Text

IR 05000390-04-006 & IR 05000391-04-006, on 03/29/04 Through 04/02/04 & 04/12/04 Through 04/16/04, for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2; Triennial Fire Protection
	ML041450096
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	05/20/2004
From:	Ogle C; NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB
To:	Scalice J; Tennessee Valley Authority
References
	FOIA/PA-2004-0277 IR-04-006
	Download: ML041450096 (28)
	v • d • e

May 20, 2004

Tennessee Valley Authority

ATTN: Mr. J. A. Scalice

Chief Nuclear Officer and

Executive Vice President

6A Lookout Place

1101 Market Street

Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION

INSPECTION REPORT 05000390/2004006 and 05000391/2004006

Dear Mr. Scalice:

On April 16, 2004, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at

your Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the

inspection findings, which were discussed on that date with Mr. W. Lagergren and other

members of your staff. Following completion of additional review in the Region II office, a final

exit was held by telephone with Mr. P. Pace of your staff on May 7, 2004, to provide an update

on changes to the preliminary inspection findings.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.

This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green)

involving a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety

significance and because it is entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating

the finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement

Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of

the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the

Regional Administrator Region 2; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

TVA 2

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its

enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system

(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/

reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Charles R. Ogle, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos.: 50-390, 50-391

License Nos.: NPF-90, Construction

Permit No. CPPR-92

Enclosure: NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000390/2004006 and

05000391/2004006 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl:

Karl W. Singer

Senior Vice President

Nuclear Operations

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail Distribution

James E. Maddox, Vice President

Engineering and Technical Services

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail Distribution

William R. Lagergren

Site Vice President

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail Distribution

General Counsel

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail Distribution

(cc w/encl contd - See page 3)

TVA 3

(cc w/encl contd)

Thomas J. Niessen, Acting General Manager

Nuclear Assurance

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail Distribution

Mark J. Burzynski, Manager

Nuclear Licensing

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail Distribution

Paul L. Pace, Manager

Licensing and Industry Affairs

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail Distribution

Larry S. Bryant, Plant Manager

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Tennessee Valley Authority

Electronic Mail Distribution

County Executive

Rhea County Courthouse

375 Church Street, Suite 215

Dayton, TN 37321-1300

County Mayor

P. O. Box 156

Decatur, TN 37322

Lawrence E. Nanney, Director

TN Dept. of Environment & Conservation

Division of Radiological Health

Electronic Mail Distribution

Ann Harris

341 Swing Loop

Rockwood, TN 37854

James H. Bassham, Director

Tennessee Emergency Management Agency

Electronic Mail Distribution

Distribution w/encl: See page 4

TVA 4

Distribution w/encl:

M. Chernoff, NRR

L. Slack, RII EICS

RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB

PUBLIC

OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP

SIGNATURE RA RA RA RA RA

NAME PFILLION GWISEMAN MTHOMAS KODONOHUE SCAHILL

DATE 5/17/2004 5/17/2004 5/17/2004 5/19/2004 5/19/2004 5/ /2004 5/ /2004

E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

PUBLIC DOCUMENT YES NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML041450096.wpd

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-390, 50-391

License Nos.: NPF-90, Construction Permit CPPR-92

Report No.: 05000390/2004006 and 05000391/2004006

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: 1260 Nuclear Plant Road

Spring City TN 37381

Dates: March 29 - April 2, 2004 (Week 1)

April 12 - 16, 2004 (Week 2)

Inspectors: K. ODonohue, Fire Protection Team Leader (Lead Inspector)

P. Fillion, Reactor Inspector

G. Wiseman, Sr. Reactor Inspector

M. Thomas, Sr. Reactor Inspector

Approved by: Charles R. Ogle, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000390/2004-006, 05000391/2004-006; 03/29 - 04/02/2004 and 04/12 - 16/2004; Watts

Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Triennial Fire Protection.

The report covered an announced two-week period of inspection by four regional inspectors.

One Green non-cited violation was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by

their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance

Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be

assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing

the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649,

Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

C Green. A non-cited violation (NCV) of Operating License Condition 2.F, was

identified for inadequate implementation of the approved fire protection program

(FPP). Specifically, the licensees process for evaluating the impact of design

changes on the FPP (in this case a change to local manual operator actions)

was not adequate to ensure that the change would not adversely affect the ability

to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Upon identification,

the licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program.

The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection

against external factors attribute and degraded the reactor safety mitigating

systems cornerstone objective. This finding was determined to be of very low

safety significance because the local manual operator action which prompted

this violation was considered within the capability of the operator to perform and

could be reasonably accomplished within the 15-minute time specified in the Fire

Protection Report. This determination was based on inspector walkdowns.

(Section 1R05.05)

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity

1R05 Fire Protection

The purpose of this inspection was to review the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant fire protection

report (FPR) for selected risk-significant fire areas. The FPR includes the fire protection

plan (FPP), safe shutdown analysis (SSA), and fire hazards analysis (FHA). Emphasis

was placed on verification that the post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) capability [from both

the Main Control Room (MCR) and the Auxiliary Control Panels (ACP)] and the fire

protection features provided for ensuring that at least one redundant train of SSD

systems are maintained free of fire damage. The inspection was performed in

accordance with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) Reactor Oversight

Process using a risk-informed approach for selecting the fire areas and attributes to be

inspected. The inspectors used the licensees Individual Plant Examination for External

Events and in-plant tours to choose three risk-significant fire areas, and a portion of a

fourth, for detailed inspection and review. The fire areas chosen for review during this

inspection were:

C Fire Area (FA) 14, Corridor, Rooms 737.0-A1A and 737.0-A1B.

C FA 27, 480-V Shutdown Board Room 1B.

C FA 33, 480V Board Room 1-B.

C FA 48, Control Building, Room 755.0C-12, Main Control Room

The inspectors evaluated the licensees FPR against applicable requirements, including

Operating License Condition 2.F; Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50

(10 CFR 50), Appendix R; 10 CFR 50.48; commitments to Appendix A of Branch

Technical Position Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch 9.5-1; Watts Bar

Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR); related NRC safety evaluation

reports (SER); and plant Technical Specifications. The inspectors evaluated all areas of

this inspection, as documented below, against these requirements.

Specific documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

.01 Systems Required to Achieve and Maintain Post-fire Safe Shutdown

a. Inspection Scope

The licensees SSA was reviewed to determine the components and systems necessary

to achieve and maintain SSD conditions from the MCR in the event of fire in Fires Areas

14, 27, and 33. The objectives of this evaluation were to:

Verify that the licensee's shutdown methodology had correctly identified the

components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain an SSD condition.

2

Confirm the adequacy of the systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant

makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring and support system functions.

Verify that an SSD can be achieved and maintained without off-site power when it

can be confirmed that a postulated fire in any of the selected fire areas could cause

the loss of off-site power.

Verify that local manual operator actions are consistent with the plants fire

protection licensing basis.

The inspectors evaluated whether the SSA properly identified and categorized

components in terms of safe shutdown function. In addition, instrumentation known to

be necessary for safe shutdown, e.g., pressurizer level indication, was checked. The

safe shutdown components which were reviewed for operability during and after a

severe fire in either FA 14, FA 27 or FA 33 are listed in the attachment.

The MCR (remote) and in-plant manual operator actions (local) for controlling plant

operation, fire response, and achieving an SSD condition in response to a severe fire in

FA 14, FA 27, FA 33, and FA 48 (MCR) were reviewed and walked down by the

inspectors. The applicable procedures reviewed as part of this effort are listed in the

attachment.

Inspectors reviews of the procedures focused on ensuring that all required functions for

post-fire safe shutdown, and the corresponding equipment necessary to perform those

functions, were included in the procedures. The inspectors walked down each section

of the fire response procedure corresponding to the fire area listed above to verify that

local manual operator actions were feasible and could be performed in a timely manner.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.02 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the frequency of or potential for

fires, the combustible fire load characteristics, potential exposure fire severity, the

separation of systems necessary to achieve SSD, and the separation of electrical

components and circuits to ensure that at least one SSD path was free of fire damage.

The inspectors reviewed selected portions of the FPR as referenced by the Watts Bar

UFSAR. This review was conducted to determine if the licensees commitments, as

established in the fire protection licensing basis documents, were satisfied. The

inspectors examined the fire protection barriers and selected indoor transformer

combustible oil-retention basins to confirm installation was in accordance with the

applicable separation and design requirements stated above.

3

The inspectors reviewed the licensees documents which establish and implement

controls and practices to prevent fires and to control the storage of permanent and

transient combustible materials and ignition sources, to verify that the objectives

established by the NRC-approved FPP were satisfied. The documents reviewed are

listed in the attachment.

The inspectors toured the selected plant fire areas to observe: (1) the material condition

of fire protection systems and equipment, (2) the storage of permanent and transient

combustible materials, and (3) the licensees implementation of the procedures for

limiting fire hazards, combustible waste collection, housekeeping practices, and

cleanliness conditions. These reviews were accomplished to ensure that the licensee

was maintaining the fire protection systems, had properly evaluated in-situ combustible

fire loads, controlled hot-work activities, and limited transient fire hazards in a manner

consistent with the UFSAR, administrative procedures and other fire protection program

procedures.

The inspectors reviewed operator and fire brigade staffing, fire brigade response, fire

brigade qualification training and drill program procedures, and fire brigade drill critiques

for brigade shifts from January 2001 - May 2003. The reviews were performed to

determine whether fire brigade drills had been conducted in high fire risk plant areas

and whether fire brigade personnel training, qualifications, drill response, and

performance met the requirements of the FPP.

The inspectors walked down the fire emergency equipment storage locations and dress-

out areas in the auxiliary and service buildings to assess the operational readiness of

fire fighting and smoke control equipment. The fire brigade self-contained breathing

apparatuses were reviewed for adequacy as well as the availability of supplemental

breathing air bottles and the capability to refill these bottles. Additionally, the on-site fire

response vehicle and associated fire brigade personal protective equipment located at

the fire brigade house were reviewed to evaluate equipment accessibility and

functionality.

The inspectors reviewed fire fighting pre-fire plans for the selected fire areas to

determine if appropriate information was provided to fire brigade members to identify

SSD equipment and to facilitate suppression of an exposure fire that could impact safe

shutdown capability. The inspectors walked down the selected fire areas to compare

the associated pre-fire plans and drawings with as-built plant conditions. This was done

to verify that fire fighting pre-fire plans and drawings were consistent with the fire

protection features and potential fire conditions described in the FPR. In addition, the

inspectors performed a review of drawings, engineering calculations, and maintenance

instructions for potential fire suppression induced flooding associated with the floor drain

systems for the 480-V Shutdown Board Room 1B (FA 27) and the 480V Board Room 1B

(FA 33). The review focused on ensuring that those local manual operator actions

required for normal redundant train MCR shutdown performed outside the control room

would not be inhibited by the effects of the fire event, fire suppression activities, or

leakage from automatic or manual fire suppression systems within the fire areas or from

an adjacent plant area.

4

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.03 Post-fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis

a. Inspection Scope

Using the FPR and the Appendix R Required Components Report, the inspectors

reviewed how systems would be used to achieve and maintain reactivity control, over-

pressure protection, inventory control with high or low pressure injection systems, and

residual heat removal during and following a fire in the areas selected for inspection.

The inspection specifically focused on the minimum required systems and equipment

necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions because damage to these

systems could pose a significantly greater risk than damage to systems required to

achieve cold shutdown conditions.

The inspectors performed a detailed review of a number of valves, instruments and

other equipment relative to a postulated fire in each of the areas selected for inspection.

This review included examination of the licensees Appendix R Required Components

Report, which was a matrix of Appendix R Analysis Areas versus important cables,

together with statements of resolutions for any cables that did not meet Appendix R,

III.G.2 separation criteria. Component power supply, elementary control diagrams,

cable schedules with routing information and the cable tray drawings were reviewed as

necessary to confirm that the Appendix R Required Components Report was correct.

Resolutions for any cables that did not meet Appendix R,III.G.2 separation criteria were

verified by such means as field inspection of cable protective wrap or examination of

post-fire shutdown procedure steps.

The potential for spurious valve operation or malfunction was considered in the period

immediately following a fire and in the period after operator realignment to hot standby

mode but before fire extinguishment. The inspectors also utilized this information to

determine if the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2 (for protection of control

and power cables) were met. In the case of a severe control room fire, alternative safe

shutdown capability was considered. The applicable criterion was that a fire would not

degrade the ability to safely shutdown from the ACP. The components and equipment

included in the review are listed in the attachment. Among the components reviewed,

were the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORV) and the associated flow

control valves (PORV block valves). The criteria for this review were that the PORVs

would not spuriously open due to a fire and that at least one PORV would be available

to operators in either the main control room or the ACP should RCS conditions during

the shutdown evolution require manual opening of a PORV.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

5

.04 Alternative Shutdown Capability

a. Inspection Scope

The licensees Fire Protection Report and plant configuration were reviewed to

determine the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain SSD

conditions from the ACP in the event of fire in the MCR. The objectives of this

evaluation were to:

Verify that the licensee's alternative shutdown methodology had correctly identified

the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain an SSD condition.

Confirm the adequacy of the systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant

makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring and support system functions.

Verify that hot and cold shutdown from outside the MCR can be achieved and

maintained with offsite power available or not available.

Design of control circuits, including their overcurrent protective devices, was considered

in terms of fire-induced short-circuits in the MCR resulting in loss of SSD capability. In

general, the licensee utilized isolation/transfer switches and double fusing of circuits to

allow transfer of control for a component from the MCR to the ACP. Specific circuits

reviewed were those listed in the attachment. Additionally, the inspector reviewed

6900V Shutdown Board 1A-A offsite power circuit breakers and an undervoltage relay.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.05 Operational Implementation of Alternative Shutdown Capability

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the operational implementation of the SSD capability for an

Appendix R fire in FA 14, FA 27, FA 33, or FA 48 to verify that: (1) the training program

for licensed personnel included MCR and alternative safe shutdown capability; (2)

personnel required to achieve and maintain the plant in hot standby, from the MCR or

ACR, following a fire could be provided from normal onsite staff, exclusive of the fire

brigade; (3) the licensee had incorporated the operability of alternative shutdown

transfer and control functions into plant Technical Specifications (TS); and (4) the

licensee periodically performed operability testing of the alternative shutdown

instrumentation, and transfer and control functions. The inspectors reviewed Abnormal

Operating Instruction (AOI) AOI-30.1, Plant Fires; and selected sections of AOI-30.2,

Fire Safe Shutdown. The reviews focused on ensuring that all required functions for

post-fire safe shutdown, and the corresponding equipment necessary to perform those

functions, were included in the procedures for the selected fire areas.

6

The inspectors also reviewed criteria in the following licensee engineering department

standards and design control procedures to verify that plant changes were adequately

reviewed for the potential impact on the FPR, fire protection features, SSD equipment,

and procedures as required by Watts Bar Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.F.

G-73, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems,

Revision 5

SPP-9.3, Plant Modification and Engineering Change Control, Revision 9

TI-277, Modification Compliance Review-Fire Protection, Revision 0

FPDP-3, Management of the Fire Protection Report, Revision 4

b. Findings

Inadequate Evaluation Process for Design Changes Which Could Affect Safe Shutdown

in the Event of a Fire

Introduction: The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Operating License

Condition 2.F., for inadequate implementation of the approved FPP. Specifically, the

licensees process for evaluating the impact of design changes on the FPP (in this case

a change to local manual operator actions) was not adequate to ensure that the

changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in

the event of a fire.

Description: The licensee implemented a design change which revised a local manual

operator action which had been previously approved by the NRC during Watts Bar Unit

1 licensing in 1995 for a fire in Room 757-A5 (FA 27). The licensees process for

evaluating the impact of design changes on the FPP was addressed in the following

procedures:

G-73, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems,

Revision 5

SPP-9.3, Plant Modification and Engineering Change Control, Revision 9

TI-277, Modification Compliance Review-Fire Protection, Revision 0

FPDP-3, Management of the Fire Protection Report, Revision 4

During review of these procedures, the inspectors noted that the process for evaluating

the impact of design changes on FPP local manual operator actions only addressed

whether emergency lighting was affected (e.g., changes to emergency light positions or

additional emergency lights required). The inspectors noted that an evaluation limited to

determining the availability of emergency lighting was not sufficient to determine if the

local manual operator actions could be performed within the required time in a

satisfactory manner. In addition, these review procedures did not consider other

aspects of local manual operator action such as complexity, location of the actions with

7

respect to the fire, accessibility, or environmental considerations, which could affect the

operators capability to perform the action. The failure to consider factors other than

emergency lighting could result in a change to the FPP which impacted the ability to

achieve and maintain SSD.

A potential example of this was noted during the inspectors review of design change

notice (DCN) 39742-A. The licensee implemented DCN 39742-A in December 1997,

which revised a local manual operator action that had been previously approved by the

NRC during Watts Bar Unit 1 licensing in 1995 for a fire in Room 757-A5 (FA 27). The

DCN added manual switches to the control circuits for MCR air handling units (AHU)

A-A and B-B and identified revised local manual operator actions for restarting the

AHUs. The revised local manual operator actions replaced previously approved manual

operator actions included in the licensees Fire Protection Report (FPR).

The licensee performed a safety assessment/safety evaluation (WBPLEE-97-154-0)

during implementation of DCN 39742-A to evaluate the impact of the DCN on the FPP.

The DCN was evaluated against the design and licensing bases and was found to be

acceptable by the licensee. The inspectors noted that this evaluation did not address

the impact of the DCN on FPP emergency lighting, as required by Procedure SPP-9.3.

More importantly, the inspectors also noted that other conditions which could affect the

capability of the operators to perform this revised local manual operator action were not

addressed, such as, accessibility, complexity, environmental considerations, etc. The

revised local operator manual action for AHU A-A was incorporated into Section C.23 of

AOI-30.2.

During in-plant walkdowns of procedure AOI-30.2, Section C.23, the inspectors

observed that the new switch for AHU A-A and the associated revised local manual

operator action were located in Room 757-A2 of the auxiliary building, which was

adjacent to Room 757-A5 (FA 27), the postulated area of the fire. The inspectors

initially questioned whether this revised manual action could be accomplished by the

operators, based on the potential impact of the fire brigade activities in the immediate

vicinity of Room 757-A2, and possible smoke migration from Room 757-A5 into Room

757-A2. After additional walkdowns of AOI-30.2, Section C.23, and discussion of

possible scenarios for the fire brigade activities with licensee fire operations personnel,

the inspectors concluded that the revised manual operator action could reasonably be

accomplished within the time required by the FPR.

Analysis: The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection

against external factors attribute and degraded the reactor safety mitigating systems

cornerstone objective. The finding degraded the defense-in-depth for fire protection.

The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (green),

because the revised manual operator actions which prompted this violation were

considered within the capability of the operator and could be reasonably accomplished

within the 15-minute time specified in the FPR. This determination was based on field

walkdowns of the Procedure AOI-30.2, Section C.23, and review of pre-fire plans and

fire brigade activities for a fire in Room 757-A5.

8

Enforcement: Operating License Condition 2.F requires that the licensee shall

implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program,

as described in the Fire Protection Report for Watts Bar Unit 1, as approved in

Supplements 18 and 19 of the SER (NUREG-0847). License Condition 2.F further

states that the licensee may make changes to the approved fire protection program

without prior NRC approval, only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability

to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. The licensees process for

evaluating the impact of design changes on the FPP was addressed in Procedures

FPDP-3, Management of the Fire Protection Report; SPP-9.3, Plant Modifications and

Engineering Change Control; TI-277, Modification Compliance Review - Fire Protection

and G-73, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems.

Contrary to the above, on April 15, 2004, when evaluating a licensee change to the FPP,

the inspectors observed that the licensees process for evaluating the impact of design

changes on the FPP (e.g., local manual operator actions) was not adequate to ensure

that the changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe

shutdown in the event of a fire. The procedures for evaluating the impact of design

changes on FPP local manual operator actions only required that the evaluation address

whether emergency lighting was affected. The procedures did not consider other

conditions such as complexity, location of the manual actions with respect to the fire,

accessibility or environmental considerations which could affect whether the manual

actions could reasonably be accomplished. This process could result in the licensee

inappropriately implementing design changes which may not lead to safe plant

conditions and could adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown

in the event of a fire, without receiving prior NRC approval. This finding is a violation of

NRC requirements and will be identified as NCV 50-390/2004-006-001, Inadequate

Evaluation Process for Design Changes Which Could Affect Safe Shutdown in the Event

of a Fire. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as

Problem Evaluation Reports (PER) 34252 and 34259.

.06 Communications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed plant communication capabilities to evaluate the availability of

the communication systems to support plant personnel in the performance of manual

operator actions for shutdown, fire event notification, and fire brigade fire fighting duties.

This included verifying that site paging (PA), and portable radio communication systems

were consistent with the licensing basis and would be available during fire response

activities.

Walkdowns were performed of AOI-30.2 sections to evaluate the ability of the plants

portable radio communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of

SSD functions. In addition, the inspectors reviewed 50 of the most recently completed

fire brigade drill critique reports to assess proper operation and effectiveness of the fire

brigade command post portable radio communications during fire drills and identify any

history of operational or performance problems with radio communications during fire

drills.

9

The inspectors also performed an independent technical review of the licensees plant

change documentation completed in support of DCN 19796-B, performed in 1995, which

reconfigured the routing of portable radio repeater antenna system cables to provide at

least 20 feet horizontal spatial separation on different elevations of the auxiliary building.

This DCN was evaluated in order to assess the radio communication systems

vulnerability to a fire in FA 14 and verify that the plant modification was performed

consistent with the design control procedures listed in the attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.07 Emergency Lighting

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the design, placement, operation, and periodic testing

procedures for direct current self-contained battery powered emergency lighting units

(ELU) and dedicated, battery powered portable ELUs. The inspectors evaluated the

capability of the ELUs to support plant personnel in the performance of SSD functions,

including local manual operator actions, and for illuminating access and egress routes to

the areas where those manual actions would be performed. The inspectors checked

that these battery power supplies were rated with at least an 8-hour capacity, as

required by Section III.J of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. During walkdowns of the plant

areas where operators performed local manual actions, the inspectors inspected area

ELUs for proper operation and checked the aiming of lamp heads to determine if

sufficient illumination would be available to adequately illuminate the SSD equipment,

the equipment identification tags, and the access and egress routes thereto, so that

operators would be able to perform the actions without needing to use flashlights. The

inspectors also reviewed completed surveillance and maintenance procedures and test

records to ensure that the licensee properly maintained the lighting equipment.

The inspectors observed whether emergency exit lighting was provided for personnel

evacuation pathways to the outside exits as identified in the National Fire Protection

Association (NFPA) 101, Life Safety Code, and the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA) Part 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards. This

review also included examination of whether backup emergency lighting was provided

for the fire emergency storage locations, the fire brigade dress-out areas and fire

brigade house in support of fire brigade operations should power fail during a fire

emergency.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

10

.08 Cold Shutdown Repairs

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed and inspected one example of a repair procedure that may be

needed to transition from hot standby to cold shutdown. The procedure was contained

in Maintenance Instruction MI-0.047, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Repairs. The

procedure involved installing a jumper wire in a 6.9 kV switchgear compartment to allow

starting two emergency raw water cooling pumps on one diesel generator. Control

circuits and wiring diagrams were reviewed to confirm the correct terminal points, and a

field inspection was made to verify the as-built configuration and workability of the

procedure.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.09 Fire Barriers and Fire Area/Zone/Room Penetration Seals

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the selected fire areas to evaluate the adequacy of the fire

resistance of fire area barrier enclosure walls, ceilings, floors, fire barrier mechanical

and electrical penetration seals, fire doors, and fire dampers to ensure that at least one

train of SSD equipment would be maintained free of fire damage. The inspectors

selected several fire barrier features for detailed evaluation and inspection to verify

proper installation and qualification. The inspectors walked down the selected fire areas

to observe the material condition and configuration of the installed fire barrier features,

as well as, reviewed construction details and supporting fire endurance tests for the

installed fire barrier features to verify the as-built configurations were qualified by

appropriate fire endurance tests. The inspectors also reviewed the FHA to verify the fire

loading used by the licensee to determine the fire resistance rating of the fire barrier

enclosures.

The inspectors conducted a detailed inspection of two 2-hour fire-rated enclosure walls

separating the Unit 1 480V board room and the adjacent rooms to confirm that they had

been properly installed and qualified. Additionally, six fire doors in the selected fire

areas were reviewed to determine if they were designed, installed, and qualification

tested. Engineering evaluations and a summary of completed inspection and

maintenance procedures for the selected fire walls and doors were reviewed. These

reviews were performed to ensure that the passive fire barriers were properly inspected,

maintained, and met the licensing and design bases as described in the licensee

submittals, NRC SERs, and the FPR.

The inspectors selected nine penetration fire seals in the 480-V Shutdown Board Room

1B (FA 27) and the 480V Board Room 1B (FA 33) for review. The inspectors conducted

a detailed inspection of the seals to confirm that they had been properly installed and

qualified. The inspectors reviewed the installation instructions for the selected

mechanical and electrical fire barrier penetration seals, the penetration seal detail

11

drawings, qualification tests, and the fire protection penetration seal deviation analysis

for the technical basis of penetration seals to verify that the fire barrier installations met

design requirements, license commitments, and standard industry practices. The

inspectors also compared the penetration seal ratings with the ratings of the barrier

enclosures in which they were installed. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a summary

of completed surveillance and maintenance procedures for the selected fire barrier walls

to verify the fire seals were being adequately inspected and maintained.

The inspectors reviewed AOI-30.2, selected fire fighting pre-plans, fire damper location

and detail drawings, and heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system

drawings to verify that access to shutdown equipment and selected operator manual

actions would not be inhibited by smoke migration from one area to adjacent plant areas

used to accomplish SSD. The inspectors reviewed the design, installation details, and

qualification testing for three mechanical fire dampers in the 480-V Shutdown Board

Room 1B (FA 27) to verify that the damper installations met design requirements and

license commitments.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.10 Fire Protection Systems, Features and Equipment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed SSD calculations, vendor documentation, flow diagrams, cable

routing information, system operating instructions, operational valve lineup procedures,

and system availability studies, associated with the fire pumps and fire protection water

supply system. Using operating and test procedures, the inspectors toured selected fire

pumps and portions of the fire main piping system to evaluate material condition,

consistency of as-built configurations with engineering drawings, and verify correct

system breaker and valve lineups. The review evaluated whether the common fire

protection water delivery and supply components could be damaged or inhibited by fire-

induced failures of electrical power supplies or control circuits. In addition, the

inspectors reviewed periodic surveillance and functional operability flow tests for the fire

pumps and fire main loop to assess whether the test program was sufficient to verify

proper operation of the fire protection water supply system in accordance with those

design requirements and acceptance criteria specified in Section 14, Operating

Requirements of the FPP.

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the design, installation, and operation of the

automatic detection and alarm system for the selected fire areas to actuate in the early

stage of a fire. This included walkdowns of the systems and review of the type of

installed detectors, detector spacing, and the licensees technical evaluation of the

detector locations and the ceiling reinforcing plans as shown on location drawings. The

inspectors also reviewed licensee submittals and the NRC SERs associated with the

selected fire areas. These reviews were performed to ensure that the fire detection

systems for the selected fire areas were installed in accordance with the design and

licensing bases of the plant. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed fire detection

12

surveillance procedures and the detection system operating requirements specified in

the FPP to determine the adequacy of fire detection component testing to ensure that

the detection systems could function when needed.

The inspectors reviewed the manual suppression standpipe and fire hose system to

verify adequate design, installation, and operation in the selected fire areas. The

inspectors examined flow measurement/pressure test data to verify that sufficient

pressure and flow volume was available to produce electrically safe and effective fire

hose operation within the nozzle manufacturers specified flow range. The inspectors

performed in-plant walk-downs and observed placement of the fire hoses and

extinguishers to confirm consistency with the fire fighting pre-plan drawings and fire

protection program documents. Additionally, the inspectors checked a sample of

manual fire hose lengths to determine whether they would reach the SSD equipment in

the selected fire areas. This was done to ensure that manual fire fighting efforts could

be accomplished in the selected areas.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.11 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the administrative controls for out-of-service, degraded, and/or

inoperable, fire protection features. An Out-of-Service Impairment Report for CY 2003,

which itemized out-of-service fire protection features, was reviewed. The review was

performed to verify that the risk associated with removing fire protection and/or post-fire

systems or components was properly assessed and adequate compensatory measures

were implemented in accordance with the licensees approved fire protection program.

The inspectors also performed an independent technical review of the licensees

evaluation documentation completed in support of Impairment Permit Nos. 03-0108,

03-0247, 03-0233, 03-0370, and 03-0409, which opened fire doors to compensate for

loss of ventilation cooling for the 480V Board Room 1B (FA 33). Additionally, the

inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the licensees short term compensatory measures

to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions

were taken.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.12 Fire Protection Licensing Basis

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensing basis documents, including Operating License

Condition 2.F, to ascertain if the Watts Bar FPP was consistent, and in compliance, with

10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. The inspectors evaluated and compared

13

the licensees SSD procedures, and various calculations of record against the licensing

basis to measure the adequacy and consistency of the program documentation.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

Fire brigade response and emergency/incident reports for 2002 and 2003, selected fire

safety inspection reports, as well as corrective action program (CAP) PERs resulting

from fire, smoke, sparks, arcing, and equipment overheating incidents were reviewed.

This review was conducted to assess the frequency of fire incidents and any

maintenance-related or material condition problems related to fire incidents. The

inspectors also reviewed other CAP documents, including completed corrective actions

documented in selected PERs, and operating experience program (OEP) documents to

verify that industry-identified fire protection problems potentially or actually affecting

Watts Bar were appropriately entered into and resolved by the CAP process. Items

included in the OEP effectiveness review were NRC Information Notices, industry or

vendor-generated reports of defects and noncompliance under 10 CFR Part 21, and

vendor information letters.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On April 16, 2004, the lead inspector presented the inspection results to

Mr. W. Lagergren and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The

licensee confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the

inspection. Following completion of additional review in the Region II office, a final exit

was held by telephone with Mr. P. Pace on May 7, 2004, to provide an update on

changes to the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee acknowledged the findings.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel:

L. Bryant, Plant Manager

T. Davis, Supervisor, Fire Operations

C. Faulkner, Operations Support Manager

J. Gomez, Electrical Unit Lead, Site Engineering and Support

E. Haston, Site Engineering, Fire Protection

M. Heatherly, Corporate Fire Protection Engineer

J. Kammeyer, Site Engineering Manager

R. Kirkpatrick, Fire Protection Engineer, Site Engineering and Support

W. Lagergren, Site Vice President

L. Massinger, Design Engineer

P. Pace, Licensing Engineer, Licensing and Industry Affairs

J. Sterchi, Fire Protection Engineer, Fire Operations

R. Stockton, Licensing Manager

T. Wallace, Operating Manager

J. Young, Operations Specialist

NRC Personnel:

J. Bartley, Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000390/2004006-001 NCV Inadequate Evaluation Process for Design

Changes Which Could Affect Safe Shutdown in the

Event of a Fire (Section 1R05.05)

Discussed

None

ATTACHMENT

2

LIST OF COMPONENTS INSPECTED

Section 1R05.01: Post-fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis and

Section 1R05.03: Post-fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis

Component Identification Description

1-LCV-62-132-A Volume control tank outlet valve (MOV)

1-FCV-70-90A RCP thermal barrier return isolation valve (MOV)

1-FCV-62-93 Charging flow control valve (AOV)

1-LCV-62-136-B RWST to Charging Pump (MOV)

1-PCV-68-340-A Pressurizer PORV

1-PCV-68-334-B Pressurizer PORV

1-FCV-68-333-A RCS pressure relief flow control valve

1-FCV-68-332-B RCS pressure relief flow control valve

1-LI-68-326C Pressurizer level indicator

1-MTR-62-108-A Charging pump motor

1-MTR-26-1-A HP electric driven fire pump 1A-A

1-MTR-26-4-B HP electric driven fire pump 1B-B

2-MTR-26-9-A HP electric driven fire pump 2A-A

2-MTR-26-11-B HP electric driven fire pump 2B-B

0-PMP-26-3150 HP diesel driven fire pump

Section 1R05.02: Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability

Documents

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Report, Revision 26; Part II

SPP-10.7, Housekeeping/Temporary Equipment Control, Revision 1

SSP-10.10, Control of Transient Combustibles, Revision 1

SSP-10.11, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work), Revision 2

FPDP-1, Conduct of Fire Protection, Revision 0

TVA Health and Safety Practice 4, Smoking Cessation Policy, Dated January, 2003

WBN Technical Instruction TI-291, Combustible Control Zones and Sensitive Areas

Watts Bar Transient Combustible Evaluations issued from January, 2004

ATTACHMENT

3

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

AOI-30.1, Plant Fires, Rev. 6

AOI-30.2, Fire Safe Shutdown, Rev. 15

SOI-236.01, 125V DC Vital Battery Board 1, Rev. 16

ARI-15-21, Control Power & Fire Protection, Revision 16

DS-M17.2.2, Design Standard for Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems, Revision 5

EPIP-17, Fire Emergency Procedure, Revision 0

Fire Protection Report, Revision 25

FOR-26-9, Quarterly HPFP Valve Alignment Verification, Revision 4

FPDP-1, Conduct of Fire Protection, Revision 0

FPDP-2, Administration of Pre-Fire Plans, Revision 0

FPDP-3, Management of the Fire Protection Report, Revision 4

FPDP-4, Fire Emergency Response, Revision 0

FPS-777-EQUIP, Emergency Equipment Storage Locations, Inspection and Inventory,

Revision 12

1-JB-291-6917, Inventory of Appendix R Repair Equipment, Rev 0

G-73, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems and Features,

Revision 5

G-96, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Penetration Seals, Revision 1

G-98, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems,

Revision 5

MI-0.047, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Repairs, Rev. 4/13/04

MAI- 4.8, Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Thermal and Anti-sweat Insulation,

Revision 10

MI-13.105, Fire Detector Replacement, Sensitivity Check, and/or Smoke Check, Revision 1

PI-FPU-1.0, Periodic Fire Brigade Training, Revision 1

PM-0-FPS-777-EQIP, Emergency Equipment Storage Inspection and Inventory, Revision 12

RPTR-253-NSS/H, NSS/H Repeater Annual Test, Revision 1

RPTR-253-F2, Repeater Annual Test, Revision 0

SOI-13.01, Fire Detection System, Revision 10

SOI-26.01, High Pressure Fire Protection System, Revision 21

SPP-9.3, Plant Modification and Engineering Change Control, Revision 9

SSP-10.9, Control of Fire Protection Impairments, Revision 2

SSP-10.12, Fire Protection Quality Assurance, Revision 0

TI-211, Fire Protection Weekly Inspection Report, Revision 0

TI-277, Modification Compliance Review-Fire Protection, Revision 0

TI-291, Combustible Control Zones and Sensitive Areas, Revision 0

TRN-32, Ignition Source Fire Watch Training, Revision 2

TRN-33, Fire Protection Employee Qualification, Revision 0

ATTACHMENT

4

Drawings

41N373-5, Concrete Partition Walls, Outline & Reinforcement, Revision 7

45W724-1, Electrical Wiring Diagram, 6900V Shutdown Power 1A-A Schematic, Revision 22

45W760-26-2, Electrical Wiring Diagram High Pressure Fire Protection System, Revision 12

45W760-211-8, Electrical Wiring Diagram, 6900V Shutdown Power 1A-A Schematic,

Revision 13

45W760-211-9, Electrical Wiring Diagram, 6900V Shutdown Power 1A-A Schematic,

Revision 16

45W816-7, Conduit and Grounding Fire Detection, El. 755.0, Control Building, Revision 5

45W826-8, Conduit and Grounding, El. 729.0 and 737.0, Auxiliary Building, Revision 56

45W826-21, Conduit and Grounding Fire Detection, El. 737.0, Auxiliary Building, Revision 1

45W828-24, Conduit and Grounding Fire Detection, El. 757.0, Auxiliary Building, Revision 5

45W830-8, Conduit and Grounding Fire Detection, El. 772.0, Auxiliary Building, Revision 3

45A883-39, Electrical Penetration Seal Details, Typical M4, Revision 4

47A472-38, Mechanical Penetration Seal Details, Typical XXXVIII, Revision 4

47A472-46, Mechanical Penetration Seal Details, Typical XLVI, Revision 4

47W200-2, Equipment Plan El. 772.0 & Above, Revision 12

47W200-3, Equipment Plan El. 757.0 & El. 755.0, Revision 12

47W200-4, Equipment Plan El. 737.0 & El. 729.0, Revision 12

47W240-3, Compartment-Fire Cells, Auxiliary Building, Plan El. 737.0, Revision 8

47W240-4, Compartment-Fire Cells, Auxiliary Building, Plan El. 757.0, Revision 9

47W240-5, Compartment-Fire Cells, Auxiliary Building, Plan El. 772.0, Revision 8

47W240-7, Compartment-Fire Cells, Control Building, Plan El. 729.0 & El. 755.0, Revision 8

47W243-2, Thermo-Lag 330-1, Two Layer Design for Conduits 3" and Smaller, Revision 0

47W243-3, Thermo-Lag 330-1, Junction Boxes, Revision 0

47W479-15, Mechanical Drains and Embedded Piping, Revision 12

47W611-26-1, Electrical Logic Diagram High Pressure Fire Protection System, Revision 19

1-47W801-1, Main and Reheat Steam Flow Diagram, Rev. 38

1-47W803-2, Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Diagram, Rev. 49

1-47W809-1, Chemical and Volume Control System Flow Diagram, Rev. 48

1-47W813-1, Reactor Coolant System Flow Diagram, Rev. 39

47W832-2, Flow Diagram Fire Protection, Revision 35

1-47W845-3, Essential Raw Cooling Water Flow Diagram, Rev. 20

47W850-1, Flow Diagram Fire Protection & Raw Service Water , Revision 26

47W852 sheets 3 and 5, Mechanical Flow Diagram Floor and Equipment Drains, Revision 17

1-47W859-1, Component Cooling System Flow Diagram, Rev. 44

1-47W859-2, Component Cooling System Flow Diagram, Rev. 34

47W866-3, Flow Diagram Heating Cooling & Ventilating Air Flow, Revision 37

47W920-601, Mechanical HVAC Duct Insulation, Revision 2

47W920-609, Mechanical HVAC Duct Insulation, Revision 1

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-737-02, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 737- 0, Revision 1

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-757-02, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 757- 0, Revision 1

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-757-03, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 757- 0, Revision 1

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-757-04, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 757- 0, Revision 1

Pre-Fire Plan No. AUX-0-772-03, Auxiliary Building, Elevation 772- 0, Revision 0

Pre-Fire Plan No. CON-0-755-01, Control Building, Elevation 755- 0, Revision 2

ATTACHMENT

5

Calculations, Analyses, and Evaluations

EEB-MS-TI07-0005, 125 VDC Vital Control Power Systems Fault Calculation, Rev. 19

EPM-AST-031895, HPFP System Water Supply to the Auxiliary Building Preaction Sprinkler

System, Revision 0

EPM-AST-051695, HPFP System Standpipe Water Supply, Revision 1

EPM-DOM-02990, Combustible Load Summary, Revision 0

Fire Protection License Condition Impact Evaluation (LCIE) for SPP-10.10, Revision 2, dated

9/27/2002

FPR Part X, NFPA Code Evaluation, Revision 10

WB-DC-40-51, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability, Rev. 3

WBN-OSG4-031, Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown Per 10CFR50 Appendix R, Rev. 32

WBP-EVAR-9205004, Appendix R Analysis for Intra-plant Communication Systems, Revision 3

NER No. 03-1207, NRC Information Notice 2003-08: Potential Flooding Through Unsealed

Concrete Floor Crack, dated 8/29/2003

TVA System 13, Detection System Compliance Summary Matrix, Revision 10

TVA Fire Protection Sprinkler Walkdown Justification Sheets, Volume 3, Tab 1, Attachments 4

and 5, dated 12/15/1994

Out-Of-Service (OOS) SPP-10.9 Impairment Report for CY 2003, Impairment Permit

Nos. 03-0108, 03-0247, 03-0233, 03-0370, 03-0409

WBN-OSG4-031, Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown Per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Rev. 30

Audits and Self-Assessments

Fire Brigade Drill Critiques for Brigade Shifts from January 2001 - May 2003.

Site Compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire, Dated February 23 - 26, 2004

Completed Surveillance Procedures and Test Records

1-SI-0-53-A, 18-Month Verification of Remote Shutdown Transfer Switches for Train A, Rev. 14

1-SI-0-53-B, 18-Month Verification of Remote Shutdown Transfer Switches for Train B, Rev. 18

Fire Protection Weekly Inspection Reports (TI-211) for period from January 2004

0-FOR-26-2, Work Order 00-10633-00, 3 Year High Pressure Fire Protection Hydraulic

Performance Verification, completed 6/27,01

0-FOR-26-7-A, 18 Month Test of High Pressure Fire Protection Pump 1A-A, completed 3/17,04

0-FOR-26-25, 18 Month Diesel Driven Fire Protection Pump Capability Test, completed 4/17,03

0-FOR-228-1A, SPP-8.2 Quarterly Inspection and Testing of Emergency Light Battery Packs,

Diesel Building and Control Building, completed 10/08/03

0-FOR-228-1A, SPP-8.2 Quarterly Inspection and Testing of Emergency Light Battery Packs,

Auxiliary Building, Elevations 692,729, and 737, completed 11/14/03

0-FOR-228-3B, SPP-8.2 Quarterly Inspection and Testing of Emergency Light Battery Packs,

Auxiliary Building, Elevations Above 737, completed 10/29/03

ATTACHMENT

6

Technical Manuals/Vendor Information

Rubatex Corporation Therma-cel Sheet Insulation Product Technical Bulletins and Product

Data, Revision 03/03

Armacell LLC, AP/Armaflex Sheet and Roll Insulation Product Data, Revision 10/03

Elkhart Brass, Friction Loss Data, Friction Loss in Rubber or Vinyl Lined Fire Hose, Revision

12/17/03

Elkhart Brass, Model L-205-EB, Industrial Non-Shock Fog Nozzle Specification, Revision

12/17/03

Task Force Tips, Technical Specification for Model H-VPGI, Handline w/Grip, Instructions for

Safe Operation and Maintenance, Revision 4, 11/7/02

Pyrotronics Catalog Number 6119, Technical Specification for Model DI-3 Series Ionization

Smoke Detector, dated 04/87

Watts Bar Vendor Manual No. WBN-VM-E353-1840, Exide Electronics Corp. 8-Hour

Emergency Lighting Battery Packs, Revision 1

Applicable Codes and Standards

NFPA 13-1975 Automatic Sprinkler Systems

NFPA 14-1974 Standpipe and Hose Systems

NFPA 20-1973 Centrifugal Fire Pumps

NFPA 20-1993 Centrifugal Fire Pumps

NFPA 24-1973 Outside Protection

NFPA 30-1973 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code

NFPA 72D-1975 Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems

NFPA 72E-1974 Automatic Fire Detectors

NFPA 80-1975 Fire Doors and Windows

NUREG-1552,Supplement 1,Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Nuclear Power Plants, dated

January 1999

OSHA Standard 29 CFR 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards,

Underwriters Laboratory, Fire Resistance Directory, designs U904, U905, and U906, dated

January 1995

Underwriters Laboratory Standard 555, Standard for Fire Dampers and Ceiling Dampers,

dated May 14, 1979

Fire Protection Handbook, 17th Edition

ML041450096

Text

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