ML20100C492

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Proposed Tech Spec Revising Containment Pressure Setpoint & Deleting MSIV Surveillance
ML20100C492
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/27/1984
From:
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20100C490 List:
References
9451N, NUDOCS 8412050484
Download: ML20100C492 (19)
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Text

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i ATTACHMENT 2 Proposed Changes to'DPR - 29 Revised Page: 3.1/4.1-8 3.1/4.1-9 3.1/4.1-10 3.2/4.2-11 3.2/4.2-lla*

3.2/4.2-12 3.7/4.7-10 3.7/4.7-18

  • New Page

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8412050484 841127

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ADOCK 05000254 PDR 9451N

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QUAD CITIES DPR-29 TABLE 3.1-1

. REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUENTATION REQUIREENTS REFLEL MODE _

Minimum Number of Operable or 1 Tripped Instrument Channels per Trip System (1)_ Trip Function Trip Level Setting Action (2) 1 Mode switch in shutdown A 1 Manual scram A

-IRM 3 High Flux 1120/125 of full scale A 3 Iqoperaulve APRM(3) 2 High flux (15% scram) Specification 2.1.A.2 A 2 Inoperative A 2 RHigh reactor pressure 1cl060 psig A 2 High drywell pressure (5) 102.5 psig A 2 ~ Reactor low water level ?_8 inches (8) A 2 (per bank) High water level in scram 1(40 gallons per bank A discharge volume (4) 2 Turbine condenser low L21 inches Hg vacuum A vacuum (7) 2 Main steamline high <7 X normal full A radiation (12) -power background

'A Main steamline isolation <10% valve closure A valve closure (7)

I 3.1/4.1-8 l Amendment No. 66, 90 i

b'

QUAD CITIES DPR-29 TABLE 3.1-2 REACTOR' PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUENTATION REQUIREENTS STARTtP/ HOT STANDBY MODE Minimum Number of 0perable or

-. Tripped Instrument Channels per Trip System (l) Trip Function Trip Level Setting Action (2)

~1 Mode switch in shutdown A 11 Manual. scram A IRM 3 High Flux {120/125 of full scale A 3 Inoperative APRM(3) 2' High flux (15% scram) ' Specification 2.1.A.2 A-2- Inoperative. A 2 High reactor pressure fl060 psig A 2- High drywell pressure (5) 42.5 psig A-2 Reactor low water level 18 inches (8) .A' 2 (per bank) High water level in scram 140 gallons per bank A

discharge volume (4) 2 Turbine condenser low 721 inches Hg vacuum A

vacuum (7)

2. Main steamline high <7 X normal full A

radiation (12) power background 4- Main steamline isolation <10% valve closure A

valve closure (7)

, 3.1/4.1-9 i Amendment No. 66, 90 6312N

-QUAD CITIES DPR-29 TAB _E 3.1-3 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSic'UENTATION REQUIREENTS RUN MODE Minimum Number' of Operable or-

-Tripped Instrument Channels per Trip System (1) Trip Function Trip Level Setting Action (2) 1 Mode switch in shutdown ~A

-1 Manual scram A APRM(3) 2- High flux (flow based) Specification 2.1.A.1 A or B 2 Inoperative- A or B 2 Downscale(ll)- Z3/125 of full scale A or B 2 High reactor pressure <1060 psig A 2 High drywell pressure <2.5 psig A 2 Reactor low water level p inches (8) A 2-(per bank) High water level in scram $40 gallons per bank -A discharge volume 2 Turbine condenser low 121 inches Hg vacuum A or C vacuum 2 Main steamline high <7 X normal full A or C radiation (12) -power background 4 Main steamline isolation <10% valve closure A or C .

valve closure (6) 2 Turbine control valve >40% turbine / generator A or C fast closure (9) -load mismatch (10) 2 Turbine stop valve 610% valve closure A or C closure (9) 2 Turbine EHC control 1900 psig A or C fluid low pressure (9) 3.1/4.1-10 Amendment No. 60, 90

J QUAD CITIES DPR'29 TABLE 3.2.1 INSTRLENTATION THAT INITIATES PRIMARY CONTAIMENT ISOLATION FUNCTIONS Minimum No. of Operable Inst.

Channels per Trip System (1) Instruments Trip Level Setting Action (2) 4 Reactor Low Water (5) >144" above top A of active fuel

  • 4 Reactor Low Low Water (5) 2.84" above top A of active fuel
  • 4 High drywell pressure (5) <(2.5 psig (3) A 16- High Flow Main $,140% of rated B Steam line(5) steam flow 16 High Temperature Main <[2000F B Steam Line Tunnel 4' High Radiation Main <'7 times normal B Steam Line Tunnel (6) -rated power background A Low Pressure ->825 psig B Main Steamline(4) 4 High Flow RCIC 4300% of rated steam C

. Steamline flow (7) 16 RCIC Turbine Area 4:-2000F C

, High Temperature 4 High Flow HPCI <300% of rated steam D Steam Line -flow (7) 16 High Temperature HPCI f,2000F D Steam Line Area 3.2/4.2-11

.. Amendment No. 66, 88

QUAD CITIES OPR-29 NOTES:' (For Table 3.2.1).

1. Whenever primary containment. integrity is required, there shall be two operable or tripped trip systems for each function, except for low
pressure main steamline which only.need be available in the hun po_sition.
2. Action: If the..first column cannot be met for one of the trip

' systems, that trip system shall be tripped.

If the first column cannot be met for both trip systems, the appropriate actions listed below shall be taken:

A. Initiate an orderly shutdown and have reactor in Cold Shutdown condition in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

B. . Initiate an orderly load reduction and have reactor in Hot Standby within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

C. Close isolation valves in RCIC system.

D. Close isolation valves in HPCI subsystem.

3. Need not be operable when primary containment integrity is not required.
4. The isolation trip signal is bypassed when the mode switch is in Refuel or Startup/ Hot Shutdown.

5.. This instrumentation also isolates the control room ventilation system.

6. This signal also automatically closes the mechanical vacuum pump
disharge line. isolation valves.

- 7. Includes a time delay of 3 g_t< 10 seconds.

  • Top of active fuel is defined as 360" above vessel zero for all water levels used in the LOCA analyses (see Bases 3.2).

3.2/4.2-lla Amendment.No.- 66,-88

.V

. . :r)UAD CITIES Taola 3.2.2 DPR-29 INSTRUpf.NTATION THAT INITIATES OR (DNTROLS THE CDRE AND CDNTAlletNT CDO.ING SYSTEMS cMinisun No. Of

- (berable or -

Tripped Instrument .

Channels (1) Trip runction inp Level Setting Remarks 4 . Reactor low low water >84 inones (4 incnev-0 Inen) 1. In conjunction with low reactor pressure

level aoove top of active fuelt initiates core spray ano LPCI.

2.-In conjunction witn nign-drywell pressure 20-secono time celay ano low-pressure core coonng interlock initiates auto olowoown.

3. Initiates ifCI anc RCIC.
4. Initiates starting of diesel generators.

4(4) HLgn-Oryvell (2.5 psig 1. Initiates core spray, LPCI, MCI anc SGTS.

pressure (2)(3)

2. In conjunction with low low water level, 120 secono time delay, ano low-pressure core coo 11rg interlock initlaces auto olowoown.
3. Initiates starting of diesel generators.
4. Initiates isolation of Control r30s - .

ventilation.

2

~

Reactor Low Pressure 300 psig g3350 psig 1. Pemissive for opening' core spray ano LPC1 admission valves.

2. In conjuction witn low low reactor water level initiates core spray ano LPCI.

, Cbntalment Spray Prevents inadvertent operation of containacat

. Interlock spray ounng accident conditions.

2(3) _2/3 core he1@c >2/3 core heignt

-4(3) containment higi _,0.) psig g31.5 psig pressure 2 Timer auto blowdown $120 seconds In conjunction witn low luw reactor water level, nign-drywell pressure, ano low pressure core cooling interlock initiates auto blowdow").

4 Low-pressure core 100 psig

m e steamline break do not exceed the 10 CFR 10'1 guidelines, it is necessary that no fuel rod perfuration resulting from the accidert occur prior to closuie of the main steamline isolation valves. Analyses indicate that fuel rod cladding perforations would be avoided for main steam valve closure times, including instrument delay, as long as 10.5 seconds. However, for ::dded margin, the technical specifications require a valve close time of not greater than 5 seconds. For reactor coolant system temperatures less than 212

  • F. the containtnent s'+f not becorne pressurized due to a loss-of-coolant accident. The 212' F limit is i>ased on preventiy pressunitation of the reactor building and rupture of the blowout panels. These valves are Nghly reliab'e. have low service I

( requirement, and most are normally closed. The initiating sensor. and associated trip channels are also . checked to demonstrate the capabil:ty fcr automatic isolation ireference SAR Section 5.2.2 and Table 5.2.4 ). The test inter al at once per operating cycle for automatic initiation results in a failure probability of I.I x 104that a line will not isolate. More frequent testing for valve operability results in a mote reliable system. The containment is penetrated by a large number of small diameter instrument lines which contact the i primary coolant system. A program for periodic test ng and examination of the tiow check valves in these lines is performed by blowing down the instrument line during a vessel hydro and observing the following two conditions, which will verify that the flow check valve is operable: ) 3.7/4.7-18 Amadent 35 o ,a,:: . + 1 Ob- ' ' .j : 1 A~ ri s: < *) F-ATTACHMENT 3 Proposed Changes to-DPR - 30 - 9q . Revised Page: -3.1/4.1-8 3.1/4.1-9 3.1/4.1-10 3.2/4.2-11 '. 3.2/4.2-11a*

. '0 (i) f

. . ? ' 3.2/4.2-12 3.7/4.7-10 3.7/4.7-18 qo. pfN,i *New Page , N .L' s b L h.  %  %  % %f ' - t. E -- s t k e 5O h ' . '\j \ . * , .g . ~k.  : I _' } % . '? y d 49451N (_ y .r ,, QUAD CITIES -DPR-30 TABLE 3.1-1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUENTATION REQUIREENTS REFUEL MODE Minimum Number of Operable or Tripped Instrument Channels per Trip System (1) Trip Function Trip Level Setting Action (2) 1 Mode switch in shutdown A 1 Manual scram A 1RM 3 High Flux 4120/125 of full scale A 3 Inoperative APRM(3) 2 Hlyh flux (15% scram) Specification 2.1.A.2 A 2 Inoperative A 2 High reactor pressure f,1060 psig- A 2 High drywell pressure (5) <2.5 psig A 2 Reactor low water level 18 inches (8) A -2 High water level in scram -<50 gallons A discharge volume (4) 2 Turbine condenser low 2,21 inches Hg vacuum A. vacuum (7) 2 Main steamline high <7 X normal full A radiation (12) -power background 4 bbin steamline isolation <10% valve closure A . valve closure (7) 3.1/4.1-8 Amendment No. 60 6312N QUA0 CITIES DPR-30 TABLE 3.1-2 REACTOR PROTECTION ~ SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUENTATION REQUIREENTS STARTLP/ HOT STAND 8Y MODE Minimum Number of' Operable or -Tripped Instrument Channels:per Trip Sy' stem (1) Trip Function Trip Level Setting Action (2) 1 Mode switch in shutdown A 1 Manual scram A IRM .3- High Flux fJ20/125 of full scale A 3 Inoperative APRM(3) 2 High flux (15% scram) Specification 2.1.A.2 A 2 Inoperative A 2 High-reactor-pressure fl060 psig A 2 High drywell pressure (5) f2.5 psig' A ~2 Reactor low water level 28 inches (8) A 2 High water. level in scram ~~450 gallons A discharge-volume (4) 2 Turbine condenser low ->21 inches Hg vacuum A vacuum (7) 2 Main steamline high <7 X normal-full A radiation (12) -power background 4- Main steamline isolation 110% valve closure A valve closure (7) 3.1/4.1-9 Amendment No. 60 QUAD CITIES DPR-30 TABLE 3.1-3 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUENTATION REQUIREENTS RUN MODE Minimum Nunber of Operable or -Tripped Instrument Channels per Trip, System (1) Trip Function Trip Level Setting Action (2) 1- Mode switch in shutdown A 1 Manual scram A APRM(3) 2 High flux (flow based) Specification 2.1.A.1 A or B 2 -Inoperative A or B 2 Downscale(11) 53/125 of full scale A or B 2' High reactor pressure <1060 psig A 2 High drywe11' pressure q[2.5 psig A 2' Reactor low water level 28 inches (8) A 2 High water level in scram g,50 gallons A discharge volume 2 Turbine condenser low 2,21 inches Hg vacuum A or C vacuum 2 Main steamline high -47 X-normal full A or C radiation (12) power background 4 Main steamline isolation - (10% valve closure A or C valve closure (6) .2 Turbine control valve 740% turbine / generator A or C fast closure (9) -load mismatch (10) 2- Turbine stop valve <10% valve closure A or C closure (9). ? Turbine EHC control >900 psig A or C fluid low pressure (9) 3.1/4.1-10 Amendment-No. 60 il g - s.. t .-- QUAD CITIES- ~ DPR ..TAELE 3.2.1 INSTRtDENTATION THAT-INITIATES PRIMARY CONTAlf4ENT ISOLATION FUNCTIONS

Minimum No..Of.

Operable Inst. - Chamels per . Trip System (1) Instruments. Trip Level Setting Action (2) 4 Reactor Low Water (5) >144" above top A of active fuel

  • l4 Reactor Low Low Water (5) 28,4" above top A of active fuel
  • 4_ High drywell pressure (5) _2.5< psig (3) A

^ 16 High Flow Main 4140% of rated B Steam-line(5) steam flow 16 High Temperature Main- 42000F B Steam Line Tunnel 4 Hi@ Radiation Main - <7 times normal B Steam Line Tumel(6) -rated power background . 4' Low Pressure @ 25 psig B Main Steamline(4) 4 High Flow RCIC -000% of rated steam 'C Steamline- flow (7) - 16- RCIC Turbine Area <2000F C Hi@ Temperature ~' 4 High Flow FFCI <3G0% of rated steam D Steam Line flow (7) -16 High' Temperature FPCI < _2000F D Steam Line Area 3.2/4.2-11 Amendment No. 60, 83 QUAD CITIES-OPR-30 NOTES: -(For Table 3.2.1) -1. Whenever primary containment integrity is required, there shall be-two ' operable or tripped trip systems for each function, except for low pressure main steamline which only need be available in the RUN position.-

2. Action: If the first column cannot be met for one of the trip systems, that trip system shall be tripped.

If the first column.cannot be met for both trip systems, the appropriate actions listed below shall be taken: A._ Initiate an orderly shutdown and have reactor in Cold Shutdown-condition in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. ~ B. Initiate an orderly load reduction and have reactor in Hot Stancby within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. C. . Close isolation valves in RCIC system. .D. Close isolation valves in HPCI subsystem.

3. Need not be operable when primary containment integrity is not required.
4. The isolation trip signal is bypassed when the mode switch is in Refuel or Startup/ Hot Shutdown.
5. This instrumentation also isolates the control room ventilation system.
6. .This signal also automatically closes the mechanical vacuum pump disharge line isolation valves.
7. Includes a time delay of 3 f_t< 10 seconds.
  • - Top of active fuel is defined as 360" above vessel zerc for all water levels used in the LOCA analyses (see Bases 3.2).

L 3.2/4.2-11a Amendment No..60, 83 QUAD CITIES DPR-30 Taois 3.2.2 INSTRIAENTATION THAT INITIATES OR (DN1ROLS THE CDRE AND Q)NTAltef.NT QJG.ING SYSTBt3 Minimun te. of -Operacle or -Trippec Instrument-Channels (1)- ' Trip Function Trip Level Setting Remarks a .% actor low low water >64 incnes (4 incnes/-O inen) 1. In conjunction with low reactor pressure level aoove top of active fuel * -initiates core spray ano LPCI.

2. In conjunction witn hign-drywell pressure 120-secono time celay ano low-pressure core cooling interlock initiates auto olowoown.
3. Initiates El ano ICIC.
4. Initiates starting of diesel generators.

4(4) Hign-Orywell (2.5 psig 1. Initiates core spray, LPCI, IPCI anc SGTS. pressure (2)(3)

2. In conjunction with low low water level, 120 second time delay, ano low-pressure core cooling interlock initiates auto olowoown.
3. Initiates starting of diesel gererators. -
4. Initiates isolation of control room ,

ventilation. 2 Fkactor t.cw Pressure 300 psig <_p5350 psig 1. Pemissive for operung core spray ano I.PCI admission valves.

2. In conjuction witn low low reactor water -

Cbntairment Spray Prevents inadvertent operation of contalruent . Interlock spray curing accident conditions. 2(3) _,2/3 core heid1t 12/3coreheignt - 4(3) containment hig) 0.3 psig g_d.5 psig pressure -r 2 Timer auto blowdown $20 seconds In conjunction witn low low reactor water

level, nign-drywil prassute, ano low pressure core cooling interlock initiates auto blowdown.

4 t.ow-pressure core 100 psig<g0 psig cooling punp disdiarge Defers APR actuation pending confirmation of pressure luw-pressure core cooling system operation. L r - ( 2/ Bud 5) ulcervoltage on 3045 55 volts

emergency buses 1. Initiates startirg of diesel generators. .

' 2. 4 missive for starting ECCS pumps.

3. Removes nonessential loacs from ouses.

r- 4. tlypasses degraded voltage timer. l . . L l

  • Top of active fuel is cerinec at 360 incnes aoove vessel zero for all waterlevels usec in tne LOCA analysis. -

b . ,. Amendment'No. 66, 77 3.2/4.2-12 e - ,_e,y--w ,,-y - - -,y..---,-...,,w,,y---,,p ..-_---c-,,,~w,weyr- ----"em'evy-**w-e v w- v v y -n w w - v - -w w w + w v v r---- 7w--- ev vr -*w--' n {L, QUAD CITIES DPR-30: -reopened. 2)' Tne main steamline isolation ' valve (one at a time) shal1~be verified for closure time. - 2 .' 'In the event'any isolation valve .2. 'When an' isolation valve listed in -specified'in. Table 3.7.1 becomes' . . Table 3.7.1 is inoperable, the inoperable,' reactor power operation position of at least one other may continue provided at least one valve in each line having an .. ~ valve is in the mode corresponding inoperable valve shall be recorded to the isolated condition. daily.

3. :If Specifications D.3.D.1 and 3.7.D.2 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the

. reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. - 4.: The temperature of the main steam- ' air pilot valves shall be less-than 1700F except as specified in Specifications 3.7.D.5 and 3.7.D.6 below.

5. From and after the date that the temperature of any main steamline air-pilot valve is found to be greated than 1700F, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days unless the

, -temperature'of such valve is sooner reduced to less than 1700F, provided the main steamline

isolation valves are operable.

6.. Ifl Specification 3.7.D.5 cannot De met, the main'steamline-isolation valve shall be considered inoperable and action taken in accordance with Specification 3.7.0.2. L 4 3.7/4.7-10 te.-4. Teat No. 67. QUAD-CITIES , DPR-30 -l will be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to regulatory guide position C.3.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 1 (June 1976). Once per operating cycle demonstration of HEPA filter preuure drop, operability of inlet heaters at rated power, air distribution to each HEPA filter, and automatic initiation of each standby gas treatment system circuit is necessary to assure system performance capability). Note: bases within parentheses will not be applicable until about December 31,1976, when equipment modifications are completed to allow increased testing. D. Prismary Containment Isolation Valves Those large pipes comprising a portion of the reactor coolant system, whose failure could result in uncovering the reactor core, are supplied with automatic isolation valves (except those lines needed for emergency core cooling system operation or containment cooling).The closure times specified herein are adequate to prevent loss of more coolant from the circumferential rupture of any of these lines outside the containment than from a steamline rupture. Therefore, this isolation valve closure time is sufficient to prevent uncovering the core. In order to assure that the doses that may result from a steamline break do not exceed the 10 CFR 100 guidelines, it is necessary that no fuel rod perforation resulting from the accident occur prior to closure of the main steamline isolation valves. Analyses indicate that fuel rod cladding perforations would be avoided for main steam valve closure times, including instrument delay, as long as 10.5 seconds. However, for added margin, the technical specifications require a valve close time of not greater than 5 seconds. For reactor coolant system temperatures less than 212 ' F, the containmer t could not become pressurized ' due to a loss-of-coolant accident. The 212' F limit is based on preventing pressurization of the reactor building and rupture of the blowout panels. These valves are highly reliable, have low service ( requirement, and most are normally closed. The initiating sensors and associated trip channels are also e checked to demonstrate the capability for automatic isolation (reference SAR Section 5.2.2 and Table 5.2.4 ). The test interval at once per operating cycle for automatic initiation results in a failure probability of 1.1 x 104that a line will not isolate. More frequent testing for valve operability results in a more reliable system. The containment is penetrated by a large number of small diameter instrument lines which contact the primary coolant system. A program for periodic testing and examination of the flow check valves in these lines is performed by blowing down the instrument line during a vessel hydro and observing the following two conditions, which will verify that the flow check valve is operable: Amendment 34 i 3.7/4.7-18 C5 _ _ k ATTACHMENT-4 Evaluation of Sianificant Hazards' Consideration Description of: Amendment R'e quest An amendment to the Technical Specifications-for Quad 9 Cities 1 Units.1 & 2 is requested raising the high drywell pressure tripLpoint from-2.0 psig to 2.5 psig and deletion of the bi-weekly MSIV partialistroke test. Basis for Proposed- No- Significant Hazards- Consideration Determination (The. Commission has provided guidance concerning-the. application of the. standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing_certain examples (48FR-

14870).- The examples of actions involving no significant hazards-

.  ; consideration include: (vi) a. change which either result in.some increase-to the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin,-but where the results of~the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect.to the system or component'specified in the Standard Review Plan. Commonwealth Edison feels this example encompasses both of the, requested' changes. And increase of-the high drywell pressure to  : -215 psig and deletion of the'bi-weekly MSIV testing is a-relaxation of the current. Technical Sperification-limits-and therefore, may be considered as a reduction of'an existing safety margin. However, both proposed revisions'still~ comply with the staff's general guidance on the drywell pressure set point and MSIV testing. In the case of the proposed 2.5 psig setpoint, the increase is requested in order to reduce inadvertent _ECCS operation. The new- ~ operating margin between normal dry. wpm' pressure and the trip point Lis still-within the original plant'a, W. dent analysis and falls . - within the' Staff's guidance on setpoint margin for resolution of TMI Item II.E 4.2.5. .In the case of the deletion of the bi-weekly MSIV test, the provisions remaining in the Technical Specifications for testing the MSIV's meet the requirements of'the-BWR Standard Technical ~ . Specification for'that' valve. Therefore, although'some relaxation -in surveillance requirements will occur, the remaining' provisions will meet the staff's requirements for testing of the MSIV's. Therefore, since the app 1'ication for amendment involves a proposed change.that istsimilar to an example for which no

significant hazards co'nsideration exists, Commonwealth Edison has
made a proposed determination that the application involves no

'significant hazards consideration, 9451N' 1.

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