ML20195D823
| ML20195D823 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1986 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1516, NUDOCS 8606050138 | |
| Download: ML20195D823 (176) | |
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0R G' NA O
UN11ED STATES a
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
I IN THE MATTER OF:
DOCKET NO:
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOUTH TEXAS UNITS 1 & 2 c
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a LOCATION:
BAY CITY, TEXAS PAGES:
1-121 DATE:
THURSDAY, MAY 29, 1986 m
Mpemove&omeasne ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
]hl Cfficial Reporters 444 North CapitolStreet Washington, D.C. 20001
)g (202) 347-3700 60 8 860S29 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE T-1516 PDR
1 1
7_
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
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3 X
4 In the Matter of 5
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER 6
7 (South Texas Project Units 1 & 2) 8 x
9 Best Western Hotel 10 Bay City, Texas 11 12
<~s (s_)
13 Thursday, 29 May 1986 14 15 The hearing in the above-entitled matter was 16 convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m.,
17 18 BEFORE:
19 MR. CHARLES WYLIE 20 DR. CHESTER SEISS i
21 DR. CARSON MARK 22 MR. JESSE EBERSOLE i
23 MR. MEDHAT M.
EL-ZEFTAWY 25 TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
[1p 2
1 PROCEEDINGS G
2 DR. MARK:
The meeting will come to order, South 3
Texas Units One and Two.
4 I am Carson Mark, Subcommittee Chairman.
5 I haven't said anything yet.
Is that all right?
6 The other ACRS members present today are Jesse 7
Ebersole, Chet seiss, Charlie Wylie.
8 The purpose of the meetings -- in view of the 9
recent events, the purpose of the meeting is to hear from 10 the Applicant and the staff on the subject of an operating 11 license for South Texas.
12 Dr. El-Zeftawy is the cognizant ACRS staff member
(~'T
(_)
13 for this meeting on my left.
14 The rules for participation in today's meeting 15 have been announced as part of the notice of the meeting 16 previously published in the Federal Register on May 8th, 17
'86.
18 A transcript of the meeting is being kept and 19 will be made available as cited in the Federal Register 20 notice.
21 It is requested that each speaker first identify 22 himself or herself and speak with sufficient clarity and 23 volume so that he or she can readily be heard.
('
24 We've received no written statements from members
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25 of the public.
We have received no requests for time to TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
3 1
make statements from members of the public.
2 I don't think I have much to add to that setting, 3
with which everyone I'm sure is familiar.
4 Before this afternoon's session, I must say that 5
the South Texas Project people gave those of us here a very 6
informative and very nicely arranged tour of the plant 7
which may allow us tc formulate questions or may already 8
perhaps have answered some questions.
9 I think, apart from that -- where on Earth is the 10 agenda?
11 We have a break scheduled in the meeting around 12 4:00 p.m.,
and we'll see just where we are on the (O
_j 13 presentations at that moment and take a fifteen minute 14 recess.
15 The meeting as laid out might end not much later 16 than 5:00.
As laid out, it's before 5:00 but no one really 17 believes things like that.
And then tomorrow we will 18 resume a session on the same subject which is expected, 19 starting at 8:30, to run perhaps a little beyond noon, 20 until about 1:00 o' clock.
21 We will proceed with the meeting and I'll call on 22 Mr. Goldberg of Hoaston Power & Light.
23 MR. GOLDBERG:
Good afternoon.
My name is Jerry 24 Goldberg.
I am group vice-president nuclear with Houston
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25 Lighting & Power company.
On behalf of all the owners, I'd TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
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1 like to welcome you to the South Texas Project.
f V
2 I'm sorry I was unable to join you on your tour 3
this morning.
Mr. Dewease, our vice-president of nuclear 4
operations, and myself attended Houston Industries' annual 5
meeting that has a particular importance; it's at this 6
meeting that they re-elect the officers of the company.
7 And had we not attended, they might have felt that we 8
weren't interested in serving another year.
9 I'm pleased to tell you we were re-elected and 10 now we'll get on with our program.
11 A little bit about my background.
I am basically 12 a professional sailor, a graduate of the U.S.
Merchant
)
13 Marine Academy, Kings Point, where I studied marine 14 engineering.
15 Having served a couple of years on active duty 16 with our Navy, I entered the naval nuclear program in 1955.
17 I was at the Quincy shipyard of the Bethlehem Steel 18 Corporation which later was taken over by General Dynamics.
19 And during that period in my career, I was involved in the 20 design and/or construction of eight naval nuclear plants.
21 It was also during a period of some fifteen years 22 in that program that I also undertook graduate studies in 23 nuclear engineering and received my Master's from MIT in
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24 1960.
v 25 In 1970, I left the naval nuclear program and TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
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1 joined Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation and served
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V 2
in various capacities up to vice-president and deputy 3
director of nuclear construction.
4 During my career at Stone & Webster, I was 5
involved in design of various portions of approximately 20 6
nuclear stations and was directly involved in the 7
construction of four units and the overhaul of two units.
8 I joined Stone -- excuse me.
I joined Houston 9
Lighting & Power Company in the fall of 1980 in the 10 capacity of vice-president of nuclear engineering and 11 construction.
12 Then in February of last year, our group O
vm) 13 vice-president -- our executive vice-president retired and 14 I took over as group vice-president nuclear, and then 15 served in that capacity until the present time.
16 At this point, I'd like to get into a brief 17 introduction of the unit which most of you have had a good 18 look at.
Our South Texas units are a twin unit 19 Westinghouse pressurized water reactor, 1250 megawatts 20 output.
21 These are duplicate units; they're are few shared 22 facilities.
We share the ultimate heat sink; we share 23 certainly portions of the security system.
But for all
/~N 24 intents and purposes, these are stand-alone units, with
(_)
25 their'own control room, their own fuel building, their own TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
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auxiliaries.
fs 2
MR. WISENBURG:
Excuse me, Mr. Goldberg, 3
Dr. Mark, we have some pretty good rear projection slides 4
up here and if the television camera would watch and 5
coordinate with us and not blind us, I think we'd all be 6
better off.
7 MR. GOLDBERG:
A little bit about the ownership 8
of this project.
This plant is owned by four utilities.
9 Houston Lighting & Power company functions as project 10 manager on behalf of all the owners.
11 And as you can see in this projection, we own 12 30.8 percent of the plant.
The City of Austin owns 16
)
13 percent; the City of San Antonio, 28 percent; and Central 14 Power & Light Company, 25.2 percent.
15 The plant is located approximately 90 miles south 16 southwest of Houston and approximately twelve miles in the 17 same general direction, south southwest, of Bay City, 18 Texas.
We're approximately eight miles north of the Gulf 19 of Mexico, 20 Before talking about the current status of the 21 plant, which you all of course had an opportunity to see 22 this morning, I'd like to review a brief history of this 23 project which I think you'll find very interesting.
{"N 24 This project started back in June of 1973, and 25 Brown & Root was selected to design and construct the South TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
7 1
Texas Project.
f-N.J 2
In August of 1975, a limited work authorization 3
was granted and ground clearing and the start of project 4
activities commenced.
5 In December 1975, the project received its 6
construction permit.
7 I think we just lost one of our controls.
There 8
we go.
9 In August of 1979, the nuclear steam supply 10 system components for Unit One were set in the reactor 11 containment.
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
May I ask a question, other than G(.,)
13 just straight economics, there of course Combustion and 14 Babcox & Wilcox about which we all know, and GE and 15 Westinghouse.
I wonder if you could comment on the 16 rationale of choice among all these suppliers.
17 MR. GOLDBERG:
While I didn't study that history 18 all that much, I was aware of the fact that the project did 19 in fact consider essentially all the above supplierc.
I 20 believe the choice of Westinghouse was made, I suspect 21 principally because of its vast experience.
22 Westinghouse had introduced the project to the 23 essentially the RESAR 41 design which they heralded as the
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24 plant of the future.
And while it did not enjoy much of 25 the future here in the United States, it apparently has TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
l 8
1 caught on in Europe and I guess had it not been for some of
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the early difficulties that I'll be speaking about on South 3
Texas, South Texas was the lead plant for a number of other 4
units.
5 As it turns out, the Europeans got there first 6
and in effect they pioneered with some of the lead plants.
7 But I think Westinghouse's experience and the expectation 8
that the RESAR 41 plant was going to be a plant to deliver 9
much improved economics weighed heavily in the decision to 10 select that plant.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
Thank you.
12 MR. GOLDBERG:
From the start of construction, in O(_)
13 late '75 and up until the fall of 1979, construction seemed 14 to be going along fairly smoothly.
But then they 15 encountered a number of difficulties.
And in November of 16 1979, a special inspection team from the Nuclear Regulatory 17 Commission came in to investigate a number of concerns 18 involving both quality of construction as well as 19 allegations of harassment of quality control inspectors.
20 In December of that year, there was a stop work 21 issued on further pouring of complex concrete.
22 Then following in April 1980, a stop work on 23 quality welding and shortly thereafter, there was a show
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24 cause order issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission v
25 which was an outgrowth of their investigation.
And also at TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177 1
1 9
1 that time, they imposed a civil penalty of some $100,000.
g3V 2
During the ensuing months in 1980, the project 3
directed its full energies to dealing with the issues that 4
were addressed in the show cause order.
And in October of 5
1980, they were able to demonstrate readiness to restart 6
quality welding.
And it so occurred in October of 1980.
7 Following in January '81, they restarted work on 8
pouring of complex concrete.
9 And then in May of 1981, we started our operating 10 license hearing.
This hearing which you'll hear more about 11 later is basically broken into three phases.
Phase I 12 started in May of 1981 and the focal point of the hearing
()
13 was to demonstrate the character and competence of Houston 14 Lighting & Power Company to complete the construction of 15 South Texas and to operate the station once completed.
16 Following extensive study of the problems that 17 the project was having in dealing with the complexity of 18 the building of a nuclear plant, and the difficulty that 19 Brown & Root was having in maintaining any kind of schedule 20 that would complete the plant in a time frame that was 21 acceptable to the owners, the owners reluctantly made the 22 decision to change contractors and they terminated Brown &
23 Root services in September of 1981.
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24 MR. EDERSOLE:
I wonder if I might ask a question 25 about that welding problem.
Under -- the previous slide, TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
1 r
1 10 1
said you stopped because of inadequate welding.
Did you 2
have to go back and cut out bad welds or did you go back 3
and re-examine them?
If so, how did you do that?
In 4
short, that's a difficult problem, once you have got 5
embedded in it, to deal with inadequate welding.
How did 6
you get out of that what turned out to be a box on some 7
parts?
8 MR. GOLDBERG:
There were three major areas of 9
nuclear grade welding work that had been in progress.
One 10 area was the welding of the reactor coolant main loop 11 piping.
12 Another area was the start of nuclear grade
()
13 supports for cable trays.
And the other key area was the 14 welding of the essential cooling water piping system.
15 In the case of the reactor coolant pipe welding, 16 thorough review of the procedures that were followed in the 17 x-rays of the welds indicated that the quality of that work 18 was fully acceptable.
There were difficulties experienced 19 in the welding of the cable tray supports which were to be 20 welded in accordance with -- I believe the standard was 21 AWSD 1.1.
22 There were, I would classify, a number of minor 23 but nevertheless discrepancies as when you compare the
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24 welding with the code requirements.
The area that had the 25 most difficulty was the welding of the essential cooling TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
11 1
water system and the project elected to go back and x-ray 2
all the butt welds that had been made in that system.
3 There was extensive work rejected, and it was 4
reworked, either repair of an existing weld or if the 5
extent of the difficulty was such that that was not 6
economical, entire welds were cut out and replaced.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
Since x-raying doesn't detect the 8
metallurgy of the weld but rather its physical state, how 9
did you argue that the metallurgy of the weld was that 10 good.
11 MR. GOLDBERG:
Well, there was an extensive 12 review of a variety of facets of the welding program.
()
13 There were a number of consultants brought in and 14 they formed a welding task group and I know that in the 15 course of their dellb rations, they thoroughly reviewed 16 procedures, selection of weld rods, techniques, 17 nondestructive testing utilized.
18 And when we were completed, I think it's fair to 19 say that whatever difficulties did exist in that program, 20 were thoroughly identified and subsequently resolved.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
Thank you.
22 MR. GOLDBERG:
Bechtel was hired to replace Brown 23
& Root as the new architect engineer and construction
()
24 manager.
25 But subsequently, Brown & Root decided that it no TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
12 1
longer wished to stay on in the capacity of constructor and O
2 as a result of their decision to vacate the role of 3
constructor, we hired the Ebasco Company in February of 4
1982 to take over the construction activities.
5 So in effect, as I'll show you a little bit later 6
on as well, the way the project is constituted, Houston 7
Lighting & Power Company is the project manager, Bechtel is 8
the architect engineer and construction manager, and Ebasco 9
is the constructor.
10 In June of 1982, following a shutdown of work of 11 approximately six months, during which time there was an 12 extensive review of the work that had been done,
()
13 particularly in the engineering area, and there will be a 14 discussion of how we went about doing that review, but by 15 June of 1982, Bechtel had benchmarked the engineering and 16 construction status with sufficient certainty that we were 17 able to resume nonsafety-related construction work.
18 Then a couple of months later, in August, we were 19 able to resume safety-related construction activities.
20 Then in March of 1984, we received a partial 21 initial decision from the Atomic Safety & Licensing Board 22 which clearly concluded that flouston Lighting & Power 23 Company did have both the character and the competence to 24 complete the South Texas Project construction and to 25 operate the station once completed.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
1 13 1
A year later, the first systems were completed O
2 sufficiently that they could be turned over to the start-up 3
testing group for the start of plant testing activities.
4 Then in May of 1985, we energized the first power 5
distribution systems in Unit one.
6 Then in July of 1985, we commenced Phase II of 7
our licensing hearings.
Phase II focused on IIL&P's 8
handling of the Quadrex report.
We are awaiting a decision 9
from the licensing board regarding Phase II.
10 In December of 1985, we commenced flushing the 11 nuclear steam supply systems on Unit one.
Then following 12 in March of this year, we did attend a prehearing 13 conference with the licensing board for Phase III which 14 originally was to review the quality assurance program in 15 support of plant operations.
16
!!owever, owing to the lack of any specific 17 concerns by the intervenor regarding those matters, it's 18 not clear at this point whether there will be a Phase III 19 hearing or not.
20 Then in April of this year, we received the 21 safety evaluation report from the NRC.
22 Now, let's take a look at where we are right now.
23 Currently our Unit One is at a status of 89.9 percent 24 complete against a scheduled status of 90.3 percent.
And 25 our Unit Two is at 60.4 percent, slightly ahead of TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
14 1
schedule.
2 Schedules that we're working toward are a fuel 3
load on Unit One of June of '87 and for Unit Two, 18 months 4
later.
Unit one, commercial operation is scheduled for 5
December of '87 with Unit Two following 18 months later.
6 Total project status, taking into account the 7
contribution from each of the two units, we are at 77.5 8
percent complete against a schedule target of 77.6.
The 9
engineering is at a stage of 92.9 percent complete against 10 a target of 93.3.
11 of some importance is a brief insight as to what 12 seems or what are the remaining work activities on
()
13 Unit No. 1.
We have taken the liberty of identifying what 14 we'd like to call critical bulk commodities.
And what we 15 think might be of some special interest is the fact that 16 when you look at what is in fact completed, portion of the 17 remaining work to be completed breaks down to approximately 18 30 percent in the nuclear arca and 70 percent in the 19 nonnuclear areas.
20 So while we still have a lot of work left to do, 21 a substantial portion of that work is in the nonnuclear 22 areas.
23 As far as the testing status, we have some 335 24 mechanical subsystems and as of the beginning of May, we 25 were scheduled to have a 139 turned over from construction l
f TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
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to start-up and a 111 were in fact turned over.
O 2
In the electrical area, there were a hundred and 3
eighty-five scheduled and we had a hundred and sixty-seven 4
turned over.
This represents approximately a four to five 5
week delinquency as far as the time.
There are 6
considerable recovery plano in progress and we have made 7
some rather dramatic improvement during the month of May, 8
and I would fully expect that we are going to make some 9
very important test milestones which I have illustrated 10 here.
11 First one upcoming is the secondary plant 12 hydrostatic test scheduled for July of this year, followed
()
13 by the primary plant hydrostatic test in August, and then 14 in early '87, we have our hot functional test followed by 15 our integrated leak rate test, structural integrity test of 16 the containment in March and fuel load in June.
17 The staff required to deal with the South Texas 18 Project, as you can see we have just under 700 Dechtel 19 construction management personnel.
We have over 5,000 20 Ebasco construction supervisory personnel, I'm sorry, over 21 1450 Ebasco supervisory personnel, over 5,000 craft 22 personnel, approximately 540 engineering and home office 23 personnel in Bechtel and ilL&P has a staff of some 1669 24 personnel which include all the persons associated with the 25 test program.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
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HL&P directs all testing activities including O
2 construction proof testing.
And then there's some 363 3
other personnel which include a lot of the smaller 4
subcontractors.
5 And the total staff is a little over 10,100.
6 I'd like to talk briefly about the quality of the 7
HL&P staff.
Included in this 1669 personnel are some 8
thousand fifteen career personnel which are assigned to our 9
nuclear group.
10 And then the balance, of course, are craft 11 employees, mostly in the test technician area.
This 12 thousand fifteen career HL&P employees represents some 6600 i
()
13 years of nuclear experience and are some 330 professionals 14 in that group which include 83 persons with Master's 15 degrees and five persons with doctorate degrees.
16 our corporate organization structure is 17 illustrated above.
Of special note is the fact that the 18 nuclear group reports directly to the Chairman of the Board 19 and chief executive officer of Houston Lighting & Power 20 Company.
21 We also, in addition to tho organization you see 22 here, have a special nuclear committee of our board of 23 directors which have four directors sitting on the 24 committee.
And the chairman of that particular committeo 25 is Dr. Joe Hendry who I suspect some of you gentlemen may TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
17 l
1 know.
O 2
And that board or that committee of the board a
3 conducts monthly reviews of the project.
And as a matter 4
of fact, next Tuesday, that review will take place here in 5
Bay city where they'll also review the physical progress of 6
the job and the test program as well as go over the high 7
points of our other progress.
8 I've been in the nuclear business one way or 9
another for roughly 30 years.
And one of the things that 10 I've developed over these years is a set of what I would 11 like to call management tenants.
These are the things that 12 I hold dear and as a result, I expect my people to deal
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(_)
13 with these matters in the same spirit.
And I would like to 14 review briefly with you gentlemen what those tenants are.
15 This project is fully committed to build and 16 operate this station in full compliance with applicable 17 regulatory requirements.
18 We don't waste time trying to avoid l
19 responsibility.
20 We require every person performing a task to 21 accept full responsibility for performing that task 22 properly.
23 of course we have our quality assurance folks
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independently confirm that those activities are being 24 i
25 performed in a proper quality manner.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177 1
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18 1
We perform extensive management oversight of O
2 project activities to ensure that the program is working 3
the way it should.
4 And a little bit later on, our manager of nuclear 5
assurance will share with you gentlemen some of the 6
oversight programs that we utilize to carry out that 7
mission.
8 We strive to report in a timely and forthright 9
manner all matters of importance either by regulation or by 10 common sense recognition to the Nuclear Regulatory 11 Commission.
12 We're committed to protecting the environment and
()
13 the health of the public and our employees.
14 Wherever possible, we like to utilize proven 15 equipment and techniques for design and construction and 16 operation to enhance reliable operation of the plant.
17 We're trying to keep abreast of industry 18 occurrences and apply worthwhile experiences as they might 19 improve our program.
20 We are making overy effort to hear the concerns 21 of any employee associated with this project in whatever 22 organization he may or she may serve.
And you will hear a 23 little bit later on about the program we use to carry out 24 that function.
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25 We try to learn from our mistakes.
And in order TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
19 I
1 to do that, we are absolute zealots at trying to get to the O
2 underlying cause.
As Ben Franklin once said, all men make 3
mistakes, but only fools repeat them.
And we try not to be 4
the fool.
5 We plan, train and do our level best to retain 6
qualified personnel to support our program.
7 I'd like to return to organizational structure.
8 Earlier, I showed how I report to the chief executive 9
officer.
10 Reporting to me, there are seven major functions:
11 Nuclear operations; nuclear licensing; nuclear assurance 12 which we'll explain more fully shortly; the South Texas
()
13 Project team or nuclear engineering group; a group we call 14 engineering assurance; and then a special assignments 15 function.
16 Our nuclear operations organization is basically 17 divided into three main elements.
We have, of course, the 18 plant operations group responsible for the operation, 19 maintenance, chemistry, technical support, radiation 20 protection, radiological and environmental monitoring, and 21 emergency planning.
22 We have a nuclear training organization which 23 reports to the vice-president of operations but functions
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to deal with the training needs of the entire nuclear 24 25 organization.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
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And then we have our nuclear security group.
2 Under nuclear licensing, we have the interface 3
with the NRC and State of Texas with respect to all 4
licensing and permit matters.
We maintain a licensing 5
commitment tracking system.
They also coordinate the 6
operational experience review; they maintain our FSAR; they 7
disseminate new or revised licensing requirements, and they 8
prepare our comments on proposed rules and regulations or 9
new policies of the NRC.
10 our nuclear assurance organization currently has 11 three main groups.
We have our construction quality 12 assurance program, construction quality assurance group;
()
13 our operations quality assurance group, and then the group 14 called safe team.
And that is the name of the group that 15 is organized to hear the concerns of any employee working 16 at the station.
17 And Mr. Geiger, our nuclear assurance manager, 18 will explain the inner workings of safe team.
19 I'm going to pass over the project momentarily 20 and come back to that.
21 We have an off project engineering function which 22 we call nuclear engineering, and that's subdivided into two 23 principal functions, a service group that handles our core 24
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physics and performance analysis, reliability analysis, and 25 plant analysis.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
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We also have a fuel group that deals with the 2
planning, acquisition and inspection of our nuclear fuel.
3 We have a very unique function called engineering 4
assurance, which I'd like to briefly discuss and it will be 5
discussed more fully a little bit later.
But this is a 6
special off-project group of engineers who function to 7
perform independent third party real time substantive 8
reviews of the engineering work of the Bechtel group.
9 Assisting them in performing this function, we 10 have contracted for the services of Stone & Webster 11 Engineering Corporation who supply certain engineering 12 specialists to carry out the various reviews.
13 We think that this approach to overviewing the 14 quality of engineering work is superior than the various 15 types of reviews that at least years before the NRC was 16 conducting close to the end of a job, in that this review 17 is conducted as the design of the plant progresses and 18 clearly any problems it uncovers enables us to deal with it 19 much' earlier and to make the appropriate corrections so as 20 to influence the remaining work in a favorable way.
21 And like every organization, you have to have a 22 wild card and we have a group we called special 23 assignments.
And this group basically has to handle the 24 various activities that just don't seem to fit in anybody 25 else's bailiwick.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
22 1
A little bit earlier, I made an effort to V
2 highlight how this project is organized.
And I thought it 3
would be useful just to have a slide and it reflects the 4
fact that we, liL & P, function, as the project manager; 5
Bechtel group functions as architect engineer and 6
construction manager; Ebasco is the constructor; and 7
Westinghouse is the nuclear steam supplier.
8 I'd like to get into a little bit more on our 9
project organization.
As can be seen here, HL&P functions 10 as project manager.
And it has reporting to the project 11 manager for coordination, the QA manager; then we have 12 direct authority over the Bechtel project manager and then
()
13 of course we have the authority over the construction --
14 IIL&P construction manager, engineering manager, start-up, 15 cost and schedule, records management, project controler, 16 and our nuclear purchasing activities.
17 Our project GA manager has direct overview 18 responsibility of Bechtel and Ebasco quality assurance 19 groups.
20 And our IIL&P construction manager has direct 21 authority over the Bechtel construction manager and the 22 Ebasco construction supervision.
23 That completes my introduction of the project.
24 Are there any questions?
25 MR. WYLIE:
I would like to ask one.
Going back TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
23 1
to your description of the nuclear group operations and 2
your engineering assurance group, I understand that for the 3
major project at hand, until completion; is it your intent 4
to continue with this organization as shown for the follow 5
on revisions and modifications after operations?
6 MR. GOLDBERG:
We do intend to continue the 7
function that we currently call engineering assurance.
But 8
we will move that function directly under the nuclear 9
assurance manager.
It will still exist functionally but 10 the reporting relationship will move up through the manager 11 of nuclear assurance.
12 MR. WYLIE:
I see.
)
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
Do you recall any circumstances 14 under Westinghouse or Bechtel made a proposal of some sort 15 and you objected to it and up-graded the plant?
16 MR. GOLDBERG:
I'm sure we have done that.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, for instance, I saw an 18 excerpt, main feedwater pump.
How did that come about?
19 MR. GOLDBERG:
The start-up feed pump?
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes.
21 MR. GOLDBERG:
The way that came about was rather 22 interesting.
No.
1, I always wanted a start-up feed pump.
23 And the way we worked our way into it, we made an important 24 change to the feedwater system.
25 As part of our efforts to provide for the state TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
24 1
of the art water treatment of the feed system, so as to b,sv) 2 minimize corrosion of steam generators, we added a 3
deaerating feedwater heater.
And in the course of these 4
extensive changes, if you will, to the condensate and feed 5
train, we looked closely at what we had for pumping 6
capability.
And we did not like what we saw.
7 We had, as I recall, three -- no, excuse me, I 8
think we had two 60 percent capacity feed pumps.
And if 9_
I'm wrong, somebody correct me.
10 MR. WISENBURG:
You are right.
11 MR. GOLDBERG:
And it struck me that that didn't 12 make very good sense.
If we had one feed pump down for
()
13 maintenance, the plant could not make its rated output.
14 Plus the fact these were monstrous pumps and 15 their ability to supply water in standby conditions would 16 probably prove difficult based on experience that, speaking 17 for myself, I've had at other plants.
18 So we wanted to increase our feed pumping 19 capacity and, at the same time, we wanted to be able to 20 have a smaller pump that could handle the needs during hot 21 standby and very low flow conditions.
So that's how we got 22 into a start-up feed pump.
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
I think you'll get that return 24
{
manyfold in years to come.
25 What did you want that you didn't get from your TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
25 1
hierarchy?
,. s
\\)
2 MR. GOLDBERG:
It would be terribly immodest to 3
say that there was something that I wanted and didn't 4
get -- or to say that there was nothing that I didn't get.
5 It's practically that, for the simple reason that owing to 6
the difficulty that this plant got into in its early days, 7
that as it turned out, there's nothing important that I 8
wanted for this project, whether it be material, whether it 9
be talent, whether it be salary structure, whether it be 10 organizational structure, that I haven't been successful in 11 getting my management to support.
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
Thank you.
()
13 MR. GOLDBERG:
I'm sorry, is there another 14 question?
15 All right, at this time, I'd like to have 16 Mr. Dotson, our project engineering manager, give us an 17 overview of the engineering features on the plant.
18 MR. DOTSON:
Thank you, Jerry.
They're swapping 19 the slides but I'll go ahead and get started and tell you 20 my name is Erroll Dotson and I'm manager of engineering for 21 the South Texas Project.
22 And my presentation will address the plant 23 layout, the unique features of the South Texas Project, and 24 some other selected engineering subjects.
(v^T 25 However, I would first like to provide you with a TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
l 26 1
summary of my education and work experience.
I received a
-]
2 Bachelor of Science Mechanical Engineering degree from the 3
University of Cincinnati in 1963; an MS degree from Akron 4
University in 1969, and I have a Master in Business 5
Administration with an accounting major from the University 6
of North Florida.
7 I have 22 years commercial nuclear experience in 8
addition to two years in atomic demolitions in the U.S.
9 Army.
10 My commercial experience began with Babcock &
11 Wilcox in the early 1960s; continued with Burns & Roe where 12 I gained architect engineering experience and then I worked O(_/
13 for Westinghouse on the floating nuclear project.
14 Prior to joining Houston Lighting & Power, I 15 spent eight years with Florida Power & Light with the 16 project engineering manager for St. Lucie Unit II from 17 prior to the time we received the construction permit until 18 after the unit was in commercial operation.
19 During that same time period, I was also 20 responsible for the modifications to the St. Lucie Unit I 21 operating plant.
22 I've been with Houston Lighting & Power for two 23 years.
{}
24 The first part of my presentation will provide an 25 overview of the plant layout and the plot plan.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
27 1
The plant site consists of 12,200 acres, shown
-s( )
2 there in dark blue.
The main cooling reservoir south of 3
the power block shown in light blue there, has 7,000 acres 4
of surface and provides the non-safety cooling water source 5
for the plant.
6 The essential cooling pond is an excavated pond 7
enclosed by an earthen embankment and it functions as the 8
ultimate heat sink for the plant and provides a cooling 9_
water for the safety related systems and has about 46 acres 10 of surface area.
11 South Texas Project is a 1250 megawatt electric 12 unit, four-loop Westinghouse pressurized water reactor.
()
13 The site consists of two plants, as Jerry said, 14 which are slide-along duplicates.
15 Each plant is physically separated from the other 16 and each has its own safety-related and non-safety related 17
- systems, only a few non-safety related support systems are 18 common to both plants and all of these will be in place and 19 operational before the start-up of Unit one.
20 The common systems and buildings are the 21 administration building for the plant management, the 22 security system, the firewater pump house and tanks, the 23 auxiliary boiler, the make-up water demineralizer and 24 building as well as the main cooling reservoir and the 25 essential cooling pond I mentioned earlier.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177 l-
i 28 1
The structures that are individual for each unit
( '.)
2 are the turbine generator building, shown in dark blue 3
there, and the following safety related structures:
The 4
reactor containment building, fuel handling building, 5
mechanical and electrical auxiliary building, isolation 6
valve cubicle building, the diesel generator building, the 7
auxiliary feedwater storage tank and the essential cooling 8
pond intake structure.
9 The reactor containment building is similar to 10 many large dry containment buildings in the United States, 11 quite large, as you saw.
12 The nuclear steam supply system, as I said, is a p
(_j 13 four-loop Westinghouse system with model E steam 14 generators.
However, the residual heat removal system is 15 located within the containment building which is quite 16 unusual for a United States plant.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
May I comment?
18 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, sir, 19 MR. EBERSOLE:
Why is that?
20 MR. DOTSON:
Well, for one thing, it allows 21 recirculation of primary coolant within the containment 22 where we feel it belongs.
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
Does that avoid the seal problem
~
("S 24 or to avoid getting activity out of an external loop?
25 MR. DOTSON:
Primarily to avoid taking activity TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
l 29 1
outside containment.
(_)
\\_
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
But for that, you buy the problem 3
of having it run inside where you can't get to it.
4 MR. DOTSON:
That's somewhat true.
It is in a 5
fairly accessible area.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
I was just wondering if there was 7
a rational risk / benefit plan from which you derived that 8
design, you know, the recipe by which you came up with it.
9 MR. DOTSON: I believe there was.
That was before 10 my time.
I was present during the time of the 11 Westinghouse -- with Westinghouse in the RESAR 4100.
And 12 primary benefit is, as I said, was to keep all the activity C)
(_
13 within the containment.
14 And functionally, it functions just as well in 15 there as outside.
And it is placed in the accessible area 16 within the containment; perhaps not quite as accessible as 17 outside but it's not accessible when it's operating anyway.
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
Thank you.
19 MR. DOTSON:
Another unique feature which you saw 20 is the fact that we have a fuel storage pit inside the 21 containment also which can store one third of the core or 22 66 spent nuclear assemblies.
The --
23 MR. WYLIE:
Could I ask a question.
r-24 MR. DOTSON:
NT]
- Yes, sir.
25 MR. WYLIE:
That basically is to store a third of TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177 t
30 1
the core, basically just to increase the efficiency of O-2 handling and refueling?
3 MR. DOTSON:
That's correct, yes, sir, reduce 4
the --
5 MR. WYLIE:
Each time you move a third in?
6 MR. DOTSON:
We have that capability, yes, to 7
have the fuel actually in there before you remove the --
8 MR. WYLIE:
So --
9 MR. DOTSON:
So that you don't have to transfer 10 between the containment and the spent fuel pit during the 11 refueling operation.
12 MR. WYLIE:
Okay, fine.
)
13 MR. DOTSON:
The fuel handling building contains not onl'y the spent fuel pool as most fuel handling 14 15 buildings do, but also contains the safety injection pumps 16 and the containment spray pumps in the lower elevation and 17 the post accident sampling system which is located on the 18 operating floor.
19 The mechanical and electrical auxiliary building 20 is a singi? structure which contains the electrical 21 auxiliary systems on the north side of the common wall and 22 the mechanical auxiliary systems on the south side of that 23 same wall, in effect, forming two buildings.
24 Mechanical auxiliary building which cont.ains the 25 refueling water and the reactor make-up water storage tank TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
31 1
is somewhat unusual, to protect them from missles, 7,
(_)
2 contains -- the rest of the building contains rather 3
typical things such as cooling water systems, heat T
4 exchangers, radwaste processing, chemical and waste 5
control, boric acid make-up and the processing systems.
6 The electrical auxiliary building has the control 7
room in a central location, which gives the operator quick 8
access to each of the switch gear rooms and the auxiliary 9
shutdown panel.
10 And also located in this building is the 11 technical support center, the cable spread rooms, the 12 switch gear rooms, the relay rooms and the other electrical
- m
(_)
13 equipment.
14 Diesel generator building is divided into three 15 compartments or three buildings for the three identical 16 Cooper diesel generators which serve as the Class IE onsite 17 AC power.
18 Each diesel has a 5500 kilowatt continuous 19 capacity rating and is physically separated from the other 20 two diesels.
21 The isolation valve cubicle building is separated 22 into four compartments.
Each compartment has an auxiliary 23 feedwater pump, a main steam isolation valve, a feedwater
(}
24 line and it's attendant valves and the safety related
%J 25 atmospheric steam duct, power operated relief valves.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
32 1
7.
Next I'd like to talk about the three train L) 2 system at South Texas project uses a three train engineered 3
safety features system to meet regulatory criterion instead 4
of a more common two train system.
5 Three train design in a fashion similiar to the 6
two train design consists of physically segregated and 7
electrically independent engineered safety features 8
systems.
9 There are no shared components which are 10 necessary to provide heat removal from the core, heat 11 removal from the containment atmosphere or heat rejection 12 to the ultimate heat sink.
/~;
(_)
13 This slide shows one of the three trains as you 14 can see, strongly resembles that of a two train system with 15 some exceptions, as I'll now point out.
16 The most important exception, we believe, is that 17 the train is not interconnected with either of the other 18 two trains except at the refueling water storage tank as 19 you see.
20 The three train system therefore is much simpler 21 than a headered two train system in that each emergency 22 core cooling system train injects directly into a reactor 23 coolant system cold leg.
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
Do I see a single surge tank for l
25 all three loops?
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
33 1
MR. DOTSON:
Are you talking about the refueli.ng
\\_/
2 water storage tank?
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes, CCW.
4 MR. DOTSON:
Oh, I'm going to come to the CCW.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
Okay, all right.
6 MR. DOTSON:
Talking about the blue portion now 7
and then I'll move on to other portions of that slide.
8 On receipt of the safety injection signal, the 9_
high head and the low head pumps start up and they run in 10 minimum recirculation until they can actually inject.
And 11 there's no isolation valves, no headered lines or balasting 12 orafices in any of those safety injection lines.
()
13 And this allows for a simpler design, easier 14 testing, and no interaction between the safety injection 15 trains outside the electrical system.
16 Containment spray is headered and it's actuated 17 on high containment pressure.
When the low level of the 18 refueling water storage tank is reached, suction is 19 switched to the containment sump as with most plants and 20 recirculation continues from that sump.
And each train has 21 its own sump.
So there are three containment sumps.
22 For long term cooling, the residual heat removal 23 is used much in the same fashion that a two train system
/~
24
(_)S normal cold shutdown would be used.
Heat, talking now 25 about the component cooling water system.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
34 1
DR. SEISS:
There's some valves shown on that.
[_s) x_/
2 diagrm.
Are those the only valves in those systems?
3 MS. DOTSON:
You want to return that slide?
4 Those aren't the only valves.
We've left a lot of them out 5
for simplicity.
6 DR. SEISS:
I was just --
7 MR. DOTSON:
For example, we have a double 8
isolation valves from the electrical system on the suction 9
side and so forth.
No, we just -- we left most of the 10 valves out of this slide.
11 The heat from the residual heat removal system 12 heat exchangers is rejected to the component cooling water Oi/
13 system which also supplies cooling water to the reactor s_
14 coolant pump, thermal barrier, rei; tor containment fan 15 coolers and other cooling requiremects.
16 So to answer your question, thm component cooling 17 water system is a closed system with a surge tank 18 compartmentalized.
So in reality, each train is completely separatewithinkernalbafflesactuallyformingthree 19 20 tanks.
21 So there really is no interconnection there at 22 the surge tank.
And in this case, the component cooling 23 witer system circulates water through the component cooling 24 water heat exchanger in a closed loop, cooling the residual 25 heat removal heat exchanger and other cooling requirements TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
35 1
as we described and in turn -- we've got that one in O_s 2
backwards.
We'll use that one.
3 Looking at the portion -- this portion right 4
here.
Heat rejection from the component cooling water heat 5
exchanger is to the essential cooling water system and that 6
system also supplies cooling water for the diesel generator 7
heat exchangers, the essential chillers and the component 8
cooling water pump supplementary coolers.
9_
MR. EBERSOLE:
What was the working relative 10 pressures at the central water and the component cooling 11 water?
Does the component cooling water carry higher 12 pressure?
()
13 MR. DOTSON:
I didn't hear the question.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
Is the component cooling water 15 carried at higher pressure so leakage is it out ward or is 16 at the reverse.
What are the pressures of the two systems; 17 is there a logic of pressure differential?
18 MR. DOTSON:
The component cooling water is an 19 intermediate system and I believe leakage would be from it 20 to the essential cooling water system.
Can someone help 21 me?
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
So the logic is to leak inwards 23 instead of outwards?
24 MR. DOTSON: I need some help on that one.
25 Let me get back to you with that one.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
i 36 1
1 MR. WISENBURG:
Erroll, excuse me, I'll answer 2
the question.
The ECW pressure is higher than component 3
cooling water.
Leakage would be from ECW into component 4
cooling water.
ECW is of course monitored for outward 5
leakage.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
Even so, all right.
Thank you.
7 So a leak would result in a high tank level.
8 MR. WISENBURG:
That's correct, sir.
9 MR. DOTSON:
You want to move on?
10 The three train design accomplishess all that the 11 more familiar two train design does with some notable 12 advantages.
()
13 And the first advantage is proven equipment size, 14 since this is a larger plant, the equipment size would~be 15 larger, if it were a two train system rather than three.
16 South Texas Project has the capability to shut 17 the plant down, as you'll see later, with one of three 18 trains in many cases rather than one of two.
Three trains 19 also prcvide greater margin, since for the majority of 20 analyzed possible accidents, only one of three trains can 21 successfully mitigate the accident, even though that's not 22 the design basis of the plant.
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
Without regarding an accident but (J"]
24 just considering the steady state operation, when you have 25 three trains, there's at least two major options.
You one TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
37' 1
run with all of them running, and then you experience a Os 2
mild transient when one of them quits but the other two 3
pick it up easily, or you run with two of them and then you 4
start the third one if one of them quits.
Which option do 5
you pick, or do you have a variety?
6 MR. DOTSON:
Well, normally the signal to require 7
those trains would start all three of them.
8 Safety injection signal would actually start all 9
three.
10 MR. EBERSOlE:
I'm talking about running support 11 systems.
12 MR. DOTSON:
Like component cooling water?
()
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
Right.
14 MR. DOTSON:
Normally that would be one system, I 15 believe.
The operations folks would operate that just with 16 one system.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
You operate one system with two in 18 standby.
19 MR. DOTSON:
I believe.
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
Do you rotate?
21 MR. DOTSON:
And we would rotate running time on 22 those systems.
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
What sort of time, operational 24 time division do you have, six months, year?
(v~}
l 25 MR. DOTSON:
You want to answer that?
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
a 38 1
MR. EBERSOLE:
You keep them --
%j) 2 MR. DOTSON:
You know, we want to put equal run 3
time on them, but when they switch over, we'd like to get 4
back to you with that.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
Every time you switch over, 6
there's a breathless interval?
7 MR. DOTSON:
They have the opportunity of 8
bringing this cyling on before you shut the first one down.
9 Okay, I'll preceed.
We'll get back to you 10 MR. EBERSOLE:
Anyway, it's a normal one out of 11 three running on line?
12 MR. DOTSON:
Right, for component cooling water
()
13 which is the normally operating system, and its essential 14 cooling water system associated with it.
Those are really 15 the only two systems that run during normal plant 16 operation, with the exception of the reactor containment 17 fan coolers which I'll describe here in a little bit.
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
So you run on one train with two 19 hundred percent back up; is that correct?
20 MR. DOTSON: Yes, sir.
21 DR. MARK:
In the SER, I guess -- I'm not sure 22 this fits in exactly with what you're discussing at the 23 moment, in the electrical auxiliary building, heating
~T 24 (J
ventilation and air conditioning, it is written that two 25 must be running all the time of the three train system.
Is TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
39 1
that perhaps a mistake?
,_,d 2
MR. DOTSON:
No, that's correct.
Those are 50 3
percent systess.
And so for normal loads, we'll be running 4
two of those three.
I was referring simply to systems that 5
I've just described.
6 DR. MARK:
I realized that you were talking of a 7
different set of systems at the moment.
8 MR. DOTSON:
Those are two out of three normally, 9_
but we've looked at if we could -- if we only had to run 10 one of reducing the heat loads, that is possible.
But 11 normally that's a two out of three system, the heating 12 ventilation system.
)
13 Shall we go on?
14 We're saying that one of three trains does 15 provide greater protection, though, for plant investment 16 since we have single train shutdown capabilities for fire 17 protection, small break loss of coolant accidents and 18 normal shutdown, which I'll show a little more detail here 19 in a minute.
20 As part of the three train design, as I said, 21 we've achieved greater simplicity in piping design, with no 22 header pipe between the trains.
23 And this slide, perhaps is what we're relating to 24 (a~}
somewhat, shows the minimum number of trains required to 25 operate under various plant conditions.
Of course most of TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
40 1
the emergency core cooling systems don't operate at all.
V 2
.But for normal operation, when we want essential 3
cooling water, one component cooling water, and one reactor 4
containment fan cooler train is used.
And for normal 5
shutdown, only one residual heat removal train is needed.
6 So it's only for the non-mechanistic large 7
postulated breaks that two trains are required and that's 8
because one train is postulated to spill out the break and 9
not be effective.
10 one train is postulated to experience a single 11 failure.
And of course the third train performs the 12 function and injects into the reactor coolant loop.
()
13 And therefore, the support systems, the component 14 cooling water, essential cooling water, must be three train 15 as well.
16 Containment spray ar I mentioned, is the headered 17 system with two trains required.
And so the third part of 18 this says that for other events, you can see that only one 19 train is required, since we've eliminated the spilling, and
(
20 those of the more probable events.
21 So the three train design at South Texas Project 22 performs the same functions as a two train design in 23 achieving the various shutdown modes.
24 For hot standby, we use a chemical and volume r w]
25 control system, the auxiliary feedwater system and primary TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177 L
41 1
7, system components as necessary, to maintain inventory, 2
reactivity control, temperature and pressure control.
3 And for bringing the plant to cold shutdown, as I 4
said, we use a residual heat removal system as the other 5
plants do and the other support systems as well.
6 The three train design, though, coupled with our 7
plant layout, provides considerable advantages for us for 8
fire protection and I'd like to describe that.
9 First of all, with three trains, we have two ways 10 to shut the plant down in the event of a fire in any single 11 fire area, versus only one pathway as required by 12 Appendix R.
()
13 And also the South Texas Project complies with 14 the requirements of Appendix R, with the control room 15 deviation as most people do, that is we don't have 36 sprinklers in the control room.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
Ask about the fire areas in this 18 context.
Is an area defined by a perimeter separation 19 system that is static or passive or does it involve active 20 fire dampers and ventilating ducts?
21 MR. DOTSON:
Both.
Our fire areas are defined by 22 three hour barriers.
But in many cases, to complete that 23 barrier, a three hour fire damper is used.
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
And is the operational reliability,
25 of this well known and could you quote it to me, these l
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177 l
42 l
1 dampers?
2 MR. DOTSON:
I think --
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
You did a PRA, I believe.
Have 4
you got in that PRA study the basic logic or how well these 5
zonal separation systems --
6 MR. DOTSON:
I don't know that we have studied 7
reliability of the fire dampers, not to my knowledge.
I 8
know that --
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
I'm just drying to get at the 10 validity of the area concept, against this somewhat 11 questionable part played by active separation devices.
12 MR. DOTSON:
That's one advantage that we have.
p)
's_
13 We have more margin.
In a sense, our fire areas are 14 typical of most plants and in this case, we haven't chosen 15 some of the other alternatives of Appendix R other than 16 three hour barriers so we are safer in that regard.
But in 17 addition to that, we do have two additional ways, 18 considering that fire area's totally inoperable --
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
I understand.
But my question is 20 prompted by a fairly recent investigation that disclosed 9
21 the rather astonishing unreliability of fire dampers.
22 MR. DOTSON:
Well, we've had some of the typical 23 industry problems with fire dampers, some of them failing 24 to close and so forth.
And we've had to make some 25 modifications.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
43 1
DR. SEISS:
Are there fire dampers involved in d
2 the separation of the three train systems?
3 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, in the case of the fire areas, 4
there are, yes.
5 DR. MARK:
Why?
6 MR. DOTSON:
Excuse me?
7 DR. MARK:
Why?
8 MR. DOTSON:
The ducting and so forth, it's 9
almost impossible, I think, to design a plant where you 10 wouldn't have some ventilation ducting having to cross fire 11 areas, just in the same way of some of our cabling has to, 12 we put three hour wrap on it.
p
(
13 DR. MARK:
Ventilation systems.
14 MR. DOTSON:
Excuse me?
15 DR. MARK:
Do they share ventilation systems?
16 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, there is some sharing.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
Let me ask the Staff this 18 question.
Is this a commonly accepted indication of zonal 19 fire areas to allow this to be identified only -- or rather 20 necessarily by the accomplishment of positive dampers?
Is 21 the Staff -- is that their position?
22 MR. WILSON:
Jerry Wilson, NRC.
23 Jesse, could you repeat the question?
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
I'm saying another -- talking 25 about the fire areas.
Ideally, a fire area would be TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
44 1
surrounded by a static or passive wall of concrete <ith.
7_ s
( s)
~
2 some closed doors.
3 Unideally, it's achieved by closing a bunch of 4
What does the Staff say about the latitude 5
here.
6 MR. WILSON:
I think you're aware that virtually 7
all the plants are making use of dampers for isolating 8
these rooms.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
And we're finding they don't work, 10 too.
11 MR. WILSON:
And the Staff is continuing to study 12 that.
I don't know what more to tell you than that.
()
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
Okay.
We just raised it as kind 14 of a questionable issue.
15 MR. DOTSON:
I think we're trying to say we're as 16 good as anyone else with an ace in the hole.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
I thought you were trying to say 18 you were better.
19 MR. DOTSON:
I think that comes out better.
We 20 are no better in fire dampers, unfortunately, although I 21 think in many cases we have fewer than a lot of folks, with 22 our separation.
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
You are better in that you've got 24 three shots instead of two.
25 MR. DOTSON:
That's right.
Yes, sir.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
1 45 1
As well as Appendix R, we've addressed and
,s 2
complied with the requirements of Appendix A, to the branch 3
technical position APCSB 9.5-1, which I think you're 4
familiar with that.
We do have sprinklers in concentrated 5
cable areas and so forth.
6 We have also limited the vertical propagation of 7
the fire which is a problem often times, of course, with 8
the separation with three trains.
9 We have our three trains on three separate 10 elevations in the plant and those are separated by three 11 hour1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> barriers.
Unfortunately, some of them have dampers in 12 those barriers.
,-()
13 Additional advantages also for the three train 14 system is that the auxiliary shutdown panel capabilities 15 include controls for all three trains.
We actually 16 transfer all three of those trains to the auxiliary 17 shutdown panel and we have the ability to maintain cold 18 shutdown from the auxiliary shutdown panel so it's not a 19 hot shutdown panel.
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
The problem with that second 21 bullet up there is it says heavy concrete walls but it 22 doesn't say tin dampers that move up and down.
23 MR. DOTSON:
Well, we put our best foot forward.
24 If there are better dampers, we would look at 25 them.
We've not been very happy with dampers.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
4 46 1
MR. EBERSOLE:
But the heavy concrete walls gives 2
you a misleading impression.
3 MR. DOTSON:
But on the other hand, sir, the 4
location of most of these ducts and their size certainly, 5
while it doesn't form a tight barrier, you look at more 6
mechanistic fire, they're not so detrimental, either.
7 That's been my opinion.
In some cases, it night even be 8
better if they didn't work and actually let that heat 9
dissipate.
We looked at that considerably back when I was 10 on St. Lucie; in fact made that presentation to the NRC and 11 in fact ended up suing them on Appendix R.
Needless to say 12 we didn't win.
r3 g,)
13 DR. SEISS:
These three systems share a 14 ventilation system.
Does that in any way affect their 15 ability to function independently if they lose that common 16 ventilation system?
17 MR. DOTSON:
I'm not sure I understand the 18 question, sir.
19 DR. SEISS:
Well, in answer to a question a few 20 minutes ago, you said that the three train systems shared a 21 ventilation system.
And that was the reason for the 22 dampers.
23 MR. DOTSON:
Well, in that context, I was r^s 24 addressing the fact that ducts from other areas would V
25 transverse areas relating to fire.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
47 1
Now, going to the ventilation, itself, I consider
,7,
2 that a separate question.
Are you addressing the ability 3
to cool the various areas?
4 DR. SEISS:
Yes.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
Aren't you saying really that you 6
have common duct work for multiple systems?
7 MR. DOTSON:
Yes.
8 DR. SEISS:
I'd like to get back to the question 9
of cooling, ventilating, pump rooms, et cetera.
Are those 10 independently supplied, the three trains?
11 MR. DOTSON:
The three trains are incependent.
12 The three HVAC trains are each independent.
C)
(_
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
Does that include the duct work?
14 MR. DOTSON:
And the duct work; is that correct?
15 I believe I'm correct.
In some cases, there's some duct 16 work that's common and I think a good deal of it, at least 17 the supply must be separated.
18 MR. WISENBURG:
There are three separate, an A, B
19 and a C train ventilation systems which, in some cases 20 share, common headers.
That is, if you would, for some 21 reason, loose the A train, the other two trains would 22 supply flow through the common header.
23 DR. SEISS:
There's no way that one failure could 24 impair all three?
l 25 MR. WISENBURG:
No, sir.
l TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177 L
48 1
MR. DOTSON:
I think I was trying to answer two
-s 2
questions at the same time.
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
What if you knock down a major 4
duct with a forklift or something, doesn't that -- if you 5
loose a main duct, a supply duct, don't you lose all three 6
of the active fan systems.
7 MR. DOTSON:
If you lost a common duct, yes, sir, 8
you could.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
So it's a little bit like piping, 10 except here, you have a common tin pipe for the duct work.
11 MR. DOTSON:
That's correct.
We've also looked 12 at temperatures as to what happens on loss of various
)
13 systems.
And, of course, at that point, the operating 14 people have to take some action to shut down loads and so 15 forth, to reduce temperatures.
16 But there are cases where you could damage a 17 common duct and defeat all three systems.
I guess you 18 could say that, yes, sir.
19 Returning to fire protection, to complete that, 20 we also have three cable spread rooms, I just wanted to 21 make mention of that.
I think we're unusual in that 22 regard, and each of them in a separate fire area.
23 So our heavily cabled areas are in separate fire 24 areas.
(~T
%-)
~
Of course, we have normal fire protection equipment j
25 that you're used to seeing such as manual suppression, TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
49 1
automatic suppression in concentrated cable areas, 2
administrative procedures to prevent or limit fires, fire 3
detection systems and fire fighting plans for each fire 4
zone.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
What is the extinguishing agent 6
that you use in the spreading rooms.
7 MR. DOTSON:
Water, sir.
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
Water?
9 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, sir.
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
And do you invoke that the water 11 won't damage cables which have been aged for 30 years or do 12 you say, "Well, I only have a fire in one place at one 13 time"?
14 MR. DOTSON:
Well, our goal is to put the fire 15 out.
I'd say we ha ve two other spread rooms.
16 MR. EBERSJLE:
Is your fire protection system 17 seismically competent to go or not go in the presence of a 18 seismic disturbance?
19 MR. DOTSON: It's not a seismic system per se, but 20 it's designed so that it won't fail safety systems during a 21 seismic event.
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
It will not respond.
23 MR. DOTSON:
It's not designed to function during
(~
24 a seismic event.
It's designed not to fail safety-related V) 25 systems during a seismic event.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
50' 1
MR. EBERSOLE:
It will not openly spray
[_h V
2 everywhere in a seismic event?
3 MR. DOTSON:
That's correct.
4 Next part I'd like to talk about our auxiliary 5
feedwater system.
6 MR. WISENBURG:
Excuse me.
We could respond to 7
Mr. Ebersole's request relative to rotating the operating 8
essential cooling water, component cooling water system.
9 Operating philosophy would be to rotate systems 10 approximately monthly.
However, we haven't set the exact 11 frequency yet because there's some concern that should you 12 do you that, you age all three trains at the same rate and
()
13 then at some point in time you're going to have to shut 14 down to change out the complete system.
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
Hopefully they're not that 16 uniform.
17 MR. WISENBURG:
I might also add to your 18 questions relative to the dampers.
We did report the 19 situation relative to Ruskin fire dampers and Pretoria 20 (Phonetic) fire dampers under 10 CFR 50.55(e) and have done 21 some extensive air flow testing in various configurations 22 on the dampers, realizing that there are still some j
l 23 problems but those tests have prompted modifications.
<s 24 MR. EBERSOLE:
Thank you, b
25 Well, I really just noticed, you know, a fine TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
51 1
and expensive system which appeared to be riding on the.
Is\\
V 2
somewhat tenuous matter of damper reliability.
3 MR. DOTSON: I think there's some truth to that 4
but I believe there's also, like I say, another story that 5
can say that you might be better off if they didn't work 6
and you dissipated that heat, although I'm not willing to 7
present that as a design basis.
8 The auxiliary feedwater system for the South 9_
Texas Project is a four-train design including diverse 10 stream-driven feedwater punp.
Segregation of the trains 11 allows simplification in design by having one auxiliary 12 feedwater pump supply water for each of the four steam n'q,)
13 generators as shown here.
In other words, one pump and one 14 steam generator.
15 Three independent class IE sources feed the three 16 trains; and two of the pumps, one motor-driven, and one 17 turbine-driven, receive the same actuation signal from the 18 A train.
But the other two motor-driven pumps are actuated 19 by separate signals.
20 The cross connects that you see are normally 21 closed but they can be operated from the control room, if 22 necessary.
23 The recent event involving the feedwater system
(~T 24 that was reported in the press stems from a calcu,lation V
25 performed to determine if one pump feeding one steam TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
52 1
generator could maintain a stable cooling condition.
,I 1
C/
2 An initial calculation determined that this was 3
possible.
But on the updating of t.'1at calculation, it was 4
determined that the inputs to the calculation were in 5
evolution and that operator action was part of the solution 6
and so the action was to manually operate the safety 7
related atmospheric dump, power operated relief valve, even 8
though maintaining cooling with one steam generator, is not 9
a design requirement.
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
Could you get adequate natural 11 circulation from the primary loop with only one steam 12 generator working?
()
13 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, sir.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
You do?
15 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, sir.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
With one steam generator?
17 MR. DOTSON:
One steam generator, yes, sir.
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, you seem to be getting lots 19 of water toward the secondary side.
How about the case of 20 where you get too much and you're running over the high 21 level trip point in the -- running out into the main steam 22 lines.
Do have you safety grade cutoffs?
23 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, that event has been looked at.
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
Can the main steam lines carry the 25 water load in case that happens?
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
l 53 1
MR. DOTSON:
That's been looked at; I believe 7-i, e
'^'
2 that's the case, yes, I'm getting a load of nods.
I 3
thought that was the case.
Yes, sir, up to the main steam 4
isolation valve.
5 MR. WISENBURG:
We've looked at it further than 6
that.
It will carry it up to the turbine stop.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
What will happen to the aux feed 8
pump when that happens, if it happens to the wrong one; 9
will it damage the aux feed turbine part?
Can it?
10 MR. DOTSON:
You're saying if water was injected 11 into the turbine -- I don't that what -- that we've looked 12
-- I'd have to get back to you on that.
Not to my 13
(,,j 13 knowledge.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
It's a common and popular question 15 today, do you always turn the secondary side off before it 16 fills up the main steam lines.
17 MR. DOTSON:
We sure like to.
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
And you can say that you can carry 19 the water load.
Am I correct?
20 MR. WISENBURG:
That's correct, sir.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
But if it happens to the f
22 turbine-driven aux feed pump is -- what's known about what l
23 happens to it?
Anything?
-m 24 MR. DOTSON:
We'll have to get back to you.
I
(-
i 25 don't believe we've looked at injecting water into that l
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
[
1 54 1
Pump.
s
(
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
Most of those rugged turbines are 3
supposed to be able to carry water.
4 MR. DOTSON:
I'll just have to get back to you on 5
that.
I don't know the answer.
6 MR. GOLDBERG:
I don't think that's been 7
analyzed.
But I don't think that small turbine could 8
handle the water.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
It's a Terry, isn't it?
10 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, it is.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
I don't know, I've heard various 12 stories about their ability to carry water and dump it and O)
(
13 continue to run.
I don't know.
14 MR. DOTSON:
It is a Terry Turbine.
We'll have 15 to bet back to you on that, sir.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
As long as you don't slug it.
17 MR. DOTSON:
That event you're talking about I 18 think would slug it.
19 DR. SEISS:
I'd like to go back to the 20 three-train system for a moment.
All three trains take 21 suction from the refueling water storage tank?
22 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, sir, they do.
23 DR. SEISS:
What does your mini-PRA tell you 24 about the function of that common source on the reliability p%)
s 25 of the systems?
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
55 1
MR. DOTSON:
That's a passive system, but I would s
2 like to defer that question and get back to you on that.
I 3
don't know.
4 DR. SEISS:
I assume it's normally open valves?
5 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, sir.
6 DR. SEISS:
Normally open valves have been known 7
to shut.
PRA's, at least.
8 MR. DOTSON:
We'll get back to you with that 9
answer.
10 DR. SEISS:
And the other question relating to 11 that is the seismic margin?
12 MR. DOTSON:
Seismic margin?
(_3) 13 DR. SEISS:
A seismic event and the seismic r
14 capability of that tank.
15 MR. DOTSON:
I'm going to address seismic margin 16 a little later on in my presentation.
Not that tank 17 specifically, but I'll discuss in general and perhaps we 18 could bring that question up then.
Could you pick up that 19 question?
20 MR. WISENBURG:
Relative the the dependancy on 21 auxiliary feedwater storage tanks from our PRA, it does not 22 show any significant dependency on the tank to the pumps in 23 that part of the system.
24 DR. SEISS:
Has it shown to be reliable enough 25 that --
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
F '
.~
56 1
MR. DOTSON:
It's a passive system.
There's p_(.)
2.
nothing that needs to operate.
3 MR. DOTSON:
Let me go on and then perhaps we can 4
pick it up if we have anything further to add.
5 Anyway, the conclusion of what I was saying was 6
that the - 'we did resolve that item with one steam 7
generator and one pump and one steam generator with the 8
Staff and it is possible to maintain the plant in a safe 9
shutdown condition with one auxiliary feedwater pump, 10 feedwater steam generator -- and even though that's not a 11
' design basis for the plant.
Okay?
12 Next slide.
Control room integration, I'd like
()
13 to talk about.
South Texas Project has the unique 14 '
opportunity in the 1982-1983 time frame to address the 15 Three Mile Island concerns for post-accident monitoring and 16 human factors engineering with a complete design and 17 evaluation of operated equipment interfaces upon integrated 18 design.
19 South Texas project design concept fully meets 20 the intent of NURFG-G737, Supplement 1.
This is possible 21 because in 1962, we have fewer than 20 percent of the 22 safety related control panels, fabricated; the Three Mile 23 Island criteria development was nearly complete; the (V3 24
' Westinghouse Owners Group emergency response guidelines
. 25 were available, and we had the active participation of the TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177 i
57 1
Houston Lighting & Power Operations Department at that
_,s LJ 2
time.
3 Control design review integration, integrated the 4
following requirements:
Human factors design; 5
post-accident monitoring instrumentation; safety-parameter 6
displays; emergency operating procedures; safety grade cold 7
shutdown capability; by-pass and inoperable status 8
monitoring for engineered safety features equipment, and 9
annunciator and alarm prioritization.
10 In performing the control room design review, a 11 full scale mock-up of the main control panels were 12 constructed.
And the actual control room design review was
()
13 conducted using this mock-up.
14 Evaluation was performed osing Westinghouse 15 owners group emergency response guidelines as a basis for 16 the emergency operating procedures and the task was 17 performed by a joint team from engineering, operations and 18 a human factors consultant from Torrey Pines.
19 A complete re-layout of six complete safety l
20 related panels resolved human engineering deficiencies and also upgraded to provide full 21 the remaining panels
.i o. a 22 integration of the criteria requirements as well as to l
1 l
23 provide an integrated design for all the main control l
l
(~)
24 panels.
(J 25 This slide shows the milestones for the control l
l TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
58 1
room design review which stretched over a three-year period
~
2 and you saw the results in your tour.
3 Only a few items remain to be completed in the 4
control room design review and these include such items as 5
a check of the panel labels, annunciator titles, indicator 6
fields to confirm that the actual hardware meets the design 7
requirements in addition to lighting and sound surveys, 8
computer displays, work space, communications, which need 9
to be evaluated after the control room is completed.
10 Emergency operating procedures will be validated 11 on the plant simulator, which has been upgraded to 12 correspond to the control room design which you also saw.
("\\
(_)
13 During this same time frame that I just 14 described, the alternate shutdown capability from outside 15 the control room was also evaluated and as you can see, 16 Appendix R Criteria; safety-grade cold shutdown criteria, 17 human facators engineering for the auxiliary shutdown panel 18 and cable routing designs could all be accomplished since 19 that work had not been completed.
20 South Texas Project developed the alternate 21 shutdown capability for all three trains from outside the 22 control room with appropriate instrumentation for all three 23 trains, also available outside the control room.
24 The qualified display processing system, which I 25 will describe later, was developed in this same time frame TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
59 1
also.
'~
2 This slide shows how the qualified display 3
processing system, or QDPS, provides a monitoring 4
capability in both the main control room and the auxiliary 5
shutdown panel.
6 As this next slide shows, when a nonmechanistic 7
evacuation of the control room is postulated, control of 8
equipment necessary for hot shutdown and equipment which 9
must be operated frequently to reach and maintain cold 10 shutdown, is transferred for each train individually in the 11 switch gear rooms to the auxiliary shutdown panel.
12 The South Texas Project qualified display (Gj 13 processing system was another major aspect of the control 14 room integration effort in addition to human factors 15 engineering of control panels and the alternate. shutdown 16 capability.
17 The objectives of the QDPS were to optimize the 18 instrumentation design to include many facets of the 19 evolving regulatory requirements such as Three Mile Island, 20 Appendix R, and safety-grade cold shutdown as well as to 21 provide the optimized cable routing and also the use of the 22 latest digital technology.
23 Several categories of inputs to the QDPS were 24 identified to meet these objectives.
Post-accident 25 monitoring parameters including inadequate core cooling TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177 l
60 1
instrumentation and Regulatory Guide 1.97, Category 1 f,
2 variables.
3 A minimum set of parameters necessary to monitor 4
and control safe shutdown of the plant.
Complementary 5
post-accident monitoring, control and protection system 6
parameters used to enhance the implementation of graphic 7
displays.
8 Some examples of an advanced design modification 9
parameters which included the steam generator water level 10 density compensation and a primary temperature averaging 11 scheme which uses for averages the three reactor coolant 12 system hot leg RTDs for each loop.
( ))
13 The outputs from the QDPS includes a qualified 14 post-accident monitoring displays in the control room; 15 critical safety function parameter displays in the control 16 room; safe shutdown displays in the control room and on the 17 auxiliary shutdown panel; isolated data links to the safety 18 parameter display system; modulating control for safe 19 shutdown valves, and the steam generator water level 20 density compensation and temperature averaging scheme 21 outputs to the protection system.
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
How do you view the SDPS at this 23 point in time with this system you have?
Is it an asset or 24 is a nuisance?
25 MR. DOTSON:
- Well, I, from the design engineering TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
61 1
side, consider it an asset.
I think the opera. tor should 2
probably speak to that.
It gives them a tremendous amount 3
of information right there at the controls.
It gives them 4
a tremendous amount of capability to call up different 5
displays.
At the same time, it allows them a lot more 6
information.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
How do they know it's not 8
misinformation?
9 MR. DOTSON:
Well, let me get to that in just a 10 minute.
11 MR. WISENBURG:
Excuse me.
He wants to hear it 12 from the operator, himself.
()
13 MR. BALCOM:
Dick Balcom, operations manager for 14 South Texas.
And we consider the SPDS a viable part of our 15 backup systems and our control systems as well as QDPS.
16 We were intimately involved with the development 17 of all those displays and it will be a great asset to the 18 operation of the plant.
19 MR. EBERSOL:
Okay, thank you.
20 MR. DOTSON:
To describe the system a little 21 further, and maybe I'll get to answer your question, QDPS 22 is a digital monitoring system which offers the following 23 advantages:
The graphic displays support the operating 24 procedures; there are fewer panel indicators, therefore, 25 simpler controls panel; relieves the operator of the burden TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177 l
62 1
of cross channel checking of redundant indicators, O
as you 2
saw, see them on the same display; performs quality 3
checking of input signals; it simplifies instrumentation of 4
the signal distribution by using data links, and it 5
monitors itself through on line diagnostics and self 6
calibrations.
7 Because the qualified display processing system 8
is a new system, an extensive verification and validation 9
program has been undertaken, and this I believe is the 10 answer to your question.
An independent team of verifiets 11 has been identified to perform exhaustive structural and 12 functional testing of the software and hardware.
()
13 AnG the actual software and hardware, which is 14 being tested is the Unit 2 system.
And this program will 15 be completed prior to fuel load and the process is being 16 audited by the NRC Staff.
s 17 Next, I'd like to talk to you about our 18 anticipated transients without scram, or ATWS Mitigation 19 Capability.
The ATWS mitigation system actuation circuity 20 is called AMSAC, and it's a nonsafety system that provides 21 diversity from the reactor protection system.
22 We've committed to install this system no later 23 than the completion of the first refueling outage.
And 24 this ATWS/AMSAC system can readily be incorporated in the 25 control room design since it uses same technology as the TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
63 1
7-QDPS and it can fit into the same nonsafety related cabinet
(_/
2 that we have.
3 South Texas Project AMSAC will be the 4
Westinghouse owners group generic design using the option 5
of initiation of low feedwater flow, and the system will 6
trip the main turbine generator and initiate auxiliary 7
feedwater flow independent of the reactor protection 8
system.
9 I'd like to talk about our core design and rapid 10 refueling, which are also unique in the United States.
11 South Texas Project has a 14-foot fuel assembly design 12 rather than a typical 12-foot length design.
However, the
()
13 core performance is not essentially different from other 14 plants in operation, both here and abroad.
15 The 3800 mega~ watt thermal South Texas Project 16 core has 193 fuel assemblies of the Westinghouse standard 17 17 by 17 fuel pin array.
18 This fuel is essentially the same as the current 19 Westinghouse fuel from both a design and a fabrication 20 point of view.
21 Several plants overseas have already used the 22 14-foot Westinghouse fuel design, the Tihange III and 23 Doel IV units in Belgium as well as the three operating 24 Paluel units in France and twenty additional French plants 25 have a 14-foot design.
Doel IV has recently completed its TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
64 1
first cycle in mid-May.
,_sU 2
The South Texas Project design fuel assemblies 3
you see here in comparison, has 10 grids rather than the 4
typical 8 for a 17 by 17 fuel assembly of 12-foot length.
5 And the extra grids are used to increase the axial support 6
of a longer and heavier fuel load and limit rod bow and the 7
bottom nozzle legs are slightly longer, that's to reduce 8
neutron flux on the lower core plate.
9 The assembly guide pins there at the top are part 10 of the upper nozzle rather than the bottom of the upper 11 core plate because of the rapid refueling design, which 12 I'll describe in a few minutes.
()
13 And this slide shows a comparison of a 12-foot 14 core -- and we picked McGuire -- for the South Texas 15 Project 14-foot core and the thermal hydraulic parameters 16 remain essentially the same for the 12-foot and 14-foot 17 cores and also accident limits are still met with adequate 18 margin.
19 As stated earlier, the South Texas Project fuel 20 design core performance is not considered different from 21 the other units already in operation both domestically and 22 abroad.
23 Rapid Refueling.
Rapid refueling reduces the 24 number of operator actions in the refueling operation by 25 eliminating certain operations and minimizing the number of TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
65 1
components to be handled separately.
_s d
2 A summary of rapid refueling is:
First, a quick 3
opening reactor vessel with rotolock studs; second, no 4
requirement for disconnecting the electrical cabling to the 5
control rod drives; and third, access to the core is gained 6
in a single lift with the upper head, upper internals, 7
control rods lifted in a single package and the control 8
rods parked in the head and the upper internals rather than 9
left in the core.
10 And fourth, allowing the potential for minimizing 11 the number of fuel handling operations by having storage 12 capability within the containment as we said earlier.
()
13 As as I stated, Doel IV has come down, they used 14 the rapid refueling and have now gone back up and we have a 15 person, an HL&P employee, stationed at Doel IV in Belgium 16 and he has observed all these operations and he's in the 17 process of writing a report.
So we'll have some firsthand 18 experience on rapid refueling.
19 Next subject I'd like to cover are the -- is the 20 steam generator integrity and some of the secondary system 21 improvements that we've made.
22 South Texas Project has made several 23 modifications to the secondary side of the plant to protect 24 our investment in the steam generators.
25 Individually, these modifications have been done TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
66 1
in other plants, but collectively, we believe they're i
2
- unique, t
3 History has shown that steam generator is the 4
hardware most susceptible to nonsafety related problems, at 5
least major hardware, and in fact some plants have already 6
had to replace them.
So we've committed along with design 7
changes, to maintain chemistry control, as you'll hear our 8
plant manager, Warren Kinsey talk about, to minimize these 9
problems.
10 South Texas Project has the Westinghouse Model E 11 steam generators which are essentially identical to the 12 more familiar Model D, but slightly larger.
()
13 In order to protect the steam generators, Houston 14 Lighting & Power has studied the industry problems and has 15 made major modifications to prevent these problems from 16 causing steam generator failures at South Texas project.
17 These modifications include the addition of a 18 prt:ation polishing demineralizer as well as the mixed bed 19 polishers as a final protection to the steam generator for 20 impurities; the addition of a deaereator storage tank to 21 reduce oxygen to less than detectable levels, that's a 22 deaereator and a storage tank which has a steam stripping 23 and a hold up to reduce oxygen to less than detectable 24 levels.
25 The addition of a motor-driven startup steam TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
67 1
7 generator feed pump, as Jerry Goldberg talked about, which 2
allows the secondary system to be used in all phases, of 3
operation, including startup, it's electric driven.
4 In addition to the steam generator blowdown 5
demineralizer, an increased blowdown capability to reduce 6
impurities that could be in the steam generator; we've 7
eliminated copper in the feedwater and condensate train, 8
for the use of titanium condenser, all to preclude copper 9
in the secondary system.
10 We use all volatile treatment chemistry instead 11 of phosphate treatment to reduce sludge buildup.
We've 12 expanded the steam generator tubes in the preheater section
()
13 to eliminate tube vibration and wear which has been 14 experienced in other steam generators.
15 We have the addition of sludge lancing port to 16 facilitate steam generator cleaning.
We have a steam 17 generator layup system to prevent corrosion when the plant 18 is down.
And finally, we stress relieve the tubes on the 19 primary side within the tube sheet to prevent stress 20 corrosion cracking by using the rotopeening technology.
21 I'd like to cover seismic design and some margins 22 associated with it.
This is a brief summary of the South 23 Texas Project seismic design in somewhat greater detail as 24 requested.
25 There is considerable margin in the seismic TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
68 1
design in the plant structures and equipment and I'll now O
2 describe the various layers of margin which the South Texas 3
project has.
4 This slide shows the distribution of the tectonic 5
events within a 200 mile radiur. Of the site.
And as you 6
can see, 23 were found, but none were a magnitude greater 7
than 3.9 and none closer than 80 miles to the site.
8 And since there were so few events, we studied 9
events located further from the site and the site 10 characterization of the South Texas Project site considers 11 two basic source mechanisms; one, the tectonic activity in 12 the underlying basement rock of the Gulf Coast
()
13 seismotectonic province where the South Texas Project is 14 located; and two, an event in the tectonic provinces 15 adjacent to the the Gulf Coast province.
16 Consideration of these events resulted in a worse 17 case earthquake intensity six at the site which correlates 18 with a horizontal ground acceleration of 0.07G.
19 In order to comply with a minimum safe shutdown 20 earthquake acceleration established in 10CFR part 100, we 21 used 0.1G.
22 So you can see, this activity in itself resulted 23 in considerable margin since the South Texas Project is in 24 an area of nearly zero seismic activity.
25 The floor response spectra for the various TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
69 1
buildings was developed using a two-step finite element O
2 method to account for the soil structure interaction and 3
this method constitutes the design basis analysis for the 4
South Texas Project.
5 A second analysis was performed using elastic 6
half step method for the soil structure interaction and a 7
confirmatory analysis using a single finite element method 8
was also used for comparison.
9 And this slide shows a typical comparison for 10 those response spectra, a typical response spectra, that 11 is, generated by the three methods.
And a comparison of 12 the three methods confirmed the conservatism of the South
()
13 Texas Project design basis spectra.
For example, the 14 clastic half space was used for the low cyclas less than 15 four.
16 DR. SEISS:
That's the spectrum at the base mat 17 of the structure?
18 MR. DOTSON:
This is just a typical, this is just 19 filling up -- I'm just putting this up as typical.
Just 20 putting it up as typical, not particularly representative, 21 but as typical.
22 DR. SEISS:
But it's an input spectrum.
23 MR. DOTSON:
Excuse me?
24 DR. SEISS:
An input spectrum, not a floor 25 spectrum.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
=
70 1
MR. DOTSON:
No, is this is a floor spectrum.
2 DR. SEISS:
This is a typical floor specucum?
3 MR. DOTSON:
A typical floor spectrum, yes, sir.
4 Let me get a nod.
That's correct.
5 DR. SEISS:
Was the previous slide also?
6 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, sir, that's the slide basically 7
showing the same thing two different ways.
8 DR. SEISS:
Does this typical floor spectrum have 9
peak?
10 MR. DOTSON:
I still didn't hear the question.
il DR. SEISS:
You've got a very sharp peak up 12 there.
At about nine, ten hurts, and I think the
()
13 requirements are that be broadened to fifteen percent 14 either side.
So I don't see quite how that's typical of 15 anything.
16 MR. DOTSON:
Well, it's showed to be 17 representative of the three different methods is what we're 18 trying to show, not as a particular floor response 19 spectrum, but how the three methods -- here you can see it 20 broader.
Maybe this is the slide we ought to look at.
21 As what kind of results these three methods 22 generally yield is what we're trying to show, n;t any 23 specific floor or any specific location, but just to show 24 that we did use three methods, that this is what they 25 typically showed, and the two-step finite element method is TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
71 1
the one we generally did use and it was generally most s
2 conservative.
That's all we're trying to show.
3 DR. SEISS:
Let's look at the next slide, then.
4 MR. DOTSON:
That's simply a comparison.
5 MR. WISENBURG:
Dr. Seiss, this slide is just a 6
ratio.
The previous slide is the actual floor spectrum.
7 DR. SEISS:
Okay.
So that slide tells me that 8
I've got something that's designed for nine hertz; you've 9
got a factor of about 6.8 on it, that if I've got something 10 that's designed for 20 hertz, you've got a factor of 1.2 on 11 it.
Is that what it means?
12 MR. DOTSON:
Of the various methods, it's just a
()
13 comparison of the methods.
It's not a factor of safety per 14 se, it's just showing the conservatism of that method.
I 15 would not call it --
16 DR. SEISS:
I still don't understand it.
17 MR. DOTSON:
What we did, is we used this sort of 18 a typical slide and using three different methods.
19 DR. SEISS:
That I understand.
20 MR. DOTSON:
And the second slide simply shows a 21 ratio of what the first slide is.
And that's all -- the 22 two slides are trying to show the same thing in two 23 different ways.
24 DR. SEISS:
That confuses me even more.
The 25 ratio of what to what?
It says it's the ratio of the --
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
72 1
MR. DOTSON:
The ratio of the twc-step finite O
2 element method to the elastic half step.
3 DR. SEISS:
That's not what it says.
It says the 4
ratio of design basis to confirmatory basis.
5 MR. DOTSON:
Well, the design basis is the 6
finite --
7 DR. SEISS:
Is the two-step method --
8 MR. DOTSON:
-- element method and the 9
confirmatory is the single step finite element.
I think I 10 misspoke it there.
11 DR. SEISS:
So that's the ratio of the two-step 12 to the single step, at every frequency?
()
13 MR. DOTSON:
Yes.
14 DR. SEISS:
Okay.
Thank you.
15 MR. DOTSON:
We had that same discussion when we 16 were going to present this and I probably abouldn't have 17 put it up that way.
18 In addition, the South Texas Project design is 19 often governed by the operating basis earthquake load 20 combination because you do use higher load factors, lower 21 allowable stresses and lower damping ratios which result in 22 a higher use of member capacity when compared to safe 23 shutdown earthquake load combinatin.
24 And since the operating basis earthquake governs 25 the design in many cases, then you get more m.irgin in the TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
73 1
O 2
And other margins which are typical in most 3
plants, but I just call them out, are materials strengths 4
which are typically greater than assumed during design; 5
actual damping values which are higher than the values for 6
design; standard members which are selected throughout a 7
floor area or a low area, and inelastic behavior and 8
redistribution stresses are not generally taken into 9
account.
10 Other margins are that the design loads are 11 usually higher than the actual loads, and in many cases, 12 the equipment is generically tested to a higher envelope
()
13 than the response spectra for South Texas would be, 14 particularly since we have a less than ten safe shutdown 15 earthquake in many places.
16 And therefore we believe that the South Texas 17 Project design in conforming to the regulatory requirements 18 has a considerable amount of margin as we've shown in these 19 various layers of analyses.
20 DR. SEISS:
What's the construction of the 21 refueling water storage tank?
22 MR. DOTSON:
What is the construction?
23 DR. SEISS:
What is the construction of the 24 refueling water storage tank?
Is it a free-standing steel 25 tank?
I couldn't tell.
It has concrete on the outside, TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
74 1
but I couldn't tell whether it's a steel-lined concrete O
2 tank --
3 MR. DOTSON:
No, that wasn't the refueling water 4
storage tank that you saw.
That was the auxiliary 5
feedwater storage tank.
6 DR. SEISS:
Okay.
Then what's the 7
construction --
8 MR. DOTSON:
The refueling water storage tank is 9
inside the mechanical auxiliary building and we didn't go 10 over there.
11 DR. SEISS:
And what is it?
12 MR. DOTSON:
It's a free-standing --
( )
13 DR. SEISS:
Steel tank?
14 MR. DOTSON:
-- inside the buildings.
A 15 free-standing steel tank, yes, sir.
16 DR. SEISS:
Have you any idea what its seismic 17 capacity is?
18 MR. DOTSON:
I'm not sure what the word 19
" capacity" would mean.
20 DR. SEISS:
There's some studies that have been 21 made of seismic margins have suggested that the weak 22 components might be steel tanks and relay chatter and I 23 forget one other.
But when we have looked at earthquakes rS 24 in Chile and places like that, we find about half the steel
\\_J 25 tanks have had severe damage and about a fifth of them have TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
I l
75
\\
1 had enough damage to leak.
O 2
So it's been one of the weak spots and that's why 3
I picked on it and it's also a single source of water for 4
your three trains.
5 MR. WISENBURG:
Dr. Seiss, the RWSP is 6
siesmically qualified by analysis.
And the analysis does 7
include flexibility in the both horizontical and vertical 8
direction.
9 The loads in the analysis include contribution 10 from nozzle loads, hydrostatic forces, sloshing.
Your 11 question on its capacity we can't answer right now.
We are 12 doing some research and we'll see if we can get back to you
()
13 before the end of the day.
14 DR. SEISS:
I suspect it doesn't make a whole lot 15 of difference from the tanks that are used in plants that 16 are designed for 0.2G.
17 MR. WISENBURG:
It doesn't.
18 DR. SEISS:
Probably have some margin.
That's 19 the first thing I would look at.
20 MR. DOTSON:
We'll get back to you on that.
21 I'd like to cover one more subject, and this is 22 my concluding subject and that is elimination of postulated 23 pipe breaks.
24 South Texas project has an aggressive program to 25 eliminate postulated pipe breaks to reduce the need for the TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
\\
76 1
O design of their effects and we have taken advantage of the 2
most recent regulatory requirements in allowing the use of 3
fracture mechanics, that is leak before break on the 4
reactor coolant loop piping in addition to the elimination 5
of the arbitrary intermediate breaks.
6 we've also implemented the use of a larger 7
cumulative usage factor in piping analyses to further 8
reduce the number of break locations which must be 9
postulated.
And we have ongoing efforts to extend the 10 benefit of the pipe break eliminations to the balance of 11 plant and the pressurized surge line using the same 12 fracture mechanics technology and leak before break
()
13 processes that were used in the rule for elimination of the 14 high energy line breaks for the reactor coolant system 15 piping.
16 And we're in the process of requesting exemptions 17 to these lines and are strongly urging that in parallel the 18 rule for exemption to GDC4 be applied to these lines as 19 well as to the reactor coolant loop piping.
20 We believe that the schedule and cost benefits 21 due to the elimination of engineering for pipe whip 22 restraint designs and the material to fabricate them is 23 significant.
And in addition, the jet barriers and the 24 restraints themselves create a more congested plant.
25 Their elimination from inspection requirements TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
77 1,
would significantly lower operational radiation exposure.
O 2
So while we applaud and appreciate the direction that 3
regulation is taken on this issue already, but for South 4
Texas Project to maximize the benefit that can result from 5
further break elimination, we'd like to have the Staff 6
address our request in a timely fashion and we'd like to 7
request that the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 8
support us in this effort.
9 I'd like to conclude with that commercial.
10 DR. SEISS:
If you've got the exemption you are 11 asking for, or the change to GDC4 was approved, that would 12 be essentially the same thing, I believe?
()
13 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, sir.
14 DR. SEISS:
Arc there pipe restraints that you 15 have not designed yet that could be left out or restraints 16 that you have not installed yet that could be left out or 17 would you be taking out restraints you've already put in?
18 MR. DOTSON:
All of the above.
19 DR. SEISS:
All of the above.
I noticed when I 20 looked at the containment a number of loose pieces of 21 structural steel stacked up at one place or other and I 22 didn't know whether those were restraints you intended to 23 install but haven't yet put in or whether you had left them 24 out.
25 MR. DOTSON:
We have taken out some that, where TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
78 I
the rule has already applied in the reactor coolant system 2
piping.
I'm sure that the material you saw was restraints 3
that needed to be put in.
The particular advantage, of 4
course, here, would be Unit 2, since that exemption nor the 5
rule have been modified, we're continuing to design and 6
install those restraints.
7 DR. SEISS:
Would you intend to make Unit 1 and 8
Unit 2 identical as far as pipe restraints?
9 MR. DOTSON:
Like to.
We would like to, yes, 10 sir.
But it wouldn't be a requirement.
Any advantage we 11 can get there is helpful to us for the reasons I've just 12 mentioned.
()
13 MR. WISENBURG:
Dr. Seiss, the steel you saw were 14 part of the large steam generator restraints that I think 15 you probably saw on the model, also.
16 Right now, those on Unit 1 will be installed.
17 MR. WYLIE:
I've got several questions I'd like 18 to ask that are a matter of clarification from items which 19 were contained in the FSAR, which maybe you could clarify, 20 either now you might want to think some of them and clarify 21 them later.
22 In the FSAR, where a comparison with similar 23 facility designs was outlined in a tabular form, under the
(~T 24 Gasious Waste Management System, it says that no gas V
25 strippers are used, uses the volume control tank first, TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
79 1
atmospheric pressure, passive operation, regenerative O
2 dryer, no delay tanks.
3 I think in effect, you're accomplishing the same 4
thing by another means than gas strippers and delay tanks.
5 I think you're using the charcoal delay tanks --
6 MR. DOTSON:
That's correct.
7 MR. WYLIE:
through a passive system and using 8
what you call a water lube skid or a condenser to take the 9
water out?
10 MR. DOTSON:
That's correct.
11 MR. WYLIE:
Is that correct?
12 11R. DOTSON:
Yes, sir.
()
13 MR. WYLIE:
Okay.
Another one, under 14 Significant Design Changes, regarding the pressurizer power 15 operated relief valve, it says you changed from three power 16 operated relief valves full load rejection capability which 17 I don't quite understand, to two power operated relief 18 valves, 50 percent load rejection capability.
Would you 19 like to clarify that?
20 MR. DOTSON:
We will have to get back to you on 21 that one.
I don't know.
22 MR. WISENBURG:
Are you looking at the FSAR page 23 that that's on or your notes, because --
24 MR. WYLIE:
Yes, it's in the Table 2 under 25 Significant Design Changes.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
)
80 1
MR. WISENBURG:
Thank you, sir.
We will get back U,_s 2
to you on that.
3 MR. WYLIE:
Also we'd like to know, regarding the 4
FURV's, the type of valves used for the internal pilot 5
operator or whatever.
Another design change is listed as 6
elimination of the emergency boration (phonetic) system.
7 In effect you're accomplishing that in another way, aren't 8
you?
9 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, that was --
10 MR. WYLIE:
If that's the case, using the safety 11 injection system.
12 MR. DOTSON:
I think that's the elimination of'a
(
13 bit tank, right.
14 MR. WYLIE:
Maybe you'd like to think about that 15 a little bit and clarify that.
16 MR. DOTSON:
That's a generic Westinghouse tank.
17 MR. WYLIE:
Also, you show that you have deleted 18 the seal bypass line on the reactor coolant pumps.
The 19 question is:
How are you going to flush the crud out under 20 the seal in startup situations?
21 MR. DOTSON:
Get back to you on that one.
22 MR. WYLIE:
Okay, thank you.
23 MR. WISENBURG:
Dr. Mark, before we break, I am 24 embarrassed to say that I misspoke relative to the pressure 25 differential between the Ecw and CCW systems.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
81 1
CCW system does operate at a higher pressure than
,_b 2
the essential cooling water system.
The component cooling 3
water system is, of course, monitored for leakage from 4
primary to CCW, both radiation detectors, pressure, 5
increasing level in the tank.
If you did in fact 6
experience a leak from primary to CCW system, you would of 7
course isolate that train, shift to another operating train 8
until you got the problem resolved.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
The component cooling water 10 loop -- are they treated water or do they carry a signal of 11 some sort to tell you when they're leaking?
12 MR. WISENBURG:
Primarily relying on increased
)
13 radiation level.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
But there should be nothing in the 15 component cooling system, to speak of, should there?
16 MR. WISENBURG There should not be anything, 17 that's correct, sir.
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
Do you put a tracer in it to tell 19 you when you're leaking in.
Is it a treated water system?
20 In short, do you know when the component cooling water 21 tubes are leaking?
22 MR. WISENBURG:
Primarily rely on surge tank 23 levels as --
24 MR. EDERSOLE:
The loss of inventory.
25 MR. WISENBURG:
Yes, sir.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
82 1
MR. EBERSOLE:
But you've got a make-up, system, O
2 don't you, that holds it to a certain level?
3 MR. WISENBURG:
The level monitored by the 4
operators make up --
5 MR. EBESOLE:
Oh, it's not an automatically 6
maintained level?
7 MR. WISENBURG:
Not automatically made up, sir.
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
Okay.
9 DR. MARK:
Are there other questions on the 10 session we are having?
If not I'd like to propose that we 11 take a fifteen minute recess and resume at 4:25.
Thank 12 you, Mr. Dotson.
O 13 (Recess.)
14 DR. MARK:
The meeting will resume.
I believe we 15 hear next from Mr. Geiger of HL&P.
16 MR. DOTSON:
Good afternoon, gentlemen.
17 I'm going to discuss with you this afternoon 18 those major overview and assessment programs which were put 19 into place by Houston Lighting & Power at the South Texas 20 project during the construction phase.
21 I'll be discussing four of them:
The transition 22 program, the construction quality assurance program, 23 engineering assurance and finally safe team.
r-)
24 Before I do so, however, let me briefly recap my LJ 25 education and experience.
I have 27 years of experience in TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
83 1
the profession of quality assurance including ten years in 2
the nuclear industry.
3 I've been with HL&P since 1981.
I was originally 4
came to the project as the project quality assurance 5
manager, later served also as the manager of quality 6
assurance and for the last year, have been the manager of 7
nuclear assurance.
8 I have a degree in industrial engineering, and am 9
a professional engineer in the quality engineering 10 discipline.
11 The first of the major overview and assessment 12 programs which I'm going to discuss is the transition
()
13 program.
That program was the process which we put into 14 place to effect the change of responsibilities from our 15 previous architect engineer and constructor to the current 16 project participants.
I'm going to discuss it in terms of 17 three major elements, that is engineering, construction, 18 and quality assurance.
19 Before doing that, let me review the purpose and 20 the benefits of that transition program.
Its purpose was 21 to provide a thorough re-examination of all the completed 22 as well as the in-process work.
The benefits we derived 23 from it included an additional measure of confidence in the r3 24 adequacy of that completed work as well as making a solid V
25 determination that we did in fact have a firm basis for TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
84 1
continuati6n of the project.
b.)
v 2
Those engineering transition activities began in 3
. late 1981, following the announcement by Houston Lighting &
4 Power that we were replacing Brown & Root as the architect 5
engineer and construction manager, with the Bechtel 6'
corporation.
7 The engineering transition activities were 8
conducted utilizing vork packages and compliance packages.
9 There were 230 work packages, each one of which contained 10 the relevant pieces of documentation pertaining to a
~
11 structure, a.nystem or a component of the plant.
12 The compliance packages of which there were a 4
/'l
(/
13 dozen contained those relevant pieces of the documentation 14 pertinent to a multi-discipline topic, such as 15 environmental qualification, or safe shutdown criteria.
16 Each of those 230 packages contained a 17 description of the current engineering status including the 18
. design verification, a listing of licensing items that were 19 pertinent to the package, such things as the NRC
~'
20 information notices, bulletins as well as a description of 21 any FSAR changes.
22 The packages also identified any recommendations 23 for significant corrective actions, contained a summary of i
(~T 24 work to go, identified any assumptions or special
%-)
25 conditions that were germane to that package.
- Finally, TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
85 1
each package was cross referenced.
2 DR. MARK:
From where did the recommendations for 3
significant corrective actions primarily come from?
4 MR. GEIGER:
They would have been developed 5
during the process.
Brown & Root took part in the process 6
of preparing and developing the documentation.
7 Bechtel Engineering conducted a review and, as 8
I'm going to discuss in a moment, HL&P engineering.
I'd 9
have to say probably that these special conditions or 10 corrective actions could have probably come from in the 11 three, most likely I suspect from Bechtel or ourselves.
12 DR. MARK:
They weren't imposed from Washington,
()
13 however?
14 MR. DOTSON:
Not to my knowledge, sir, no, sir.
15 MR. GOLDBERG:
I wonder if I might add one point 16 which would help on this question.
17 one of the fundamental conditions for Bechtel 18 taking over the design responsibility was that they had to 19 accept responsibility for the design of the entire plant 20 including that portion previously engineered by Brown &
21 Root.
l 22 It followed therefore to look -- protect 23 Bechtel's interest, that they had to thoroughly review the g-)
24 work of the predecessor and most of the concerns were N_/
25 raised by Bechtel.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
86 1
DR. MARK:
Thank you.
-s 2
MR. EBERSOLE:
May I say a particular design 3
feature that I see here that always bothers me, called the 4
reactor heat removal system.
5 MR. GEIGER:
Yes, sir.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
You have the pumps inside.
I know 7
a few other plants like this.
I know historically reactor 8
heat removal for shutdown purposes has long been regarded 9
as kind of a hybrid function, nonsafety, safety, whatever, 10 but it hasn't been up to being required to meet 11 environmental qualifications, et cetera.
12 Can you give me your logic in reviewing this of
()
13 leaving it the way it was and now having the staff have to 14 fix it?
15 MR. GEIGER:
I'd lik? to take the opportunity to 16 pause for a moment and refer that question to a member of 17 our engineering staff that participated in the actual 18 package review.
May I?
19 I don't know who that would be but someone has to 20 be able to answer that.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
While you're still thinking about 22 it, yot know, I've seen a lot of conservatisms and good 23 design features here but this piece of residual practice 24
("b kind of bothers me in the face of all the good stuff I've s
25 seen.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
87 1
MR. WISENSURG:
We have our engineers who are 2
most knowledgeable downstairs putting togetner the answer 3
to Dr. Wylie's question so we had like to respond it to 4
when they get back.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
How about tomorrow, that will be 6
fine.
7 MR. GEIGER:
All right, sir, thank you.
8 Just to enlarge really upon what Mr. Goldberg 9
said, my next statement was based upon this engineering 10 transition program, Bechtel accepted the design and assumed 11 responsibility for the design.
12 HL&P engineering accepted each of these packages
()
13 by signature and they're signature denoted that the package 14 reflected an accurate status of the work as described and 15 that that status represented an acceptable basis for 16 continuation of the effort.
17 During the process, HL&P quality assurance 18 performed a series of audits and surveillances, and based 19 on the results of those audits is and surveillances, we 20 reached the conclusion that that transition process was 21 thorough, well documented and did achieve its objective.
22 During the conduct of the engineering transition, 23 the NRC also conducted a series of inspections and reviews, gg 24 in fact they had several personnel assigned to the V
25 engineering office who reviewed specific packages.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
88 1
Turning now to the second major element of the
-s 2
the transition program, that is construction, I'll discuss 3
that program in terms of its three major parts, that is the 4
benchmarking of construction status, activities involved 5
with storage and maintenance and finally ASME code 6
responsibilities.
7 The benchmarking of the construction status of 8
the plant was accomplished through a series of walkdowns, 9
marked up drawings and a review of the documentation 10 supporting the completed construction.
11 The change in responsibility for storage and 12 maintenance of equipment, both in the warehouse as well as l'~
(
13 installed, was accomplished through a review of the status 14 of the equipment, a review of the pertinent requirements 15 for the storage and maintenance of that equipment, and 16 finally the placing of those' requirements into an automated 17 system.
18 Finally, the transfer response defined by the 19 ASME code was accomplished through a transfer of 20 responsibility agreement and a matrix of responsibilities 21 which were signed by all the appropriate parties that are 22 listed here, that is Brown & Root, Bechtel, Ebasco, 23 Westinghouse, HL&P as well as the State of Texas.
r"s 24 There were at the time of this transition some N]
25 number of open nonconformance reports, that is NCR's.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
89 1
"Open" I<
in this case is defined as a nonconformance report v
2 that either has not yet received a disposition or the work 3
required by the disposition has not yet been completed.
4 Those open NCR's were rolled over, if you will, 5
to either Bechtel or Ebasco as appropriate for completion 6
of the necessary work.
7 During the process of this construction 8
transition as well as in engineering, HL&P quality 9
assurance performed a series of audits and surviellances 10 and based on the results of those, we reached the same 11 conclusion that we had in engineering, that is that the 12 transition program in construction was thorough, was well t')
i 13 documented, and that it did achieve its objective.
j 14 The NRC as well conducted a series of inspections 15 and reviews utilizing both their resident inspectors as 16 well as inspectors who visited the project from the Region 17 offices.
18 Third major element in the transition program was 19 quality assurance program.
Both the Bechtel and the Ebasco 20 quality assurance programs which were described in their 21 NRC approved topical reports were modified to be STP 22 specific.
23 At the same time, the HL&P quality assurance 24 program had to be rewritten to accommodate the new
(-)
V 25 participants as well as to describe the interfaces and the TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
90 1
responsibilities of those three organizations.
2 HL&P approved both the Bechtel and the Ebasco 3
quality programs, and we submitted the quality assurance 4
program description to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 5
March of '82.
6 The quality assurance program description is an 7
STP specific document which is really the counterpart for 8
South Texas of the more familiar Chapter 17.1.
The NRC 9
approved that quality assurance program description in late 10 March of '82, and safety related construction resumed in 11 August of '82.
12 In summary, then, the transition program that we
,m Is,)
13 underwent at South Texas involved a thorough re-examination 14 of all the completed and the in-process work and it 15 provided us with an additional measure of confidence in the 16 adequacy of the completed work as well as reaching a 17 determination that we had a firm basis for continuation of 18 the project.
19 I might add that this was a unique effort.
The 20 project at the time of this transition was approximately 40 21 percent complete.
We affected a complete changeover of 22 responsibility from one architect engineer constructor to 23 others.
rs 24 b
The second major overview and assessment program 25 I would be discussing this afternoon is the construction TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
91 1
quality assurance program.
I'm going to discuss that 2
program in its three major parts:
First, organization; 3
secondly, effectiveness inspections, and finally 4
independent reviews.
5 It is these last two topics which in my judgment 6
set the South Texas project apart from other projects.
7 This slide represents a combination of the 8
standard boxes and lines as well as some interfaces that 9
exist at the South Texas Project.
Reporting relationship 10 here is that which has been described to you by 11 Mr. Goldberg, that is I report directly to him and in turn, 12 the HL&P project QA manager reports to me.
(3 q_j 13 That line which extends from the project quality 14 assurance manager to the project manager for HL&P 15 represents, as we've identified, interface and 16 coordination.
In reality, it represents a clear 17 communication channel that's been established to ensure 18 consistent interpretation and implementation of the HL&P 19 quality philosophy.
20 The remaining lines on the chart which extend 21 from HL&P to Bechtel and Ebasco and then the final line 22 from Bechtel to Ebasco represents programmatic direction.
23 Programmatic direction is defined as those activities that
(^J) 24 are involved in establishing the program requirements, 25 approving the system features that implement those TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
92 1
requirements, and finally the monitoring of the k
2 implementation of those features.
3 We at HL&P have a keen appreciation of our 4
responsibilities as the project manager, not only for 5
ourselves but or the other participants which have been 6
described to you.
It is, I believe, in a real sense, one 7
of our major duties to assure that both Bechtel and Ebasco 8
have the same keen sense of their responsibilities.
9 Finally, the programmatic directional line also 10 denoted in chart form the team work that's necessary 11 between those organizations to achieve our objectives.
We 12 recognize our that although the team work is required and Ai) 13 it is happening, every team has a leader and certainly in s_
14 this case that leader is Houston Lighting & Power.
15 The second element of the construction quality 16 program that I want to discuss is effectiveness 17 inspections.
And these are performed by the HL&P quality 18 control staff.
19 They're designed to replicate the first line 20 inspection in order to assess its effectiveness.
In 21 general, the first line inspection at South Texas is 22 accomplished by Ebasco, although in some areas it's 23 accomplished by Bechtel or subcontractor.
r3 24 In any event, we perform effectiveness
(./
25 inspections of these activities.
The effectiveness TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
93 1
inspection program is not, as I've identified, a
,.sv)
(
2 representative sample.
The objective however is to assess 3
the effectiveness of the inspection process.
And as such, 4
it does add to our confidence in the adequacy of those 5
activities.
6 It's scheduled and performed based upon ongoing 7
construction work, the available resources, as well as the i
1 8
results of previous inspections, either by front line t
9 inspector or as a result of effectiveness inspection 10 program.
11 We are currently in the process of shifting the 12 emphasis of these inspections from commodity installations
(~( j) 13 to those activities associated with turnovers and release 14 for tests.
15 This final slide is a tabulation of a number of 16 effectiveness inspections we've conducted over the last 17 several years, including the first quarter of this year.
18 As you can see, the effort reached its peak in '85, 19 coincident with the construction effort when we 20 re-inspected approximately 86,000 characteristics.
The 21 data for '86 represents first quarter activities.
22 The final element of my discussion of the 23 construction and quality program is the independent reviews 24 that we have had conducted on the South Texas Project.
25 We've had, we believe, a significant number of independent TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
94
)
1 reviews conducted over approximately the last six years or N.]
2 so.
3 Before discussing them in any detail, let me make 4
it clear that we take a pro-active approach to quality at 5
the South Texas Project.
We put our program into place, 6
and through a process of self tests, critique, seeking out 7
and utilizing information from other utilities as well as 8
other projects, we conduct a search for more effective and 9
more efficient methods to achieve our objectives.
10 At the same time, we're well aware that 11 independent and objective reviews by competent personnel 12 very frequently -- in fact almost invariably -- yield a p)
(
13 couple of things, confirmation of what we're doing is 14 effective in some areas as well as additional intelligence 15 as to ways we might improve what we're doing in order to be 16 more effective and more efficient.
17 This list of significant independent reviews that 18 have been conducted, includes various types.
Some of these 19 reviews looked at specific topics on the project; for 20 example the quality assurance program for a -- or a 21 specific discipline such as concrete; others looked at many 22 aspects of the project.
23 The first major independent review on the list 24 I'd like to discuss is the review that was conducted in
's 25 1980, the disciplines of welding, soils, concrete.
Those TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
95 1
reviews were conducted as a result of the show cause order
(' l 2
that was issued to the project in early 1980 which 3
Mr. Goldberg discussed earlier.
4 Each of these reviews collected a significant 5
amount of data relative to each of those disciplines and to 6
the construction work that had been accomplished.
The data 7
was reviewed by independent experts whose conclusions were 8
documented in reports that were submitted to the NRC.
9 The results of the review of that data by those 10 independent experts was that there were no deficiencies or 11 problems which would affect the safety of the South Texas 12 Project in either soils or concrete disciplines.
(~)s q_
13 In the welding discipline, the deficiencies that 14 were identified resulted in a comprehensive re-examinationj 15 and repair program.
And Mr. Goldberg discussed that 16 briefly in his remarks.
17 When that re-examination and repair program was 18 complete, HL&P and subsequently the NRC concluded that the 19 welding was acceptable.
20 In addition, finally in 1980, at our request, the 21 Bechtel Corporation which, at that point, did not have any 22 role on the project, assumed or performed an assessment of 23 the quality assurance program.
rx 24 O
In 1981 we asked Bechtel to return again to 25 perform another assessment of the program.
In addition in TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
96 1
'81, the Quadrex review of the design and engineering V
2 effort by Brown & Root on South Texas was completed.
3 Again, this is one that Mr. Goldberg made reference to.
4 That review had been initiated by HL&P so that an 5
independent party might assess the progress and the 6
technical adequacy of the Brown & Root design and 7
engineering effort.
8 The review concluded --
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
I have a little trouble here, I 10 didn't find the scope of what you're talking about.
I see 11 up there construction quality assurance, that's one thing.
12 Does the product match the paper.
To me it does.
Does the
()
13 product match the design paper, you know.
You start with a 14 basic notion that the design paper is a firm basis to do 15 construction.
16 MR. GEIGER:
That's correct.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
That's a heck of a lot different 18 from design quality assurance.
Is this piece of paper what 19 it should be that I'm going to build.
20 MR. GEIGER:
That's correct.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
Can you kind of clarify the scope 22 of your investigation as to whether it was the broader one 23 which looked at the paper quality of design and then in (s
24 turn said I'm going to build it the way it has been 25 properly designed or do you just start with the TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
97 1
construction design and say I'm going to build it the way
,_s i
1 V
2 the paper says.
3 MR. GEIGER:
In reference to the Quadrex review, 4
I assume that's what you're referring to.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes, I am.
6 MR. GEIGER:
That review was, as Mr. Goldberg 7
identified, initiated by HL&P to look at Brown & Root's 8
efforts in the design and engineering arena, look at 9
essentially the technical adequacy of that work as well as 10 their schedule progress.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
So t's scoped then to include the 12 design.
13 MR. GEIGER:
Yes.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
That's why I raised the question a 15 while ago.
16 MR. GEIGER:
Yes, sir.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
Because I thought that was it.
18 MR. GEIGER:
It was looking at, as I said, their 19 progrest as per their schedule as well as the actual 20 technical adequacy of the work that they were doing.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
Okay.
22 MR. GEIGER:
That review, when it was concluded, 23 when it was complete, concluded that Brown & Root was 24 having difficulties in fulfilling the schedule for 25 completion of the design, in engineering activities at TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
-- i
98 1
7_s South Texas and as well, there were three deficiencies that
(_)
2 emerged as a result of the review which were reported to 3
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10 CFR 50.55(e) as 4
potentially reportable.
Further examination determined 5
that one of those three was not reportable.
6 MR. WISENBURG:
Mr. Ebersole, perhaps we're 7
confusing you.
The title of these things are construction 8
quality assurance as opposed to operational quality 9
assurance.
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
What about design quality 11 assurance?
12 MR. WISENBURG:
The title means those quality
()
13 assurance and oversight activities which take place during 14 the construction phase, to include some oversight of --
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
That says that it does not 16 incorporate a review of the design adequacy per se, what 17 you just said.
18 MR. WISENBURG:
Then I'm not communicating well, 19 because it wasn't the point.
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
To me, " construction quality 21 assurance" says I've got the design paper with which to 22 construct and I'm going to build it that way.
Are you with 23 me?
I have a basis to build which is a good set of design 24 drawings; I'm not going to look at the quality of the 25 design, I'm going to build it whether it's good, bad or TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
99 1
otherwise.
2 MR. GOLDBERG:
I think we still confused you with 3
one point.
All the QA activities that occur during the 4
construction of the plant, we've labeled under the heading 5
construction quality assurance.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes.
7 MR. GOLDBERG:
But that includes all the reviews 8
of engineering activities that QA audits as well, and we 9
further mentioned one very special review that we conduct 10 which we happen to have engineers doing, as opposed to 11 quality assurance personnel.
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
What I'm really asking is in the
()
13 design phase, both the A/E as well as the vendor, the 14 product supplier, Westinghouse, and in the design phase, 15 are you talking about quality assurance in the design phase 16 considering the architect engineer's design work as well as 17 the vendor design work?
18 MR. GOLDBERG:
Yes.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
So construction quality assurance 20 I must interpret in the broad context.
21 MR. GOLDBERG:
Right.
This is strictly a label 22 and it includes all the quality assurance activities which 23 include --
rs 24 MR. EBERSOLE:
That terminate everything and V
25 everything up to operational.
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100 1
MR. GOLDBERG:
Yes, sir.
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
Okay.
3 MR. GEIGER:
That's correct.
4 MR. EBERSOLE: I wonder why you so constrained it 5
by putting the word " construction," that's all.
6 MR. WISENBURG:
It's just a 7
MR. GEIGER:
We're just not very bright, I guess.
8 It would have, in this context, probably been 9
more accurately labeled as " design and construction quality 10 assurance."
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yeah.
12 DR. MARK:
I wonder if the point is not implied,
()
13 at least, by your last slide, where three design 14 deficiencies were brought to light under this process.
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
Could be.
16 MR. GEIGER:
Thank you, sir.
17 During 1982, the project completed or conducted 18 the transition program which I've just described in some 19 detail.
20 Additionally, we asked representatives from a 21 group of four utilities to do an assessment of our quality 22 assurance program and that was also completed in '82.
23 I have also identified the engineering assurance 24 program as being put into place in 1982.
I'm going to 25 discuss that program in detail in just a few moments.
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101 1
In '83, the project took action to have a 2
self-initiated evaluation performed.
This evaluation was 3
performed by independent contractors utilizing the 4
Institute for Nuclear Power Operations guidelines and 5
performance objectives for construction projects.
6 In '84, members of that same group returned to do 7
an assessment of our test control program and the reason 8
that happened is because in '83, there simply was not 9
sufficient activity for them to be able to do meaningful 10 assessment.
11 In '85, the project was reviewed by the Institute 12 of Nuclear Power Operations, themselves, by means of a r~N i,)
13 construction project evaluation.
Both that self-initiated 14 evaluation in '83 and '84 as well as the evaluation in '85, 15 as I said, utilized the INPO performance objectives and 16 criteria.
17 They both pointed out some areas of what they 18 termed good practices as well as identified some areas 19 where improvement was required.
20 Later in '85, the project initiated a 21 preconstruction and appraisal team review, also known as 22 pre-CAT.
That effort was also conducted by independent 23 contractors, and concentrated on several specific areas of 24 the project.
(-
x_-
25 The areas which they reviewed were based on TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
102 1
analysis of the results of CAT inspections at other
(_)
s 2
projects.
3 The final independent review, I want to discuss 4
this afternoon, was our limited readiness review, audit 5
program.
This slide describes some of the characteristics 6
of some of the audits that HL&P had been conducting at the 7
South Texas Project for several years before the limited 8
readiness review program.
9 Due to resource limitations, these types of 10 audits were conducted approximately three times a year.
11 They were broad scoped, technical audits, performed by a 12 team of approximately five auditors including technical
(~h
(_)
13 specialists.
14 The audit teams looked at the FSAR commitments, 15 reviewed the translation of those commitments into 16 work-directing documents, reviewed some of the in-process 17 work, and in some cases, included actual inspection of 18 completed work.
That basic program then was expanded into 19 the limited readiness review program.
20 This outlines the limited readiness review 21 program.
It was determined in early '85 that we would 22 probably gain some benefit by review of certain topics at 23 South Texas.
The decision was then made to expand the r^N 24 scope and number of the previous audits and accomplish this V
25 task utilizing independent contractors.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
103 1
They were managed by Houston Lighting & Power and O_
2 they utilized our existing audit program.
The topic 3
selection included the criteria that I've identified here, 4
that is topics or activities which had proven troublesome 5
at other projects, which may have been troublesome at South 6
Texas, and finally those topics which while they're not 7
unique to South Texas, were certainly of special interest 8
to the project.
9 These are the topics that were selected for the 10 limited readiness review program.
I've also identified 11 that to date, there were no findings pertaining to any 12 structure or system or component's ability to perform its CT
(,j 13 safety function.
14 There have been some programmatic issues 15 identified and resolved.
16 In conclusion, then, let me state that the 17 implementation of our quality assurance program, the 18 effectiveness inspections and those coupled with the 19 independent reviews that we've had conducted, do provide us 20 with a high level of confidence and assurance that the 21 activities here at South Texas have been conducted in an 22 effective manner.
23 Third major element of our overview and 24 assessment program is engineering assurance.
I mentioned 25 it a little earlier when I was reviewing the list of major TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177 1
104 1
independent reviews and Mr. Goldberg also alluded to it O
2 during his discussion.
3 That program was put into place in 1982.
Its 4
purpose was to provide an ongoing real time review of 5
design activities.
That review obviously has the 6
opportunity to influence the course of future design 7
activities as well as to provide confirmation of the 8
adequacy of the design and the design process.
9 As you may remember from Mr. Goldberg's 10 discussion earlier, the engineering assurance department 11 reports directly to his office and is independent of 12 project activities.
(_)
13 Following its establishment in '82, the 14 engineering assurance program conducted its first review in 15
'83.
Each of the reviews includes substantial 16 participation by Stone & Webster Engineering Company 17 personnel.
Those reviews that have been so far completed 18 resulted in the expenditure of approximately 35,000 19 manhours by the engineering assurance department.
20 This slide identified the reviews that have been 21 conducted and completed as well as identifying those that 22 are currently scheduled to be completed during '83.
During 23 the conduct of the reviews that have been completed, there 24 were some technical problems noted and corrected, and as 25 well there were some opportunities for design process TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
105 1
improvement noted and implemented.
O 2
There are several pertinent facts pertaining to 3
the engineering assurance program that I'd like to point 4
out.
First, the NRC through their I&E branch at 5
headquarters, has regularly inspected the program to 6
confirm its adequacy and is consistency with independent 7
design review objectives.
8 Secondly, the NRC has endorsed the engineering 9
assurance program as satisfying the objectives of an 10 independent design verification program.
11 Finally, we have in place an oversight committee 12 which regularly reviews progress of that program as well as
()
13 its results.
14 In conclusion then, the engineering assurance 15 program is an additional step that we've taken to increase 16 our level of confidence in the adequacy of the design and 17 the design process at South Texas.
18 The final element of these overview and 19 assessment programs and I'm going to discuss is our safe 20 team program.
Safe team is an administrative program we 21 put into place.
Its purpose is to provide a forum for STP 22 employees to identify any concerns they might have in the 23 area of nuclear safety or quality.
24 Its objective is to encourage these employees to 25 come forward with their concerns now so that we may TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
106 1
investigate them, correct any deficiencies that may be k_)
2 uncovered, and report back to that concernee.
3 The entire safe team process from receipt of 4
concerns through conduct of the investigation and extending 5
to the reply that is returned to the concernee is conducted 6
on a confidential and a anonymous basis.
7 This slide identifies several of the features of 8
the safe team program which in my judgment are different 9
from the safe team program or programs of that type which 10 have been established at other projects.
11 First of these is the safe team review committee.
12 That committee is charged with the responsibility for
(~h
(,)
13 reviewing all investigation reports, all correspondence to 14 concernees, and for making recommendations to the project 15 based upon the results of their review.
16 Its members include representatives from 17 engineering, quality assurance, licensing, construction, as 18 well as the legal representatives.
19 All investigations of nuclear safety or quality 20 concerns conducted by safe team are conducted by contract 21 personnel.
22 Recommendations that are applied to the project 23 are followed up, tracked, feedback obtained from the 24 project on all of those recommendations.
25 The NRC has looked at the safe team program here TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
107 I
at South Texas and it has rated the program as 2
satisfactory.
More importantly, I think, is the fact that 3
the NRC is referring allegations that they have received to 4
save team for investigation and are utilizing the results 5
of those safe team investigations as the basis for their 6
responce.
7 These are some statistics for safe team.
These 8
are as of the end of April.
We have, through various 9
means, if you can see, contacted approximately 17,800 10 employees or previous employees of South Texas.
As a 11 results of those contacts, we received 580 class one 12 concerns.
7s( )
13 A class one in our terminology means a concern 14 related to nuclear safety or quality.
15 As a result of the investigative activity, we've 16 closed, completed the investigation and provided feedback 17 to the concernee, approximately 525.
Finally as a result 18 of that investigation activity, we've substantiated in 19 whole or part, 111 of those 525 concerns.
20 DR. SEISS:
May I ask a question, two questions 21 in fact.
Of those 580, how many were expressed by 22 professional employees as opposed to craft.
23 MR. GEIGER:
What's your second question?
24 DR. SEISS:
Of those 580, how many related to QA 25 as compared to quality.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
108 1
MR. GEIGER:
How many related to QA as opposed to 7,h 2
quality?
3 DR. SEISS:
Yes.
4 MR. GEIGER:
I don't have that information at my 5
fingertips.
I'll have to research it, but we'll have it 6
tomorrow.
7 In summary, then, the safe team program provides 8
a forum for employees to identify concerns so that they may 9
be investigated and corrected now.
10 DR. MARK:
You probably said but I missed it, how 11 long the safe team operation has been in effect.
12 MR. GEIGER:
It's been in effect since September
)
13 of 1984.
14 DR. MARK:
So 17,000 in a year and a quarter.
15 That's quite a busy office.
16 MR. GEIGER:
Yes, sir.
Now, some substantial 17 part of that, and my memory says roughly eight, maybe nine 18 thousand, represented -- represents contacts that we tried 19 to make with employees who had previously been at South 20 Texas but were no longer on the job at that point.
21 I'd have one final point and that is that the 22 safe team program will remain in place throughout the 23 remainder of the construction phase and we plan to have in
(~%
24
\\_]
place a concept similar to safe team throughout the 25 operations phase as well.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
109 1
7s Now, with that information concerning safe team,
(_)
2 I've completed my presentation of the overview and
{
3 assessment programs.
But I'd like to beg your indlugence 4
before I leave and discuss one additional program at the 5
South Texas Project.
That is our drug and alcohol testing 6
program.
7 A concern was brought to safe team in the fall of 8
1985, a concern about the use of illegal drugs by HL&P 9
personnel off site.
Primarily as a result of that concern, 10 the South Texas Project drug and alcohol testing program 11 was put into place in January of '86.
12 Drug and alcohol testing program is one element in
(_)
13 of our fitness for duty program.
It consists of baseline 14 testing for alcohol and illegal drugs followed by random 15 testing using a computer selected sample.
16 This testing program's applicable to all 17 permanent HL&P employees on the project as well as 18 employees of our contractors and subcontractors.
19 This slide depicts the number of personnel who 20 have been tested through early May, as well as identifying 21 the number of personnel who either failed the test or 22 refused to be tested.
Both numbers include prospective 23 employees who must take and pass the test as a condition of 24 employment.
(-}
V 25 This element of the fitness for duty program TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
110 1
represents in our judgment an additional step that we have 2
taken to ensure a virtually drug and alcohol free 3
environment on the job as well as provide a significant 4
deterrent to off site alcohol abuse and use of illegal 5
drugs.
6 DR. MARK:
You say the prospective employee must 7
take the test.
8 MR. GEIGER:
Yes, sir.
9 DR. MARK:
Of what does the test consist?
Is it 10 behavioral observation or is it a blood sample on a given 11 day?
12 MR. GEIGER:
It is a breathalyzer test for
,m()
13 alcohol; it is a urine sample for drug.
14 DR. MARK:
So you know what those machines record 15 on the day he shows up for his application.
16 MR. GEIGER:
Yes, sir.
17 DR. MARK:
But you don't know how he spent the 18 month of April?
19 MR. GEIGER:
That's true.
Howeve r, we believe, 20 certainly that by a fact that people are tested as a 21 baseline and then later are aware that they could be 22 selected by the computer at any time to be re-tested, that 23 it does provide a deterrent.
24 DR. MARK:
Is there, in parallel with this, a
25 supervisor observation kind of --
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
111 1
MR. GEIGER:
Yes, sir.
%J 2
DR. MARK:
-- activity?
3 MR. GEIGER:
Yes, sir.
This is a specific 4
element of our fitness for duty program which is 5
appropriate to South Texas.
6 HL&P as a corporation has had a drug and alcohol 7
abuse program in place for some time.
One of the features 8
of that is observation of employees and that is part of the 9
program at South Texas also.
10 With that information, gentlemen, I'm sure you'll 11 be glad to hear I'm all done.
12 DR. MARK:
Are there questions for Mr. Geiger?
/~~
(_j}
13 I believe that --
14 MR. WISENBURG:
Dr. Mark, before we break, I 15 think that's the last we had on the agenda for today.
16 Mr. Goldberg would like to respond more 17 completely to Mr. Ebersole's question relative to demands 18 which we've made of our contractors over and above what 19 they would normally have supplied us.
20 DR. MARK:
I wonder if there was a comment l
21 promised to Mr. Ebersole earlier.
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
I'm not quite clear.
1 23 DR. MARK:
Mr. Goldberg's comment, which was
~s 24 (d
certainly one -- was not relevant to the question the 25 engineers are going to make a comment upon.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
112 1
MR. WISENBURG:
No, no, sir.
_, )
\\
~
2 DR. MARK:
I didn't know if that comment was 3
appropriate now or not, or on the engineering rationale.
4 MR. WISENBURG:
We also are prepared to answer 5
some but not'all of Mr. Wylies questions on enginerring 6
differences.
7 DR. MARK:
Why don't we, if it's all right with 8
you gentlemen, why don't we check off the things that we 9
can.
10 MR. WISENBURG:
We'd be delighted to, sir.
11 DR. MARK:
Mr. Goldberg, then.
12 MR. GOLDBERG:
Gentlemen, I was asked a question (Q
13 as I recall by Mr. Wylie regarding any things I could
.j 14 recall that we imposed on any of our contractors that went 15 above and beyond what they were prepared or intending to 16 perform or supply.
17 And a couple of things came to mind as I thought 18 about that question.
And these are just representative of 19 the types of things that have occurred on the South Texas 20 project.
. :21
- I'd like to start with one item that involved a 22 piece of equipment supplied by Westinghouse.
The Paluel
'- 23 Plant in France experienced a thimble guide two vibration, 24 the Nuclear Reactor Commission licensing staff sent us a 25 letter calling that matter to our goes and inquiring would
~.
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
113 I
we have the problem and what do we intend to do about it.
2 Well, Westinghouse performed considerable amount 3
of work and it was their view that we would not have the 4
problem.
However, in our view, if one were to have such a 5
problem after the plants were operating, the consequences 6
from a standpoint of cost to deal with it in our view were 7
prohibitive.
8 And it struck us that being ultraconservative was 9
the prudent thing to do.
So we are requiring that the 10 thimble guide tubes on Unit one be sleeved to provide a 11 measure of stiffness that assures us that we would not have 12 a vibration problem.
(G
,j 13 I can also recall when we had some early material 14 control problems on the project going back maybe three or 15 four years ago.
It was Bechtel's view that a way of 16 dealing with identification of certain materials involved a 17 color coding process.
18 There were a lot of reasons why we ultimately 19 concluded that that wasn't a reliable enough system to keep 20 us out of difficulty and we met with Bechtel and we imposed 21 on them a rather substantial improvement, but in terms of a 22 more rigorous technique and a more extensive application of 23 that technique than Bechtel had originally envisioned.
24
)
And we had a related material control question O
25 where sometimes material certification isn't a hundred TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
114 1
percent and it's a matter of gathering up additional
,~s
\\_)\\
2 documentation.
3 Clearly, some material can be risk release, 4
installed in the plant with appropriate recognition that 5
there's a question mark.
And then in the event that you 6
'can't resolve it, you can always replace the material.
7 But there is a class of material where, as a 8
practical matter, replacement would be virtually almost 9
impossible without a major problem, such as weld rod or 10 materials that go into the production of concrete.
11 So in effect, we laid requirements on Bechtel 12 that they weren't used to dealing with that required that O(_)
13 they could not risk release any consumable material that 14 once used in the plant would be almost impossible to 15 retrieve.
16 And these are just some small examples of things 17 that we've imposed on our contractors.
18 of course, we have influenced the staffing of the 19 contractor teams to an enormous degree.
We're trying to 20 get the very best people on this project, as I suspect 21 every project endeavors to do, and I don't mind telling you 22 we have rejected hundreds of people and had them replaced 23 with better people.
24 MR. WISENBURG:
Mr. Dotson will reply to 25 Mr. Wylie's questions relative to differences, inasmuch as TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177 J
115 1
as we are prepared to respond at this point.
2 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, sir, I'd like to reply to some 3
of them.
4 One question was in the original design, we had 5
an emergency boration system in the Westinghouse standard 6
design that required a boron injection tank which or rapid 7
injection of high boron concentration.
8 Westinghouse happen since done analyses to 9
determine that we can meet the regulatory criteria with the 10 safety injection pumps and the boron concentration that's 11 in the refueling water storage tank and that twelve percent 12 boric acid slug is not necessary any longer.
()
13 And this is consist with the analysis that's 14 they've done on several plants at this point.
15 Another question was the basis for reducing the 16 number of pressurizer PRV's from three to two.
The three, 17 the three valves were required for full load rejection and 18 again in the ;iestinghouse standard design, South Texas 19 Project has opted, as far as I know from the origin, for a 20 50 percent load rejection therefore only two pressurizer 21 PRV's are required.
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
While you're on that topic, can I 23 ask you to confirm what I've heard, the PRV's in most of 24 the older designs were not environmentally qualified for 1
w i
25 anything in particular; they weren't safety grade in any TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
116 1
context, open or shut or whatever, because the safety's 2
back them up.
3 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, sir.
4 MR. EBERSOLE:
They had block valves which were 5
equally nonqualified for anything.
They were just comfort 6
items to keep you off the safeties.
7 Subsequently, they were found to be potentially 8
valuable if you lose the secondary cooling method.
And in 9
the context of using them as an open flow feed / bleed 10 process, but that runs into trouble every time you invoke 11 it unless you stabilize the PRV's and associated block 12 valves against the rather hostile environmental conditions
()
13 that would occur if you go to feed / bleed.
14 What is the status of your PRV's in block valves 15 in the environmental context?
16 MR. DOTSON:
Okay, I'll answer that question and 17 go into a question you asked earlier a little bit.
It has 18 gone through the qualification, it is a Garrett valve.
And 19 a it's a solenoid type valve that -- where the flow 20 actually helps the valve move through the direction it's 21 supposed to move, either open or close, closed, and it has 22 a spring to close.
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
But you drive it with a solenoid rg 24 device which is energized to make it open.
Is that V
25 correct, the PRV?
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l 117 i
1 MR. DOTSON:
It works, I believe it works in both
[O
'v' 2
directions.
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
Are those solenoids and associated 4
wiring and internal boards --
5 MR. DOTSON:
They're Class IE qualified to IEEE 6
323, 1974.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
Is the essence of this, the PRV's 8
are environmentally qualified --
9 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, sir.
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
For the blowdown condition?
11 MR. DOTSON:
Yes, sir, they are.
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
What about the block valve, in
()
13 case you shut it and you wish you had it open?
14 MR. DOTSON:
I'll have to get the answer on the 15 block valve.
I think it is as well but I'll have to 16 comfirm that.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
Okay, that will be fine for 18 tomorrow, then.
19 MR. DOTSON:
Another question that relates a bit 20 to that.
You asked a question I think about the residual 21 heat removal system being qualified somewhat recently.
The 22 plants was originally a hot shutdown bleed and feed type 23 plant, and we would prefer to use the RHR in the normal 24 cold shutdown mode.
So we went back into the qualification
(-))
25 and actually determined that that pump was qualified after TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
118 1
7_s some pretty careful research.
t
)
'N'#
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, you put it inside 3
containment, which I think was a blunder, at least in my 4
view, and you gave me the argument a while ago that you did 5
it so you wouldn't have radiation leakage when you were 6
pumping.
Yet when I look at the diagram back here on the 7
interrelation of ESF systems, the pump switchs that really 8
have to handle contaminated fluids off the sump 9
post-accident, which are the LHSI and the HHSI and the CS, 10 they're all outdoors.
11 MR. DOTSON:
For the accident, that's correct.
12 But for the normal --
()
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
But the pump that I'm going have 14 to use month by month by month, the RHR's, are inside where 15 I'd rather not have them.
16 MR. DOTSON:
What I'm saying, sir, is it was put 17 in there for normal operation.
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes, I understand.
19 MR. DOTSON:
And we have recently looked at the 20 qualification and are capable of using it.
Now at the 21 present time -- in fact, the option in our discussions with 22 the Staff was either use an extended source for the 23 auxiliary feedwater which would be from the emergency 24 cooling water system, essential cooling water system, or to 25 qualify the RHR which we, by the way, opted to do and we TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177 i
119 1
offered that to the NRC, so to put in there for origioal (7,)
2 operation not for accident mitigation.
And we've 3
subsequently found that it can be useful and qualified for 4
the mitigation of an accident in the long term.
So it's 5
actually got a different purpose than it had originally.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
Are you telling me the RHR pumps 7
are now qualified and you're not going to wait for three 8
years to qualify them?
9 MR. DOTSON:
We've presently -- I hate to say it 10 with a hundred percent certainty, but we're so close, that 11 yes, they're essentially qualified and we'll be presenting 12 that material to the NRC shortly.
()
13 MR. EBERSOLC:
Okay.
14 MR. DOTSON:
We'll have the remainder of the 15 answers tomorrow.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
He's got a question.
17 DR. SEISS:
I'd like to ask a question to be 18 answered at any time.
19 In Mr. Goldberg's presentation, he had a figure 20 showing about 10,000 people on the project as of now.
I 21 was wondering how many of those people are involved in QA 22 in its broadest sense, QA/QC et cetera, and then of those 23 how many are involved in the actual hands on QC, inspection 24 of the product, of the process, as it's being carried out?
c}
v 25 Could you get me those figures?
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
120 1
MR. GOLDBERG:
Yes, we can.
7_l-2 DR. SEISS:
Thank you.
3 MR. GOLDBERG:
Dr. Seiss, I wanted to make sure I 4
captured the essence of your question.
As I understood 5
your question, I believe you asked if we could identify the 6
total number of people included in that 10,100 number which 7
are involved in QA/QC activities and then the number that 8
are uniquely doing quality control inspection work.
9 I was contemplating, in responding, to give you 10 the total number of all the people in the QA organizations 11 which include auditors and quality control engineers, et 12 cetera.
(3
,s,)
13 I was not planning, of course, to throw in a 14 number of engineers that are clearly involved in the broad 15 quality since.
Was it the broader sense that you were 16 looking for.
17 DR. SEISS:
I think what you called QA 18 organization, including audit on down to QC, would probably 19 be the first part.
20 MR. GOLDBERG:
Okay.
Thank you.
21 DR. SEISS:
I think all engineers involved in 22 quality efforts.
23 DR. MARK:
I believe we've carried things as far
(-)
24 as we can this afternoon.
I think perhaps it was planned LJ 25 already but if not, I would like to mention my interest TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
121 1
with respect to the discussion that we'll have with Mr.
(
2 Cody tomorrow, I believe that's the right place; your 3
status with respect to off site power supplies.
May not 4
take much discussion but I think it would be worth hearing 5
it, unless somebody knows a quick answer at the moment.
6 MR. WISENBURG:
Could you be more specific 7
relative to the nature of your question?
I don't think 8
Mr. Cody is the person to respond.
9 DR. MARK:
Well, he's going to talk about severe 10 accidents and that's what starts them all.
Grid stability, 11 experience; all your power lines must come in from the 12 north; are they far enough apart that the same tornado
()
13 doesn't take them all out and things like that.
Look, I 14 just thought it would perhaps be a thing that someone could 15 give a little thought to and bring is a short word on
{
16 tomorrow.
17 MR. WISENBURG:
We'd be happy to address the 18 question.
When we do it --
19 DR. MARK:
I didn't want to be insistant on that.
20 You mean right now or tomorrow?
21 MR. WISENBURG:
We'll do it tomorrow.
22 DR. MARK:
That's very good.
In that case, I 23 think we'll recess the meeting until 8:30 tomorrow morning.
rq 24 (Recess at 5.30 p.m.)
()
25 TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177
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122 1
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER
\\_/
3 this is to certify that the attached proceedings before the 4
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS in the matter of:
5 6
NAME OF PROCEEDING:
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, et al.
7 (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2) 8 9
10 11 PLACE:
BAY CITY, TEXAS 12 DATE:
THURSDAY, MAY 29, 1986
)
13 14 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 15 transcript thereof for the file of the Advisor'j Committee 16 on Reactor Safeguards.
17 18 19 dh h
l 20 R.
Patrick Tate 21 Official Reporter 22 Tate Reporting Service 23 C)
I 25 i
TATE REPORTING SERVICE, (713) 222-7177 i
5 hb gi ut Good afternoon gentlemen, o
X
_________i_
s I am going to discuss with you this afternoon those Overview and Assessment Programs which were put into place by Houston Lighting & Power at the South Texas Project during the construction phase.
_______________ gig I will be discussing four of those programs:
Transition Program, Construction Quality Program, Engineering Assurance, and SAFETEAM..
O
Before I do so, however, let me briefly recap my education and experience.
I have 27 years of experience in the' profession of Quality Assurance, including 10 years in the nuclear industry.
I have been with HL&P since 1981.
I was originally hired as the Project Quality Assurance Manager, served also as the Manager of Quality Assurance, and for the last year have been the Manager of Nuclear Assurance.
I have a degree in Industrial Engineering and am a Professional Engineer in the Quality Engineering discipline.
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The first of the major Overview and Assess.
Programs attheSouthTexasProjectwhichIamgoingtodikcusisthh Transition Program.
The Transition Program was that process which we put into place to effect the change of responsibill-ties from our previous architect / engineer / constructor to the current project participants.
#2A I will be discussing it in terms of its three major
-elements - that is, Engineering, Construction, and Quality Assurance.
_______________g3 Before doing that, however, I would like to review the Q
purpose and the benefits of the Transition Program.
Its purpose was to perform a through reexamination of completed and in-process work.
The benefits that we derived from that examination included an additional measure of confidence in the adequacy and the quality of the previously completed work, as well as, making a solid determination that we did have a firm basis for continuation of the South Texas Project.
The Engineering transition activities began in late 1981 following the announcement by Houston Lighting & Power that we were replacing Brown & Root as architect / engineer and construction manager for the STP with the Bechtel Corporation.
O 2
... =.
O Ine engineering transition activities M
g4 utilizingworkpackagesandcompliancepackages 230 work packages, each one of which contained the relevant pieces of documentation pertaining to a structure, a system, or component of the plant.
Compliance packages (of which there were 12) contained the relevant pieces of documentation pertinent to a multi-discipline topic, such as environmental qualification or safe shutdown criteria.
g5 Each of the 230 work packages contained a description of the current engineering status, including design verification, a listing of licensing items that were pertinent to the package, including such things as NRC Information Notices, O
bulletins, as well as, a description of any FSAR changes.
The package also identified any recommendations for significant corrective actions, contained a summary of the work to go, identified any assumptions or special conditions that were germane to the package.
Finally, each package was cross-referenced.
Based on this Engineering Transition Program, Bechtel accepted the design and assumed responsibil-ity for that design.
g&
HL&P Engineering accepted each package by signature.
Their signature denoted that this package reflected an accurate status of the work described and that, that status O
3
presented an acceptable basis for continuati n
' the effort.
O ouring tnis process stae quality assurance perfeq d a series Based on the resubs of those'\\ -
of audits and surveillances.
audits and surveillances we reached the conclusion that the transition process was thorough, well documented, and achieved its objective.
During the conduct of the Engineering transi-tion the NRC also conducted a series of inspections and reviews; in fact, they had several personnel assigned to the~
Engineering office who reviewed specific packages.
g]
Turning now to the second major element of the Transition Program, that is the Construction transition, I will discuss that Transition Program for Construction in terms of its three major parts, that is.- the benchmarking of construction O
status, activities involved with storage and maintenance, and finally ASME Code responsibilities.
g8 The benchmarking of the Construction status of the plant was accomplished through a series of walk-downs, marked-up drawings, and a review of the documentation supporting the completed construction.
The change in responsibility for the storage and maintenance of equipment, both in the warehouse and installed, was accomplished through a review of the status of that equipment, a review of the pertinent requirements for the storage and maintenance of that eoulpment, and finally the placing of those requirements into an automated system.
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nnany, tne transfer of responsibinues egnedbytne ASME Code was accomplished through a Transfer ok Responsiblik -
ity Agreement and a Matrix of Responsibilities which were signed by all of the appropriate parties that are listed, that is - Brown & Root, Bechtel, Ebasco, Westinghouse, HL&P, as well as the State of Texas.
There were, at the time of the transition, some number of open NCRs, that is Nonconformance Reports.
Open, in this case, is defined as a Nonconformance Report that either had not yet received a disposition, or the work required by a disposition had not yet been completed.
Those open Nonconformance Reports were rolled-over, if you will, to either Bechtel or Ebasco, as appropriate, for completion of the necessary work.
During the process of O
Construction transition, as in the Engineering transition, HL&P Quality Assurance performed a series of audits and surveillances of the activities.
Based on the results of those audits and surveillances, we determined that the transition program in Construction was thorough, well documented, and achieved its objectives.
The NRC, as well, conducted a series of inspections and reviews utilizing both their resident inspectors, as well as inspectors who visited the project from the region offices.
#10 The third major element in the transition program for the South Texas Project was in the arena of Quality Assurance.
O l
5
L BoththeBechtelandEbascoQualityAssurantgagramswhich O
were described in their NRC-approved Topical Repyswere modified to be STP specific.
Atthesametime,dheHL&P Quality Assurance Program was rewritten to accommodate the new participants, as well as to describe the interfaces and the responsibilities of the three organizations.
HL&P approved the Bechtel and Ebasco Quality Assurance Programs for STP and submitted the Quality Assurance Program Description to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in March of 1982.
The Quality Assurance Program Description is an STP specific-document which is the counterpart for South Texas of the more familiar Chapter 17.1.
The NRC approved the Quality Assurance Program Description for South Texas late in March of 1982; and safety related construction resumed in August of 1982.
O
_.____n1 In Summary then, the Transition Program at the South Texas Project involved a thorough re-examination of all of the completed, as well as the in-process work, it provided HL&P with an additional measure of confidence in the adequacy of that completed work, and it was determined that we had a firm basis for continuation of the project.
I might add that this was a unique effort.
The project at the time of the transi-tion was approximately 40% complete and we affected a complete changeover of responsibility from one architect / engineer and constructor to others.
O 6
_____..---------#12 The second major Overview and Assessment gram that I will discuss this af ternoon is the Construction /iluality Program.
_______________g13 I am going to discuss that Construction Program in three major parts.
First the organization, secondly Effectiveness Inspections, and finally, independent reviews.
It is these last two topics which, in my judgment, set STP apart from other projects.
#14 This slide represents a combination of the standard boxes and 11nes, as well as some interfaces that exist at the South Texas Project.
The reporting relationship is that which has O
been described to you ny Mr. co1dberg, tnat is - 1 report directly to him and in turn the HL&P Project QA Manager reports to me.
That line which extends from the Project Quality Assurance Manager to the Project Manager for HL&P represents, as we have identified, interface and coordination.
In reality, it represents a clear communication channel which has been established to ensure the consistent interpretation and implementation of the HL&P quality philosophy.
The remaining lines on the chart which extend from HL&P to Bechtel and Ebasco and then the final 11ne from Bechtel to Ebasco represent programmatic direction.
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______.________gl4A 4
O erogrammaticdirectionisderinedastnohqivities involved in establishing the program requiremenli; approving the system features that will implement those requirements; and finally, the monitoring of the implementation of those system features.
We at HL&P have a keen appreciation of our responsibilities as the Project Manager, not only on our own behalf but on the behalf of the other participants in the J
project.
It is in a real sense, one of our major duties to assure that both Bechtel and Ebasco have that same keen appreciation of their responsibilities on the South Texas Project.
Finally, that programmatic direction line also denotes in chart form the team work that is necessary between those organizations in order to achieve our objectives.
We do O
recognize, however, that although teamwork is required and is happening, every team has a leader and in this case certainly that leader is Houston Lighting & Power.
#15 The second element of the Construction Quality Program that I would like to discuss is Effectiveness Inspections.
Effectiveness Inspections are performed by HL&P Quality Control.
#16 They are designed to replicate the first line inspection in order to assess its effectiveness.
In general, the first line inspection at South Texas Project is accomplished by 1
O I
i 8
1
Ebasco, although in some areas it is accomplished by Bechtel O
or a sub-contractor.
In any event, we perfo getiveness Inspections of those activities.
The Effectived ss Inspect 1 Program is not a representative sample.
The objective, however, is to assess the effectiveness of the inspection process and as such it does add to our confidence in the adequacy of those inspection activities.
It is scheduled and performed based upon our knowledge of the ongoing construction work, the available manpower resources, as well as the results of previous inspections that have been conducted either by first line inspectors or as a result of the Effectiveness Inspection Program.
We are currently in the process of shifting the emphasis of the Effectiveness Inspection Program from commodity installations to those inspection activities O
associated witn turnovers and release for tests.
#17 This final slide on Effectiveness Inspections is a tabulation of the number conducted and the number of characteristics inspected over the last several years, including the first quarter of 1986.
As you can see, the Effectiveness Inspection effort reached its peak in 1985 coincident with the construction effort when we reinspected approximately 86,000 characteristics.
The data for 1986 is for first quarter activity.
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- --- - - -- - # 18 O
Inefinetelementofmydiscussionoftnhistruction QualityProgramistheindependentreviewsthatiavebeen conducted on the South Texas Project.
The project has had a significant number of independent reviews conducted over approximately the last six years.
Before discussing those independent reviews, let me make clear that HL&P takes a pro-active approach to quality.
Having put our Quality Assurance Program into place - through a process of self test, critique, seeking out and utilizing information from other utilities and other projects - we conduct a consistent search for more effective and more efficient methods of achieving our objectives.
At the same time, we are well aware that independent, objective reviews by competent personnel very frequently, in fact almost invariably, yield confirmation that what we are doing is effective; as well as, additional intelligence as to ways that we may improve what we are doing in order to be more effective and more efficient.
#19 This list of the significant independent reviews that have been conducted on the South Texas Project includes a variety of types of reviews.
Some reviewed specific topics on the project (for example, the Quality Assurance Program or perhaps a specific discipline such as concrete); others reviewed many aspects of the project.
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# 19 A The first major independent review on this 1QtthatI wouldliketodiscussisthereviewconductedtih1980ofthdh disciplines of welding, soils, and concrete.
#20 These reviews were conducted as a result of the Show Cause order that was issued to the project in early 1980.
Each review collected a significant amount of data relative to each of those disciplines and to the construction work that had been accomplished in each of those disciplines.
That data was reviewed by independent experts, whose conclusions were documented in reports which were submitted to the NRC.
The results of the review of that data by those independent
- ""S
" ' '" t t""'" **r* "
d*
""' "S
' "' b **' "" '"
O would affect the safety of the South Texas Project in the soils or concrete disciplines.
In the welding discipline, the deficiencies identified resulted in a comprehensive Re-examination & Repair Program.
When this Re-examination and Repair Program was completed, Houston Lighting & Power and, subsequently, the NRC concluded that the welding was acceptable.
In addition, in 1980 at HL&P's request Bechtel Corporation (which then did not have any role on South Texas) performed an assessment of the Quality Assurance Program.
#21 In 1981 Bechtel returned to perform another assessment of the Quality Assurance Program.
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#22 O
in eed1 tron, in 1981 tne cuadrex Review of design and engineering effort by Brown & Root on South Texas was completed.
That review had been initiated by HL&P so that an independent party might assess the progress and the technical adequacy of the Brown & Root design and engineering effort.
The review concluded that Brown & Root was having difficulties in fulfilling the schedule for the completion of design and engineering activities at the South Texas Project.
As well, there were three deficiencies that emerged as a result of the review which were reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10CFR50.55(e) as potentially reportable.
Further examination determined that one of the three was not reportable.
#23 In 1982, the project had conducted the transition program which I have described in some detail in my previous remarks.
Additionally, we asked representatives from a group of four utilities to come in and tfdo an assessment of our Quality Assurance Program.
That was also completed in 1982.
I have also identified the EA program as being put into place during 1982.
I will discuss the EA program in detail a little later.
O 12
k
#24 O
m V
In 1983 t'he project took action to have a
.-Initiate.d 7
evaluation performed.
This evaluation was pefformed by
'\\%
independent consultants utilizing the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations guidelines and performance objectives for 1.
construction projects.
In 1984, members of that same group of 1
Independent contractors returned and did an assessment of our test control program.
That happened in 1984 because in 1983 there simply was not sufficient activity to enable them to make a meaningful assessment in that area.
In 1985, the project was reviewed by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations by means of a Construction Project Evaluation.
#25
- O Both the Self Initiated Evaluation in 1983 and 1984, as well as the Construction Project Evaluation in 1985 utilized the INPO Performance Objectives and Criteria for the evalua-tions; and both pointed out some areas of " good practices," as
~
well as identifying some areas where improvement was required.
#26 Later in 1985, the project initiated a pre-Construction Appraisal Team Review, also known as a pre-CAT.
#27 That effort was also conducted by independent consultants and concentrated on several specific areas of the project.
The areas which they reviewed were based upon an analysis of O
tne resuits of car inspections at otner projects.
13
#28 The finaf independent review at the South as Project I wanttodiscussthisafternoonwasourLimit'bdffeadiness Review Audit Program.
g29 This slide describes the characteristics of some of the audits that HL&P had been conducting at STP for several years before the Limited Readiness Review Audit Program.
Due to resource limitations, these types of audits were conducted approximately three times a year. They were broad scope technical audits performed by a team of approximately five auditors; with technical specialists assigned.
These audit teams conducted a review of the FSAR commitments, reviewed the t"* *
'"-d O
documents, reviewed some of the in-process work, and, in some cases, included actual inspection of completed work.
That basic program was then expanded into the Limited Readiness Review Audit Program.
#29A This outlines the Limited Readiness Review Audit Program.
It was determined in early 1985 that we would gain some additional confidence by review of certain topics.
The decision was then made to expand the scope and number of our previous audits and to accomplish the task utilizing outside contractors managed by Houston Lighting & Power and utilizing the Houston Lighting & Power existing audit program.
The O
14 1
topicselectionfortheLimitedReadinessRgew udit Program included the c'riteria that I have identified he that is topicsoractivitieswhichhadproventroubl'es[eatother projects, which may have been troublesome at STP, and finally, those topics which while are not unique to STP were certainly of special interest to the project.
g30 These are the topics that were selected for the Limited Readiness Review Audit Program.
-I have also identified that to date there were no findings pertaining to any structure, system, or component's ability to perform its safety function.
There were some programmatic issues identified and resolved.
#31 In conclusion, let me state that the implementation of our Quality Program during the construction phase; the implementation of our Effectiveness Inspections; combined with the independent reviews that we have had conducted, provide us with a high level of assurance that the activities at the South Texas Project are effective.
#32 The third major element of our Overview and Assessment Programs is our Engineering Assurance Program.
I mentioned this program earlier when I was reviewing the list of major independent reviews that have been done.
O 15
______________g33 The Engin'eering Assurance Program was pu 1
place at.
the South TerTs Project in 1982.
Its pufpose is to provide'a on-going real time review of the design activities.
This review has the opportunity to influence the course of future design activities, as well as to provide confirmation of the adequacy of the design and design process. As you may remember from Mr. Goldberg's presentation earlier, the Engineering Assurance Department reports directly to his office and is independent of project activities.
Following its establish-ment in 1982, the Engineering Assurance program conducted their first review in 1983.
Each of the reviews includes substantial participation by Stone & Webster Engineering Company personnel.
The reviews that have so far been completed have resulted in the expenditure of approximately 35,000 manhours by the Engineering Assurance Department.
' _______________g34 This slide identifies the reviews that have been conducted and completed by Engineering Assurance, as well as identifying those reviews that are currently scheduled to be completed during 1986.
During the conduct of the reviews that have been completed, there were some technical problems noted and corrected, as well as some opportunities for design process improvement noted and then implemented.
O 16
j O,
inere ere severet pertinent facts concer
______________g35 Engineering Assurance Program which I w di '
ti1e First, the NRC, through their I&E branch fd like to po o
has regularly inspected the program of E rom headquarters, to confirm its adequacy and its consist ngineering Assu dent design review objectives.
ency with the indepen-i the Engineering Assurance Program as sati fSe of an independent design verification programs ying have in place an oversight committee whi h Finally, we the program progress and its resultsregularly reviews c
In conclusion then, Engineering Assuranc
______________g35A South Texas Project is an additional st e Program at the O
increase our level of confidence in the adeep taken b k
and the design process for the South Texas Projqu ect.
The final element of our Overview and As
- ----- -- - --#36 that I am going to discuss this afternoo sessment Programs Program.
n is our SAFETEAM SAFETEAM
_______________g37 is an administrative program that into place for the purpose of providing a fo we have put employees to identify any concern they may have i rum for STP nuclear safety or quality.
n the area of O
17
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_____________g37A l'
Its~ objective is to, encourage employees o.,, M forward with their concerns now so that we may irivestigate the i
concern, correct any deficiencies that may be uncovered as a I
result of the investigation, and report back to the concernee.
The entire SAEETEA'M process from receipt of concerns, through conduct of the investigation, extending to the reply that is returned to the concernee, is conducted on a confidential and an anonymous basis.
#38 j
l This depicts several of the features of the SAFETEAM Program in place at STP which, in my judgment, are different from the SAFETEAM Programs or programs of that type which q
have been established at~other projects.
The first of those features is the SAFETEAM Review Committee.
That review committee is charged with the responsibility for reviewing all investigation reports, as well as correspondence to the concernees and for making recommendations to the project i
based upon the results of their review.
Member.s include representatives from Engineering, Quality Assurance, Licensing, Construction, as well as a legal representative.
All investigations of nuclear safety or quality concerns conducted by SAFETEAM are conducted by contract personnel.
Recommendations are made by the SAFETEAM Review Committee to the project.
Follow-up, tracking, and feedback are all performed on those recommendations.
The NRC has. Inspected the O
18
O e
SAFETEAM program at South Texas, and it rat t
program as pV satisfactory.
More importantly, I believe, (h
Eact that.
~
the NRC is referring allegations that they receive to SAFETEA for investigation and are utilizing the results of those SAFETEAM investigations as the basis for their response.
_______________g39 These are some statistics for the SAFETEAM program at South Texas - these are as of the end of April 1986.
We have through various means contacted approximately 17,800 employees or previous employees of the South Texas Project.
As a result of those contacts, we have received 580 Class I Concerns -
C Bss I, in our terminology, means a concern related to nuclear safety or quality.
As a result of our investigative Q
activity, we have closed (that is completed the investigation and provided feedback to the concernee) approximately 525 concerns.
Finally, as a result of the investigation and closure of the 525 concerns, we have substantiated, in whole or part, 111 of the 525 concerns.
#40 In summary, the SAFETEAM Program provides a forum
)
for employees to identify concerns so that they may be I
investigated and corrected now.
The SAFETEAM program is being used and it is fulfilling its objective.
I would add one final point and that is that the SAFETEAM program will remain in place throughout the remainder of the construction phase at the South Texas project.
The concept of a SAFETEAM O
organ 1zation w111 continue in place during tne operations phase at South Texas project as well.
19
E O
With that information concerning our SAFETEAM program, gentlemen, I have now completed my presentation of the Overview and Assessment Programs.
Before I leave the podium, I would like to discuss one additional program at the South Texas Project - that is, our drug and alcohol testing program.
A concern was brought to SAFETEAM in the fall of 1985 - the concern was about the use of illegal drugs by HL&P personnel of f-site.
Primarily as a result of that concern, the South Texas Project drug and alcohol testing program was put into place in January 1986.
Slide O
Ine drug and alcohol testing program is one element of the Fitness for Duty Program.
It consists of baseline testing for alcohol and illegal drugs, followed by random testing using a computer-selected sample.
This testing program is applicable to all permanent HL&P employees on the project, as well as employees of our contractors and sub-contractors.
I
Slide This slide depicts the number of personnel who have been tested through early May - as well as, identifying the number of personnel who have failed the testing program; or refused to be tested.
O Both numbers include prospective employees who must take and pass the tests as a condition of employment.
20
/3U This element of our Fitness for Duty Program represents an additional step taken by Houston Lighting & Power to ensure a virtually drug and alcohol free environment on the job - as well as, to provide a significant deterrent to off-site alcohol abuse and illegal drug use.
With that information, gentlemen, I have concluded my presentation.
OV l
nU 21
PRESENTATION FOR THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE
_)
INTRODUCTION AND LAYOUT MY NAME IS ERROLL DOTSON AND I AM THE MANAGER OF ENGINE T!!E SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT.
MY PRESENTATION WILL ADDRESS:
9 THE PLANT LAYOUT, 9
UNIQUE FEATURES OF THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, AND 9
OTHER SELECTED ENGINEERING SUBJECTS.
HOWEVER, I WILL FIRST PROVIDE YOU WITH A
SUMMARY
OF MY EDUCATION AND WORK EXPERIENCE.
4 I RECEIVED A BSME DEGREE FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF 1
CINCINNATI IN 1963, 9
AN MSME FROM AKRON UNIVERSITY IN 1969, AND 9
AN MBA WITH AN ACCOUNTING MAJOR FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA IN 1976.
I HAVE 22 YEARS OF COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR EXPERIENCE IN ADDITION T 2 YEARS IN ATOMIC DEMOLITIONS IN THE U.S. ARMY, 9
MY COMMERCIAL EXPERIENCE BEGAN WITH BABCOCK & WILCOX IN THE EARLY 1960's, 9
CONTINUED WITH BURNS & ROE WHERE I GAINED ARCHITECT-ENGINEERING EXPERIENCE, AND THEN 9
I WORKED FOR WESTINGHOUSE ON THE FLOATING NUCLEAR FROJECT.
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PRIOR TO JOINING HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, O
I SPENT 8 YEARS WITH FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT AS PROJECT ENGINEERING MANAGER FOR ST. LUCIE UNIT II FROM PRIOR TO THE RECEIPT OF THE CONSTRUCTION PERMIT UNTIL AFTER COMMERCIAL OPERATION WAS ACHIEVED 9
DURING THE SAME TIME PERIOD I WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MODIFICATIONS TO THE ST. LUCIE I OPERATING PLANT.
I'VE BEEN WITH HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY FOR 2 YEARS.
THE FIRST PART OF MY PRESENTATION WILL PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF 9
THE PLANT LAYOUT AND 0
THE PLOT PLAN.
(
THE PLANT SITE CONSISTS OF 12,200 ACRES.
)
THE MAIN COOLING RESERVOIR SOUTH OF THE POWER BLOCK AREA HAS:
e 7,000 ACRES OF SURFACE AND l
9 PROVIDES THE NON-SAFETY COOLING WATER SOURCE FOR THE l
l PLANT.
i THE ESSENTIAL COOLING POND IS AN EXCAVATED POND ENCLOSED BY AN EARTHEN EMBANKMENT.
O IT FUNCTIONS AS THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK FOR THE PLANT AND 9
PROVIDES THE COOLING WATER FOR THE SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS.
4 IT HAS ABOUT 46 ACRES OF SURFACE AREA.
I O
PAGE 2
}
THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT IS A 1250 MEGAWATT ELECTRIC UNIT WITH A
()
4-LOOP WESTINGHOUSE PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR.
THE SITE CONSISTS OF 2 PLANTS WHICH ARE SLIDE-ALONG DUPLICATES.
EACH PLANT IS PHYSICALLY SEPARATED FROM THE OTHER AND EACH HAS ITS OWN SAFETY-RELATED AND NON-SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS.
ONLY A FEW NON-SAFETY RELATED SUPPORT SYSTEMS ARE COMMON TO BOTH PLANTS AND ALL OF THESE WILL BE IN PLACE PRIOR TO STARTUP OF UNIT I.
THE COMMON SYSTEMS AND BUILDINGS ARE:
9 AN ADMINISTRATION BUILDING FOR PLANT MANAGEMENT 9
THE SECURITY SYSTEM 4
THE FIREWATER PUMP HOUSE AND TANKS e
THE AUXILIARY BOILER S
THE MAKE-UP WATER DEMINERALIZER SYSTEM AND BUILDING G
AS WELL AS, THE MAIN COOLING RESERVOIR, AND O
G THE ESSENTIAL COOLING POND AS PREVIOUSLY SHOWN.
THE STRUCTURES THAT ARE INDIVIDUAL FOR EACH UNIT ARE:
9 THE TURBINE GENERATOR BUILDING AND 9
THE FOLLOWING SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURES:
THE REACTOR CONTAINMENT BUILDING THE FUEL HANDLING BUILDING THE MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY BUILDING THE ISOLATION VALVE CUBICLE BUILDING AUXILIARY FEEDWATER STORAGE TANK THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING, AND THE ESSENTIAL COOLING POND IN-TAKE STRUCTURE.
PAGE 3
THE REACTOR CONTAINMENT BUILDING IS SIMILAR TO MANY LARGE DRY
{';
CONTAINMENT BUILDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES.
9 THE NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM IS A 4-LOOP WESTINGHOUSE SYSTEM WITH MODEL E STEAM GENERATORS.
9 HOWEVER, THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM IS LOCATED WITHIN THE REACTOR CONTAINMENT BUILDING, 9
AS IS A FUEL STORAGE PIT WHICH CAN STORE 66 SPENT OR NEW FUEL ASSEMBLIES.
STP's FUEL HANDLING BUILDING CONTAINS NOT ONLY THE SPENT FUEL POOL AS DO MOST FUEL HANDLING BUILDINGS, BUT IT ALSO CONTAINS 9
THE SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS AND 9
THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS IN THE LOWER ELEVATIONS.
9 THE POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM IS LOCATED ON THE OPERATING FLOOR.
TEE MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY BUILDING IS A SINGLE STRUCTURE WHICH CONTAINS S
THE ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY SYSTEMS ON THE NORTH SIDE OF A COMMON WALL AND 9
THE MECHANICAL AUXILIARY SYSTEMS ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE WALL.
THE UECHANICAL AUXILIARY BUILDING CONTAINS THE REFUELING WATER AND REACTOR MAKE-UP WATER STORAGE TANKS WHICH PROTECTS THEM FROM MISSLES.
9 THE SAFETY-RELATED COOLING WATER SYSTEMS AND THEIR HEAT EXCHANGERS ARE ALSO LOCATED HERE, AS ARE 9
THE RADWASTE PROCESSING AND STORAGE SYSTEMS S
CHEMICAL VOLUME CONTROL,,AND THE 9
BORIC ACID MAKE-UP AND PROCESSING SYSTEMS.
PAGE 4
l '.
1 THE ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY BUILDING HAS THE CONTROL ROOM IN
()
CENTRAL LOCATION WHICH GIVES THE OPERATORS QUICK ACCESS S
l TO EACH OF THE SWITCHGEAR ROOMS AND 6
THE AUXILIARY SHUTDOWN PANEL.
ALSO LOCATED IN THIS BUILDING ARE:
9 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER, 9
CABLE SPREAD ROOMS, 9
SWITCH GEAR ROOMS, 9
RELAY ROOMS AND OTHER ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT.
THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING IS SEPARATED INTO 3 COMPARTM FOR THE 3 IDENTICAL COOPER DIESEL GENERATORS WHICH SERVE CLASS IE SOURCE FOR ON-SITE AC POWER.
EACH DIESEL HAS:
/7 k>
9 A 5500 KW CONTINUOUS CAPACITY RATING AND 9
IS PHYSICALLY SEPARATED FROM THE OTHER 2 DIESELS THE ISOLATION VALVE CUBICLE __ BUILDING IS SEPARATED INTO FOUR COMPARTMENTS AND ENCLOSES 9
THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS, 9
MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES, 9
FEEDWATER LINES AND THEIR ATTENDANT VALVES, AND 9
THE SAFETY-RELATED ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES.
O v
PAGE 5
THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT USES A THREE TRAIN ENGINEERED SAFETY
()
FEATURES SYSTEM DESIGN TO MEET REGULATORY CRITERIA INSTEAD OF THE MORE COMMON TWO TRAIN SYSTEM.
THE THREE TRAIN DESIGN, IN A FASHION SIMILAR TO THE TWO TRAIN DESIGNt e
CONSISTS OF PHYSICALLY SEGREGATED AND G
ELECTRICALLY INDEPENDENT ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEMS.
NO SHARED COMPONENTS ARE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE :
9 HEAT REMOVAL FROM THE CORE, 9
HEAT REMOVAL FROM THE CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE OR, O
HEAT REJECTION TO THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK.
O THIS SLIDE SHOWS ONE OF THE THREE TRAINS AND STRONGLY RESEMBLES THAT OF A TWO TRAIN SYSTEM WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS AS I'LL POINT OUT.
THE MOST IMPORTANT EXCEPTION IS THAT THIS TRAIN IS NOT INTERCONNECTED WITH EITHER OF THE OTHER TWO TRAINS EXCEPT AT THE REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK, AS SHOWN.
i i
THE THREE TRAIN SYSTEM IS MUCH SIMPLER THAN THE HEADERED TWO TRAIN SYSTEM IN THAT EACH ECCS TRAIN INJECTS DIRECTLY INTO A REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COLD LEG.
O PAGE 6
ON RECEIPT OF THE SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL, THE HIGH HEAD AND THE
{}
LOW HEAD PUMPS:
4 START-UP AND RUN IN MINIMUM RECIRCULATION UNTIL REQUIRED 9
WITH NO ISOLATION VALVES, O
HEADERING LINES, 9
OR BALANCING ORIFICES IN ANY SAFETY INJECTION LINE.
THIS ALLOWS FOR:
9 A SIMPLER DESIGN, 9
EASIER TESTING, AND G
NO INTERACTION BETWEEN THE SAFETY INJECTION TRAINS OUTSIDE THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.
I CONTAINMENT SPRAY IS HEADERED, BUT IS ACTUATED ONLY ON HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE.
WHEN THE LOW LEVEL OF THE REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK IS REACHED, SUCTION IS SWITCHED TO THE CONTAINMENT SUMP, AS WITH MOST PLANTS, AND PECIRCULATION CONTINUES FROM THE SUMP.
EACH i
FOR LONG TERM COOLING, THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP IS USED MUCH IN THE SAME FASHION AS A TWO TRAIN NORMAL COLD SHUTDOWN.
THE HEAT FROM THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR)
HEAT EXCHANGERS IS REJECTED TO THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM WHICH ALSO SUPPLIES COOLING WATER FOR THE:
9 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP THERMAL
- BARRIER, 9
REACTOR CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS, 9
AND OTHER COOLING REQUIREMENTS.
O i
PAGE 7
THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM IS A CLOSED SYSTEM WITH THE
(}
SURGE TANK COMPARTMENTALIZED; SO THAT IN REALITY, EACH TRAIN IS COMPLETELY SEPARATE WITH THE INTERNAL BAFFLES ACTUALLY FORMING THREE TANKS.
IN THIS CASE, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM:
9 CIRCULATES WATER THROUGH THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER IN A CLOSED LOOP, O
COOLING THE RER HEAT EXCHANGER, AND 0
PERFORMING VARIOUS OTHER COOLING FUNCTIONS.
IN TURN, HEAT IS REJECTED FROM THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER TO THE ESSENTIAL COOLING POND BY THE ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER SYSTEM.
THIS SYSTEM ALSO SUPPLIES COOLING WATER FOR THE:
9 DIESEL GENERATOR HEAT EXCHANGERS, S
THE ESSENTIAL CHILLERS, AND G
THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP SUPPLEMENTARY COOLERS.
PAGE 8
THE THREE-TRAIN DESIGN ACCOMPLISHES ALL THAT THE MORE FAMILIAR
()
TWO-TRAIN DESIGN DOES WITH SOME NOTABLE ADVANTAGES.
THE FIRST ADVANTAGE IS PROVEN EQUIPMENT SIZE.
SINCE THIS IS A LARGER PLANT, THE EQUIPMENT SIZES WOULD BE LARGER IF IT WERE TWO TRAINS RATHER THAN THREE.
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT HAS THE CAPABILITY TO SHUT DOWN THE PLANT, AS YOU'LL SEE LATER, WITH ONE OF THESE THREE TRAINS RATHER THAN WITH ONE OF TWO.
THREE TRAINS ALSO PROVIDE GREATER MARGIN SINCE FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE ANALYZED POSSIBLE ACCIDENTS, ONE OF THREE TRAINS CAN SUCCESSFULLY MITIGATE THE ACCIDENT.
/~-
IN TURN, ONE OF THREE TRAINS PROVIDES GREATER PROTECTION FOR PLANT INVESTMENTS SINCE WE HAVE SINGLE TRAIN SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES FOR S
FIRE PROTECTION, 9
SMALL BREAK LOCA'S, AND e
NORMAL SHUTDOWN.
AS PART OF THE THREE-TRAIN SYSTEM, WE'VE ALSO ACHIEVED GREATER SIMPLICITY IN PIPING DESIGN WITH NO HEADERED PIPE BETWEEN THE TRAINS, AS I MENTIONED EARLIER.
O PAGE 9
THIS SLIDE SHOWS THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF TRAINS REQUIRED TO O
orsa^*8 unosa v^a1ous cono 21ons-FOR NORMAL OPERATION AND NORMAL SHUTDOWN:
9 ONLY ONE ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER, e
COMPONENT COOLING WATER, AND e
REACTOR CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER TRAIN IS USED.
FOR NORMAL SHUTDOWN, ONE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL TRAIN IS NEEDED.
SO IT IS ONLY FOR THE NON-MECHANISTIC, LARGE POSTULATED BREAKS THAT TWO TRAINS ARE REQUIRED.
SINCE THE SYSTEMS ARE NOT HEADERED, WE SEE THAT:
9 ONLY ONE SAFETY INJECTION TRAIN IS POSTULATED TO
()
- SPILL, 9
ONE IS POSTULATED TO EXPERIENCE A SINGLE EAILURE, AND 9
ONE INJECTS INTO THE REACTOR COOLANT LOOP.
THEREFORE, THE SUPPORT SYSTEMS MUST ALSO BE THREE-TRAIN.
THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY IS A HEADERED THREE-TRAIN SYSTEM WITH TWO TRAINS REQUIRED.
AS YOU CAN SEE, ONLY ONE TRAIN OF EACH SYSTEM IS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE OTHER ACCIDENTS; THAT IS, THE ONES WHICH MAY HAVE A FINITE PROBABILITY.
(
PAGE 10
i THE THREE-TRAIN DESIGN AT SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT PERFORMS THE SAME
(N FUNCTIONS AS THE TWO-TRAIN DESIGN IN ACHIEVING VARIOUS SHUTDOWN
(_)
MODES.
FOR HOT STANDBY, 9
WE USE THE CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM, 9
THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM, AND 9
THE PRIMARY SYSTEM COMPONENTS, AS NECESSARY, TO MAINTAIN INVENTORY, REACTIVITY CONTROL, TEMPERATURE CONTROL, AND PRESSURE CONTROL.
FOR BRINGING THE PLANT TO COLD SHUTDOWN, WE USE THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM, AS DO OTHER PLANTS, AS WELL AS THE tm ATTENDANT SUPPORT SYSTEMS.
d THE THREE-TRAIN DESIGN COUPLED WITH THE PLANT LAYOUT PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE FOR FIRE PROTECTION.
FIRST OF ALL, WITH THREE TRAINS WE HAVE TWO WAYS TO SHUT DOWN THE PLANT IN THE EVENT OF A FIRE IN ANY FIRE AREA VERSUS ONLY ONE ADDITIONAL PATHWAY, AS REQUIRED BY APPENDIX R.
THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R AND PROVIDES EQUIVALENT TO OR BETTER ALTERNATIVES TO CRITERIA OF APPENDIX A TO THE BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION, APCSB 9.5-1.
WE'VE ALSO LIMITED THE VERTICAL PROPAGATION OF THE FIRE WITH THE VERTICAL SEPARATION OF THE PLANT SINCE WE RAVE THREE TRAINS.
O PAGE 11 1
ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES ARE:
l')
(_j 9
THAT THE AUXILIARY SHUTDOWN PANEL CAPABILITIES INCLUDE CONTROLS FOR ALL THREE TRAINS, AND i
9 WE HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN COLD SHUTDOWN FROM THE AUXILIARY SHUTDOWN PANEL.
THE SOUTH TEXAS PLANR IS HIGHLY COMPARTMENTALIZED WITH CONCRETE WALLS AND CEILINGS WHICH COULD FURTHER IMPEDE THE SPREAD OF A FIRE.
FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE THREE CABLE SPREAD ROOMS, EACH IN A SEPARATE FIRE AREA.
OF COURSE, WE HAVE THE NORMAL FIRE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT THAT YOU ARE USED TO SEEING, SUCH AS:
()
9 MANUAL SUPPRESSION, 9
AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION IN CONCENTRATED CABLE AREAS, 9
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES TO PREVENT OR LIMIT FIRES, 9
FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS, AND 9
FIRE FIGHTING PLANS FOR EACH FIRE ZONE.
PAGE 12
~
THE SOUTH TEXAS PLANT AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM IS A FOUR-TRAIN DESIGN INCLUDING A DIVERSE STEAM-DRIVEN FEEDWATER PUMP.
SEGREGATION OF TRAINS ALLOWS SIMPLIFICATION IN DESIGN BY HAVING ONE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TRAIN FOR EACH OF THE FOUR STEAM GENERATORS, AS SHOWN HERE.
THREE INDEPENDENT CLASS IE POWER SOURCES FEED THE THREE TRAINS.
TWO OF THE PUMPS, ONE OF THE MOTOR-DRIVEN AND THE TURBINE-DRIVEN, RECEIVE THE SAME ACTUATION SIGNAL FROM THE A TRAIN.
THE OTHER TWO MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMPS ARE ACTUATED BY SEPARATE SIGNALS.
THE CROSS CONNECTS, SHOWN HERE, ARE NORMALLY CLOSED BUT CAN BE OPERATED FROM THE CONTROL ROOM, IF NECESSARY.
PAGE 13 O
THE RECENT EVENT INVOLVING THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM THAT O
WAS REPORTED IN THE PRESS STEMMED FROM A CALCULATION PERFORMED TO DETERMINE IF ONE PUMP FEEDING ONE STEAM GENERATOR COULD MAINTAIN A STABLE COOLING CONDITION.
THE INITIAL CALCULATION DETERMINED THAT THIS WAS POSSIBLE.
HOWEVER, ON THE UP-DATING OF THAT CALCULATION, O
IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE INPUTS TO THE CALCULATION WERE IN EVOLUTION 9
IN THAT OPERATOR ACTION FROM THE CONTROL ROOM WAS REQUIRED.
THIS ACTION WAS TO MANUALLY OPERATE THE SAFETY-RELATED ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE.
MAINTAINING COOLING WITH ONE STEAM GENERATOR IS NOT A DESIGN i
BASIS.
IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THAT OPERATOR ACTION.
THIS ITEM HAS SINCE BEEN RESOLVED WITH THE NRC STAFF.
IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN THE PLANT IN A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION WITH ONE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP FEEDING ONE STEAM l
GENERATOR, EVEN THOUGH THIS IS NOT A DESIGN REQUIREMENT IN ALL CASES.
O PAGE 14
CONTROL ROOM INTEGRATION THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT HAD A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY IN THE 1982-83 TIME-FRAME TO ADDRESS THE THREE MILE ISLAND CONCERNS S
FOR POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING AND HUMAN FACTOR ENGINEERING 6
WITH A COMPLETE DESIGN EVALUATION OF OPERATOR AND EQUIPMENT INTERFACES FOR AN INTEGRATED DESIGN.
THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DESIGN CONCEPT FULLY MEETS THE INTENT OF NUREG-0737, SUPPLEMENT 1.
THIS WAS POSSIBLE BECAUSE IN 1982:
9 FEWER THAT 20 % OF THE SAFETY-RELATED CONTROL PANELS WERE FABRICATED, O
THE THREE MILE ISLAND CRITERIA DEVELOPMENT WAS NEARLY
- COMPLETE, 4
THE WESTINGHOUSE OWNER'S GROUP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES WERE AVAILABLE, AND
)
9 THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE BL&P OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT WAS POSSIBLE.
THE CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW INTEGRATED THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS:
9 HUMAN FACTORS DESIGN, 9
POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION, 9
SAFETY-PARAMETER DISPLAYS, O
EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES, 9
SAFETY GRADE COLD SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY,
. O BY-PASS AND INOPERABLE STATUS MONITORING FOR ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES EQUIPMENT, AND 9
ANNUNCIATOR AND ALARM PRIORITIZATION.
O PAGE 15
IN PERFORMING THE CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW, A FULL SCALE p\\_)
MOCK-UP OF THE MAIN CONTROL PANELS WAS CONSTRUCTED.
THE ACTUAL CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW WAS CONDUCTED USING THIS MOCK-UP.
THE EVALUATION WAS PERFORMED USING THE WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GROUP EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES AS A BASIS FOR EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES.
THIS TASK WAS PERFORMED BY A JOINT TEAM FROM ENGINEERING, OPERATIONS, AND A HUMAN FACTORS CONSULTANT FROM TORREY PINES.
A COMPLETE RE-LAYOUT OF SIX SAFETY-RELATED PANELS RESOLVED HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCIES WHICH WERE IDENTIFIED.
()
THE REMAINING PANELS WERE ALSO UP-GRADED:
9 TO PROVIDE FULL INTEGRATION OF THE CRITERIA REQUIREMENTS, AS WELL AS 9
TO PROVIDE AN INTEGRATED DESIGN FOR ALL OF THE MAIN CO,NTROL PANELS.
(2) l PAGE 16
THIS SLIDE SHOWS THE MILESTONES FOR THE CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW WHICH HAS STRETCHED OVER THREE YEARS.
~
ONLY A FEW ITEMS REMAIN TO BE COMPLETED IN THE CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW.
THESE INCLUDE SUCH ITEMS AS:
9 A CHECK OF THE PANEL LABELS, 9
ANNUNCIATOR TITLES, AND 9
INDICATOR SCALES TO CONFIRM THAT THE ACTUAL HARDWARE MEETS THE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS.
IN ADDITION, 9
LIGHTING AND SOUND SURVEYS WILL BE CONDUCTED 9
COMPUTER DISPLAYS, WORK SPACE, AND COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE EVALUATED WHEN THE CONTROL ROOM IS COMPLETED.
THE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES WILL BE VALIDATED ON THE
()
PLANT SIMULATOR WHICH HAS BEEN UPGRADED TO CORRESPOND WITH THE CONTROL ROOM DESIGN.
DURING THIS SAME TIME-PERIOD, THE ALTERNATE SHUT-DOWN CAPABILITY FROM OUTSIDE THE CONTROL ROOM WAS ALSO EVALUATED.
AS YOU CAN SEE FROM THIS SLIDE:
9 APPENDIX R CRITERIA, 9
SAFETY-GRADE COLD SHUTDOWN CRITERIA, O
HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING FOR THE AUXILIARY SHUTDOWN PANEL, AND s\\ 9 CABLE ROUTING DESIGNS COULD ALL BE ACCOMPLISHED SINCE THAT WORK HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED.
O PAGE 17 4,.
.. - - -. ~
THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DEVELOPED THE ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN C]'
CAPABILITY FOR ALL THREE TRAINS OUTSIDE THE CONTROL ROOM WITH APPROPRIATE INSTRUMENTATION FOR ALL THREE TRAINS ALSO AVAILABLE OUTSIDE THE CONTROL ROOM.
THE QUALIFIED DISPLAY PROCESSING SYSTEM, WHICH I WILL DESCRIBE LATER, WAS DEVELOPED.
THIS SLIDE SHOW HOW QDPS PROVIDES MONITORING CAPABILITY IN BOTH THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM AND TDE AUXILIARY SHUTDOWN AREA.
AS THE NEXT SLIDE SHOWS, WHEN THE NON-MECHANISTIC EVACUATION OF THE CONTROL ROOM IS POSTULATED:
O CONTROL OF EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR HOT SHUTDOWN AND 0
EQUIPMENT WHICH MUST BE OPERATED FREQUENTLY TO REACH AND MAINTAIN COLD SHUTDOWN O
IS TRANSFERRED FOR EACH TRAIN INDIVIDUALLY IN THE SWITCHGEAR ROOMS TO THE AUXILIARY SHUTDOWN PANEL.
{}
THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT OUALIFIED DISPLAY PROCESSING SYSTEM WAS ANOTHER MAJOR ASPECT OF THE CONTROL ROOM INTEGRATION EFFORT 4
IN ADDITION TO HUMAN FACTORS DESIGN OF THE CONTROL PANELS AND 9
THE ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY.
1 THE OBJECTIVES OF QDPS WERE:
9 TO OPTIMIZE THE INSTRUMENTATION DESIGN TO INCLUDE MANY FACETS OF THE EVOLVING REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS, SUCH AS:
THREE MILE ISLAND, APPENDIX R, AND SAFETY-GRADE COLD SHUTDOWN CRITERIA, 9
AS WELL AS, TO PROVIDE OPTIMIZED CABLE-ROUTING UTILIZING THE LATEST DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY.
PAGE 18
P SEVERAL CATEGORIES OF INPUTS TO THE QDPS WERE IDENTIFIED TO MEET
()
THESE OBJECTIVES:
9 POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING PARAMETERS INCLUDING INADEQUATE CORE COOLING INSTRUMENTATION AND REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97, CATEGORY l VARIABLES, 9
A MINIMUM SET OF PARAMETERS NECESSARY TO MONITOR AND CONTROL SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT, O
COMPLEMENTARY POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING, CONTROL, AND PROTECTION SYSTEM PARAMETERS USED TO ENHANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF GRAPHIC DISPLAYS, O
ADVANCED DESIGN MODIFICATION PARAMETERS WHICH INCLUDE:
STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL DENSITY COMPENSATION AND A PRIMARY TEMPERATURE AVERAGING SCHEME WHICH O'
AVERAGES THE THREE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HOT LEG RTDs FOR EACH LOOP.
PAGE 19
E THE OUTPUTS FROM THE ODPS INCLUDE:
9 QUALIFIED POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING DISPLAYS IN THE l
CONTROL ROOM, O
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION PARAMETER DISPLAYS IN THE CONTROL ROOM, 9
SAFE SHUTDOWN DISPLAYS IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND ON THE AUXILIARY SHUTDOWN PANEL, 9
ISOLATED DATA LINKS TO THE SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY
- SYSTEM, 9
MODULATING CONTROL FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN VALVES, AND 9
STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL DENSITY COMPENSATION SYSTEMS AND THE TEMPERATURE AVERAGING SCHEME OUTPUTS TO THE PROTECTION SYSTEM.
(OJ THE QDPS IS A DIGITAL MONITORING SYSTEM WHICH OFFERS THE FOLLOWING ADVANTAGES:
9 GRAPHIC DISPLAYS SUPPORT THE OPERATING PROCEDURES, 9
FEWER PANEL INDICATORS, THEREFORE, SIMPLER CONTROL
- PANELS, 9
RELIEVES THE OPERATOR OF THE BURDEN OF CROSS CHANNEL CHECKING REDUNDANT INDICATORS, 9
PERFORMS QUALITY CHECKING OF INPUT SIGNALS S
SIMPLIFIES IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SIGNAL DISTRIBUTION BY USING DATA LINKS, AND 9
MONITORS ITSELF THROUGH ON-LINE DIAGNOSTICS AND SELF CALIBRATION.
PAGE 20
O BECAUSE THE QUALIFIED DISPLAY PROCESSING SYSTEM IS A NEW SYSTEM, AN EXTENSIVE VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION PROGRAM HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN.
AN INDEPENDENT TEAM OF VERIFIERS HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED TO PERFORM EXHAUSTIVE STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF THE SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE.
ACTUAL SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE ARE BEING TESTED ON THE UNIT 2 SYSTEM.
THIS PROGRAM WILL BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO FUEL LOAD AND THE PROCESS IS BEING AUDITED BY THE NRC STAFF.
O 1
PAGE 21 O
NEXT, I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT OUR ANTICIPATED 7-()
TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM OR ATWS MITIGATION CAPABILITY.
THE ATWS MITIGATION SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUITY IS CALLED AMSAC.
THE AMSAC IS A NON-SAFETY SYSTEM THAT PROVIDES DIVERSITY FROM THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM.
WE HAVE COMMITTED TO INSTALL THIS SYSTEM NO LATER THAN THE COMPLETION OF THE FIRST REFUELING OUTAGE.
THE ATWS/AMSAC SYSTEM CAN READILY BE INCORPORATED INTO THE CONTROL ROOM DESIGN SINCE:
0 IT USES THE SAME TECHNOLOGY AS THE QUALIFIED DISPLAY PROCESSING SYSTEM AND 0
CAN FIT INTO THE SAME NON-SAFETY RELATED CABINET.
THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT AMSAC WILL BE THE WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GROUP GENERIC DESIGN USING THE OPTION OF INITIATION ON LOW FEEDWATER FLOW.
THE SYSTEM WILL:
0 TRIP THE MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR AND G
INITIATE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOW INDEPENDENT OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM.
()
PAGE 22
9 1
GENERAL REACTOR CORE DESCRIPTION THE SOUTH TEXAS PLANT HAS A 14-FOOT FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGN RATHER THAN THE TYPICAL 12-FOOT LENGTH DESIGN.
HOWEVER, THE CORE PERFORMANCE IS NOT ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM i
OTHER UNITS ALREADY IN OPERATION, BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND ABROAD.
THE 3800 MEGAWATT THERMAL SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT CORE HAS 9
193 FUEL ASSEMBLIES 9
OF THE WESTINGHOUSE STANDARD 17 X 17 FUEL PIN ARRAY.
THIS FUEL IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS CURRENT WESTINGHOUSE FUEL FROM BOTH A DESIGN AND FABRICATION STANDPOINT.
()
SEVERAL PLANTS OVERSEAS ALREADY USE THE 14-FOOT WESTINGHOUSE FUEL DESIGN:
9 THE TIHANGE III AND DOEL IV UNITS.IN BELGIUM e
AS WELL AS, THREE OF THE OPERATING PALUEL UNITS IN FRANCE.
9 TWENTY FRENCH PLANTS HAVE THE 14-FOOT DESIGN.
DOEL IV HAS RECENTLY COMPLETED ITS FIRST CYCLE AND COMPLETED i
REFUELING IN MID-MAY.
PAGE 23
()
THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DESIGN HAS 10 GRIDS PER FUEL ASSEMBLY RATHER THAN THE TYPICAL 6 FOR A 17 X 17 FUEL ASSEMBLY ARRAY.
ARE' THE EXTRA GRID 5EB USED 9
TO INCREASE THE AXIAL SUPPORT OF A LONGER AND HEAVIER FUEL ROD AND 0
TO LIMIT ROD BOW.
THE BOTTOM NOZZLE LEGS ARE SLIGHTLY LONGER:
9 5.6 INCHES AS COMPARED TO 3 INCHES S
TO REDUCE NEUTRON FLUX ON THE LOWER CORE PLATE.
THE ASSEMBLY GUIDE PINS ARE PART OF THE UPPER NOZZLE RATHER THAN ON THE BOTTOM OF THE UPPER CORE PLATE BECAUSE OF THE RAPID REPUELING DESIGN, WHICH I WILL DESCRIBE LATER.
O THIS SLIDE PROVIDES A COMPARISON OF THE 12-FOOT CORE MCGUIRE UNIT AND THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT'S 14-FOOT CORE.
THE THERMAL HYDRAULIC PARAMETERS REMAIN ESSENTIALLY THE SAME FOR THE 12-FOOT AND 14-FOOT CORES AND ALL ACCIDENT LIMITS ARE STILL MET WITH ADEQUATE MARGIN.
AS STATED EARLIER, THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT FUEL DESIGN CORE PERFORMANCE IS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM OTHER UNITS ALREADY IN OPERATION, BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND ABROAD.
I PAGE 24
RAPID REFUELING
' RAPID REFUELIN'G-REDUCES THE NUMBER OF OPERATOR ACTIONS IN THE REFUELING' OPERATION BY-9 ELIMINATING CERTAIN OPERATIONS AND 9
MII!IMIZING THE NUMBER OF COMPONENTS TO BE HANDLED SEPARATELY.
' A SUMMAR OF RAPID REFUELING IS:
9
- FIRST, A QUICK OPENING REACTOR VESSEL WITH ROTOLOCK STUDS; 9
- SECOND, NO REQUIREMENT FOR DISCONNECTING THE ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS TO THE CONTROL ROD DRIVES, 4
- THIRD, THE ACCESS TO THE CORE IS GAINED IN A SINGLE LIFT WITH THE UPPER HEAD, UPPER.INTERRALS, AND CONTROL RODS LIFTED AS A SINGLE'. PACKAGE AND O
WITH THE CONTROL RODS PARKED IN THE HEAD AND l
THE UPPER INTERNALS RATHER THAN LEFT IN THE CORE; AND l
9
- FOURTH, ALLOWING THE POTENTIAL FOR MINIMIZING THE l
I NUMBER OF FUEL HANDLING OPERATIONS BY HAVING STORAGE CAPABILITY WITHIN THE CONTAINMENT.
AS I STATED, DOEL IV HAS COME.DOWN FOR REFUCLING AND USED THE RAPID REFUELING METHODS.
~
BL&P HAS A MAN S"ATi.ON:'6 THERE TO GAIN OPERATING EXPERIENCE.
l 3
PAGE 25
SECONDARY SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT HAS MADE SEVERAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE SECONDARY SIDE OF THE PLANT TO PROTECT OUR INVESTMENT IN THE STEAM GENERATORS.
INDIVIDUALLY THESE MODIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN DONE AT OTHER PLANTS, BUT COLLECTIVELY WE BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE UNIQUE.
HISTORY HAS SHOWN THE STEAM GENERATORS TO BE THE HARDWARE MOST SUSCEPTIBLE TO NON-SAFETY RELATED PROBLEMS; IN FACT, SOME PLANTS HAVE ALREADY REPLACED THEM.
WE'VE COMMITTED, ALONG WITH THESE DESIGN CHANGES, TO MAINTAIN CHEMISTRY CONTROL TO MINIMIZE PROBLEMS.
[s SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT HAS THE WESTINGHOUSE MODEL E STEAM GENERATORS WHICH ARE ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL TO THE MORE FAMILIAR MODEL D, BUT LARGER.
IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE STEAM GENERATORS, HOUSTON LIGHTING &
POWER COMPANY:
9 HAS STUDIED INDUSTRY PROBLEMS AND 9
HAS MADE MAJOR MODIFICATIONS TO PREVENT THESE PROBLEMS FROM CAUSING STEAM GENERATOR FAILURES AT THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT.
PAGE 26
THESE MODIFICATIONS INCLUDE:
O 8
THE ADDITION OF PRECATION POLISHING DEMINERALIZERS, AS WELL AS THE MIXED BED POLISHERS, AS A FINAL PROTECTION TO THE STEAM GENERATOR FOR IMPURITIES; 9
THE ADDITION OF A DEAEREATOR STORAGE TANK TO REDUCE OXYGEN TO LESS THAN DETECTALLE LEVELS; 9
THE ADDITION OF A MOTOR-DRIVEN STARTUP STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP TO ALLOW THE SECONDARY SYSTEM TO BE USED IN ALL PHASES OF OPERATION INCLUDING STARTUP; 9
THE ADDITION OF A STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN DEMINERALIZER; AND 9
INCREASED BLOWDOWN CAPABILITY TO REDUCE IMPURITIES TBAT COULD BE IN THE STEAM GENERATOR; 9
ELIMINATION-OF COPPER IN THE FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE TRAIN, USE OF TITANIUM CONDENSER TUBES ---- ALL TO N
PRECLUDE COPPER IN THE SECONDARY SYSTEM; e
USE OF ALL VOLATILE CHEMISTRY INSTEAD OF PHOSPHATE TREATMENT TO REDUCE SLUDGE BUILDUP; 9
EXPANSION OF THE STEAM GENERATOR TUBES IN THE PREHEATER SECTION TO ELIMINATE TUBE VIBRATION AND WEAR WHICH HAS BEEN EXPERIENCED IN OTHER STEAM GENERATORS; e
ADDITION OF SLUDGE LANCING PORT TO FACILITATE STEAM GENERATOR CLEANING; 9
A STEAM GENERATOR LAYUP SYSTEM TO PREVENT CORROSION WHEN THE PLANT IS DOWN; 9
AND
- FINALLY, THE STRESS RELIEVING OF TUBES ON THE PRIMARY SIDE WITHIN THE TUBE SHEET TO PREVENT STRESS CORROSION CRACKING USING THE ROTOPEENING TECHNOLOGY.
O PAGE 27
4 SEISMIC DESIGN O
THIS IS A BRIEF
SUMMARY
OF THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT SEISMIC DESIGN WITH SOMEWHAT GREATER DETAIL, AS REQUESTED.
THERE IS A CONSIDERABLE MARGIN IN THE SEISMIC DESIGN OF THE PLANT STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT.
I WILL NOW DESCRIBE THE VARIOUS LAYERS OF MARGIN WHICH THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT HAS.
THIS SLIDE SHOWS THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE TECTONIC EVENTS WITHIN A 200 MILE RADIUS OF THE SITE.
AS YOU CAN SEE, 23 WERE FOUND, O
BUT NONE WITH A MAGNITUDE GREATER THAN 3.9 AND 0
NONE CLOSER THAN 80 MILES TO THE SITE.
SINCE THERE WERE SO FEW EVENTS, WE STUDIED EVENTS LOCATED FURTHER FROM THE SITE.
THE SEISMIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT SITE CONSIDERS TWO BASIC SOURCE MECHANISMS:
4 9
- ONE, THE TECTONIC ACTIVITY IN THE UNDERLYING BASEMENT
~
ROCK OF THE GULF COAST SEISMOTECTONIC PROVINCE WHERE THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT IS LOCATED, AND 0
- TWO, AN EVENT IN TECTONIC PROVINCES ADJACENT TO THE GULF COAST PROVINCE.
CONSIDERATION OF THESE EVENTS RESULTED IN A WORST CASE EARTHQUAKE INTENSITY VI AT THE SITE WHICH CORRELATES WITH A HORIZONTAL GROUND ACCELERATION OF 0.07G.
1 IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE MINIMUM SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE ACCELERATION ESTABLISHED IN 10CFR100, 0.lG WAS USED.
SO AS YOU CAN SEE, THIS ACTIVITY IN ITSELF RESULTED IN CONSIDERABLE MARGIN SINCE THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT IS AN AREA OF O-NEARLY ZERO SEISMIC ACTIVITY.
j PAGE 28 l
\\
l THE FLOOR RESPONSE SPECTRA FOR THE VARIOUS BUILDINGS WAS DEVELOPED USING A TWO-STEP FINITE ELEMENT METHOD TO ACCOUNT FOR O
THE SOIL STRUCTURE INTERACTION.
l THIS METHOD CONSTITUES THE DESIGN BASIS ANALYSIS FOR THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT.
A SECOND SEISMIC ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED USING THE ELASTIC HALF SPACE METHOD FOR SOIL STRUCTURE INTERACTION.
4 A CONFIRMATORY ANALYSIS USING A SINGLE STEP FINITE ELEMENT METHOD WAS ALSO USED FOR COMPARISON.
4 THIS SLIDE ILLUSTRATES A TYPICAL COMPARISON OF THE RESPONSE SPECTRA GENERATED BY THE THREE METHODS.
A COMPARISON OF THESE DIFFERENT METHODS CONFIRMS THE CONSERVATISISM OF THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DESIGN BASIS SPECTRA.
FOR EXAMPLE, THE ELASTIC HALF SPACE WAS USED FOR LESS THAN 4 CYCLES PER SECOND.
J IN ADDITION, THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DESIGN IS TYPICALLY GOVERNED BY THE OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE LOAD COMBINATION DUE TO:
9 THE USE OF HIGHER LOAD FACTORS, O
LOWER ALLOWABLE STRESSES, 9
AND LOWER DAMPING RATIOS WHICH RESULT IN A HIGHER USE OF MEMBER CAPACITY WHEN COMPARED TO THE SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE LOAD COMBINATION.
SINCE THE OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE GOVERNS THE DESIGN, MORE MARGIN IS ACHIEVED FOR THE SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE.
O PAGE 29
4 ADDITIONAL MARGIH RESULTS FROM THE FACT THAT:
0 MATERIAL STRENGTHS ARE TYPICALLY GREATER THAN ASSUMED DURING THE DESIGN STAGE, 9
ACTUAL DAMPING VALUES ARE HIGHER THAN THE VALUES FOR
- DESIGN, 9
STANDARD MEMBERS ARE SELECTED THROUGHOUT A FLOOR AREA OR A WALL AREA, AND 9
INELASTIC BEHAVIOR AND THE REDISTRIBUTION OF STRESSES ARE NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
OTHER MARGIN IS THAT DESIGN LOADS ARE HIGHER THAN ACTUAL LOADS.
IN MANY CASES, THE EQUIPMENT IS GENERICALLY TESTED FOR HIGHER VALUES THAN THE DESIGN VALUES FOR THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT SINCE MOST OTHER NUCLEAR PLANTS HAVE A SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE VALUE HIGHER THAN 0.lG.
THEREFORE, THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DEF.IGN IN CONFORMING TO THE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS BAS A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MARGIN, AS WE HAVE SHOWN IN EACH STAGE OF THE ANALYSES.
(])
PAGE 30
O ELIMINATION OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAKS THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT HAS AN AGGRESSIVE PROGRAM:
O TO ELIMINATE POSTULATED PIPE BREAKS s
0 TO REOUCE THE NEED TO DESIGN FOR THEIR EFFECTS.
WE'VE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE MOST RECENT REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 0
IN ALLOWING THE USE OF FRACTURE MECHANICS (LEAK BEFORE BREAK) ON THE REACTOR COOLANT LOOP PIPING, IN ADDITION 0
TO THE ELIMINATION OF ARBITRARY INTERMEDIATE BREAKS.
WE'VE ALSO IMPLEMENTED THE USE OF A LARGER CUMULATIVE USAGE FACTOR IN PIPING ANALYSES TO REDUCE FURTHER THE NUMBER OF BREAK LOCATIONS WHICH MUST BE POSTULATED.
4 WE HAVE ON-G0ING EFFORTS TO EXTEND THE BENEFIT OF PIPE BREAK ELIMINATION 0
TO THE BALANCE OF THE PLANT AND 0
THE PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE O
USING THE SAME FRACTURE MECHANICS TECHNOLOGY AND LEAK DETECTION PROCESSES AS WERE USED IN THE RULE FOR ELIMINATION OF THE HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS FOR THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PIPING.
WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF REQUESTING EXEMPTIONS TO THESE LINES AND ARE STRONGLY URGING THAT IN PARALLEL THE RULE FOR EXEMPTION TO GDC4 BE APPLIED TO THESE LINES, AS WELL AS TO THE REACTOR COOLANT LOOP PIPING.
()
.O THE COST AND SCHEDULE BENEFITS DUE T0:
0 THE ELIMINATION OF ENGINEERING FOR PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT DESIGNS AND 0
THE MATERIAL TO FABRICATE THEM IS SIGNIFICANT.
IN ADDITION, THE JET BARRIERS AND THE RESTRAINTS THEMSELVES CREATE A MORE CONGESTED PLANT.
THEIR ELIMINATION FROM INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS SIGNIFICANTLY LOWERS OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE.
WE APPLAUD AND APPRECIATE THE DIRECTION THAT REGULATION HAS TAKEN ON THIS ISSUE ALREADY, BUT FOR STP TO MAXIMIZE THE BENEFIT THAT CAN RESULT FROM FURTHER BREAK ELIMINATION, THE NRC STAFF MUST ADDRESS OUR REQUESTS IN A TIMELY FASHION.
WE REQUEST THAT THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUPPORT US IN THIS EFFORT.
O 31
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