ML20072A592

Responses to Util 830523 Followup Interrogatories on Des Contentions 11,17 & 19

ML20072A592
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	06/06/1983
From:	CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP, PALMETTO ALLIANCE
To:	DUKE POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8306100196
Download: ML20072A592 (13)

Text

. . . ,

C 43 s g

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -

E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION _  %

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING b R , 8 k? E 4 '

g .

In the Matcer of ) s.

O

) Docket Nos.

DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al. ) 50-414

)

(Catawba Nuclear Station, ) June 6, 1983 Units 1 and 2) )

PALMETTO ALLIANCE AND CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP RESPONSES TO APPLICANTS MAY 23, 1983 FOLLOW-UP INTERROGATORIES ON DES CONTENTIONS 11, 17, and 19 Intervenors P.A. and C.E.S.G.hereby respond to the Appli-cants' Follow-Up Interrogatories of May 23, 1983, on DES Conten-tions 11, 17, and 19.

CONTENTION 11

1. P.A. and C.E.S.G. contend that section 102 (2) (c) of the National Environmental Protection Act, NRC regulations pursuant to this section in 10CFR 51, and Council on Environ-mental Quality Guidelines (Section 1508.7) , requires the NRC Staff to consider the risks in the operation of the McGuire plant in assessing the environmental impact of Catawba opera-tions. Specifically, 51. 23 (c) requires that "the draft en-vironmental impact statement will include a preliminary cost-benefit analysis which considers and balances the environmental and other effects of the facility, and the alternatives avail-able for reducing or avoiding adverse environmental and other 8306100196 830606 PDR ADOCK 05000413 PR gg

effects, as well as the environmental, economic, technical and

~

other benefits of"the facility."' The regulations go on to man-date that'the impact' statement shall~take account of " economic, socioeconomic,-and possible cumulative impacts and nuch other

' fue l-cycle . impacts as may reasonably appear' 'signifi'c ant. "

Section 1503.7 of'the'CEQ Guidelines provides that "the-curaulative impact is the impact on the environment which re -

sults from the incremental inpact of the action when added to other past, present and reasonably forseeable future actions re-gardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions." The McQuire Plant constitutes an important part of the pre-existing environment upon which the Catawba plant will impact, and hence.must be accounted for.

The fact that the Applicants own and operate both McQuire and Catawba' stations, and that the NRC has regulatory responsibil-ity for both of these plants, makes it even more evident that thefsort of environmental statement' required by Statute, NRC Regulations, CEQ Guidelines, must include an assessment of both the Catawba.and McQuire plants.

.2. CEO Guidelines, Sections 1502.16,-1508.7, 1508.8, 150.8, 1508.25.

3. See response to interrogatory 1, above.

4. No.

5. At page 9-9 of the Catawba FES the Staff attempts to respond to Intervenors criticism of the DES deficiencies re-

~

flected in DES contention 11. There, under the heading " Response to Comment No. Il" Staff derives its evaluation of McGuire risk on the basis of its projections of "the sprobability that the wind blows from McGuire to Charlotte," and its assumptions that the same " probability of a consequence versus distance from Catawba can be applied to McGuire. . .(Ib the absence of any other infor-mation..." P.A. and C.E.S.G. previously asserted at these

" risk numbers" for Catawba early' fatalities and latent cancers due to severe accidents are " faulty;" and, that the "windsectors" impacted by the likely variable winds blowbig a radioactive plume in the event of a severe accident are also faulty. A more re-alistic model, which expands to adjacent windsectors to encompass the Charlotte population and the path cf variable wiads under accident conditions will significantly increase the effect of "McGuire risks."

6. As reflected in Palmetto Alliance and C.E.S.G.'s May 2, 1983, responses to interrogatories 14, 15, 16 and 17 on this contention Staff's calculations made at page 9-9 of the Catawba FES responsa to comment no. 11 is that which Intervenors have characterized as " superficial." The basis for this view are expressed in response to interrogatory 5, above.

7. No. Please see response to individual interrogatories for Intervenors position as to the inadequacy of the Staff's environmental evalaation.

8. The doubling of a realistic assessment of Catawba in-pacts in order to reflect the risk of concurrent McGuire oper-ation would represent the bounding case which would be reason-able to assume for purposes of any _NEPA impact analysis.

9. P.A. and C.E.S.G. reject this definition of risk be-cause it implies that if the number that results from multi-plying probability and-consequences is " low" then the benefits of a project outweigh the attendent risks. P.A. and C.E.S.G.

reject this for three reasons. First, the process of quantify-ing probabilities is, of neccessity, speculative. If one con-cludes that the chances of undesireable consequence X occuring is one in one thousand, there is a non-zero chance X will occur next week. Second, analysis is often incomplete. That the NRC staff did not consider effects of variable winds in computing the risks posed by the concurrent operation of the McQuire and Catawba plants illustrates this point. The narrow cost-benefit calculations employed by the NRC Staff also tend to be incomplete in that non-quantifiable, less tangible factors tend to be ommitted. Thirdly, the NRC's definition of risk implies that there is some " scientific" criterion that de-termines whether or not a risk is acceptably low or unacceptably hich, that some risk number can decide this issue. We contend that this is simply false. The criterion that establishes what is acceptable or unacceptable risk is a political criterion, not a scientific one. Even if the NRC Staff's risk numbers were a more or less correct approximation of the probabilities of

undesireable consequences, even if these risk numbers were too high, P.A. and C.E.S.G. insist that the citizenry might still legitimately conclude but because the consequences of malfunction at a nuclear plant are sc1 undesireable any non-zero probability of an accident is too high. P.A. and C.E.S.G. believe that de-fining risk as " probability times consequences" obfuscates these important issues.

10. Risk should be defined in such a way that it refers not simply to a probability number, but to the consequences as well. Risk is the chance of injury, damage, or loss (dangerous chance).

11. Previously asked and answered. Please see May 2, 1983, responses and those above.

12. Yes. To the extent that such demonstration is required, P.A. and C.E.S.G. will so demonstrate at time of hearing.

13. As explained in response to interrogatory 24 of May 2, 1983, the NRC Staff analysis'refered to is the same assessment of Catawba impacts which is at issue in this contention.

CONTENTION 19

1. 10CFR 51.23 (c) requires that "the impact statement hsall take account of economic, socioeconomic, and possible cumulative impacts and such other fuel cycle imports as may reasonably appear significant." Any reasonable person would conclude that an accident in the handling and storage of spent fuel casks, or a loss of onsite/offsite power resulting

. ._ _ . - _ . . - _ _ . _ _ ..._. _._ _ ~ _ . . . . ... _ . _ . . _ . . _ _. ___

in breakdown of the cooling trains, would raise the likelihood of a significant impact on the environment. Because such acci-dents, which would likely entail pool water boil off and possibly criticality, are made more likely by the increased number of fuel assmblies to be stored at Catawba (see Palmetto Alliance contention 16) an environmental statement conform-ing to NEPA guidelines must consider the environmental costs of operating Catawba as a storage facility for spent fuel from other Duke facilities.

2. Such an analysis would evaluate: impact of the doubling of the fuel pool capacity and resultant increased heat load and radiation inventory from Oconee and McQuire spent fuels; loss of fuel pool cooling due to loss of on-site and/or offsite power; cask drop damage and possible criticality incidents from crushed fuel assemblies; accidents involving mishandling of casks including inadvertant unshielded removal of cask lids; the probability of cask drop accident; and external threats such as aircraft crashes.

3. It is P.A.' and C.E.S.G.'s position that we have already demonstrated that the DES /FES's treatment of the environmental effects of storing Oconee and McGuire spent fuel fails to satisfy 10CFR 51. Especially relevant is 10CFR 51.23(c). When Duke Power doubles the amount of spent fuel to be handled and stored at Catawba we believe that something more than the NRC Staff's cursory treatment of this issue is required by NEPA, as implemented in 10CFR 51.

4. Palmetto Alliance and.CESG's contentions go beyond'whe-n ther or not' routine releases of radiation'from Oconee and McGuire

$ fuels have been. considered.'In so'far as we understand this question we believe it has been answered elsewhere. Please clarify.

5. The DES /FES evaluation is~ deficient because it does not adequately address the environmental' risks associated with See

~

storing a much larger number of spent fuel assemblies. ,

.I earlier. responses for details.

6. See Palmetto Alliance April 19, 1983, Response to Interrogatory no. 6 on contention 16, Palmetto Alliance May 27, 1983 Further Supplementary-Response = to Applicant Interrogatory no. 13 on contention 16, and Palmetto Alliance May 27', 1983 Responses to-Applicants' Follow-Up Interrogatories on Contention 16.

7. P.A. and C.E.S.G. do not contend that there is any_

fundamental difference between Catawba spent fuel and sconee/

~

McGuire spent fuel such that one results in a greater heat load than the other. We are contending that if Catawba recieves spent fuel from Oconee and McGuire as well as it's own spent fuel, this will result in an expanded heat load and radiation inventory.

8. See the responses-cited in response to interrogatory 6, above.

9. See the responses cited in respxue to interrogatory 6, above.

10. See the responses cited in response to interrogatory 6, above.

11. See the responses noted in interrogatory 6, above.

As with interrogatories 7,8,9, and 10 above, the Applicants seem to attribute to P.A. and C.E.S.G. the view that the origin of the spent fuel has an effect on how dangerous to the environment it is, or how likely-it is to escape into Lhe environment. It is obvious from our previous statements and responses that P.A. and C.E.S.G. do not make such an absurd contention.

12. See responses to Applicants interrogatories 1, 2, 3 and 5, above. See also P.A. and C.E.S.G. May 2, 1983 responses to Applicants Interrogatories and Request to Produce regarding DES contentions 11, 17, and 19, particularly interroga'ories 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

13. P.A. and C.E.S.G.'s response to Applicants interrog-atory 1 (May 2, 1983 P.A. and C.E.S.G. responses) and the elaborations of these issues contained in Palmetto's responses to Applicant's and Staff's interrogatories regarding contention 16 summarize the difficiencies of the DES /FES analysis.

14. See responses noted in Applicants interrogatory 6, above.

15. See response to Applicant's interrogatory 11, above.

16. See responses to Applicants interrogatory 11, above.

17. The threats to the environment of storing Oconee, McGuire, and Catawba spent fuel are greater than the threats to the environment of storing only Catawba spent fuel at Catawba. For the deatils of this contention see the responses cited in the response to Applicants' interrogatory 6, above.

T

~18. See P.A. Further Supplementary Responses to-Applicants' Interrogatories _regarding contention 6 (May 27, 1983), response to interrogatory 13.

DES CONTENTION 17

1. Absence of explicitidata reflecting such consideration.

See DES p.5-35'and FESJp.9-12. . .. .

2. See May 2, ,1983 response to Interrogatory 2.

3. P.A._and C.E.S.G. believe that NEPA and implementing reg-ulations generally require that the NRC take full account of the impact of this licensing action. Such impact should include an evaluation of the worst case.

4. In the absense of explicit statements by the NRC Staff, P.A.;and C.E.S.G. are unable to identify any other factors, calcu-lations and/or data used in the DES /FES which may be " incorrect and/or render the DES /FES incorrect." ,

5. Please see response to Interrogatory 10 regarding Con-tention 11, above.

6. P.A.-and C.E.S.G. do not know.

7. Yes, in part.

8. Yes.

9. The NRC Staff has made available some information to ,

C.E.S.G. with respect to this matter; however, our examination of this information is incorplete.

11. Please see May 2, 1983 responses to Interrogatories 13 and 18 of this contention.

1:2. Please see response to Interrogatory 9, above.

13. P.A. and C.E.S.G. assert that general NEPA authority requires such consideration of worst case impacts as well

. as the NRC's own policy statement with respect to consideration of severe accidents.

14. Common sense and personal experience.

15. Common sense and personal experience of the resident of the Charlotte area.

16. The absense of an explicit statement to the contrary.

17. The probabilities of severe accidents, radiation exposure, and damage are understated by the Staff as in DES Figures 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7. The DES recognizes only one serious accident after 400 reactor years of operation, TMI-2, p. 5-46.

In this period there were two other serious accidents, the partial meltdown at Fermi, p. 5-30, and Browns Ferry I and II, not refer-enced. The releases at Browns Ferry were not monitored. A melt-down was averted by improvisation, not by following established cuidelines. The Fermi meltdown was limited by the time of scram-ming. A somewhat more delayed scram would have resulted in more extensive meltdown and increased the probability of a substantial release period. The actuality has been three accidents of a potentially very serious sort in 411 reactor years, a probability of 1 per 133 years of reactor operation. The DES understates serious accident probability in relying on the Reactor Safety Study, NUREG-75/104. The NRC Staff has failed to adequately assess the impacts of serious accidents at the facility, beyond design basis. And seriously underestimates the probability and consequences of plainly

credible site-specific serious accidents.

. The probabalistic analysis employed in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH 1400) has been so seriously criticized as to nake its use in licensing proceedings as a basis for decision-making entirely inappropriate. "The consecuence model used in WASH 1400 should be substantially improved, and its sensitivities explored before it is used in the regulatory process." (NUREG/CR 0400, " Risk As-sessment Review Group Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, H.W. Lewis, chairman").,

18. This scenario would be " devastating" to the citizens exposed downwind, particularly those in the Gastonia-Charlotte area, who live'to the north and northeast of the plant site.

2 1

1

'I l

t

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

)

In the Matter of )

) Docket Nos. 50-413 DUKE POWER COMPANY, et. al. ) 50-414

)

(Catawba Nuclear Station, ) June 6, 1983 Units 1 and 2) )

) (5 7 bey rsy AFFADAVIT OF PHILIP H. OS>

1 G; i.3 Philip H. Jos, do affirm as follow;s:, -. '

I, ,

I am duly authorized to participate n 'Answerin jint-errogatories on behalf of Palmetto Alliance [on DES Contentions 11, 17, and 19 and I affirm that the responses given are true and complete to the best of my knowledge.

- [g- \

~ _

Philip H. Jos i

AFFIRMED AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS 6TH DAY OF JUNE, 1983.

s ss f i k

~

y ~

Notary Public of South Carolina My Commission Expires:

i l

L Chairman Jesse L. Riley Atomic Safety and Licensing 854 Henley Place Board Panel Charlotte, N.C. 28207 U.S. Nuclear' Regulatory Comm.

Washington, D.C. 20555 George E. Johnson, Esq. Scott Stucky Office of the Executive Legal Docketing and Service Director Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington D.C. 20555 William L. Porter, Esq. Carole F. Kagan, Attorney Albert V. Carr, Jr., Esq. Atomic Safety and Licensing Ellen T. Ruff, Esq. Board Panel Duke Power Company U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

P O Box 33189 Wasnington, D.C. 20555 Charlotte, N.C. 28242 Richard P. Uilson, Esq. NIRS Assistant Attorney General 1346 Connecticut Ave. N.W.

State of South Carolina Washington, D.C. 20555 P O Box 11549 Columbia, 5.C. 29211 I

s

\ N% _J I Robert Guild Council for Palmetto Alliance I

l