ML031840382
| ML031840382 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 06/26/2003 |
| From: | Rosalyn Jones Duke Power Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML031840382 (43) | |
Text
Pk Duke R. A. JONES UEPowere Vice President A Duke Energy Company Duke Power 29672 / Oconee Nuclear Site 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672 864 885 3158 864 885 3564 fax June 26, 2003 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Oconee Nuclear Site Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 10 CFR 50.59 Annual Report Attached are descriptions of Oconee facility changes, tests, and experiments which were completed subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 between January 1, 2002, and December 31, 2002. This report is submitted pursuant to the requirement of 10 CFR 50.59 (d)(2).
If there are any questions, please contact Larry Nicholson at (864) 885-3292.
Very truly yours,
/s~/A R. A. Jones, Site Vice President Oconee Nuclear Site Attachment D~'~Li-I www. duke-energy. corn
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 26, 2003 Page 2 xc: Mr. L. A. Reyes Regional Administrator, Region II U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 Mr. M. C. Shannon Senior NRC Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Site Mr. L. N. Olshan Senior Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Attachment 1 Oconee Facility Changes - 2002 Description Page I. Nuclear Station Modifications 1 - 16 II. Minor Modifications 17 - 27 III. Procedures 28 - 29 IV. Selected Licensee Commitments 30 - 36 V. Technical Specification Bases 37 VI. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 38 VII. Calculations 39 VIII. Miscellaneous 40
I. NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATIONS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Essential Siphon Vacuum The modification NSM ON-23000 Part C tied the Essential Siphon No technical specification changes are required. However, a technical Vacuum (ESV) system into the CCW Intake Header and plant power specification change is required to allow the licensing basis requiring and control systems. The remainder of the ESV system has been the restart of a CCW pump be deleted in favor of maintaining the v designed and constructed under other parts of NSM ON-53000. This siphon with the ESV system. UFSAR Section 9.2.2.1 was revised to NSM (ON-23000) performed all functional testing of the system as a add a paragraph discussing the new ESV system. Likewise, a new whole. Installation tests (e.g., hydrostatic pressure test) were typically section 9.2.2.2.5 was added to discuss ESV. SLC 16.9.7 was revised to performed under the NSM part that installed the piping or components. indicate that the Unit 2 ECCW siphons are under TS 3.7.8. UFSAR Figures 9-42 (Siphon Seal Water System) and 9-43 (Essential Siphon Vacuum System) was added. UFSAR Figure 9-9 was revised to show the ESV tie-in.
1
NUCLEAR STATION MODIFCATIONS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Main Steam NSM ON-12980 added a flow path from the "IB" Moisture Separator No technical specification or SLC changes are required. UFSAR Drain Tank (MSDT) to a new demineralizer. Only a portion of the Sections 10.3.5.1 and 10.4.5.2 were revised to add description about Moisture Separator Reheater (MSR) drain flow was routed through the having the ability to divert a portion of the moisture separator drain demineralizer. Then, this flow goes to the condenser. Note that MSR liquid through a new heat exchanger and demineralizer, and that the drain flow refers to the liquid flow leaving the moisture separator side heat exchanger is cooled by LPSW. UFSAR Figure 10-4 was revised to of the MSRs. The majority of MSR drain flow will be pumped to the show a line going to the Moisture Separator Drain Demineralizer for "C' Flash Tank or pressure fed to the "D" Flash Tank with existing Unit 1. UFSAR Section 11.6.3.2.1 was revised to denote the Resin components. The flow from the Moisture Separator drains will need to Recovery System receives sluice from the Condensate Polishing be cooled to some extent to prevent ion (i.e., contaminant) release from Demineralizer Backwash Sump and that the sump can contain both the demineralizer, as well as to prevent resin melting. The heat powdered and bead resins from various demineralizers.
exchanger will use Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) from the nonessential header as a cooling media. The cooling water will be returned to LPSW just prior to entering the Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) System.
2
NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATIONS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Reactor Building Electrical Penetrations The modification NSM ON-13071 replaced four Reactor Building A paragraph in UFSAR Section 3.8.1.5.4 was revised to account for electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs) in ONS Unit 1. The four EPAs differences in the construction of the Conax penetrations and existing replaced by NSM ON-13071AL1 were manufactured by Viking D. G. O'Brien/Viking penetrations. The UFSAR revision does not Industries, Inc. and by the D. G. O'Brien Company. Viking is no change or affect the design basis for electrical penetrations. The longer in business and D. G. O'Brien no longer supplies EPAs under an revision only documents the differences in penetrations due to the use Appendix B program. These manufacturers have ceased production of of penetrations supplied by different manufacturers. No Technical EPAs and all related replacement components. Specification changes are required. No changes are required to the Selected Licensee Commitments.
3
NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATIONS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Main Steam Modification ON-22980 added a flow path from the "2B" Moisture No technical specification or SLC changes are required. UFSAR Separator Drain Tank (MSDT) to a new demineralizer. Only a portion Sections 10.3.5.1 and 10.4.5.2 were revised to add description about of the Moisture Separator Reheater (MSR) drain flow will be routed having the ability to divert a portion of the moisture separator drain through the demineralizer. Then, this flow will go to the condenser. liquid through a new heat exchanger and demineralizer, and that the Note that MSR drain flow refers to the liquid flow leaving the moisture heat exchanger is cooled by LPSW. UFSAR Figure 10-4 is to be separator side of the MSRs. The majority of MSR drain flow will be revised to show a line going to the Moisture Separator Drain pumped to the '"C' Flash Tank or pressure fed to the 'ID" Flash Tank Demineralizer for Unit 2. UFSAR Section 11.6.3.2.1 is to be revised to with existing components. The flow from the Moisture Separator denote the Resin Recovery System receives sluice from the Condensate drains will need to be cooled to some extent to prevent ion (i.e., Polishing Demineralizer Backwash Sump and that the sump can contain contaminant) release from the demineralizer, as well as to prevent resin both powdered and bead resins from various demineralizers.
melting. The heat exchanger will use Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) from the nonessential header as a cooling media. The cooling water will be returned to LPSW just prior to entering the Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) System 4
NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATIONS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Feedwater Modification ON-23053 involved circuitry used in the mitigation of These components are QA-1. Relays are powered from safety related accidents. A License Amendment Request (LAR) was approved on power sources. The power sources have adequate capacity for these September 26, 2001 for the proposed modification and Technical additional loads. Circuit protection is coordinated such that a circuit Specifications to implement an Automatic Feedwater Isolation System failure would be isolated to that circuit (no failure propagation to other (AFIS). New terminal blocks and fuse blocks are installed in the SGLC circuits). No technical specification or SLC changes were required.
cabinet. The MSLB actuation relays are replaced with new relays. UFSAR sections 3.1.1.1, 5.2.3.4, 6.2.1.4A, 7.1, 7.1.1, 7.4.3.1.2, New interposing relays and transzorbs are installed. Unused breakers 7.5.2.5, 7.9 (including subsections), 10.1, 10.3.2, 10.4.6.3, 10.4.7.2, were deleted from the cabinet. 10.4.7.3, and 15.13.1 were revised.
5
NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATIONS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Reactor Building Electrical Penetration The modification NSM ON-23071 replaced four Reactor Building There are no changes to existing power sources or loads for those electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs) in ONS Unit 1. The four EPAs circuits passing through the new Conax electrical penetrations as replaced by NSM ON-23071AL1 were manufactured by Viking compared to the same circuits passing through the replaced electrical Industries, Inc. and by the D. G. O'Brien Company. Viking is no penetrations. The electrical rating of the connectors and penetrations is longer in business and D. G. O'Brien no longer supplies EPAs under an adequate for their circuit application. The modification does not create Appendix B program. These manufacturers have ceased production of any new seismic/non-seismic interactions. There is no new safety to EPAs and all related replacement components. non-safety (QA-1 to non-QA-1) electrical interfaces resulting from this modification. No Technical Specification or UFSAR changes are required. No changes are required to the Selected Licensee Commitments.
6
NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATIONS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Emergency Feedwater The NSM ON-23076 addressed the common mode failures in the nitrogen supply system and upgraded much of the instrument and No Technical Specifications or SLC changes are required. UFSAR control portion of valves 2FDW-315 and 2FDW-316 to a QA-1 status. Section 3.2.2 was revised to add that the nitrogen supply to the Unit 2 EFW control valves is able to withstand the maximum hypothetical earthquake. UFSAR Table 3-68 was revised to include additional references for the seismic qualification documentation for the post accident monitoring indicators and the steam generator level control system cabinets. UFSAR Sections 7.4.3.1.2 and 7A.3.2.2 was revised to provide the description of the Unit 2 control valves and their function. UFSAR Section 7A.3.2.3 was revised to clarify that the feedwater control valves are the emergency feedwater control valves.
UFSAR Section 10.4.7.2 was revised to address the function of the Unit 2 valves and their failure modes on loss of air/nitrogen. UFSAR Section 10.4.7.2 was revised to add some Unit 2 alarms. UFSAR Section 10.4.7.3 was revised to add information that the nitrogen supply to the Unit 2 EFW control valves is designed to withstand seismic loadings. UFSAR Section 10.4.9 was revised to add this Unit 2 NSM as a reference. No adverse effects on the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire scenarios were determined to exist There is no adverse effect on containment integrity and no new release paths are created.
7
NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATIONS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Reactor Building The NSM ON-23095 replaced the existing RBCU fan motors, fan No UFSAR, Technical Specification or Selected Licensee Commitment rotors, and fan housings with the L449TCZ frame motor design. changes are required. There are no new safety to non-safety (or QA-1 to non-QA-1) electrical interfaces. There is no adverse effect on containment integrity and no new release paths are created. Neither the function of the system nor the method of performing that function will be altered by this modification. There is no change in the operating modes, or events for which the system is required to function. This modification does not change the performance requirement of any system or equipment 8
NUCLEAR STATION MODFICATIONS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Feedwater Modification ON-33053 involved circuitry used in the mitigation of This modification required changes to Technical Specification 3.3.11, accidents. A License Amendment Request (LAR) was approved on 3.3.12, 3.3.13 due to the new circuitry being used in the mitigation of September 26, 2001 for the proposed modification and Technical accidents. The UFSAR changes initiated by this modification are to Specifications to implement an Automatic Feedwater Isolation System remove all references to MSLB detection circuitry, since the MSLB (AFIS). New terminal blocks and fuse blocks are installed in the SGLC detection circuitry will have been replaced by AFIS on all three units cabinet. The MSLB actuation relays are replaced with new relays. after implementation of this modification. Also, the UFSAR changes New interposing relays and transzorbs are installed. Unused breakers remove unit references in discussions of AFIS (the existing UFSAR text were deleted from the cabinet describing AFIS operation is not changed), since AFIS will be applicable to all three units after implementation of this modification.
These UFSAR changes incorporate appropriate information from this modification into the UFSAR Sections 7.4.3.1.2 and 7A.3.2.2.
9
NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATIONS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Emergency Feedwater The NSM ON-33076 addressed the common mode failures in the No Technical Specifications or SLC changes are required. UFSAR nitrogen supply system and upgraded much of the instrument and Section 3.2.2 was revised to add that the nitrogen supply to the Unit 2 control portion of valves 3FDW-315 and 3FDW-316 to a QA-1 status. EFW control valves is able to withstand the maximum hypothetical earthquake. UFSAR Table 3-68 was revised to include additional references for the seismic qualification documentation for the post accident monitoring indicators and the steam generator level control system cabinets. UFSAR Sections 7.4.3.1.2 and 7.4.3.2.2 was revised to provide the description of the Unit 3 control valves and their function. UFSAR Section 7.4.3.2.3 was revised to clarify that the feedwater control valves are the emergency feedwater control valves.
UFSAR Section 10.4.7.2 was revised to address the function of the Unit 3 valves and their failure modes on loss of air/nitrogen. UFSAR Section 10.4.7.2 was revised to add some Unit 3 alarms. UFSAR Section 10.4.7.3 was revised to add information that the nitrogen supply to the Unit 3 EFW control valves is designed to withstand seismic loadings. UFSAR Section 10.4.9 was revised to add this Unit 3 NSM as a reference. No adverse effects on the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire scenarios were determined to exist. There is no adverse effect on containment integrity and no new release paths are created.
10
NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATIONS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Reactor Building Modification NSM-ON-33090/AL3 improved safety related electrical The modification of the RBCU fan control circuitry does not introduce distribution system (EDS) and equipment terminal voltages under the possibility for a malfunction of a SSC with a different result because the activity does not introduce a failure mode that is not bounded by worst-case accident conditions with degraded grid by stopping and subsequently restarting the RBCU fans after a period of three (3) those described in the RBCU description in UFSAR Section 9.4.6 and minutes from the high speed or off position. Table 6-6. TS Bases Section B3.6.5 will be revised to reflect the added time delay. There is no adverse effect on containment integrity and no new release paths are created.
11
NUCLEAR STATION MODEFICATIONS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Reactor Building Spray Modification ON-33105 improved the post-accident operation of the No Technical Specifications or SLC changes are required. This Reactor Building Spray (RBS) system is. It is the resolution of the modification does not result in a departure from a method of evaluation actions described in LER 269/98-12, "Building Spray System Outside described in the UFSAR used in establishing the design bases or in the Design Basis due to Design Inadequacy". This LER was the result of safety analyses. This modification affects the inputs used in some of the discovery that no NPSH calculations existed that evaluated the those analyses, but does not require any changes to evaluation operation of the RBS system with suction from the BWST. methodology. In summary, no adverse effects are created as a result of this modification. This modification fulfill an outstanding NRC commitment. There is no adverse effect on containment integrity and no new release paths are created.
12
NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATIONS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Emergency Condenser Circulating Water (ECCW)
Part C5 of NSM ON-5300010 adds some of the Essential Siphon The existing CCW structures and system are not designed for turbine Vacuum (ESV) piping and components in the ESV trench located in the missiles. This part of the modification is not performing a function by itself. Thus, protection from turbine missiles using UFSAR criteria is not Intake Dike. This vacuum system was added to increase the reliability and duration of the Emergency Condenser Circulating Water (ECCW) needed at this time. No technical specification changes are required.
siphon supply to the Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) pumps UFSAR Section 3.2.2 was revised to list that the ESV System can following a Loss of Coolant Accident coincident with a Loss of Offsite withstand the MHE.
Power (LOCAALOOP).
13
NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATIONS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Emergency Condenser Circulating Water (ECCW)
NSM, ON-53003, Part B, Implementation Parts BM1 and BM2, This modification did not change any of the existing functions, but reclassified the CCW Intake Header to QA Condition 1 and Branch simply enhanced the seismic capabilities of the system. Also, it Lines to QA Condition 4. Also, a variety of design changes were upgraded some of the system and component classifications to QA performed to upgrade the design of some of these piping sections to Condition 1 to ensure that future maintenance and modifications are resist seismic loads. These design changes primarily consisted of pipe done in accordance with its level of importance. No Technical support/restraint upgrades along a few valve upgrades. These changes Specification changes are required. UFSAR Section 3.1.1.1 was were made to help ensure the availability of water to the suction of the revised to list the QA Condition 1 SSC's.
LPSW pumps during all Design Basis Events, especially those involving a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP).
14
NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATIONS EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Demnineralized Water (DW) and Filtered Water (FW)
Modification ON-53078 replaces obsolete and degraded components of This modification does not adversely affect the design basis or the Demineralized Water (DW) and Filtered Water (FW) Systems and operation of the DW System, FW System or any of the other systems certain interfacing components from other systems which provide which interface with WT. The modification does not affect the amount Water Treatment (WT) support functions. Existing components which of chlorine on site. The on site storage location of the chlorine is not are reused are, in some cases, relocated to accommodate the new changed by this modification. Chlorine gas detection and annunciation components. The scope of this modification is non QA. is not affected by this modification. No UFSAR or Technical Specification changes are required. No changes are required to the Selected Licensee Commitments.
15
NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATIONS DESCRIPION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW)
The NSM ON-53096 replaced the existing three-way diverting valves The modification does not affect any controlling numerical value for a LPSW-216 and LPSW-219 and replaced some of the existing carbon parameter established during the licensing review as presented in the steel piping with stainless steel piping. The piping configuration was UFSAR for any parameter used to determine the integrity of the barrier.
changed so that air will not be capable of accumulating in the chiller The activity does not involve a change in an evaluation methodology.
discharge piping and being transported to the chiller supply piping. UFSAR Figure 9-24 was revised to change some of the piping dimensions. No technical specification or SLC changes are required.
16
I. MINOR MODIFICATIONS (ONOEs)
DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Engineered Safeguards (ES)
Minor Modification ONOE-12852 replaced all the obsolete type CY No changes to the technical specifications are required. This motor starters in safety related motor control center (MCC) 3XS3 with modification does not adversely affect the single failure protection of an equivalent type TM motor starter. the components or systems that are supplied by the affected MCC.
UFSAR Table 3-68, "Electrical Equipment Seismic Qualification", has been revised to include the test report file number for the replacement motor starters. This activity will not increase the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.
17
MINOR MODIFICATION (ONOEs)
DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Low Pressure Injection (LPI)
Modification ONOE-15290 provided instructions for removing the No changes to the Technical Specifications are required. Tech Spec Engineered Safeguard signal to valve 2LP-21 (2A BWST OUTLET Bases 3.5.3 were modified to add a statement that the ES signal has ISOL VLV). Relays 2MX55, 2CR65, 2CR66 and 2RX56 and been removed from 2LP-21 and 2LP-22. UFSAR Chapter 6, Section associated wiring will be removed in Engineered Safeguards Odd 6.3.2.2.2, Figures 6-1 and 6-2, Table 6-11, Chapter 7, Table 7-3, and Channels Terminal Cabinet 2ESTC1. Cables 2EMC727, 2EMC728, Chapter 9, Figure 9-19 were changed to show the removal of the 2EMC772 and 2EMC773 and associated RZ Modules will be spared in automatic feature of 2LP-21 and 2LP-22 to open on an ES signal.
place for future use. Cables 2EXS3003, 2EMC422, and 2LP161D are deleted. New cable 2LP161DA is added to provide valve 2LP-21 position indication to the OAC. EGS Connectors are also added to the operator on 2LP-21.
18
MINOR MODIFICATION (ONOEs)
DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Low Pressure Injection (LPI)
Modification ONOE-15291 provided instructions for removing the No changes to the Technical Specifications are required. Tech Spec Engineered Safeguard signal to valve 2LP-22 (2B BWST OUTLET Bases 3.5.3 were modified to add a statement that the ES signal has ISOL VLV). Relays 2MX30, 2CR35, 2CR67 and 2RX34 and been removed from 2LP-21 and 2LP-22. UFSAR Chapter 6, Section associated wiring will be removed in Engineered Safeguards Even 6.3.2.2.2, Figures 6-1 and 6-2, Table 6-11, Chapter 7, Table 7-3, and Channels Terminal Cabinet 2ESTC2. Cables 2EMC729, 2EMC730, Chapter 9, Figure 9-19 were changed to show the removal of the 2EMC809 and 2EMC810 and associated RZ Modules will be spared in automatic feature of 2LP-21 and 2LP-22 to open on an ES signal.
place for future use. Cables 2EMC423, and 2LP164D are deleted.
New cable 2LP164DA is added to provide valve 2LP-22 position indication to the OAC. EGS Connectors are also added to the operator on 2LP-22.
19
MINOR MODIFICATION (ONOEs)
DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Electrohydraulic Control (EHC)
Minor Modification ONOE-15997 deleted the Main Turbine trips on Deletion of the EHC logic removes a vulnerability to single failure.
Low Feedwater Pump Hydraulic Oil pressure and Low Feedwater Pump The EHC logic and the ATWS logic are redundant designs.
Discharge Pressure generated by the EHC system. The EHC System Redundancy will be maintained, as the ATWS has two independent provides protective devices that protect the turbine against overspeed, channels and both channels are required to trip to provide a signal to thermal damage, and mechanical damage. Currently, there are trip the turbine. No Technical Specification or other SAR document redundant Main Turbine trips on Low Feedwater Pump Hydraulic Oil changes are required by this activity.
pressure and Low Feedwater Pump Discharge Pressure generated from the EHC system and the Anticipatory Transient Without Scram (ATWS) system.
20
MINOR MODIFICATIONS (ONOEs)
DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Electrohydraulic Control (EHC)
Minor Modification ONOE-15998 deletes the EHC logic that trips the turbine on low Feedwater Pump hydraulic oil pressure and low Deletion of these redundant trips does not introduce the possibility of a Feedwater Pump Discharge Pressure. The EHC logic has single failure change in the likelihood of a malfunction because it is not an initiator of vulnerabilities that cause the turbine to trip. Deletion of the EHC logic any new malfunctions and no new failure modes are introduced. The removes this vulnerability to single failure. The EHC logic and the modified design is more reliable than the original since single failure ATWS logic are redundant designs. Redundancy will be maintained, as vulnerability has been eliminated. No Technical Specification or other the ATWS has two independent channels and both channels are SAR document changes are required by this activity.
required to trip to provide a signal to trip the turbine.
21
MINOR MODIFICATIONS (ONOEs)
DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW)
Modification OE-16266 replaced the control signal/components going The new and modified components do not cause any seismic interaction to the existing LPSW 216/219 valves/actuators. (analog to digital concerns between seismically qualified and non-seismically qualified upgrade) The existing pneumatic valve control loop consists of a structures, systems, or components. The modification does not create any temperature sensor in the 'exiting' condenser piping, a pneumatic adverse effects to the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire separation temperature transmitter, a pneumatic controller/receiver, and a solenoid requirements. This modification does not require any changes to the fire valve (energized whenever the chiller is operating to allow the control protection system. There is no adverse effect on containment integrity signal to control the valve and de-energized when the chiller is off to and no new release paths are created. No adverse effects to the port a 20 psig signal to the valve positioner to place the valve in the full Appendix R fire scenarios were determined to exist. The equipment recirc' position). failure modes are the same as the existing components, so there is no increase in radiological dose. Therefore, the consequences of SAR-analyzed malfunctions of SSC's important to safety is unchanged as a result of this mod. UFSAR Section 9.2.5.2 was revised to correct the description of condenser water temperature control and to change the location of the sensor from downstream to upstream of the condenser.
22
MINOR MODIFICATION (ONOEs)
I DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Main Steam Minor modification OE-16719 documents tube repairs in the 2A OTSG. All the repair parts are QAcondition 1 and will be no more likely to fail These repairs include the removal of any existing plugs which might than the existing parts. Tube stabilization and plugging are accepted contain defects, and installation of stabilizers (as necessary) and plugs as industry practices for removing heat exchanger tubes from service. Once required by the results of visual inspections (bubble or drip tests) and the steam generator manways are closed up and secured the RCS pressure eddy current testing, and the tube stabilization criteria document boundary of the steam generator is intact. No changes to the UFSAR or Technical Specifications are required.
23
MINOR MODIFICATIONS (ONOEs)
DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Main Steam Minor modification OE-16720 documents tube repairs in the 2B OTSG. All the repair parts are QA condition I and will be no more likely to fail These repairs include the removal of any existing plugs which might than the existing parts. Tube stabilization and plugging are accepted contain defects, and installation of stabilizers (as necessary) and plugs as industry practices for removing heat exchanger tubes from service. Once required by the results of visual inspections (bubble or drip tests) and the steam generator manways are closed up and secured the RCS pressure eddy current testing, and the tube stabilization criteria document. All the boundary of the steam generator is intact. No changes to the UFSAR or repair parts are QA condition 1 and will be no more likely to fail than the Technical Specifications are required.
existing parts.
24
MINOR MODIFICATIONS (ONOEs)
DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Closed Circuit TV (CCTV)
Minor Modification ONOE-17026 added security cameras to the CCTV The security system is not safety related and does not interact with any system. CCTV monitors and controls were also added to the security safety system. No adverse effects and/or interations with SSCs important workstation console. Wireless receivers and a terminal box were to safety are associated with the addition of these security camera added. components. No adverse effects to the safety and health of the station or public will result from implementation of this modification. No changes to the UFSAR or Technical Specifications are required.
25
MINOR MODIFICATION (ONOEs)
DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Low Pressure Injection (LPI)
Minor Modification ONOE-17321 revised OSS-0254.00400-1028 and This activity simply documents existing procedural guidance which UFSAR Section 6.3.3.2.1 to document the system limitations associated was established to ensure that post accident equipment is used in a with opening the primary and alternate boron dilution flow paths. manner for which it was originally designed. Without the existing guidance in current procedures that is only being documented within OSS-0254.00400-1028 and UFSAR Section 6.3.3.2 by this activity, post accident mitigation equipment may be damaged.
The acceptable post accident mitigation strategies associated with the post accident boron dilution system has been evaluated. No changes to Technical Specifications are required.
26
MINOR MODIFICATIONS (ONOEs)
DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: CCW Minor modification ONOE-17323 revised the CCW System DBD to The proposed changes would have no effect on the radiological change the lake level required to support CCW reverse gravity flow consequences of a Turbine Building flood. The UFSAR does not during a Turbine Building flood. contain a radiological consequence analysis for a Turbine Building flood. The SSF will be fully capable of performing its function of mitigating a Turbine Building flood. The proposed changes will not prevent or degrade the effectiveness of actions required to mitigate a flood using the SSF. The proposed changes are not initiators of any accidents and no new failure modes are introduced. Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual, Section 16.9.7 and Section 16.9.11 were changed. No changes to Technical Specifications are required.
27
H
I. PROCEDURE
S DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Low Pressure Injection (LPI)
The procedure EP/3/A/1800101 change secures the Reactor Building These changes are within the current licensing bases for Oconee as Spray (RBS) pump and isolates BWST in order not to drain the RCS stated in the UFSAR. These changes do not constitute a change to when LPI system is aligned to Decay Heat Removal (DHR) operation. analyzed conditions presented in the UFSAR or remove any The changes to the Turbine Building Flood, LOCA Cooldown, Force commitments. The changes do not constitute a change to the SAR.
Cooldown, and HPI Cooldown enhanced the defense in depth Furthermore these changes do not affect Tech Specs. Based on this methodology (Beyond Design Basis) mitigation. information, the procedural changes will not change the design function of the system described in the UFSAR. The changes do not change the committed mitigation strategy described in the TBD. No changes to UFSAR or Technical Specifications are required.
28
PROCEDURES EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Spent Fuel This safety evaluation supports performing procedure UFSAR section 9.1.42.2 mentions the canal seal plate, and the M/OA/I 150/005B to allow the canal seal plate to be removed for sequence in which fuel movement takes place. Specifically the repair while the fuel transfer tube covers are removed. sequence of installing the seal plate, closing SF-I and SF-2 and then removing the transfer tube covers is mentioned. This appears to be simply the logical progression of events to allow defueling the reactor, and does not appear to be intended to ensure that the transfer tube covers are installed if the canal seal plate where to be removed for repair. The removal of the canal seal plate while the transfer tube covers are removed will not result in an inadvertent lowering of the spent fuel pool level since SF-i and SF-2 are verified closed and not leaking. No changes to Technical Specifications or the UFSAR are required.
29
IV. SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Emergency Condenser Circulating Water (ECCW)
This safety evaluation supports a revision to Selected Licensee The proposed changes would have no effect on the radiological Commitment (SLC) 16.9.7 to state that measurement error must be consequences of a LOOP. By maintaining lake level within the limits added when using manual methods to determine lake level. The change plus measurement error, the ECCW siphon header will be fully capable requires a higher lake level to be maintained when relying on manual of performing its function of mitigating a LOOP. The proposed changes methods to determine the lake level. This will provide additional NPSH will not prevent or degrade the effectiveness of actions required to for the LPSW pumps. mitigate a LOOP. The proposed changes do not involve any changes to a method of evaluation described in the UFSAR. The proposed changes do not require a change to Technical Specifications. No changes to the UFSAR are required, other than the proposed changes themselves.
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SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Spent Fuel The containment isolation system is used post accident to minimize This activity revised SLC 16.6.1 and changed OSS-0254.0O0-4001 to leakage from containment. The system is not an accident initiator. This reflect that local leak rate testing of Penetration 5a is not required and modification does not introduce any new failure modes for the removed valves 1/2/3SF0073 from the list of valves in Penetration 11 containment isolation system nor any other systems, structures or and removed valves 1/2I3SFOO72 from the list of valves in Penetration components. The proposed change does not affect any margins of
- 12. This is an editorial correction. safety defined in the basis for any technical specification. The proposed change does not affect any safety limits or limiting safety system settings. No plant safety limits, setpoints, or design parameters are adversely affected. There is no impact to the nuclear fuel, cladding, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), or containment integrity. This change does not require a change to Technical Specifications. UFSAR Figure 6-9 and UFSAR Table 6-7 were revised. (UFSAR change 02-11) 31
SELECTED UCENSEE COMMTMENTS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Reactor Building This evaluation supports raising the limit on containment Average The increase in containment average temperature has been evaluated by Temperature (as imposed by SLC 16.6.13 and SLC 16.6.13 Bases) from 1351F to 140'F. It will also add an alternate means of NEA (Safety Analysis Group) and found to be acceptable because it determining average temperature. will not cause the minimum containment overpressure to fall below the required value of 2.2 psi (ref 7). The change has also been evaluated for potential adverse effects on EQ curves as documented in the Equipment Qualification Maintenance Manual, and these limits were not affected (ref 8). The current surveillance limit on concrete temperature is 1750 F (ref 4), so there will be no adverse impact on concrete structures. The revision to SLC 16.6.13 and SLC 16.6.13 Bases has been completed.
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SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS DESCRIPEION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU)
SLC 16.9.12 was revised to allow an RBCU to be isolated when in No new components are being added to the facility. SLC 16.9.12 Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4, and to allow SR 16.9.12.3 to be met by verifying ensures that the safety-related functions of the LPSW System are the LPSW Isolation valves in a particular RBCU train are full open maintained. SLC 16.9.12 does not create any conditions or events regardless of the position of LPSW-565. This revision facilitates which lead to accidents previously evaluated in the SAR. The SLC system testing when system conditions may challenge a flow rate revision does not adversely affect LPSW flow used for normal or requirement when the RBACs are inservice. accident operation. No malfunctions of SSCs important to safety will occur provided the specified conditions within the SLC are met. The SLC revision does not adversely affect a design basis limit for a fission product barrier. Evaluation methodologies, as describe in the UFSAR, are unaffected.
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SELECTED LICENSEE COMMENTS DESCRIPEION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Keowee SLC SR 16.9.2.3 was deleted and the Bases 3rd paragraph was This ensures during testing that the technicians can consistently apply expanded to clarify the expectations of SR 16.9.2.4 and SR 16.9.2.5. the acceptance criteria. Proper sprinider discharge flow and orientation This activity removes the subjective part of the methodology in will effectively maximize fire mitigation and prevent the impingement determining the sprinkler system operability which requires a highly of water to other areas/equipment not affected by the fire.
experienced fire protection technical background to make the judgment This activity removes the subjective part of the methodology in and leaves in place the more objective and consistent acceptance determining the sprinkler system operability which requires a highly criteria based on flow out a minimum number of nozzles which are experienced fire protection technical background to make the judgment directed appropriately. and leaves in place the more objective and consistent acceptance criteria based on flow out a minimum number of nozzles which are directed appropriately. Removing SR 16.9.2.3 does not change effectiveness of any sprinkler system being tested as previously reported to the NRC.
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SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Keowee The proposed changes would have no effect on the radiological This safety evaluation supports a revision to Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.9.7 to state that measurement error must be consequences of a LOOP. By maintaining lake level within the limits plus measurement error, the ECCW siphon header will be fully capable added when using manual methods to determine lake level. The change of performing its function of mitigating a LOOP. The proposed changes requires a higher lake level to be maintained when relying on manual methods to determine the lake level. This will provide additional NPSH will not prevent or degrade the effectiveness of actions required to mitigate a LOOP. The proposed changes do not involve any changes to for the LPSW pumps.
a method of evaluation described in the UFSAR. The proposed changes do not require a change to Technical Specifications. No changes to the UFSAR are required, other than the proposed changes themselves.
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SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: High Pressure Injection (HPI), Low Pressure Injection (LPI) and Reactor Building Spray (RBS)
This activity added SLC) to control High Pressure Injection (HPI), Low This activity does not in any way increase the likelihood of initiation, or Pressure Injection (LPI) and Reactor Building Spray (RBS) room adversely affects the mitigation of, any SAR described accidents. No temperature assumptions. This control is necessary to ensure starting new radiological release pathways or failure modes are created. There temperatures assumed in OSC-6667 "Auxiliary and Turbine Building is no increase in the consequences of any SAR described accident Loss of Cooling/Ventilation Analysis" (ref. 4) are valid. There is no adverse affect on any SSC, and no increase in the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The creation of this SLC does not change design, material or construction standards for HPI, LPI or the RBS systems. No changes are made to the method of operation of the systems. This activity does not require a Technical Specification or other licensing change. No changes to the Technical Specifications are required to implement these SLC changes.
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V. TECHNICAL SPECIFCATION BASES DESCREIPION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Reactor Building Spray (RBS)
This activity revises Technical Specification Bases 3.3.7,3.5.3 and 3.6.5 This activity simply documents changes previously received within to document previously reviewed procedure changes to EP/*/A/1800/001 EPI*/Al1800001 change 28b, 30b, and 28b. In particular, the support (Change 28b, 30b, 28b) and plant modifications (ONOE-12477, -12478, - function of the Reactor Building Spray (RBS) trains to the operability 13693, -13695, -15288, -15289). of the LPI crossover is being documented within the TS 3.5.3 and TS 3.6.5 bases. Alignment (via automatic, remote manual, or local manual means) of the Reactor Building Spray trains prior to cross connection of LPI headers prevents potential over pressurization of the LPI suction headers. In addition, the time delay for establishing full LPI flow following a LBLOCA was revised and evaluated within plant modifications ONOE-12477, -12478, -13693, -13695, -15288, and 15289 from 53 seconds to 74 seconds. This activity simply corrects information within the TS 3.3.7 and 3.5.3 bases that was not previously revised per ONOE-12477, -12478, -13693, -13695, -15288, and 15289.
As such, all changes associated with this activity have been previously reviewed and deemed acceptable.
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VI. UFSAR CHANGES (Pkg. 02-30)
DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: Reactor UFSAR 3.1.16 was revised to clarify that RIA-16 and RIA-17 are not true N-16 radiation monitors. This UFSAR revision does not result in a change that would cause any system parameter to change. RIA-16 and RIA-17 are not considered fission product barriers; therefore, this activity does not result in a design basis for any fission product barrier as described in the UFSAR being exceeded or altered. No Technical Specification changes are required. UFSAR Section 3.1.16 was updated accordingly.
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VII. CALCULATIONS None 39
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEM INVESTIGATION PROCESS (PIP)
DESCRIPTION EVALUATION
SUMMARY
SYSTEM: HPSW The changes provide protection to the HPSW pumps by ensuring The procedure enhancements to the HPSW Alarm Response Guide and minimum flow requirements is maintained. The license commitment of RPI01AI1000IO29 "Fire Brigade Response" will ensure that minimal pump automatically staring has not been defeated; therefore, the cycling of HPSW pressures occur while maintaining maximum operation of the HPSW pump is within compliance of the license deliverable water pressures to the water spray systems and fire hose condition of SLC 16.9.1. Maintaining maximum pressures available to stations. water spray systems and fire hose connections are already established criteria of SLC 16.9.2 and SLC 16.9.4 respectively. In summary, these changes to HPSW system operation satisfy the requirements of SLC 16.9.1, 16.9.2 and 16.9.4 and HPSW. There are no changes to Technical Specifications or UFSAR required.
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