ML041450096
ML041450096 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Watts Bar |
Issue date: | 05/20/2004 |
From: | Ogle C NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB |
To: | Scalice J Tennessee Valley Authority |
References | |
FOIA/PA-2004-0277 IR-04-006 | |
Download: ML041450096 (28) | |
See also: IR 05000390/2004006
Text
May 20, 2004
Tennessee Valley Authority
ATTN: Mr. J. A. Scalice
Chief Nuclear Officer and
Executive Vice President
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION
INSPECTION REPORT 05000390/2004006 and 05000391/2004006
Dear Mr. Scalice:
On April 16, 2004, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at
your Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the
inspection findings, which were discussed on that date with Mr. W. Lagergren and other
members of your staff. Following completion of additional review in the Region II office, a final
exit was held by telephone with Mr. P. Pace of your staff on May 7, 2004, to provide an update
on changes to the preliminary inspection findings.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green)
involving a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety
significance and because it is entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating
the finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement
Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of
the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the
Regional Administrator Region 2; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.
TVA 2
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system
(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Charles R. Ogle, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos.: 50-390, 50-391
License Nos.: NPF-90, Construction
Permit No. CPPR-92
Enclosure: NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000390/2004006 and
05000391/2004006 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl:
Karl W. Singer
Senior Vice President
Nuclear Operations
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution
James E. Maddox, Vice President
Engineering and Technical Services
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution
William R. Lagergren
Site Vice President
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution
General Counsel
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution
(cc w/encl contd - See page 3)
TVA 3
(cc w/encl contd)
Thomas J. Niessen, Acting General Manager
Nuclear Assurance
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution
Mark J. Burzynski, Manager
Nuclear Licensing
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution
Paul L. Pace, Manager
Licensing and Industry Affairs
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution
Larry S. Bryant, Plant Manager
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution
County Executive
Rhea County Courthouse
375 Church Street, Suite 215
Dayton, TN 37321-1300
County Mayor
P. O. Box 156
Decatur, TN 37322
Lawrence E. Nanney, Director
TN Dept. of Environment & Conservation
Division of Radiological Health
Electronic Mail Distribution
Ann Harris
341 Swing Loop
Rockwood, TN 37854
James H. Bassham, Director
Tennessee Emergency Management Agency
Electronic Mail Distribution
Distribution w/encl: See page 4
TVA 4
Distribution w/encl:
M. Chernoff, NRR
L. Slack, RII EICS
RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB
PUBLIC
OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP
NAME PFILLION GWISEMAN MTHOMAS KODONOHUE SCAHILL
DATE 5/17/2004 5/17/2004 5/17/2004 5/19/2004 5/19/2004 5/ /2004 5/ /2004
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
PUBLIC DOCUMENT YES NO
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML041450096.wpd
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.: 50-390, 50-391
License Nos.: NPF-90, Construction Permit CPPR-92
Report No.: 05000390/2004006 and 05000391/2004006
Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location: 1260 Nuclear Plant Road
Spring City TN 37381
Dates: March 29 - April 2, 2004 (Week 1)
April 12 - 16, 2004 (Week 2)
Inspectors: K. ODonohue, Fire Protection Team Leader (Lead Inspector)
P. Fillion, Reactor Inspector
G. Wiseman, Sr. Reactor Inspector
M. Thomas, Sr. Reactor Inspector
Approved by: Charles R. Ogle, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000390/2004-006, 05000391/2004-006; 03/29 - 04/02/2004 and 04/12 - 16/2004; Watts
Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Triennial Fire Protection.
The report covered an announced two-week period of inspection by four regional inspectors.
One Green non-cited violation was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by
their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance
Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be
assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing
the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649,
Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
C Green. A non-cited violation (NCV) of Operating License Condition 2.F, was
identified for inadequate implementation of the approved fire protection program
(FPP). Specifically, the licensees process for evaluating the impact of design
changes on the FPP (in this case a change to local manual operator actions)
was not adequate to ensure that the change would not adversely affect the ability
to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Upon identification,
the licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program.
The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection
against external factors attribute and degraded the reactor safety mitigating
systems cornerstone objective. This finding was determined to be of very low
safety significance because the local manual operator action which prompted
this violation was considered within the capability of the operator to perform and
could be reasonably accomplished within the 15-minute time specified in the Fire
Protection Report. This determination was based on inspector walkdowns.
(Section 1R05.05)
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
None
REPORT DETAILS
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity
1R05 Fire Protection
The purpose of this inspection was to review the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant fire protection
report (FPR) for selected risk-significant fire areas. The FPR includes the fire protection
plan (FPP), safe shutdown analysis (SSA), and fire hazards analysis (FHA). Emphasis
was placed on verification that the post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) capability [from both
the Main Control Room (MCR) and the Auxiliary Control Panels (ACP)] and the fire
protection features provided for ensuring that at least one redundant train of SSD
systems are maintained free of fire damage. The inspection was performed in
accordance with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) Reactor Oversight
Process using a risk-informed approach for selecting the fire areas and attributes to be
inspected. The inspectors used the licensees Individual Plant Examination for External
Events and in-plant tours to choose three risk-significant fire areas, and a portion of a
fourth, for detailed inspection and review. The fire areas chosen for review during this
inspection were:
C Fire Area (FA) 14, Corridor, Rooms 737.0-A1A and 737.0-A1B.
C FA 27, 480-V Shutdown Board Room 1B.
C FA 33, 480V Board Room 1-B.
C FA 48, Control Building, Room 755.0C-12, Main Control Room
The inspectors evaluated the licensees FPR against applicable requirements, including
Operating License Condition 2.F; Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50
(10 CFR 50), Appendix R; 10 CFR 50.48; commitments to Appendix A of Branch
Technical Position Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch 9.5-1; Watts Bar
Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR); related NRC safety evaluation
reports (SER); and plant Technical Specifications. The inspectors evaluated all areas of
this inspection, as documented below, against these requirements.
Specific documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.
.01 Systems Required to Achieve and Maintain Post-fire Safe Shutdown
a. Inspection Scope
The licensees SSA was reviewed to determine the components and systems necessary
to achieve and maintain SSD conditions from the MCR in the event of fire in Fires Areas
14, 27, and 33. The objectives of this evaluation were to:
- Verify that the licensee's shutdown methodology had correctly identified the
components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain an SSD condition.
2
- Confirm the adequacy of the systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant
makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring and support system functions.
- Verify that an SSD can be achieved and maintained without off-site power when it
can be confirmed that a postulated fire in any of the selected fire areas could cause
the loss of off-site power.
- Verify that local manual operator actions are consistent with the plants fire
protection licensing basis.
The inspectors evaluated whether the SSA properly identified and categorized
components in terms of safe shutdown function. In addition, instrumentation known to
be necessary for safe shutdown, e.g., pressurizer level indication, was checked. The
safe shutdown components which were reviewed for operability during and after a
severe fire in either FA 14, FA 27 or FA 33 are listed in the attachment.
The MCR (remote) and in-plant manual operator actions (local) for controlling plant
operation, fire response, and achieving an SSD condition in response to a severe fire in
FA 14, FA 27, FA 33, and FA 48 (MCR) were reviewed and walked down by the
inspectors. The applicable procedures reviewed as part of this effort are listed in the
attachment.
Inspectors reviews of the procedures focused on ensuring that all required functions for
post-fire safe shutdown, and the corresponding equipment necessary to perform those
functions, were included in the procedures. The inspectors walked down each section
of the fire response procedure corresponding to the fire area listed above to verify that
local manual operator actions were feasible and could be performed in a timely manner.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.02 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the frequency of or potential for
fires, the combustible fire load characteristics, potential exposure fire severity, the
separation of systems necessary to achieve SSD, and the separation of electrical
components and circuits to ensure that at least one SSD path was free of fire damage.
The inspectors reviewed selected portions of the FPR as referenced by the Watts Bar
UFSAR. This review was conducted to determine if the licensees commitments, as
established in the fire protection licensing basis documents, were satisfied. The
inspectors examined the fire protection barriers and selected indoor transformer
combustible oil-retention basins to confirm installation was in accordance with the
applicable separation and design requirements stated above.
3
The inspectors reviewed the licensees documents which establish and implement
controls and practices to prevent fires and to control the storage of permanent and
transient combustible materials and ignition sources, to verify that the objectives
established by the NRC-approved FPP were satisfied. The documents reviewed are
listed in the attachment.
The inspectors toured the selected plant fire areas to observe: (1) the material condition
of fire protection systems and equipment, (2) the storage of permanent and transient
combustible materials, and (3) the licensees implementation of the procedures for
limiting fire hazards, combustible waste collection, housekeeping practices, and
cleanliness conditions. These reviews were accomplished to ensure that the licensee
was maintaining the fire protection systems, had properly evaluated in-situ combustible
fire loads, controlled hot-work activities, and limited transient fire hazards in a manner
consistent with the UFSAR, administrative procedures and other fire protection program
procedures.
The inspectors reviewed operator and fire brigade staffing, fire brigade response, fire
brigade qualification training and drill program procedures, and fire brigade drill critiques
for brigade shifts from January 2001 - May 2003. The reviews were performed to
determine whether fire brigade drills had been conducted in high fire risk plant areas
and whether fire brigade personnel training, qualifications, drill response, and
performance met the requirements of the FPP.
The inspectors walked down the fire emergency equipment storage locations and dress-
out areas in the auxiliary and service buildings to assess the operational readiness of
fire fighting and smoke control equipment. The fire brigade self-contained breathing
apparatuses were reviewed for adequacy as well as the availability of supplemental
breathing air bottles and the capability to refill these bottles. Additionally, the on-site fire
response vehicle and associated fire brigade personal protective equipment located at
the fire brigade house were reviewed to evaluate equipment accessibility and
functionality.
The inspectors reviewed fire fighting pre-fire plans for the selected fire areas to
determine if appropriate information was provided to fire brigade members to identify
SSD equipment and to facilitate suppression of an exposure fire that could impact safe
shutdown capability. The inspectors walked down the selected fire areas to compare
the associated pre-fire plans and drawings with as-built plant conditions. This was done
to verify that fire fighting pre-fire plans and drawings were consistent with the fire
protection features and potential fire conditions described in the FPR. In addition, the
inspectors performed a review of drawings, engineering calculations, and maintenance
instructions for potential fire suppression induced flooding associated with the floor drain
systems for the 480-V Shutdown Board Room 1B (FA 27) and the 480V Board Room 1B
(FA 33). The review focused on ensuring that those local manual operator actions
required for normal redundant train MCR shutdown performed outside the control room
would not be inhibited by the effects of the fire event, fire suppression activities, or
leakage from automatic or manual fire suppression systems within the fire areas or from
an adjacent plant area.
4
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.03 Post-fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis
a. Inspection Scope
Using the FPR and the Appendix R Required Components Report, the inspectors
reviewed how systems would be used to achieve and maintain reactivity control, over-
pressure protection, inventory control with high or low pressure injection systems, and
residual heat removal during and following a fire in the areas selected for inspection.
The inspection specifically focused on the minimum required systems and equipment
necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions because damage to these
systems could pose a significantly greater risk than damage to systems required to
achieve cold shutdown conditions.
The inspectors performed a detailed review of a number of valves, instruments and
other equipment relative to a postulated fire in each of the areas selected for inspection.
This review included examination of the licensees Appendix R Required Components
Report, which was a matrix of Appendix R Analysis Areas versus important cables,
together with statements of resolutions for any cables that did not meet Appendix R,
III.G.2 separation criteria. Component power supply, elementary control diagrams,
cable schedules with routing information and the cable tray drawings were reviewed as
necessary to confirm that the Appendix R Required Components Report was correct.
Resolutions for any cables that did not meet Appendix R,III.G.2 separation criteria were
verified by such means as field inspection of cable protective wrap or examination of
post-fire shutdown procedure steps.
The potential for spurious valve operation or malfunction was considered in the period
immediately following a fire and in the period after operator realignment to hot standby
mode but before fire extinguishment. The inspectors also utilized this information to
determine if the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2 (for protection of control
and power cables) were met. In the case of a severe control room fire, alternative safe
shutdown capability was considered. The applicable criterion was that a fire would not
degrade the ability to safely shutdown from the ACP. The components and equipment
included in the review are listed in the attachment. Among the components reviewed,
were the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORV) and the associated flow
control valves (PORV block valves). The criteria for this review were that the PORVs
would not spuriously open due to a fire and that at least one PORV would be available
to operators in either the main control room or the ACP should RCS conditions during
the shutdown evolution require manual opening of a PORV.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
5
.04 Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The licensees Fire Protection Report and plant configuration were reviewed to
determine the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain SSD
conditions from the ACP in the event of fire in the MCR. The objectives of this
evaluation were to:
- Verify that the licensee's alternative shutdown methodology had correctly identified
the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain an SSD condition.
- Confirm the adequacy of the systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant
makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring and support system functions.
- Verify that hot and cold shutdown from outside the MCR can be achieved and
maintained with offsite power available or not available.
Design of control circuits, including their overcurrent protective devices, was considered
in terms of fire-induced short-circuits in the MCR resulting in loss of SSD capability. In
general, the licensee utilized isolation/transfer switches and double fusing of circuits to
allow transfer of control for a component from the MCR to the ACP. Specific circuits
reviewed were those listed in the attachment. Additionally, the inspector reviewed
6900V Shutdown Board 1A-A offsite power circuit breakers and an undervoltage relay.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.05 Operational Implementation of Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the operational implementation of the SSD capability for an
Appendix R fire in FA 14, FA 27, FA 33, or FA 48 to verify that: (1) the training program
for licensed personnel included MCR and alternative safe shutdown capability; (2)
personnel required to achieve and maintain the plant in hot standby, from the MCR or
ACR, following a fire could be provided from normal onsite staff, exclusive of the fire
brigade; (3) the licensee had incorporated the operability of alternative shutdown
transfer and control functions into plant Technical Specifications (TS); and (4) the
licensee periodically performed operability testing of the alternative shutdown
instrumentation, and transfer and control functions. The inspectors reviewed Abnormal
Operating Instruction (AOI) AOI-30.1, Plant Fires; and selected sections of AOI-30.2,
Fire Safe Shutdown. The reviews focused on ensuring that all required functions for
post-fire safe shutdown, and the corresponding equipment necessary to perform those
functions, were included in the procedures for the selected fire areas.
6
The inspectors also reviewed criteria in the following licensee engineering department
standards and design control procedures to verify that plant changes were adequately
reviewed for the potential impact on the FPR, fire protection features, SSD equipment,
and procedures as required by Watts Bar Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.F.
- G-73, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems,
Revision 5
- SPP-9.3, Plant Modification and Engineering Change Control, Revision 9
- TI-277, Modification Compliance Review-Fire Protection, Revision 0
- FPDP-3, Management of the Fire Protection Report, Revision 4
b. Findings
Inadequate Evaluation Process for Design Changes Which Could Affect Safe Shutdown
in the Event of a Fire
Introduction: The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Operating License
Condition 2.F., for inadequate implementation of the approved FPP. Specifically, the
licensees process for evaluating the impact of design changes on the FPP (in this case
a change to local manual operator actions) was not adequate to ensure that the
changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in
the event of a fire.
Description: The licensee implemented a design change which revised a local manual
operator action which had been previously approved by the NRC during Watts Bar Unit
1 licensing in 1995 for a fire in Room 757-A5 (FA 27). The licensees process for
evaluating the impact of design changes on the FPP was addressed in the following
procedures:
- G-73, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems,
Revision 5
- SPP-9.3, Plant Modification and Engineering Change Control, Revision 9
- TI-277, Modification Compliance Review-Fire Protection, Revision 0
- FPDP-3, Management of the Fire Protection Report, Revision 4
During review of these procedures, the inspectors noted that the process for evaluating
the impact of design changes on FPP local manual operator actions only addressed
whether emergency lighting was affected (e.g., changes to emergency light positions or
additional emergency lights required). The inspectors noted that an evaluation limited to
determining the availability of emergency lighting was not sufficient to determine if the
local manual operator actions could be performed within the required time in a
satisfactory manner. In addition, these review procedures did not consider other
aspects of local manual operator action such as complexity, location of the actions with
7
respect to the fire, accessibility, or environmental considerations, which could affect the
operators capability to perform the action. The failure to consider factors other than
emergency lighting could result in a change to the FPP which impacted the ability to
achieve and maintain SSD.
A potential example of this was noted during the inspectors review of design change
notice (DCN) 39742-A. The licensee implemented DCN 39742-A in December 1997,
which revised a local manual operator action that had been previously approved by the
NRC during Watts Bar Unit 1 licensing in 1995 for a fire in Room 757-A5 (FA 27). The
DCN added manual switches to the control circuits for MCR air handling units (AHU)
A-A and B-B and identified revised local manual operator actions for restarting the
AHUs. The revised local manual operator actions replaced previously approved manual
operator actions included in the licensees Fire Protection Report (FPR).
The licensee performed a safety assessment/safety evaluation (WBPLEE-97-154-0)
during implementation of DCN 39742-A to evaluate the impact of the DCN on the FPP.
The DCN was evaluated against the design and licensing bases and was found to be
acceptable by the licensee. The inspectors noted that this evaluation did not address
the impact of the DCN on FPP emergency lighting, as required by Procedure SPP-9.3.
More importantly, the inspectors also noted that other conditions which could affect the
capability of the operators to perform this revised local manual operator action were not
addressed, such as, accessibility, complexity, environmental considerations, etc. The
revised local operator manual action for AHU A-A was incorporated into Section C.23 of
AOI-30.2.
During in-plant walkdowns of procedure AOI-30.2, Section C.23, the inspectors
observed that the new switch for AHU A-A and the associated revised local manual
operator action were located in Room 757-A2 of the auxiliary building, which was
adjacent to Room 757-A5 (FA 27), the postulated area of the fire. The inspectors
initially questioned whether this revised manual action could be accomplished by the
operators, based on the potential impact of the fire brigade activities in the immediate
vicinity of Room 757-A2, and possible smoke migration from Room 757-A5 into Room
757-A2. After additional walkdowns of AOI-30.2, Section C.23, and discussion of
possible scenarios for the fire brigade activities with licensee fire operations personnel,
the inspectors concluded that the revised manual operator action could reasonably be
accomplished within the time required by the FPR.
Analysis: The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection
against external factors attribute and degraded the reactor safety mitigating systems
cornerstone objective. The finding degraded the defense-in-depth for fire protection.
The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (green),
because the revised manual operator actions which prompted this violation were
considered within the capability of the operator and could be reasonably accomplished
within the 15-minute time specified in the FPR. This determination was based on field
walkdowns of the Procedure AOI-30.2, Section C.23, and review of pre-fire plans and
fire brigade activities for a fire in Room 757-A5.
8
Enforcement: Operating License Condition 2.F requires that the licensee shall
implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program,
as described in the Fire Protection Report for Watts Bar Unit 1, as approved in
Supplements 18 and 19 of the SER (NUREG-0847). License Condition 2.F further
states that the licensee may make changes to the approved fire protection program
without prior NRC approval, only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability
to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. The licensees process for
evaluating the impact of design changes on the FPP was addressed in Procedures
FPDP-3, Management of the Fire Protection Report; SPP-9.3, Plant Modifications and
Engineering Change Control; TI-277, Modification Compliance Review - Fire Protection
and G-73, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems.
Contrary to the above, on April 15, 2004, when evaluating a licensee change to the FPP,
the inspectors observed that the licensees process for evaluating the impact of design
changes on the FPP (e.g., local manual operator actions) was not adequate to ensure
that the changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe
shutdown in the event of a fire. The procedures for evaluating the impact of design
changes on FPP local manual operator actions only required that the evaluation address
whether emergency lighting was affected. The procedures did not consider other
conditions such as complexity, location of the manual actions with respect to the fire,
accessibility or environmental considerations which could affect whether the manual
actions could reasonably be accomplished. This process could result in the licensee
inappropriately implementing design changes which may not lead to safe plant
conditions and could adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown
in the event of a fire, without receiving prior NRC approval. This finding is a violation of
NRC requirements and will be identified as NCV 50-390/2004-006-001, Inadequate
Evaluation Process for Design Changes Which Could Affect Safe Shutdown in the Event
of a Fire. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as
Problem Evaluation Reports (PER) 34252 and 34259.
.06 Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed plant communication capabilities to evaluate the availability of
the communication systems to support plant personnel in the performance of manual
operator actions for shutdown, fire event notification, and fire brigade fire fighting duties.
This included verifying that site paging (PA), and portable radio communication systems
were consistent with the licensing basis and would be available during fire response
activities.
Walkdowns were performed of AOI-30.2 sections to evaluate the ability of the plants
portable radio communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of
SSD functions. In addition, the inspectors reviewed 50 of the most recently completed
fire brigade drill critique reports to assess proper operation and effectiveness of the fire
brigade command post portable radio communications during fire drills and identify any
history of operational or performance problems with radio communications during fire
drills.
9
The inspectors also performed an independent technical review of the licensees plant
change documentation completed in support of DCN 19796-B, performed in 1995, which
reconfigured the routing of portable radio repeater antenna system cables to provide at
least 20 feet horizontal spatial separation on different elevations of the auxiliary building.
This DCN was evaluated in order to assess the radio communication systems
vulnerability to a fire in FA 14 and verify that the plant modification was performed
consistent with the design control procedures listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the design, placement, operation, and periodic testing
procedures for direct current self-contained battery powered emergency lighting units
(ELU) and dedicated, battery powered portable ELUs. The inspectors evaluated the
capability of the ELUs to support plant personnel in the performance of SSD functions,
including local manual operator actions, and for illuminating access and egress routes to
the areas where those manual actions would be performed. The inspectors checked
that these battery power supplies were rated with at least an 8-hour capacity, as
required by Section III.J of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. During walkdowns of the plant
areas where operators performed local manual actions, the inspectors inspected area
ELUs for proper operation and checked the aiming of lamp heads to determine if
sufficient illumination would be available to adequately illuminate the SSD equipment,
the equipment identification tags, and the access and egress routes thereto, so that
operators would be able to perform the actions without needing to use flashlights. The
inspectors also reviewed completed surveillance and maintenance procedures and test
records to ensure that the licensee properly maintained the lighting equipment.
The inspectors observed whether emergency exit lighting was provided for personnel
evacuation pathways to the outside exits as identified in the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) 101, Life Safety Code, and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) Part 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards. This
review also included examination of whether backup emergency lighting was provided
for the fire emergency storage locations, the fire brigade dress-out areas and fire
brigade house in support of fire brigade operations should power fail during a fire
emergency.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
10
.08 Cold Shutdown Repairs
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed and inspected one example of a repair procedure that may be
needed to transition from hot standby to cold shutdown. The procedure was contained
in Maintenance Instruction MI-0.047, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Repairs. The
procedure involved installing a jumper wire in a 6.9 kV switchgear compartment to allow
starting two emergency raw water cooling pumps on one diesel generator. Control
circuits and wiring diagrams were reviewed to confirm the correct terminal points, and a
field inspection was made to verify the as-built configuration and workability of the
procedure.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.09 Fire Barriers and Fire Area/Zone/Room Penetration Seals
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the selected fire areas to evaluate the adequacy of the fire
resistance of fire area barrier enclosure walls, ceilings, floors, fire barrier mechanical
and electrical penetration seals, fire doors, and fire dampers to ensure that at least one
train of SSD equipment would be maintained free of fire damage. The inspectors
selected several fire barrier features for detailed evaluation and inspection to verify
proper installation and qualification. The inspectors walked down the selected fire areas
to observe the material condition and configuration of the installed fire barrier features,
as well as, reviewed construction details and supporting fire endurance tests for the
installed fire barrier features to verify the as-built configurations were qualified by
appropriate fire endurance tests. The inspectors also reviewed the FHA to verify the fire
loading used by the licensee to determine the fire resistance rating of the fire barrier
enclosures.
The inspectors conducted a detailed inspection of two 2-hour fire-rated enclosure walls
separating the Unit 1 480V board room and the adjacent rooms to confirm that they had
been properly installed and qualified. Additionally, six fire doors in the selected fire
areas were reviewed to determine if they were designed, installed, and qualification
tested. Engineering evaluations and a summary of completed inspection and
maintenance procedures for the selected fire walls and doors were reviewed. These
reviews were performed to ensure that the passive fire barriers were properly inspected,
maintained, and met the licensing and design bases as described in the licensee
submittals, NRC SERs, and the FPR.
The inspectors selected nine penetration fire seals in the 480-V Shutdown Board Room
1B (FA 27) and the 480V Board Room 1B (FA 33) for review. The inspectors conducted
a detailed inspection of the seals to confirm that they had been properly installed and
qualified. The inspectors reviewed the installation instructions for the selected
mechanical and electrical fire barrier penetration seals, the penetration seal detail
11
drawings, qualification tests, and the fire protection penetration seal deviation analysis
for the technical basis of penetration seals to verify that the fire barrier installations met
design requirements, license commitments, and standard industry practices. The
inspectors also compared the penetration seal ratings with the ratings of the barrier
enclosures in which they were installed. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a summary
of completed surveillance and maintenance procedures for the selected fire barrier walls
to verify the fire seals were being adequately inspected and maintained.
The inspectors reviewed AOI-30.2, selected fire fighting pre-plans, fire damper location
and detail drawings, and heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system
drawings to verify that access to shutdown equipment and selected operator manual
actions would not be inhibited by smoke migration from one area to adjacent plant areas
used to accomplish SSD. The inspectors reviewed the design, installation details, and
qualification testing for three mechanical fire dampers in the 480-V Shutdown Board
Room 1B (FA 27) to verify that the damper installations met design requirements and
license commitments.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.10 Fire Protection Systems, Features and Equipment
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed SSD calculations, vendor documentation, flow diagrams, cable
routing information, system operating instructions, operational valve lineup procedures,
and system availability studies, associated with the fire pumps and fire protection water
supply system. Using operating and test procedures, the inspectors toured selected fire
pumps and portions of the fire main piping system to evaluate material condition,
consistency of as-built configurations with engineering drawings, and verify correct
system breaker and valve lineups. The review evaluated whether the common fire
protection water delivery and supply components could be damaged or inhibited by fire-
induced failures of electrical power supplies or control circuits. In addition, the
inspectors reviewed periodic surveillance and functional operability flow tests for the fire
pumps and fire main loop to assess whether the test program was sufficient to verify
proper operation of the fire protection water supply system in accordance with those
design requirements and acceptance criteria specified in Section 14, Operating
Requirements of the FPP.
The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the design, installation, and operation of the
automatic detection and alarm system for the selected fire areas to actuate in the early
stage of a fire. This included walkdowns of the systems and review of the type of
installed detectors, detector spacing, and the licensees technical evaluation of the
detector locations and the ceiling reinforcing plans as shown on location drawings. The
inspectors also reviewed licensee submittals and the NRC SERs associated with the
selected fire areas. These reviews were performed to ensure that the fire detection
systems for the selected fire areas were installed in accordance with the design and
licensing bases of the plant. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed fire detection
12
surveillance procedures and the detection system operating requirements specified in
the FPP to determine the adequacy of fire detection component testing to ensure that
the detection systems could function when needed.
The inspectors reviewed the manual suppression standpipe and fire hose system to
verify adequate design, installation, and operation in the selected fire areas. The
inspectors examined flow measurement/pressure test data to verify that sufficient
pressure and flow volume was available to produce electrically safe and effective fire
hose operation within the nozzle manufacturers specified flow range. The inspectors
performed in-plant walk-downs and observed placement of the fire hoses and
extinguishers to confirm consistency with the fire fighting pre-plan drawings and fire
protection program documents. Additionally, the inspectors checked a sample of
manual fire hose lengths to determine whether they would reach the SSD equipment in
the selected fire areas. This was done to ensure that manual fire fighting efforts could
be accomplished in the selected areas.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.11 Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the administrative controls for out-of-service, degraded, and/or
inoperable, fire protection features. An Out-of-Service Impairment Report for CY 2003,
which itemized out-of-service fire protection features, was reviewed. The review was
performed to verify that the risk associated with removing fire protection and/or post-fire
systems or components was properly assessed and adequate compensatory measures
were implemented in accordance with the licensees approved fire protection program.
The inspectors also performed an independent technical review of the licensees
evaluation documentation completed in support of Impairment Permit Nos. 03-0108,
03-0247, 03-0233, 03-0370, and 03-0409, which opened fire doors to compensate for
loss of ventilation cooling for the 480V Board Room 1B (FA 33). Additionally, the
inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the licensees short term compensatory measures
to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions
were taken.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.12 Fire Protection Licensing Basis
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensing basis documents, including Operating License
Condition 2.F, to ascertain if the Watts Bar FPP was consistent, and in compliance, with
10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. The inspectors evaluated and compared
13
the licensees SSD procedures, and various calculations of record against the licensing
basis to measure the adequacy and consistency of the program documentation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
Fire brigade response and emergency/incident reports for 2002 and 2003, selected fire
safety inspection reports, as well as corrective action program (CAP) PERs resulting
from fire, smoke, sparks, arcing, and equipment overheating incidents were reviewed.
This review was conducted to assess the frequency of fire incidents and any
maintenance-related or material condition problems related to fire incidents. The
inspectors also reviewed other CAP documents, including completed corrective actions
documented in selected PERs, and operating experience program (OEP) documents to
verify that industry-identified fire protection problems potentially or actually affecting
Watts Bar were appropriately entered into and resolved by the CAP process. Items
included in the OEP effectiveness review were NRC Information Notices, industry or
vendor-generated reports of defects and noncompliance under 10 CFR Part 21, and
vendor information letters.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On April 16, 2004, the lead inspector presented the inspection results to
Mr. W. Lagergren and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The
licensee confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the
inspection. Following completion of additional review in the Region II office, a final exit
was held by telephone with Mr. P. Pace on May 7, 2004, to provide an update on
changes to the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee acknowledged the findings.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel:
L. Bryant, Plant Manager
T. Davis, Supervisor, Fire Operations
C. Faulkner, Operations Support Manager
J. Gomez, Electrical Unit Lead, Site Engineering and Support
E. Haston, Site Engineering, Fire Protection
M. Heatherly, Corporate Fire Protection Engineer
J. Kammeyer, Site Engineering Manager
R. Kirkpatrick, Fire Protection Engineer, Site Engineering and Support
W. Lagergren, Site Vice President
L. Massinger, Design Engineer
P. Pace, Licensing Engineer, Licensing and Industry Affairs
J. Sterchi, Fire Protection Engineer, Fire Operations
R. Stockton, Licensing Manager
T. Wallace, Operating Manager
J. Young, Operations Specialist
NRC Personnel:
J. Bartley, Senior Resident Inspector
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
05000390/2004006-001 NCV Inadequate Evaluation Process for Design
Changes Which Could Affect Safe Shutdown in the
Event of a Fire (Section 1R05.05)
Discussed
None
ATTACHMENT
2
LIST OF COMPONENTS INSPECTED
Section 1R05.01: Post-fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis and
Section 1R05.03: Post-fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis
Component Identification Description
1-LCV-62-132-A Volume control tank outlet valve (MOV)
1-FCV-70-90A RCP thermal barrier return isolation valve (MOV)
1-FCV-62-93 Charging flow control valve (AOV)
1-LCV-62-136-B RWST to Charging Pump (MOV)
1-PCV-68-340-A Pressurizer PORV
1-PCV-68-334-B Pressurizer PORV
1-FCV-68-333-A RCS pressure relief flow control valve
1-FCV-68-332-B RCS pressure relief flow control valve
1-LI-68-326C Pressurizer level indicator
1-MTR-62-108-A Charging pump motor
1-MTR-26-1-A HP electric driven fire pump 1A-A
1-MTR-26-4-B HP electric driven fire pump 1B-B
2-MTR-26-9-A HP electric driven fire pump 2A-A
2-MTR-26-11-B HP electric driven fire pump 2B-B
0-PMP-26-3150 HP diesel driven fire pump
Section 1R05.02: Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability
Documents
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Report, Revision 26; Part II
SPP-10.7, Housekeeping/Temporary Equipment Control, Revision 1
SSP-10.10, Control of Transient Combustibles, Revision 1
SSP-10.11, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work), Revision 2
FPDP-1, Conduct of Fire Protection, Revision 0
TVA Health and Safety Practice 4, Smoking Cessation Policy, Dated January, 2003
WBN Technical Instruction TI-291, Combustible Control Zones and Sensitive Areas
Watts Bar Transient Combustible Evaluations issued from January, 2004
ATTACHMENT
3
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Procedures
AOI-30.1, Plant Fires, Rev. 6
AOI-30.2, Fire Safe Shutdown, Rev. 15
SOI-236.01, 125V DC Vital Battery Board 1, Rev. 16
ARI-15-21, Control Power & Fire Protection, Revision 16
DS-M17.2.2, Design Standard for Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems, Revision 5
EPIP-17, Fire Emergency Procedure, Revision 0
Fire Protection Report, Revision 25
FOR-26-9, Quarterly HPFP Valve Alignment Verification, Revision 4
FPDP-1, Conduct of Fire Protection, Revision 0
FPDP-2, Administration of Pre-Fire Plans, Revision 0
FPDP-3, Management of the Fire Protection Report, Revision 4
FPDP-4, Fire Emergency Response, Revision 0
FPS-777-EQUIP, Emergency Equipment Storage Locations, Inspection and Inventory,
Revision 12
1-JB-291-6917, Inventory of Appendix R Repair Equipment, Rev 0
G-73, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems and Features,
Revision 5
G-96, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Penetration Seals, Revision 1
G-98, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems,
Revision 5
MI-0.047, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Repairs, Rev. 4/13/04
MAI- 4.8, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Thermal and Anti-sweat Insulation,
Revision 10
MI-13.105, Fire Detector Replacement, Sensitivity Check, and/or Smoke Check, Revision 1
PI-FPU-1.0, Periodic Fire Brigade Training, Revision 1
PM-0-FPS-777-EQIP, Emergency Equipment Storage Inspection and Inventory, Revision 12
RPTR-253-NSS/H, NSS/H Repeater Annual Test, Revision 1
RPTR-253-F2, Repeater Annual Test, Revision 0
SOI-13.01, Fire Detection System, Revision 10
SOI-26.01, High Pressure Fire Protection System, Revision 21
SPP-9.3, Plant Modification and Engineering Change Control, Revision 9
SSP-10.9, Control of Fire Protection Impairments, Revision 2
SSP-10.12, Fire Protection Quality Assurance, Revision 0
TI-211, Fire Protection Weekly Inspection Report, Revision 0
TI-277, Modification Compliance Review-Fire Protection, Revision 0
TI-291, Combustible Control Zones and Sensitive Areas, Revision 0
TRN-32, Ignition Source Fire Watch Training, Revision 2
TRN-33, Fire Protection Employee Qualification, Revision 0
ATTACHMENT
4
Drawings
41N373-5, Concrete Partition Walls, Outline & Reinforcement, Revision 7
45W724-1, Electrical Wiring Diagram, 6900V Shutdown Power 1A-A Schematic, Revision 22
45W760-26-2, Electrical Wiring Diagram High Pressure Fire Protection System, Revision 12
45W760-211-8, Electrical Wiring Diagram, 6900V Shutdown Power 1A-A Schematic,
Revision 13
45W760-211-9, Electrical Wiring Diagram, 6900V Shutdown Power 1A-A Schematic,
Revision 16
45W816-7, Conduit and Grounding Fire Detection, El. 755.0, Control Building, Revision 5
45W826-8, Conduit and Grounding, El. 729.0 and 737.0, Auxiliary Building, Revision 56
45W826-21, Conduit and Grounding Fire Detection, El. 737.0, Auxiliary Building, Revision 1
45W828-24, Conduit and Grounding Fire Detection, El. 757.0, Auxiliary Building, Revision 5
45W830-8, Conduit and Grounding Fire Detection, El. 772.0, Auxiliary Building, Revision 3
45A883-39, Electrical Penetration Seal Details, Typical M4, Revision 4
47A472-38, Mechanical Penetration Seal Details, Typical XXXVIII, Revision 4
47A472-46, Mechanical Penetration Seal Details, Typical XLVI, Revision 4
47W200-2, Equipment Plan El. 772.0 & Above, Revision 12
47W200-3, Equipment Plan El. 757.0 & El. 755.0, Revision 12
47W200-4, Equipment Plan El. 737.0 & El. 729.0, Revision 12
47W240-3, Compartment-Fire Cells, Auxiliary Building, Plan El. 737.0, Revision 8
47W240-4, Compartment-Fire Cells, Auxiliary Building, Plan El. 757.0, Revision 9
47W240-5, Compartment-Fire Cells, Auxiliary Building, Plan El. 772.0, Revision 8
47W240-7, Compartment-Fire Cells, Control Building, Plan El. 729.0 & El. 755.0, Revision 8
47W243-2, Thermo-Lag 330-1, Two Layer Design for Conduits 3" and Smaller, Revision 0
47W243-3, Thermo-Lag 330-1, Junction Boxes, Revision 0
47W479-15, Mechanical Drains and Embedded Piping, Revision 12
47W611-26-1, Electrical Logic Diagram High Pressure Fire Protection System, Revision 19
1-47W801-1, Main and Reheat Steam Flow Diagram, Rev. 38
1-47W803-2, Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Diagram, Rev. 49
1-47W809-1, Chemical and Volume Control System Flow Diagram, Rev. 48
1-47W813-1, Reactor Coolant System Flow Diagram, Rev. 39
47W832-2, Flow Diagram Fire Protection, Revision 35
1-47W845-3, Essential Raw Cooling Water Flow Diagram, Rev. 20
47W850-1, Flow Diagram Fire Protection & Raw Service Water , Revision 26
47W852 sheets 3 and 5, Mechanical Flow Diagram Floor and Equipment Drains, Revision 17
1-47W859-1, Component Cooling System Flow Diagram, Rev. 44
1-47W859-2, Component Cooling System Flow Diagram, Rev. 34
47W866-3, Flow Diagram Heating Cooling & Ventilating Air Flow, Revision 37
47W920-601, Mechanical HVAC Duct Insulation, Revision 2
47W920-609, Mechanical HVAC Duct Insulation, Revision 1
Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-737-02, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 737- 0, Revision 1
Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-757-02, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 757- 0, Revision 1
Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-757-03, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 757- 0, Revision 1
Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-757-04, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 757- 0, Revision 1
Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-772-03, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 772- 0, Revision 0
Pre-Fire Plan No. CON-0-755-01, Control Building, Elevation 755- 0, Revision 2
ATTACHMENT
5
Calculations, Analyses, and Evaluations
EEB-MS-TI07-0005, 125 VDC Vital Control Power Systems Fault Calculation, Rev. 19
EPM-AST-031895, HPFP System Water Supply to the Auxiliary Building Preaction Sprinkler
System, Revision 0
EPM-AST-051695, HPFP System Standpipe Water Supply, Revision 1
EPM-DOM-02990, Combustible Load Summary, Revision 0
Fire Protection License Condition Impact Evaluation (LCIE) for SPP-10.10, Revision 2, dated
9/27/2002
FPR Part X, NFPA Code Evaluation, Revision 10
WB-DC-40-51, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability, Rev. 3
WBN-OSG4-031, Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown Per 10CFR50 Appendix R, Rev. 32
WBP-EVAR-9205004, Appendix R Analysis for Intra-plant Communication Systems, Revision 3
NER No. 03-1207, NRC Information Notice 2003-08: Potential Flooding Through Unsealed
Concrete Floor Crack, dated 8/29/2003
TVA System 13, Detection System Compliance Summary Matrix, Revision 10
TVA Fire Protection Sprinkler Walkdown Justification Sheets, Volume 3, Tab 1, Attachments 4
and 5, dated 12/15/1994
Out-Of-Service (OOS) SPP-10.9 Impairment Report for CY 2003, Impairment Permit
Nos. 03-0108, 03-0247, 03-0233, 03-0370, 03-0409
WBN-OSG4-031, Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown Per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Rev. 30
Audits and Self-Assessments
Fire Brigade Drill Critiques for Brigade Shifts from January 2001 - May 2003.
Site Compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire, Dated February 23 - 26, 2004
Completed Surveillance Procedures and Test Records
1-SI-0-53-A, 18-Month Verification of Remote Shutdown Transfer Switches for Train A, Rev. 14
1-SI-0-53-B, 18-Month Verification of Remote Shutdown Transfer Switches for Train B, Rev. 18
Fire Protection Weekly Inspection Reports (TI-211) for period from January 2004
0-FOR-26-2, Work Order 00-10633-00, 3 Year High Pressure Fire Protection Hydraulic
Performance Verification, completed 6/27,01
0-FOR-26-7-A, 18 Month Test of High Pressure Fire Protection Pump 1A-A, completed 3/17,04
0-FOR-26-25, 18 Month Diesel Driven Fire Protection Pump Capability Test, completed 4/17,03
0-FOR-228-1A, SPP-8.2 Quarterly Inspection and Testing of Emergency Light Battery Packs,
Diesel Building and Control Building, completed 10/08/03
0-FOR-228-1A, SPP-8.2 Quarterly Inspection and Testing of Emergency Light Battery Packs,
Auxiliary Building, Elevations 692,729, and 737, completed 11/14/03
0-FOR-228-3B, SPP-8.2 Quarterly Inspection and Testing of Emergency Light Battery Packs,
Auxiliary Building, Elevations Above 737, completed 10/29/03
ATTACHMENT
6
Technical Manuals/Vendor Information
Rubatex Corporation Therma-cel Sheet Insulation Product Technical Bulletins and Product
Data, Revision 03/03
Armacell LLC, AP/Armaflex Sheet and Roll Insulation Product Data, Revision 10/03
Elkhart Brass, Friction Loss Data, Friction Loss in Rubber or Vinyl Lined Fire Hose, Revision
12/17/03
Elkhart Brass, Model L-205-EB, Industrial Non-Shock Fog Nozzle Specification, Revision
12/17/03
Task Force Tips, Technical Specification for Model H-VPGI, Handline w/Grip, Instructions for
Safe Operation and Maintenance, Revision 4, 11/7/02
Pyrotronics Catalog Number 6119, Technical Specification for Model DI-3 Series Ionization
Smoke Detector, dated 04/87
Watts Bar Vendor Manual No. WBN-VM-E353-1840, Exide Electronics Corp. 8-Hour
Emergency Lighting Battery Packs, Revision 1
Applicable Codes and Standards
NFPA 13-1975 Automatic Sprinkler Systems
NFPA 14-1974 Standpipe and Hose Systems
NFPA 20-1973 Centrifugal Fire Pumps
NFPA 20-1993 Centrifugal Fire Pumps
NFPA 24-1973 Outside Protection
NFPA 30-1973 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
NFPA 72D-1975 Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems
NFPA 72E-1974 Automatic Fire Detectors
NFPA 80-1975 Fire Doors and Windows
NUREG-1552,Supplement 1,Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Nuclear Power Plants, dated
January 1999
OSHA Standard 29 CFR 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards,
Underwriters Laboratory, Fire Resistance Directory, designs U904, U905, and U906, dated
January 1995
Underwriters Laboratory Standard 555, Standard for Fire Dampers and Ceiling Dampers,
dated May 14, 1979
Fire Protection Handbook, 17th Edition
Other Documents
Corrective action program problem evaluation reports (PERs) resulting from fire, smoke,
sparks, arcing, and equipment overheating incidents for the calendar Year (CY) period 2001-
2003
NRC Information Notice 2003-08, Potential Flooding through Unsealed Concrete Floor Cracks,
dated June 25, 2003
Transient Combustible Evaluations (SPP-10.10) issued for 90 day period from January 2004
U. S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Invensys Building Systems Announce Recall of
Siebe Actuators in Building Fire/Smoke Dampers, dated October 2, 2002
ATTACHMENT
7
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Fire Protection System Engineering Status Report, Systems 013 and
026, CYs 2001, 2002, 2003, and 1st Quarter CY 2004, February 18, 2004
Design Change Authorization DCA-M12070, Changes to Conduits and Cables to Meet
Appendix R, (Portions relevant to components reviewed) revised on various dates.
Design Change Notice 19796-B, Reconfigure the Radiax Antenna System, May, 16, 1995
Design Change Notice 38919-A, Appendix R Manual Action Requirements
Design Change Notice 39742-A, Add Manual Switches to Resolve Appendix R Control Circuit
Interaction
Fire Test ICC0286018, Fire and Hose-Stream Tests for Penetration Seal Systems, April 1986
Fire Test ICC1185020, Penetration Seal Systems in a Concrete Floor Slab Utilizing a Silicone
Elastomer Blockout, November, 1985
Fire Test 93-H-72449, 3-Hour Fire Resistance Evaluation of Twelve Fire Penetration Seal
Designs Contained in Different Slabs, November, 1993
Fire Test CTP-1142, 3-Hour Fire Qualification Test of Six (6) Inch Depth LDSE w/Aluminum and
Steel Penetrants, August, 1987
3-OT-JPMA034, Reset The TDAFW Pump (After Mechanical Overspeed) Per SOI-3.02,
Revision 6
3-OT-JPMA015, Local Operation of Turbine Driven AFW Pump Per SOI-3.02, Revision 6
3-OT-JPMA015A, Local Operation of Turbine Driven AFW Pump Per SOI-3.02, Revision 4
3-OT-JPMA015B, Local Reset of AFWT A-S Per SOI-3.02, Revision 0
3-OT-JPMA398, Alignment of ERCW to 1a-a Ccp Lube Oil Heat Exchanger per AOI-15,
3-OT-JPMA155, Bypassing 1-FCV-62-93, CVCS Charging Header Flow, For Local Control
3-OT-JPMA045B, Operate #1 S/G PORV (Locally With N2) Per SOI-1.01, Revision 0
3-OT-SRT0126, Main Control Room Inaccessibility (simulator scenario), Revision 0
3-OT-SRT0018A, Appendix R Fire (simulator scenario), Revision 0
3-OT-AOI3000, AOI-30.1, 30.2 Plant Fires (lesson plan), Revision 4
3-OT-AOI2700, AOI-27, Main Control Room Inaccessibility (lesson plan), Revision 4
3-OT-SID0012, Auxiliary Control Room Demonstration (simulator instruction), Revision 0
License Basis Documents
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Report, Revision 26
Letter dated 09/15/93, from W. J. Museler (Tennessee Valley Authority) to U.S. NRC : Watts
Bar Nuclear Plant - Submittal of the Revised WBN Fire Protection Report (TAC M63648)
Safety Evaluation Report, Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, SER
Supplement 18, Dated October, 1995
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications
CRs Reviewed
WBN-01-002973, Cracking of Face-Pieces of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)
WBN-01-003748, Potential Degradation of Firefighter Primary Garments
WBN-01-014483, Hydrogen Fire at Nuclear Power Station
WBN-00-016440-000, Revise Note in AOI-30.2, Section C.69, to Be Consistent with the FPR
WBN-02-011625, The High Pressure Fire Protection Detector System Actuated for Elevation
737 in the Auxiliary Building
WBN-02-013342, Smell of Smoke in Main Control Room
ATTACHMENT
8
WBN-03-000732, Smoke Coming From Ventilation Duct in Operations Turnover Room
WBN-03-012875, Electrical Burning Smell in Main Control Room
WBN-03-018587, Diesel Driven Fire Pump Fill Valve Not in the Locked Open Position
CRs and Work Orders Generated During this Inspection
WBN-04-033650, Basis for certain manual actions contained in AOI-30.2 not identified in
design documents
WBN-04-033818, Inconsistencies in Fire Protection Report, analysis volume AV-036, possibly
typographical error
WBN-04-033822, AOI-32.2 sketch for room volumes on elevation 737.0 of the auxiliary building
incorrect
WBN-04-033881, AOI-30.2 contains inconsistent steps for disablement of centrifugal charging
pumps
WBN-04-033898, Combustible Loading of the General Ventilation Chiller Package A Not
Included In Calculation EPM-DOM-012990
WBN-04-033985, Evaluate the Need for a Testing Program for the Insulating Oil for the Plant
Indoor Fluid Filled Transformers
WBN-04-033888, Redundant steps identified in AOI-30.2
WBN-04-033899, Poor equipment conditions identified during walkdown of AOI-30.2
WBN-04-033900, Blocked floor drain identified during walkdown of AOI-30.2
WBN-04-033926, Training needs (Appendix R) were identified based on interviews with
operation personnel
WBN-04-034224, Emergency lighting aim not adequate for manual action contained in
AOI-30.2
WBN-04-034241, Appendix R labeling enhancement opportunities identified during walkdown of
AOI-30.2
WBN-04-034259, Design change process does not address manual action considerations
Work Order 04-815011-000, Oil Leak Identified on General Ventilation Chiller B
Work Order 04-815090-000, South door of 6.9 KV Unit startup board does not operate properly
Work Order 04-815097-000, Clean floor drain in 6.9KV Shutdown Board Room B-train
ATTACHMENT
9
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADAMS Agency-Wide Documents Access and Management System
ACP auxiliary control panel
CAP corrective action program
CCW component cooling water
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR condition report
DC direct current
ELU emergency lighting unit
FA fire area
FHA Fire Hazards Analysis
ft foot
FPPR Fire Protection Program Report
FZ fire zone
GOP General Operating Procedure
HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
LCV level control valve
MCR main control room
MOV motor operated valve
NCV non-cited violation
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ONOP Off-Normal Operating Procedure
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PARS Publicly Available Records Systems
POC point of combustion
RCP reactor coolant pump
RWST refueling water storage tank
SDP Significance Determination Process
SER safety evaluation report
SSAR Safe Shutdown Analysis Report
SSD safe shutdown
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
UL Underwriters Laboratory
URI unresolved item
V volt
ATTACHMENT