ML20083G182
| ML20083G182 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000142 |
| Issue date: | 01/06/1984 |
| From: | Hirsch D COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8401110161 | |
| Download: ML20083G182 (10) | |
Text
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CUMMITTEE 10 BRIDGE THE GAP Jcnuary 6,1984 1637 Butler Avenus, Suito 203
] Ios Angeles, California
, (213) 478-0829 0?ffEfE0 2
UNITED STATES CF AMERICA 3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .g4 JM 10 A10:08 4 BEF@E THE ATOMIC SAFliTY AND LICENSING BOARDrggg gp gg;, .
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6 Docket No. 50-142 OL THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY (Proposed Renewal of 7 'O' CALIFORNIA Faulllh License) 8 (UCLA Research Reactor) 9 FEMORANDUM CLARIFYING CONTENTION XX PARAGRAPHS 1.2, _and 3 10 11 I. Introduction 12 In its Memorandum and Order of December 23, 1983, the Atomic 33 g Safety and Licensing Board announced plans for re? Jase of a suitable pr te tive reer t g vern dis very n Contention XX, scheduled a conference 15 call for January 23 to consider discovery ground rules, deferred further jg g consideration of Staff's Motion for Summary Disposition on Contention XX and directed CBG to clarify its December 13 Memorandum as to Status of g
Contention XX by indicating which portions of paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of
, Contertion XX bear on the issues of UCLA's compliance with 10 CFR 73 40(a) and
,21 73 67 Said clarification follows.
22 23 8401110161 840106 24 hDRADOCK 05000142 PDR 25 26 _1/ As indicated in the Memorandun and Order at pa6e 1, the Staff's April 13,
- ' 1981 motion has been ruled premature and responses have been deferred pending 27 6 mpleti n f dis very. Discovery, in turn, was contingent upon a suitable nondisclosure agreement, which the Board has now indicated it will issue.
28 A portion of the Staff motion, which did not require discovery of sensitive information. was considered by the Board. In its December 23 Order, the Board defers further consideration of that motion pending receipt of certain Staff explanations regarding its affiants. CBG thus herein responds not to Staff's summary disposition assertions as to whether material disputes exist, but rcrn1v ewirion, ,t tha % ,M 'n renuant. itn viewn no tn the statun nf Con.7,
'.. Background 1
To answer the J.A's question requires a brief review of the 2
development of Contention XX, which hefdn over three ' years ago.
4 When it intervened in this proceeding in 1980, in addition to 5 its accident and Argon-41 concerns, CBG alleged deficient security precautions, G Whereas it had been provided access to the rest of the Application and could 7 thereby formulate contentions on inadequacies therein based on review 8 thereof, this was not the case with the security plan which was withheld 9 from public disclosure. Such plans are, however, discoverable in NRC 10 licensing proceedings, under suitable protections, if a threshold showing 11 is made hr an Intervenor that there is a lasis for a security concern.
]2 CBC thus submitted its security contention, providing several pages of 13 bases therefor, which were summarized in the subparagraphs of the Contention.
14 The Board, in its March 20, 1981, Order, ruled that there was sufficient 15 basis for concord about the facility's, admitted the contention and opened
}g discovery thereon, with summary disposition deferred until completion of 17 discovery. Discovery has been suspended pending implementation of jg a discovery procedure, and thus the contention'a status is essentially 39 that of March 21,1981--awaiting the commencement of discovery.
20 'Ihere have been, however, two developments since Earch of 1981, 21 and it is the effect--if any--of these developments on the bases of Contention 22 XX that the Board wishes CBG to address. -
23 One development is' that the Board has squarely rejected the 24 arguments of Staff and Applicant that sabotage Protection is not required.
25 As CBG's contention always alleged that such protection was required, 26 the Board's agreement thereon in no way alters the contention or its subparts.
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1 Se other development concerned UCIA's belated reduction in 2 its inventory of Highly Enriched Uranium, and in its request for license 3 authorization for said IEU. %e Application filed in 1980 requested 4 9400 grams of 93% enriched HEU. CBG, in Contention XIII, contended that 5 was too much, and in Contention XX, that security precautions to protect 6 against thef t of the IEU were inadequate. CBG contended that UCLA failed 7 to meet the theft security :pequirements of 10 CFR 73 67, which UCLA claims g it does meet. In addition, CBG asserted that that UCIA had on site a 9 quantity of SNM in excess of the' formula quantity specified in 10 CFR 73 60s 10 UCLA admitted it did not have security measures required by 10 CFR 73 60, 33 but claimed it possessed less than a formula quantity of SNH. We Board 12 thus, seeing that UCLA admitted not having 73 60 precautionn, saw a possibility 33 of resolving the dispute as to whether they possessed a formula quantity 34 without necessity of access to sensitive information and that resolution f that issue might affect the scope of subsequent discovery. CBG was 15 3g thus directed to engage in discovery on the matter of the fuel inventory (and radiation level, as UCLA claimed an exemption on that basis).
37 As discovery on that matter was beginning, UCLA reduced its inventory to 18 g what it claimed was just below 5 kg, with a year spent thereafter trying to determine from conflicting records and regulation interpretations 20 g whether UCLA had indeed finally--after ten years of possession of SNM in g ' excess of 5 kilograms--gotten just below that level. We Board first ruled UCLA had not gotten below that level, resolving that portion of the contention that alleged noncompliance with 73 60 in CBG's favor, later reversing itself and ruling that UCLA is finally no longer required to meet 73 60 Wat matter is still under review, with UCIA and Staff to file certain affidavits thereon, 28 1
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4 1 Thus, UCLA was in violation of 73 60 uhen the contention was 2 written. It may no longer be subject to 73 60. We Board has ruled it is 3 subject to 73.67 and 73.40(a) and wishes to know CBG's view what, if any 4 effect, not being subject to 73.60 would have on the subparagraphs of 5 Contention xx.
G We answer to that question requires a brief review: of how 7 the phrase " pursuant to 10 CFR 73.60 and 73 67" got into the Contention 8 to bej;in with. CBG did not place that language in the Contention as written 0 the code citations were placed there by the Board in its Earch 20, 1981 10 Ord er. CBG had contended that the security at the facility was inadequate 11 to protect against sabotage and theft of the weapons-grade materials.
12 At the prehearing conference of February 5,1981, staff and UCIA argued 13 that UCIA was not required to protect against sabotage at all and not 14 required to have measures to prevent thef t--merely be able to detect and 15 report theft. CBG argued that sabotage protection was required and
]G nore than the dbility to know that thef t had occurred was required by 17 the regulations. (Both points have been confirmed by the Boards in its 18 October 24, 1983, Order, the Board states, for example, "We are not prepared 10 to draw the conclusion that thef t is permissible under the rules so long 20 as ono knows it has occurred.")
21 At the prehearing conference discussing admission of the contention, 22 it was charged that CBG was attempting to go beyond the requirements of 23 73.67 in its thef t protection assertions, and that 73 67 was the only 24 regulation that applied because UCLA assertedly (though incorrectly asserted) 25 had less than a formula quantity. CBG argued that UCIA did not' even comply 26 with 73.67, but that in addition it did have a formula quantity on site.
27 ne B ant, in its prehearing conference order of Varch 20, 1981, in summariziry; 28 these arguments, stated as follo.4s (p. 12):
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1 At the prehearing conference CBG said, "We contend n that even under 73.67...that the Applicant doesn't even meet J 2 those provisions, and have listed a number of instances where we see those deficiencies. We contend further, however, that 3 73.60 also applies in this case..." Tr. 391 4 The Board has decided to admit Contention XX modified by the insertion of " pursuant to MR 73.60 and 73.67" between
'5 the words "it possess," and "thus indicating" in the contention.
Tr. 359 6 (emphasis in' original) 7 It is suggested that that prehearing conference transcrin b reviewed 8
(359-398) for further clarification of the context in which the applicability 9 of 73.60 as a separate issue arose.
CBG at that time-and now--viewed the 10 bases of the contention contained in the subparagraphs as applicable to 11 the sabotage protection requirements and to the theft protection requirements 12 - of 73.67. UCLA contended they only applied to 73 60, to which CBG responded 13 that they did not, that .67 required far more than the thef t-reporting 14 requirement UClA claimed was all that was required, but that at any rate 15 UCLA was then subject to 73 60 anyway.
'In other words, CBG said UCLA's 16 claims were wrong for two indeDendent reasons--(l) sabotage and 73.67 17 requirements mandated the measures we detailed, and (2) 73.60 was also applicable.
18 If it is finally determined that 73 60 is no longer applicable because UCLA 19 has finally gotte n below 5000 grams, the first of the two independent reasons 20 remains. Furthermore, as CBG mited in its Lecember 13, 1983, Memorandua, 21
. there is little practical difference between 73 67 and 73.60, except a 22 minor difference as to searches, that difference covered by the requirements 23 necessary to protect a6ainst sabotage at this facility. As quoted in that '
24 F.emorandum, Counsel for Staff said at the June 29, 1982, prehearing 25 conference.
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2 "As a mtter of fact, I would like to point out that 73.60 is not different from 73 67 except in the matter 3 of searches. There is no significant difference between the regulations, but there is that difference."
4 (emphasis added) TR 514 5
6 In summary, the contention was not written on the basis that 73.60 applied. It was written on the basis that UCLA, as stated from the begirning, did not even meet 73.67 Since UCLA admitted they didn't meet 0 73.60, and since CBC had information demonstrating more than a formula 10 quantity on site requiring 73.60 requirements be met in addition to the II 73 67 standards that were already not met, the Boarti added "73 60 and 73.67" I2 to the contention. Removing the reference to 73.60--if UCLA has indeed IO finally gotten below 5000 grams--in CBc's view makes no alteration in I4 the contention, as it had contended all along .67 was not being met.
15 The effect--or lack thereof--on each of the subparagraphs forming the 30 basis for the contention of inadequate' theft and sabotage protection is-17 discussed below.
18 10 III. Paragraphs __l,2, and 3 20 21 Paragraph 1 22 This paragraph asserts that the facility has areas containing 23 either vital equipment and/or special nuclear materials, which should 24 be protected against sabotage and/or theft and to which access should 25 be adequately controlled. Subparts a through e must be protected against 26 acts of sabotaae: subparts a and d must, in addition, be protected against 27 theft of SNM. (Staff disagrees with subparts e and e as not containing vital 28 equipments this is a factual dispute to which CBG is not to respond until discovery is comploted and unless summary disposition is reopened, and is l
4 1 a matter which CBG would prefer to respond to in a non-public format, as 2 it would require identifying precisely what can be sabotaged and how, 3 matters best not detailed publicly.)
4 5 Faragraph 2 gHef"f 5 6 his paragraph jthat there are areas adjacent to the Paragraph 7 1 aieas containing vital equipment or special nuclear natorial, and that 8 these adjacent areas are insufficiently isolated and secured to prevent them 9 from bein6 used as penetration points or staging areas for penetration
- 10 of the Paragraph 1 areas. Staff seems to believe CBG is asserting h t 11 these areas contain nuclear material or vital equipment, which is not the 12 case, but that they are adjacent areas improperly lighted and otherwise secured access 1
}3 so as to prevent unauthorizedfto the areas which must be protected against
}4 sabotage or theft. In other words', on one side of a wall is the area that 15 needs to be protected, on the other side are areas providing easy access to .
16 the areae to which access should not be possible without authorization.
37 Se best example is the access court used for truck loading and unloading.
jg CBG pointed to the Board on its tour of the facility problems with the 39 single door separating that access court from the reactor. To protect 20 the SNM and vital equipment on the inside of that dbor requires protecting 21 .the outside of that door, and CBG alleges that is not beirg adequately done.
22 Paragraph 2's subparts a through f all provide means of unauthorized 23 ac ess into the Paragraph 1 areas to which access is supposed to be adequately 24 c ntrolled. Subparts a through f all provide such means of urauthorized 25 entry int areas which need to be protected for sabotage reasons; they each 26 likewise provide means of arranging entry into areas that should be protected 27 r a theft. Again, the specific weaknesses in the security of these areas
,y an! precisely how a thief or saboteur would take advantage of those weaknesses must await a more protected setting and completion of discovery. (Itshould
-also be noted that some of the Paragraph 1 areas can be used for urauthorized I en trv i ntn n e er drn m ,r.5, 1 ,~, 1 4
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2 Faragraph 3 3 Paragraph 3 provides certain tases for the concern that 4 security measures for protecting areas against sabotage or theft are 5 inadequate. Subparts a,b c d. and e all are valid with regards measures 6 necessary to adequately comply with 73 40(a) sabotage protection requirements.
7 In addition, it is CBG's view that subparts a,b,c d, and e all involve e
8 .i*ilure to comply with 73 67 theft protection requirements.
9 10 IV' C0"C1881'"
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%e Board has specifically deferred CBG's responding to the substanca 12 of the factual and legal arguments advanced by Staff as to why protecting 33 certain areas against theft or sabotage should not be required, or why 34 security inadequacies as identified in Paragraph 2 and 3 need not, in Staff's 15 view, be remedied. Detailed argument why sabotage of certain equipment, 16 or sloppiness with certain keys, or problems with securing of specific doors, 37 gg is not to occur until such sensitive information can be fully protected and gg CBG has had discovery on the security plan and related information.
De Board has asked CBG its view of which subparts of its g contentionapplyto7367and7340(a)theftandsabotageprotection g ' requirements. As there is little difference in practical terms between 73.67 and 73 60, and as sabotage protection requires other seccity measures 23 beyond those for theft protection, the effect of reducing IEU quantities to below formula levels, if true, does not affect any part of the Contention, whose subpart bases were always based on grounds independent of 10 CFR 73 60.
UCLA must protect against sabotage as per 73 40(a) and thsft as per 73 67, and CBG alleges, and has always alleged, that it fails to adequately do so.
Se contention and its subparts remain awaiting early resolution of the disputos--
which have not been addressed herein-and early determination of whether the
O i
. 4 security plan is adequate to protect against the consequences of theft of 2 _
3 kilogram quantities of highly enriched uraatium a .i the radiological sabotage 4 of a rector containing enough fission products to contaminate out 75 kilometers 5 of Los Angeles, given the particular characteristics of this facility and 6 the environment in which it resides. A case-by-case judgment must be made, 7
. based on these and other factors, whether UCIA complies with the regulations--
g the contention clearly alleges it does not.
9 10 Res e fully tied, 11 12 S Daniel Hirsch dated at Ben Lomond, CA I4 this 6th day of January,1984 15 10 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- NUC12AR REGULATORY COMMISSION
. BEFOR2 THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of Docket No. 50-142 THE RECEN'fS OF THE UNIVEIGITY OF CALIFORFIA (Proposed Renewal of Facility License)
(UCLAResearchReactor)
DECIARATION OF SERVICE I hereby declare that copies of the attacheds Memorandum Clarifying Contention XX Paragraphs 1. 2. 3 in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, addressed as indicated, on this date: January 6.1984 .
John H. Frye, III, Chairman Christine Helwick Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Glenn R. Woods '
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of General Counsel 390 University Hall Dr. Emmeth A. Imebke 2200 University Aventie Administrative Judge Berkeley, CA 94720 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. John Bay Washington, D.C. 20555 3755 Divisadero #203 San Francisco, CA 94123 Glenn 0. Bright A411nistrative Judge Igan Naliboff Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Deputy City Attorney U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission City Hall Washingt e. D.C. 20555 1685 Main Street s" Santa Monica, CA 90401 Chief, Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary Dorothy 'Ihompson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Nuclear Iaw Center Washington, D.C. 20555 6300 wilshire Blvd., #1200 Counsel for NRC Staff '
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission . role Kagan, Esq.
Washington, D.C. 20555 ' Atomic t and L Board Panel attentions Ms. Colleen Woodhead U.S. Nucl atory Commission William H. Cormier Office of Administiative Vice Chancellor University of California m 405 Hilgard Avenue {4 Les Angeles, California 90024 /
DanielHirsch/'/
President COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE CAP I