ML20087P420
| ML20087P420 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 04/06/1984 |
| From: | Carr A DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP, PALMETTO ALLIANCE |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8404060416 | |
| Download: ML20087P420 (115) | |
Text
-
c: Distribution ED CORRNIDfftQE.
c: G. W. Hallman - WC 1241 c: C. J. Wylie - EC 0204
- uET,ED u.>i,.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAx REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 NOMB BEFORE THE ATU M SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
,,. m a.. w. X -
n :.-
In the Matter of
)
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al.
)
Docket Nos. 50-413
)
50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
Applicants' Response To " Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group's Interrogatories and Requests To Produce Documents on Diesel Generator Contentions to Applicants and NRC Staff" and "CESG's Interrogatories to Duke Power Regarding Emergency Diesel Contentions Admitted By Atomic Safety and Licensing Board."
In accordance with the Licensing Board's Order dated February 23,.1984, as amended in the telephone conference call of March 14, 1984 (Tr. 12,620-22, 3/14/84), Applicants hereby file their responses to the interrogatories, identified in the caption, filed on March 26 by Palmetto Alliance and the Carolina Environmental Study Group (CESG).
I.
These interrogatories deal both with Intervenors' contention on the Catawba crankshaft issue and the issue admitted by the Board on its own motion dealing with certain Catawba-specific problems (Memorandum and Order (Referring Certain Diesel Generator Issues to the Appeal Board),
February 23,
- 1984, pp.
4-6; Memorandum and Order (Admitting a
Board Contention Concerning Certain Diesel Generator Problems), February 27, 1984, pp 2-3).
In admitting these two' contentions, the Board limited their focus to matters peculiar to Catawba, explicitly re.jecting matters e
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i of generic import.
More specifically, though Intervenors had sought in their proposed contention to have the Board accept as issues for litigation the generic issues of deficiencies in quality assurance at TDI and the operating performance of TDI generators at other nuclear facilities (February 23 Memorandum at
- p. 4), the Board refused to accept these generic issues, admitting only the " crankshaft" portion of Intervenors ' proposed contention (February 23 Order, pp 5-7).
The Board stated that such issues 1
were rejected for several reasons, including the fact that liti-gation of the generic matters would inevitably lead to delay of the proceeding.
Chief among its reasons for refusing to litigate these generic matters on the Catawba docket is the fact that, as generic issues, they may affect some fifteen different facilities and identical, or substar';ially identical, contentions had been admitted in at least three other cases.
(Id.
at pp. 6-7).
Clearly, then, under the Board's February 23 Memorandum and Order there is no warrant for discovery on the generic issues of either TDI quality assurance or the operational history of TDI diesel i
engines in marine applications or at sites other than Catawba.
Nor does the Board's order of February 27 expand the scope of the issues markedly.
The Board issued that order, and admitted a limited contention on its own motion, based on a letter to it from Applicants' counsel which outlined several problems which had only recently been discovered.
(February 27 Order,
- p. 2)
The Board went on to say that:
The contention we now admit is site-specific in the sense that it focuses on problems that have actually been experienced at the Catawba facility, indeen it is because of its site-specific aspect that we felt obliged 4
2-m
. _.,, ~..
to raise this issue on our own motion, even at this late date.
We recognize, however, that this Board contention also has generic aspects because its thrust is more toward operational rel. ability than design consid-erations.
As the Applicants' letter points out, "these matters are similar in nature to matters found with other TDI diesels."
We
- expect, therefore, that litigation of this contention may involve us in proof of diesel operating histories from other nuclear plants with diesels 'of the same design. As we indicated in our referral order, we think it would be preferable to litigate the generic aspects of present concerns about TDI diesels in a lead or special proceeding, rather than in many individual operating license cases.
M. at
- p. 3] (emphasis added)
Thus it is clear that, at most, the Board's own contention, and the discovery permitted thereunder, may involve some aspects (identified in Applicants' letter of February 17) of diesel operating history at other nuclear plants with diesel engines of the same designs and to that extent may legitimately be said to involve aspects of the generic contention.
It does not, however, involve any aspect of the generic issue of TDI QA, and thus discovery is not permitted on that issue, nor does it give license for unrestricted inquiry into matters beyond site-specific issues at Catawba.
One final point should' be mentioned.
The term " diesel generator" encompasses two separate components, 1) a diesel engine which powers 2) a generator which produces electricity.
Both Intervenors' and the Board's contentions concern thenselves with the diesel engine as opposed to the generator.
No issue has been raised, let alone admitted, respecting any alleged problem with the generator portion of the diesel generator.
Therefore discovery is not permissible on any such matter.
9 The two contentions now at issue in this proceeding are:
1.
PA/CESG Contention The Applicants have not demonstrated a reasonable assurance that the TDI emergency diesel generators at the Catawba Nuclear Station can perform their safety function in service because of:
(1)
Inadequate design of the crankshafts.
2.
The Board Contention Whether there is reasonable assurance that the TDI emergency diesel generators at the Catawba Station can perform their functions and provide reliable service because of the problems reported in the Applicants' letter to the Board of February 17, 1984.
II.
Requests to Produce Applicants will make available for inspection and copying by Palmetto Alliance and CESG those documents, not subject to privileges or objections asserted by Applicants in the responses to individual interrogatories, identified in the responses co individual interrogatories.
Such documents will be available to Palmetto Alliance and CESG on and, for a reasonable period of time after, April 2, 1984 at Duke Power Comyany's offices at 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, NC.
III.
Responses to Palmetto Alliance Interrogatories A.
General Interrogatories 1.
Please state the full name, address, occupation and employer of each person answering the interrogatories and designate the interrogatory or the part thereof he or she answered.
The initials of the person or persons providing the primary information used in the answers to interrogatories will be indicated in parentheses following each answer.
1 l l
The business address, occupation and employer of each such person will be provided in the attachment to these responses that contains each such person's affidavit.
2.
Please identify each and every person whom you are considering to call as a witness at t.he hearing in this matter on this contention, and with respect to each such person, please-a.
State the substance of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify; b.
Give a summary of the grounds for each opinion; and c.
Describe the witness' educational and professional background.
(a)
Applicants presently plan to call as witnesses on the PA/CESG Contention Eugene W. Thomas and/or Peter J.
Carrato, both of whom are employed by the Bechtel Power Corporhtion.
Their testimony will support the document entitled
" Evaluation of Crankshaft Streuses, For Duke Power Corporation, Catawba Nuclear
- Station, by Bechtel Power Corporation, March 19, 1984" (hereinafter "Bechtel Analysis").
The substance of the facts and opinions to which they will testify, and the grounds for each opinion, is set forth in that document.
The Bechtel Evaluation is available for inspection-and copying in accordance with Part II, supra.
Should applicants decide not to call one of these gentlemen as witnesses, or to add an additional witness, Intervenors will be notified.
t (b)
Applicants have not yet identified the witnesses to l
address the Board contention.
When such witnesses are identified, Intervenors will be notified.
5-
3.
Is your
- position, claim or defense regarding the contention based on one or more calculations?
If so:
i a.
Describe each calculation and identify any document setting forth such calculation.
I b.
Who performed each calculation?
c.
When was each calculation performed?
d.
Describe each parameter used in such calculation and each value assigned to the parameter, and describe the source of your data.
e.
What are the results of each calculation?
f.
Explain in detail how each calculation provides a basis for the contention.
Applicants'
- position, claim or defense on Intervenors' contention is contained in the Bechtel Evaluation.
That document contains the information with respect to the calculations and parameters relied upon by Applicants.
The evaluation is based upon Bechtel calculations 1984-1 through 1984-6 which contain the pertinent parameters.
These calculations have ' been provided to Applicants.
The calculations in the " Evaluation of Crankshaft Stresses" dated March 19, 1984 were performed by Bechtel; the calculations in its
- Appendix,
" Torsional and Lateral Speed,-
Engine Numbers 75017/20, Delaval-Enterprise Engine Model DSRV-16-4, 7000 KW/9770 BHP at 450 RPM, for Duke Power Company, Catawba Nuclear Station" da*:ed October 22, 1975, were performed by the Engins and Compressor Division of Transamerica Delavel, Inc.
These documents are available for inspection and copying in accordance with Part II, supra.
(EWT, PJC) 4.
Is your
- position, claim or defense regarding the contention based on one or more experiments or tests?
If so:
l l
l i
a.
Describe each experiment or test and identify any document setting forth such experiment or test.
b.
Who performed each experimen: or te i.?
c.
When was such experiment or test performed?
d.
Describe each parameter or variable measured in such experiment or test.
I e.
What are the results ot each experiment or test?
f.
Explain in detail how each experiment or test provides a basis for your position, claim or defense regarding the contention.
Applicants'
- position, claim or defense on Intervenors' contention is not based upon an experiment or test.
Applicants' position, claim or defense with respect to why I
the ability of the Catawba diesel generators to provide reliable l
backup power is not compromised by the problems set out in the Board contention will be based upon Applicants' test and inspection program.
Applicants' testing program is described in the attachment to the February 22, 1984 response to NRC Staff questions, as well as in handouts (previously provided to Palmetto Alliance and CESG) accompanying a presentation made to the NRC Staff in Bethesda on.
March 21.
Applicants have committed to provide to the NRC Staff a more detailed description of the test and inspection program by April 4.
A copy of that document will be served upon Palmetto Alliance and CESG.
As lthe procedure is developed further submittals will be made to the NRC Staff; those submittals will also be served on PA/CESG.
The program of the ' owner's Group. is
~
described in several Board Notifications -sent. out by the NRC.
Staff.
Copies of all those documents have~been served on Palmetto l l v
i l
i
.,-,4-m_
Alliance and CESG.
The information sought in parts c d and e of l
this Interrogatory is and will be contained in the described documents.
The results of Applicants' test program will demonstrate that i
the Catawba diesel generators are capable of providing a reliable source of backup power.
(GWH) 5.
Is your
- position, claim or defense regarding the contention based upon conversations, consultations, correspondence or any other type of communication with one or more individuals?
If so, a.
Identify by name and address each such individual.
b.
State the educational and professional background of each such individual, including occupation and institutional affiliations.
c.
Describe the nature of each communication with such individual, when it occurred, and identify all other individuals involved.
d.
Describe the information received from such individuals and explain how it provides a basis for the issues.
e.
Identify each letter, memorandum, tape, note or other record related to each conversation, consultation, correspondence, or other communication with such individual.
Applicants object to this Interrogatory.
In Applicants' view it is directed either to the position which Applicants have taken with respect to the PA/CESG and Board contentions before the j
Licensing Board in this proceeding, or the manner in which Applicants have interpreted the PA/CESG Interrogatories and furnished these responses _
thereto.
In either
- event, any conversations, correspondence or any other type of communications are privileged, and thus not subject to discovery.
I l
- 8 '-
i
With respect to the positions Applicants have taken on the contentibns before the Board, such are guided by legal strategy developed in anticipation of litigation after extensive consultation among counsel for Applicants, and between and among Applicants' counsel and members of Applicants' staff, to ascertain the factual matters necessary to formulate that strategy.
The positions Applicants have taken with respect to answering the PA/CESG Interrogatories were formulated on the basis of discussions among counsel for the Applicants.
Such positions were then communicated, during telephone conference calls and conferences, to members of Applicants' staff to guide and aid those persons in preparing initial drafts of responses to the Interrogatories.
In
- short, these positions, and thus the communications between and among Applicants' counsel and staff underlying those positions, are a direct result of Applicants'
- counsel, while preparing the case for litigation, "[A]ssembl[ing] information, sif t [ing] what
[they]
consider
[
]
to be relevant from the irrelevant
- facts, prepar[ing]
[their]
legal theories and plan [ning]
[their] strategy.
Such preparation includes
" interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible [ actions]." Hickman vs. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 511-512 (1945).
Applicants' counsel are entitled to conduct this process "without undue and needless interference" and any communications and/or conversations conducted during that process are subject to l
protection under the attorney work-product privilege. M. at 511;
.m see Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1
and 2)
ALAB-691, ___ NRC (September 9, 1982) slip o_p.
at 33-35.
Thus, Applicants object to this Interrogatory in that it' calls for information which is privileged under the attorney work-product doctrine.
Applicants would note, however, that to the extent members of Applicants' staff have communicated with one another, and with other organizations or persons, regarding the subject matter of these contentions, and those communications are reflected in l
documents, such documents have been made available in accordance with Part II, above, and have been addressed in some Interrogatory responses.
See pp 50-58, infra.
Those documents are indexed and a copy of the index has been provided to Intervenors.
They range from notes of conversations to final reports of consultants.
Therefore Applicants believe that whatever obligation exists under this Interrogatory has been discharged, and object to providing further information in response to it.
For Applicants to provide any further information in what could be a myriad of conversations with various individuals would be to impose a substantial and unnecessary burden upon them, which is unwarranted in light of the voluminous information made available to Intervenors.
I Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, Applicants object to providing further information in response to this Interrogatory.
To respond further would cause Applicants i
annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
Further, such information is not relevant to the subject matter of the I' -
i contention, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
6.
'Is your
- position, claim or defense regarding the contention, based upon one or more NRC Staff documents?
If so, please identify such -documents and make them available for inspe' tion and copying.
c Applicants believe that this interrogatory is addressed to 1
the NRC Staff; Applicants would note that NRC Regulatory Guides 1.108, 1.137, 1.41, 1.68 and 1.9 are generally applicable to diesel generators.
These Regulatory Guides will be available for 1
inspection and copying in accordance with Part II.
(RPM)
B.
Specific Interrogatories 1.
Identify what you believe to be the relevant design standards which apply to diesel generator crankshaft i
design.
Identify any and all documents upon which you base your response.
We believe " Standard Practices for Low and Medium Speed Stationary Diesel and Gas Engines" published by the Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association, is an acceptable and relevant standard which applies to stationary diesel generator crankshafts.
Although indicated in the foreword of this standard "It is not the I
purpose of this book to attempt to set forth basic design criteria for engines.
.", it provides design objectives and criteria for crankshafts made of conventional materials subject to torsional vibratory conditions.
These design obj ectives and criteria are generally accepted by the industry and are used to evaluate crankshaft torsional vibratory stresses.
(EWT, PJC) 2.
What data, experiments, calculations or operational history do, you rely. upon to support your position, claim,'or defense that the Catawba crankshaft design is adequate?
State with' particularity those
- data, experiments, calculations or operational history which -.
3ou believe to be directly applicable to the Catawba Nuclear Station diesel generator crankshafts.
The adequacy of the Catawba crankshaft design is demonstrated by the Bechtel Evaluation, and its Appendix, both of which are specific to the Catawba crankshafts.
Those analyses demonstrate that the stresses are shown to be less than the recommended allowable stresses published by DEMA.
(EWT, PJC) 3.
State the differences between the data, experiments or operational history identified in the previous answer to that which characterizes the Catawba diesel generator crankshafts.
State further the assumptions used to apply this data to the Catawba diesel generator crankshaft.
The analyses in the response to Interrogatory 2 are specifically for the Catawba diesel generator crankshaft.
(EWT, PJC) 4.
What are the Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association (DEMA) standards? Are the DEMA standards applicable to diesel generator design for use in nuclear power plant application?
a.
If so, are they adequate for such use?
Identify and specify the basis for your response.
b.
If not, explain in detail the basis for your conclusions;
-4 identify the standards you believe should be applicable and the basis for their application.
" Standard Practices for Low and Medium Speed Stationary Diesel and Gas Engines",
published by the Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association indicates in its Foreword that it is
. to serve as a
reference for consulting engineers, government
- agencies, users, suppliers, power plant super-intendents, and engine operators.
It provides generally accepted standards for nomenclature, installation, application, operation,
and maintenance of engines and accessory equipment in various types of stationary engine installations."
This book of standards, was originally published chiefly for the application of diesel engines to generator sets.
It has been refined over the years to reflect improvements in engines and their application to stationary service.
As such this standard is applicable to diesel generators in any stationary application, including nuclear.
The Foreword states that "it is not the purpose of this book to attempt to set forth basic design criteria for engines
."; however, it does provide design objectives and criteria for crankshafts made of conventional materials subject to torsional vibratory conditions.
These design objectives and criteria are recognized as authoritative by the industry and are used to evaluate crankshaft torsional vibratory stress.
The adequacy of this standard is demonstrated by its continued publication and revisions for more than forty years.
(EWT, PJC) 5.
How do the counter weights on the Catawba V-16 crankshaft compare to those on the Shoreham crankshaft?
Catawba has counterweigh" on crank throws 3,
4, 5 and 6.
Each counterweight weighs 828.21 pounds, as shown in " Torsional and Lateral Critical Speed",
the Appendix to the Bechtel Evaluation.
Delaval drawing 02-310-09, Crankshaft and Bearing Assembly - 13" Pins shows the tolerance on the countern ights to be 110 pounds for any given engine set.
We have no direct information concerning the use of counterweights on the Shoreham engine.
(EWT, PJC) 6.
What is the fillet radius on the Catwaba crankshaft?
1 Both the crankpin and main. journal fillet radii on the Catawba crankshaft are
.75 inches.
These fillets are of the reentry type as described in the minutes of the November 30, 1983 Nuclear Plant Emergency Standby Diesel Transamerica Delaval Generator Users' Group Meeting.
(EWT,PJC) 7.
Has the Shoreham crankshaft been shot-pegned in the fillet area?
The only information we have regarding the fillets of the Shoreham crankshaft is based on the " Emergency Diesel Generator Crankshaft Failure Investigation Shoreham Nuclear Power Station",
prepared by Failure Analysis Associates, October 31, 1983.
That report indicates that the fillets of the Shoreham crankshaft were neither shot-peened nor rolled.
(EWT, PJC) 8.
Please provide the specific documentary basis for your answer to the three proceeding questions.
Documentation is as noted in the responses to questions 5, 6,
and 7.
(EWT, PJC) 9.
Have all DSRV-16 crankshafts in nuclear applications been inspected by one common qualified individual?
By an inspection from Failure Analysis Associates?
If so, please identify aay documents reflecting these inspections.
Nc.
There are no plans to use one common qualified individual to inspect all DSRV-16 crankshafts.
It has not yet been decided if Failure Analysis Associates will inspect all DSRV-16 crankshafts.
(RPM) 10.
Are the DSRV-16 crankshafts nominally identical?
If not, detail the differences in these crankshafts.
The DSRV-16 crankshafts used in all TDI nuclear installations are nominally identical.
We have no detailed information on all DRSV-16 crankshafts.
Data supplied by TDI, in the minutes of the -
November 30, 1983 Transamerica Delaval Nuclear Plant Emergency Standby Diesel Generator User's Group Meeting, indicate that all DSRV-16-4. crankshafts are dimensionally similar.
(EWT, PJC, RPM) 11.
What assurance is there that the conditions of the Catawba DSRV-16 crankshafts are known as to:
a.
metallurgy; b.
fillet radius; c.
shot-peening of fillet radius; d.
web design -- flat-sided or circular-shaped; e.
use of counter weights?
A metallurgical test on a sample block of the material used in Duke Power's crankshafts was performed by TDI.
This test proved that the chemical composition of the shaft was indeed as required by the specifications.
In addition, an ultrasonic test was performed by TDI, and a magnetic particle test was performed by TDI.
Inspections by TDI assured that the Duke Power crankshafts were produced within the specifications of the crankshaft drawing.
The inspections assured that the fillet radii are within specification, that these radii were shot-peened and that the crank webs ate manufactured as par the drawing.
Torsional critical speed and mass elastic system analyses were performed for the Duke engine generator system.
The number, location and weight of the counterweights were determined from these analyses.
This system is tersionally identical to Grand Gulf, which had a physical torsiograph test to verify system design.
(RPM) 12.
If the foregoing had been determined and are known, how do they relate to best practice and DEMA standards for each such condition?
I i
l i
" Standard Practices for Low and Medium Speed Stationary Diesel and Gas Engines" published by the Diesel Engine
- g. -
Manufacturers Association does not provide specific requirements or recommendations for metallurgy, fillet radius, shot-peening, web design or use of counterweights in crankshaft design.
(EWT, PJC) 13.
On the basis of the nine NRC inspections at Trans-America Delaval, Inc. (TDI) by the NRC, see, 1/26/84, Meeting on TDI diesel generators, (Tr. 15), what means have been identified or will be employed to effectively correct TDI's performance, i.e.,
to " shape them up" and "make them fly straight?"
How long will it take?
Please explain in detail basis for your answers.
Applicants obj ect to responding to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it is outside the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board as issues in this proceeding.
As nearly as we can tell, Intervenors seek information relating to the TDI quality assurance program, as reflected in NRC Staff inspections. /
As explained above (pp.
1-4, supra), that issue has been ruled out of this proceeding by the Board, and thus no discovery may be had on it,-as the Commission's rules permit discovery only of information or documents " relevant to the subject matter involved in the proceeding" and further limit the term " subject matter" to the contentions admitted
.by the presiding officer.
10 CFR (Stanislaus Nuclear
- Project, Unit 1),
LBP-78-20, 7 NRC 1038, 1040-1041 (1978);
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, et al.
(Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-613, 12 NRC 317, 330 (1980)..
i l
l Intervenors have. been provided with copies of the nine NRC L
Inspection Reports, contained in Board Notification 84-021,
" Staff Inspection Reports of Transamerica Delaval, Inc., for Inspections Conducted from 3/79 to 7/83."
l !
For the reasons described
- above, Applicants object to providing the information sought by this Interrogatory.
To provide this information would subject Applicants to annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
Further, such information is not relevant to the subject matter of this contention, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated' to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. /
14.
How long will it take for TDI to properly manufacture diesel generators or components?
How will this point be identified?
The fabrication of the diesel generators at Catawba began in November of 1976 and the last eng1ne was shipped in December of 1979.
In Applicants' view these diesels were
" properly manufactured."
That view will be confirmed by Applicants' test and inspection program.
(GWA)
Applicants object to providing further information in response to this Interrogatory.
Though it is unclear on its face, it appears to seek information related solely to TDI's QA Program, and Applicants object on the grounds that it seeks information outside the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board.
Therefore for the reasons given in the response to Interrogatory 13, Applicants object to responding to this Interrogatory.
For Applicants to respond would be to cause them annoyance, oppression, undue burden, and expense.
Further, the information sought is not relevant to the subject matter of these contentions, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
- /
In any event it appears that this Interrogatory is more properly directed to the. NRC Staff.
L 17 -
l
15.
Describe in
- detail, and produce for inspection and copying, all documentation required by Applicants from TDI regarding the Catawba diesel generators, including out not limited to those summarized in attachment 12-1 to Applicants February 22, 1984 response to the NRC Staff.
Applicants object to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it 3
seeks information outside the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board.
Though the Interrogatory is unclear on its face it appears to seek information related to TDI's QA program.
For
- exataple, though Applicants do not understand what Palmetto i
Alliance and CESG mean by "all documentation required by Applicants from TDI", the documents summarized in Attachment 12-1 and referred to in the Interrogatory, relate to TDI and Applicants' QA programs. /
Therefore for the reasons given in the response
.to i
Interrogatory 13, Applicants object to responding to this Interrogatory.
For Applicants to respond would be to cause'them annoyance, oppression, undue burden, and expense.
Further, the information sought is not relevant to the subject matter of these contentions, nor would its disclosure be reasonably expected to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
16.
Identify in detail, and make available for inspection and copying any and all records of Applicants' surveillance performed at TDI with respect to the Catawba diesel generators.
- /
With respect to the Applicants' QA program, discovery is clearly not-permitted.
Not only is it niit a part "of the contentions admitted by the Board, but the subject was. not-even raised :in. Intervenors '
proposed. contention.
Such - an assertion does appear to be a part of an amended or new
. diesel generator contention served by Intervenors on March 23; however, that contention has not yet been ruled'on by the Board, and clearly discovery related to 'it is not l-permissible at this time.
18 -
~
Applicants object to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it seeks information outside the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board,. that is, information relating solely to TDI's and/or Applicants' QA programs.
Therefore, for the reasons given in the respongat
~o interrogatories 13 and 15 Applicants object to respondir w - d.>
y Interrogatory.
For Applicants to respond would be to caut_ enem annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
Further, the information sought is not relevant to the subject matter of these contentions, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to i
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
17.
Identify in detail all records reflecting shop testing, qualification testing, or generic testing with respect to the Catawba diesel generators, including but not limited to the testing identified in attachment 6-2 to the above-referenced submittal.
Make available such records for inspection and copying.
To the extent that this Interrogatory is directed toward admitted contentions, Applicants' answer to Interrogatory 49 is responsive.
Applicants object to providing further response to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it seeks information outside of the scope of the contention admitted by the Board.
The Interrogatory is unclear, but it appears to seek information relating solely to TDI's and/or Applicants' QA programs.
Therefore, for the reasons given in the responses to Interrogatories 13 and 15, Applicants object to responding to this Interrogatory.
For Applicants to respond would be to.cause.them l
annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
- Further, the inf armation -sought is not relevant to the subject matter of the l
l-.
contentions, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery lof admissible evidence.
18.
. Identify in detail, and make available for inspection and copying any records of inspections of the Catawba diesel generators at TDI as well as after receipt at Catawba.
Applicants object to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it seeks information outside the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board.
The Interrogatory is unclear, but it appears to seek information relating solely to TDI's and/or Applicants' QA programs.
Therefore, for the reasons given in the responses to Interrogatories 13 and 15, Applicants object to responding to this Interrogatory.
For Applicants to respond would be to cause them annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
Further, the information sought is not relevant to the subject matter of the contentions, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
19.
Identify any components of the Catawba diesel generators not manufactured by TDI and describe in detail the surveillance and inspection records applicable to each component.
Please make available such records for-inspection and copying.
All components of the Catawba diesel engines which are the subject of the contentions admitted by the Board were supplied by TDI.
All such components were manufactured by TDI with the j
exception of the turbochargers (manufactured by Elliott Corporation) and the fuel injection pump (manufactured by Bendix Corporation).
(GWH) l Applicants object to supplying further information in l
response to this Interrogatory.
As explained above, pp.
1-4, supra.,
the subject of the PA/CESG contention and the Board's contention is the diesel engine, not the generator.
Therefore discovery on the generators is not permitted.
Consequently, Applicants object to providing further information in response to this Interrogatory.
To respond further l
would cause Applicants annoyance, oppression, undue burden and i
expense.
Further, such information is not relevant to the subject matter of the contention, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
20.
With respect to the Catawba diesel generators were any inspection, audit, surveillance or testing hold points or check points missed?
Please specify.
Applicants do not understand the Interrogatory.
Applicants do not understand the reference to " testing hold points or check points missed" and therefore cannot determine what response, if
- any, is appropriate.
- However, it appears that the requests regarding " inspection, audit, surveillance," hold points or check points may seek information related solely to TDI's and/or Applicants' QA programs.
Therefore, for the reasons given in the responses to Interrogatories 13 and 15, Applicants object to responding to this Interrogatory.
21.
Why did you operate the engines lacking a full QA record?
What failures or deficiencies have Applicants or the NRC Staff identified in the Catawba engines in
-procurement, vendor surveillance,.
or receiving inspection programs?
For other DSRV-16 engines?
Applicants object to this Interrogatory on the ground that it seeks information outside the scope.of the contentions admitted by 1.
the Board.
The Interrogatory seeks information relating to TDI's and/or Applicants' QA programs.
Therefore, for the' reasons given in the responses to Interrogatories 13 and 15, Applicants object to responding to this Interrogatory.
For Applicants to respond would be to cause them annoyance, oppression, undue burden and ' expense.
- Further, the information sought is not relevant to the subject matter of the contentions, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
22.
A file was found in the generator associated with one TDI diesel engine during early operation.
Could it have been discovered before that point? If so, in what inspection?
By whom?
Why wasn't it?
23.
A second file was found in another generator.
Was this found during a QA inspection?
If not, how was it found?
Why?
24.
How did files 1 and 2 come to be in the generators?
What has been done to determine the cause of this occurrence?
Was this a common cause?
What corrective steps, if any, have been taken?
Please specify.
In how many other generators have files been found?
25.
Have any other extraneous items been found in the TDI diesel generators or associated equipment?
Please specify circumstance. articles, and consequences.
Applicants object to supplying the information sought in Interrogatories 22-25 on the grounds that it is outside the scope of the contentions admitted as issues in this proceeding by this Board.
Interrogatories 22-24 focus on two files found in the generator portions of the diesel generators during testing.
Interrogatory 25 seeks information' regarding whether "any other extraneous items" have been found in the "TDI diesel generators or associated equipment." _
k Applicants base their objections on two grounds.- First as noted above (pp. 1-4, supra.), the generator portion of the diesel generator is not a part of the diesel engine which is the sole subject of the contention admitted by the Board.
The Intervenors' contention and the Board's contention relate solely to the diesel engine, not to the generator portion, of the diesel generators.
- Thus, the sought discovery is not permissible.
- Second, the questions appear to seek information as to Applicants' QA program.
For the. reasons set forth in the responses to Interrogatories 13 I
and 15, the sought' discovery is impermissible.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, Applicants object i
to these Interrogatories.
To respond to them would cause 1
Applicants annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
2 Further, such information is not relevant to the subject matter of the contentions, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
26.
The following statement was made in the Owners Group 1/26/84, presentation to the NRC:
. we had decided that as part of the design review quality revalidation
- effort, the quality.
engineers and indeed the specialists are evaluating the need to perform either inspections or evaluations of components on the basis of their function and their real requirements as opposed to just doing quality assurance program review.
(Tr. 27).
Describe in detail, such inspections and evaluations and identify the components and their
" function" and "real requirements" as applied to the Catawba diesel generators.
The information sought is contained in Attachment 1.
(RPM) 27.
Identify.
all-manufacturers of emergency diesel generators for use.in nuclear power plants.
Identify plant and type,-and principal specifications _. including i
l..
model number, cylinders, configuration, and number at each plant.
Applicants object to this Interroga.ory.
The interrogatory is unclear, but to address its first sentence, Applicants are not aware, with any degree of certainty, of the identity of "all manufacturers of emergency diesels for use in nuclear power plants."
Tc collect this information would require some sort of survey of all manufacturers of diesel generators.
So far as the 4
second sentence is concerned, it appears that Intervenors want an identification, as well as other specific information, of the diesel generators at each nuclear plant, whether operating or under construction, in the country. / Applicants do not have this information and cannot obtain it short of conducting an industry-wide survey.
Applicants do not intend to conduct such surveys, nor are they obligated to do so.
Such would constitute a substantial and unwarranted burden upcn Applicants.
This is particularly true in light of the fact that the requested information does not relate to the-issues admitted for litigation by this Board.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, Applicants object to this Interrogatory.
To respond would cause Applicants annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
Further, such information is not relevant to the subject matter of the contention, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
- /
We assume, though the Interrogatory does not so state, that l
the request is limited to this country, i i
- =,
28.
With respect to these diesels identify all failures, deficiencies, incidents, licensee event reports (LERs) or other significant operational occurrences.
For
- example, the bearing and shaft failure at Arkansas i
No.
1.
l.
l Applicants object to this Interrogatory So far as the Catawba diesel generators are concerned, the relevant information is identified in the documents'provided in the request to produce 4
and in the answers to Interrogatories 49 and 49A.
Such information with respect to diesels at other plants is beyond the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board and Applicants object to providing such on those grounds.
However, Applicants would point out that the requested information with respect to TDI diesels is contained in the various Board Notifications, which l
have all been served on Intervenors.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, Applicants object to providing further information in response to this Interrogatory.
Such would cause Applicants annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
- Further, such information is not relevant to the subject matter of the contentions, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
29.
Id'entify the nuclear plant where high winds caused damage to the transformer or switch yard.
Was off-site power lost?
Was the facility operating?
Were emerger;cy diesel generators used for a safe shutdown?
Applicants object to this Interrogatory.
They have no specific knowledge of such an event and would be required to conduct a survey of the industry to learn of it.
Applicants have l
no intention of conducting such a survey nor are they obligated to 4.._.
l l
t I
do so.
In any event, the information sought is outside the scope t
of the contentions admitted by the Board.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, Applicants object to this Interrogatory.
To respond would cause Applicants annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
Further, such
- l information is not relevant to the subject matter of the contention, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
30.
What instances have emergency diesel generators been required to function in nuclear power plant l
applications?
Please identity in detail including facility name, dcte and description of circumstances.
Applicants object to this Interrogatory.
Applicants do not have this information available and to compile it would require Applicants to survey the entire industry.
Applicants have no intention of conducting such a survey, nor are they obligated to do so.
In any event, the information sought is outside the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, Applicants object to this Interrogetory.
To espond would cause Applicants annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
Further, such information is not relevant to the subject matter of the contention, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to j
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
30A.
Why is the measured crankshaft torque ten percent higher than predicted according to Failure Analysis Associates, 1/26/84 (Tr. 38)?
What effect does this
-prediction have on-knowledge of the perforinance of the i
Catawba crankshaft?
Since we were not involved in either the analysis or testing of the Shoreham crankshaf t,. or have available details of this
)
{ l a
-.. ~.
~
I
analysis or testing, other than the subject transcript and the Failure Analysis Associates Report " Analysis of the Replacement Crankshafts for Emergency Diesel Generators Shoreham Nuclear Power Station", October 31, 1983, we cannot provide specific reasons why the measured crankshaft torque is ten percent higher than predicted.
The prediction of crankshaft torque on the Shoreham machine has no effect on the knowledge of the performance of the Catawba crankshaft.
(EWT, PJC) 31.
What replacement options for diesel generators or components are available or are under consideration by the NRC, the Owners Group or any members thereof, or by Applicants?
Please describe each including time and availability considerations.
l Applicants do not presently have under consideration replacement of the diesel generators.
Applicants object to providing any further information in response to this Interrogatory.
PA/CESG call on Applicants to provide information to them respecting replacement options under consideration by other organizations, e.g.
the NRC, the Owner's Group, or any members thereof.
To obtain such information would require Applicants to conduct a survey of the NRC, the Owner's
- Group, and members of the Owner's Group.
Applicants have no intention of conducting such a survey and are under no obligation to do so.
In any event, the information sought is beyond the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, Applicants object to this Interrogatory.
To respond would cause Applicants annoyance, oppression, undue burden and e:: pense.
Further, such
l information is not relevant to the subject matter of the contention, nor would its disclosure be reasonably, calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
(GWH) 32.
Is Long Island Lighting Company at Shoreham planning to replace or supplement the TDI generators with others l
. supplied by a manufacturer such as Colt Industries?
What is the NRC Staff position on this action?
Applicants object to this Interrogatory.
It seeks information beyond the scope of the contentions admitted by the i
Board.
Moreover, Applicants have no way of knowing what the NRC Staff position might be on o licensing matter involving another utility.
Therefore, for the reasans set forth above, Applicants object to this Interrogatory.
To respond would cause Applicants annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
Further, such 4
information is not relevant to the subject matter of the contention, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
33.
Provide a listing of each 10 C.F.R. Part 21 report with respect to emergency diesel generators.
The 10 CFR Part 21 Report information of which Applicants are aware for TDI diesel generators, is provided as a
part of Applicants'
Response
4-1 to the NRC
- Staff, dated February 22, 1984.
Applicants object to providing any further information in response to this Interrogatory.-
Information with respect to 10 l
CFR Part 21 Reports for diesel generators other than those manufactured by TDI -
is clearly outside-the s cope - of the l
contentions admitted by the-Board.
In addition, such information '
l l
is not readily available to Applicants and to collect it would impose an undue burden.
Th,erefore, for reasons set forth above, Applicants object to providing further information in response to this Interrogatory.
To respond further would cause Applicants annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
- Further, such information is not relevant to the subject matter of the contention, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evide:.ae.
33A.
With respect to the design review task descriptions, 1/26/84 meeting, (tr. 55), how many tasks were:
a.
eliminated; b.
reduced; c.
left unchanged; d.
augmented Identify the reviewers who participated in each change.
Task Descriptions prepared for use in Design Review and/or Quality Revalidation activities for the Owners' Group member utilities are subject to review and revision in accordance with the Owners' Group Program Procedures prior to their release for implementation.
The extent of revision will vary, depending on the specifics of the component and task in question.
Statistics for revision, elimination, reduction, expansion, etc.,
of Task i
Descriptions in the review and approval process are not maintained by the Owners Group.
(RPM) 34.
Which task will apply to all components?
Or which tasks will a population be sampled for qualification by a sampled surrogate?
Identify the number of surrogates and the number of components in the total population in each case.
What assurance is there that the populations are sufficiently homogeneous for randomly chosen surrogates to be representative?
- See, for l
example, 1/26/84 at (Tr. 77).
l i
The extent and type of sampling required to validate.
significant quality attributes for specific engine components is a function of the criticality of the component's design function in supporting the engine's operation, the margin of safety inherent in the component's design, the availability of installed and/or spare components for examination and
- testing, the known operational history of the components in TDI engine applications, and the judgment of the Owners' Group Technical Staff.
Due to the variances of one or more of the above considerations from component to component, the campling selected may vary considerably, from very minimal sampling to 100%
sampling.
Additionally, required sampling for "following" engine components will be modified as appropriate, based upon results of inspections conducted on " lead engine" components.
(RPM) 35.
List results/ recommendations put forth by Owners Group task force.
How many would be changed on review? What were the changes?
By which reviewer were they suggested?
How many reviews left the results/
recommendations unchanged?
How many recommendations were made less stringent?
More stringent?
Who made what changes? Identify and describe in detail each.
The TDI Owners' Group has provided Duke Power Company with recommendations for inspections of diesel engine parts on the DRSV-16 engine.
To the extent that these recommendations are applicable to the specific engines at Catawba Nuclear Station, they have been incorporated into our inspection program.
A list of these parts, and a brief description of the inspection to be performed on each part, is contained in Attachment 2.
(RPM) 35A.
Describe in detail the Catawba maintenance and testing program for emergency diesel generators.
, l
\\
The periodic maintenance and testing program for the Catawba diesel generators is under development.
The maintenance program will be,
based on TDI recommendations, Owner's Group recommendations, and. Duke Power engineering review of the Application.
The testing program will comply with Regulatory Guide 1.108, Catawba Technical Specifications and Duke Power engineering review.
(RPM)
Applicants object to providing further information in answer to this Interrogatory.
The Catawba maintenance and testing program for its diesel generators is not an issue encompassed in the contentions admitted by the Board in this proceeding.
Applicants have responded only because of potential overlap with their reliability and testing program.
To provide further information would be to subject Applicants to unnecessary burden and expense.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, Applicants object to this Interrogatory.
To respond would cause Applicants annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
Further, such information is not relevant to the subject matter of the contention, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
36.
For a universe of 100 engines will a single acceptable l
inspection or test qualify the other 997 Explain fully l
the basis for your answer.
There is no one single acceptable test or inspection that can
(
qualify a diesel geneiator for use in a nuclear power plant.
(RPM)
To the extent that this Interrogatory seeks informatibn concerning TDI's and/or Applicants' QA programs, Applicants object on the gro.unds that it seeks information beyond the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board.
For the reasons given in the responses to Interrogatories 13 and 15, Applicants object to responding to this Interrogatory.
For Applicants to respond would be to cause them annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
Further, the information sought is not relevant to the subject matter of these contentions, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
37.
If the initial sample proves unsatisfactory and the second sample is satis f actory what would the further sampling be? How will it be determined as to size and relation to accepted versus rejected samples?
The results of further inspections combined with engineering l
review of the inspection would determine the size of the sample.
(RPM) 38.
Three AE pistons are to be inspected at Shoreham after run.
With respect to later model engines what test /
inspection results " auld call for a reduced level of l
inspection?
See, 1/26/84 Meeting (Tr. 84).
i A reduced level of inspection would be warranted on later model engines whose owners have elected to install AE pistons if-inspection results from lead.R48 V-16
- engines, following accumulation of 100 hrs. at full load,. confirm absence of. linear indications in the piston-crown stud boss region in all pistons examined.
(RPM) 39.
-Do you assert that authorization for fuel load ' and operation at any power levels - is appropriate prior to full qualification of the
' acceptability of the emergency diesel generators at the Catawba Nuclear
- 32
=
4 i
Station?
If so, describe in detail the factual and technical basis for your answer with respect to the protection of the public health and safety at each power level for which such authorization is believed
, appropriate and given the spe'cific progress achieved in qualification of the emergency diesel generators at such time.
t Applicants object to this Interrogatory on the basis that it seeks information beyond the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board.
Information relating to Applicants' views regarding fuel load prior to " full qualification of the acceptability of the emergency diesel generators"- is not encompassed, directly or indirectly, in either of the contentions admitted by the Board. /
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, Applicants object to this Interrogatory.
To
-respond would cause Applicants
{
annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
Further, such information is not relevant to the subject matter of the contention, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculate'd to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
39A.
Prior to ordering the TDI diesels did Applicants perform any investigation of customer satisfaction or operating history for TDI supplied engines?
If so, explain in detail.
If not, explain why and identify any other 'information relied upon with respect. to the acceptability of TDI engines.
Prior to ordering the TDI engines, an evaluation was done of TDI engines.
An experience list, which was submitted with TDI's quotation propo's al, was evaluated.
Other users of TDI-engines were contacted and gave favorable _ responses.
.(JPV)
- /
Applicants would also note that this Interrgatory also appears to call.for a -legal conclusion unrelated to the facts, which is another grounds for objection.
See Boston Edison Company, et al.
(Pilgrim Nucidar Generating
- Station, Unit 2),
LBP-75-30, 1 NRC 579, 588 (1975); _4A Moores Federal Practice,
l
$3317..
~
d 40.
Were Applicants aware of the operating experience of TDI engines in marine applications?
Describe in detail.
At th,e time of procurement, we were aware that TDI engines were in use in marine applications as shown by their experience lists submitted with their proposal.
We were not aware of specific operating experience in marine applications.
(RHW) 41.
What information did Applicants have as to the trustworthiness of TDI's QA program, particularly with respect to its quality control -inspection program?
42.
Uhat information did Applicants have or acquire concerning the qualifications of TDI QA personnel?
These Interrogatories are clearly directed toward a
contention which was denied admission. Applicants object to these Interrogatories on the grounds that they seek information outside the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board, that is, information relating solely to TDI's and/or Applicants' QA programs.
Therefore, for the reasons given in the-responses to Interrogatories 13 and 15, Applicants object to responding to this Interrogatory.
For Applicants
- o respond would be to cause them annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
- Further, the information sought is not relevant to the subject matter 'of these contentions, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
43.
What information did Applicants. have or acquire regarding the rated.and actual horsepower per cylinder for TDI engines in marine and nuclear applications?
l Did Applicants have or acquire any information regarding over-rating or under-powering of TDI engines?
What is the horsepower rating per cylinder of the Catawba diesels? ~What is the horsepower per cylinder of the comparable model diesel in' use in marine l
applications?
-~34 -
O b
Horsepower ratings were provided by all bidders with their proposals.
These ratings were provided by TDI for engines used in marine app,lications as well as for stationary power.
We did not have or acquire any information regarding over-rating or under-powering of TDI engines.
The horsepower rating for the Catawba engines is 610.6 bhp per cylinder.
The horsepower rating of the comparable model diesel engine in use in marine application is 677 horsepower per cylinder.
(RHW) 44.
With respect to the " design improvements" listed in attachment 4-1 to Applicants 2/22/84 submitted to the
- NRC, why were the failures there reflected not understood as evidence of product immaturity?
In large
- measure, the
" design improvements" were modifications necessary to meet the requirements of the nuclear industry, such as the extra bracing and supports to qualify the diesels for seismic events.
Modifications also were made to insure that the diesels would start and be ready to accept loads within a specified (11 seconds) time.
These modifications are not necessary or required for commercial application.
Applicants do not believe the " failures," such as they are, indicate " product immaturity." TDI has used commercial operating experience of their engines to improve their design.
It is reasonable to expect design improvements after analysis of I
l components with thousands of hours of commercial operation.
Such i
design improvements increase the longevity of the component.
l It also should be noted that it is unlikely that the nuclear diesels will ever see the number of hours of operation that is seen in commercial operation or the operating conditions to which a commercial diesel is subjected.
(JDH)
_~
44A.
What competing bids for emergency diesel generators were solicited and/or received by Applicants in addition to the submission by TDI?
Identify and make available for inspection and copying documents
, reflecting such alternate equipment.
Applicants object to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it seeks information outside the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board, that is, Applicants' procurement procedures which are related to Applicants' QA program.
Therefore, for the reasons given in the responses to Interrogatories 13 and 15, Applicants object to responding to this Interrogatory.
For Applicants to respond would be to cause them annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
Further, the information sought is not relevant to the subject matter of these contentions, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
45.
With respect to the term
" limitless trouble-free service" as employed in item 10 of attachment 4-1 to Applicants' 2/23/84 submittal, provide a
detailed definition incloding precise measurement of service time represented by the term.
Commercial diesels have operated for prolonged periods with the improved exhaust manifold seal rings with trouble free service.
It is expected that the Catawba diesels will be subjected to fewer hours of operation than commercial diesels.
Therefore, trouble free service is expected from the exhaust manifold seal i
ring for the life of the Catawba diesels.
A reasonably precise measurement of time represented by the term would be the life of the Catawba diesels which is based on
(
the 40 year life of the plant.
(JDH)
I o
- 36 i
45A.
On which diesel senerator was the seven day no load Idle Endurance Test performed as referenced in response No. 6 of the above submittal? What is the significance of this test?
The seven day no load Idle Endurance Test was performed by TDI on a DSRV-16-4 engine with a 7000 KW generator used at the Grand Gulf plant.
Extended operation of standby diesel generators at no load may be required if one engine is temporarily inoperable during service or overhaul or if off-site power is being used to circulate coolant water during a loss of coolant accident.
This test demonstrates that the engine can idle at no load for 7 days and then successfully accept load.
(RHW) 46.
What is the basis for asserting that 300 start tests of the Grand Gulf diesel generator adequately qualifies the Catawba engines?
Describe in detail and identify all documents reflecting this basis.
The basis for the type qualification program for the 300 start test is contained in IEEE 387-1977 and Regulatory Guide 1.9.
(RHW) 47.
What is the basis for use of testing and inspection of the Catawba 1-A dia-al generator to qualify-the other three generators at Catawba?
Explain in detail the basis for this answer and identify all documents reflecting such basis.
The basis for use of testing and inspection of the Catawba 1-A diesel generator to qualify the other three generators at Catawba is U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide l
l 1.9 entitled " Selection, Design, and Qualification of Diesel -
Generator Units Used as Standby (on site) Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants".
The position established by this Reg.
Guide is conformance with the requirements of IEEE Standard 37 -
i 387-1977, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Diesel - Generator Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating Station"..This IEEE standard states,
" Diesel-generators of types not previously qualified as a standby power source for nuclear power generating stations shall be subject to a
" type qualification" testing program consisting of a " load capability qualification, start and load acceptance qualification, and margin qualifi-cation.
" Qualification tests may be performed on one or more units, although qualification of one unit will qualify like units of the " type" for equal or less severe service."
(RPM) 48.
What relevant statistical information leads to justifying this practice?
Regulatory Guide 1.9 and IEEE Std. 387-1977 do not indicate any statistical information justifying-the practice of
" type qualification" of diesel generators.
(RPM) 48A.
What load level was employed in the "24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> loaded run" included in the testing of the Unit 1 diesel generators?
The "24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> loaded run" involved 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> at 100% rated load and 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at 110% rated load.
(RPM) 49.
With respect to the testing of the Catawba Unit 1
diesel generators described in response to item 7 in Applicants' 2/22/84 submittal explain in detail the results of each of the start-up and pre-operational functional testing.
Identify documents reflecting circumstances and conditions of each test as well as the test results.
If any test was-omitted or' modified l
explain fully the basis for such action.
l l
The information sought in the Interrogatory is contained in.
49A.
Identify in detail any and all documents reflecting the Catawba diesel generators operating history and any
- problems, deficiencies or unusual or abnormal operations observed.
Include each item and event reflected in r e s p o n s e.. N o. 8.and Applicants' 2/22/84 submittal.
Please update your response to include any subsequent developments..
1 1
l The information sought in response to this Interrogatory is contained in Attachment 4.
50.
. Identify fully the documentary basis for responses'No.
11 and 12 in Applicants' 2/22/84 submittal to the NRC Staff.
Please make these documents available for inspection and copying.
The documentary bases for response No. 11 are identified in the response itself.
Intervenors have been served with copies of the response.
The documentary basis for the response to No. 11 is available for inspection and copying.
The documentary bases for responses 12(3), 12(4), 12(5) and 12(6) are identified in the responses themselves.
Intervenors have been served with copies of the responses.
The documentary bases for these responses is available for inspection and copying.
To the extent that specific TDI Owner's Group documents are not identified in the response and are relevant to the admitted contention, such documents are available for inspection and copying.
(JDH)
Applicants object to providing any documentary basis or other information related to respor--s 12(1) and 12(2) because these relate to Applicants' and/or TDI's QA programs.
Therefore, Applicants object to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it seeks information outside the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board.
Therefore, for the reasons given in the responses to Interrogatories 13 and 15, Applicants object to responding to this-
[
-Interrogatory.
For Applicants to respond would be to cause them 1
[
annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
- Further, the information sought is not relevant to the subject matter of these l
contentions. nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the, discovery of admissible evidence.
51.
.With respect to the response to item 13 of Applicants' 2/22/84 submittal to the NRC Staff regarding loss of voltage incidents describe in detail each such incident at Applicants' Oc6 pee and McGuire facilities setting forth the information described in that response with respect to Catawba.
Applicants object to this Interrogatory because it seeks t
information beyond the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board. Intervenors, noting that Applicants have provided certain information to the NRC Staff regarding an undervoltage incident at Catawba */ request similar information with respect to Duke's Oconee and McGuire facilities.
Without making a point of the fact that it is problematical
- whether, given the nature of the contentions admitted by.the
- Board, Interrogatories are permissible regarding the Catawba incident, **/ Interrogatories directed to potential incidents at Duke's Oconee and McGuire plants " involving loss of voltage at the emergency bus (es) involving operations of diesel generators" certainly are not relevant.
- ka only conceivable relevance such i
an inquiry could have is whether if such an event had occurred, i
the diesel gene'rators operated as required.
- However, 1
.i
- /
The NRC Staff had asked all owners of TDI diesel generators to provide information regarding incidents "in which voltage was lost at the emergency bus (es) requiring operation of the DG(s)."
See Applicants' Responses of ' February 2 2 ',
- 1984, Response 13.
- /
Applicants would note that, rather than require-the Board's involvement in
-that
-issue Applicants have
' answered Interrogatories relating 'to the referenced incident.
See Responses. to CESG's ' Interrogatories. is 24 and 25, p.
61, infra.
40 -
such information might possibly be within the cognizance of this j
Board only if the source of backup power at Oconee and McGuire is TDI diesel, generators. Such is not the case.
Backup power at Oconee is not supplied by diesel generators.
The diesel generators at McGuire were not manufactured by TDI.
Thus, this Interrogatory is not permissible.
Therefore, for the reasons given in the responses to Interrogatories 13 and 15, Applicants object to responding to this Interrogatory.
For Applicants to respond would be to cause them annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
- Further, the information sought is not relevant to the subject matter of these contentions, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to l
lead to the discovery of advisable evidence.
52.
Identify by name, title, address and telephone number each and every person responsible for performing the following functions with respect to the Catawba emergency diesel generators:
a.
specification design; b.
bid solicitation and analysis; c.
approval of TDI as supplier; d.
QA audit and surveillance of TDI; e.
receiving inspection; f.
diesel generator testing; g.
component inspection; h.
post Shoreham failure TDI liaison; i.
Owners Group liaison and representation; J.
NRC liaison; k.
design qualification; 1.
extended operation test of diesel generator 1-A m.
Analysis of options and procurement of replacement components in equipment.
Describe the work experience, training and qualifications of each of these individuals.
The original procurement specification had input from several different groups but at the time of original release, design input, was coordinated under the direction of Mr. J. P.
Voglewede.
Mr. Voglewede's present title and address is Supervising Design
- Engineer, P.O.
Box
- 33189, Charlotte, North Carolina
- 28242, j
i telephone,.704-373-8158.
Mr. H. B. Tucker Vice President, Nuclear Production P.O. Box 33189 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 704-373-4531 Mr.
C. J. Wylie Design Engineering - Electrical-Chief Engineer P.O. Box 33189 4
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 704-373-4438 Mr. R. O. Sharpe Nuclear Engineer P.O. Box 33189 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 704-373-8466 W. R. McCollum Unit Schedule Engineer Catawba Nuclear Station PO Box 256 Clover, SC 29710 4
803-831-2282 Ext. 2465 R.
P. Muschick Maintenance Engineer PO Box 33189 Charlotte, NC 28242 704-373-5875 G. W. Hallman Nuclear Maintenance Manager PO Box 33189 Charlotte, NC 28242 704-373-2345 Transamerica Delaval Inc.
is responsible for the design qualification of the diesel generators.
J. M. Lines Technical Specialist P.O. Box 33189 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 704-373-5591 J. D. Heffner.
Technical Specialist P.O. Box 33189 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 704-373-4865 a
J. P. Voglewede Supervising Design Engineer P.O. Box 33189 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 704-373-8158 (JPV)
Applicants have provided responses to those portions of this Interrogatory which are relevant to the admitted contentions.
To the extent that this Interrogatory seeks information outside the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board, Applicants object.
Applicants object on these grounds to Interrogatory 52 subparts b, c, d, and e.
Therefore, for the reasons given in the responses to Interrogatories 13 and 15, Applicants object to responding to this Interrogatory.
For Applicants to respond would be to cause them annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
- Further, the information sought is not relevant to the subject matter of these 4
contentions, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissable evidence.
IV.
Responses to CESG Interrogatories Crankshaft Contention 1.
At the time Catawba DG pistons were removed for further heat treatment of piston skirts, were all crankshaft fillets examined for cracks?
What examination methods were used?
Visual inspection using 5X magnification of the crank pin fillets was made.
These were the only fillets inspected during that maintenance activity.
(RPM)-
i 2.
Are the manufacturing drawings, specifications, and metallurgy identical for the Grand Gulf and the Catawba DGs?
If not define the difference.
Provide serial numbers and dates of manufacture for both.
The erankshafts supplied for the Grand Gulf and Catawba DSRV-16 diesel-engines are identical in design. The have the same manufacturing drawings, specifications, and metallurgy require-ments.
The crankshafts for both job sites are TDI part number 1A-5445.
The TDI control numbers for the Duke Power and Mississippi Power and Light crankshafts are as follows:
Duke MP&L S/N Control #
S/N Control #
75017 569 74033 425 2
s 75018 571 74034 485 75019 593 74035 534 75020 608 74036 533 (RPM)
ASLB's. Contention 3.
In regard to the NRC staff's questions of December 30, 1983, specifically Duke Power Company's response to-8, describe fully and completely the failure of the turbo bearing both physically and functionally.
The turbocharger bearing did not fail in the sense that it would have prevented the diesel generator from providing backup power.
l a.
Physically the turbocharger bearing failed because the bearing face on the turbine end thrust bearing wiped due to insufficient lubrication.
b.
Functionally the turbocharger bearings failed as because loss of bearing metal on the turbine end thrust i
bearing allowed the back face of the thrust l
l
- 44
)
,,.-~
runner on the blower end to rub the blower end oil seal.
This resulted in excessive heating on the blower
,end oil seal which eventually caused it to crack.
When turbocharger oil pressure drops below 15 psi in a n
routine run, the diesel is automatically shut down.
During an actual emergency condition, low turbocharger oil pressure would not shut the diesel engine down.
Therefore in an emergency situation the diesel generator would have continued to provide backup power.
(JEC) 4.
What was wrong with the replaced governor box, response to 8?
The problem with the governor box was identified as a
defective internal DC bridge rectifier which allowed AC signals along with the DC signals to pass to the actuator.
As a result, erroneous signals were transmitted to the governor
- actuator, causing the diesel to oscillate (minor increase / decrease in diesel RPM).
This problem was corrected by replacing the control box.
(Jnu) 5.
In view of the response EL40114D/16, define " actual reliability" in'the context..What incidents would have a significant bearing on the actual reliability?
" Actual Reliability" in this response means that the inci-
~
- dents, as
- stated, would not have prevented the diesel from starting and performing its required function during an actual emergency situation.
No such incident reported in the referenced l
response would have a
significant bearing on the actual 1
reliability of the diesel.
(JDH) -.
l 6.
Would a significantly failed turbocharger bearing make a Catawba DG inoperable? What would the consequence be of a seized turbocharger shaft?
What effect would an inoperative turbocharger have on the power output of a
, Catawba DG--in quantitative terms?
A failed' turbocharger would not make the, diesel inoperative.
A seized turbocharger shaft would stop the turbo-charger from rotating.
The diesel could then be operated as a
normally aspirated engine.
An inoperative turbocharger would reduce the load carrying capability of the diesel generator to a maximum of 75% of rated load.
(JEC) 7.
Are there any failure modes of a governor box which would interfere with DG reliability?
If so, what are they?
A malfunction in the governor box would slightly impact the diesel performance.
The electrical governor is backed up_by a mechanical governor which operates automatically if the electric-governor fails.
Therefore, failure of the electrical governor box does not compromise the reliability of the diesel.
(JDH) 8.
Regarding response 9.,
what additional tests and inspections will be performed on DGs 1B, 2A, and 2B.
Applicants do not understand the reference to " response 9."
However, the Catawba Nuclear Station IB DG will be operated for a total of least 750 hours0.00868 days <br />0.208 hours <br />0.00124 weeks <br />2.85375e-4 months <br />.
It will then be inspected.
The extent of the 1B inspection will be based on the results of the previous inspection of the
- IADG, and/or completed previous DSRV 16-4 inspections.
j Tests and inspections of 2A and 2B DG are yet to be determined.
(RPM) 9.
What design and operability requirements were speci-fically imposed on TDI in the purchase contract in
s' regard to reliability and durability?
Define reliability and operability as you use these terms.
1r you use the term durability, please define.
1 Design and operability requirements imposed on TDI are listed in our procurement specification - Refer to Duke Power's responses to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Requests for Additional Information Delaval Generator Evaluation, Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, Question 1.
Reliability:
The ability of the diesel generator to start, accelerate to synchronous speed and accept load in the required time in a reliable manner as determined by the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.108.
Operability:
Operability is defined in the Catawba Technical Specifications, definition 1.18.
(RHW) 10.
Did Duke know of the history of TDI diesel performance on the Alaska ferry, Columbia, at the time of executing the purchase contract with TDI?
If not, when did DPC learn?
11.
Did TDI offer the s***e of Alaska as a reference during the procurement stage?
Did TDI offer references?
If so, please list.
Applicants object to Interrogatories 10 and 11.
These interrogatories seek information as to Applicants' knowledge of certain TDI engines in marine applications at the time - of procurement, as well as other matters existing at that time.
Such information is not discoverable for two reasons.
- First, the knowledge had by Applicants at the time of procurement respecting TDI engines in marine applications, or in other applications, is irrelevant to the contentions admitted by the Board.
Se conel, such information treads close to involvement with TDI's quality assurance program, which is an issue ruled out of this proceeding by the Board.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth
- above, Applicants object to these Interrogatories.
To respond to them would cause Applicants annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
- Further, such information is not relevant to the subject matter of the contention, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
12.
Regarding response 12 to staff; what Catawba DG items were repaired:
Used-as-is?
Applicants object to this Interrogatory.
The reference to DG items being repaired or used "as-is" is contained in response 12(1) which is concerned with Applicants' and/or TDI's QA programs.
Therefore, Applicants object to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it seeks information outside the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board.
Therefore, for the reasons given in the responses to Interrogatories 13 and 15, Applicants object to responding to this l
l Interrogatory.
For Applicants to respond would be to cause them annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
- Further, the information sought is not relevant to the subject matter of these l
contentions, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to l
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
l
,y
~ -
5..
i 13.
Define " valid test reliability" as it is used.
What assurance is there that 98% valid test reliability will insure safe shutdown?
A valid test for reliability purposes is defined in Reg.
Guide 1.108.
The 98% reliability provides reasonable assurance that a diesel generator will be available when needed.
It should be pointed out that there is a redundant diesel generator set that i
has 100% backup capability.
(LAR) i 14.
Are the Grand Gulf DG failures:
piston crown separations, piston skirt cracks, fuel line failures, cylinder head cracks, turbocharger problems, push rod
- cracks, air starter valve problems and a generator short, consistent with the reliability required for a safe-shutdown device?
No.
The Grand Gulf diesel engine problems have been identified and modifications made to correct and solve the l
problems.
These modifications have been made on the Catawba diesel engines to prevent similar problems.
(JDH)
~
15.
Regarding response to 12.,
how do you reconcile the problems encountered with TDI DG's with your conclusion that "the TDI generators were reliable?" Was this the
- uniform, unqualified response of those you queried?
Specify each individ"a.1 responding for each concern by l
name and by job title.
Applicants do not understand the reference to " response 12" with respect to the quote in the question.
However, Applicants l
l have or are investigating each problem that has been identified i
concerning the Delaval diesels.
The corrective action to the problems has been or will be evaluated and either is or will be satisfactory to Duke Power. The outcome of Applicants.' tests and inspection program will be to reasonably assure that the diesel l
generators will perform their intended function.
(JDH)..
i 16.
Do you concur with the conclusion referenced in 15.
foregoing?
None of the DG problems encountered on the TDI DG's at Catawba are inconsistent with the reliability required for a safe-shutdown device.
(GWH; RPM) 17.
Has DPC at any time talked or corresponded with a mechanical supervisor or superintendent or engineer of the state of Alaska in connection with the performance of TDI diesels on the MV Colombia?
the operators of the MV Pride of Texas?
of the MV E H Gott?
If so, provide the complete record of these communications.
Yes.
The summary of communications is as follows:
a.
ITEM:
Head Cracking UTILITY /PT.
U.S.
Steel /MV "E
H Gott";
State of Alaska /M.V. " Columbia" CONTACT (S): E Merry /U S Steel; K. Besselin/ Alaska
SUMMARY
During routine annual inspection, cracking was discovered on cylinder
- heads, primarily between exhaust valves.
Infrequent cracking between exhaust valve, intake valve and injection port.
The cause of this cracking was determined to be a combin-H on of high stress areas, age, and thin areas due to head design.
The cracked heads were i
replaced.
Head longevity is increased by normal engine operation versus overload conditions.
UTILITY /PT.
Titan Navigation /MV " Pride of Texas" CONTACT (S).
J McGlashan
SUMMARY
During routine inspections, cylinder-heads were found to be leaking water through cracks and pores that were apparently caused by non-uniform castings..
~. -
l The faulty leaks were replaced with new heads manufactured after 1978.
l b.
ITEM.
Cylinder Head Valve Seats (Exhaust)
UTILITY /PT.
Titan Navigation /MV " Pride of Texas" CONTACT (S).
J McGlashan
SUMMARY
During routine inspection some stellite valve seats were found severely cracked to base metal.
Some contributing factors are heat removal, seat installa-tion, age and stress.
The exact cause is still under investigation by TDI.
The damaged head was replaced and returned for seat replacement.
Prevention ~ of the recurrence of this problem is a
function of seat installation and is being evaluated by TDI.
c.
ITEM.
Cylinder Head Exhaust Valve Seats UTILITY /PT.
State of Alaska /MV " Columbia" CONTACT (S).
K Bessilin/ Alaska
SUMMARY
Cylinder head exhaust valve seats were found to be cracked during a routine inspection of the engine.
The cause of the failure was determined to be a combination of the seat installation, welding process / technical and the head (base) thickness.
8 The correction for this problem has been to improve the welding process on newer head designs.
l l
l :
The prevention of recurrence for this problem is a l
function of the manufacturer's design and has improved with a
~
newer. head design.
I d.
ITEM.
Cylinder Liners UTILITY /PT.
Duke Power Company / Catawba; State of Alaska /M.V. " Columbia" l
l CONTACT (S).
Andrew Rush /TDI, Bob Johnston/TDI; i
K. Besselin/ Alaska
SUMMARY
There have been reports from " Columbia" and one occurrence at Catawba of the receipt of cylinder liners that had not been honed.
The Catawba incident resulted from j
the discovery of an unhoned liner originally installed in the 1A diesel and found while removing the pistons for the piston skirt skirt heat treat modification.
Those received by
" Columbia" were spare or replacement cylinder liners.
The cause of these incidents is an error in shipping and installation by Transamerica Delaval.
To correct these problems, the cylinders were honed to the proper cross hatch pattern.
As a precaution to prevent recurrence, all cylinder liners are inspected for proper surface finish before installation.
ITEM.
Cylinder Liner 1
UTILITY /PT.
State of Alaska /M.V. " Columbia" CONTACT (S).
K. Besselin, Max Zbinden/ Alaska
SUMMARY
"The Columbia" experienced water leakage into the crankcase through faulty cylinder liner seals., _ -,.
~.
i The cause of the seal leakage was a loss of elasticity in the neoprene 0-rings.
The problem was corrected by changing the material of the 0-rings from neoprene to viton (which retains its elasticity).
4 f.
ITEM.
Cylinder Liner UTILITY / PLT. Titan Navigation /M.V. " Pride of Texas" CONTACT (S).
John McGlashan
SUMMARY
The cylinder liner (as well as the head, block, piston skirt, and connecting rod) of one cylinder was.
damaged during a maintenance roll of the engine.
The cause of the damage was determined to be water that 1
had leaked form the turbocharger intercooler, filled the combustion air header and reached the cylinder.
During the compression stroke, the water was forced against the head causing the damage of these components.
l All affected components were replaced or repaired including the leaking intercooler.
To prevent recurrence, drain cocks were_ installed in the l
combustion air header to allow continual removal of moisture prior to and during operation.
g.
ITEM.
Cylinder Heads UTILITY / PLT.
State of Alaska /M.V. " Columbia" CONTACT (S).
Bob Johnston/TDI; K. Besselin/ Alaska l
l l
i
SUMMARY
- Scoring, scratching and scuffing of several cylinder liners were observed during inspection.
This scuffing was attributed to the chrome flaking from the piston
- rings, becoming embedded behind the rings.
This caused normal ring flexture during travel to cease.
The end result being scuffed cylinder liners.
Columbia honed or replaced the liners as needed.
TDI recommended the use of another brand of piston
- ring, "Muskegon", which has virtually stopped the wear induced because of flaking chrome on the piston rings.
TDI has worked with Koppers on the chrome plating flaking problem and determined the faulty rings to be of only a certain time frame of manufacture.
h.
ITEM.
Cylinder Block
_UTTLITY/ PLT.
State of Alaska /M.V. " Columbia" CONTACT (S).
K. Besselin/ Alaska
SUMMARY
During overhaul of the engines of the
" Columbia" the cylinder block bores were observed to be distorted and the cylinder blocks warped.
Fretting was discovered in the region where the cylinder block meets the crankcase.
The cause of this warpage was determined to be improperly torqued cylinder block to crankcase thru-bolts allowing misalignment of the block to occur.
After several thousand hours of operation, warpage and excessive liner wear including loss of liner crusher were found.
l t
i I 1
l The cylinder blocks and liners were replaced, and the torques were verified.
The warpage problems have been eliminated.
i.
ITEM.
Cylinder Block UTILITY / PLT. TITAN Navigation /M.V. '.' Pride of Texas" CONTACT (S).
John McGlashen
SUMMARY
During a maintenance roll of the engine, the cylinder block was cracked.
The cause of the damage was determined to be water that had leaked from the turbocharger intercooler, filled the combustion air header and reached the cylinders.
During the compression stroke, water was forced against the head causing damage to several components.
All affected components were replaced or repaired.
To prevent recurrence, the engines were fitted with drain cocks in the combustion air header which allows moisture to be removed through constant venting prior to and during operation.
UTILITY /PT.
US Steel /M.V.
"E H
Gott";
State of Alaska /M.V. " Columbia" CONTACT (S). Ed Merry /"C.H. Gott"; K. Besselin/ Alaska
SUMMARY
During an overhaul, the diesel generators were found to have circumferential surface cracking in the top land of the block where the cylinder liners meet the block.
55 -
This surface cracking has been attributed to high stress on the land due to radial thermal expansion of the cylinder liner.while in operation.
To solve the problem, the M.V.
Gott machined the engine block to remove this surface cracking.
The Columbia replaced the blocks because of warpage.
To prevent further recurrence, TDI has recommended that these cylinder liners be machined to give a slightly greater clearance.
J.
ITEM.
Connecting Rods UTILITY / PLT.
State of Alaska /MV " Columbia" CONTACT (S).
K Besselin, R Tee / Alaska
SUMMARY
Surface cracking and fretting of connecting rod connections and bolts have been observed during maintenance.
The cause of this damage is believed to be severe engine operations at peak and overload conditions.
The problem was corrected by replacing the damaged rods.
To prevent recurrence of this problem, operation of the engine must be limited to design load or less.
TDI rebuilt all but one rod and installed heavier rod bearings.
I k.
ITEM.
Intercooler Failure UTILITY / PLT.
US Steel /MV "E H Gott" CONTACT (S).
E Merry /"E H Gott",-
SUMMARY
Water was found in cylinder and traced to a leaking intercooler as the water source.
Inspection of intercooler showed the cause of the leakage to be a loss of tube integrity because of gussett on a baffle plate tubing support was welded on one side and pulled against the tube.
The resultant rubbing action wore a hole in the tube.
The gussett was straightened and welded in place and the breached tube was plugged to correct the problem.
The other intercooler was examined and the same condition did not exist.
UTILITY / PLT.
Titan Navigation /MV " Pride of Texas" CONTACT (S).
J McGlashan
SUMMARY
Catastropic cylinder failure occurred during an air roll prior to starting the engine.
The cause of this failure was determined to be water in one of several liners.
The leakage was caused by severe erosion from water borne metal machine chips which resulted in a breach in the tubing.
The problem was corrected by repairing the
- engine, plugging the affected tubes, and installing a temporary in line filter to remove any remaining metal chips.
The chips were traced to replacement heads.
Recurrence of this problem was prevented by water flushing each head to remove machining waste from the head.
This should be done by the manufacture..
1.
ITEM.
Turbocharger - Nozzle Ring Vane UTILITY / PLT.
State of Alaska - MV " Columbia" CONTACT (S).
K Besselin/ Alaska
SUMMARY
During operation turbochargers were checked because of unusual noise and performance..
The nozzle ring vane was found to be cracked.
The cause was determined to be a lack of support for the vane during high power / load changing conditions.
The initial correction was to replace that cracked nozzle ring.
TDI evaluated this cracking problem and submitted a 10CFR21 to modify the vane from a four (machine screw) to an eight machine screw mounting configuration.
(JDH) 18.
Is it possible to assemble individual components each satisfactory in regard to QC into an unsatisfactory diesel engine?
Applicants object to this Interrogatory.
It seeks information beyond the scope of the contentions admitted by the Board and in any event would cause Applicants to engage in unwarranted speculation to respond.
The Interrogatory
- asks, assuming all individual components of an engine are proper with respect to QA, whether such components can be assembled into an
" unsatisfactory" diesel engine.
This Ir.terrogatory thus seeks i
information directly related to TDI's QA Program, a matter ruled out of this proceeding by the Board.
Moreover, though the short i
l answer to the Interrogatories is of' course' "yes",
it 1
- 58.-
)
1 calls for assumptions regarding, among other
- things, breakdowns in QA by TDI.
Those assumptions are unwarranted and in any case are beyond the scope of the contention.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, Applicants object to this Interrogatory.
To respond would cause Applicants annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.
Further, such information is not relevant to the subject matter of the contention, nor would its disclosure be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible c.vidence.
19.
Provide the code crit;eria,
all applicable, for diesel cylinder heads; the relation between HP per cubic inch and cylinder head specifications; ditto piston crowns and piston skirts.
There are no specific code criteria which relate to diesel cylinder heads, piston crowns and piston skirts.
These parts are designed by the manufacturers based on experience and engineering judgment.
(RHW) 20.
Were the 1097 hours0.0127 days <br />0.305 hours <br />0.00181 weeks <br />4.174085e-4 months <br />
-"n by Grand Gulf Div. I DG trouble free?
Was operation at any time interrupted by mal-function or anticipated malfunction and increased damage?
Please list.
21.
Same questions as 20. for Div. II Grand Gulf DG.
For both, provide load levels during tests.
i l
i The following is a list of the problems experienced at Grand l
Gulf for Division I and Divsion II diesel generators.
a.
, Starting Air Valve Failure (LER 83-82) Div I b.
Cracked Welds Turbocharger Jacket Water Discharge Piping (LER-83-107) Div I c.
Voltage Regulatory Failed (LER 83-102) Div I d.
Turbocharger Capscrew Failure (LER 83-107) Div I e.
High Pressure Fuel Oil Line Failure (LER-83-114) Div I f.
LSSS Panel Did Not Operate as Designed (LER 82.83) Div I and II g.
Cracked Weld on Push Rod (LER 83-82) Div I h.
D/G Fire (One Hour Notification, LER 83-126) Div I i.
Trip on High Jacket Water Temperature Signal (LER 83-95) Div I J.
Rear Crankcase Capscrew Failure (LER 82-80) Div II k.
Automatic Voltage Regulatory Failure (LER-83-140) Div I The testing included a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> run, of which 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> was at 110% load and 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> at 100% load.
A seven day run at 60%
load was also completed.
(RPM) 22.
What parts of Catawba DG 1A were dye penetrant tested at the time of removing piston skirts for further heat treatment?
At the time of the piston skirt removal no dye penetrant testing was done.
(RPM) 23.
In reference to 12(4)7, what corrective action has been taken in regard to cylinder head cracks? Will cylinder head cracks be dealt with on a case-by-case basis or generically?
In your question you reference 12(4)7.
This section does not exist.
However, we have based our answer on 12(6)7.
During the years 1974 through 1978, Transamerica Delaval was involved in casting modifications to correct leakage problems which were resolved in 1978.
The casting improvements were to correct for porosities, and to increase the thickness of the Jacket water walls in the heads.
Maritime units using the same head, manufactured between 1977 1
l and 1978, are changing heads at a rate of 1 to 3 heads per l L
..=
__. -. =
i d
5000-6000 hours of operation provided they are operated in a continually overloaded condition.
These heads are being replaced with heads, manufactured after 1978 as failures occur.
Most of the Catawba Unit I heads were manuf actured between 9/78 and 12/78.
The Unit 2 heads were manufactured between 3/79 and 9/79.
Duke Power will replace the 1978 vintage cylinder heads on a case-by-case basis when and if head leakage occurs.
The replace-ment heads will be of post 1978 manufacture.
(JDH) 24.
What are the relations of Moser-Lines, yellow and red
- buses, and the plant's 22 KV bus?
Please provide diagram.
The diagram in Attachment 5 shows the relative-locations of the Moser Lines, yellow and red buses, and the unit feeders within the 230 KV switchyard area at Catawba.
The unit 22 KV bus is located in the transformer yard, adjacent to the Turbine Building,
-on the respective unit.
A breaker-and-a-half scheme is used in the Catawba switchyard such that all lines and unit feeders can remain in service with either the red or yellow bus out of service.
(KRC) 25.
How were the faults that developed as a result of the Moser Pole failure cleared?
The Moser Lines were tripped via. protective relaying associated with these lines.
Tripping the Moser Lines results in tripping power circuit breakers (PCB's) 26, 27, 29, and 30 in the Catawba switchyard.
The yellow bus breakers were tripped via the.
l yellow bus differential relays.
(KRC) 26.
Did DPC' require preventive maintenance programs of'TDI-at the time' of procurement?- Was such a requirement absent from the purchase' requisitions?.
~,y..-
,.,.__.y.._
.y_m,_
r._
Yes.
This requirement was included in the purchase specification.
(RHW) 27.
During a blackout, how many DG's are required for the
' shutdown of one nuclear unit?
During a LOCA?
During s
blackout (loss of off-site power),
one DG is required for shutdown of one nuclear unit.
During a LOCA, the required loads would normally be supplied power from the preferred off-site circuits.
If for some reason off-site power were unavailable, one DG would be required to shutdown one nuclear unit.
(KRC) 28.
Is there a program for regular inspections of the DGs on some predetermined basis?
If so what are the intervals and what are the inspection procedures?
This Interrogatory is essentially the same as PA Interrogatory 35A.
See the answer provided to 35A.
(RPM) 29.
What criteria were used to decide that a piston skirt required a second heat treatment from TDI?
How many such were there?
TDI has determined that all nodular piston skirts require a two step heat treating process.
There was a total of 1499 piston skirts which were identified by heat number and serial number not to have had the required temper or stress relieving process and therefore had to be returned to TDI for this required temper process. (RPM)
Respectfully Submi ted, Albert"V. Car Jr.
DUKE POWER C ANY I
P. O. Box 33 9
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242.
(704) 373-2570'
1 J. Michael McGarry, III Anne W. Cottingham Michael D. White BISHOP, LIBERMAN, COOK PURCELL & REYNOLDS 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 Attorneys for Duke Power Company, et al.
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AFFIDAVITS AND RESUMES The attached Affidavits are provided for Duke Power Company and Bechtel Power Corporation employees who have provided information used in the answers to the foregoing Interrogatories. The resumes provided are for potential witnesses to be called to testify on admitted contentions.
All Duke Power Company employees may be reached at the company's offices in Charlotte, North Carolina.
Both Bechtel Power Corporation employees may be reached at the company's offices in Gaithersburg, Md.
t 4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the. Matter of
)
)
l DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al.
)
Docket Nos. 50-413
)
50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station.
)
Units 1 and 2)
AFFIDAVIT I,
L.
A.
Reed, being duly sworn, hereby state that I am employed by Duke Power Company as Nuclear Engineer.
I have been responsible for furnishing the basic information used in responding to those Interrogatories by Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group concerning the diesel generator contentions admitted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board by which my initials appear.
Those responses are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Ld2-o.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this c2 day of M,
1984.
7 O
D2sr/%Q#
Notpy Public My Commissions expires: 7-/o78
i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the matter of
)
)
DUKE POWER CCMPANY, et al.
)
Docket Nos. 50-413
- -~
)
50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
AFFIDAVIT I,
Peter J.
Carrato, being duly sworn, hereby state that I am employed by Bechtel Power Corporation as a Senior Engineer.
I have been responsible for furnishing the basic information used in responding to those Interrogatories by Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group concerning the diesel generator contentions admitted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board by which my initials appear.
Those responses are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
' f 3 73 84 Subscribed and sworn to before me this cfLf_ day of March, 1984.
s 4YC k NN k{ -
Notary Public l
My Commission expires: My Commission Expires July 1,1988 l
l
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al.
)
Docket Noc. 50-413
)
50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
AFFIDAVIT I,
Eugene W. Thomas, being duly sworn, hereby state that I am employed by Bechtel Power Corporation as an Engineering Specialist..
I have been responsible for furnishing the basic information used in responding to those Interrogatories by Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group concerning the diesel generator contentions admitted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board by which my initials appear.
Those responses are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
N
/
YY%
Subscribed and sworn to before me this A 7 day of March, 1
d.
Notary Public My Commission expires: yy rz
- Expires July 1,1986 i-
i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al.
)
Docket Nos. 50-413
)
50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
AFFIDAVIT I, William R.
McCoilum being duly sworn, hereby state that I am employed by Duke Power Company as Catawba Unit 1 Schedule Engineer.
I have been responsible for furnishing the basic information used in responding to those Interrogatories by Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group concerning the diesel generator contentions admitted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board by which my initials appear.
Those responses are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
W /.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3cth day of W m,b 1984.
yYlmu J 3 O. M co(Gkd a)
Roladt Publiv v o
My Commissions expires: 8-t-84
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al.
)
Docket Nos. 50-413
)
50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
1, G.
Wayne Hallman, being duly sworn, hereby state that I am employed by Duke Power Company as Nuclear Maintenance Manager.
I have been responsible for furnishing the basic information used" in responding-to those Interrogatories by Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group concerning the diesel generator contentions admitted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board by which my initials appear.
Those responses are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
J k
~
O Subscribed and sworn to before me this.90th day of 4Tianch 1984.
L OR Notary Public" v
.My Commissions expires: S-t-gq
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the' Matter of
)
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY, et--al.
)
Docket Nos. 50-413
)
50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
AFFIDAVIT I, Ronald H. Wright, being duly sworn, hereby state that I am employed by Duke Power Company as Design Engineer I.
I have been responsible for furnishing the basic information used in responding to those Interrogatories by Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group concerning the diesel generator contentions admitted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board by which my initials appear.
~
Those responses.are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
MM N.M v
.. ~
Subscribed and sworn to before me this. Sc>4 day of W M 1984.
h_i_ Jr. Q. Ow- 0 %)
Notary PublicU U
d My Commissions expires: @-14Y f
i i
e
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD J
In the Matter of
)
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al.
)
Docket Nos. 50-413
)
50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
AFFIDAVIT I, Robert O.
Sharpe, being duly sworn, hereby state that I t
am employed by Duke Power Company as Nuclear Engineer.
I have been responsible for furnishing the basic 1
information used in responding to those Interrogatories by Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group concerning the diesel generator contentions admitted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board by which my initials appear.
Those responses are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
f Oh
~
Subscribed and sworn to before me this Jodh day of yh,./,
1984.
'ntarruiut 6!: Qs,.nu.u o (,y.rw )
Notary Public My Commissions expires: 9-t-M
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C,OMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the. Matter of
)
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY, et -al.
)
Docket Nos. 50-413
)
50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
AFFIDAVIT I, Russell P. Muschick, being duly sworn, hereby state that I am employed by Duke Power Company as Maintenance Engineer, l
I have been responsible for furnishing the basic information used in responding to those Interrogatories by Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group concerning the diesel generator contentions admitted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board by which my initials appear.
Those responses are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
--, J),y.~
Subscribed and sworn to before me this s -*s dav of ye vi, 1984.
Hk.v.a cO L O 0rra w.
( ;.M a,.r.
I Notary Public*
My Commissions expires: 9 -' W l
-l
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al.
)
Docket Nos. 50-413
- ~ ~ -
)
50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
AFFIDAVIT I,
James E.
Cooper, being duly sworn, hereby state that I am employed by Duke Power Company as Technical Specialist.
I have been responsible for furnishing the basic information used in responding to those Interrogatories by Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group concerning the diesel generator contentions admitted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board by which my initials appear.
Those responses are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
0Aa E _ h o 7
Subscribed and sworn to before me this Joe day of y?7M 1984.
W anotusEL 0. O n > (tD d &
No t'a&y PubliW U My Commissions expires: P-/-fY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al.
)
Docket h.as. 50-413
)
50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
AFFIDAVIT I,
John D.
Heffner, being duly sworn, hereby state that I am employed by Duke Power Company as Technical Specialist.
I have been responsible for furnishing the basic information used in responding to those Interrogatories by Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group concerning the diesel generator contentions admitted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board by which my initials appear.
Those responses are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
---n Subscribed and sworn to before me this Joe day of y& uA 1984.
Wwwuuit 0.% %~)
U Notarf PublicU l
My Commissions expires: P-l-84 l
l l
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al.
)
Docket Nos. 50-413
)
50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1 and 2)
AFFIDAVIT I,
Kenneth R.
Caraway, being duly sworn, hereby state that I
am employed by Duke Power Company as Supervising Design Engineer.
I have been responsible for furnishing the basic information used in responding to those Interrogatories by Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group concerning the diesel generator contentions admitted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board by which my initials appear.
Those responses are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
h e,sf i
subscribed and sworn to before me this Joe day of yW M 1984.
i au*Ef 0. Ohnntikao bi%4&
No
- y Publie U 8
~
My Commissions expires: f-1-sY
I NAME E. W. THOMAS POSITION CivilStaff Supervisor EDUCATION BSCE, Drexel Institute of Technology MSME, Drexel Institute of Technology
SUMMARY
l 3/4 Yrs Civil staff supervisor 2% Years Civil group supervisor, nuclear power plant 3% Years Deputy civil group supervisor, nuclear power plant 2% Years Groupleader, nuclear power plant 3% Years Engineering specialist, nuclear power plants I
6 Years Senior dynamics engineer and dynamics engineer, aerospace in-dustry EXPERIENCE Mr. Thomas is currently serving as a civil staff supervisor. His responsibilities include providing assistance to the chief civil engineer in review of the technical adequacy of engineering design for both fossil and nuclear projects. Mr. Thomas is also a member of Bechtel's Dynamics Committee, which establishes criteria for seismic analyses and design criteria for vibrating and rotating equipment.
Previously, Mr. Thomas was assigned as civil group supervisor for the multi-unit SNUPPS project,1150 MW PWR nuclear units, involving several utilities. He was responsible for the activities of the civil group, which included design of the powerblock and safety-related site structures, technical resolution of field problems, preparation of specifications and bid packages, technical evaluation of bids, and review of vendor drawings for civil niated items.
In earlier assignments to SNUPPS, Mr. Thomas was deputy group supervisor and reactor building group leader.
As an engineering specialist, Mr. Thomas was involved in pipe whip restraint design, miscellaneous concrete and structural steel design, and FSAR preparation for Millstone Nuclear Power Plant's 830 MW PWR Unit 2 for Northeast Nuclear Energy Company. During this time he was a member of the committee writing Bechtel Topical BC-TOP-9. He also worked on pipe whip restraint design for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1,900 MW PWR project for The Toledo Edison Company /The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company; seismic analysis of the auxiliary and control buildings, pipe hanger design and miscellaneous concrete and structural steel design for the 760 MW PWR Turkey Point Power Plant's Units 3 and 4 for Florida Power & Light Company; and seismic analysis of the contain-ment for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, two 800 MW BWR units for Georgia i
Power Company.
~ Prior to joining Bechtel, Mr. Thomas was a senior dynamics engineer and dynamics engineer. Using flight test data, finite element and other analytical methods, he determined dynamic. characteristics of air frames. He aho prepared computer programs for predicting rotor dynamic loads on helicopters and for determining structural natural frequencies for large models.
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS National Society of Professional Engineers l
{ REGISTRATION Registered Professional Engineer in Maryland, Missouri, and Kansas
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NAN 1E P. J. CARR ATO POSITION Senior Engineer EDUCATION BS, Civil Engineerir:g, Bucknell University h!S, Civil Engineering, Bucknell University PhD, Duke University SUNIN1ARY 2 Years Civil / structural staff engincu 4 Years Civil / structural design engineer, nuclear pow er plant ENPERIENCE Dr. Carrato is currently serving on the staff of the chief civil engineer for the Gaithersburg Power Division, primarily involved in structural mechanics. He is the staff specialist for masonry wall analysis and anchorage to concrete. Some of the more in-depth imestigations in which he has been involved include the effect of embedment on soil-structure interaction in seismic analysis of structures, and har-monie analysis of torsional vibrations in the crankshafts of diesel engines.
Dr. Carrato also served on a part-time basis as a visiting professor at the Unisersity of the District of Columbia, where he instructed a course in foundation design.
Previously, Dr. Carrato was assigned to the Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station, two 1300 51W BWR units for hiississippi Power & Light Company as a design engineer. In this capacity, he served in both the light structures group and the con-tainment group. Design responsibilities included cable tray supports, HVAC duct supports, pipe anchors, main steam relief valve pipe supports and supports for submerged piping.
PROFESSIONAL NIENIBERSHIPS American Society of Civil Engineers, American Welding Society, American Con-crete Institute American Institute of Steel Construction REGISTRATION Registered Professional Engineer in Virginia PUBLICATIONS J. B. Kim, W. Hollings, Ill, P. J. Carrato " Final Report on Full Scale Lateral Load Test on Pile Caps to Penn. DOT," 1975 J. F. Wilson, P. J. Carrato " Approaches to High Efficiency Design of Elevated Concrete Guideways," in Journal of Advanced Transportation, Spring 1981 i
12/83
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al.
)
Docket No. 50-413
)
50-414 Catawba Nuclear Station
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Applicants' Response To " Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group's Interrogatories and Requests To Produce Documents on Diesel Generator Contentions to Applicants and the NRC Staff" and "CESG's Interrogatories to Duke Power Regarding Emergency Diesel Contentions Admitted By Atomic Safety and Licensing Board" in the above captioned matter have been served upon the following by deposit in the United States mail this 2nd day of April,1984.
James L. Kelley, Chairman Richard P. Wilson, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Assistant Attorney General Panel State of South Carolina U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 11549 Washington, D. C. 20555 Columbia, South Carolina 29211 Dr. Paul W. Purdom
- Robert Guild, Esq.
235 Columbia Drive Attorney-at-Law Decatur, Georgia 30030 P. O. Box 12097 Charleston, South Carolina 29412 l
l Dr. Richard F. Foster
- Palmetto Alliance P. O. Box 4263 2135 1/2 Devine Street Sunriver, Oregon 97702 Columbia, South Carolina 29205 Chairman
- Jesse L. Riley Atomic Safety and Licensing 854 Henley Place Board Panel Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 l
Chairman John Clewett, Esq.
l Atomic Safety and Licensing 236 Tenth Street, S.E.
l Appeal Board-Washington, D.C. 20003 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
George E. Johnson, Esq.
Karen E. Long Office of the Executive Legal Assistant Attorney General Director N. C. Department of Justice 4
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 629 Washington, D.C. 20555 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.
Scott Stucky Anne W. Cottingham, Esq.
Docketing and Service Section Debeyoise & Liberman U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Commission Washington, D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20555 Don R. Willard Spence Perry, Esq.
Mecklenburg County Associate General Counsel Department of Environmental Federal Emergency Management Health Agency 1200 Blythe Boulevard Room 840 Charlotte, North Carolina 28203 500 C Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20472
/
Klbert V. Ca r
- Designates hand delivery on April 2, 1984.
l-A3TACHMENT 1 Nt2MWbT 10 P4WWIn A1LIANCE/
CESG INIERIOGATORY 26 The purpose of this Attachment is to describe such inspections and evaluations and identify the components and their " function" and "real requirements" as
\\
a result of Catawba diesel generator operation.
1.
Cylinder Heads Functional Requirements: Provide pressure tight cap for engine cylinder, and provide passages and sealing for cooling water, habe oil, starting air, intake and exhaust gases.
Inspections: The following inspections will be done toievaluate the Catawba cylinder heads.
A.
Visual inspection of:
- Intake and exhaust valve seats
- Valve guide mating area B.
Liquid penetrant examination of:
- Intake and exhaust valve seats
- Fire deck area between exhaust valves C.
Ultrasonic thickness measurements of:
- Fire deck area
- Injector cavity area 2.
Subcover Assembly Functional Requirement: Provide structural mounting on top of the cylinder i
l head for rocker son assembly.
Inspection: The following inspections will be done to evaluate the Catawba subcover assemblies:
A.
Visual inspection.
B.
Liquid penetrant inspection of rocker are mounting surfaces.
3.
Fuel Injection Pump Functional Requirement: To convert low pressure fuel delivered by the l
l fuel oil transfer pump to high pressure fuel suitable for injector operation.
Inspection: The following inspections will be done to evaluate the Catawba fuel injection pumps:
A.
Material hardness measurements.
B.
Ultrasonic inspection to test casting integrity 4.
Crankcase Covers Functional Requirement: Provide access to crankcase for inspection and maintenance.
Inspection: The following inspections will be done to evaluate the Catawba crankcase covers:
A.
Bolt torque readings.
B.
Visual inspection of bolt boles for cracks.
5.
Pushrods Functional Requirements: The pushrods form a portion of the linkage that transmits camshaft lobe motion to the cylinder intake and exhaust valve, thereby controlling the valve opening and closing cycle.
Inspection: The following inspections will be done to evaluate the Catawba pushrods:
A.
Visual inspection to assure that pushrod of friction welded design.
B.
Visual inspection of spherical surfaces.
C.
Liquid penetrant examination of friction welds.
6.
Rocker Arm Assembly Functional Requirement: The rocker arm assembly forms a portion of the valve operating linkage taking rectilinear motion from the pushrod to opening the exhaust and intake valves.
f Inspection: The following inspections will be done to evaluate the Catawba rocker arm assemblies:
A.
Visually inspect for signs of distress.
B.
Material tests.
l l
C.
Hardness tests.
D.
Liquid penetrant inspection of adjusting screw swivel pads.
E.
Magnetic particle test of rocker azin capscrews.
7.
Fuel Oil Piping and T.bing t
l Functional Requirements: To transfer fuel oil from one component to another.
Inspection: The following inspections will be done to evaluate the Catawba fuel oil piping and tubing:
A.
Walk dov.n of piping system to confirm that it is in accordance with TDI drawings.
B.
Visual examination of supports to confirm that they are in accordance with TDI drawings.
8.
Turbocharger Lube Oil Piping Functional Requirement: Provide means for supplying lubrication to the turbocharger.
Inspection: The following inspections will be done to evaluate the Catawba turbocharger lube oil piping:
A.
Walk down of piping system to confirm that it is in accordance with TDI drawings.
B.
Visual examination of supports to confirm th:t they are in accordance with TDI drawings.
9.
Turbocharger and Intercooler Functional Requirements: Provide means of increasing air volume to cylinder.
Inspection: The following inspection will be done to evaluate the Catamba turbocharger and intercooler:
A.
Visual inspection of turbine parts, bearings, butterfly valves, and intercooler.
B.
Dimensional inspection of bearings.
~
l C.
Hardness and asterial tests of butterfly shafts and mounting fasteners.
D.
Torque readings on fasteners.
E.
Liquid penetrant inspection of intercooler adapters.
10.
Crankshaft Functional Requirement: The crankshaft converts reciprocating motion, component inertial forces and gas pressure piston forces to rotary motion and torque at the output flange.
Inspection: The following inspections will be done to evaluate the Catawba crankshaft:
A.
Thrust clearance and web deflection measurements.
B.
Visual inspections of main bearings and journals.
C.
Liquid penetrant inspection of bearing caps.
D.
Dimension measurement of main bearing shells.
E.
Eddy current inspection of fillets between crankpins and webs.
11.
Connecting Rods Functional Requirement: The connecting rod transmits engine firing force from the pistons and piston pins through the rod to the crankshaft such that the reciprocating motion of the pistons induces rotation and output torque of the crankshaft.
Inspections: The following inspections will be done to evaluate the Catawba connecting rods:
A.
Visual inspection of connecting rods, connecting rod bushings and shells, piston pins, and bolts.
B.
Dimensional measurement of connecting rods, connecting rod bushings and shells, piston pin and link rod pin.
l C.
Eddy current inspection of female threads in rod box and crank pin bearing shells.
D.
Liquid penetrant inspection of rod box sid a and crankpin bearing
I l
l E.
Magnetic particle inspection of connecting rod bolts.
F.
X-ray inspection of crank pin shells.
G.
Material and hardness test of connecting rod piston pin bushing and piston pins.
- 12. Pistons Functional Requirement: The pistons react to the cylinder firing pressure l
and provide a reciprocating mechanism for converting combined inertia and combustion pressure forces into mechanical torque through the connecting rod piston pin, connecting rod and crankshaft.
Inspection: The following inspection will be done to evaluate the Catawba pistons:
A.
Visual inspection of pistons and piston rings.
B.
Dimensional measurements of piston ring axial clearance in piston and piston ring butt gap in cylinder.
C.
Liquid penetrant inspection of stud bosses in piston and piston pin bosses in piston.
D.
Torque measurement of piston believue studs.
E.
Materialstestofpirgonrings.
- 13. Cylinder Block and Liner Functional Requirements: The cylinder block comprises the framework of liquid cooled engine and provides passages and support for the cylinder liner and camshaft. The cylinder block reacts to the dynamic loads frun the cylinder firing pressure and the valve assemblies. The liner forms the walls of the combustion chamber and must provide the guide for the piston motion while reacting to high tenperature gas forces and piston skirt side,
forces without excessive wear or scuffing.
Inspection: The follawing inspection will be done to evaluate the Catawba cylinder blocks and liners:-
l A.
Visual inspection of cylinder block liner and cylinder head studs.
B.
Dimensional inspection of cylinder liner and cylinder liner seating area in cylinder block.
C.
Liquid penetrant inspection of top of cylinder block and liner seating area in cylinder block.
D.
Ultrasonic examination of top of cylinder block and liner seating area in block.
E.
Materials and hardness tests on cylinder liners.
F.
Material test on cylinder head studs.
- 14. Air Start Valve Capscrews Functional Requirement: The air start valve capscrews provide a clamping force to hold air start valves in place on cylinder heads.
Inspection: A dimensional inspection of air start valve capscrews will be accomplished to evaluate their use in the Catawba diesels.
- 15. Jacket Water Pump Functional Requirement: The jacket water pump takes suction from the jacket water standpipe and delivers the required pressure and flow to the jacket water header. The jacket water circulates through the engine cylinder jackets, exhaust, manifold, the turboch'arger water. cooler, the turbocharger oil cooler and jacket water cooler.
Inspection: The following inspections will be done to evaluate the Catawba jacket water pumps:
A.
Visual inspection of jacket water pump gearing.
B.
Viscal inspection of jacket water pump wear ring and face seals.
C.
Visual inspection of all bolted parts for looseness.
D.
Material and hardness tests of jacket water pump impeller and shaft.
I l
l l
- 16. wiring and Termination Functional Requirement: The wiring and terminations interconnect instrument. control and power circuits on the diesel generator and at the control panels.
Inspection: Under development.
17.
Instrumentation Thermocouples Functional Requirement: Provides temperature signals for control and monitoring of the diesel engine.
Inspection: Under development.
e 4
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l l
l l
ATr#NMT 2 RESKNSE 10 PAIJETIO AI.LIANCE/
i CESG INIliRROG410RY 35 CATAWBA DIEST ! $PECTION PARTS LIST 03-30-1984 AT 11:36 peSe 1 l
BARTWrE IINEWS CIN EARINS CAP EE ESERY PT F 05 SCOLE R4EA, VISUL (F CAP SURFACE IRIN EM hil CAPS VIIUL OF CAP MTIE SURFACE FOR FRETTIES LLSE DIL IN'ERdL 1E11001S VER:FY AS BUILT WITH WALKDM TO DMWINS LIBE l11L TLB:hS 100 FITT! MIS VE4!FY AS MLT WITH idLKD0m TO DE NG LLE DIL LINE SJPPCR*S VEq;FY AS BLCT WITh WR.KDCE TO DiflWINS CARMSrJFT AC TU4h!E liEAR ECT OF CARESr#lFT FILLETS CARMS4F* EAR!hG SHEL.
VISJR. D4 #5 FOR EICESS GR, CIWICKINS, ETC CIIINKCASE ASSE E Y M*ERIA. DECK FROR lECDOS, VIS MJT POCKET AREAS CYLINDER SLTA PT (F LIER LANDIE, BLOCK TOP, 3 ADJACENT CYL l
CYLlhDER LIhER 3 L!8ER sap 3LE-VISUAL, DIPEhSIDA., WERIAL CYLIWER RJXX JACET WA*ER MAhi~LD fE BLILT SYSTEM IA.KDom PER DlWW!hSS CTL12ER BLOCK STJDS 4 CYLINDER SIWP.E-VISUAL, MTERIILS, MRDhESS CYL ELOC4 JACKET WTR M 4:FILD Nu'S RE O L TOROUE, E M RKINES, FDE NS LAPS
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FLYWEEL 30.Tlh6 VERIFY TOR 0KS MEET TDI IE:LilEMEN'S FIDIT EAR CASE 80LTIMi VERIFY AS BuleT OF ACCESSIB E PER DMW!E CmECTIh6 lEDS f00 BJinINSS lECESSIB E AEAS-frT, PT,MTERIALS MRONESS (IBfECilidi RCD BEA9!NS ShE.LS 1005 INSP, RT, ECT, PT, VISUAL, DI E SIONS f
PIST0h PT STdD BOSS MEA AND SK19T PISTON RIES IEEERIAL CHEC4, SE SET, VISUAL OF INSTAL.ATION plSTON FIN AGEEU.Y V:SLA. FOR 69, IELLED IN DIL PLuliS INTAKE TAPP-7S DIOSIONAL CHECK OF ROJ.ER CLEAllitiCE FLEL TAPPETS DIESIDA R3.LER CLEARMCE, FIEE TO lETA~E INISrlFT ASSE12.Y VISUAL FOR EA9, PT IF EICESSIVE DWHinF* St# PORTS, BC TIM 5 HND SEAR fE F370 TG4LES, VISull th IEA9
!aLER EAR fESEEY (CMh4 70 DURM VISul FOR EAR, MTERILS itG MIDESS CGtPARIS3 I!LER EAR ASSEPS.Y VISUAL FOR 101. MTERILS feiD 1611DESS CDIDA91Sch AIR START VfLVE VIS OF SEAT, D18EN OF CAPSCREW CYLINDER EAD PT VluE ETS, UT FIE DECd 3 PLACES IhTflHE itiD EIMuS* VALVES VIS OF EAT, STEM, PT IELD EAD TO STEM RVE SPRIES SPRIMIS SH1LD E ILACK WITH 684ITE STRIPES SE0VER 18iiERY VIS iEB AiEA704 CIWICKS, PT ET BT AIEA REL ptslP LimASE AND CON ROL 94!Fi IWITERIflL OF LIMA!E, MfDESS OF 96F*
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CYLINDER R.DCK CIIVER, BAEKETS felD 50LTS VERIFY TDEK, IIINDITION OF GASKET CluteOWE (IFJIS VERIFY TOIEUE, VIS FOR 30LT leLE CRACKS E KER ASIi M Y EEiWL VIS,15tTER!ll.S (DI GE, D11EN RX:KET LIP EINAUST EDER flRM IESE91lLY VIS FOR CilACKS Ih ElCKE' AIEA, D11EN SOCKET LIP puSHRCDS VER:FY FRICTIM MEUED puPIRDOS INSTAfD 13eECTOR PLaHIED VERITY FilICTION IELDED PLSHIEDS ISTALLED NEMER IWF 30LTIE VEllIFY 701192, IIT SAMPLE ORPSCEndi DEitCR MIVE Elut 28 941FT IIITERIflL AND IWWDESS OF SHIFTS IIS EAllS DDIGt MIVE tRIPIIS VERIFY CDG! Tim (F CIIP.!Mi IWITERIAL D ElI Ot OWE S3EED TRIP VERIFY plWPER IsillLLATI(Bi UER lEInflil3 EN JVERSnEED Trip fue IEXEmpty DRIVE VISiA., PT, IIITDt!fLS ICVIIG PAllTS, Elut IGUDESS OWERSPED TRIP CBfLIIS VERIFY 151TERIAL IS IEOPIEIE, V!S FOR IBSITIOh DDDGR LlumEE VI5uRL FOR (DUEBIWi DR IElut, LE LIITITE DI im IBEED ERLATIG DEllNOR VERIFY PlWPER ISTIL:.AT!!DI luiD ETTINS 12EltCt IElli EOdhiER MERY VERIFY ORpiTED p151T108 IF IIILBt JIDE* Ifl*DI fijRP IlpELLElt ite DEFT IIITERIALS, IElut RIIS, PT EAR INTDEc0LIR PIPINiH:0LP.ls,ETIM,ENT BEBIER 890 AT JW ETWBi FRR TUMO, 075 ESE mrT!s AIR s!STRIu0it asEEY WIURE IGul D IOppETE, MMWS IF EEEESIVE
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Printeo 53 of the 138 recorcs.
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l ATTACHMENT 3
RESFWSE 'lO PAIRETID AILIANCE/
CESG INTERROGNIDRY 49 RESPONSE TO #4a TP/3 /A/1100/02A - DIESEL GENERATOR 1 A PREOPERAT10NAL Fl%TTIONAL TEST i
Pt'RPOSE REST'LTS 1.s To demonstrate that the Diesc)
Refer to the respective functaonal Generator IA Auxiliary Systems, test for specif Jcm.
Cooling Water (KD). Lube Oil (LD),
Fuel Oil (FD), Starting Air (VG),
I and Building Ventilation (VD) perform in accordance with Design.
2.)
A. To demonstrate the proper logic, On 9/24/83 and 9/25/83 proper operation of the following Etch of the these trip functions were trip devices:
su,cessfully tested to show that upon an alarmed condition the Diesel Generator 1A i
Trip High Temp Lube 011 Outlet Alarm would shutdown, if running on a manual start l
Trip High Temp Bearings Alarm signal. Each of these trip functions were Trip High Teep Jacket Water Out Alarm successfully tested to show that upon an i
Trip h* Press Turbo Oil Alarm alarmed condition the Diesel Generator 1A Trip h Press Lube Oil Alarm would continue to run, with the exception Trip Vibration Alarm of Trip Overspeed Alarm Trip low Low Press Trip High Press Crankcase Alarm Lube Oil Alarm, Trip Generator Fault Alarm.
Trip Overspeed Alarm if running on an emergency start signal.
Trip low low Press Lube Oil Alarm The Trip Overspeed Alarm, Trip low low Trip Generator Fault Alrarm Press Lube Oil Alarm, and Trip Generator Fault Alare Trip functions were successfully tested to show that upon an alarmed condition the Diesel !anerator 1A would shutdown, if running on an emergency start signal.
On 9/24/83, 9/25/83 and 9/27/83 B. Proper operation of the following The Diesel Generator IA controls were initiating devices and permissive successfully tested to show that while and prohibit interlocks:
positioned to LOCAL all REM 011 controls except STOP, were inactive. The Diesel Diesel Generator Governor Control Generator IA controls were successfully RAISE and IAWER (Iacal and Remote) tested to show that while positioned to Diesel Generator Voltage Control REMOTE all IDCAL controls, except STOP RAISE and LOWER (Iacal and Remote) and EMERGENCY STOP, were inactive. The Diesel Generator STOP and EMERGENCY Diesel Generator 1A controls were STOP (Local and Resiote) successfully tested to show that when Diesel Generator Breaker Control Room Override was actuated all i
Diesel Generater Control Room Override REM 011 controls were inactive. This Diesel Generator,Imcal and Remote test proved that the Diesel Generstor 1A
. could be controlled properly during all-modes of operation, IACAL (Diesel Roon),
REMOTE (Control Room), Control Room Override (Diesel Room).
l On 9/24/83 i
3.) To demonstrate that the Diesel Generator The Diesel Samarator 1A was shown to start saa he started and leaded to 7000 EW in and be loaded to 7000 EW in 51.24 seconds,
$ 60 seceads, and operates with this load and them operated with this load for for 3 60 minutes.
-65 minutes.
I RESULTS PURPO.cr.
Un 3/22/64
.)
lo demonstrate that the Diesel Generator The ability of the Dies cl Gencastor IA and its load group can function without and its load group to function without any dependence upon any other load group any dependence upon any other load group or portion thereof.
or portion thereof was successfully testang as part of the Engineered Safe-guard Featurc>, Actuat ion Funct ional Ter t.
This was, demonstrated by verifying absence
(
of voltage on the Train B essential swith-gear during the Train A essential switchgear loading sequence.
On 3/22/84 5.) To demonstrate that 1) Diesel Generator The Engineered safeguard Features Actaation is capable of starting and accelerating Functional Test successfully tested this to rated speed, in the required sequence, requirement by showing that voltage dips all of the Engineered Safeguard Feature due to loading did not go below 6% of leads, 2) at no time during the loading nominal at any time. Frequency changes aequence that the frequency and voltage due to loading did not vary by more decreases to less than 95% of nominal than 1%.
and 75% of nominal, respectively, and
- 3) the frequency is restored to within 2% of nominal, and the voltage is restored to within 10% of nominal within 60% of each load-sequence time interval.
6.) To demonstrate, by simulating loss of all This test has not been completed as of yet.
AC voltage, that the Diesel Generator can start automatically and attain the required voltage and f requency and maintain them within the required limits.
7.) To demonstrate the proper operation'.of This test has not been completed as of yet.
the Diesel Generator during the Design-Accident-loading Sequence and to verify that the voltage and frequency are maintained within required limits.
On 3/17/84 8.) To demonstrate the Full-lead-Carrying The Diesel Generator 1A was started and capability of the Diesel Generator for an loaded to 7000 kW (100%) until engine interval of > 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, of which 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> equilibrium temperature was reached. Next shall be at 100% load at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> the load was increased to 7700 XW (110%)
shall be at 110% load.
for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 5 minutes as the start l
of the Full-Imad Carrying Capability Test. Then load was reduced to 7000 XW l
(200%) for 27 hours3.125e-4 days <br />0.0075 hours <br />4.464286e-5 weeks <br />1.02735e-5 months <br /> and 5 minutes.
The Diesel Generator 4A was able to complete this test successfully but Design Engineering is reviewing data to determine acceptability of the Jacket Water temperatures that were recorded.
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RESULTS l pystipotr.
1 On 3/11/84 and 3/17/84 9.: To demonstrate tisat the Fuc1 011 Tilter With the Diesel Generator 1A loaded te can tw changed with thc' Diesel Generator 7000 W (100*.) the ability to swap from aperat ang, using the diverter valve, one fuel oil filter to the other wat-i wit he::t a drop of loss of fuct of) successfully tested. By using the diverter valve it is possibic to chang.-
prc> sus.
to the other fuel oil filter without f
a drop or loss of fuel of) pressure.
On 3/11/44 and 3/17/44 10.) To demonstrate that the Fuel Oil Strainer With the Diesel Generator 1A loaded to i
can be changed with the Diesel Generator 7000 W (2007.) the ability to swap from i
operating, using the diverter valve, one fuel oil strainer to the other was uithout a drop of loss of fuel oil successfully tested. By using the diverter valve it is possible to change to the pressure.
other fuel oil strainer without a drop 7
or. loss of fuel oil pressure.
On 3/18/24 i 31.) Ta verify the fuel oil storage capacity With the Diesel Generator loaded to j
of seven days at full load by measuring 7000 W (200%) the fuel oil consumption the Diesel Generator's fuel consumption rate was measured to be 510 gal /hr.
rate at full load.
This does not meet initial acceptance I
criteria of < 488.5 gal /hr. Therefore, Design Engineering is evaluating the results to determine accootability.
'On 3/22/84 32.) To demonstrate the functional capability The Engineered Safeguard Teatures af the Diesel Generator, at full-load Actuation Functional Test successfully temperature, to operate properly. By tested this requires,ent by showing that simulating a Black Out concurrent with the D/G can be started with 5 minutes o LOCA signal, verify that the Diesel of being shutdown from a run of greater Generator can start, in the required than one hour. The D/G accepted the time ar.d sequence loads automatically combined 3/0 and 14CA loading while t;hile maintaining voltage and frequency maintaining voltage and frequency within eithin required limits.
limits.
l 1his requirement has been reworded to agree with our current Technical Specifications.
13.) To demonstrate the capability of the 1he' Diesel Generator 1A was successfully I
Diesel Generator, to start and accept tested to show the 35 consecutive starts 150". rated load 31 hour3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br />, 35 sensecutive as follows:
times.
.-_.___...__y
,_..y.
Page 1
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Starting Time tit a r t n Dat e/Tienc T2mi Load Loaded Result Commeng 1
c.24-83/11:35 4.05 Ser 7000 W 65 Hin Valid / Success.
9-24-83/13:25 3.15 Set 0 Kk 0 Han invalid. Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 3
9-24-83/13:30 3.35 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 4
9-24-83/13:35 3.47 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 5
9-24-83/14:25 3.24 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 6
9-24-83/14:30 3.50 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 7
9-24-83/14:35 3.95 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 6
9-24-63/14:40 4.18 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips
~
9 9-24-83/15:30 3.15 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 10 9-24-83/15:35 3.40 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips Il 9-24-83/15:40 3.45 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 12 9-24-83/15:45 3.89 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testias trips 13 9-24-83/16:45 2.98 Sec 4000 W 80 Min Valid / Success 14 9-24-83/19:45 3.03 Sec 4500 W 70 Min Valid / Success
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Starting Time Start n list e tTi.me Time Load Loaded Result Comments 15 9-25-83/06:35 6.25 Sec 0 KV 0 Hin Invalid / Success Did not at tempt to load, testing trips le 9-25-83/10:50 2.93 Sec 0 KV 0 Min Invalid / Success Dad not attempt to load, testing trips 17 9-25-83/12:40 2.97 Sec 0 KW 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not atteept to load, testing trips 1
18 9-25-83/13:30 3.96 Sec 0 KW 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 19 9-25-83/16:45 6.11 Sec 0 KW 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 20 9-25-63/17:00 3.25 Sec 4000 KV 90 Min Valid / Success 21 9-25-83/19:45 3.03 Sec 0 KW 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing controls 22 9-25-63/20:25 3.00 Sec 4000 KV 65 Min Valid / Success 23 9-26-83/10:05 3.03 Sec 4000 KW 70 Min Valid / Success 24 9-26-83/13:05 3.05 Sec 5000KW 75 Min Valid / Success 25 9-27-83/09:50 3.12 Sec 4000 KW 65 Min Valid / Success 26 9-27-83/13:15 3.05 Sec 4000 KV 60 Min Valid / Success 27 9-27-83/15:10 3.06 Sec 4000 KW 65 Min Valid / Success 28 9-28-83/10:45 3.08 Sec 4000 KW 65 Min Valid / Success 29 9-28-83/13:10 3.05 Sec 7000 KW 65 Min
' Valid / Success 30 9-24-83/15:05 3.09 Sec 4000 KW 70 Min Valid / Success 31 9-29-83/08:15 3.05 Sec 4000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 32 9-29-83/10:20 3.04 Sec 7000 KW 65 Min Valid / Success 33 9-29-83/12:45 3.06 Sec 4000 KW 65 Min Valid / Success
. s..
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-W.
Starting Time Start 1:
Date/ Time Time Load Loaded Result Comments 3
o-29-83/14:30 3.0c Sec 7000 KV 90 Min Valid / Success 35 9-30-83/06:35 3.30 Sec 4000 KV 60 Min Valid / Success 33 9-30-83/10:35 3.07 Sec 7700 KV 65 Min Valid / Success 37 9-30-83/13:10 3.05 Sec 4000 KW 65 Min Valid / Success 38 9-30-83/15:30 3.00 Sec 4000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 39 10-1-83/09:00 2.96 Sec 4000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 40 10-1-83/11:30 3.09 Sec 4000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 41 10-1-83/13:40 3.04 Sec 4000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 43 10-1-83/15:55 3.05 Sec 4000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 43 10-1-83/18:00 3.10 Sec 4000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 44 10-1-83/19:55 3.95 Sec 4000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 45 10-1-83/21:50 3.11 Sec 4000 KV 60 Min Valid / Success 46 10-2-83/09:00 3.06 Sec 4000 KV 60 Min Valid / Success 47 10-2-83/11:05 3.14 Sec 4000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 48 10-2-83/13:10 3.12 Sec 4000 KV 60 Min Valid / Success 49 10-2-83/15:10 3.12 Sec 4000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success
)
50 10-3-83/09:25 3.04 Sec 5000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 51 10-3-83/11:20 3.09 Sec 4000 KW 70 Min Valid / Success l
52 10-3-83/13:35 3.08 Sec 4000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 33 11-6-83/17:16 6.15 Sec 0 KW 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, simul-l teneous starts l
54 11-6-83/17:35 6.12 Sec 0 KW 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, simul-taneous starts e
PURPO.tr.
E 5ULTs 1.. ) To demonstrate that the transient This test has not been completed as of yet.
'~
, followans the complete loss of load would not cause the Diesel Generator to reach 500 R'P!!.
15.) To demonstrate that the capability of This was successfully demonstrated during the Diesel Generator to supply emergency the Diesel Generator 1A Load Sequencer i
power within the required time is not Functional Test. This test showed that impaired during testing.
If the Diesel Generator IA was 1.) Paralleled to the system grid and l
2.) An energency signal was received, I
that the Diesel Generator IA Breaker would open and the Diesel Generator IA would continue to operate ready to accept loads if necessary.
16.) To demonstrate that 1) the Diesel This test has not been completed as of yet.
l Generator is capable of startiha and accelerating to rated speed, in the l
required sequence, all of the Black Out Loads, 2) at no time during the loading sequence that the frequency and voltage decrease to less than 95% of nominal and 75% of nominal, respectively, and 3) the frequency is restored to within 2% of nominal, and the voltage is restored to within 10% of nominal within 60% of each load sequence time interval.
17.) To demonstrate the capability of the This test has not been completed as of yet.
Diesel Generator to reject a load of - 825 XV and maintain voltage af.
4160 1 416 volts and frequency at 60 1 1.2 HZ.
18.) To demonstrate the ability to This test has not been completed as of yet.
- 1) synchronize the Diesel Generator while connected to the emergency load, with offsite power, 2) transfer the emergency load to the offsite power,
- 3) isolate the Diesel Generator, and
- 4) restore the Diesel Generator to standby status.
On 11/6/83 i
19.) To demonstrate the capability to
, Diesel Generator 1A and Diesel simultaneously start both Diesel
- Generator 15 were started simultaneous 1f Generators without a common failure.
on each of the 2 redundant electrical circuits without a common failure. Refer to #13 response for start times and dates.
O
PURPOSE RESULTS On 3/22/84 20.) To verify that the auto-connected During loading of D/G on a loads to the Diesel Generator do combination B/0 and LOCA signal not exceed 7700 KV.
the maximum load applied to the D/G was below 4450 KW.
- 21. ) To demonstrate the Diesel Generator The wording of the requirement wa>
- 1) starts from ambient conditions and changed after discussions with the NRC accelerates to at least 427 RPM in during EST testing. According to the
$ 11 seconds, 21 the generator voltage Technical Specifications and the NRC, and frequency shall be 4160 1 420 volts only one test signal needed to be and 60 t 1.2 HZ within 11 seconds after verified, based upon the conditions the start signal on an ESF Actuation set forth. This test was successfully Test signal.
completed 3/27/84 by simulating a EST Actuation Signal and verifying the Diesel Generator IA started in 6.15 seconds as obtained by the D/G 1A start timer. The D/G reached its nominal value for frequency and voltage in less than 6 seconds.
22.) To demonstrate on a simulated loss This test has not been completed as of yet.
of offsite power.
- 1) The de-energi:stion of the emergency buses and, 2) load shedding from the emergency buses.
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TP/1/A/1550/01A - DIESEL GENERATOR 1 A FUEL. O!L SYSTQlpLD FtHCTIONAL TEST Pl*RPOST.
RESULTS i
1.1 To verify proper operation of the On 7/6/83 the following alarms were following alarm >:
verified to operate properly on a simulated abnormal condition:
A. High AP Fuel Filter A. High AP Fuel Filter
- 3. High AP Fuel Pump Strainer B. High AP Fuel Pump Strainer C. High AP DC Pump Strainer C. High AP DC Pump Strainer D. Iow Press Fuel Oil D. Low Press Fuel Oil E. Migh Level Main Fuel Tank E. High Level Main Fuel Tank F. Low Level Main Fuel Tank F. Imv Level Main Fuel Tank G. Main FO Tank Tech Spec Warn G. Mi Level F0 Retaining Wall H. High Level Fuel Day Tank
- 1. Iow Level Fuel Day Tank The remainder of the alarms have J. Fuel Pump 0/S Drive Failure not been tested as of yet.
K. Ni Level FC Retaining Wall
~
2.) To verify the interlock between the On 7/6/83 the interlock between the l
Diesel Generator IA Fuel Oil Day Diesel Generator 1A Fuel Oil Day l
Tank Retaining Wall Drain Valve Tank Retaining Wall Drain Valve and the Lube Oil Transfer Pump.
(IFD81) and the Lube Oil Transfer Pump was successfully tests. '1his test verified that upon receipt of an increasingly high level in the retaining wall, that 1FD81 would open and the Lube Oil Transfer Pump would automatically start.
It also verified that once the high level condition was cleared, that ITD81 would close and the Lube Oil Transfer Pump would stop automatically.
3.) To establish operating data on the On 7/6/83 operating data was recorded Motor Driven Fuel Oil Booster Pump.
for the Diesel Generator IA Motor Driven Fuel Oil Booster Pump. This dets will be used as part of the Performance Monitoring Program to trend pump performance. Since this was performed the function of the Motor Driven Fuel Oil Booster Pump has been deleted from system design.
4.) To establish operating data on the on 7/6/83, operating data was Fuel 011 Recirculation Pump.
recorded for the Fuel Oil
-Recirculation Pump. This data vill be used as part of the Performance monitoring Program.
5.) To verify the interlock between the This test has not been completsd Main 70 Tank Tech Spec Warn Alarm and as of yet.
the Ftsel Oil Recirculaties Pump.
P -
w
,*-'+-e-
s TP/1/A/1400/07A - DIESEL GENERATOR 1 A COOLING WATER SYSTEM COLD FUNCTIONAL TEST ptKrosr.
RESULTS l
1.) To verify proper operation of the On 7/11/63 the following alarms were ic11oJing alarms.
verified to operate properly on a simulated abnormal condition:
A.
Lok Temp Jacket Water In b.
Low Temp Jacket Water out A.
Low Temp Jacket Water in C.
High Temp Jacket Water In B.
lov Temp Jacket Water Out D.
High Temp Jacket Water Out C.
High Temp Jacket Water In E.
'High Temp Aftercooler Water In L.
High Temp Jacket Water Out F.
Low Press Jacket Water E.
High Temp Aftercooler Water In I
G.
Low Level Jack Water F.
Low Press Jacket Water G.
Imv Level Jack Water 2.) To verify the interlock between the On 7/11/83 the interlock between the Jacket Water Keep Wars Pump and the Diesel Generator IA Jacket Water Keep Jacket Water Keep Wars Nester.
Warm Pump and the Diesel Generator 1A Jacket' Keep Wars Nester was successfully tested. This test verified when the Jacket Water Keep Wars Pump stops, the Jacket Water Keep Wars Heater de-energizes.
3.) To verify the capability of the KD On 7/11/84 the capability of the KD System to maintain the Diesel in a system to maintain the Diesel Generator 1A warm condition during standby operation.
In a warm condition during standby operation, was successfully tested. The final acceptance criteria was the Jacket Water temperature was maintained at 150'T 10*F during standby operation. The KD system tested out to be 150*F which meets the acceptance criteria. However, it was noted later that the thermostat has a 50*F desdband which would allow the syst'em to cool to - 100*F. An IPR has been v'ritten to correct this problem.
When the new thermostat is installed this requirement will be retested.
TP/1/A/1700/01A - DIESEL GENERATOR 1A LUBE OIL SYSTEM COLD FUNCTIONAL TEST 1.) To verify proper operation of the On 7/11/83 the following alarms were i
following alsras:
verified to operate properly on a simulated abnormal condition:
A.
Lou Temp Lube Oil Inlet
. Low Temp Lube Oil Inlet f
B.
h-Temp Lube 011 Outlet A.
C.
Righ Temp Lebe Oil Inlet B.
Iow Temp Imbe Oil Outlet D.
Nish Temp Lube 011 Outlet C.
High Temp Lube Oil Inlet E.
.Migh AP Lube Filter D.
High Temp Lube Oil Outlet F.
Nish AP Lube Strainer E.
High AP Lube Filter G.
Imv Press Lube 011 F.
Migh AP Imbe Strainer M.
Low Press Trabo 011 Right Front G.
Imv Press Labe Oil I.
Iow Freas harbo 011 Left Front H.
Law Press harbo 011 Right Front J.
Imv Imbe Tank Level I.
Imv Press harbo 011 Left Front 1
J.
Imv Imbe Tank Eevel
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1 PURPOSE RESULTS 1 ::.) To verity the interlock between the Du 7/11/83 the interlock between the Pre-Lube Oil Pump and the Lube Oil Diesc) Generator'IA Pre-Lube Oil Pump Sump Tank Heaters, and the Diesel Generator 1A Lube oil Sump Tank Heaters were successfully tested. This test verified when the Pre-Lube Oil Pump stops, the Lube Oil Sump Tank Heaters de-energize.
3.) To verify the capability for the LD On 7/11/83 the capability of the LD System to maintain the Diesel in a System to maintain the Diesel w:ra condition during standby Generator IA in a warm condition operation.
during standby operation, was successfully tested. The final acceptance criteria was the Lube Oil Temperature is maintained at 155'T i 5'T during standby operation. The LD System tested out to be 150*F which meets the acceptance criteria.
However, it was noted later the thermostats have a 50*F deadband which would allow the system to cool to
~105'F.
An IPR has been written to correct this problem. When the new thermostats are installed this requirement will be ratested.
TP/1/A/1450/08A - DIESEL GENERATOR 1A ENGINE STARTING AIR SYSTEM COLD FUNCTIONAL TEST 1.) To verify proper operation of the On 8/6/83 the following alarms l
following alarms:
were verified to operate properly on a simulated abnormal condition:
A.
Imv Press Starting Air B.
Iow Press Control Air A.
Low Press Starting Air B.
Low Press Control Air 2.) To verify that Starting Air On 8/6/83 the Diesel Generator 1A Compressor 1A1 operates Engine Starting Air System 1A1 was cutomatically to maintain verified to maintain the starting adequate starting Air Tank 1A1 Air Tank 1A1 pressure at 250 1 15 psig.
pressure.
The automatic function of the starting Air Compressor 1A1 was demonstrated 3 times l
to maintain the starting Air Tank 1A1 pressure between 242.5 psig and 255 psig.
3.) To verify that Starting Air On 8/6/83 the Diesel Generator 1A Compressor 1A2 operates autoestically Engine Starting Air System 1A2 was to maintain adequate Starting Air verified to maintain the starting Tank 1A2 pressure.
Air Tank 1A2 pressure at 250 1 15 psig.
The automatic function of the starting Air Compressor 1A2 was demonstrated 3 times to maintain the starting Air Tank 1A2 pressure between 242 psig and 257 pois.
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l TP/1/A/1100/03 - DIESEL GENERATOR 17 PREOPERATIONAL FUNCTIONAL TEST l
PURPOST.
RESULTS 1.)
To demonstrate that the Diesel Refer to the respective functional Generator 1A Auxiliary Systems, test for specifics.
Cooling Water (KD). Lube Oil (LD).
Fuel Oil (FD). Starting Air (VG).
and Building Ventilation (VD) perform in accordance with Design.
2.)
A. To demonstrate the proper logic, On 11/30/83 proper operation of the following Each of the these trip functions were trip devices:
successfully tested to show that upon an alarmed condition the Diesel Generator 1B Trip High Temp Lube Oil Outlet Alarm would shutdown, if running on a manual start Trip High Temp Bearings Alarm signal. Each of these trip functions were Trip High Temp Jacket Water Out Alarm successfully tested to show that upon an Trip Imv Press Turbo Oil Alarm alarmed condition the Diesel Generator 1B Trip Imv Press Lube Oil Alarm would continue to run, with the exception Trip Vibration Alarm of Trip Overspeed Alarm, Trip Imw low Press Trip High Press Crankcase Alarm Lube Oil Alare, Trip Generator Fault Alarm, Trip Overspeed Alarm if running on an emergency start signal.
Trip Low Low Press Lube Oil Alarm The Trip Overspeed Alare, Trip Low Low Trip Generator Fault Alrarm Press Lube Oil Alarm, and Trip Generator Fault Alarm Trip functions were successfully tested to show that upon an alarmed condition the Diesel Generator IB would shutdown, if running on an emergency start signal.
On 12/1/83, 12/2/83 and 12/3/83 B. Proper operation of the following The Diesel Generator IB controls were initiating devices and permissive successfully tested to show that while and prohibit interlocks:
positioned to LOCAL all REMOTE controls except STOP, were inactive. The Diesel Diesel Generator Governor Control Generator IB controls were successfully RAISE and LOWER (Local and Remote) tested to show that while positioned to Diesel Generator Voltage Control REMOTE all LOCAL controls, except STOP RAISE and LOWER (Incal and Remote) and EMERGENCY STOP, were inactive. The i
Diesel Generator STDP and EMERGENCY Diesel Generator 15 controls were STOP (Imcal and Remote) successfully tested to show that when Diesel Generator Breaker Control Roos Override was actuated all l
Diesel Generator Control Room Override REMOTE controls were inactive. This l
Diesel Generator Incal and Remote test proved that the Diesel Generator IB could be controlled properly during all modes of operation, IACAL (Diesel Room),
REMOTE (Control Roce), Control Room Override (Diesel Room).
On 11/29/83 3.) To demonstrate that the Diesel Generator The Diesel Generator IB was shown to start can be started and loaded to 7000 KW in and be loaded to 7000 KW in 30.6 seconds, 3 60 seconds, and operates with this load' and then operated with this load for i
for > 60 minutes.
65 minutes.
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PURPOST.
RESULTS 4.)
To demonstrate that the Diesel Generator
.This test has not been completed and its load group can function without as o'f yet, any dependence upon any other load group or portion thereof.
3.1 To demonstrate that 11 Diesel Generator This test has not been completed is capable of starting and accelerating as of yet.
to rated speed, in the required sequence, all of the Engineered Safeguard Feature Imads. 2) at no time during the loading aequence that the frequency and voltage decreases to less than 95% of nominal and 75% of nominal, respectively, and
- 3) the frequency is restored to within 2% of nominal, and the voltage is restored to within 10% of nominal within 60% of each load-sequence time interval.
6.) To demonstrate, by simulating loss of all This test has not been completed as of yet.
AC voltage, that the Diesel Generator can start automatically and attain the required voltage and frequency and esintain them within the required limits.
7.) To demonstrate the proper operation of This test has not been completed as of yet.
the Diesel Generator during the Design-Accident-Loading Sequence and to verify that the voltage and frequency are maintained within required limits.
On 3/22/84 8.) To demonstrate the Full-Load-Carrying The Diesel Generator IB was started and capability of the Diesel Generator for an loaded to 7000 kW (100%) until engine interval of > 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, of which 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> equilibrium temperature was reached.
Next shall be at 100% load at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> the load was increased to 7700 KW (110%)
shall be at 110% load.
for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> as the start of the Full-Load Carrying Capability Test. Then load was reduced to 7000 KW (100%) for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
The Diesel Generator IB was able to complete this test successfully but Design Engineering is reviewing data to determine acceptability of the Jacket Water temperatures that were recorded.
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I PlitSPOSE RESULTS l
On 3/22/84
- 9. ) To demonstrate that the Fuel Oil Filter With the Diesel Generator IB loaded to j'
operating, using the diverter valve, one fuel oil filter to the other was can be changed with the Diesel Generator 7000 W (100%) the ability to swap from without a drop of loss of fuel oil successfully tested. By using the pressure.
diverter valve it is possible to change j
to the other fuel oil filter without j
a drop or loss of fuel oil pressure.
1 On 3/22/84 j 20.) To demonstrate that the Fuel Oil Strainer With the Diesel Generator 1B loaded to j
can be changed with the Diesel Generator 7000 KW (100%) the ability to swap from operating, using the diverter valve, one fuel oil strainer to the other was trithout a drop of loss of fuel oil succgssfully tested. By using the diverter pressure.
valve it is possible to change to the I
other fuel oil strainer without a drop
{
or loss of fuel oil pressure.
{
On 3/23/84 i 11.) To verify the fuel oil storage capacity With the Diesel Generator IB loaded to l
cf seven days at full load by esasuring 7000 KW (100%) the fuel oil consumption i
the Diesel Generator's fuel consumption rate was measured to be 470 gal /hr.
rate at full load.
This does meet initial acceptance l
criteria of < 488.5 gal /hr but Design Engineering is evaluating the results to determine acceptability.
{
This requirement has been reworded to i
agree with our current Technical l
Specifications.
i I 22.) To demonstrate the functional capability This test has not been completed 1
cf the Diesel Generator, at full-load as of yet.
temperature, to operate properly. B) 01mulating a Black Out concurrent with c IDCA signal, verify that the Diesel Generator can start, in the required time and sequence loads automatically chile maintaining voltage and frequency t;ithin required limits.
i j 33.) To demonstrate the capability of the The Diesel Generator 1B was successfully Diesel Generator, to start and accept tested to show the 35 consecutive starts j
150% rated load 31 hour3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br />, 35 consecutive as follows:
times.
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Starting Tisc Stert :
Datc/ Time Time Load Loaded Result Comments 1
13-17-83/11:43 3.43 Sec 7000 W 40 Min Invalid / Success Terminated run intentionally due to spurious actuation of C0 alarm 7
2 11-29-83/14:25 3.71 Sec 7000 Kh*
65 Min Valid / Success 3
11-30-83/10:25 3.2 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 4
11-30-83/10:30 3.36 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 5
11-30-83/10:35 3.5 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 6
11-30-83/20:37 3.65 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 7
11-30-83/20:42 3.8 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 8
11-30-83/10:53 3.6 Sec
.OW 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 9
11-30-83/11:10 3.52 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 10 11-30-83/12:45 3.14 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 11 11-30-83/12:55 3.26 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 12 11-30-83/13:00 3.48 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips
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Starting Time Stnrt n Date/Tiec Time Imad Imaded Result Comme ts 13 11-30-83/13:15 6.49 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 14 11-30-83/14:19 3.9 Sec 0E O Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 15 11-30-83/14:30 2.69 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 16 11-30-83/14:40 5.07 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 17 11-30-83/14:44 4.96 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 18 11-30-83/14:51 4.92 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing trips 19 12-1-83/08:57 3.14 Sec 7000 W 60 Min Valid / Success 20 12-1-83/11:00 3.2 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, testing controls 21 12-1-83/12:55 3.19 Sec 4000 W 60 Min Valid / Success 22 12-2-83/08:37 3.15 Sec 4000 W 60 Min Valid / Success 23 12-2-83/11:05 3.19 Sec 5000 W 60 Min Valid / Success 24 12-2-83/13:35 3.22 Sec 4000 W 21.45 Min Invalid / Success Trip of a device (overcurrent relay) which is bypassed in emerSency 25 12-3-83/08:45 3.13 Sec 5000 W 75 Min Valid / Success l
26 12-3-83/11:55 3.29 Sec 7000 W
. 60 Min Valid / Success 27 12-4-63/11:57 3.17 Sec 4000 W 60 Min Valid / Success 28 12-4-83/14:03 3.4 Sec 5000 W 60 Min Valid / Success
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Starting Time Start n Date/ Time Time Load Loaded Result Comments 29 12-4-83/16:00 3.23 Sec 7000 KV 60 Min Valid / Success 30 12-5-83/12:51 3.22 Sec 4000 KV 62 Min Valid / Success l
31 12-5-83/15:07 3.2 Sec 7000 KW 0 Min Invalid / Success Spurious trip of Lo Tbrbo 011 Press Alarm 32 12-6-83/14:17 3.24 Sec 0 KW 0 Min Invalid / Success Troubleshooting Turbo Oil Trip 33 12-7-83/10:50 3.14 Sec 5000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 34 12-11-83/11:23 3.24 Sec 7700 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 35 12-13-83/15:30 4.28 Sec 4000 KV 61 Min Valid / Success 36 12-14-83/10:02 3.19 Sec 7700 KW 63 Min Valid / Success 37 12-14-83/13:16 3.3 Sec 5000 KW 62 Min Valid / Success 38 12-14-83/15:45 3.25 Sec 5000 KV 62 Min Valid / Success 39 12-16-83/08:42 3.16 Sec 4000 KW 61 Min Valid / Success 40 12-16-83/14:11 3.13 Sec 4000 KW 103 Min Valid / Success 41 12-16-83/17:00 3.25 Sec 4000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 42 12-16-83/19:50 3.23 Sec 40D0 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 43 12-17-83/10:35 3.11 Sec 4000 KW 62 Min Valid / Success 44 12-17-83/13:00 3.21 Sec 5000 KW 61 Min Valid / Success 45 12-17-83/15:20 3.25 Sec 6000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 46 12-17-83/17:36 3.2 Sec 4000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success 47 12-17-83/20:07 3.2 Sec 4000 KW 61 Min Valid / Success 48 12-18-83/09:02 3.19 Sec 4000 KW 61 Min Valid / Success 49 12-18-83/11:25 3.2 Sec 5000 KW 61 Min Valid / Success 50 12-18-83/13:50 3.22 Sec 4000 KW 62 Min Valid / Success 31 12-18-83/17:31 3.19 Sec 4000 KW 60 Min Valid / Success
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Starting Time Start n Date/ Time Time load Loaded Result Comments 52 12-18-83/19:21 3.26 Sec 4000 W 60 Min Valid / Success 53 12-19-83/08:12 3.2 Sec 4000 W 61 Min Valid / Success 54 12-19-83/10:38 3.21 Sec 4000 W 62 Min Valid / Success 55 12-19-83/13:05 3.2 Sec 5000 KW 61 Min Valid / Success 56 12-19-83/16:05 3.21 Sec 0W 0 Min Invalid / Success Did not attempt to load, check-ing governor settings and fuel oil 57 12-21-83/15:28 3.19 Sec 4000 W 62 Min Valid / Success f
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PURPOSE RESULTS l
- 14. ) To demonstrate that the transient This test has not been completed as of yet.
l following the complete loss of load should not cause the Diesel Generator i
to reach 500 RPH.
15.) To demonstrate that the capability of This was successfully demonstrated during the Diesel Generator to supply emergency the Diesel Generator 1B Load Sequencer power within the required time is not Functional Test. This test showed that tapaired during testing.
if the Diesel Generator 15 was 1.) Paralleled to the system grid and 2.) An emergency signal was received, that the Diesel Generator 1B Breaker would open and the Diesel Generator IB would continue to operate ready to accept loads if necessary.
16.) To demonstrate that 1) the Diesel This test has not been completed as of yet.
Generator is capable of starting and accelerating to rated speed, in the l
required sequence, all of the Black Out Imads, 2) at not time during the loading sequence that the frequency and voltage decrease to less than 95*. of nominal and 75% of nominal, respectively, and 3) the frequency is restored to within 2*. of nominal, and the voltage is restored to within 10*. of nominal within 60% of each load sequence time interval.
17.) To demonstrate the capability of the This test has not been completed as of yet.
Diesel Generator to reject a load of - 825 EW and maintain voltage at, 4160 i 416 volts and frequency at 60 1 1.2 HZ.
18.) To demonstrate the ability to This test has not been completed as of yet.
- 1) synchronize the Diesel Generator while connected to the emergency load, with offsite power, 2) transfer the emergency load to the offsite power,
- 3) isolate the Diesel Generator, and
- 4) restore the Diesel Generator to standby status.
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PURPOst RESULTS 19.) To verify that the auto-connected This test has not been completed loads to the Di,esel Generator do as of yet, not exceed 7700 KV.
)
20.) To demonstrate the Diesel Generator The wording of the requirement was 11 starts from ambient conditions and changed after discussions with the NRC accelerates to at least 427 RPt! in during EST testing, According to the
- 11 seconds, 2) the generator voltage Technical Specifications and the NRC, and frequency shall be 4160 1 420 volts only one test signal needed to be and 6011.2 HZ within 11 seconds after verified, based upon the conditions the start signal on an EST Actuation set forth. This test was succ.essfully Test Signal.
completed 3/27/84 by simulating a ESF Actuation Signal and verifying the Diesel Generator IA started in 6.19 seconds as obtained by the D/G IB start timer. The D/G reached its i
nominal value for frequency and voltage in less than 7 seconds.
21.) To demonstrate on a simulated loss This test has not been completed as of yet.
of offsite power.
- 1) The de-energization of the emergency buses and, 2) load shedding from the emergency buses.
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l TP/1/A/1550/013 - DIESEL GENERARHt 13 FUEL 01L SYS11M COLD FUNCTIONAL TEST PURPOSE RESUL_TS_
i 2.) To verify proper operation of the On 10/21/83 the following alarms were following alarms:
verified to operate properly on a simulated abnormal condition:
A. High AP Fuel Filter A. High AP Fuel Filter B. Nish AP Fuel Pump Strainer
- 3. Nish AP Fuel Pump Strainer C. Nigh AP DC Pump Strainer C. High AP DC Pump Strainer D. Imv Press Fuel Oil D. Law Press Fuel Oil E. Nigh Level Main Fuel Tank E. High Level Main Fuel Tank F. Iow Level Main Fuel Tank F. Low Level Main Fuel Tank G. Main F0 Tank Tech Spec Warn G. N1 Level FO Retaining Wall N. High Level Fuel Day Tank 1
I. Low Level Fuel Day Tank The remainder of the alarms have i
J. Fuel Pump 0/5 Drive Failure not been tested as of yet.
K. Ni Level FO Retaining Wall f
2.) To verify the interlock between the On 3/26/84 the interlock between the Diesel Generator IB Fuel Oil Day Diesel Generator IB Fuel Oil Day Tank Retaining Wall Drain Valve Tank Retaining Wall Drain Valve and the Lube 011 Transfer Fump.
(ITD83) and the Lube Oil Transfer Pump was successfully tests. This test verified that upon receipt of an increasingly high level in the retaining wall, that ITD83 would open and the Lube 011 Transfer Pump would automatically start.
It also verified that once the high level condition was cleared, that ITD83 would close and the Lube Oil Transfer j
Pump would stop automatically.
3.) To establish operating data on the This test has not been completed as Motor Driven Fuel 011 Booster Pump.
of yet.
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TP/1/A/1400/075 - DIESEL GENERATOR 18 COOLING WATER SYSTEM COLD FUNCTIONAL TEST i
l PURPOSE RESULTS 3.) To verify proper operation of the On 10/21/83 the following alarms were following alarms.
verified to operate properly on a simulated abnormal condition:
A.
Low Temp Jacket Water In B.
Iow Temp Jacket Water Out A.
Low Temp Jacket Water in C.
High Temp Jacket Water In B.
Low Temp Jacket Water Out D.
High Temp Jacket Water out C.
High Temp Jacket Water In E.
High Teep Aftercooler Water In D.
Nish Temp Jacket Water Out F.
Low Press Jacket Water E.
High Temp Aftercooler Water in G.
Low Level Jack Water F.
Imv Press Jacket Water G.
Imv Level Jack Water l
l 2.) To verify the interlock between the On 10/22/83 the interlock between the Jacket Water Keep Wars Pump and the Diesel Generator IB Jacket Water Keep Jacket Water Keep Wars Heater.
Wars Pump and the Diesel Generator 1B Jacket Keep Wars Nester was successfully tested. This test verified when the Jacket Water Keep Wars Pump stops, the Jacket Water Keep Warm Nester de-energizes.
t 3.) To verify the capability of the KD This test has not been completed System to maintain the Diesel in a as of yet. Awaiting final resolution trare condition during standby operation.
of the KD Heater thermostat problem.
This problem involves a'50'F deadband associated with the thermostat, which is unacceptable.
TP/1/A/1700/01B - DIESEL GENERATOR 1B LUBE OIL SYSTEM COLD FUNCTIONAL TEST I
1 l
1.) To verify proper operation of the On 10/21/83 the following alarms were following alarms:
verified to operate properly on a i
simulated abnormal condition:
A.
Low Temp Lube Oil Inlet B.
Im Temp Lube 011 Outlet A.
Low Temp Lube Oil Inlet i
C.
High Temp Lube 011 Inlet 51 Low Temp Lube Qi1 Outlet i
l D.
High Temp Lube 011 Outlet C.
Nigh Temp Lube Oil Inlet E.
High AP Lube Filter D.
Nish Temp Lube Oil Outlet l
F.
Nish AP Lube strainer E.
Nigh AP Lube Filter l
G.
Low Press Lube Oil F.
Nigh AP Lube Strainer M.
In Press Trubo 011 Right Front G.
Low Press Lube Oil I.
In-Press hrbo 011 Left Front N.
Imv Press hrbo 011 Right Front i
J.
Imv Imbe Tank Level I.
Imv Press Terbo 011 Imit Front 1
. J.
Imv Lebe Tank Level
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ -.. - _ _. - -. -.. - -. - -.. - -..... - -. - -. -.. - -. -..... -,, l
PURPOSE RESULTS 2.) To verify the interlock between the On 10/21/83 the interlock between the Pre-Lube Oil Pump and the Lube Oil Diesel Generator 1B Pre-Lube Oil Pump Sump Tank Nesters.
and the Diesel' Generator 1B Lube oil Sump Tank Heaters were successfully tested. This test verified when the Pre-Lube Oil Pump stops, the Lube Oil Sump Tank Heaters de-energize.
3.) To verify the capability for the LD This test has not been completed System to maintain the Diesel in a as of yet. Awaiting final resolution trare condition during standby of the LD Mester thermostat problem.
operation.
This problem involves a 50*F deadband associated with the thermostats, which is unacceptable.
TP/1/A/1450/08B - DIESEL GENERATOR IB ENGINE STARTING AIR SYSTEM COLD TUNCTIONAL TEST 1.) To verify proper operation of the On 10/21/83 the following alarms l
following alares:
were verified to operate properly on a simulated abnormal condition:
A.
Iow Press Starting Air 3.
Iow Press
- Control Air A.
ImW Press Starting Air B.
Low Press Control Air 2.) To verify that Starting Air On 10/21/83 the Diesel Generator 1B Compressor 1B1 operates Engine Starting Air System IB1 was cutomatically to maintain verified to maintain the starting cdequate starting Air Tank 1B1 Air Tank 181 pressure at 250 1 15 psig.
pressure.
The automatic function of the starting Air Compressor 181 was demonstrated 3 times to maintain the starting Air Tank 181 pressure between 240 psig and 252 psig.
3.) To verify that Starting Air On 10/21/83 the Diesel Generator 1B Compressor 152 operates automatically Engine Starting Air System 132 was to maintain adequate Starting Air verified to maintain the starting-Tank 132 pressure.
Air Tank 152 pressure at 250 1 15 psig.
The automatic function of the starting Air Compressor 132 was da=anstrated 3 times to maintain the starting Air Tank 152 pressure between 240 psig and 255 psia.
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ATTAODIENT 4 PM EIm/
Response to Que: tion 49A CESG INIERROGATORY 49A l
l De following is a listing of significant events during the Diesel Generator IA Extended Run:
1200 brs 1/25/84 Diesel Generator 1A started,and ' loaded to 7000 W.
1 i
2300 krs 1/26/84 While loaded to 7000 W the Right Front Turbocharger Accumulated Hours Lube Oil Drip Line failed at the ferrule. The engine 232.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> manually shutdown to prevent oil spray. This line is 1/4" S.S. tubing which supplies lube oil to the Right Time for Repair 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Front Turbocharger bearings during standby. The failure appeared to be the result of over tightening the tubing nut and vibration. The tubing was replaced under WR80640PS. The suggestions for long ters action are:
1)
Use thicker wall S.S. tubing.
2)
Observe proper station procedures for tubing.
3)
Design a better support for this tubing, or add a vibration dampener.
D e final reselution will be documented on a NC1.
0700 hrs 1/27/84 Diesel Generator 1A restarted and loaded to 7000 KW.
0800 hrs 1/29/84 While loaded to 7000 KW, the delivery valve holder on Accumulated Hours the IL Fuel Oil Injection Pump cracked. The engine 281.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> was manually shutdevn to prevent a fire hazard. The Time for Repair delivery valve holder is a casting which houses the 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> delivery valve of the Fuel 011 Injection Pump. This housing is subjected to cyclic hydraulic pressures of 3000 psig. The entire Fuel Oil Injection Pump was replaced under WR80950PS. The defective delivery valve holder was sent to B & W Labs in Ohio for analysis. Results are pending and the problem will be resolved through NCI CN-065.
Diesel Generator IA restarted and loaded to 7000 KW.
2200 krs 1/29/84 While loaded to 7000 KW, a temporary modification to 1700 hrs 2/4/84 l
Accumulated Mours the Left Front Turbocharger Lube Oil Drain failed 419.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> resulting in an oil spill. The engine was manually shutdown to prevent a fire hasard.
It was decided to Time for Repair 267 hours0.00309 days <br />0.0742 hours <br />4.414683e-4 weeks <br />1.015935e-4 months <br /> repair several problems at this time.
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l The Turbo Lube Oil Pressure had been decreasing since 2/1/84. Upon investigations performed by Duke.
Delaval and Elliot representatives, it was determined that both the Right Front and Left Front h rbochargers had experienced thrust bearing failures.
The problem was as a result of insufficient lube oil being supplied to the thrust bearing faces during
~
startup. The oil flow was measured at.0211 sph per turbocharger. After discussions with Delaval.'the oil flow was increased to.1427 sph per turbocharger. Further analysis is being performed by Dela' val to determine a solution to thrust bearing failure. The turbochargers were replaced under WR1429PRF and WR1445PRF.
The 3L Cylinder Need started leaking jacket water on l
2/3/84. This indicated a possible cracked cylinder head. Upon removing the suspect head and pressuring with water, it was verified that a hairline crack had i
developed. The crack was located in the area where the Fuel Oil Injector goes through the head. De cylinder head was replaced under WR1430PRF. The cause of the failure presently appears to be a casting imperfection. Final resolution will be through NCI CN-067.
While the cylinder head was being replaced, the push rods were examined for cracks. Since 2 of 3 push rods on 3L were cracked, all other push rods were removed. Upon examination numerous push rods showed linear indications in the weld areas. A new version of push rod is being manufactured by TDI which utilizes friction welding. This new type push rod was placed into the engine. NPR-CR-2169A was written to doctment this change.
While replacing the push rods, it was noticed that the IR Rocker Box Assembly was damaged. The Rocker Box Assembly holds the Rocker Arms in place for engine operation. The damage was next to the Intermediate Exhaust Rocker Arm. The entire Rocker Box Assembly was replaced under WR1446PRF. He cause of the failure appears to be as a result of a l
misalignment of the Intermediate Exhaust Rocker Arm dowel pin. This misalignment probably occurred during the Spring 1983 rebuild of this engine. This problem has been documented on NCI CN-066.
1 De following items were performed during this u
shutdown:
1) h e Turbocharger Lube Oil Drip Line orifices were drilled to.070" under WR1455PRT. This size orifice delivers.1427 sph of labe oil to.
each turbocharger.
1
2)
Right Bank h rbocharger Exhaust' Manifolds bolts had failed (4 total failures). These are 1/2" diameter bolts of a non-ferrous material. The bolts were replaced by other bolts, manufactured by TDI. This problem will be documented on a j
NC1.
l 3)
A 3/8" 8.S. tubing line had been misaligned due
~
to an impact causing the line to rub assinst the engine. Vibration caused this line to wear through resulting in an air leak. This line is part of the Control Air System and is identified as line E-53 (60 psi Supply). He tubing was replaced under WR1439PRF.
2030 hrs 2/15/84 Diesel Generator 1A restarted and loaded to 7000 EW.
l 0130 hrs 2/19/84 Diesel Generator 1A was manually shutdown to Accumulated Hours investigate possible water loss from the Jacket 296.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Water System and reason for excessive Outlet Time Down - 40.5 hrs temperatures on Jacket Water and Lube 011. No apparent reascn for discrepancies. This was subsequently resolved (see 05:30 hrs - 2/23/84 entry).
1800 hrs 2/20/84 Diesel Generator 1A restarted and loaded to 7000 KW.
1640 hrs 2/21/84 Diesel Generator 1A was manually shutdown again in an Accumulated Hours attempt to determine why Outlet temperatures on Jacket 517 hours0.00598 days <br />0.144 hours <br />8.54828e-4 weeks <br />1.967185e-4 months <br /> Water and Lube Oil are high. No apparent reason for Time Down - 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> discrephnetes. H is was subsequently resolved (see 05:30 hrs 2/23/84 entry).
0545 hrs 2/22/84 Diesel Generator IA restarted and loaded to 7000 KW.
0653 brs 2/22/34 While loaded to 7000 KW, the Left Front Turbocharger Accumulated Mours Imbe oil Drip Line failed at the ferrule. The engine 518 hours0.006 days <br />0.144 hours <br />8.564815e-4 weeks <br />1.97099e-4 months <br /> was manually shutdown to prevent oil spray. This line is 1/4" 5.8. tubing which supplies Imbe Oil to the Time for Repair 22.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Left Front h rbocharger bearings during s'tandby. The failure appears to be the result of over-tightening the tubing aut and vibration. The tubing was replaced under WR82890PS. Actions implemented are:
1)
Use of thicker wall 8.S. tubias.
2)
Added vibration dampeners for this tubing.
l
0530 hrs 2/23/84 Diesel Generator 1A restarted and loaded to 7000 XV.
Subsequent to this start. the solution to the Jacket
{
Water loss and high Outlet temperatures *was discovered. The thermocouples which read the Outlet l
I temperatures were found to be defective. These were i
replaced under WR1497PRT. The water loss was attributed to misinterpretation of system instrumentation.
1030 hrs 2/25/84 Diesel Generator IA manually shutdown to repair crack Accumulated Hours in the Right Front h rbocharger Aftercooler.
The 571 hours0.00661 days <br />0.159 hours <br />9.441138e-4 weeks <br />2.172655e-4 months <br /> crack developed in the aftercooler casing at the Time for Repair Inlet flange. The aftercooler casing was replaced 35.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> under WR708tefr. The crack appears to be the result of an incorrect alignment of the Turbocharger flange and the Aftercooler flange. The suggestion for long term action is to ensure proper flange alignment before torquing any of the Turbocharger bolts.
2200 hrs 2/26/84 Diesel Generator 1A restarted and loaded to 7000 KV.
0840 hrs 2/29/84 Diesel Generator 1A manually shutdown to prevent fire Accumulated Hours hazard. The tubing ferrule on the 7L Fuel Oil 629.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Injector had an indentation. H is resulted in a Time for Repair fine mist of Fuel Oil being sprayed onto the head.
32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> The entire tubing assembly was replaced under WR83180PS. This problem will be documented by an NCI.
While the engine was shutdown, it was noticed that a 1/2" capscrew on the 3R side door cover was missing its he,ad. Upon replacing that bolt and retorquing the coter, another capscrew head sheared off at less than 15 ft-lb. D e bolts were replaced under WR1515PRF. Further failure analysis is needed and will be documented by a NCI.
1700 hrs 3/1/84 Diesel Generator 1A restarted and loaded to 7000 KW.
i 1730 hrs 3/8/84 Diesel Generator 1A manually shutdown to allow for Accumulated Nours prerequisite testing needed to start the Engineered 798 hours0.00924 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.03639e-4 months <br /> Safeguard Features Actuation Functional Test.
Time Down - 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> 0020 hrs 3/9/84 Diesel Generator la restarted and loaded to 7000 KW.
as of 1200 brs 3/9/84, the Diesel Generator 1A has 810 hours0.00938 days <br />0.225 hours <br />0.00134 weeks <br />3.08205e-4 months <br /> of documented run. Of this time.
- 75% has been at 7000 EW (100%).
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