ML072070375

Conforming License Amendments to Incorporate the Mitigation Strategies Required by Section B.5.b. of Commission Order EA-02-026 (Tac Nos. MD4516 and MD4517)

ML072070375
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	08/09/2007
From:	Stewart Bailey NRC/NRR/ADRO/DORL/LPLII-2
To:	Scarola J Carolina Power & Light Co
Bailey, S N, NRR/ADRO/DORL/LPL II-2
Shared Package
ML072070357	List: ML072070375 ML072190527
References
EA-02-026, EA-06-137, TAC MD4516, TAC MD4517
Download: ML072070375 (14)

Text

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555-0001 August 9, 2007 Mr. James Scarola, Vice President Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Carolina Power & Light Company Post Office Box 10429 Southport, North Carolina 28461

SUBJECT:

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - CONFORMING LICENSE AMENDMENTS TO INCORPORATE THE MITIGATION STRATEGIES REQUIRED BY SECTION B.5.b. OF COMMISSION ORDER EA-02-026 AND THE RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION MITIGATION STRATEGIES REQUIRED BY COMMISSION ORDER EA-06-137 (TAC NOS. MD4516 AND MD4517)

Dear Mr. Scarola:

This letter documents the results of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's regulatory assessment of the adequacy of the actions taken by the Carolina Power & Light Company for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, in response to Section B.5.b.

of the February 25, 2002, Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order (EA-02-026) and related NRC guidance.

This letter also documents the results of the NRC staff's regulatory assessment of the adequacy of the actions taken by the licensee to comply with the requirements in the Commission's Order dated June 20, 2006 (EA-06-137), to incorporate key radiological protection mitigation strategies into specific documents.

Compliance with the ICM Order The ICM Order was issued following the events of September 11, 2001, as part of a comprehensive effort by the NRC, in coordination with other government agencies, to improve the capabilities of commercial nuclear reactor facilities to respond to terrorist threats.

Section B.5.b. of the Order required licensees to develop specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing or readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that could be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire, including those that an aircraft impact might create. Although it was recognized prior to September 11, 2001, that nuclear reactors already had significant capabilities to withstand a broad range of attacks, implementing these mitigation strategies would significantly enhance the plants' capabilities to withstand a broad range of threats. It should be noted that portions of the ICM Order, as well as other documents referenced in this letter, contain security-related or safeguards information, and are not publicly available.

NOTICE: The attachments to the Safety Evaluation contain Security-Related Information. Upon separation from these attachments, this letter and Enclosures 1 and 2 are DECONTROLLED.

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J. Scarola Licensee actions to implement Section B.5.b mitigation strategies have been ongoing since the issuance of the 2002 ICM Order. In 2005, the NRC issued guidance to more fully describe the NRC staff's expectations for implementing Section B.5.b of the ICM Order. The NRC guidance relied upon lessons learned from detailed NRC engineering studies and industry best practices.

Additionally, the NRC conducted two on-site team assessments at each reactor facility that identified additional mitigating strategies for preservation of core cooling, containment integrity, and spent fuel pool cooling. In total, these efforts have added defense in depth through the use of additional equipment and strategies. Moreover, these enhancements that have strengthened the interface between plant safety and security operations now include fire-fighting response strategies; plant operations to mitigate fuel damage; and actions to minimize releases.The enclosed Safety Evaluation (SE) details the interactions between the NRC staff and the Carolina Power & Light Company, as well as the rest of the nuclear industry, related to the final resolution of Section B.5.b. of the ICM Order.

The NRC is incorporating requirements for the B.5.b mitigating strategies into the Facility Operating Licenses. This letter, therefore, also transmits the license condition that captures the ICM Order Section B.5.b mitigation strategy requirements and incorporates them into the licensing basis.

This proposed license condition was transmitted by the NRC to the Carolina Power & Light Company in a letter dated September 21, 2006. By letter dated February 9, 2007, the Carolina Power & Light Company informed the NRC staff that it would accept the proposed license condition, with a minor change that the NRC staff finds acceptable. The effectiveness of the licensee's actions to implement the mitigative strategies contained in this license condition will be subject to future NRC review and inspection.

Compliance with the June 20, 2006, Order The June 20, 2006, Order modified the licenses of Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 to require the Carolina Power & Light Company to implement certain key radiological protection mitigation strategies that are identified in Attachment 2 to the Enclosure of the Order, and to incorporate them into security plans, safeguards contingency plans, guard training and qualification plans, and/or emergency plans, as appropriate.

By letter dated August 28, 2006, the NRC informed the licensee that, instead of incorporating the required strategies in the aforementioned plans, the license condition specified in the August 28, 2006 letter would be sufficient to satisfy the Order's requirement.

By letter dated October 17, 2006, the Carolina Power & Light Company confirmed that the key radiological protection mitigation strategies applicable to the facility have been implemented, as required by the Order.

By letter dated October 17, 2006, the Carolina Power & Light Company also indicated its agreement with the NRC's proposal to amend the operating license to include the new license condition referred to in the NRC's August 28, 2006 letter. This license condition is included with the administrative license change associated with the resolution of the Section B.5.b issue.

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~rrI:ILL [12r 2r:LV  !~Ut~IT7 fl~L~T~fl irirnnrl-Tinii J. Scarola Conclusion Consistent with the Order, administrative license changes to Renewed Operating Licenses DPR-71 and DPR-62 for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively, are being made to incorporate the agreed upon license conditions. These changes comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations (10 CFR) Chapter I. Please replace the affected pages of the Facility Operating Licenses with the enclosed pages (Enclosure 1).

The attachments to the SE are designated exempt from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1) since they contain security-related information and are Official Use Only.

Ifyou have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-1321.

Sincerely, Stewart N. Bailey, S ior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324

Enclosures:

1. Revised Pages of Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/o atts to Encl. 2: See next page

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Mr. James Scarola Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Carolina Power & Light Company Units 1 and 2 cc w/o atts to Encl. 2:

David T. Conley Mr. Robert P. Gruber Associate General Counsel II - Executive Director Legal Department Public Staff - NCUC Progress Energy Service Company, LLC 4326 Mail Service Center Post Office Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27699-4326 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602-1551 Ben Waldrep Mr. David R. Sandifer, Chairperson Director, Site Operations Brunswick County Board of Commissioners Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Post Office Box 249 Carolina Power & Light Company Bolivia, North Carolina 28422 Post Office Box 10429 Southport, North Carolina 28461-0429 Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Norman R. Holden, Mayor 8470 River Road City of Southport Southport, North Carolina 28461 201 East Moore Street Southport, North Carolina 28461 Mr. John H. O'Neill, Jr.

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP Mr. Warren Lee 2300 N Street NW. Emergency Management Director Washington, DC 20037-1128 New Hanover County Department of Emergency Management Ms. Beverly Hall, Section Chief Post Office Box 1525 Division of Radiation Protection Wilmington, North Carolina 28402-1525 N.C. Department of Environment and Natural Resources Mr. J. Paul Fulford 3825 Barrett Dr. Manager, Performance Evaluation and Raleigh, North Carolina 27609-7721 Regulatory Affairs PEB5 Carolina Power & Light Company Mr. Terry D. Hobbs Post Office Box 1551 Plant General Manager Raleigh, North Carolina 27602-1551 Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Carolina Power & Light Company Mr. Randy C. Ivey Post Office Box 10429 Manager - Support Services Southport, North Carolina 28461-0429 Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Carolina Power & Light Company Public Service Commission Post Office Box 10429 State of South Carolina Southport, North Carolina 28461 Post Office Drawer 11649 Columbia, South Carolina 29211 Ms. Margaret A. Force Assistant Attorney General State of North Carolina Post Office Box 629 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO ORDER NO. EA-02-026 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose The purpose of this Safety Evaluation (SE) is to document the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's regulatory assessment of the adequacy of the actions taken by the Carolina Power & Light Company (the licensee) in response to the February 25, 2002, Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order and the subsequent NRC letter to licensees dated February 25, 2005, transmitting NRC guidance (Phase 1 guidance document). This SE describes the basis for finding licensee strategies adequate to satisfy the requirements of the ICM Order. This SE also discusses the license condition that satisfactorily captures the mitigation strategy requirements. If the licensee makes future changes to its strategies within its commitment management program, this SE will be useful to the NRC staff in determining if the changed strategies are adequate to meet the license condition. It should be noted that portions of the ICM Order, as well as other documents referenced in this SE, contain security-related or safeguards information, and are not publicly available.

This SE also documents the NRC's basis for imposing an additional license condition as a means of satisfying the requirements in the Commission's Order dated June 20, 2006, to incorporate key radiological protection mitigation strategies into the security plan, safeguards contingency plan, guard training and qualification plan, and/or emergency plan, as appropriate.

1.2 Background of ICM Order The February 25, 2002, ICM Order that imposed interim compensatory measures on power reactor licensees required in Section B.5.b, Mitigative Measures, the development of "specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing or readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that can be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of NOTICE: The attachments to the Safety Evaluation contain Security-Related Information. Upon separation from these attachments, this Safety Evaluation is DECONTROLLED.

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or~rtolWI. @@L141h_01.. 8UOEVI WlOgT law ',do the plant due to explosions or fire." These actions were to be implemented by the end of August 2002. Inspections of the implementation of the Section B.5.b requirements were conducted in 2002 and 2003 (Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/148). The inspections identified large variabilities in scope and depth of the enhancements made by licensees. As a result, the NRC determined that additional guidance and clarification was needed for nuclear power plant licensees.

Subsequent to the conduct of the TI 2515/148 inspections, engineering studies conducted by the NRC Office of Regulatory Research (RES) provided insights into the implementation of mitigation strategies to address the loss of large areas of a plant due to explosions or fire, including those that an aircraft impact might create. The NRC actions resulting from these studies included: (1) inspections of licensee actions that address plant-specific consequences, (2) issuance of advisories that involve processes and protocols for licensee notification of an imminent aircraft threat, and (3) identification of mitigative measures to enhance plant response to explosions or fire.

On November 24, 2004, the NRC issued a letter to licensees providing information on the Commission's phased approach for enhancing reactor mitigative measures and strategies for responding to Section B.5.b of the ICM Order. On February 25, 2005, the NRC issued guidance (Phase 1 guidance document) to describe more fully the NRC staff's expectations for implementing Section B.5.b of the ICM Order. Determination of the specific strategies required to satisfy the Order, elaborated on by the Phase 1 guidance document, was termed Phase 1.

Further information on the Commission's phased approach and its reliance on the Phase 1 guidance document and related workshop was described in an NRC letter to licensees dated January 14, 2005.

The NRC Phase 1 guidance document relied upon lessons learned from recent NRC engineering studies involving plant assessments, as well as industry best practices. This guidance also included the spent fuel pool mitigative measures described in a NRC letter to licensees dated July 29, 2004, "Issuance of Spent Fuel Pool Mitigative Measures." These best practices were identified during the inspections conducted in 2002 and 2003. The Phase 1 guidance document also incorporated industry comments made at two B.5.b-related workshops held on January 14, 2005, and February 2, 2005.

1.3 Background of June 20, 2006, Order By letter dated June 20, 2006 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML061600023), the NRC issued an Order (ADAMS Accession No. ML061600076) that modified the license of the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, facility. The Order required the Carolina Power & Light Company to implement certain key radiological protection mitigation strategies that are identified in Attachment 2 to the Enclosure of the NRC's June 20, 2006, letter and to incorporate them into security plans, safeguards contingency plans, guard training and qualification plans, and/or emergency plans, as appropriate. The Order also required the licensee to ensure that site procedures, and initial and recurring operations staff training programs were updated to include the key radiological protection mitigation strategies that are identified in Attachment 2 to the Enclosure of the NRC's June 20, 2006, letter. The Order required the licensee to complete the changes to site plans, OITIQU. ~2OE prr: OEO2flIT'! ~ ~nnr ~p[j

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rriou~~~~~- TriIrr6niW06- IYJQO site procedures, and training programs necessary to fully implement the key mitigation strategies and notify the Commission within 120 days of the date of the Order by sending the changed plan pages to the NRC.

Subsequent to issuing the Order, and by letter dated August 28, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML062300304), the NRC informed the licensee that, instead of incorporating the required strategies in the aforementioned plans, the following license condition would be sufficient to satisfy the Order's requirement:

[Licensee] shall implement and maintain all Actions required by Attachment 2 to NRC Order EA-06-137, issued June 20, 2006, except the last action that requires incorporation of the strategies into the site security plan, contingency plan, emergency plan and/or guard training and qualification plan, as appropriate.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

2.1 Compliance with Section B.5.b of the ICM Order Section B.5.b of the ICM Order required licensees to develop specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing or readily-available resources (equipment and personnel) that can be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire. Determination of the specific strategies required to satisfy the Order, elaborated on in the Phase 1 guidance document, was termed Phase 1.

In order to assure adequate protection of public health and safety and common defense and security, the NRC determined that differences in plant design and configuration warranted independent assessments to verify that the likelihood of damage to the reactor core, containment, and spent fuel pools and the release of radioactivity is low at each nuclear power plant. The Commission directed the NRC staff to conduct site-specific security and safety assessments to further identify enhanced mitigation capabilities. Site-specific assessments of spent fuel pools was deemed Phase 2 and site-specific assessments of reactor core and containments was deemed Phase 3.

The goal of the Phase 2 and 3 mitigation strategy assessments was for the NRC and the licensees to achieve a new level of cognition of safety and security through a comprehensive understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the plants under normal, abnormal, and severe circumstances (from whatever cause). Based on this improved understanding, licensees could take reasonable steps to strengthen their capabilities and reduce their limitations. The NRC expected that safety and security would be well served by further enhancing the licensees' severe accident management strategies for mitigating a wide spectrum of events through the use of readily-available resources and by identifying potential practicable areas for the use of beyond-readily-available resources.

During 2005, the NRC staff performed inspections (TI 2515/164) to determine licensees' compliance with Section B.5.b of the ICM Order (Phase 1). Subsequent meetings were held with licensees to resolve identified open issues. Confirmatory B.5.b Phase 1 inspections

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(TI 2515/168) were conducted during the period of June to December 2006. The NRC staff conducted site visits as part of the Phase 2 assessments during 2005. In 2006, the NRC staff observed licensee Phase 3 studies and conducted independent Phase 3 assessments.

On January 24, 2006, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted a letter (M. Fertel to L. Reyes) describing an industry proposal for resolving ("closing") Phase 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML060260220). The industry proposed high level functional mitigating strategies for a spectrum of potential scenarios involving spent fuel pools. In a letter to all Holders of Licenses for Operating Power Reactors dated June 21, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML061670146), the NRC accepted the Phase 2 proposal pending review of site-specific details of its application and implementation. In arriving at this conclusion, the NRC staff placed significant weight on portions of the proposal that rely on industry commitments to provide beyond-readily-available resources not previously available. These additions will significantly enhance licensees' mitigating strategies capabilities.

On June 27, 2006, the NEI submitted two letters (M. Fertel to W. Kane). In one of the letters, the NEI proposed a license condition to capture the Section B.5.b requirements and addressed items deferred from Phase 1 to Phase 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML061790400). The license condition includes 14 items in the same broad categories as the February 25, 2005, Phase 1 guidance document; fire fighting response strategy, plant operations to mitigate fuel damage, and actions to minimize releases. The proposal suggested that the implementing details found to be an acceptable means of meeting the license condition would be treated as commitments, and managed in accordance with NEI 99-04, "Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes." In the second letter, the NEI proposed generic strategies for closure of Phase 3 (ADAMS Accession No. ML061860753). The required strategies for all three phases would be covered by the license condition and all implementing details would be managed by NEI 99-04.

The February 25, 2005, Phase 1 guidance document included 34 expectations. Two of these items were deferred to Phase 2 and seven items (i.e., six expectations and one element of a seventh expectation) were deferred to Phase 3. The NRC staff reached agreement with licensees on the non-deferred items under Phase 1.

Table 1 provides a cross reference of how the 34 elements of the February 25, 2005, Phase 1 guidance document and Phases 2 and 3 mitigating strategies correspond to the sections of the license condition.

On June 29, 2006, the NRC staff issued a letter to the NEI conditionally accepting its proposed license condition and strategies (ADAMS Accession No. ML061790306). The letter reiterated that mitigation strategies in NEI's proposals that were identified during the Phase 2 and 3 assessments, which utilize reasonable, evident, readily-available resources (as identified in the February 25, 2005, Phase 1 guidance document) are required pursuant to Section B.5.b of the ICM Order. The implementing details of the required strategies will be implemented by commitment and managed in accordance with the NEI commitment management guideline, NEI 99-04. The NRC staff believes the NEI proposal reasonably justifies excluding from formal regulatory controls those additional strategies identified during the site-specific Phases 2 and 3 assessments that the NRC previously deemed required under Section B.5.b of the ICM Order, but not identified in NEI's proposals. Inherent in this conclusion is recognition of the addition of beyond-readily-available resources included in the proposals. The implementing details of t1ITl~l~ ..TE uris: UEo2nIr: flEL~TED irForIL12~Troh1-

.A~lT IlL r rrrYTr mitigation strategies included in the proposal, including those that utilize beyond-readily-available resources, will be treated as commitments, which will become part of the licensing basis of the plant. Additional strategies identified during site-specific assessments which licensees deem acceptable and valuable to promote diversification and survivability, will be incorporated into licensees' Severe Accident Management Guidelines, Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines, or appended to other site implementation guidance. To verify compliance, the NRC staff evaluated the site-specific implementation and documentation of the proposed Phases 2 and 3 mitigating strategies for each U.S. nuclear power plant.

2.2 Compliance with the June 20, 2006, NRC Order By letter dated October 17, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML071170250), the Carolina Power &

Light Company confirmed that the key radiological protection mitigation strategies applicable to the facility (described in Attachment 2 to the Enclosure to the NRC's June 20, 2006, letter) have been incorporated into site procedures, and initial and recurring operations staff training programs, as required by the Order.

In this same letter, the Carolina Power & Light Company indicated its agreement with the NRC's proposal to amend the operating license to include the new license condition described in Section 1.3 of this SE.

This license condition is sufficient to satisfy the June 20, 2006, Order's requirements to incorporate key radiological protection mitigation strategies that are identified in Attachment 2 to the Enclosure of the Order into the security plan, safeguards contingency plan, guard training and qualification plan, and/or emergency plan, as appropriate.

Due to the similarities between the final resolution process of this issue and Section B.5.b of the February 25, 2005, Security Order, this license condition has been included with the administrative license change associated with the resolution of the B.5.b issue.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The NRC staff's technical evaluation for strategies identified in Phase 1 of Section B.5.b is found in Appendix A. The NRC staff's technical evaluation for strategies identified in Phases 2 and 3 of Section B.5.b is found in Appendix B. No separate technical evaluation for the strategies that were required by the June 20, 2006, Order was necessary.

The Mitigating Strategies Table (MST) is included as Appendix C. The purpose of the MST is to capture, at the functional level, a summary of licensee strategies for compliance with the 34 measures presented in the February 25, 2005, Phase 1 guidance document and to indicate how the 34 items correlate to the 14 items in the Section B.5.b license condition.

4.0 REGULATORY COMMITMENTS The implementing details of the mitigating strategies required by the license condition are identified in licensee submittals dated February 9, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070450149), and May 11, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML071370353). These details will be implemented by commitment and managed in accordance with the NEI commitment

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orrioi:+/- nl.w1 rrn.:Tci'r management guideline, NEI 99-04. The NRC staff concludes this provides reasonable controls for mitigating strategy implementation and for subsequent evaluation of licensee-identified changes.

Because the 14 items required by the license condition correlate to the 34 items presented in the February 25, 2005, Phase 1 guidance document and the mitigating strategies within NEI's Phase 2 and 3 proposals, and because the implementing details will be managed under NEI 99-04, the NRC staff is satisfied that there will be sufficient controls to ensure that the strategies are adequately maintained.

5.0 CONCLUSION

Based on the NRC staff's review described in Appendices A, B, and C of this SE, the licensee's responses to the February 25, 2005, Phase 1 guidance document and the spent fuel pool and reactor core and containment mitigating strategy assessments meet the requirements of Section B.5.b, Mitigative Measures, of the February 25, 2002, ICM Order that imposed interim compensatory measures on power reactor licensees. The NRC staff concludes that full implementation of the licensee's enhancements in the submittals identified in Section 4.0, above, constitutes satisfactory compliance with Section B.5.b and the license condition, and represents reasonable measures to enhance the licensee's effectiveness in maintaining reactor core and spent fuel pool cooling and containment integrity under circumstances involving the loss of large areas of the plant due to fires or explosions.

The NRC staff further concludes that the license condition described in Section 1.3 of this SE is sufficient to satisfy the June 20, 2006, Order's requirements to incorporate key radiological protection mitigation strategies that are identified in Attachment 2 to the Enclosure of the Order into the security plan, safeguards contingency plan, guard training and qualification plan, and/or emergency plan, as appropriate.

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Attachments (Official Use Only - Security-Related Information - ADAMS Accession No. ML072110219):

1. Phase 1 Assessment (Appendix A)

2. Phases 2 and 3 Assessment (Appendix B)

3. Mitigating Strategies Table (Appendix C)

Principal Contributors: David J. Nelson Michael K. Webb Nathan T. Sanfilippo Date: August 9, 2007 ZFFIOI.~L UOE O[2L. QEUflIT~ ~

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,,*w,.-,j Table 1 CROSS REFERENCE BETWEEN LICENSE CONDITION AND GUIDANCE DOCUMENT ELEMENTS License Condition section Guidance Document Elements A. Fire fighting response strategy with the following elements:

1. Pre-defined coordinated fire response strategy and B.1.b Staging of personnel guidance B.1.e Outside organization Support B.1.j Treatment of casualties B.1.k Site assembly areas (mass casualties)

B.1 .m Industry best practice - feeding fire protection ring header

2. Assessment of mutual aid fire fighting. assets B.1 .c Airlifted resources B.1.f Mobilization of fire fighting resources - existing or new MOUs B.1.g Mobilization of fire fighting resources - coordination with other than local mutual aid fire fighting resources (i.e, Industrial facilities, large municipal fire departments, airports, and military bases)

3. Designated staging areas for equipment and B.1.a Staging of equipment materials B.1.h Controlling emergency response vehicles (includes rad monitoring)

4. Command and Control B.l.d Command and control B.1.i Communications enhancements

5. Training of response personnel B.1.1 Training considerations

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1. Protection and use of personnel assets B.2.a Personnel considerations

2. Communications B.2.b Communications measures

3. Minimizing fire spread B.2.h Compartmentalization of plant areas

4. Procedures for implementing integrated fire response B.2.c Procedures (Included in Phase 3 strategies) strategy B.2.d Evaluation of vulnerable buildings and equipment (Included in Phase 3 strategies)

B.2.e Industry best practice - Containment venting and vessel flooding B.2.f Industry best practice for compensatory function (Included in Phase 3 strategies)

B.2.g Best practice for use of plant equipment B.2.i Best practice involving plant areas potentially affected by fire or explosions (Included in Phase 3 strategies)

B.2.k Best practice for establishing supplemental response capabilities B.2.1 Best practice for establishing supplemental response capabilities

5. Identification of readily-available, pre-staged B.2.g Best practice for use of plant equipment - portable equipment generator and transformer (Included in Phase 3 strategies)

B.2.j Best practice involving reliance on portable and offsite equipment (Included in Phase 3 strategies)

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6. Training on integrated fire response strategy B.2.n Training considerations

7. Spent fuel pool mitigation measures B.2.m.1 Dispersal of Fuel B.2.m.2 Hot fuel over rack feet B.2.m.3 Downcomer area B.2.m.4 Enhanced air circulation (Included in Phase 2 strategies)

B.2.m.5 Emergency pool makeup, leak reduction/repair (Included in Phase 2 strategies)

C. Actions to minimize release to include considerations of:

1. Water spray scrubbing B.3.a Water spray scrubbing B.3.b Prestaging of equipment

2. Dose to onsite responders B.3.c Dose projection models (Included in Phase 3 strategies)

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Pkg ML072070357 Letter & Encl 2: ML072070375, Encl 1: ML072190527, Attachments to SE (OUO): ML072110219) *No Legal Objection OFFICE NRR/LPLIV/PM NRR/PSPB/LA NRR/LPLII-2/PM NRR/DPR/PSPB NAME MFields DBaxley SBailey DNelson DATE 7/25/07 7/31/07 8/7/07 7/25/07 OFFICE NSIR OGC* NRR/LPLII-2/BC NAME Afrazier, DJohnson for JGoldberg TBoyce DATE 7/30/07 7/26/07 8/7/07