yes. 1 3 0 Would it be correct that the second -- the l 4 third sentence of answer 28 is really 3.l(b) and not i 5 3.l(a) ? 6 MR. FRANTZ: Excuse me, Mr. Sinkin, I'm not 7 sure what you mean is this really 3.l(b) rather than 8 3.l(a) . 9 MR. SINKIN: A discipline supplying data to 10 another discipline was not checking to see that the data 11 were being properly used. 12 MR. FRANTZ: Are you saying that's also a 13 concern of 3.1(a) or concern of 3.1(b). .o 14 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Is that also a concern of 15 3.l(b) as well as 3.1(a). 16 A (By Mr. Lopez) I think that's fair, yes. 17 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Yes. 18 A (By Mr. Lopez) As was pointed out, there are a 19 number of instances, particularly through the generics, a 20 common thought, a common concern expressed, in more than 21 one generic finding. 22 MR. FRANTZ: Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Sinkin has 23 reached a break point, it might be helpful to take a 24 break here. 25 MR. SINKIN: Sure. -) I 1 TATE REPORTING' SERVICE, 498-8442

13598 'q-(_) 1 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: A fairly short break, I 2 guess. 3 (Recess.) 4 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay, back on the record. 5 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) In question and answer 31, the 6 last line of page 26, you state criterion 6 does not 7 require the issuance of a particular type of design 8 criteria. Does criterion of 6 require that there be a 9 design criteria? 10 A (By Mr. Bernsen) Just to check. I think that 11 the more appropriate reference, of course, to the issue 12 or the concept of design criteria would be found in 13 criterion 3. O 14 - But then, if you have controlled criteria, then 15 6 would cover it -- the process of control. 16 MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, at this point in the 17 testimony, we have what is at best an anomaly and I'll 18 just tell what you the problem is and we can figure out 19 what to do with it. 20 A paragraph has been taken from CCANP's motion 21 of November 1981 that was not intended to actually be an 22 example of the contention but was the context for the 23 other two examples of the contention. And yet it has 24 been taken -- there's three paragraphs in the actual 25 contention, two of them are from different generic O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13599 (;) 1 findings than this one and what has happened is they've 2 taken the first paragraph and said, "Does this violate a 3 certain criteria?" when there was no intention in CCANP's 4 part to even say that that paragraph demonstrated a 5 violation, it set the context for the other two i 6 paragraphs. 7 So essentially, the question and answer 32 8 doesn't address anything that we ever meant to put into 9 issue. I don't know what we could about that. f 10 MR. FRANTZ: I can appreciate your concern, Mr. 11 Sinkin. I think the testimony probably stands as it is ! '12 and why don't you just ask any questions trying to 13 connect up the sentences if you wish to do so.

  .O                         14                   MR. SINKIN:                                                Okay.

15 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) You finish your response to I 16 3.1(b) on page 29. My question is where in your 17 testimony -- 18 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Sinkin, A or B. 19 MR. SINKIN: They finish B? l 20 JUDGE LAMB: No. 21 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: They finish A? 22 MR. SINKIN: Finish A, begin B, excuse me. 23 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) You describe the concerns 1, 24 expressed in 3.l(b) in question and answer 35. And when 25 I look at 3.l(b) , see three different concerns that are !() f TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13600 e~ (m)s 1 not expressed there and I want to just touch those with 2 you and ask you to address them. 3 In section two, I'm sorry, in section three, 4 while you have addressed the second sentence, the first 5 sentence is saying that Brown & Root's review of vendor 6 submitted reports is not consistent and that sometimes 7 they are poorly done. Can you tell me where you have 8 addressed that part of the generic, as to whether you 9 find it potentially reportable or not? 10 A (By Mr. Bernuen) Perhaps while you're doing 11 some research, I could give a general comment that the -- 12 the specific sentence appears to be an observation, and 13 nothing more. 14 It identifies no deficiency specifically or , 15 really any quality assurance or quality program 16 deficiency that I could visualize. It's strictly an 17 observation. One would have to get the follow-up 18 information that says that as a result of the review, we 19 found deficiencies in vendor submitted reports that had 20 some safety significance. And that doesn't appear to be 21 the case. So that it appears to be merely an observation 22 which doesn't need to be addressed as a potential finding 23 or anything of the sort. 24 Q Let me ask you to turn to question M-49, the , 25 Quadrex assessment, item three, where the conclusion of O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13601 ['T (_/ 1 Quadrex is that Brown & Root review of this vendor report 2 was seriously deficient. 3 My question would be whether item F, item three 4 in the Quadrex report, the assessment of M-49 represents 5 to you a quality assurance problem? 6 A (By Mr. Lopez) Okay, I reviewed the various 7 documents and I've got to admit I was reading when you 8 were asking the question and I think I heard part of the 9 question. Could you repeat it again, it was relative to 10 whether or not we had considered M-49. 11 Q Whether M-49, the Quadrex assessment, item 12 three, represented a quality assurance problem to you. 13 A (By Dr. Bernsen) I disagree. I would have to O 14 know more about it. It could -- let's say it could. 15 A (By Mr. Lopez) I don't recall a specific 16 review of that item number three. 17 A (By Dr. Bernsen) We did not look at that 18 specifically. It is addressed in the Bechtel task force 19 line item 167. 20 0 Which I believe states that Bechtel agrees with 21 Quadrex? 22 A (By Mr. Bernsen) Has a concern with regard to 23 the roughage questions, right. 24 (No hiatus.) 25 O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

n s-~~ l 13602 1 Q Well, in response to questioning from your

  }

2 attorney in direct, you were asked if you had considered 3 4 . 5 . 5.1 (c) in your consideration of generic finding 4 3.1 (b) . 4 . 5 . 5.1 ( c) clearly references M-49 as one of 5 the questions. 6 When you answered yes to that question, were ' 7 you saying that you only looked at the discipline l 8 finding, but did not look at the underlying question? 9 A (By Mr. Lopez) No, that wasn't my intention. 10 I was attempting to respond to both the discipline 11 finding and the underlying questions, but I must admit I 12 -don't recall the specific itsm number 3 under the O 13 Quadrex assessment when I was re' viewing that. 14 Q And let me just get a feel for the process you 15 went through just now. You reviewed a number of 16 documents in order to reach your conclusion as to 17 whether you had looked at this particular question. And 18 the documents you looked at -- well, if you would, tell 19 me which documents you used as the fundamental basis of 20 your testimony. 21 A The testimony, the written testimony? 22 Q The written testimony. 23 A Okay. O 24 I think, as I described earlier, the first 25 thing that I did, and I think the question was related TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

     -srv-                                                                     q 13603    l

('; 1 to the generic finding, was to try to review the generic 2 finding to see if I, in my mind, could capture what I 3 felt was the significant issue that Quadrex was 4 attempting to address. The way I viewed that particular 5 aspect, the relevant information that Quadrex was 6 attempting to reach in 3.1(b) , was a concern relative to 7 the variability of the review of vendor reports being 8 done by Brown & Root. And in that respect, I was 9 looking at the underlying questions to try to see if I 10 could determine whether or not there was, one, a basis 11 for the statement of, if you will, variability. 12 I think the terminology that Quadrex used was 13 quality of review, although Mr. Stanley testified that 14 he was not thinking of that in the sense of quality 15 assurance but more in the sense of the depth of review 16 that was being performed by the reviewers. And in that 17 sense, you know, I was attempting to try to determine 18 whether or not there was a general agreement that there 19 was a variation in the depth of the review that was 20 performed. 21 0 So, you looked at the Quadrex report? 22 A And I should make one other point. And, in 23 addition, with respect to the 3.1(b) discussion, further 24 relative to whether or not there were procedures for 25 documenting those reviews, which is also a part of the TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

w l 13604 j ]) 1 ~ question that's being raised under 4.5.5.1(c) . So, the 2 emphasis of my assessment, if you will, went to the 3 variation in the reviews and whether or not I felt there 4 were procedures in place for documenting those reviews. 5 Q But in responding to my question, my question 6 was really what basic documents you looked at. For 7 example, I noticed that you came to get the NRC NUREG 8 0948. Is that one of the documents you used in 9 generating your testimony? 10 A Not really. The reason that I went to that 11 docun:ent is that as part of the report, the NRC 12 attempted to develop some form of cross-reference 13 between questions and discipline findings and generic 14 findings and I wanted to make sure that I got quickly to 15 the discipline finding that related to that. Since you 16 had identified the question, I did not clearly recall 17 which discipline finding related to it, so I used it for 18 that purpose, not -- 19 Q Did you get to 4.5.5.1 before I mentioned it? 20 You were already there when I mentioned it? 21 A Yes. 22 Q Right. 23 A Yes. O 24 Q By using NUREG 0948? 25 A Used NUREG as a -- basically what I did was I TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 13605

~                                                                         '

1 looked at I believe it was Appendix C of that-document /J" 2 which lists the various questions and the discipline 3 findings that reference it. So, if I went there, found 4 that -- there's a series of questions, 4.5.5.1 and 5 3.1(b) identified as referencing that. So, it was 6 merely a shortcut to try to get to the discipline 7 finding. 8 Q Back to you, Dr. Bernsen. Your statement was 9 before you could say there was a quality assurance 10 problem in item 3, you'd have to have more information. 11 A (By Dr. Bernsen) Yes. I mean, first of all, 12 there's no indication from, say, an engineering review O 13 of that observation in the assessment or in the question 14 that there was a significant safety problem associated 15 with the component. So that from a quality assurance 16 standpoint, I would not have been advised that there was 17 a significant problem. , i 18 Now, as I say, I don't know why engineering 1 19 judgments indicated that that particular statement in 20 the Quadrex report was a non-significant issue. And, 21 therefore, I'd say I'd have to know more about it. 22 You understand what I'm saying? 23 0 I missed a little bit. You said engineering () 24 judgment determined this was not a non-significant 25 issue? TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 13606 (~} 1 A What I'm saying is that no technical review v 2 has indicated that 4.5.5.1(c) and the underlying 3 questions resulted in a significant deficiency. 4 Q Well, let me ask you, with your quality 5 assurance hat on, if you're looking at this what Quadrex 6 says is even a cursory examination, not even an in-depth 7 examination of a vendor's stress report that contains 8 items A, B, C, D and E in that report, and this is an 9 item that Brown & Root has gotten and reviewed and it 10 still has these things in it, do you not feel then at 11 that point you have enough information to know that you

12. have a potential quality assurance problem?

13 A Not without additional information. 14 Q And the additional information would come from 15 engineering evaluating the actual component that was 16 ordered through this report? 17 A I think first of all I'd need to know 18 specifically what were the requirements, what was the 19 status of the document review, did the engineer consider 20 that the results were acceptable on some other basis. 21 None of that information is available, so I don't really 22 know whether this is'merely an observation or whether 23 it's a specific violation or finding with regard to the O' 24 requirements. That information is not contained , 25 therein. It's not a complete story or picture of the TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 ]

13607 f~) v 1 situation. 2 Q And you would have to have the complete story 3 before you would consider it a potential quality 4 assurance problem? 5 A Unless engineering told me that their judgment 6 was that this was a deficiency -- 7 Q So, you would -- 8 A -- of some significance. 9 Q Excuse me. Of significance you said? 10 A Yes. 11 Q You would send this identification of the v 12 problem 3 over to engineering and say tell me if this is (l) - 13 significant, is that what you're saying? 14 A Yeah. Essentially give me more information. 15 At this stage it's an observation that needs further 16 follow-up. 17 0 Looking at question M-50, Dr. Bernsen, in the 18 Brown & Root response, first of all, in the last line it 19 states that no special operability tests are performed 20 for valves which must operate during pipe rupture. Do 21 you consider that a quality assurance problem? 22 A Not without some engineering evaluation of 23 whether that was necessary. I do know that valves of ' 24 certain sizes and types are qualified or can be 25 qualified by analysis. I also know that it's preferred TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13608 {} 1 to do it by testing. But I think again I'd have to rely 2 on some engineering evaluation of whether this was a 1 3 significant deficiency. 4 Q Are valves that must operate during pipe 5 rupture qualified by analysis? 6 A (By Mr. Lopez) You know, valves that are -- 7 all valves that have to be addressed with regard to 8 operability can be qualified either by analysis or by 9 testing or in some cases a combination of both, 10 regardless of whether or not pipe rupture is the 11 consideration.

.. 12      Q     So, you would disagree --

O 13 A Well, let me further state, the pipe rupture 14 oftentimes leads to an analysis by some form of analysis 15 because the loadings that are specified for pipe rupture 16 are severe enough to cause great difficulty in simply 17 testing it. It's very difficult sometimes to put the 18 kinds of -- to simulate the kinds of loads that are 19 predicted. So, oftentimes an analysis is the only 20 practical way, usually an analysis in combination with 21 some operability testing or based on prototypes or 22 something along those lines. 23 Q So, turning to the Quadrex assessment on the O 24 next page, item 2, you would disagree with the Quadrex 25 position on this? TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13609 hN 1 MR. FRANTZ: I'm going to object to this O 2 entire line of cross-examination. I'm not sure what the 3 relevance is to finding 3.1(b) which is the finding I 4 believe which is at issue here. 5 MR. SINKIN: Well, 3.1(b) references -- well, 6 we got from 3.1(b) to 4.5.5.1 (c) which they said they 7 had reviewed as part of their review of 3.1(b) . 8 4 . 5 . 5 .1 ( c) references question M-50. 9 MR. FRANTZ: And M-50 has several parts, 10 including part 4 which talks about guidelines for review 11 and approval of vendor reports. I don't see where the 12 remainder of that question and answer in the assessment l'~#l 13 is relevant. 14 0 (By Mr. Sinkin) Well, let's talk about item 15 4, Dr. Bernsen. I think we need to set a context here. 16 Let's say you're HL&P. You hired a 17 consultant. They've spent 2400 hours evaluating the 18 design and engineering program of your architect 19 engineer and they have presented you with this report. 20 And a finding is that Brown & Root has no procedure 21 providing guidelines for the consistent review and 22 approval of vendor reports. Do you consider that you  ;

                                                                                 )

23 have a quality assurance problem on your hands? ') l 24 A (By Dr. Bernsen) No.

       '25       0     Why not?

l TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e 13610 (]}; 1 A Because guidelines for reviews are generally 2 considered desirable documents but not essential 3 documents. There are basic procedures for the review, 4 indicating the process of review, designating 5 responsibilities and things of this nature. But -- 6 except for very general guidelines and procedures such 7 as, you know, making sure that the -- general 8 instructions on making sure that it meets the 9 specification requirements and perhaps some generalized 10 observations on things like fit, anchor bolt locations, l'1 things of this nature, it isn't essential to have 12 detailed guidelines, no. 13 Now, Frank, do their procedures contain 14 guidance on review of vendor documents? I thought they 15 did. 16 A (By Mr. Lopez) They do indicate guidance on 17 the review and what should be looked at. 18 I think, as we commented in our testimony in 19 response to question 39, on, yes, answer 39 on page 39, 20 that we agree with Quadrex that it is a good practice to 21 provide additional guidance for the review of vendor 22 reports in addition to what was shown in their 23 procedures. O 24 I think it's worthwhile pointing out that 25 particularly with respect to the items in the ASME area, TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

mrtw 13611 (~) 1 which my recollection was that was the area that was s/ 2 being discussed particularly with regard to M-49, a 3 somewhat unique situation relative to quality assurance 4 applies in that the industry has established through the 5 ASME code and the, if you will, industry quality 6 assurance programs that apply, recognize that detailed 7 technical expertise of various organizations that are 8 certified to operate under the quality assurance program 9 umbrella of the ASME code, that they have their 10 technical adequacy and the, if you will, the quality 11 assurance aspects of how they perform their work, their g- 12 technical adequacy as well as QA progranmatic adequacy

    ~

13 reviewed by the ASME code, the AShE code committees. 14 Part of the reason for that is that, once 15 again, it's a question of technical expertise and also 16 to provide some consistent industry-wide guidance not 17 necessarily requiring, as an example, a recipient user 18 of ASME code items having to have the technical , 1 19 expertise within his organization to review technical J 20 adequacy of work done by designers, analysts, that may ) 1 21 only exist in a contracted organization like the ASME 22 valves. 23 The way that the ASME code attempts to try to 24 provide assurances that individual, if you will, users 25 or individual organizations that may contract for ASME TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 ___

      %Me 13612

() 1 code items, some assurance that they can rely upon, if 2 you will, this umbrella quality assurance activity are 3 the procedures that they establish for auditing of those 4 organizations, technical review of those organizations, 5 certification of those organizations and their 6 authorization to certify their own documents, if you 7 will, to perform design verifications of technical 8 adequacy of their own work. So that recipient 9 organizations need not have the same level of technical 10 expertise in their organization to be able to 11 independently judge the technical adequacy of what's -- 12 Q But the situation we're in here is if you're 13 Brown & Root, you received an item, you received a 14 vendor report. I'm Quadrex. I come along, I look at 15 the vendor report and I find that the stresses were not 16 calculated for the ASME 3 code and I tell you that. 17 A Right. 18 Q Now, do you consider you have a quality 19 assurance problem? Maybe it's at the vendor. 20 A Well --  ; 21 A (By Dr. Bernsen) You've got to understand, 22 you're postulating a situation that may or may not exist 23 here. I don't know what the true story is. That's a ' O 24 Quadrex observation. 25 Now, recognize that Quadrex observations were TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442 _ - - -. - - -

utrue j 13613 () 1 reviewed by Brown & Root at the time. They have been 2 reviewed by Bechtel experts subsequently. To my I 3 knowledge, none of these reviewers have identified that 4 specific item as a significant deficiency so that there 5 may be a story that isn't apparent here and you're 6 speculating that there's more to it than there may be. 7 0 I'm putting myself in the position of HL&P on 8 May the 8th, 1981. This is what they have with the 9 Brown & Root response. 10 A With advice from Brown & Root. 11 Q Now, is there something in the Brown & Root ,s 12 response that tells you you don't have a quality %-] , 13 assurance problem in item 3 of question M-497 14 A (By Mr. Lopez) May I see that? 15 MR. FRANTZ: I think this question's been 16 asked at least twice before whether item 3 in M-49 17 presents a quality assurance problem. 18 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) The question is is there 19 something in the Brown & Root response delivered May 8, 20 1981, that tells you you don't have a quality assurance 21 problem. Is there some basis in that for saying you 22 don't have a quality assurance problem. 23 A (By Mr. Lopez) The Brown & Root sheet for 24 this indicated that there was insufficient data for 25 assessment. They saw no evidence this concerned impacts TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

e r l 13614 !(]) 1 of safety to the public and, therefore, did not consider 2 it reportable. They went on to say that the programs 3 established for verifying the seismic and 1-E r 4 qualification report adequacy. I think they're 5 addressing once again the general scope of that 6 discipline finding rather than each individual line item 7 in the questions that were referenced, or apparently so. 8 And I guess I would like to add that the way I 9 see Quadrex' assessment of the M-49 question is that the 10 B&R review of this vendor report was seriously 11 deficient, but that the review of this report was 12 deficient. 13 The point I was trying to make relative to 14 Brown & Root's technical expertise to review stress 15 analysis performed by an ASME certified supplier might 16 make it quite likely that they would not necessarily be 17 able to perform the level of detailed review to be able 18 to determine that adequacy. They might not have the 19 people available for that. Quadrex was commenting on 20 the fact. that they found that to be a concern. 21 I also believe that, once again, in referring 22 to Mr. Stanley's testimony of yesterday, that you asked 23 him whether or not in this particular area relative to () 24 vendor report review he saw any quality assurance 25 problems with any of the findings in questions that they TATE REPORTING (713) 498-0442

13615 () 1 found and he indicated that he did not. 2 Q All I'm asking is do you agree with that? , 3 A Based upon the information that I have here, 4 yes. But I don't know -- I cannot honestly say that I 5 know the resolution of the specific questions that were 6 addressed in item 3 of the Quadrex assessment of M-49. 7 0 On May 8th, 1981, did HL&P know the resolution 8 of those items? 9 A Not to my knowledge. The statement in the 10 Brown & Root response does not indicate anything that I 11 can see specifically addressing that item. I don't know 12 if they may have had it from some other source. (:) 13 Do you know of any source other than the Brown Q 14 & Root comments that the Houston review team had with 15 them in that meeting? Or are you saying just -- 16 A I don't know of any myself. The only thing 17 that I have heard in testimony here were statements by 18 Mr. Goldberg and Dr. Sumpter that they also had some -- 19 apparently had some information based upon their own 20 knowledge. But I'm not aware of that. 21 JUDGE DECllHOEFER: Mr. Lopez, in a situation 22 like that, would you consider that the matter might be 23 considered potentially reportable and subject to later 24 withdrawal if it turns out not to bo? 25 liR. LOPEZ: Well, I think without, you know, TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13616 . O 1 going back to the -- what I would do in a situation like 2 that, confronted with that in this fashion would be to  ! i 3 try to determine with the help of whatever engineering 4 expertise was available to me, first of all, whether or i 5 not the statements that were made were, in fact, correct 6 clearly. And, secondly, if correct, whether or not I 7 saw any potential for safety significance in those  ! 8 findings. 9 The statements as I read them may or may not t 10 have such implications. And without looking at the l t 11 specific comment against the document that's being 12 reviewed, I would have a difficult time judging that, . l 13 you know, in isolation of that information. - 14 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: At least insofar as safety 15 significance is concerned, do not the I&E guidelines l 16 suggest that that kind of thing be reported when the 17 safety significance is determined or not determined, as l [ 18 the case may be, the matter then be either withdrawn or 19 confirmed? The I&E guidelines that I'm referring to are [ I 20 the ones that say if you can't determine within fourteen i i 21 days, report it and then determine it later.  ! i 22 MR. LOPEZ The April 1, 1980, I&E guidance i 23 manual or I&E guidance -- O 24 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Either of you. i 25 DR. BERNSEN: I think we're going pretty far ( TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13617 I beyond the substance of that observation, though, ([ }) 2 because at least you have to find out whether there's a 3 deficiency. That's really what Frank is saying. 4 In other words, what was the nature of the 5 report they reviewed? Was it the final report? Was it 6 certified by a professional engineer? Was there a 7 preliminary report? Was that requirement in the 8 specification an essential requirement? You know, is it 9 really a deficiency? 10 Perhaps if the investigation -- if the 11 identification of its safety significance beyond that 7-~s 12 point was not easy to determine, then I believe that one ( ) 1 13 would report it as potential. It may bo U.at it was 14 clearly easy to identify the lack of e4rety 15 cignificance. But there's a lot of speculative things 16 here that we don't have with regard to that question and 17 that's the problem. If you pose a hypothetical, it 18 would be a lot easier. 19 0 (By Mr. Binkin) Dr. Bernoon, let me -- 20 MR. SINKIN: Do you have a quantion, Judge 21 Shon? 22 JUDOC SlfCN: Yeah, I think. 23 Thin epocific thing that we're talking about (,_) 24 here in qutstion 11-49 in thin Gundrox achoacmont 3 nayn 25 thingo like the ntroncoa woro not calculated according TATE REPORTING (713) 498-0442

w 13618 (]) I to the ASME 3 code, there's no summary of applied loads 2 and all that sort of thing. And the valves referred to 3 are evidently supposed to be qualified for seismic 4 loading. At least it says so, a page before that it 5 mentions seismic loads. 6 Isn't it sort of reasonable to presume that 7 they're important to safety one way or another if 8 they've got to qualify for ASME 3 and seismicity and all 9 that sort of thing? I mein -- 10 MR. LOPEZ: Well, I think it's safe to assumo 11 that by virtue of them having been specified as ASME 12 code valves, it was probably that these valves were 13 being used in some safety-related service. I say _ 14 probably because Brown & Root did have some systems for 15 which they specified ASME code requirements for 16 non-safety-related systems, but that's -- I think the 17 initial presumption would be that this valve order, if 18 you will, the entire specification probably went to 19 purchase all butterfly valves whether they be 20 safety-related applications or not. That would be the , 21 normal expectation. In other words, they would l 22 typically not have a separate -- 23 JUDGE SHON: You would specify all the ( 24 butterfly valves to safety-related specs whether they l 25 needed them or not? TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

        =

i 13619 1 1 MR. LOPEZ: No, no, no. All the valves which (] 2 they had committed to provide as ASME valves would 3 typically be ordered under the same specification.  ; 4 There were some instances where they were using ASME ' 5 code requirements for systems that were not 6 safety-related. 7 JUDGE SHON: Well, it just seemed to me 8 natural to assume from what has been said here that, 9 first of all, the valves ordered probably had a safety 10 application. 11 MR. LOPEz: I agreed with that aspect of your , 12 question. ,

O 13 JUDGE SHON: And, secondly, that they probably t

14 were not handled properly in the exchange with the 15 vendor since the vendor didn't calculate the stresses at l 16 all. It seems -- l 17 MR. LOPEE: I don't think that's -- that's not 18 the way that I characterize it. It says the stresses , 19 were not calculated per the code. I don't -- I was not i 20 reading that to mean that they weren't done, only that , i

    '!1   the reviewer did not seem to think it was in accordance 22    with the code.                                                                                   ,

23 JUDGE SHON: I see. Well, then it seems as if l O 24 these things that you have specified and that you have 1 i l 25 mentioned that they may not have been safety-related, it  ! [ TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13620 []} 1 may have been done right and all this sort of thing, at 2 least at first flush don't seem to offer an out from 3 this sort of thing. It looks as if there was a mistake 4 made and it was in the safety-related system, doesn't 5 it? At least at first glance? 6 DR. BERNSEN: It looks like there may be a 7 mistake, as you say or characterize a mistake. But what 8 I am really saying is now from a QA perspective, let's 9 forget the engineering because I think that it's been 10 fairly -- a number of people have gone over this finding 11 and the underlying questions and not found it necessary 12 to consider this potentially reportable or reportable or O 13 anything of the sort. There must be some underlying 14 reasons that we don't have obvious to us right now. 15 Now, I can't consider a suspected deficiency 16 on a single component that isn't considered potentially i 17 reportable as evidence of a QA program breakdown. ! 18 That's really what I'm trying to get at. That I -- 19 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, Dr. Bernsen, you're 20 supposed to be determining or telling us whether it is 21 I potentially reportable or reportable. So -- { 22 DR. BERNSEN: Okay. But I guess there's two

 ,                 23                                     aspects.                         One is the question of program breakdown, j'                  24                                    generic problem, significant breakdown.                              And I really 25                                    can't see how a non-potentially reportable item could be TATE REPORTING          (713) 498-8442

13621 (} 1 considered -- a single case or even several could be 2 considered as evidence of a program breakdown. That's 3 the first thing. 4 MR. FRANTZ: Mr. Chairman, I might also note 5 that we are offering these witnesses purely from the 6 standpoint of determining whether or not there is a 7 significant quality assurance breakdown evidenced in the 8 specific findings called out by the Board. We did not 9 ask them to perform a review to determine whether or not 10 there was a significant deficiency in the final design 11 for release for construction. Therefore, they have not 12 gone through the types of engineering analysis you might () 13 need to determine the safety significance of some of l 14 these findings. 15 JUDGE LAMB: If you read the first item under 16 the Quadrex assessment, you come out with -- well, let 17 me ask you whether that establishes the context in which 18 it says that the seismic load seems unduly restrictive 19 and talks about financial impact. Are they saying, in h J l 20 effect, that this is an overly conservative approach in 21 your view or not? 22 MR. LOPEZ: In that line item, yes. 23 JUDGE LAMB: Now, does item 3 fall within that O 24 context or not? 25 DR. BERNSEN: Not necessarily and technically TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

W 13622 1 probably not. If these valves were specified to the ( }) 2 code and if they're talking about a code-covered portion 3 of the valve, then a serious design deficiency in 4 implementing the code would be cause for concern. 5 Now, it may turn out, however, that the 6 designer could say, well, I over-specified my 7 requirements and even though this analysis shows some 8 deficiency, I can't change my requirements and make it 9 comply with the code. 10 So, there's all kinds of options. But I'm not 11 sure that the two are -- I can' t say they' re related or 12 not related. 13 ' JUDGE LAMB: Thank you. 14 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Let me -- 15 MR. SINKIN: Are you finished? 16 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes. Go ahead. 17 Q (By fir. Sinkin) Well, Mr. Bernsen, let me ask 18 you, in the draft of the Bechtel task force report in 19 the response to item 167, line item 167, did Bechtel 20 take the position that Brown & Root's approach to vendor 21 review was reasonable and ignore the specific quality 22 problems pointed out by Quadrex? Is that not what Mr. 23 Stanley is complaining about in comment 30 of CCANP 104, O 24 and actually an Applicants' -- 25 MR. FRANTZ: We now have a question pending TATE REPORTING _ (713) 498-8442

e 13623 () 1 already. 2 MR. SINKIN: I'm sorry. He's looking at 3 Applicants' 72 where all this information is contained. 4 A (By Dr. Bernsen) I don't have the draft' task 5 force assessment in front of me. I'm not sure that's 6 available. I have a comment from the task force that 7 says they revised both its assessment and assigned 8 category to accommodate the Quadrex comment. 9 (No hiatus.) 10 11 -

)

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 0 24 25 TATE REPORTING (713) 498-8442

13624 1 Q Was catogory 6 previously changed to 2 catogory 47 3 A (By Dr. Bernsen) That's what the footnote 4 shows. 5 0 Haven't you, in fact, done the very same thing 6 in preparing your testimony for this hearing that was 7 done in the draft of the Bechtel task force report, 8 ignore the specific quality problems and abstract a 9 general question as to whether Brown & Root's vendor 10 procedures are adequate? 11 A I don't think so. That's still my position, 12 that in the context of what we're addressing, the 13 questions were addressing, I don't think it changes. O 14 Q Can you tell me how you would prepare testimony - 15 to respond to whether item 3.l(b), a generic, finding is 16 reportable or potentially reportable and not look at 17 question M-49? 18 MR. FRANTZ: I object. There is no foundation 19 for that question. 20 MR. SINKIN: The witness said he did not review question 21 M-49. 22 MR. FRANTZ: He never said that. 23 JUDGE BECHBOEFER: I thought he said in 24 conjunction with this particular finding, he didn't. But 25 maybe I'm wrong. /^') \~) TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13625

)     1        A      (By Mr. Lopez)   I think what I testified to was 2 to the relevance of the -- as I understood the Quadrex 3 comment which was relative to the availability in the 4 review and as to the documentation of the vendor report 5 review process.

6 Q (By Mr. Sinkin) Let's get this straight. Did 7 you look at -- Mr. Lopez, did you look at question M-49 8 when preparing your testimony on whether generic finding 9 3.l(b) was potentially reportable? 10 A (By Mr. Lopez) As I think I testified earlier -- 11 yes, to the question -- I looked at the question. But as 12 I have testified, I looked at it primarily with respect 13 to whether or not it tended to confirm or not the O 14 statement from Quadrex as to whether or not there was a 15 variation in the depth of vendor report reviews. 16 Q And did you find there was a variation in the 17 depth of vendor report reviews? 18 A Yes, I did. The variation -- I did not find -- 19 I did not determine from my review that I found a 20 significant quality assurance program breakdown in the l 21 process of vendor report review, which is -- which was 22 the primary purpose of my testimony. 23 Q I believe in discussing a significant quality 24 assurance breakdown, Dr. Bernsen, you used the term 25 " generic." Is that correct? O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13626 (,) 1 A (By Mr. Bernsen) I believe I used the term 2 " generic." 3 Q But you in the context of the word " generic," 4 will you tell me how you're using the word to determine 5 whether you have a significant quality assurance 6 breakdown? 7 A With regard to a process or procedure or 8 practice, evidence of more than single isolated 9 occurrences, a more generalized condition. 10 0 50.55(e) says, "A significant breakdown in any 11 portion of the quality assurance program. Is the review 12 of vendor submitted reports part of the quality assurance 13 program? 14 A Yes, review of -- review of vendor documents 15 is a procedure that's generally covered in the 16 engineering program, yes. 17 0 Can you point me out, Mr. Lopez, in answer 35, 18 where the problem of the variability in vendor reports is 19 called forth in your testimony? 20 A (By Mr. Lopez) I did not respond to that 21 particular portion at the response to question 35. 35 22 was merely trying to summarize the characterization of 23 3.l(b). I attempted to respond; we attempted to respond 24 to that question later on at response to question number 25 39.

 /N TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13627 fs =

 \,)   1        Q    Can you point me out in answer 39 where you're 2   addressing the variation in vendor reports?

3 A (By Mr. Bernsen) It doesn't say " variation of 4 vendor reports." 5 A (By Mr. Lopez) I didn't use that terminology. 6 I point to what my testimony -- how my testimony 7 attempted to deal with that. I didn't use the 8 terminology variation of vendor report reviews. 9 0 But you told me earlier that variation of 10 vendor reports was how you perceived the generics. Am I 11 correct? 12 A Not variation in the reports, themselves. 13 . D The vendor --

    ) 14        A    Inconsistent review of the vendor reports, 15   themselves; the variation in how those reports were 16   reviewed by Brown & Root engineers.         That seemed to be 17   the way I understood the Quadrex concern.

18 Okay, would you ask the question again? 19 Q Are you saying that answer 39 responds to the 20 variation in how Brown & Root reviews vendor reports? 21 A I believe so. 22 Q Can you show me were in 39, or is it the entire 23 answer? 24 A It's encompassed in the whole answer but I can 25 point to specific sections in you would like. O TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13628 (m) 1 A In the initial response, it's indicated that it 2 appears that Quadrex was concerned with the extent to 3 which Brown & Root was performing these functions rather 4 than their total absence, which is reviewing, verifying 5 the work of subcontractors and vendors. And then in 6 general discussion of that, we talk about the methods 7 that are typically used by architect engineers, 8 purchasers that, is to confirm the adequacy of activities 9 performed by suppliers in terms of the kinds of reviews 10 that are performed, including the inspections of products 11 upon delivery of which a review might be one example. 12 Then particularly with respect to the

 . 13 verification aspects relative to those checks or design 14 reviews or work done by other subcontractors or vendors, 15 we addressed the question of whether or not it is always 16 possible or practical for a purchaser to have the 17 technical expertise to perform such reviews and whether 18 or not reliance upon the vendors own verification process 19 might be appropriate under Appendix B.

20 0 That's the same response you gave when you were 21 discussing item A in M-49, the stresses not calculated 22 per the ASME III code. Were you responding directly to 23 M-49, item 3-A when you wrote that statement? 24 A Item 3-A. 25 Q That's the stresses not calculated per ASME III O-TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13629 c_ () I code. 2 A I think as I've previously testified, I don't -- 3 you know, I was not specifically addressing that lin'e 4 item. 5 Q Based on the Quadrex findings -- I'm sorry, 6 were you finished your review? 7 A I was just checking to see. Only that 8 concluding statement on page 39 which is referenced 9 before that we agree with Quadrex that it would be a good 10 practice to provide additional guidance to reviewers of 11 vendor reports. 12 Q So based on the next to the last statements, in 13 39, in light of the findings in M-49, would you make.any 14 modification to the statement beginning "also it may be 15 noted"? 16 A I would not. 17 A (By Mr. Bernsen) No. 18 Q You don't consider M-49 item three as 19 identifying significant safety deficiencies in the work 20 performed by this particular vendor? 21 A (By Mr. Lopez) Not based upon the information 22 that I have, that I relied upon for this testimony. 23 Q Let's turn to M-51, item three under the 24 Quadrex assessment. p 25 MR. SINKIN: Excuse me. Before We do that, (Jh TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

13630 7-( ,1 1 since this is a separate question and it would be an 2 inquiry of some length since we're at 6:00 o' clock, I 3 think I'll break here. 4 JUDGE SHON: Suits us. 5 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I think that's a good idea. 6 We'll be back tomorrow at 9:00 for soils. 7 (Recess at 6:03.) 8 9 10 11 12 13 - \> 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TATE REPORTING SERVICE, 498-8442

W

  ,( 1                 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTERS 2

3 This is-to certify that the attached proceedings before 4 the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR COMMISSION in the matter of: 5 6 NAME OF PROCEEDING: EVIDENTIARY HEARING HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER COMPANY, 7- ET AL (SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 AND 2) 8 9 DOCKET NO.: STN 50-498-OL-STN 50-499-OL 10 11 PLACE: HOUSTON, TX

   - 2     DATE:                 Wednesday, July 31, 1985 13 14   were held as herein appears, and that this is the 15   original transcript thereof for the file of the United 16   States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

17 1 18 , ,, 19 l 4A :57 I T%> R. Patrick Tate, CSR 20 f 21  % Susan R. Goldstein, CSR

     . 22                                                            i Official Reporters 23 h

Q4 25 l

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