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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARL-99-035, Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-10-18018 October 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld ML20217G0801999-10-0707 October 1999 Informs That on 990930,staff Conducted mid-cycle PPR of Farley & Did Not Identify Any Areas in Which Performance Warranted More than Core Insp Program.Nrc Will Conduct Regional Insps Associated with SG Removal & Installation ML20217P0661999-10-0606 October 1999 Requests Withholding of Proprietary Rept NSD-SAE-ESI-99-389, Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs ML20217B1891999-10-0404 October 1999 Submits Clarification Re Development of Basis for Determining Limiting Internal Pressure Loads Re Review of NRC SE for Cycle 16 Extension Request.Util Intends to Use Guidelines When Evaluating SG Tube Structural Integrity ML20212J8391999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards RAI Re Request for Amends to Ts.Addl Info Needed to Complete Review to Verify That Proposed TS Are Consistent with & Validate Design Basis Analysis.Request Discussed with H Mahan on 990930.Info Needed within 10 Days of This Ltr ML20212J8801999-09-30030 September 1999 Discusses GL 98-01,suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Util 980731,990607 & 03 Ltrs Provided Requested Info in Subj Gl.Nrc Considers Subj GL to Be Closed for Unit 1 L-99-032, Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 2 L-99-034, Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 2 ML20212F8861999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request Number 32 for NRC Approval. Approval Requested by 991231 to Support Activities to Be Performed During Unit 1 Refueling Outage Scheduled for Spring of 2000 ML20212E7031999-09-23023 September 1999 Responds to GL 98-01, Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Util Requested to Submit Plans & Schedules for Resolving Y2K-related Issues ML20212F1111999-09-21021 September 1999 Discusses Closeout of GL 97-06, Degradation of Steam Generator Internals ML20212C2351999-09-16016 September 1999 Submits Corrected Info Concerning Snoc Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal ML20212D0101999-09-15015 September 1999 Informs That Submittal of clean-typed Copy of ITS & ITS Bases Will Be Delayed.Delay Due to Need for Resolution of Two Issues Raised by NRC staff.Clean-typed Copy of ITS Will Be Submitted within 4 Wks Following Resolution of Issues ML20212C4641999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Info Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams L-99-031, Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed1999-09-13013 September 1999 Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed ML20212C8041999-09-10010 September 1999 Responds to to D Rathbun Requesting Review of J Sherman Re Y2K Compliance.Latest NRC Status Rept on Y2K Activities Encl ML20212D4581999-09-10010 September 1999 Responds to to D Rathbun,Requesting Review of J Sherman Expressing Concerns That Plant & Other Nuclear Plants Not Yet Y2K Compliant ML20212A6951999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20212A8341999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20211N8041999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That on 990930 NRC Issued GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Condition, to Holders of Nuclear Plant Operating Licenses ML20211N4301999-09-0808 September 1999 Discusses Proposed Meeting to Discuss Kaowool Fire Barriers. Staff Requesting That Affected Licensees Take Issue on Voluntary Initative & Propose Approach for Resolving Issues ML20212C0071999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-348/99-05 & 50-364/99-05 on 990627- 0807.No Violations Noted.Licensee Conduct of Activities at Farley Plant Facilities Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations & Sound Engineering ML20211Q4801999-09-0101 September 1999 Informs That on 990812-13,Region II Hosted Training Managers Conference on Recent Changes to Operator Licensing Program. List of Attendees,Copy of Slide Presentations & List of Questions Received from Participants Encl ML20211K2131999-08-31031 August 1999 Informs That Snoc Has Conducted Review of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Version 2 (RVID2) & Conclude That Latest Data Submitted for Farley Units Has Not Been Incorporated Into RVID2 ML20211K4101999-08-31031 August 1999 Resubmits Relief Requests Q1P16-RR-V-5 & Q2P16-RR-V-5 That Seek to Group V661 Valves from Each Unit Into Sample Disassembly & Insp Group,Per 990525 Telcon with NRC L-99-030, Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS1999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS ML20211G6851999-08-26026 August 1999 Informs That During Insp,Technical Issues Associated with Design,Installation & fire-resistive Performance of Kaowool Raceway fire-barriers Installed at Farley Nuclear Plant Were Identified L-99-029, Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 07271999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 0727 ML20211B9431999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for six-month Reporting Period 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d).Rept Covers Employees at Jm Farley Nuclear Plant & Southern Nuclear Corporate Headquarters ML20211B9211999-08-17017 August 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-348/99-09 & 50-364/99-09.Corrective Actions:Security Response Plan Was Revised to Address Vulnerabilities Identified During NRC Insp ML20210R5101999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Revised Page 6 to 990430 LAR to Operate Farley Nuclear Plant,Unit 1,for Cycle 16 Only,Based on risk- Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity,As Result of Staff Comments ML20212C8141999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Correspondence Received from Jm Sherman.Requests Review of Info Re Established Policies & Procedures ML20210T2021999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards Draft SE Accepting Licensee Proposed Conversion of Plant,Units 1 & 2 Current TSs to Its.Its Based on Listed Documents ML20210Q4641999-08-0505 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Authorized Representative of Facility Must Submit Ltr to La Reyes,As Listed,With List of Individuals to Take exam,30 Days Before Exam Date ML20210J8341999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Second Request for Addl Info Re Util 990430 Amend Request to Allow Util to Operate Unit 1,for Cycle 16 Based on risk-informed Probability of SG Tube Rupture & Nominal accident-induced primary-to-second Leakage ML20210G4901999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal, Issued 990603.Ltr Contains NRC License Commitment to Utilize ASTM D3803-1989 with Efficiency Acceptance Criteria Utilizing Safety Factor of 2 L-99-028, Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines1999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-027, Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.51999-07-27027 July 1999 Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.5 ML20210G8181999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-348/99-04 & 50-364/99-04 on 990516- 0626.One Violation Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violation IR 05000348/19990091999-07-23023 July 1999 Discusses Insp Repts 50-348/99-09 & 50-364/99-09 on 990308- 10 & Forwards Notice of Violation Re Failure to Intercept Adversary During Drills,Contrary to 10CFR73 & Physical Security Plan Requirements ML20210E4071999-07-22022 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990702 RAI Re Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described in NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-026, Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments1999-07-19019 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments L-99-264, Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20209H4721999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20196J6191999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards Final Dam Audit Rept of 981008 of Category 1 Cooling Water Storage Pond Dam.Requests Response within 120 Days of Date of Ltr 05000364/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed1999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed ML20196J7471999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards RAI Re Cycle 16 Extension Request.Response Requested within 30 Days of Date of Ltr ML20196J5781999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards RAI Re 981201 & s Requesting Amend to TS Associated with Replacing Existing Westinghouse Model 51 SG with Westinghouse Model 54F Generators.Respond within 30 Days of Ltr Date ML20196J6571999-07-0202 July 1999 Discusses Closure to TAC MA0543 & MA0544 Re GL 92-01 Rev 1, Suppl 1,RV Structural Integrity.Nrc Has Revised Rvid & Releasing It as Rvid,Version 2 as Result of Review of Responses ML20196J3591999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards SE of TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at Westinghouse 3-Loop Pwrs 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARL-99-035, Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-10-18018 October 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld ML20217P0661999-10-0606 October 1999 Requests Withholding of Proprietary Rept NSD-SAE-ESI-99-389, Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs ML20217B1891999-10-0404 October 1999 Submits Clarification Re Development of Basis for Determining Limiting Internal Pressure Loads Re Review of NRC SE for Cycle 16 Extension Request.Util Intends to Use Guidelines When Evaluating SG Tube Structural Integrity L-99-034, Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 2 L-99-032, Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 2 ML20212F8861999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request Number 32 for NRC Approval. Approval Requested by 991231 to Support Activities to Be Performed During Unit 1 Refueling Outage Scheduled for Spring of 2000 ML20212C2351999-09-16016 September 1999 Submits Corrected Info Concerning Snoc Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal ML20212D0101999-09-15015 September 1999 Informs That Submittal of clean-typed Copy of ITS & ITS Bases Will Be Delayed.Delay Due to Need for Resolution of Two Issues Raised by NRC staff.Clean-typed Copy of ITS Will Be Submitted within 4 Wks Following Resolution of Issues L-99-031, Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed1999-09-13013 September 1999 Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed ML20212C4641999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Info Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams ML20211K2131999-08-31031 August 1999 Informs That Snoc Has Conducted Review of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Version 2 (RVID2) & Conclude That Latest Data Submitted for Farley Units Has Not Been Incorporated Into RVID2 ML20211K4101999-08-31031 August 1999 Resubmits Relief Requests Q1P16-RR-V-5 & Q2P16-RR-V-5 That Seek to Group V661 Valves from Each Unit Into Sample Disassembly & Insp Group,Per 990525 Telcon with NRC L-99-030, Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS1999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS L-99-029, Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 07271999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 0727 ML20211B9431999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for six-month Reporting Period 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d).Rept Covers Employees at Jm Farley Nuclear Plant & Southern Nuclear Corporate Headquarters ML20211B9211999-08-17017 August 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-348/99-09 & 50-364/99-09.Corrective Actions:Security Response Plan Was Revised to Address Vulnerabilities Identified During NRC Insp ML20210R5101999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Revised Page 6 to 990430 LAR to Operate Farley Nuclear Plant,Unit 1,for Cycle 16 Only,Based on risk- Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity,As Result of Staff Comments ML20212C8141999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Correspondence Received from Jm Sherman.Requests Review of Info Re Established Policies & Procedures ML20210G4901999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal, Issued 990603.Ltr Contains NRC License Commitment to Utilize ASTM D3803-1989 with Efficiency Acceptance Criteria Utilizing Safety Factor of 2 L-99-028, Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines1999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-027, Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.51999-07-27027 July 1999 Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.5 ML20210E4071999-07-22022 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990702 RAI Re Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described in NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-026, Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments1999-07-19019 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments L-99-264, Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20209H4721999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 05000364/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed1999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed L-99-024, Responds to NRC RAI Re Conversion to ITS for Chapters 3.4, 3.5,3.6,3.7,3.9 & 5.0,per 990419-20 Meetings with NRC1999-06-30030 June 1999 Responds to NRC RAI Re Conversion to ITS for Chapters 3.4, 3.5,3.6,3.7,3.9 & 5.0,per 990419-20 Meetings with NRC L-99-025, Forwards Rev 2 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-0-M-99,IAW 10CFR50.4(b)(4).Attachment 1 Contains Summary of Changes & Amended Security Plan Pages.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR73.211999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Rev 2 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-0-M-99,IAW 10CFR50.4(b)(4).Attachment 1 Contains Summary of Changes & Amended Security Plan Pages.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR73.21 ML20196J8631999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA L-99-249, Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA1999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA L-99-224, Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments1999-06-0707 June 1999 Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20195F1731999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld L-99-217, Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld1999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld L-99-225, Responds to GL 98-01, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants1999-06-0707 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants ML20195F0621999-06-0707 June 1999 Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20195E9581999-06-0707 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants ML20195C6941999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program L-99-021, Forwards Response to RAI Re Conversion to ITSs for Chapter 3.3.Attachment II Includes Proposed Revs to Previously Submitted LAR Re Rais,Grouped by RAI number.Clean-typed Copies of Affected ITS Pages Not Included1999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to RAI Re Conversion to ITSs for Chapter 3.3.Attachment II Includes Proposed Revs to Previously Submitted LAR Re Rais,Grouped by RAI number.Clean-typed Copies of Affected ITS Pages Not Included L-99-203, Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program1999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program ML20195F2101999-05-24024 May 1999 Requests That Farley Nuclear Plant Proprietary Responses to NRC RAI Re W WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs, Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790 L-99-180, Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapter 3.8 of Ts.Proposed Revs to TS Previously Submitted with LAR Related to RAI1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapter 3.8 of Ts.Proposed Revs to TS Previously Submitted with LAR Related to RAI ML20206F4321999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapter 3.8 of Ts.Proposed Revs to TS Previously Submitted with LAR Related to RAI L-99-017, Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapters 3.1, 3.2,3.5,3.7 & 3.9 of Ts.Attached Pages Include Proposed Revs Previously Submitted LAR to Rais,Grouped by Chapters & RAI Numbers1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapters 3.1, 3.2,3.5,3.7 & 3.9 of Ts.Attached Pages Include Proposed Revs Previously Submitted LAR to Rais,Grouped by Chapters & RAI Numbers ML20206C8021999-04-26026 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Rept, for Alabama Power Co.Encls Contain Financial Statements for 1998,unaudited Financial Statements for Quarter Ending 990331 & Cash Flow Projections for 990101-991231 05000348/LER-1998-007, Forwards SG-99-04-001, Farley-1:Final Cycle 16 Freespan ODSCC Operational Assessment, as Committed to in Licensee & LER 98-007-00.Util Is Revising Plant Administrative SG Operating Leakage Requirements as Listed1999-04-23023 April 1999 Forwards SG-99-04-001, Farley-1:Final Cycle 16 Freespan ODSCC Operational Assessment, as Committed to in Licensee & LER 98-007-00.Util Is Revising Plant Administrative SG Operating Leakage Requirements as Listed L-99-015, Forwards Rev 1 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-O-M-99,resulting from Implementation of Biometrics Sys.Changes Incorporate Changes Previously Submitted to NRC as Rev 28 by Licensee .Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.211999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-O-M-99,resulting from Implementation of Biometrics Sys.Changes Incorporate Changes Previously Submitted to NRC as Rev 28 by Licensee .Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20206B4391999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Corrected ITS Markup Pages to Replace Pages in 981201 License Amend Requests for SG Replacement L-99-172, Forwards FNP Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW TSs Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9.Changes to ODCM Revs 16,17 & 18 Are Encl,Iaw TS Section 6.14.21999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards FNP Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW TSs Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9.Changes to ODCM Revs 16,17 & 18 Are Encl,Iaw TS Section 6.14.2 ML20205S9501999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards FNP Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW TSs Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9.Changes to ODCM Revs 16,17 & 18 Are Encl,Iaw TS Section 6.14.2 ML20205R0431999-04-13013 April 1999 Forwards Correction to 960212 GL 95-07 180 Day Response. Level 3 Evaluation for Pressure Locking Utilized Analytical Models.Encl Page Has Been Amended to Correct Error 1999-09-23
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4 s' AI:Dama Pcw Company 4D inse ness Center Paekway Post 0 Sco Bex 1NS Ottm ngnam Alcama 35201 s
hphone 205 B68458)
- w. G. Hairs. ton, m sene,r v ce Prescent h humar opsanons /\lUbailla power October 25, 1991 tweamermoc w m Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 V. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Response to Generic Letter 91-06, Resolution of Generic
.1n93 A-30. "Adgauacy of Safety-Related DC Power Supplies" Gentlemen:
The information requested by Generic Letter 91-06, Resolution of Generic Issue A-30, " Adequacy of Safety-Related DC Power Supplies," Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), for the Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 is provided in the enclosh.e to this letter. The re:ponses are based on the current Farley Nuclear Plant configuration and are subject to change in the future under 10 CFR 50.59 and/or licensing amendments as necessary.
Submission of the enclosed information completes the requirements of Generic Letter 91-06. If there are any questions please advise.
Respectfitlly submitted, nh gv' /h'sw -4wy .C r
W. G. Hairston, III WGH, III/KWW: map 1132 SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME Enclosure l THIS J50 DAY OF /Or/1/w , 1991 cc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. S. T. Hoffman M/aw1/h p]?'} M ((
Mr. G. F. Maxwell Jiotary Public l My Commission Expires: p//5/9 3-l
. 1 91103002?Z '>l1025 -
5 PDR ADOCK 05000348 e ens 1 1 1
_ . . - _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ ~
ENCLOSURE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT INFORMATION RE00ESTED IN SENERIC LETTER 91-06
. QUESTION 1:
Unit
RESPONSE
Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 QUESTION 2:-
A. The number of independent redundant divisions of Class IE or safety-related DC power for this plant is (include any separate Class lE or safety-related DC, such as any DC dedicated to the diesel generators).
B. The number of funct sonal safety-related divisions of DC power neces'ary to attain safe shutdown for this unit is.
RESPONSE
A. There are two separate, safety-related DC power systems for each unit.
One 125V-DC system is located in the auxiliary building (and also supplies the diesel building). The other 125V-DC system is located in the service water building and consists of 2 DC distribution systems shared between Units 1 and 2. Both the auxiliary building and the service water systems have two independent and redundant divisions. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the auxiliary building and service water DC distribution systems.
B. One; one train of the auxiliary building DC system and its-associated train of scrvice water DC.
QUESTION 3:
Does the control room at this unit have the following separate independently annunciated alarms and indications for each division of DC-power?-
A. Al arn.s
- 1. Battery disconnect or circuit breaker open?
- 2. Battery charger disconnect or circuit breaker open (both input AC and-output DC)?
- 3. DC system ground?
1
ENCLOSURE (CONTINUED)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT INFORMATION REG ESTED IN GENERIC LETTER 91-05
- 4. DC bus undervoltage?
- 5. DC bus overvoltage?
- 6. Battery charger failure?
- 7. Battery discharge?
- 8. Indications
- 1. Battery float charge current?
- 2. Battery circuit output current?
- 3. Battery discharge?
- 4. Bus voltage?
C. Does the unit have written procedures for response to the above alarms and indications?
RESPONSE
A Alarms IXPlRDaticn and Justifications Relative to Question 3 A 'yes" response for an alarm indicates that there is a separate, independently cnnunciated alarm for the specific function in question. it does not mean that the specific function has a dedicated annunciator window. Several alarm signals may be transmitted to a single annunciator window. As an example, Annunciator Window VC4, "lB BATT CHG FAULT OR DISC" would illuminate and an alarm would sound for any of the following causes:
- 1. Loss of AC input to Battery Charger IB.
- 2. Battery Charger IB internal f ault.
- 3. Battery Charger IB in manual control.
- 4. Battery Charger IB DC output breaker or bus 18 incoming breaker open.
This annunciator would inform the operator that there was a problem associated with Battery Charger IB. The specific problem would then be ascertained and corrected in accordance with the appropriate annunciator response procedure.
2
ENCLO5URE (CONTINUED)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT Iff.EiATION RE0 VESTED IN GENERIC LLTlf!L 91-06 auxiliary Buildina DC System Service Water DC System
- 1. Yes 1. No
- 2. Yes 2. Yes
- 3. Yes 3. Yes
- 4. Yes 4. No -
- 5. No 5. No
- 6. Yes 6. Yes
- 7. No 7. No B. Indications Auxiliar.y_Buildina DC Systar Service Water DC Sv5100
- 1. No 1. No
- 2. Yes 2. Yes
- 3. No 3. No
- 4. Yes 4. Yes C. Yes QUESTION 4:
Does this unit have indication of bypassed and inoperalle status of circuit breakers or other devices that can be used to disconnect the battery and battery charger from its DC bus and the battery charger from its AC power source during maintenance or testing?
RESPONSE
Auxiliary Buildina DC System Service Water DC System No No QUESTION 5:
If the answer +.o any part of question 3 or 4 is no, then provide information justifying the existing design features of the facility's safety-related DC systems.
l 3 l
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ENCLOSURE (CONTINUED)
JOSEPH M..FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT INFORMATION RE0 VESTED IN GENERIC LETTER 91-05
RESPONSE
Question 3.A.1 - The service water DC system consists of four batteries, each with its own battery charger. There are-two battery / battery chargers dedicated to each train. One battery and its associated battery charger supplies the serv ce water A train DC distribution system. One battery and its associated battery charger supplies the service water B train DC distribution system. Two batteries and their associated battery chargers are on standby. Therefore, each train of the service water distribution-system has a redundant battery and +
battery charger on standby. The battery and battery charger combination may be switched by changing the position of a transfer switch. The battery and battery charger output are-supplied to the service water DC distribution cabinets by fuses. If the supply fuses are pulled or blow, there is no " fuse blown" annunciator in the control room. However, power available lights for- several breakers in'the control room would be extinguished due to the loss of service i
water DCe Other non-related annunciators, e.g., service water intake structure annunciator, would alarm in the control room due to '.he loss- of service water DC. In 4ddition, the total current ammeter for the service water battery and battery charger would _ read lower than normal due to the loss of loads. Based on ,
these indications, the operator _ has sufficient information to identify the service water-distribution cabinets supply fuses have blown.
Question 3.A.4 - Control Room annunciators exist for serfilce water battery undervoltage or battery charger alarm. This annunciator monitors low DC output 4
- voltage on the battery charger side of the service water DC distribution cabinet supply - fuses . Providing the fuses supplying the distribution cabinets have not blown,L this voltage would also be that on the the service water-DC bus.
rindication of blown service water supply fuses was discussed under 3.A.1 above.
Question 3. A.5 - There is no control room alarm for DC bus overvoltage.
- However, the_ auxiliary; building-and service _ water DC_ systems battery _ charger outrut voltage is monitored by auxiliary high voltage relays which will_ initiate
. a battery charger fault or disconnect" alarm _in the control room on high voltage. The DC bus voltage -is also indicated in -the control room. Therefore, upon receiving the battery charger alarm, the operstors could readily ascertain that_the voltage was high and that the high voltage was a likely cause of the
-battery charger fault alarm. In addition, the-annunciator response procedures require the alarm to be investigated-to determine the cause. Any conditions
- :that would cause a high voltage on the DC bus would have to pass through the battery charger and result'in the- battery charger fault alarm in the control room.
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ENCLOSURE (CONTINUED)
JOSEPH M.-FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT INFORMATION RE00ESTED IN C W B]C LETTER 91-06 1
Question 3.A 7 - There is no control room alarm that specifically indicates that a battery is discharged. Control room indication is provided for auxiliary building battery current and auxiliary building-and service water bus voltage.
A-discharged battery would be detected by reduced bus voltage indication. A bus undervoltage alarm set at 127 volts would be. received in the control room before the batteries could discharge to an unacceptable level. Surveillance testing of the batteries which would detect a discharged condition is performed on a seven
. day interval. It would be very unusual for the batterjes utilized at the Farley Nuclear Plant to discharge .in a rapid manner while a float charge is being-maintained._ A gradual discharge would be detected by the surveillance testing before a significant reduction in battery capability could occur.
' Question 3.B.1 - There is no indicator in the control room that is capable of indicating the _small battery float currents for the auxiliary building or.
service water battaries. - Control- room indication is provided-for auxiliary ,
building-battery output current-and bus voltage and for service water total DC l current and battery charger output current. The battery output current would normally indicate zero on the indicator. The currents and voltages are also indicated locally at the chargers. If the battery charger should malfunction requiring the battery to feed the DC bus, the indicators would indicate the current flow. - If for some reason = the battery became discharged requiring a -
significant current- flow from the charger to the battery, the indicators would '
indicate the magni.tude of the current. In the unlikely event that-the battery
- float current was not maintained and the condition was not detected'by the available monitoring instrumentation, the problem would be identified during the
-scheduled surveillance testing and/or by the operators during routine equipment inspections.
. Question 3.B.3 - There is no control room indicator that specifically displays a battery discharge condition for the 'uxiliary building or service water batteries, but the battery / battery charger output current indicators would alert the operators if a battery was carrying a significant load or if a large current was required to maintain a battery in the charged condition._ It_is-very unlikely thatia-battery could discharge without being-detected by existing instrumentation. A battery could not discharge to the DC bus unless there was a problem with a battery charger.~ Any battery charger trouble that would cause_a battery to discharge to the bus would-be detected and alarmed by the battery charger protection-instrumentation. If a battery should become partially
- discharged and not be detected by existing indicators and alanns, the discharged condition would be identified within seven days by surveillance testing. It is highly unlikely' that the batteries would: discharge in that time period.
Question 4, Auxiliary Building DC System - In the control room, there are battery circuit breaker open alarms and battery charger DC output circuit breaker trip ~ alarms for the auxiliary building DC power system. The circuit breaker alarms would be initiated for open circuits regardless of whether they were caused from a manual opening for maintenance and testing or an automatic 5
ENCLOSURE (CONTINUED)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLAN 1 JNFORMATION RE0 VESTED 14 CffERIC LETTER 91-Q1 opening due to unstable AC or DC power conditions, if the circuit breakers in either DC power system are racked out for maintenance, the alarm will clear.
However, the racking out of the breaker would be covered by procedure and approved by the Operations Department. In addition, an LCO would be placed in ef fect in accordance with the plant Technical Specifications, if a circuit breaker in the AC power supply to the auxiliary building battery charger should open, a battery charger trouble alarm would be initiated in tha control room due to the loss of AC input to the battery charger. The annunciator response procedure requires that plant personnel determine and correct the cause of the alarm. Therefore, the control room would have adequate indication via the annunciators and administrative controls to alert them to the removal of any battery charger from its normal service.
Question 4, Service Water DC - The service water DC system consists of four batteries, each witn its own battery charger. There are two battery / battery chargers dedicated to each train. One battery and its associated battery charger supplies the service water A train DC distribution system. A second battery and its associated battery charger supplies the service water B train DC distribution system. Two batteries and their associated battery chargers are on standby. Therefore, each train of the service water distribution system has a redundant battery _ and battery charger on standby. The battery and battery charger combination may be switched by changing the position of a transfer switch. The battery and battery charger output are supplied to the service water DC distribution cabinets by fuses. If the supply fuses are pulled or blow, there is no " fuse blown" annunciator in the control room. However, power available lights for several breakers in the control room would be extinguished due to the loss of service water DC. Other non-related annunciators, e.g.
service water intake structure annunciator, would alarm in the control room due to the loss of service water DC. In addition, the total current ammeter for the service water battery and battery charger would read lower than normal due to the loss of load. Based on these indications, the operator has sufficient information to identify the service water distribution cabinets supply fuses have blown.
Maintenance would only be performed on the battery or charger that was in the standby position. If maintenance was performed on the on service battery charger, the AC input breaker to the battery charger would be opened which would initiate an annunciator for battery undervoltage or charger alarm. Removing the DC fuses for the service water DC distribution system would result in a battery no charge alarm, assuming the battery is fully charged and charger current drops significantiy. Therefore, the control room has sufficient indication via the annunciator system and administrative controls to provide adequate control of the service water DC system.
QUESTION 6:
(1) Have you conducted a review of maintenance and testing activities to minimize the potential for human error causing more than one DC division to be unavailable? and (2) Do plant procedures prohibit maintenance or testing on redundant DC divisions at the same time?
6
ENCLOSURE (CONTINUED)
JOSEPH H. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT INFORMATION RE0 VESTED IN Sf.ERIC LETTER 91-06
RESPONSE
(1) No.
(2) No.
QUESTION 7:
Are maintenance, surveillance and test procedures regarding station batteries conducted routinely at this plant? Specifically:
A. At least once per 7 days are the following verified to be within acceptable limits:
- 1. Pilot cell electrolyte level?
- 2. Specific gravity or charging curruD
- 3. Float voltage?
- 4. Total bus voltage on float charge?
- 5. Physical condition of all cells?
B. At least once per 92 days, or within 7 days after a battery discharge, overcharge, or if the pilot cell readings are outside the 7-day surveillance requirements are the following verified to be within acceptable limits:
J. Electrolyte level of each cell?
- 2. The average specific gravity of all cells?
- 3. The specific gravity of each cell?
- 4. The average electrolyte temperature of a representative ~ number of cells?
- 5. The float voltage of each cell?
- 6. Visually: inspect or measure resistance of terminals and connectors (including the connectors at the DC bus)?
C. At least every 13 months' are the following verified:
- 1. Low resistance of each connection (by test)?
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= e 4 en, ENCLOSURE (CONTINUED)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT INFORMATION RE0 VESTED IN GENERIC LETTER 91-01
- 2. Physical condition of the battery?
- 3. Battery charger capability to deliver rated ampere output to the DC bus?
- 4. The capability of the battery to deliver its design duty cycle to the DC bus?
- 5. Each individual cell voltage is within acceptable limits during the service test?
D. At least every 60 months, is capacity of each battery verified by performance of a discharge test?
E. At least annually, is battery capacity verified by performance discharge test, if the battery shows signs of degradation or has reached 85% of the expected servie.e life?
NRC statement regarding Question 7:
If the facility Technical Specifications have provisions equivalent to those found in the destinghouse and Combustion Engineering Standard Technical Specifications for maintenance and surveillance, then question 7 may be skipped and a statement to that effect may be inserted here.
RESPONSE
The facility Technical Specifications for Farley Nuclear Plant have provisions for maintenance and surveillance of the DC power supplics that are equivalent to the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-0452, Revision 4). In some cases, Farley specific values have been used for the battery parameters that are more appropriate for the batteries in service ( e.g. different limits and allowable values for float vcitage and specific gravities.)
Note: Revision 4 of NUREG-0452 specifies that an annual discharge test of battery capacity be performed on any battery that shows signs of degradction or has reached 80% of the service life expected for the application. The Technical Specifications for the Farley r.'uclear Plant require this test to be performed at least once per each 18 months.
The discharge test is normally performed during plant shutdown, and an 18 month refueling cycle is utilized at the farley Nuclear Plant. Therefore, the 18 month frequency for the battere discharge test is appropriate.
Performance of the test once per each 18 months is also in agreement with draft Revision 5 of NUREG-0452.
8
W ENCLOSURE (CONTINVED)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT INFORMATION RE0 VESTED IN GENERIC LE11ER 91:ks QUESTION 8:
Does this plant have operational features such that following loss of one safety-related DC power supply or bus:
A. Capability is maintained for ensuring continued and adequate reactor cooling?
B. Reactor coolant system integrity and isolation capability are maintained?
C. Operating procedures, instrumentation (including indicators and annunciators), and control functions are adequate to initiate systems as required to maintain adequate core cooling?
RESPONSE
A. Yes; the size of each auxiliary building battery and service water battery is based on anticipated breaker operations required during a loss-of-offsite power in conjunction with a loss-of-coolant accident.
Each battery has adequate storage capacity to carry required vital loads without charger support for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
- 8. Yes; reactor coolant system integrity and isolation capability are maintained on loss of one safety-related DC power supply or bus.
C. Yes; specific annunciator response procedures have been developed to respond to off-normal conditions that develop relative to the DC power system. Abnormal operating procedures (A0Ps) ensure that the plant can be stabilized in hot standby and cooled down to cold shutdown conditions with one train of AC or DC power inoperable. Two separate A0Ps have been provided - one for stabilization with Train A inoperable and ene for use with Train B inoperable. Those procedures provide instructions for placing the the plant -in a safe, stable condition using the available instrumentation and controls with one power train (AC or DC) inoperable.
QUESTION 9:
If the answer to any part of question 6, 7, or 8 is no, then provide your basis for not performing the maintenance, surveillance and test procedures described and/or the bases for not including the operational features cited.
9
ENCLOSURE (CONTINUED)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT INFORMATION RE0 VESTED IN GENERIC LETTER 91-06
RESPONSE
Question 6.1 - Although no formal study specifically for the 125 volt DC distribution systems has been performed. Farley Nuclear Plant has c6.. ducted several evaluations of events (both at f arley Nuclear Plant and at other facilities) in which the wrong unit or wrong train (division) of electrical equipment was isolated because of human error. These evaluations are applicable to the 125V-DC Distribution System. Redundant trains of the '25V-DC Distribution- System (including the battery room door signs) are color coded to minimize the potential for human error during the execution phase of maintenance or testing. Plant design features (including Appendix R modifications) ensure that no single active failure can render inoperable both trains of 125V-DC Distribution. This design also minimizes the possibility that a maintenance or testing error in one train could render inoperable both trains of 125V-DC Distribution.
Question 6.2 - Ad:ninistrative procedures provide controls for the planning phase of maintenance or testing to ensure that only one redundant train of the 125V-DC Distribution System is removed from service for maintenance w testing.
However, tome maintenance practices, e.g., battery visual inspections or taking battery cell gravities, are not controlled to prohibit performance on redundant trains at the same time; nor should they be, 10
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l AUXILIARY BUILDING DC DISTRIBUTION (TYPICAL FOR UNIT 1 OR 2)
FIGURE 1
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FIGURE 2
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