Text

Supplemental PRA Information in Support of License Amendment Request Nos. 302 and 173, Extended Power Uprate (EPU)
	ML053490152
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	12/09/2005
From:	Mende R; FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	L-05-192
	Download: ML053490152 (83)
	v • d • e

FENOC -;

FirstEnergy NuclearOperatingCompany RichardG. Mende 724-682-7773 Director,Site Operations December 9, 2005 L-05-192 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 BV-1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 BV-2 Docket No. 50412, License No. NPF-73 Supplemental PRA Information in Support of License Amendment Request Nos. 302 and 173, Extended Power Uprate (EPU)

License Amendment Request (LAR) Nos. 302 and 173 (Reference 1) propose an Extended Power Uprate (EPU) for Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit Nos. 1 and 2. As a result of the NRC EPU Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) audit conducted at BVPS on October 18 and 19, 2005, the following information is being provided as requested by the NRC staff reviewers. The purpose of the audit was to determine if the BVPS risk assessment was adequate to support the proposed EPU LAR, and to review the responses for Request for Additional Information (RAI) questions with respect to the EPU PRA provided in FENOC Letter L-05-140 (Reference 2).

Enclosure 1 provides updated responses to address Questions 2.c and 2.d of Reference 2, which supersede in their entirety the previous responses to Questions 2.c and 2.d of Reference 2.

Enclosure 2 provides additional information to address Question 3 of Reference 2. The information includes a sensitivity study of the Human Reliability Analysis for BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2 showing risk impact of EPU without crediting other changes to the PRA model. This information is intended to supplement the previous response to Question 3 of Reference 2.

No new regulatory commitments are contained in this submittal. If you have questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Greg A. Dunn, Manager -

Licensing, at 330-315-7243.

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. I and 2 Supplemental PRA Information in Support of License Amendment Request Nos. 302 and 173, Extended Power Uprate (EPU)

L-05-192 Page 2 I declare under penalty of perjuiy that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 9, 2005.

Sincerely, its~A Richard G. Mende

Enclosures:

1. Updated Responses to Address Questions 2.c and 2.d of RAI dated August 2, 2005

2. Additional Information to Address Question 3 of RAI dated August 2, 2005

References:

1. FENOC Letter L-04-125 "License Amendment Request 302 and 173", dated October 4, 2004.

2. FENOC Letter L-05-140 "Response to a Request for Additional Information (RAI dated August 2, 2005) in Support of License Amendment Request Nos. 302 and 173, Extended Power Uprate", dated September 6, 2005.

c: Mr. T. G. Colburn, NRR Senior Project Manager Mr. P. C. Cataldo, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. S. J. Collins, NRC Region I Administrator Mr. D. A. Allard, Director BRP/DEP Mr. L. E. Ryan (BRP/DEP)

Enclosure I of L-05-192 Updated Responses to Address Questions 2.c and 2.d of RAI dated August 2, 2005 The following information provides updated responses to address Questions 2.c and 2.d of the NRC Request for Additional Information dated August 2, 2005. These updated responses supersede, in their entirety, those previous responses transmitted by FENOC Letter L-05-140 dated September 6,2005.

Question 2.c:

Table 10.16-1 gives pre- and post-EPU times to core damage for station blackout scenarios. Why does this time Increase on BVPS-1 and decrease on BVPS-2 for the "'182 gpm, successful cooldown/depressurization, primary plant demineralized water storage tank make-up available" case?

Response to Question 2.c:

The increase in time to core damage for the BVPS-1, 182 gpm reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal LOCA with successful cooldown/depressurization and primary plant demineralized water storage tank (PPDWST) make-up available case is primarily due to changes in the initial accumulator water mass used in the Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP) parameter file for the pre- to post-EPU/ replacement steam generators (RSG) conditions.

For the BVPS-1 MAAP case SBO1 (182 gpm RCP seal LOCA with successful cooldown/'l depressurization and PPDWST refill), two significant differences in sequence progressionrwere

-noted between the pre-EPU model and the post-EPU model calculations: T

1. The pressurizer drains several hours earlier in the pre-EPU model calculation.

2. Core damage occurs several hours earlier in the pre-EPU model calculations.

In contrast, for BVPS-2, the post-EPU model calculations for the same scenario indicate core damage slightly earlier than the pre-EPU model calculations.

BVPS-1 Timing Differences Regarding the pressurizer water level, the pre-EPU model indicates that the pressurizer reaches a maximum level in about 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months and then drains until it is empty, which occurs in about 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months . The BVPS-1 post-EPU model indicates a sustained pressurizer level until approximately 17 hours1.967593e-4 days 0.00472 hours 2.810847e-5 weeks 6.4685e-6 months (see Figure 2-1).

Regarding core damage, the post-EPU model shows a delay of approximately 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months in the time of core damage relative to the pre-EPU model calculation. Precise sequence timing for BVPS-1 MMP case SBOI 1,taken from the MAAP output, is shown in Table 2-7.

Enclosure 1 of L-05-192 Page 2 of 19 Table 2-7: BVPS Unit I SBOI I Core Damage Timing Time of Time To Core Damage (hours)

Seal LOCA RCS Makeup Pre-EPU Post-EPU Post-EPU Leak Rate Cooldown/ to model with Model with model with (gpmLRCP) Depress PPDWST seal binding seal binding seal binding (minutes) Available failure at 30 failure at 30 failure at 13 minutes minutes minutes 182 30 Y 27.0 [ 30.6 1 30.3 Both the pressurizer draining and the timing of core damage are controlled in large part by the behavior of the accumulators (2 out of 3 assumed to inject). A key difference in design input from the pre-EPU to the post-EPU model (see Table 2-8) is the initial water mass assumed in the accumulators. Both models use accumulator inventory based on the Technical Specification minimum water volume (pre-EPU: 7664 gal; post-EPU: 6681 gal). However, the post-EPU volume is based on the Technical Specification minimum usable water volume, since about 195 gallons will remain in the tanks due to the injection nozzle location. Thus, the pre-EPU MAAP model is based on a larger initial water mass and hence a smaller pressurized gas volume, than the post-EPU MAAP model. Because of the smaller gas space, the accumulators in the pre-EPU model will tend to depressurize faster than the accumulators in the post-EPU model, thereby allowing less total injected water mass over the course of the accident.

Table 2-8: BVPS Unit I Summary of Design Input Changes for the MAAP Post-EPU Model Description Pre-EPU Model Post-EPU Model Available water mass Tech Spec minimum: 7664 gall 7.481 Minimum usable value:

per accumulator ft3 /at

62.3 Ib/ 3 = 6.3824E4 Ibm 5.56E4 Ibm Accumulator nitrogen Tech Spec minimum pressure: 600 psia*

pressure 619.3 psla Total volume per 1450 W 1436 ft3 accumulator I

FENOC Letter L-05-168 dated 10/28/2005 changed the minimum accumulator nitrogen cover pressure to 611 psig. This pressure increase tends to inject more accumulator water inventory into the RCS for a given pressure, so using 600 psia is conservative for the PRA SBO success criteria analysis.

Since the post-EPU Technical Specification minimum usable accumulator water volume (6681 gal) is significantly less than the adjusted pre-EPU Technical Specification minimum usable water volume (7664 gal -195 gat = 7469 gal), the water contained in the accumulators following the post-EPU plant changes could potentially be less than the accumulator inventory maintained currently. Therefore, when using the minimum volumes the effect of more mass injection observed in the MAAP calculations Is a result of the new plant configuration and not simply a result of a change in assumptions.

Figure 2-2 compares the accumulator pressures for the BVPS-1 pre-EPU and post-EPU model calculations. As shown, accumulators for both cases depressurize to approximately the same level.

Enclosure 1 of L-05-192 Page 3 of 19 Figure 2-3 compares the available BVPS-1 accumulator water mass in two accumulators for the pre-EPU and post-EPU cases. The total injected water mass for the pre-EPU case is 53,000 Ibm while the total mass injected is 70,000 Ibm for the post-EPU case. Thus, due to the expansion of different initial volumes, the post-EPU case calculates 32% more accumulator mass to be injected. This result is consistent with the first principle relationship between pressure and gas volume for isothermal expansion.

Considering isothermal expansion of the accumulator gas during the blowdown, the accumulator pressure can be related to the change in gas volume as, PIP2 = V2N 1 (1)

Where P1 and VI are the initial gas pressure and volume and P2 and V2 are the final gas pressure and volume. This equation can be used to derive an expression relating the gas volume change to the mass discharged during the blowdown:

AV = AMp = VI(PI/P 2 -1) (2)

Where AV is the total gas volume change, AM is the water mass discharged, and p is the water density.

This expression shows that for a given change in pressure, the mass discharged is linearly proportional to the initial gas volume. For the pre-EPU and post-EPU models, the initial accumulator gas volumes are 427 ft3 and 545 ft3, respectively, thus as a result of the difference in initial gas volumes and assuming the pressure changes are identical (see Figure 2-2), the post-EPU model is expected to discharge (545/427 - 1)% = 27% more water than the pre-EPU model. This is comparable to the actual mass difference calculated by MAAP of 32%.

To further investigate the influence of the change in initial accumulator inventory, the post-EPU model case was re-run using the pre-EPU initial accumulator water mass. Figures 2-4 and 2-5 compare the modified post-EPU calculation of accumulator water mass and pressurizer level to the pre-EPU calculations. As shown, significantly better agreement is obtained. In addition, the post-EPU time to core damage decreases to 29 hours3.356481e-4 days 0.00806 hours 4.794974e-5 weeks 1.10345e-5 months . The remaining two-hour time difference to core damage Is explored further in the following section.

Secondary effects on the station blackout (SBO) sequence progression between the BVPS-1 pre-EPU and post-EPU models include a higher rate of reflux cooling and a larger initial primary system water mass for the post-EPU model. The prolonged RCS Inventory loss during the SBO sequence results in separation of the primary system coolant phases. Once phase separation occurs, the primary side of the steam generator tubes is In contact primarily with steam. At this point, because turbine driven auxiliary feedwater is available, reflux condensation occurs.

Figure 2-6 shows the steam condensation rate on the primary side of the steam generator tubes and is an indication of the reflux cooling. As shown, at phase separation just beyond 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months , a significant amount of steam condensation occurs with a slightly higher rate of condensation for the post-EPU model. Hence, a higher rate of reflux cooling takes place with the post-EPU model. In the post-EPU model MMP calculations, the maximum time step is limited to I second once the primary system phases arelseparated. This leads to improved numerical stability and a slightly higher reflux cooling rate as compared to the pre-EPU model calculations.

Enclosure 1 of L-05-192 Page 4 of 19 Another key difference in the BVPS-1 MAAP inputs is that the initial primary system water mass (excluding the pressurizer) for the post-EPU model is 388,127 lbs. vs. 382,073 lbs. for the pre-EPU model MAAP analysis. Thus, the post-EPU model initially has about 1.5% more water mass in the primary system. This initial mass difference is due to a slightly larger primary side volume for the RSGs as compared to the original steam generators (OSG). The total primary side volume of one steam generator is 1136 ft3 for the RSG and 1087 ft3 for the OSG. The initial pressurizer inventory could also potentially contribute to a change in initial water mass, as well. However, for BVPS-1 the pre-EPU and post-EPU plant models both have identical initial pressurizer water masses.

Both the higher reflux cooling rate and the slightly larger initial coolant volume for the post-EPU model are positive factors that will tend to delay the onset of core damage.

BVPS-2 Timing Differences For BVPS-2, the post-EPU model shows a slightly earlier time of core damage relative to the pre-EPU model calculation, which is the opposite trend observed for the BVPS-1 calculations.

Precise sequence timing for the BVPS-2 MAAP case SBOI1, taken from the MAAP output, is shown in Table 2-9.

Table 2-9: BVPS Unit 2 SBOII Core Damage Timing Time of Time To Core Damage (hours)

Seal LOCA RCS Makeup Pre-EPU Post-EPU Post-EPU Leak Rate Cooldown/ to model with Model with model with (gpm/RCP) Depress PPDWST seal binding seal binding seal binding (minutes) Available failure at 30 failure at 30 failure at 13 minutes minutes minutes 182 30 Y 34.0 Not Analyzed 33.1 Although the trend in core damage timing is different for BVPS-2 as compared to BVPS-1, the controlling factor is the same; namely, the behavior of the accumulators has a primary influence on the time of core damage. For BVPS-2, both the pre-EPU and post-EPU calculations indicate discharge of 100% of the accumulator water inventory into the system, whereas the BVPS-1 calculations indicated only a partial injection of the accumulators. This is most likely due to the lower RCS pressures obtained during the cooldown as a result of the two steam generators required for the BVPS-2 cooldown success criteria, as opposed to only one required for BVPS-1. As shown in Table 2-10, the BVPS-2 pre-EPU initial water mass used is 62,000 Ibm per accumulator while the BVPS-2 post-EPU model initial water mass is 57,400 Ibm per accumulator. Thus, with 100% of the accumulator inventory injected, the pre-EPU model provides more water to the system and, as expected, indicates a later time to core damage than the BVPS-2 post-EPU model calculation. Also, with 100% accumulator injection, the BVPS-2 calculations show a later time to core damage than the corresponding BVPS-1 calculations.

Enclosure I of L-05-192 Page 5 of 19 Table 2-10: BVPS Unit 2 Summary of Design Input Changes for the MAAP Post-EPU Model Description Pre-EPU Model Post-EPU Model Available water mass 62,000 Ibm Minimum usable value:

per accumulator 57,400 Ibm Accumulator nitrogen 645.5 psia 600 psia*

pressure __

Total volume per 1450 ft3 1436 ft accumulator II

FENOC Letter L-05-168 dated 10/28/2005 changed the minimum accumulator nitrogen cover pressure to 611 psig. This pressure increase tends to inject more accumulator water inventory into the RCS for a given pressure, so using 600 psia is conservative for the PRA SBO success criteria analysis.

A secondary influence in the BVPS-2 calculations is the initial pressurizer water volume assumed for the calculation. The pre-EPU model uses an initial pressurizer water volume of 765 ft3 while the post-EPU model has an initial pressurizer water volume of 834 ft3. The larger initial pressurizer water volume for the post-EPU model will tend to offset the smaller post-EPU model accumulator inventory.

BVPS-1 vs. BVPS-2 Core Damage Timing and the Influence of Accumulators Several sensitivity cases were run to investigate the changes in timing of core damage for BVPS1 and 2 for the pre-EPU and post-EPU plant models. These sensitivity runs indicate that the various plant models behave in similar fashion and produce consistent results when the accumulator performance is the same. That is to say, the changes in timing to core damage are most strongly influenced by the amount and timing of accumulator water injection into the system.

First, Figure 2-7 shows the time of core damage as a function of the amount of accumulator water injected. This Information was compiled by running a series of MAAP cases in which the accumulator water mass was fixed and 100% of the accumulator Inventory was allowed to Inject into the system.

The case of zero accumulator inventory indicates that even without accumulators, there would be approximately 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months difference in the time to core damage for BVPS-1 between the pre-EPU and post-EPU plant models. The timing difference remains approximately constant as the injected water mass increases up to 40,000 Ibm. This is an indication that large timing differences (in excess of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) are caused by differences in the amount of accumulator water injected into the system.

A second effect, just as important as the total mass injected, is the timing of the accumulator injection. For example, the sensitivity case discussed previously and presented in Figures 2-4 and 2-5 shows that even when the pre-EPU and post-EPU models inject the same accumulator water mass (52,800 Ibm), there is still about a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months difference in the time to core damage.

Figure 2-8 expands the time scale for this case and indicates that near 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months , the post-EPU model has a late accumulator injection of an additional 5000 Ibm. If the late accumulator of L-05-192 Page 6 of 19 injection is prevented by closing the accumulator block valves after 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months (plotted line with triangle symbols In Figure 2-8), then the core damage timing difference from the pre-EPU model to the post-EPU model is reduced to less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (post-EPU model core damage time if late accumulator injection is prevented is 27.9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months vs. 27.0 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months for the pre-EPU model). This timing difference is consistent with the trend presented in Figure 2-7.

Figure 2-9 compares the pressurizer water level for the pre-EPU and post-EPU model sensitivity runs. As shown, if late accumulator injection is prevented, then similar pressurizer behavior is obtained between the pre-EPU and post-EPU plant models.

The sensitivity cases presented herein indicate that the trends going from the pre-EPU model to the post-EPU model of increasing time to core damage for BVPS-1 and decreasing time to core damage for BVPS-2 is primarily a result of differences in both the total mass of accumulator water injected and the timing of the injection.

SUMMARY

In summary, the main contribution to the difference in core damage timing Is the behavior of the accumulators, which is due in large part to the proposed change in Technical Specifications for accumulator water volume. The revised post-EPU Technical Specifications specifies a maximum usable accumulator water volume that is less than the current minimum contained accumulator water volume Technical Specification value. So, it is expected that there will be an actual reduction in initial accumulator water volume upon completion of the post-EPU plant modifications and that this will have a real impact on the volume injected into the RCS, thereby affecting the progression of postulated accident sequences.

Secondary influences on the calculated time to core damage for the SBO sequence are the rate of reflux cooling, which is somewhat higher in the BVPS-1 post-EPU model calculations as a result of an improved numerical calculation, and the initial RCS coolant inventories which are influenced by the BVPS-1 RSGs and assumptions of increased initial pressurizer inventory for BVPS-2.

Enclosure I of L-05-192 Page 7 of 19 BVPS Unit I SBO1I

- - EPU Model Pre-EPU Model l 25 S 20 I-4315 U)

N 10 5 2 5 (hours) 0 5 10 15 20 25 i30 3 Time (hours)

Figure 2-1: MAAP Pressurizer Water Level for Case SBOII BVPS Unit I SBOI 1

- - EPU Model -Pre-EPU Model 650 U)R600 j 2 550 wU)500 IL 450

,1 400 E 350 20 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 77 88 Time (hours)

Figure 2-2: MAAP Accumulator Pressure for Case SBO1 I of L-05-192 Page 8 of 19 BVPS Uniti SBO11

-- EPU Model - Pre-EPU Model 130,000 0 120,000 M - 110,000 100,000 0 90,000 DU:e 80,000 0 0 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Time (hours)

Figure 2-;3: MAAP Accumulator Water Mass (2 Accumulators) for Case SBO11 BVPS Uniti S1011

- -EPU Model vith pre-EPU brital Accumulator lnventory Pre-EPU Model 130,000 0120,000 110T000 E 100,000 90,000 80,000

.2 70,000 m 60,000

>R 50,000.

40,000 30,000 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8I Time (hours)

Figure 2-4: MAAP Accumulator Water Mass (2 Accumulators) for Case SBO1 1 with the post-EPU Initial Accumulator Inventory Set Equal to the pre-EPU Model Value

Enclosure I of L-05-192 Page 9 of 19 BVPS Unit I SBO11 l- -EPU Model with pmEPU Initial Accumulator n nuntoy Pre-EPU Model 20 S 15 15 0

0 5 10 15 20 25 301 Time (hours)

Figure 2-5: MAAP Pressurizer Level for Case SBO11 with the post-EPU Initial Accumulator Inventory Set Equal to the pre-EPU Model Value EPU Model Case SBOII Broken SG Reflux Condensation Rate l -- EPU Model Pr-EPU Model 6.OE+04 5.OE-I04

.4.OE+04 co 0 3.OE4+04 2.OE+04 0

10.E+04 0.OE+00 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Time (hours)

Figure 2-6: MAAP Reflux cooling for Case SBOI I

Enclosure I of L-05-192 Page 10 of 19 BVPS SBO 11 182 GPM SEAL LOCA + MA, AF, CD SUCCESS Unit I EPU Model - Unit 1 Pre-EPU Model I

Unit 2 EPU Model

__ 28.0-U,

~27.5-0 M 27.0-0 Lu i w:2.

000002,0 0004,0 0006,0 TOA CUUAO MS NETD(B Figure 2-7: Core Damage Timing as a Function of Injected Accumulator Water BVPS Unitl SBO11

- - EPU Model with pre-EPU Initial Accumulator Inventory

- - EPU Model Accumulators Blocked at 8 Hours Pre-EPU Model 130,000 E1. 120,000 110,000

.00 100,000 4-90,000 80,000 70,000 60,000 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 Time (hours)

Figure 2-8: BVPS Unit I SBOI IAccumulator Water Mass for post-EPU and Pre-EPU Models

Enclosure I of L-05-192 Page 11 of 19 BVPS Unit I SBO11

-- EPU Model with pre-EPU Initial Accumulator Inwentory EPU Model Accumulators Blocked at 8 Hours

- Pre-EPU Model 25

=F 20 20 I 0_

Xi 15 L.

0 N

= 0 E 5 IL 0

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 Time (hours)

Figure 2-9: BVPS Unit I SBO11I Pressurizer Level for post-EPU and Pre-EPU Models

Enclosure I of L-05-192 Page 12 of 19 Question 2.d.

Under the discussion of "general transients," It states: Thus, with the RSG [replacement steam generators] there is less margin for successful completion of the plant-specific feed and bleed procedure ... initiated at 0.495 hours0.00573 days 0.138 hours 8.184524e-4 weeks 1.883475e-4 months ...." Does the time available for this action change under EPU conditions? What is the human error probability (HEP) for this action, both pre- and post-EPU? Why was this action not Included in Table 10.16-2 or 10.16-5?

Response to Question 2.d.

The general transient success criteria discussion presented in LAR 1A-302 & 2A-173, L-05-104 was based on a loss of all feedwater (both main and auxiliary), with credit for operators to initiate feed and bleed at 13% wide range steam generator (SG) level per the current plant procedures. This stemmed from a Westinghouse Owner's Group issue regarding the required component success criteria for feed and bleed implementation (e.g., number of PORVs and HHSI pumps). To address this concern for EPU conditions, a BVPS-1 MAAP analysis was performed assuming that one HHSI pump injects and one PORV was opened once the SG reached the 13% wide range level, which occurred at 0.495 hours0.00573 days 0.138 hours 8.184524e-4 weeks 1.883475e-4 months with the RCPs operating.

The results of this analysis showed that even at EPU conditions the feed and bleed component success criteria did not change from the current plant model (i.e., one HHSI pump and one PORV). Because the BVPS-1 RSGs had less inventory remaining at the 13% wide range level than the BVPS-2 original steam generators and because the BVPS-1 pressurizer PORV capacity is less than the BVPS- 2 capacity, the BVPS-1 transient was considered bounding for BVPS-2, so the same success criteria apply.

The timing used for the operator action to initiate feed and bleed developed for the human reliability analysis (HRA) was based on the maximum time that operators have available in order to successfully implement feed and bleed. In the thermal-hydraulic hand calculations developed for the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) human action accident scenarios, the time for feed and bleed implementation was based on the time for the PORVs to lift prior to steam generator dryout. This was estimated to occur 5 minutes prior to dryout, or at about 58 minutes following a reactor trip, which was the timing used in the pre-EPU feed and bleed HRA.

In the LAR submittal, this 58-minute timing was compared to similar post-EPU MAAP analyses (a station blackout scenario with a 21 gpm RCP seal LOCA and loss of all auxiliary feedwater),

that had corresponding times of 63 minutes at BVPS-1 and 65 minutes at BVPS-2. Since the pre-EPU time value bounded the post-EPU time, the HEPs used in the current pre-EPU PRA models were considered to be bounding so the values were not changed for the post-EPU analysis. As such, Tables 10.16-2 and 10.16-5, which listed operator actions that have changed for the EPU analyses, did not include these actions.

During the NRC EPU PRA audit conducted at BVPS on October 18 and 19, 2005, these post-EPU MAAP analyses were revisited, and it was noted that a station blackout scenario with a 21 gpm RCP seal LOCA and loss of all auxiliary feedwater, may not be the limiting transient, since the reactor and RCPs are tripped as part of the initiating event. Additionally, the BVPS-1 draft emergency operating procedures (EOPs) for post-EPU/RSG conditions were developed, subsequent to the LAR post-EPU MAAP analyses, which revised the EOP entry and feed and bleed implementation setpoints.

Enclosure 1 of L-05-192 Page 13 of 19 With the revised post-EPU EOPs, the entry conditions will be met once all three SGs reach the 31% narrow range level; and feed and bleed cooling will be implemented when the SGs reach the 14% wide range level in two of three steam generators. Based on these revised setpoints and initiating event, new BVPS-1 MAAP analyses were performed using a loss of all feedwater initiating event to determine the post-EPU feed and bleed component success criteria and timings used to evaluate operator actions OPROBI and OPROB2. These BVPS-1 analyses are still considered to be bounding for BVPS-2, based on pressurizer PORV capacities.

The following provide descriptions of the operator actions and summaries of the revised MAAP cases and results for these new post-EPU/RSG condition analyses. Table 2-11 provides a listing of the significant times from the MAAP results for these cases.

OPROB1 - Given a complete loss of secondary heat removal, operators initiate feed and bleed by initiating safety injection, opening the PORVs, opening the PORV block valves (if needed),

and verifying HHSI flow. Prior to these specific actions necessary to establish bleed and feed, the operators will have successfully stopped the RCPs as per EOP FR-H.1. However, operator attempts to restore auxiliary or main feedwater (or dedicated AFW at BVPS-1) are unsuccessful due to equipment failures; i.e., the operator did correctly decide to try to restore feedwater per procedures (Top Event OF was successful).

OPROB2 - Given a complete loss of secondary heat removal, operators initiate feed and bleed by stopping the RCPs, initiating safety injection, opening the PORVs, opening the PORV block valves (if needed), and verifying HHSI flow. Prior operator attempts to restore auxiliary or main feedwater (or dedicated AFW at BVPS-1) are unsuccessful; i.e., the equipment was available, but the operators failed to reestablish them in time (Top Event OF has failed). In addition, operator actions to trip the RCPs prior to feed and bleed entry conditions were not completed.

Cases 1A and 1B are base case evaluations to determine the bounding post-EPU component success criteria (e.g., one HHSI pump and one PORV) assuming that feed and bleed cooling is implemented according to the revised EOP setpoints.

Case IA: SUCCESS Base case for operator action OPROB1. A total loss of main feedwater occurs at time zero coincident with a failure of auxiliary feedwater. A reactor trip occurs at 35.4 seconds from a reactor protection signal. The EOP for loss of secondary heat removal FR-H.1 entry conditions are met (all SGs < 31% narrow range level) in 0.7 minutes, and the RCPs are assumed to be tripped 5 minutes afterwards (5.7 min.). The feed and bleed entry conditions are met (SGs <

14% wide range level) in 10.4 minutes, at which time safety injection is manually actuated using a single HHSI pump and a single PORV is manually opened. The steam generators boil dry in 119.9 minutes, but the core remains covered and no core damage occurs.

The results of this analysis show that even at EPU conditions, if the operators trip the RCPs within 5.7 minutes following a total loss of feedwater, and feed and bleed is implemented according to the revised EOP setpoints, the component success criteria does not change from the current plant model (i.e., one HHSI pump and one PORV).

Case I1B: SUCCESS Base case for operator action OPROB2. A total loss of main feedwater occurs at time zero coincident with a failure of auxiliary feedwater. A reactor trip occurs at 35.4 seconds from a reactor protection signal. The EOP for loss of secondary heat removal FR-H.1 entry conditions

Enclosure 1 of L-05-192 Page 14 of 19 are met (all SGs < 31 % narrow range level) in 0.7 minutes; however, the RCPs are not tripped 5 minutes afterwards. The feed and bleed entry conditions are met (SGs < 14% wide range level) in 8.5 minutes, at which time the RCPs are tripped, safety injection is manually actuated using a single HHSI pump, and a single PORV is manually opened. The steam generators boil dry in 118.9 minutes, but the core remains covered and no core damage occurs.

The results of this analysis show that even at EPU conditions, if the operators wait until feed and bleed cooling is implemented according to the revised EOP setpoints to trip the RCPs, the component success criteria does not change from the current plant model (i.e., one HHSI pump and one PORV).

Cases 2A and 2B are sensitivity evaluations to determine if the post-EPU component success criteria determined in Cases 1A and IB (i.e., one HHSI pump and one PORV) would be successful if the operators waited until 58 minutes before implementing feed and bleed cooling.

This timing of 58 minutes is the maximum timing used to develop the BVPS-2 pre-EPU human error probabilities for the operator actions to initiate feed and bleed. At BVPS-1 a similar time of 57 minutes was estimated, so 58 minutes was used as the maximum bounding time in the MAAP post-EPU re-analyses.

Case 2A: FAILURE Sensitivity case for operator action OPROBI to determine if a single HHSI pump and a single PORV are successful at providing feed and bleed cooling if implemented in 58 minutes. A total loss of main feedwater occurs at time zero coincident with a failure of auxiliary feedwater. A reactor trip occurs at 35.4 seconds from a reactor protection signal. The EOP for loss of secondary heat removal FR-H.1 entry conditions are met (all SGs < 31% narrow range level) in 0.7 minutes, and the RCPs are assumed to be tripped 5 minutes afterwards (5.7 min.). The feed and bleed actions are implemented at 58 minutes, at which time safety injection is manually actuated using a single HHSI pump and a single PORV is manually opened. The steam generators boil dry in 62.4 minutes, the core uncovers in 82.2 minutes, and core damage occurs at 105.7 minutes.

The results of this analysis show that at EPU conditions, if the operators trip the RCPs within 5.7 minutes following a total loss of feedwater, but wait until 58 minutes before feed and bleed is implemented, the component success criteria of one HHSI pump and one PORV are insufficient in order to prevent core damage.

Case 2B: FAILURE Sensitivity case for operator action OPROB2 to determine if a single HHSI pump and a single PORV are successful at providing feed and bleed cooling if implemented in 58 minutes. A total loss of main feedwater occurs at time zero coincident with a failure of auxiliary feedwater. A reactor trip occurs at 35.4 seconds from a reactor protection signal. The EOP for loss of secondary heat removal FR-H.1 entry conditions are met (all SGs < 31% narrow range level) in 0.7 minutes; however, the RCPs are not tripped 5 minutes afterwards. The feed and bleed actions are implemented at 58 minutes, at which time the RCPs are tripped, safety injection is manually actuated using a single HHSI pump, and a single PORV is manually opened. The steam generators boil dry in 26.3 minutes, the core uncovers in 59.6 minutes, and core damage occurs at 82.8 minutes.

The results of this analysis show that at EPU conditions, if the operators wait to trip the RCPs and implement feed and bleed cooling until 58 minutes following the loss of all feedwater, the

Enclosure 1 of L-05-192 Page 15 of 19 component success criteria of one HHSI pump and one PORV are insufficient in order to prevent core damage.

Cases 3A and 3B are also sensitivity evaluations based on 58 minutes to implement feed and bleed cooling and are similar to Cases 2A and 2B except that the component success criteria is for opening two PORVs instead of one.

Case 3A: SUCCESS Sensitivity case for operator action OPROBI to determine if a single HHSI pump and two PORVs are successful at providing feed and bleed cooling if implemented in 58 minutes. A total loss of main feedwater occurs at time zero coincident with a failure of auxiliary feedwater. A reactor trip occurs at 35.4 seconds from a reactor protection signal. The EOP for loss of secondary heat removal FR-H.1 entry conditions are met (all SGs < 31% narrow range level) in 0.7 minutes, and the RCPs are assumed to be tripped 5 minutes afterwards (5.7 min.). The feed and bleed actions are Implemented at 58 minutes, at which time safety injection is manually actuated using a single HHSI pump and two PORVs are manually opened. The steam generators boil dry in 62.5 minutes and the core uncovers in 78.0 minutes; however, no core damage occurs.

The results of this analysis show that at EPU conditions, if the operators trip the RCPs within 5.7 minutes following a total loss of feedwater, but wait until 58 minutes before feed and bleed is implemented, the component success criteria of one HHSI pump and two PORVs are sufficient for preventing core damage.

Case 3B: SUCCESS Sensitivity case for operator action OPROB2 to determine if a single HHSI pump and two PORVs are successful at providing feed and bleed cooling if implemented in 58 minutes. A total loss of main feedwater occurs at time zero coincident with a failure of auxiliary feedwater. A reactor trip occurs at 35.4 seconds from a reactor protection signal. The EOP for loss of secondary heat removal FR-H.1 entry conditions are met (all SGs < 31% narrow range level) in 0.7 minutes; however, the RCPs are not tripped 5 minutes afterwards. The feed and bleed actions are Implemented at 58 minutes, at which time the RCPs are tripped, safety injection is manually actuated using a single HHSI pump, and two PORVs are manually opened. The steam generators boil dry in 26.3 minutes and the core uncovers in 58.9 minutes; however no core damage occurs.

The results of this analysis show that at EPU conditions, if the operators wait to trip the RCPs and implement feed and bleed cooling until 58 minutes following the loss of all feedwater, one HHSI pump and two PORVs are sufficient for preventing core damage.

Since Cases 2A and 2B were unsuccessful at preventing core damage, if feed and bleed was implemented at 58 minutes, using the current component success criteria of one HHSI pump and one PORV at post-EPU conditions, the remaining cases were performed to determine what the maximum time available would be in order for the operators to successfully implement feed and bleed cooling.

Case 4A: FAILURE Sensitivity case for operator action OPROB1 to determine if a single HHSI pump and a single PORV are successful at providing feed and bleed cooling if implemented in 43 minutes. A total

Enclosure I of L-05-192 Page 16 of 19 loss of main feedwater occurs at time zero coincident with a failure of auxiliary feedwater. A reactor trip occurs at 35.4 seconds from a reactor protection signal. The EOP for loss of secondary heat removal FR-H.1 entry conditions are met (all SGs < 31% narrow range level) in 0.7 minutes, and the RCPs are assumed to be tripped 5 minutes afterwards (5.7 min.). The feed and bleed actions are implemented at 43 minutes, at which time safety injection is manually actuated using a single HHSI pump and a single PORV is manually opened. The steam generators boil dry in 66.5 minutes, the core uncovers in 94.7 minutes, and core damage occurs at 123.2 minutes.

The results of this analysis show that at EPU conditions, if the operators trip the RCPs within 5.7 minutes following a total loss of feedwater, and implement feed and bleed cooling at 43 minutes, the component success criteria of one HHSI pump and one PORV are insufficient in order to prevent core damage.

Case 5A: SUCCESS Sensitivity case for operator action OPROBI to determine if a single HHSI pump and a single PORV are successful at providing feed and bleed cooling if implemented in 42 minutes. A total loss of main feedwater occurs at time zero coincident with a failure of auxiliary feedwater. A reactor trip occurs at 35.4 seconds from a reactor protection signal. The EOP for loss of secondary heat removal FR-H.1 entry conditions are met (all SGs < 31% narrow range level) in 0.7 minutes, and the RCPs are assumed to be tripped 5 minutes afterwards (5.7 min.). At 10.4 minutes the feed and bleed entry conditions are met (SGs < 14% wide range level), but the actions are not implemented. At 42 minutes, the feed and bleed actions are implemented, at which time safety injection is manually actuated using a single HHSI pump and a single PORV is manually opened. The steam generators boil dry in 67.1 minutes and the core uncovers in 95.6 minutes; however, no core damage occurs.

The results of this analysis show that at EPU conditions, if the operators trip the RCPs within 5.7 minutes following a total loss of feedwater, and Implement feed and bleed cooling at 42 minutes, one HHSI pump and one PORV are sufficient for preventing core damage.

Case 4B: FAILURE Sensitivity case for operator action OPROB2 to determine if a single HHSI pump and a single PORV are successful at providing feed and bleed cooling if implemented in 30 minutes. A total loss of main feedwater occurs at time zero coincident with a failure of auxiliary feedwater. A reactor trip occurs at 35.4 seconds from a reactor protection signal. The EOP for loss of secondary heat removal FR-H.1 entry conditions are met (all SGs < 31% narrow range level) in 0.7 minutes; however, the RCPs are not tripped 5 minutes afterwards. The feed and bleed actions are implemented at 30 minutes, at which time the RCPs are tripped, safety Injection is manually actuated using a single HHSl pump, and a single PORV is manually opened. The steam generators boil dry in 26.3 minutes, the core uncovers in 85.4 minutes, and core damage occurs at 113.4 minutes.

The results of this analysis show that at EPU conditions, if the operators trip the RCPs and implement feed and bleed cooling 30 minutes following the loss of all feedwater, the component success criteria of one HHSI pump and one PORV are insufficient in order to prevent core damage.

of L-05-192 Page 17 of 19 Case 5B: SUCCESS Sensitivity case for operator action QPROB2 to determine if a single HHSI pump and a single PORV are successful at providing feed and bleed cooling if implemented in 29 minutes. A total loss of main feedwater occurs at time zero coincident with a failure of auxiliary feedwater. A reactor trip occurs at 35.4 seconds from a reactor protection signal. The EOP for loss of secondary heat removal FR-H.1 entry conditions are met (all SGs < 31% narrow range level) in 0.7 minutes; however, the RCPs are not tripped 5 minutes afterwards. At 8.5 minutes the feed and bleed entry conditions are met (SGs < 14% wide range level), but the actions are not implemented. At 29 minutes, the feed and bleed actions are implemented, at which time the RCPs are tripped, safety injection is manually actuated using a single HHSI pump, and a single PORV is manually opened. The steam generators boil dry in 26.3 minutes and the core uncovers in 87.4 minutes; however no core damage occurs.

The results of this analysis show that at EPU conditions, if the operators trip the RCPs and implement feed and bleed cooling 29 minutes following the loss of all feedwater, one HHSI pump and one PORV are sufficient for preventing core damage.

'able 2-11: MAAP Results for Post-EPU Feed and Bleed Cases I VPS.A TOTAL LOSS OF ALL FE1DWATER AT TIME = 0. RCPS TRIPPED 5 MIN AFTER ENTRY INTO FR.-1 OPROBI CASE 1A CASE 2A CASE 3A CASE 4A CASE 5A

OF HHSI PUMPS I I 1 1 1

OF PORVS I 1 2 1 1 REACTOR TRIP (S) 35.4 35.4 35.4 35A 35.4 EOP ENTRY 31% NR SG (M) 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 TRIP RCPS (M) 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 F&B ENTRY 14% WRSG (M) 10.4 10A 10.4 10.4 10.4 IMPLEMENT F&B (M) 10.4 58.0 58.0 43.0 42.0 CIASIGNAL (M) 48.1 67.9 61.4 61A 61.0 SG DRYOUT (M) 119.9 62A 62.5 66.5 67.1 CORE UNCOVERY (M) NIA 82.2 78.0 94.7 95.6 CORE DAMAGE (M) NIA 105.7 N/A 123.2 NA SUCCESS FAILURE SUCCESS FAILURE SUCCESS F&B ENTRY CONDmON MET (M) 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 F&B IMPLEMENTED (M) 10A 58.0 58.0 43.0 42.0 TIME TO COMPLETE ACTONS (M) 47.6 47.6 32.6 31.6 BVPS-1 TOTAL LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER AT TInE - 0, RCPS TRIPPED DURING FEED & BLEED ACTIONS OPROB2 CASE lB CASE 2B CASE 3B CASE 4B CASE 5B

OF HHSI PUMPS 1 1 1 1

OF PORVS 1 1 2 1 1 REACTOR TRIP (S) 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 EVP ENTRY 31% NR SG (ML) 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 F&B ENTRY 14% WR SG (M) 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 TRIP RCPS (M) 8.5 58.0 58.0 30.0 29.0 IMPLEMENT F&B (M) 8.5 58.0 58.0 30.0 29.0 CIA SIGNAL (M) 46.2 NA N/A 50.6 50.8 SG DRYOUT (M) 118.9 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 CORE UNCOVERY (M) NIA 59.6 58.9 85A 87.4 CORE DAMAGE (M) NIA 82.8 N/A 113.4 NIA SUCCESS FAILURE SUCCESS FAILURE SUCCESS F&B ENTRY CONDITION MET (M) 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 F&B IMPLEMENTED (M) 8.5 58.0 58.0 30.0 29.0 TIME TO COMPLETE ACTONS (M) 49.5 49.5 21.5 20.5

Enclosure I of L-05-192 Page 18 of 19

SUMMARY

Based on Case 5A, the maximum time available for the operators to successfully implement post-EPU feed and bleed cooling using one HHSI pump and one PORV, given that they initially trip the RCPs within 5.7 minutes following a total loss of feedwater in accordance with the revised post-EPU EOPs, is 42 minutes. If one HHSI pump and two PORVs are opened, this time can be extended to 58 minutes and still be successful; however, this would require a change in the component success criteria modeled in Top Event OB (Feed and Bleed Cooling).

Therefore, 42 minutes was used to reassess the post-EPU HRA by modifying the timing performance shaping factor (PSF) used in the success likelihood index methodology (SLIM) process and recalculating the human error probabilities for operator actions OPROB1.

At BVPS-1, the timing performance shaping factor used to assess the pre-EPU operator action OPROBI was initially assigned a value of I (based on 57 minutes for pre-EPU conditions). This PSF value was also deemed to be appropriate for the pre-EPU sensitivity case. In order to assess operator action OPROBI for BVPS-1 post-EPU conditions based on 42 minutes, the timing performance shaping factor used in the SLIM process was changed from a value of I to a 2, to show a decrease, but still adequate time to accomplish the actions. This judgment was based on more than 31 minutes available from the time that the EOP feed and bleed setpoint Is reached (at 10.4 minutes) until the time when operators actually perform the actions (at 42 minutes).

At BVPS-2, the timing performance shaping factor used to assess the pre-EPU operator action OPROBI was initially assigned a value of 7 (based on 58 minutes for pre-EPU conditions).

However, upon further review and comparisons with the same operator actions reevaluated using the EPRI HRA calculator, a PSF value of I for the pre-EPU sensitivity case (similar to BVPS-1) was deemed more appropriate. For BVPS-2 post-EPU conditions, a value of 2 was also used for the SLIM timing performance shaping factor to assess OPROBI, based on the adequate time available to accomplish the actions.

Based on Case 5B, the maximum time available for the operators to successfully trip the RCPs and Implement post-EPU feed and bleed cooling using one HHSI pump and one PORV following a total loss of feedwater is 29 minutes. If one HHSI pump and two PORVs are opened, this time can be extended to 58 minutes and still be successful; however, this would require a change in the component success criteria modeled in Top Event OB (Feed and Bleed Cooling). Therefore, 29 minutes was used to reassess the post-EPU HRA by modifying the timing performance shaping factors used in the SLIM process and recalculating the human error probabilities for operator actions OPROB2.

At BVPS-1, the timing performance shaping factor used to assess the pre-EPU operator action OPROB2 was initially assigned a value of 1 (based on 57 minutes for pre-EPU conditions).

However, upon further review a PSF value of 2 for the pre-EPU sensitivity case was deemed more appropriate. For BVPS-1 post-EPU conditions, even though the operator actions have to be implemented in 29 minutes as opposed to 57 minutes for pre-EPU conditions, there is still enough time to complete the actions carefully and methodically, so a value of 3 for the SLIM timing performance shaping factor was used to assess OPROB2. This judgment was based on more than 20 minutes available from the time that the EOP feed and bleed setpoint is reached (at 8.5 minutes) until the time when operators actually perform the actions (at 29 minutes).

Enclosure I of L-05-192 Page 19 of 19 At BVPS-2, the timing performance shaping factor used to assess the pre-EPU operator action OPROB2 was initially assigned a value of 7 (based on 58 minutes for pre-EPU conditions).

However, upon further review and comparisons with the same operator actions reevaluated using the EPRI HRA calculator, a PSF value of 2 was deemed more appropriate. For BVPS-2 post-EPU conditions, a value of 3 for the SLIM timing performance shaping factor was also used to assess OPROB2, based on the adequate time available to accomplish the actions.

In conclusion, the feed and bleed cooling human error probabilities used in the pre-EPU sensitivity and post-EPU RAI PRA models are provided in Table 2-12. These values are also reflected in the revised response to RAI Question 3 (Tables 3-6 and 3-7), which list operators actions that have changed for the EPU analyses.

Table 2-12: Feed and Bleed Operator Action Human Error Probabilities Description Operator Action OPROBI Operator Action OPROB2 BVPS-1 Pre-EPU 1.22E-03 1.53E-02 BVPS-1 Post-EPU 1.37E-03 1.68E-02 BVPS-2 Pre-EPU 1.87E-03 2.49E-02 BVPS-2 Post-EPU 2.15E-03 2.71 E-02

Enclosure 2 of L-05-192 Additional Information to Address Question 3 of RAI dated August 2, 2005 The following provides additional Information to address Question 3 of the NRC Request for Additional Information dated August 2, 2005. The information includes a sensitivity study of the Human Reliability Analysis for BVPS Unit Nos. I and 2 showing risk Impact of EPU without crediting other changes to the PRA model. This Information is intended to supplement our previous response to Question 3 transmitted by FENOC Letter L 140.

Question 3:

Please provide an assessment of the increase in risk if only the EPU is considered. For example, the impact of containment conversion, BVPS-1 replacement steam generators, BVPS-1 AFW cavitating venturis and MFW fast-acting isolation valves should not be included unless they are required for the EPU. Note that this can be done either by having non-EPU changes In both the base model and the post-EPL model or in neither.

The NRC staff would prefer that this assessment use realistic HEPs for both the pre-EPU and post-EPU analysis (where these would change) to avoid masking of the actual change in risk; refer to question 2, above. However, if bounding HEP numbers are employed, justify that the final risk metric is bounding with respect to those HEPs.

The following risk metrics should be provided for both BVPS-1 and 2:

Internal events core damage frequency (CDF) and LERF¢ CDF and LERF from Internal fires.

Response to Question 3:

As noted in Section 1.1.2 of Enclosure 2 of LAR 302 & 173, L-04-125, the principal modifications planned to support implementation of the EPU LAR analyses include:

Containment conversion from a sub-atmospheric to an atmospheric design basis including related modifications such as the addition of (fast-acting) feedwater isolation valves and auxiliary feedwater flow limiting (cavitating) venturis for BVPS-1 Replacement charging/safety injection pump rotating assemblies Replacement steam generators for BVPS-1 Since the above modifications are required to support the EPU, they were considered necessary and either explicitly or implicitly included in the EPU LAR risk analysis (as addressed in the response to RAI Question I.b) in order to accurately determine the risk impact associated with the EPU. However, in an effort to assess the impact on risk for this RAI question, only the EPU is considered, and the impact of the above EPU associated modifications were excluded.

Enclosure 2 of L-05-192 Page 2 of 33

Background

Several Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models were used to support the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit I (BVPS-1) and Unit 2 (BVPS-2) Extended Power Uprate. First, the current models, BV1REV3 and BV2REV3D, serve as the "base case' for which a comparison may be made to the EPU models. These models contain a Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) based on simplified hand calculations of operator action timings.

There were two stages to develop the EPU models. To support the June 2005 EPU submittal, PRA models BVI EPU and BV2EPU were created (Reference 1) to evaluate EPU conditions for BVPS-1 and BVPS-2, respectively. These models included plant modifications related to EPU, as well as the EPU associated containment conversion and replacement steam generators (RSG) (BVPS-1 only). In performing the HRA for the EPU, human error probabilities (HEP) were updated using best-estimate operator action timings, generated by the MAAP software, when the results yielded a decrease in operator action times. If the MAAP software generated operator action timings that resulted in an increase, then the original, simplified timings were maintained. The logic behind this decision is that the results would yield a bounding estimate of the increase In risk due to human error. Thus, the EPU model HRA became a mixture of simplified and best-estimate HEPs. Other non-EPU related modifications were considered in the PRA models, such as using the Westinghouse Owner's Group (WOG) 2000 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal LOCA (Loss-of Coolant Accident) model, and containment isolation signal B (CIB) setpoint reset. These changes were made to reflect how BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 are expected to be operated at the time of EPU implementation. The results of BVI EPU and BV2EPU were compared to BVI REV3 and BV2REV3D baseline models to determine a change in risk.

Additionally, in response to RAls received on the EPU submittal, the BV1 EPU and BV2EPU models were modified to create the BVI RAI and BV2RAI models for BVPS-1 and BVPS-2, respectively (Reference 2). In addition to eliminating the non-EPU related modifications mentioned above, the HRA was revisited. This time using only best-estimate operator action timings, as generated by the MAAP software, regardless of whether or not the timing resulted in an HEP increase or decrease relative to the BVIREV3 and BV2REV3D baseline models. As the best-estimate timings often produced HEPs that were lower than those produced by the simplified calculations in the 'base case' models (i.e., the MAAP analysis resulted in an Increase in time available, when compared to the simplified calculations). It became apparent that it was incorrect to compare the different methodologies. As a result, a realistic change in Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) was not obtained.

In response to questions raised during the NRC EPU PRA Audit in October 2005, a sensitivity study was performed in support of the BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 Extended Power Uprate Risk Assessment to determine a better comparison of the change in risk due to the BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 EPU. The "base case' PRA models (BVI REV3 and BV2R0V3D) use simplified thermal-hydraulic hand calculations to determine the operator action time available, while the analysis for the EPU RAI used best-estimate MAAP analyses to determine the operator action time available. In order to determine a better comparison of the change in risk due to the EPU, the "base case" PRA models were modified to include recalculated HEPs, using best-estimate operator action times available based on MAAP results. These modified baseline PRA models are hereby referred to as the sensitivity models.

Enclosure 2 of L-05-192 Page 3 of 33 Methodology In order to limit the amount of recalculated HEPs, a screening process was developed to eliminate those operator actions that would not significantly impact the results. Since the purpose of the sensitivity model is to show that the resultant CDF would be lower than the "base case" CDF if the HEPs were recalculated using best-estimate operator action times based on MAAP results, Fussell-Vesely (F-V) importance values were used. The operator action F-V importance can provide a measure of the percent change in CDF due to a change in the HEP.

For this sensitivity model, it was assumed that those operator actions, whose cumulative F-V importance contributed to less than a 0.1% change in CDF, would not significantly impact the CDF and could be excluded from the reanalysis.

The sensitivity model followed a four-step process for both BVPS-1 and BVPS-2, except where differences were noted:

Evaluated all the 'base case" PRA model operator actions, and ranked them by decreasing order of Fussell-Vesely (F-V) importance.

Evaluated the operator actions that are most important to the BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 PRA models. The only criteria for screening operator actions is that the screened out operator actions would have a cumulative impact on CDF of less than 0.1% of CDF. Thus, an iterative screening was performed on the list of operator actions, until the sum of the screened out operator actions was approximately equal to (but less than) 0.1% of CDF.

The remaining operator actions where then reevaluated using the success likelihood index methodology (SLIM) process with best-estimate timings based on MAAP results, to determine new baseline HEPs.

The new HEPs were entered in the BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 'base case" RISKMAN models and requantified to create the sensitivity models.

Furthermore, in order to gain an understanding of the increase in risk at BVPS-1 due to the increase in power alone, the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) initiating event frequency needed to be equal in both this sensitivity model and in the BVI RAI model (the 'base case" has the old SGTR frequency and the BV1 RAI model has the new SGTR frequency). There were two approaches that could be used to accomplishing this. First, the post-EPU BVIRAI model may be modified to include the old SGTR initiating event frequency and then re-quantified. This could then be compared to the sensitivity model as described above. However, this approach requires that two PRA models be requantified. Therefore, the second approach was chosen. In the second option, the RSG initiating event frequency was used to requantify the sensitivity model described above. The change in steam generators would then become insignificant when evaluating a change in risk. This modified model became the BVPS-1 sensitivity model.

The new sensitivity model baseline CDF and LERF were then compared to the post-EPU CDF and LERF, for each unit, to determine a better comparison of the change in risk due to just the EPU.

Fussell-Vesely Rankings The operator action importance rankings were extracted from the BVI REV3 and BV2REV3D models. The operator actions and their F-V rankings are shown in Table 3-4.

of L-05-192 Page 4 of 33 Table 3-4: Operator Action Importances BVPS-1 Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BV1REV3 CDF) BVPS-2 Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BV2REV3D CDF)

BVPS-1 BVPS-2 Operator BVPS-1 F-V Operator BVPS-2 F-V Action BVPS-1 Description Importance Action BVPS-2 Description Importance OPRBV3 Operators set up and start portable diesel driven fans to cool the 1.36E-01 OPROBI Operators initiate bleed-and-feed operation by initiating 6.93E-02 emergency switchgear rooms upon failure of the normal switchgear safety injection, opening the PORVs, reopening the ventilation fans and the emergency switchgear ventilation fans. PORV block valves, and verifying High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pump operation.

OPRCD6 Operator depressurizes the RCS to 400 psig by dumping steam 5.OOE-02 OPROB2 Same as OBI except that the actions take place after the 3.45E-02 through the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to operators fail to attempt to restore Main Feedwater depressurize and cool down the secondary side; HHSI has failed. (MFW).

OPRCD7 Operator depressurizes the RCS to 400 psig by locally manipulating 4.81E-02 OPRCD6 Operator depressurizes the Reactor Coolant System 2.51 E-02 the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to relief steam, given (RCS) to 400 psig by dumping steam through the steam HHSI failure and loss of emergency AC orange. generator atmospheric steam dumps to depressurize and cool down the secondary side with HHSI failed (small LOCA).

OPRWMI Operator supplies borated makeup water to the RWST initially from 4.77E-02 OPRWMI Operator supplies borated makeup water to the RWST 2.08E-02 the spent fuel pool, and, in the long term, from blending operations initially from the spent fuel pool, and in the long term, during an SGTR event with makeup from service water during an SGTR event.

OPRSL3 Operators locally gag the stuck-open steam relief valves during the 2.43E-02 OPRSL3 Operators locally gag the stuck-open steam relief valves 1.48E-02 SGTR event during an SGTR event.

OPROB2 Same as ZHEOB I except that the actions take place after the 1.57E-02 OPRICI Operator cross-ties station instrument air to containment 1.04E-02 operators fail to restore MFW and the dedicated aux feed pump. instrument air.

OPRCD3 Operator depressurizes the RCS following SGTR event and 8.177E-03 OPRSLI Operator identifies the ruptured steam generator, and 5.41 E-03 dumping of steam is done through the intact steam generator isolates or verifies closed all flow paths to and from that atmospheric steam dumps. steam generator, following an SGTR event.

OPROCI Operator trips RCP during loss of CCP. 8.06E-03 OPROS6 Operator starts AFW given failure of SSPS for sequences 4.23E-03 in which there is no safety injection; for example, turbine trip sequences.

OPRSLI Operator identifies the ruptured steam generator, and isolates or 5.48E-03 OPROCI Operator trips RCP during loss of CCP. 2.79E-03 verifies closed all flow paths to and from that steam generator, following an SGTR event.

of L-05-192 Page 5 of 33 Table 3-4: Operator Action Importances BVPS-1 Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BV1REV3 CDF) BVPS-2 Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BV2REV3D CDF)

BVPS-I BVPS-2 Operator BVPS-1 F-V Operator BVPS-2 F-V Action BVPS-1 Description Importance Action BVPS-2 Description Importance OPRWAI Operator manually starts and aligns auxiliary river water pumps to 5.12E-03 OPROSI Operator manually actuates safety injection and verifies 2.67E-03 the required river water header given no LOSP. operation of certain safety equipment on loss of both trains of SSPS due to actuation relay failure. On failure of manual safety injection actuation, the operator manually aligns the safety equipment. Though there is no loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) present, a valid safety injection condition has occurred; for example, steamline break.

OPROPI Operators protect RSS pumps by stopping them (QS failure) 3.511E-03 OPROTI Operator pushes the manual reactor trip buttons after the 2.531E-03 restarting when there is sufficient water in the sump. Solid State Protection System (SSPS) fails to automatically actuate reactor trip in response to a plant trip condition OPROF6 Operator starts the dedicated AFW and manually controls the MFW 2.81E-03 OPRWA4 Operator aligns the diesel-driven fire pump with offsite 1.84E-03 bypass valve power available.

OPRMU5 Operators provide borated makeup water to the RWST initially from 2.81E-03 OPRPRI Operator secures safety injection before PORVs are 1.72E-03 the spent fuel pool, and, in the long term, from blending operations challenged.

following an interfacing systems LOCA.

OPROSI Operator manually actuates safety injection and verifies operation of 2.53E-03 OPRCD3 Operator depressurizes the Reactor Coolant System 1.46E-03 certain safety equipment on loss of SSPS due to actuation relay (RCS) to 400 psig following a SGTR, and dumping of failure given a transient initiating event that leads to SI conditions. steam is done through the intact steam generator On failure of manual safety injection actuation, the operator atmospheric steam dumps.

manually aligns the safety equipment.

OPRODI Operator depressurizes RCS to RHS entry conditions using 2.52E-03 OPROF2 Operator opens main feed bypass valves following a 1.43E-03 pressurizer spray/PORVs. partial feedwater isolation event after a plant trip.

OPROS6 Operator starts AFW given failure of SSPS for sequences in which 2.39E-03 OPRMU2 Operators provide borated makeup water to the RWST 1.26E-03 there is no safety injection; e.g., turbine trip sequences. initially from the spent fuel pool, and in the long term, with makeup from service water following a small LOCA.

OPRXTI Operator failed to perform cross-tie during SBO. 1.56E-03 OPRWAI Operator manually stops the EDG and racks the spare 1.25E-03 service water (SWS) pump onto the bus prior to restarting the EDG during a loss of offsite power.

of L-05-192 Page 6 of 33 Table 3-4: Operator Action Importances BVPS-1 Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BV1REV3 CDF) BVPS-2 Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BV2REV3D CDF)

BVPS-I1 BVPS-2 Operator BVPS-1 F-V Operator BVPS-2 F-V Action BVPS-1 Description Importance Action BVPS-2 Description Importance OPROC2 Operator trips RCP during loss of all seal cooling. I.55E-03 OPROS2 Operator manually actuates safety injection and verifies I .22E-03 operation of certain safety equipment on loss of both trains of SSPS due to actuation relay failure. On failure of manual safety injection actuation, the operator manually aligns the safety equipment. This event is following a small LOCA.

OPRCD5 Operator depressurizes the RCS to 400 psig by locally manipulating 1.14E-03 OPRODI Operator depressurizes RCS to Residual Heat Removal I .20E-03 the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to relief steam during System (RHS) entry conditions after dumping steam via a station blackout, the atmospheric steam dumps to cool down the RCS, and to depressurize the RCS by using pressurizer spraylPORVs following a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event OPRBV4 Operator starts the emergency switchgear ventilation exhaust fan I.03E-03 OPROC2 Operator trips RCP during loss of all seal cooling. 8.83E-04 VS-F- I 6B given the loss of normal switchgear ventilation and failure of the normally running emergency switchgear ventilation exhaust fan VS-F-I 6A, during a loss of offsite power.

OPROS2 Operator manually actuates safety injection and verifies operation of 8.75E-04 OPRXT1 Operator failed to perform cross-tie during SBO. 8,1 IE-04 certain safety equipment on loss of SSPS due to actuation relay failure given a small LOCA or steam line break. On failure of manual safety injection actuation, the operator manually aligns the safety equipment.

OPRHH I Operator manually aligns power supply for the standby HHSI pump, 6.97E-04 OPRWA2 Operator manually racks the spare service water (SWS) 7.89E-04 starts and aligns the pump to provide the necessary flow after a pump onto the emergency bus with offsite power small LOCA event, available.

OPRMU2 Operators provide borated makeup water to the RWST initially from 3.37E-04 OPRSMI Operators monitor the operation of the RSS pumps, 6.69E-04 the spent fuel pool, and, in the long term, from blending operations detect cavitation, and secure the pumps to prevent following a small LOCA. irreparable pump damage following a small LOCA accident and failure of the Quench Spray System.

OPRWA2 Operator manually starts and aligns auxiliary river water pumps to 3.22E-04 OPROAI Operator starts charging/HHSI pumps and aligns an 5.20E-04 the required river water header given LOSP. appropriate flow path for boron injection after an ATWS event.

of L-05-192 Page 7 of 33 Table 34: Operator Action Importances BVPS-1 Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BV1REV3 CDF) BVPS-2 Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BV2REV3D CDF)

BVPS-I BVPS-2 Operator BVPS-1 F-V Operator BVPS-2 F-V Action BVPS-1 Description Importance Action BVPS-2 Description Importance OPROBI Operators initiate bleed and feed operation by initiating safety 1.98E-04 OPRCSI Operator restores service water to the secondary 4.53E-04 injection, opening the PORVs, opening the PORV block valves, and component cooling system heat exchangers to maintain verifying HHSI pump operation. cooling to the station instrument air compressor, by opening appropriate motor-operated valves (MOVs) following a containment isolation (Phase A) signal.

OPRCD4 Operator depressurizes the RCS following a SGTR, AC orange 1.36E-04 OPRTB2 Operator reestablishes containment instrument air in the 4.OOE-04 power has failed, and operators have to locally manipulate the steam event of a CIA signal by resetting the CIA signal and generator atmospheric steam dumps to cooldown. realigning CCP flow to the Containment Instrument Air System.

OPRWA5 Operator manually stops the EDO and aligns the diesel-driven fire 1.34E-04 OPRIC2 Operator resets containment isolation Phase A (CIA) and 3.95E-04 pump during a loss of offsite power prior to restarting the restores containment instrument air.

emergency diesel generator.

OPRWA8 Operator starts spare SW pump with offsite power available 1.25E-04 OPRWA6 Operator fails to align alternate supply of service water 3.63E-04 seal cooling.

OPROAI Operator starts charging/HHSI pumps and aligns an appropriate 1.13E-04 OPRCD7 Operator depressurizes the RCS to 400 psig by locally 3.28E-04 flow path for boron injection after an ATWS event. manipulating the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to relief steam, given HHSI failure and loss of emergency AC Orange.

OPRSL2 Operators locally close the steam generator steam valves given that 1.09E-04 OPRWA3 Operator starts standby service water (SWE) pump 3.16E-04 these valves cannot be closed remotely during an SGTR accident. during loss of offsite power.

OPRBVI Operator opens the normal switchgear ventilation supply louvers 9.63E-05 OPRSL2 Operators locally close the steam generator steam valves 2.55E-04 VS-D-341, 342, and 343 to cool the emergency switchgear rooms given that these valves cannot be closed remotely during upon failure of the normal switchgear ventilation chilled water an SGTR accident.

cooling and the emergency switchgear ventilation.

OPROS3 Operator manually actuates safety injection and verifies operation of 8.85E-05 OPROF I Operators reestablish main feedwater following a safety 2.45E-04 certain safety equipment on loss of SSPS due to actuation relay injection signal by resetting the safety injection system, failure given a medium LOCA. On failure of manual safety opening the feedwater isolation valves, and starting the injection actuation, the operator manually aligns the safety startup feed pump or main feed pump.

equipment.

OPRWA7 Operator starts spare SW pump during a LOSP 8.29E-05 OPRHHI Operator manually aligns power supply for the standby 2.32E-04 HHSI pump, and starts and aligns the pump to provide the necessary flow after a small LOCA event.

of L-05-192 Page 8 of 33 Table 3-4: Operator Action Importances BVPS-1 Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BV1REV3 CDF) BVPS-2 Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BV2REV3D CDF)

BVPS-I BVPS-2 Operator BVPS-1 F-V Operator BVPS-2 F-V Action BVPS-l Description Importance Action BVPS-2 Description Importance OPRPRI Operators close PORV block valve to isolate a stuck open PORV, 6.27E-05 OPRORI Operators manually initiate recirculation mode of 1.82E-04 operation by starting the Recirculation Spray System (RSS) pumps, aligning power supplies to appropriate RSS equipment, resetting safety injection system, and verifying service water flow to RSS headers, following a small LOCA event.

OPRIAI Given LOSP, operators locally start the diesel air compressor. 5.16E-05 OPRHH2 Operators fail to properly monitor plant parameters and 1.50E-04 prematurely secure the safety injection system.

OPROS4 Operator manually actuates safety injection and verifies operation of 3.72E-05 OPRPR2 Operator closes block valve. 1.22E-04 certain safety equipment on loss of SSPS due to actuation relay failure given a large LOCA. On failure of manual safety injection actuation, the operator manually aligns the safety equipment.

OPROFI Operators align main feedwater or the dedicated auxiliary feed pump 2.26E-05 OPROS3 Operator manually actuates safety injection and verifies 5.45E-05 given the auxiliary feed was successful, but makeup to the PPDWST operation of certain safety equipment on loss of both failed. trains of SSPS due to actuation relay failure. On failure of manual safety injection actuation, the operator manually aligns the safety equipment; following a medium LOCA.

OPRRII Operator manually inserts control rods following an ATWS event 1.98E-05 OPRCDI Operator depressurizes the Reactor Coolant System 3.79E-05 and Top Event OT is successful. (RCS) to 400 psig by dumping steam through the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to depressurize and cool down the secondary side (small LOCA).

OPROR2 Operators align outside recirculation spray trains A or B to the LHSI 1.80E-05 OPRWA5 Operator manually stops the EDG and aligns the diesel- 1.85E-05 flow path for high pressure recirculation, given that both LHSI driven fire pump during a loss of offsite power prior to supply trains fail. restarting the emergency diesel generator.

OPRHH3 Operator switches to alternative AC/DC power. 1.62E-05 OPRMU3 Operators provide borated makeup water to the RWST 1.68E-05 initially from the spent fuel pool, and in the long term, with makeup from service water following a medium LOCA OPRMU3 Operators provide borated makeup water to the RWST initially from 5.20E-06 OPRRII Operator manually inserts control rods following an 1.60E-05 the spent fuel pool, and, in the long term, from blending operations ATWS event and Top Event OT is successful.

following a medium LOCA.

Enclosure 2 of L-05-192 Page 9 of 33 Table 3-4: Operator Action Importances BVPS-1 Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BVIREV3 CDF) BVPS-2 Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BV2REV3D CDF)

BVPS-l BVPS-2 Operator BVPS-1 F-V Operator BVPS-2 F-V Action BVPS-1 Description Importance Action BVPS-2 Description Importance OPRCCI Operators starts the manual standby CCR on loss of the operating 5.OOE-06 OPRIAI Operator aligns condensate polishing air compressor. 1.37E-05 and the automatic standby CCRs, to restore CCW flow to the RCP thermal barriers.

OPRXT2 Operator failed to perform cross-tie during SBO and small LOCA or 3.69E-06 OPRCD4 Operator depressurizes the Reactor Coolant System 1I.1IE-05 SGTR. (RCS) to 400 psig by dumping steam through the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to depressurize and cool down the secondary side; an SGTR event has occurred, AC Orange power has failed, and operators have to locally manipulate the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to cool down..

OPRCDI Operator depressurizes the RCS to 400 psig by dumping steam 3.51 E-06 OPRMAI Operator aligns gravity feed path from DWST to 6.92E-06 through the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to PPDWST.

depressurize and cool down the secondary side (small LOCA).

OPRWA4 Operator aligns the diesel-driven fire pump with offsite power 2.56E-06 OPRRRI Operator initiates RHS operation by clearing caution 6.02E-06 available. tags, establishing cooling water to the RHS heat exchangers, aligning power supplies to RHS equipment, and energizing the system.

OPRXT4 Operator fails to manually align SBO breakers. 2.1 IE-06 OPRHH3 Operator switches to alternative AC/DC power. 5.26E-06 OPRHCI Operator opens alternate cold leg injection flow path (MOV-SI-836) 1.69E-06 OPROR2 Operators manually initiate recirculation mode of 2.94E-06 during a small LOCA. operation by starting the Recirculation Spray System (RSS) pumps, aligning power supplies to appropriate RSS equipment, resetting safety injection system, and verifying service water flow to RSS headers, following a large LOCA event.

OPRIA2 Given no LOSP, operators start a compressor from the control room. 1.33E-06 OPRCCI Operator starts the manual standby component cooling 2.15E-06 pump (CCP) on loss of the operating and the automatic standby CCPs, to restore component cooling water (CCW) flow to the RCP thermal barriers.

OPRNAI Operator transfers DC power to alternate supply. 1.06E-06 OPRCC3 Operator switches to alternative AC/DC power. 9.89E-07 OPROF2 Operators align main feedwater or the dedicated aux feedwater 9.71E-07 OPRXT4 Operator fails to manually align SBO breakers. 2.50E-07

_ given aux feed fails and no CIA signal. I of L-05-192 Page 10 of 33 Table 3-4: Operator Action Importances BVPS-l Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BVlREV3 CDF) BVPS-2 Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BV2REV3D CDF)

BVPS-I BVPS-2 Operator BVPS-1 F-V Operator BVPS-2 F-V Action BVPS-1 Description Importance Action BVPS-2 Description Importance OPRBV2 Operator starts the emergency switchgear ventilation exhaust fan 9.22E-07 OPRMA2 Operator aligns Service Water System emergency flow 2.45E-07 VS-F-16B upon the loss of normal switchgear ventilation and failure path to AFW pumps, given failure of normal makeup to of the normally running emergency switchgear ventilation exhaust PPDWST.

fan VS-F-I 6A, given that offsite power is available and the plant has not tripped.

OPRORI Operators manually initiate recirculation mode of operation by 6.49E-07 OPRXT2 Operator failed to perform cross-tie during SBO and 2.32E-07 starting the RSS pumps, aligning power supplies to appropriate RSS small LOCA or SGTR.

equipment, resetting safety injection system and verifying RW flow to RSS headers, following a small LOCA event.

OPROF4 Operators align main feedwater or the dedicated aux feedwater 6.33E-07 OPRCC2 Operator aligns the normally isolated CCP cooler to 2.30E-07 given aux feed fails service water header A in the event that service water header B to the normally aligned cooler is lost.

OPROF3 Operators align the dedicated aux feedwater given main feed and 3.40E-07 OPRMUI Operators provide borated makeup water to the RWST 0.00E+00 aux feed fails and no CIA signal. initially from the spent fuel pool, and in the long term, with makeup from service water following a transient-initiated small LOCA or SGTR.

OPRCC3 Operator switches to alternative AC/DC power. 3.18E-07 OPROS4 Operator manually actuates safety injection and verifies O.OOE+00 operation of certain safety equipment on loss of both trains of SSPS due to actuation relay failure. On failure of manual safety injection actuation, the operator manually aligns the safety equipment; following a large LOCA.

OPRIA4 Operators align the second dryer train locally. 4.40E-08 OPRR12 Operator manually inserts control rods following an O.OOE+00 ATWS event and Top Event OT fails. For modeling convenience, no credit is conservatively assumed for this action.

OPRCC2 Operator aligns the normally isolated CCR cooler to river water in 1.23E-09 OPRRR2 Operator aligns alternate power supply to the RHS pump O.OOE+00 the event that river water to the normally aligned cooler is lost. suction MOVs on loss of one emergency bus (AC Orange or Purple) following an SGTR event.

of L-05-192 Page 11 of 33 Table 3-4: Operator Action Importances BVPS-I Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BV1REV3 CDF) BVPS-2 Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BV2REV3D CDF)

BVPS-1 BVPS-2 Operator BVPS-1 F-V Operator BVPS-2 F-V Action BVPS-I Description Importance Action BVPS-2 Description Importance OPRDFl Operator opens manual valve FW-543 to supply alternate water 1.46E-10 OPRCD2 Operator depressurizes the Reactor Coolant System N/A supply to the dedicated auxiliary feed pump. (RCS) to 400 psig by dumping steam through the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to depressurize and cool down the secondary side; AC Orange power has failed and operators have to locally manipulate the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to cool down.

OPRAFI Operator opens manual valve MS-17 to supply steam to the turbine- 5.57E-1 I OPRPII Operator isolates the RCS relief paths due to stuck-open N/A drive from steam generator I C. pressurizer PORVs after they were used to depressurize the RCS, by closing the PORV block valves associated with the stuck-open PORVs.

OPRMUI Operators provide borated makeup water to the RWST initially from 0.OOE+00 OPRC12 Operator isolates containment vents/drains by placing N/A the spent fuel pool, and, in the long term, from blending operations primary drains transfer and containment vacuum pump in following a steam generator tube rupture event, pull-to-lock, stopping reactor sump pumps, and closing the pressurizer relief tank/PRI drains transfer tank vents.

OPRR12 Operator manually inserts control rods following an ATWS event 0.OOE+00 OPRIA2 Operator aligns domestic water supply to station air N/A and Top Event OT fails. For modeling convenience, no credit is compressors.

conservatively assumed for this action.

OPRRRI Operator initiates RHS system operation by clearing caution tags, 0.OOE+00 OPRIA3 Operator aligns Service Water System water supply to N/A establishing cooling water to the RHS heat exchangers, aligning station air compressors, given failure of primary and power supplies to RHS equipment, and energizing the system. backup sources.

OPRPKI Operator isolates stuck-open Pressurizer PORV used to N/A OPRCIH Operator locally closes the RCP seal return isolation N/A depressurize, given ATWS valves outside the containment given a loss of all AC power f I-OPROF5 Operators align main feedwater or the dedicated aux feedwater N/A OPRCD5 Operator depressurizes the RCS to 400 psig by locally N/A given auxiliary feed fails. manipulating the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to relief steam during a station blackout (SBO).

OPRPII Operator isolates the RCS relief paths due to stuck-open pressurizer N/A PORVs after they were used to depressurize the RCS, by closing the PORV block valves associated with the stuck-open PORVs.

OPRCT I Operator locally restores river water to a turbine plant component N/A cooling heat exchanger by-opening manual valves.

OPRMAIl Operators supply alternate makeup to PPDWST (WT-TK-10). N/A of L-05-192 Page 12 of 33 Table 3-4: Operator Action Importances BVPS-I Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BVIREV3 CDF) p Y I BVPS-2 Operator Action F-V Importance (based on BV2REV3D CDF)

BVPS-l BVPS-2 Operator BVPS-1 F-V Operator BVPS-2 F-V Action BVPS-I Description Importance Adtinn RVPq.-2 DlPescrintinn Imnnrtrnwe OPRCD2 Operator depressurizes the RCS to 400 psig by dumping steam N/A through the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to depressurize and cool down the secondary side; AC orange power has failed and operators have to locally manipulate the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to cooldown.

OPRIA3 Operators restore cooling to compressors by locally aligning filtered N/A water given that CCT is unavailable and no LOSP.

OPRMA2 Operators align river water to the auxiliary feedwater pumps N/A suction.

OPRHH2 Operators fail to properly monitor plant parameters and prematurely N/A secure the safety injection system.

OPRC12 Operator isolates containment vents/drains by placing primary N/A drains transfer and containment vacuum pump in pull-to-lock, stopping reactor sump pumps, and closing the PRT/PRI drains transfer tank vents.

OPRCI I Operator locally closes the RCP seal return isolation valves outside N/A the containment given a loss of all AC power (station blackout).

OPRIC2 Operators crosstie station instrument air to containment instrument N/A air by locally opening manual valve IA-90.

of L-05-192 Page 13 of 33 Screening Analysis An iterative process was used to screen out the unimportant operator actions from the analysis. A base set of operator actions was chosen from Table 3-4 and the F-V importances were summed.

The process began by starting at the bottom of the table (i.e., the least important operator action) for each unit and continually adding the next highest operator action and summing the F-V values.

This action was repeated until the summed F-V value was at its highest value, without exceeding 0.1% of CDF. Those operator actions were then screened out from the analysis. The final screened out operator actions are shown in Table 3-5. The table also illustrates the summed F-V values and indicates that the total is less than 0.1% of CDF.

of L-05-192 Page 14 of 33 Table 3-5: Screening Analysis Results - Insignificant Operator Actions BVPS-I BVPS-2 Operator BVPS-1 F-V Operator BVPS-2 F-V Action BVPS-1 Description Importance Action BVPS-2 Description Importance OPRWA8 Operator starts spare SW pump with offsite power available 1.25E-04 OPRHHI Operator manually aligns power supply for the standby 2.32E-04 HHSI pump, and starts and aligns the pump to provide the necessary flow after a small LOCA event.

OPROAI Operator starts charging/HHSI pumps and aligns an appropriate flow 1.13E-04 OPRORI Operators manually initiate recirculation mode of 1.82E-04 path for boron injection after an ATWS event, operation by starting the Recirculation Spray System (RSS) pumps, aligning power supplies to appropriate RSS equipment, resetting safety injection system, and verifying service water flow to RSS headers, following a small LOCA event.

OPRSL2 Operators locally close the steam generator steam valves given that 1.09E-04 OPRHH2 Operators fail to properly monitor plant parameters and 1.50E-04 these valves cannot be closed remotely during an SGTR accident. prematurely secure the safety injection system.

OPRBVI Operator opens the normal switchgear ventilation supply louvers VS- 9.63E-05 OPRPR2 Operator closes block valve. 1.22E-04 D-341, 342, and 343 to cool the emergency switchgear rooms upon failure of the normal switchgear ventilation chilled water cooling and the emergency switchgear ventilation.

OPROS3 Operator manually actuates safety injection and verifies operation of 8.85E-05 OPROS3 Operator manually actuates safety injection and verifies 5.45E-05 certain safety equipment on loss of SSPS due to actuation relay operation of certain safety equipment on loss of both failure given a medium LOCA. On failure of manual safety injection trains of SSPS due to actuation relay failure. On failure actuation, the operator manually aligns the safety equipment. of manual safety injection actuation, the operator manually aligns the safety equipment; following a medium LOCA.

OPRWA7 Operator starts spare SW pump during a LOSP 8.29E-05 OPRCDI Operator depressurizes the Reactor Coolant System 3.79E-05 (RCS) to 400 psig by dumping steam through the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to depressurize and cool down the secondary side (small LOCA).

OPRPRI Operators close PORV block valve to isolate a stuck open PORV. 6.27E-05 OPRWA5 Operator manually stops the EDG and aligns the diesel- 1.85E-05 driven fire pump during a loss of offsite power prior to restarting the emergency diesel generator.

OPRIAI Given LOSP, operators locally start the diesel air compressor. 5.16E-05 OPRMU3 Operators provide borated makeup water to the RWST 1.68E-05 initially from the spent fuel pool, and in the long term, with makeup from service water following a medium LOCA of L-05-192 Page 15 of 33 Table 3-5: Screening Analysis Results - Insignificant Operator Actions BVPS-I BVPS-2 Operator BVPS-I F-V Operator BVPS-2 F-V Action BVPS-1 Description Importance Action BVPS-2 Description Importance OPROS4 Operator manually actuates safety injection and verifies operation of 3.72E-05 OPRRII Operator manually inserts control rods following an 1.60E-05 certain safety equipment on loss of SSPS due to actuation relay ATWS event and Top Event OT is successful.

failure given a large LOCA. On failure of manual safety injection actuation, the operator manually aligns the safety equipment.

OPROFI Operators align main feedwater or the dedicated aux feed pump 2.26E-05 OPRIAI Operator aligns condensate polishing air compressor. 1.37E-05 given the aux feed was successful, but makeup to the PPDWST failed.

OPRRII Operator manually inserts control rods following an ATWS event 1.98E-05 OPRCD4 Operator depressurizes the Reactor Coolant System 1.1IE-05 and Top Event OT is successful. (RCS) to 400 psig by dumping steam through the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to depressurize and cool down the secondary side; an SGTR event has occurred, AC Orange power has failed, and operators have to locally manipulate the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to cool down..

OPROR2 Operators align outside recirculation spray trains A or B to the LHSI 1.80E-05 OPRMAI Operator aligns gravity feed path from DWST to 6.92E-06 flow path for high pressure recirculation, given that both LHSI PPDWST.

supply trains fail.

OPRHH3 Operator switches to alternative AC/DC power. 1.62E-05 OPRRRI Operator initiates RHS operation by clearing caution 6.02E-06 tags, establishing cooling water to the RHS heat exchangers, aligning power supplies to RHS equipment, and energizing the system.

OPRMU3 Operators provide borated makeup water to the RWST initially from 5.20E-06 OPRHH3 Operator switches to alternative AC/DC power. 5.26E-06 the spent fuel pool, and, in the long term, from blending operations following a medium LOCA.

OPRCCI Operators starts the manual standby CCR on loss of the operating 5.OOE-06 OPROR2 Operators manually initiate recirculation mode of 2.94E-06 and the automatic standby CCRs, to restore CCW flow to the RCP operation by starting the Recirculation Spray System thermal barriers. (RSS) pumps, aligning power supplies to appropriate RSS equipment, resetting safety injection system, and verifying service water flow to RSS headers, following a large LOCA event.

OPRXT2 Operator failed to perform cross-tie during SBO and small LOCA or 3.69E-06 OPRCCI Operator starts the manual standby component cooling 2.15E-06 SGTR. pump (CCP) on loss of the operating and the automatic standby CCPs, to restore component cooling water

___ (CCW) flow to the RCP thermal barriers.

of L-05-192 Page 16 of 33 Table 3-5: Screening Analysis Results - Insignificant Operator Actions BVPS-1 BVPS-2 Operator BVPS-1 F-V Operator BVPS-2 F-V Action BVIPS- Description Importance Action BVPS-2 Description Importance OPRCD1 Operator depressurizes the RCS to 400 psig by dumping steam 3.51 E-06 OPRCC3 Operator switches to alternative AC/DC power. 9.89E-07 through the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to depressurize and cool down the secondary side (small LOCA).

OPRWA4 Operator aligns the diesel-driven fire pump with offsite power 2.56E-06 OPRXT4 Operator fails to manually align SBO breakers. 2.50E-07 available.

OPRXT4 Operator fails to manually align SBO breakers. 2.11 E-06 OPRMA2 Operator aligns Service Water System emergency flow 2.45E-07 path to AFW pumps, given failure of normal makeup to PPDWST.

OPRHC I Operator opens alternate cold leg injection flow path (MOV-SI-836) 1.69E-06 OPRXT2 Operator failed to perform cross-tie during SBO and 2.32E-07 during a small LOCA. small LOCA or SGTR.

OPRIA2 Given no LOSP, operators start a compressor from the control room. 1.33E-06 OPRCC2 Operator aligns the normally isolated CCP cooler to 2.30E-07 service water header A in the event that service water header B to the normally aligned cooler is lost.

OPRNA I Operator transfers DC power to alternate supply. 1.06E-06 OPRMUI Operators provide borated makeup water to the RWST 0.00E+00 initially from the spent fuel pool, and in the long term, with makeup from service water following a transient.

initiated small LOCA or SGTR.

OPROF2 Operators align main feedwater or the dedicated aux feedwater given 9.71 E-07 OPROS4 Operator manually actuates safety injection and verifies 0.OOE+00 aux feed fails and no CIA signal. operation of certain safety equipment on loss of both trains of SSPS due to actuation relay failure. On failure of manual safety injection actuation, the operator manually aligns the safety equipment; following a large LOCA.

OPRBV2 Operator starts the emergency switchgear ventilation exhaust fan 9.22E-07 OPRR12 Operator manually inserts control rods following an 0.00E+00 VS-F-16B upon the loss of normal switchgear ventilation and failure ATWS event and Top Event OT fails. For modeling of the normally running emergency switchgear ventilation exhaust convenience, no credit is conservatively assumed for this fan VS-F- 16A, given that offsite power is available and the plant has action.

not tripped.

OPRORI Operators manually initiate recirculation mode of operation by 6.49E-07 OPRRR2 Operator aligns alternate power supply to the RHS pump 0.OOE+00 starting the RSS pumps, aligning power supplies to appropriate RSS suction MOVs on loss of one emergency bus (AC equipment, resetting safety injection system and verifying RW flow Orange or Purple) following an SGTR event.

to RSS headers, following a small LOCA event.

of L-05-192 Page 17 of 33 Table 3-5: Screening Analysis Results - Insignificant Operator Actions BVPS-1 BVPS-2 Operator BVPS-1 F-V Operator BVPS-2 F-V Action BVPS-I Description Importance Action BVPS-2 Description Importance OPROF4 Operators align main feedwater or the dedicated auxiliary feedwater 6.33E-07 OPRCD2 Operator depressurizes the Reactor Coolant System N/A given aux feed fails (RCS) to 400 psig by dumping steam through the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to depressurize and cool down the secondary side; AC Orange power has failed and operators have to locally manipulate the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to cool down.

OPROF3 Operators align the dedicated aux feedwater given main feed and 3.40E-07 OPRPI1 Operator isolates the RCS relief paths due to stuck-open N/A auxiliary feed fails and no CIA signal. pressurizer PORVs after they were used to depressurize the RCS, by closing the PORV block valves associated with the stuck-open PORVs.

OPRCC3 Operator switches to alternative AC/DC power. 3.18E-07 OPRCI2 Operator isolates containment vents/drains by placing N/A primary drains transfer and containment vacuum pump in pull-to-lock, stopping reactor sumnp pumps, and closing the pressurizer relief tank/PRI drains transfer tank vents.

OPRIA4 Operators align the second dryer train locally. 4.40E-08 OPRIA2 Operator aligns domestic water supply to station air N/A compressors.

OPRCC2 Operator aligns the normally isolated CCR cooler to river water in I .23E-09 OPRIA3 Operator aligns Service Water System water supply to N/A the event that river water to the normally aligned cooler is lost. station air compressors, given failure of primary and backup sources.

OPRDFI Operator opens manual valve FW-543 to supply alternate water 1.46E-10 OPRCII Operator locally closes the RCP seal return isolation N/A supply to the dedicated auxiliary feed pump. valves outside the containment given a loss of all AC power OPRAFI Operator opens manual valve MS- 7 to supply steam to the turbine- 5.57E-1 I OPRCD5 Operator depressurizes the RCS to 400 psig by locally N/A drive from steam generator IC. manipulating the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to relief steam during a station blackout (SBO).

OPRMUI Operators provide borated makeup water to the RWST initially from 0.OOE+00 the spent fuel pool, and, in the long term, from blending operations following a steam generator tube rupture event.

OPRRI2 Operator manually inserts control rods following an ATWS event 0.00E+00 and Top Event OT fails. For modeling convenience, no credit is conservatively assumed for this action.

OPRRRI Operator initiates RHS system operation by clearing caution tags, 0.OOE+00 establishing cooling water to the RHS heat exchangers, aligning power supplies to RHS equipment, and energizing the system.

of L-05-192 Page 18 of 33 Table 3-5: Screening Analysis Results - Insignificant Operator Actions BVPS-I BVPS-2 Operator BVPS-1 F-V Operator BVPS-2 F-V Action BVPS-I Description Importance Action BVPS-2 Description Importance OPRPK I Operator isolates stuck-open Pressurizer PORV used to depressurize, N/A given ATWS OPROF5 Operators align main feedwater or the dedicated auxiliary feedwater N/A given aux feed fails.

OPRP1lI Operator isolates the RCS relief paths due to stuck-open pressurize N/A PORVs after they were used to depressurize the RCS, by closing the PORV block valves associated with the stuck-open PORVs.

OPRCT1 Operator locally restores river water to a turbine plant component N/A cooling heat exchanger by opening manual valves.

OPRMAI Operators supply alternate makeup to PPDWST (WT-TK- 0). N/A OPRCD2 Operator depressurizes the RCS to 400 psig by dumping steam N/A through the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to depressurize and cool down the secondary side; AC orange power has failed and operators have to locally manipulate the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to cooldown.

OPRIA3 Operators restore cooling to compressors by locally aligning filtered N/A water given that CCT is unavailable and no LOSP.

OPRMA2 Operators align river water to the auxiliary feedwater pumps suction. N/A OPRHH2 Operators fail to properly monitor plant parameters and prematurely N/A secure the safety injection system.

OPRC12 Operator isolates containment vents/drains by placing primary drains N/A transfer and containment vacuum pump in pull-to-lock, stopping reactor sump pumps, and closing the PRT/PRI drains transfer tank vents.

OPRCI I Operator locally closes the RCP seal return isolation valves outside N/A the containment given a loss of all AC power (station blackout).

OPRIC2 Operators crosstie station instrument air to containment instrument N/A air by locally opening manual valve IA-90.

F-V Total 8.74E-04 I F-V Total 8.79E-04

% CDF 0.087% % CDF 0.088%

Enclosure 2 of L-05-192 Page 19 of 33 Human Reliability Analysis The operator actions that were not previously screened out were reanalyzed using the SLIM HRA methodology. All changes in the HRA were made to the sensitivity models. Specifically, the time performance shaping factor (PSF) was altered to reflect the best-estimate timings from the MAAP analyses. The results of the sensitivity model were then compared to the post-EPU RAI models, to gain a better understanding of the change in risk due to just the EPU.

In the case of BVPS-1, there were no MAAP analyses to reference for the 'base case" conditions.

In this instance, engineering judgment was used to determine the change in PSF for the given operator actions. The following criteria were used to determine the change in PSF for BVPS-1:

At a minimum, the sensitivity study PSF should be less than or equal to the PSF for the RAI model.

The basis for this Is that it is expected that the increase in power level would result in a decrease in operator action time available. To reflect this, the sensitivity study PSF would be lowered. This is a recognized conservatism in the analysis.

Also, it is assumed that the sensitivity study PSF should be less than or equal to the PSF resulting from the simplified hand calculations. The simplified hand calculations are assumed to have some conservatism in the operator action time available. It Is assumed that the best-estimate MAAP runs would result in more time for the operator to perform his task (as was the case for BVPS-2).

The engineering judgment used the change in times from the BVPS-2 analysis, when applicable.

The relative change in PSF for the BVPS-2 models could be applied to the BVPS-1 models, as a guideline for how the PSF may be impacted at BVPS-1.

The BVPS-1 operator actions were reviewed in detail to determine the appropriate Time PSF. The BVPS-1 HRA notebook contains detailed information regarding the requirements of the operator for the given accident scenario. In many instances, the operator action was simple enough to warrant no change in the PSF.

Results of the HRA for the BVPS-1 sensitivity model are provided in Table 3-6. This table shows the times produced by the simplified hand calculations for the 'base case", and the times produced by MAAP for the post-EPU. Furthermore, the sensitivity model PSFs and HEPs are shown, with a comparison to the BV1 REV3 "base case" operator action PSFs and HEPs, and the post-EPU BV1 RAI PSFs and HEPs. The details of the HRA for the operator actions reanalyzed for the BVPS-1 sensitivity model are provided in the attached SLIM worksheets (included as Attachment 1), which provide the rankings, weightings, and HEP mean values for each human interaction within the group.

During the BV2REV3D PRA update, MAAP analyses were performed for the BVPS-2 model.

However, due to conservative modeling assumptions, the simplified operator action time available calculations were maintained in the model. However, those MAAP analyses were used in this sensitivity study to gain an understanding of the best-estimate operator action time available.

Using the MAAP analyses, the sensitivity model PSFs were modified to produce a best-estimate HRA. In the instances that no MAAP analyses exist for a given operator action, the same criteria listed above for BVPS-1 were applied.

Results of the HRA for the BVPS-2 sensitivity model are provided in Table 3-7. This table shows the times produced by the simplified hand calculations for the 'base case', and the times produced of L-05-192 Page 20 of 33 by MAAP for the post-EPU. Furthermore, the sensitivity model PSFs and HEPs are shown, with a comparison to the BV2REV3D "base case" operator action PSFs and HEPs, and the post-EPU BV2RAI PSFs and HEPs. The details of the HRA for the operator actions reanalyzed for the BVPS-2 sensitivity model are provided in the attached SLIM worksheets (included as Attachment 2), which provide the rankings, weightings, and HEP mean values for each human interaction within the group.

of L-05-192 Page 21 of 33 Table 3-6: Beaver Valley Unit 1 Human Reliability Anasis Summary Simplified EPU Calculation MAAP4 MAAP BV1REV3 Sensitivity Sensitivity RAI EPU RAI Basic Pre-EPU Pre-EPU EPU BVIREV3 Mean Model Model Mean Time Mean Event Description Timing Timin g Time PSF Probability Time PSF Probability PSF Probability OPRBV3 Operators set up and start portable 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months (1) N/A 8 7.12E-02 8 7.11E-02 8 7.11E-02 diesel driven fans to cool the emergency switchgear rooms upon failure of the normal switchgear ventilation fans and the emergency switchgear ventilation fans.

OPRBV4 Operator starts the emergency 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months (I) N/A 5 6.97E-03 5 6.97E-03 5 6.97E-03 switchgear ventilation exhaust fan VS-F-I 6B given the loss of normal switchgear ventilation and failure of the normally running emergency switchgear ventilation exhaust fan VS-F-16A, during a loss of offsite power.

OPRCD3 Operator depressurizes the RCS 11 hours1.273148e-4 days 0.00306 hours 1.818783e-5 weeks 4.1855e-6 months (1) >24 hours 5 5.12E-03 I 3.92E-03 2 4.19E-03 following SGTR event and dumping of steam is done through the intact steam generator atmospheric steam dumps.

OPRCD4 -epressurizes thefator e RCS -- 3.1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (1) N/A 5 8.30E-02 I 5.10E-02 I 5.10E-02 following a SGR, AC orange power has failed4and operators have to locally manipulate the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to coodo*L m L - -

OPRCD5 OpetafdeptesttizesffeRCS ?o 400 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months (1) 2.61 hours7.060185e-4 days 0.0169 hours 1.008598e-4 weeks 2.32105e-5 months 2 1.94E-02 I 1.76E-02 5 2.56E-02 psig ii~~allym anTputating thec steam -

gene acftmaswhi~ic steam dum~ps to

________relief steam aduringstation blackouts_______

OPRCD6 Operator depressurizes the RCS to 400 0.83 hours9.606481e-4 days 0.0231 hours 1.372354e-4 weeks 3.15815e-5 months (1) I hour 3 4.99E-02 2 4.40E-02 2 4.40E-02 psig by dumping steam through the --

steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to depressurize and cool down the secondary side; HHSI has failed. _

of L-05-192 Page 22 of 33 Table 3-6: Beaver Valley Unit 1 Human Reliability An lIs Summary Simplified EPU Calculation MAAP4 MAAP BV1REV3 Sensitivity Sensitivity RAI EPU RAI Basic Pre-EPU Pre-EPU EPU BVIREV3 Mean Model Model Mean Time Mean Event Description Timing Timing Timing Time PSF Probability Time PSF Probability PSF Probability OPRCD7 Operator depressurizes the RCS to 400 0,83 hours9.606481e-4 days 0.0231 hours 1.372354e-4 weeks 3.15815e-5 months (1) I hour 5 1.35E-01 3 I .05E-01 4 1.20E-01 psig by locally manipulating the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to relief steam, given HHSI failure and loss of emergency AC orange.

OPRHHI Operator manually aligns power 0.67 hours7.75463e-4 days 0.0186 hours 1.107804e-4 weeks 2.54935e-5 months (1) 0.94 hours0.00109 days 0.0261 hours 1.554233e-4 weeks 3.5767e-5 months 4 3.88E-03 0 2.52E-03 2 3.13E-03 supply for the standby HHSI pump, starts and aligns the pump to provide the necessary flow after a small LOCA event.

OPRMU2 Operators provide borated makeup 0.79 hours9.143519e-4 days 0.0219 hours 1.306217e-4 weeks 3.00595e-5 months (1) 2.58 hours6.712963e-4 days 0.0161 hours 9.589947e-5 weeks 2.2069e-5 months 3 1.OIE-02 2 9.19E-03 3 I.OIE-02 water to the RWST initially from the spent fuel pool, and, in the long term, from blending operations following a small LOCA.

OPRMU5 Operators provide borated makeup 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months (I) N/A I 6.25E-03 0 5.85E-03 I 6.25E-03 water to the RWST initially from the spent fuel pool, and, in the long term, from blending operations following an interfacing systems LOCA.

OPROBI Operators initiate bleed and feed 0.95 (57 (1) 42 1 1.22E-03 1 (3) 1.22E-03 2'3) 1.37E-03 operation by initiating safety injection, minutes) minutes()

opening the PORVs, opening the PORV block valves, and verifying HHSI PumP operation.

OPROB2 Same as ZHEOBI except that the 0.95 (57 (1) 29 1 1.39E-02 2(3) 1.53E-02 3(3) 1.68E-02 actions take place after the operators minutes) minutest2 fail to restore MFW and the dedicated auxiliary feed pump.

OPROCI Operator trips RCP during loss of 5 minutes (1) N/A 7 4.79E-03 7 4.79E-03 7 4.79E-03 CCP. (Based on BVPS-2 ZHESEI)

OPROC2 Operator trips RCP during loss of all 5 minutes (1) N/A 7 4.79E-03 7 4.79E-03 7 4.79E-03 seal cooling. (Based on BVPS-2 ZHESEI)

OPRODI Operator depressurizes RCS to RHS 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months (1) >24 hours l 1.59E-03 0 1.42E-03 0 1.42E-03 entry conditions using pressurizer spray/POR Vs.

- of L-05-192 Page 23 of 33 Table 3-6: Beaver Valley Unit 1 Human Reliabiity Analysis Summary . ..

Simplified EPU Calculation MAAP4 MAAP BVIREV3 Sensitivity Sensitivity RAI EPU RAI Basic Pre-EPU Pre-EPU EPU BV1REV3 Mean Model Model Mean Time Mean Event Description Timing Ti zn Timing Time PSF Probability Time PSF Probability PSF Probability OPROF6 Operator starts the dedicated AFW and N/A (1) N/A N/A 1.94E-02 N/A 1.94E-02 N/A 1.94E-02 manually controls the MFW bypass (assigned) (assigned) (assigned) valve OPROPI Operators protect RSS pumps by 8.5 minutes (1) N/A 7 5.36E-02 7 5.36E-02 7 5.36E-02 stopping them (QS failure) restarting when there is sufficient water in the sump. (Based on BVPS-2 ZHESMI)

OPROSI Operator manually actuates safety 1.03 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months (1) 0.72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 3 6.42E-03 2 5.86E-03 5 7.68E-03 injection and verifies operation of certain safety equipment on loss of SSPS due to actuation relay failure given a transient initiating event that leads to SI conditions. On failure of manual safety injection actuation, the operator manually aligns the safety equipment.

OPROS2 Operator manually actuates safety 0.67 hours7.75463e-4 days 0.0186 hours 1.107804e-4 weeks 2.54935e-5 months (1) 0.94 hours0.00109 days 0.0261 hours 1.554233e-4 weeks 3.5767e-5 months 5 9.19E-03 2 7.01E-03 3 7.68E-03 injection and verifies operation of certain safety equipment on loss of SSPS due to actuation relay failure given a small LOCA or steam line break. On failure of manual safety injection actuation, the operator manually aligns the safety equipment.

OPROS6 Operator starts AFW given failure of 1.03 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months (1) N/A 0 8.15E-04 0 8.1 E-04 3 1.12E-03 SSPS for sequences in which there is no safety injection; e.g., turbine trip sequences. _

OPRSLI Operator identifies the ruptured steam 0.64 hours7.407407e-4 days 0.0178 hours 1.058201e-4 weeks 2.4352e-5 months (1) 1.6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 3 3.37E-03 2 2.01E-03 3 3.38E-03 generator, and isolates or verifies closed all flow paths to and from that steam generator, following an SGTR event.

OPRSL3 Operators locally gag the stuck-open 9.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months (1) >24 hours I 1.86E-01 0 1.65E-O01 I 1.84E-01 steam relief valves during the SGTR event.

of L-05-192 Page 24 of 33 Table 3-6: Beaver Valley Unit 1 Human Reliability Analysis Summary Simplified EPU Calculation MAAP4 MAAP BVIREV3 Sensitivity Sensitivity RAI EPU RAI Basic Pre-EPU Pre-EPU EPU BVIREV3 Mean Model Model Mean Time Mean Event Description Timing T Lming Time PSF Probability Time PSF Probability PSF Probability OPRWAI Operator manually starts and aligns I hour (1) I hour 5 7.81E-03 4 7.01E-03 5 7.80E-03 auxiliary river water pumps to the required river water header given no LOSP.

OPRWA2 Operator manually starts and aligns 13 minutes (1) I hour 7 2.73E-02 6 1.98E-02 7 2.73E-02 auxiliary river water pumps to the required river water header given LOSP. .

OPRWA5 Operator manually stops the EDG and 30 minutes (1) I hour 6 2.14E-01 6 2.14E-01 6 2.14E-01 aligns the diesel-driven fire pump during a loss of offsite power prior to restarting the emergency diesel generator. (Based on BVPS-2 ZHEWA5)

OPRWA8 Operator starts spare SW pump with I hour (1) I hour 5 5.21E-03 5 5.21E-03 5 5.21E-03 offsite power available. (Based on BVPS-2 ZHEWA2) _ _

OPRWMI Operator supplies borated makeup 21 hours2.430556e-4 days 0.00583 hours 3.472222e-5 weeks 7.9905e-6 months (1) >24 hours I 8.41E-03 0 7.68E-03 0 7.68E-03 water to the RWST initially from the spent fuel pool, and, in the long term, from blending operations during an SGTR event OPRXTI Operator failed to perform cross-tie 3.1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (') N/A 5 1.28E-02 4 1.06E-02 5 1.28E-02 during SBO.

(I) No MAAP4 analyses are available, engineering judgment is used to determine the change in PSF.

(2) Post-EPU MAAP analyses performed in response to RA1 2.d indicate that the OPROBI timing is 42 minutes and that the OPROB2 timing is 29 minutes, as opposed to 65 minutes reported in Reference 1.

(3) The OPROBI and OPROB2 PSFs were modified to reflect the post-EPU MAAP analysis performed in response to RAI 2.d.

of L-05-192 Page 25 of 33 Table 3.7: Beaver Valley Unit 2 Human Reliability Analysis Summary Simplified EPU Calculation MAAP4 MAAP BV2REV3D Sensitivity Sensitivity RAI EPU RAI Operator Pre-EPU Pre-EPU EPU BV2REV3D Mean Model Model Mean Time Mean Action Description T g Timing Time PSF Probability Time PSF Probability PSF Probability OPRCD3 Operator depressurizes the Reactor 14 hours1.62037e-4 days 0.00389 hours 2.314815e-5 weeks 5.327e-6 months N/A(t ) >24 hours I 1.45E-03 0 1.21 E-03 0 1.21E3-03 Coolant System (RCS) to 400 psig following a SGTR, and dumping of steam is done through the intact steam generator atmospheric steam dumps.

OPRCD6 Operator depressurizes the Reactor 0.83 hours9.606481e-4 days 0.0231 hours 1.372354e-4 weeks 3.15815e-5 months I hour I hour 3 7.65E-02 3 7.65E-02 3 7.65E02 Coolant System (RCS) to 400 psig by dumping steam through the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to depressurize and cool down the secondary side with HHSI failed (small LOCA).

OPRCD7 Operator depressurizes the RCS to 400 0.83 hours9.606481e-4 days 0.0231 hours 1.372354e-4 weeks 3.15815e-5 months ) I hour I hour 4 I.65E-01 4 1.65E-01 4 1.65E-01 psig by locally manipulating the steam generator atmospheric steam dumps to relief steam, given HHSI failure and loss of emergency AC Orange.

OPRCS I Operator restores service water to the 0.84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months 1.3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months N/A 6 2.07E-02 6 2.06E-02 7 2.37E-02 secondary component cooling system heat exchangers to maintain cooling to the station instrument air compressor, by opening appropriate motor-operated valves (MOVs) following a containment isolation (Phase A) signal.

PRICI Operator cross-ties station instrument air I hour 30 minutes N/A I 7.94E-04 1 7.92E-04 I 7.92E-04 to containment instrument air. (Based on ZHETB2)

OPRIC2 Operator resets containment isolation I hour 30 minutes N/A I 1.10E-02 I 1.12E-02 I 1.12E-02 Phase A (CIA) and restores containment instrument air.

OPRMU2 Operators provide borated makeup water 1.01 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 1.55 hours6.365741e-4 days 0.0153 hours 9.093915e-5 weeks 2.09275e-5 months 2.58 hours6.712963e-4 days 0.0161 hours 9.589947e-5 weeks 2.2069e-5 months 3 5.97E-03 I 4.97E-03 2 5.45E-03 to the RWST initially from the spent fuel pool, and in the long term, with makeup from service water following a small LOCA. _ _

of L-05-192 Page 26 of 33 Table 3-7: Beaver Valley Unit 2 Human Reliability Analysis Summary Simplified EPU Calculation MAAP4 MAAP BV2REV3D Sensitivity Sensitivity RAI EPU RAI Operator Pre-EPU Pre-EPU EPU BV2REV3D Mean Model Model Mean Time Mean Action Description Timng Timn Timin Time PSF Probability Time PSF Probability PSF Probability OPROAI Operator starts charging/HHSI pumps and 10 minutes N/AV') N/A 2 3.83E-03 2 3.83E-03 2 3.84E-03 aligns an appropriate flow path for boron injection after an ATWS event.

OPROBI Operators initiate bleed-and-feed 58 minutes 78 minutes 42 7 4.34E-03 I, 1.87E-03 2 ) 2.15E-03 operation by initiating safety injection, minutes(2 )

opening the PORVs, reopening the PORV block valves, and verifying High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pump operation.

OPROB2 Same as OBI except that the actions take 58 minutes 78 minutes 29 7 3.79E-02 2 2.49E-02 33 2.71E-02 place after the operators fail to attempt to minutest 2 )

restore Main Feedwater (MFW).

OPROCI Operator trips RCP during loss of CCP. 5 minutes N/A(1) N/A 7 4.79E-03 7 4.79E-03 7 4.79E-03 (Based on ZHESE I)

OPROC2 Operator trips RCP during loss of all seal 5 minutes N/A(t ) N/A 7 4.79E-03 7 4.79E-03 7 4.79E-03 cooling. (Based on ZHESEI)

OPRODI Operator depressurizes RCS to Residual 14 hours1.62037e-4 days 0.00389 hours 2.314815e-5 weeks 5.327e-6 months N/A(t ) >24 hours 1.19E-03 0 1.04E-03 0 1.04E-03 Heat Removal System (RHS) entry conditions after dumping steam via the atmospheric steam dumps to cool down the RCS, and to depressurize the RCS by using pressurizer spray/PORVs following a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event. ___

OPROFI Operators reestablish main feedwater 0.84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months 1.3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 0.72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 2 1.1 9E-03 I 1.05E-03 4 1.59E-03 following a safety injection signal by resetting the safety injection system, opening the feedwater isolation valves, and starting the startup feed pump or main feed pump.

OPROF2 Operator opens main feed bypass valves 0.84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months 1.3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 0.72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 3 36E-04 0 2.93E-04 3 4.46E-04 following a partial feedwater isolation event after a plant trip. _

of L-05-192 Page 27 of 33 Table 3-7: Beaver Valley Unit 2 Human Reliability Analysis Summary Simplified EPU Calculation MAAP4 MAAP BV2REV3D Sensitivity Sensitivity RAI EPU RAI Operator Pre-EPU Pre-EPU EPU BV2REV3D Mean Model Model Mean Time Mean Action Description Timing Timing Time PSF Probability Time PSF Probability PSF Probability OPROSI Operator manually actuates safety 0.85 hours9.837963e-4 days 0.0236 hours 1.405423e-4 weeks 3.23425e-5 months 1.3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 0.72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 3 1.05E-02 2 9.15E-03 5 1.33E-02 injection and verifies operation of certain safety equipment on loss of both trains of SSPS due to actuation relay failure. On failure of manual safety injection actuation, the operator manually aligns the safety equipment.

Though there is no loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) present, a valid safety injection condition has occurred; for example, steamline break. .. ._.

OPROS2 Operator manually actuates safety 0.67 hours7.75463e-4 days 0.0186 hours 1.107804e-4 weeks 2.54935e-5 months 0.89 hours0.00103 days 0.0247 hours 1.471561e-4 weeks 3.38645e-5 months 0.94 hours0.00109 days 0.0261 hours 1.554233e-4 weeks 3.5767e-5 months 4 1.71 E-02 2 1.33E-02 2 1.33E-02 injection and verifies operation of certain safety equipment on loss of both trains of SSPS due to actuation relay failure. On failure of manual safety injection actuation, the operator manually aligns the safety equipment. This event is following a small LOCA. a) _

OPROS6 Operator starts AFW given failure of 1.3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 1.3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months N/A N/A7 I .OOE-03 N/A 1.00E-03 N/A I .OOE-03 SSPS for sequences in which there is no (assigned) (assigned) (assigned) safety injection; for example, turbine trip sequences. _

OPROTI Operator pushes the manual reactor trip I minute(') N/A(13 N/A 5 1.35E-03 5 1.37E-03 5 1.37E-03 buttons after the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) fails to automatically actuate reactor trip in response to a plant trip condition OPRPRI Operator secures safety injection before 27 minutes 27 minutes 33 minutes N/A 1.0 N/A 1.0 N/A 1.0 (assigned)

PORVs are challenged. (assigned) (assigned)

OPRSLI Operator identifies the ruptured steam 0,93 hours0.00108 days 0.0258 hours 1.537698e-4 weeks 3.53865e-5 months 1.8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months 1.6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 7 5.26E-03 4 3.02E-03 5 3.63E-03 generator, and isolates or verifies closed all flow paths to and from that steam generator, following an SGTR event.

of L-05-192 Page 28 of 33 Table 3-7: Beaver Valley Unit 2 Human Reliability Analysis Summary Simplified EPU Calculation MAAP4 MAAP BV2REV3D Sensitivity Sensitivity RAI EPU RAI Operator Pre-EPU Pre-EPU EPU BV2REV3D Mean Model Model Mean Time Mean Action Description Timing Timing Time PSF Probability Time PSF Probability PSF Probability OPRSL2 Operators locally close the steam 11.2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 23.1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months >24 hours 2 4.26E-03 0 3.28E-03 0 3.28E-03 generator steam valves given that these valves cannot be closed remotely during an SGTR accident.

OPRSL3 Operators locally gag the stuck-open 11.2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 23.1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months >24 hours N/A 1.0 N/A 1.0 N/A 1.0 steam relief valves during an SGTR event. (assigned) (assigned) (assigned)

OPRSMI Operators monitor the operation of the 5 minutes 5 minutes N/A 5.36E-02 7 5.36E-02 7 5.36E-02 RSS pumps, detect cavitation, and secure the pumps to prevent irreparable pump damage following a small LOCA accident and failure of the Quench Spray System.

OPRTB2 Operator reestablishes containment I hour 30 minutes 30 minutes I 1.IOE-02 I 1.12E-02 I 1.12E-02 instrument air in the event of a CIA signal by resetting the CIA signal and realigning CCP flow to the Containment Instrument Air System. _

OPRWAI Operator manually stops the EDG and I hour 30 minutes 30 minutes 6 7.93E-02 6 7.93E-02 6 7.93E-02 racks the spare service water (SWS) pump onto the bus prior to restarting the EDG during a loss of offsite power. _____ _____ ______

PRWA2 Operator manually racks the spare service I hour 30 minutes 30 minutes 5 5.21E-03 5 5.21 E-03 5 5.20E-03 water (SWS) pump onto the emergency bus with offsite power available.

OPRWA3 Operator starts standby service water I hour 30 minutes 30 minutes 6 7.93E-02 6 7.93E-02 6 7.93E-02 (SWE) pump during loss of offsite power.

OPRWA4 Operator aligns the diesel-driven fire I hour 30 minutes 30 minutes 5 1.89E-02 5 1.89E-02 5 1.89E-02 pump with offsite power available. I OPRWA6 Operator fails to align alternate supply of I hour 30 minutes 30 minutes 2 2.47E-02 2 2.47E-02 2 2.48E-02 service water seal cooling.

OPRWMI Operator supplies borated makeup water 38 hours4.398148e-4 days 0.0106 hours 6.283069e-5 weeks 1.4459e-5 months N/A(X) >24 hours 0 5.97E-03 0 5.97E-03 0 5.97E-03 to the RWST initially from the spent fuel pool, and in the long term, with makeup from service water duin an SGTR event.up OPRXTI Operator failed to perform cross-tie during 3.1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 3.1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months N/A 3.57E-02 4 2.89E-02 5 3.57E-02 SB O ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

of L-05-192 Page 29 of 33 Table 3-7: Beaver Valley Unit 2 Human Reliability Analysis Summary Simplified EPU Calculation MAAP4 MAAP BV2REV3D Sensitivity Sensitivity RAI EPU RAI Operator Pre-EPU Pre-EPU EPU BV2REV3D Mean Model Model Mean Time Mean Action Description Timing Timin Timing Time PSF Probability Time PSF Probability PSF Probability

1. No MAAP4 analyses are available, engineering judgment is used to determine the change In PSF.

2. Post-EPU MAAP analyses performed In response to RAI 2.d indicate that the OPROB1 timing is 42 minutes and that the OPROB2 timing is 29 minutes, as opposed to 65 minutes reported in Reference 1.

3. In response to RAI 2.d, a review of operator actions OPROB1 and OPROB2 determined that the PSF estimates were inconsistent with BVPS-1 values. These operator actions are expected to need only 5 minutes to complete; thus, the 58 minutes available to complete the action is more than sufficient. Therefore, the sensitivity model has reevaluated the operator actions and determined more realistic Time PSFs. Consequently, the RAI model was also modified to account for this new information.

Enclosure 2 of L-05-192 Page 30 of 33 Results The results of the quantification are summarized in Table 3-8 and Table 3-9, for BVPS-1 and BVPS-2, respectively.

Using the new BVPS-1 sensitivity model CDF and LERF and comparing those values to the analyses provided in the RAI responses, the BVPS-1 post-EPU PRA is indicating an increase in risk. The total CDF is increasing 2.88E-07 per year for the post-EPU conditions. This Increase in CDF is considered small (less than 1046) and is acceptable per the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.174 (Reference 3). The total LERF is increasing 5.83E-08 per year for the post-EPU.

Again, this increase in LERF is considered small (less than 10-7) and is acceptable per the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.174.

Similarly, using the BVPS-2 sensitivity study CDF and LERF and comparing those values to the analyses provided in the RAI responses, the post-EPU BVPS-2 PRA is indicating an increase in risk. The total CDF is increasing 3.41 E-07 per year for the post-EPU. This increase in CDF is considered small (less than 106) and is acceptable per the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.174. The total LERF is increasing 4.61 E-08 per year for the post-EPU. Again, this increase in LERF is considered small (less than 10-7) and is acceptable per the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.174.

While the change in CDF at BVPS-1 is smaller than the change in CDF at BVPS-2, there is a larger change in LERF. In both models, LERF is dominated by SGTR and interfacing systems LOCA (ISLOCA) events. However, at BVPS-1, the PRA model assumes that ISLOCA events can be mitigated, given that a HHSI pump can provide continued RCS inventory makeup via the RWST.

Since there was an increase in the HEP for makeup to the RWST following an ISLOCA (operator action OPRMU5) from the sensitivity model to the post-EPU RAI model (from 5.85E-03 to 6.25E-03), there was a resultant increase in the ISLOCA conditional large early release probability (LERP) which caused an increase In the LERF.

At BVPS-2, the PRA models did not credit any mitigating actions to reduce the ISLOCA since the initiating event frequency was almost 2 orders of magnitude lower than at BVPS-1 (1.07E-05 at BVPS-1 vs. 2.80E-07 at BVPS-2), due to system arrangements. As a result, the ISLOCA conditional LERP remains constant at 1.0 for both the pre and post-EPU cases, so the resultant increase is zero and the ISLOCA LERF contribution remains the same as the initiating event frequency for both cases.

Additionally, at BVPS-1 operators were credited for closing a stuck-open steam generator safety valve (operator action OPRSL3) during SGTR events, while no credit was given for this action at BVPS-2. Since there was an increase in this HEP from the BVPS-1 sensitivity model to the post-EPU RAI model (from 1.65E-01 to 1.84E-01), there was a resultant increase to the SGTR conditional LERP, which also caused an increase in the LERF contribution. At BVPS-2, this operator action was assigned a HEP of 1.0 for both the sensitivity and post-EPU RAI models, so the resultant increase on the SGTR conditional LERP was not as significant as BVPS-1. That is to say, the BVPS-2 SGTR conditional LERP is only impacted by changes to operator action OPRSLI; whereas, at BVPS-1 it is impacted by both changes to OPRSLI and OPRSL3.

A summary of these conditional LERP values for the pre-EPU sensitivity models and post-EPU RAI models is presented in Table 3-10. In the table, the SGTR initiating events are broken down by steam generator A, B, or C (designated SGTRA, SGTRB, and SGTRC, respectively). The ISLOCA of L-05-192 Page 31 of 33 is designated by initiating event VSX for V-sequence. As seen in the table, the impact to LERF at BVPS-1 is more sensitive to the post-EPU HEPs than at BVPS-2, represented by the larger increase in the SGTR and ISLOCA conditional LERP values.

Table 3-8! BVPS-1 Results BVPS-1 Risk BVIREV3 Sensitivity EPU RAI '"'i' Change In Risk Measures Model °2) (RAI - Sensitivity)

CDF TOTAL (hear) 2.37E-05 2.26E-05 2.29E-05 2.88E-07 CDF Internal (Near) 7.45E-06 6.25E-06 6.54E-06 2.86E-07 CDF External (year) 1.63E-05 1.63E-05 1.63E-05 2.OOE-09 CDF Fires (lear) 4.60E-06 4.66E-06 4.66E-06 2.23E-10 LERF TOTAL (hear) 1.03E-06 4.37E-07 4.95E-07 5.83E-08

1. Reference 2 analysis modified to include new OPROBI and OPROB2 HEPs.

2. Analysis includes RSG SGTR Initiating Event Frequency, Table 3-9: BVPS-2 Results BVPS-2 Risk BV2REV3D Sensitivity EPU RAI {" Change In Risk Measures Model (RAI - Sensitivity)

CDF TOTAL (hear) 3.49E-05 3.30E-05 3.33E-05 3.41 E-07 CDF Internal (hear) 2.OOE-05 1.86E-05 1.88E-05 2.78E-07 CDF External (Near) 1.48E-05 1.44E-05 1.45E-05 6.30E-08 CDF Fires (Near) 5.29E-06 4.89E-06 4.95E-06 6.40E-08 LERF TOTAL (/year) 1.12E-06 1.03E-06 1.07E-06 4.61E-08

1. Reference 2 analysis modified to include new OPROBI and OPROB2 HEPs.

of L-05-192 Page 32 of 33 Table 2310: Initiatinn Event Cnnditional LERP IE Frequency I LERF Conditional %LERF LERP BVPS-1 Sensitnrity SGTRA 6.96E-04 1.20E-07 1.72E-04 27.4%

SGTRB 6.96E-04 1.20E-07 1.72E-04 27.4%

SGTRC 6.96E-04 1.20E-07 1.72E-04 27.4%

VSX 1.07E-05 7.63E-08 7.13E-03 17.5%

Others 1.78E-09 0.4%

4.37E-07 100.0%

EPU RAI SGTRA 6.96E-04 1.38E-07 1.98E-04 27.8%

SGTRB 6.96E-04 1.38E-07 1.98E-04 27.8%

SGTRC 6.96E-04 1.38E-07 1.98E-04 27.8%

VSX 1.07E-05 8.06E-08 7.53E-03 16.3%

Others, 1.83E-09 0.4%

4.95E-07 _ 100.0%

BVPS-2 Sensitivity VSX 2.80E-07 2.80E-07 1.OOE+00 27.2%

SGTRA 1.61E-03 2.48E-07 1.54E-04 24.1%

SGTRB 1.61 E-03 2.48E-07 1.54E-04 24.1%

SGTRC 1.61E-03 2.48E-07 1.54E-04 24.1%

Others 4.79E-09 0.5%

1.03E-06 100.0%

EPU RAI VSX 2.80E-07 2.80E-07 1.OOE+00 26.0%

SGTRA 1.61 E-03 2.63E-07 1.63E-04 24.5%

SGTRB 1.61 E-03 2.64E-07 1.64E-04 24.5%

SGTRC 1.61E-03 2.63E-07 1.63E-04 24.5%

Others 4.85E-09 0.5%

_ 1.07E-06 100.0%

of L-05-192 Page 33 of 33 References

1. FENOC Letter L-05-104, 'Beaver Valley Power Station Unit Nos. 1and 2, BV-1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66, BV-2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73, Probabilistic Safety Review for License Amendment Request Nos. 302 and 173", June 14, 2005

2. FENOC Letter L-05-140, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, BV-1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66, BV-2 Docket No. 50-214, License No. NPF-73, Response to a Request for Additional Information (RAI dated August 2, 2005 in Support of License Amendment Request Nos. 302 and 173, Extended Power Uprate", September 6, 2005.

3. U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.174, fAn Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis", Revision 1, November 2002.

Attachment 1 of L-05-192 BVPS-1 Sensitivity Study HRA Worksheets Attachment 1 of L-05-192 Page 1 of 16 BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1 - GROUP 1 HUMAN ACTIONS EVALUATION P8W0RSHWPINFA~rFS PEFCRACE SHNM3 FACTCRS C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M 0 T N R M O T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E D I T R E ED I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M INPUTTO RSKIMN FCR Nmn PSF .lts 0.13 0.13 013 0.31 0.13 0.06 013 1.00 HER DSTRBllON OPERATCRIcONS PSF R4NNGS FU HER LO3"To OFERTORAIONS PSF W4GHTS RANGE FAICR MMDAN MAXHER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9.986m 4Q0X8 ZFIO1 5 5 5 3 5 2 5 4.188 ZO1E03 -Z6W70 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 7.5 9.49E-04 8 2 9 2 8 1 6 4.813 3a2603 -Z4071 5 5 5 10 5 5 5 40 7.5 1.85EM alB" 8 4 6 5 6 0 5 5&188 &803 2.2331 5 5 5 10 5 0 5 35 7.5 V7W03 MN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2905 *4.6394 NObRNZED PSF 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.31 0.13 0.OB 0.13 WEGHTS CAUBRhTICNTASK PSFRH0'NGS HERW LO MAX FER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.E'03 OOXO DC3fEW1 (1) 5 5 5 3 5 2 5 4,188 2 03 2699D MN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Z30E05 4.63B3 NMIE Raesdmb Cautpi

4.63B41 (1) R M eE0E St - St BydYEt 0002418 AClNJ NBV1 glR1) RSwemud 099m INkdOlthbs 3 D.ee d sFts 1 XCOIWiKu1(s) 0.4M3M Sd fd OW. 0.0X3D Figure 1: BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 1 Attachment I of L-05-192 Page 2 of 16 BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1-GROUP 2 HUMAN AC71ONS EVALUATION PEFWANCE SHAPING FACTORS PEFORMCRE SHAPING FACTORS C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M 0 T N R MO T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E 0 1 T R E E 0 I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E 0 Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M INPUJTTORSWM~ANFOR Nrm PSF WeIs 0f 0.08CO33 (133 Q(163 0 0.63 O HER OISTRuITI PE7RACTK W P RAN<NGS FU HER LOG"To OPEPATOR ACT14NS PSF WSGHTS RANGE FACTRa MEDIAN W HER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 a911 Q0 Z6eMU a 5 6 5 2 1 4 S0S3 a4E603 -ZO757 Z H0 0 5 5 0 0 0 10 7.5 3.97E-03 ZHBA2 8 8 8 5 2 2 4 5667 19E03 -Z0356 ZMW 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 10 7.5 434E03 Z-EW 7 7 6 3 5 2 5 4.53 Z85E03 -Z5456 ZfeM 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 10 7.5 1.34E-3

-EWMI1 8 5 8 5 2 0 4 5S 7.e8-03 01149 1EAM 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 10 7.5 381-w03 Z1FE0S 7 1 7 5 3 2 3 525 585E03 -ZZ1 ZH-ESI 5 0 10 10 5 5 5 40 7.5 Z775E03 ZEDS2 7 1 7 5 3 2 5 5417 7.01E-03 -Z1540 ZJE0I2 5 0 10 10 5 5 S 40 7.5 3.31E503 MN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ZOOE05 45663 NOM4JIZED PSF 0.08 0.00 Q33 0.33 Q0 0.08 (108 WEIGHTS CAIURATIONTASKS PSFRAKNGS F IER FU LOGp(IH MA3XHER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.00400 0.OO10 PLANT-X aW1 (1) 7 1 7 5 3 3 3 5.333 6.40E4)3 -2.1638 MN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Z00E-5 -4690

-456eW (1)RAWOIN3SAE THOSE FOR SMLAR SbdErr d Eak ACTION INBVI(21ECSI)

NDd Obmtia 3

£Degmd~ereb,~

XCoIldas) 0.456W27 F uE 2 d BP . SW11o Figure 2: BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 2 Attachment I of L-05-192 Page 3 of 16 BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1 - GROUP 3 HUMAN ACTIONS EVALUATION PRF(MACE SHAPING FAClTRS PERFORPOANCE SHAPNG FACTORS C P C P I P 0 R I P O R N R M 0 T N R M O T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E D I T R E E D I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M INPUrTO RSIKAN FOR Nam PSFWeVU 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.24 0.24 1.00 FIERDISTRMBUCN OPERATOR ACuICNS PSF RAM4NGS FU FIER LOG(HER) OPERATORACTONS PSF WI3GHTS RANGE FACTOR NMDIAN 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9.36E-01 4.0285 ZFE2 2 6 6 5 7 2 4 4241 259E-03 -2.53 ZHECD2 5 5 5 5 5 10 t0 45 7.5 122E-03 2 1 2 2 4 6 6 3.94 1.91E-03 2.7190 5 5 5 5 5 10 10 45 7.5 9.2E4 DHERE6 1 2 8 9 9 7 7 6.121 1.77E42 -1.7531 Z ERE6 5 5 5 5 5 10 10 45 5 1.04-02 7 7 9 9 6 6 8 7.45 6.18E-02 *12.9 5 5 5 5 0 10 10 40 5 3.83E-42 ZFER.2 MffL2 7 7 9 9 6 5 8 7.103 4.83E02 -1.3162 5 5 5 5 0 10 10 40 5 299E-02 ZIEFL3 7 7 9 9 6 5 8 7.103 4.83E402 -1.3162 Z-FfL3 ZHE1C3 5 5 5 5 0 10 10 40 5 299302 Z6EIC3 8 9 a 2 9 6 8 6.845 a70E-02 -1.4312 5 5 0 0 5 10 10 35 5 ZtOE4-02 MIN FIER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 336E.05 -4.4743 NORMAUZED PSF 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.24 024 I WT ITS CAUIBRATION TASKS PSF RANKINGS FLI HER LOG(IHE)

MAX HER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.00E+0 0.=

STP HEOS01 4 3 6 10 10 6 3 5.352 1.80E-02 -1.7447 FERM RE7 6 7 6 6 6 5 8 6.569 1.32E42 .1.879 LIN IER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 &OOE-05 4.=9 Rskn Oupt Caom 4.47426 Sld ErrdY Est 0.33B135 RSqaed 0.9785 Ni dOf 4 Dereesodf Ft 2 X CwIw(s) Q444575 SWd ET of Cod. 00470447 Figure 3: BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 3 Attachment 1 of L-05-192 Page 4 of 16 BEAVER VALLEY UNIT I - GROUP 4 HUMAN ACTIONS EVALUATION PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M 0 T N R M 0 T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E D I T R E E D I T F 0 X U N T R F 0 X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M INPUT TO RISKMAN FOR Norm. PSFWeihts 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.30 1.00 HER DISTRIBUTION OPERATOR ACTIONS PSF RANKINGS FLI HER LOG(HER) OPERATOR ACTIONS PSF WEIGHTS RANGE FACTOR MEDIAN MAX HER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 915E-ol 40.0387 ZHEHC1 2 1 2 2 4 0 5 283 2.58E-04 -3.5885 ZHEHC1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 10 9.685-05 ZHEPRI 2 2 2 2 3 0 6 3.106 3.53E-04 -3.4516 ZHEPRI 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 10 1.33E-04 ZHEC04 9 2 9 8 8 1 10 7.468 5.10E-02 -1.2922 ZHECD4 5 5 5 a 5 5 10 40 5 3,16E-02 ZHEMU3 8 6 8 5 8 5 8 6.553 1.80E-02 -1.7451 ZHEMU3 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 40 5 1.11E-02 ZHEMU4 a B 8 5 8 7 8 7.362 4.52E-02 -1.3449 ZHEMU4 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 40 5 2.80E-02 ZHEOB1 2 6 3 2 4 1 7 4.191 1.22E-03 -2.9144 ZHEOS1 5 5 a 5 5 5 10 40 7.5 5.75E-04 ZHEOA1 2 0 2 0 3 2 7 3.191 3.90E-04 -3.4095 ZHEOA1 5 5 5 5 5 0 10 35 10 1.46E-04 ZHEOT1 0 10 1 2 3 1 6 3.681 6.8OE-04 -3.1672 ZHEOT1 5 0 S 0 5 5 10 30 10 2.55E-04 MIN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.02E-05 -4.9895 NORMALIZED PSF 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.30 WEIGHTS CALIBRATION TASKS PSF RANKINGS FLI HER LOG(HER)

MAX HER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.0oE+00 0.0000 STP HERC4 2 8 3 5 6 1 6 4.681 9.52E404 -3.0079 FERM HECT3 4 6 3 3 3 3 3 3.447 1.15E-03 -2.9393 MIN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.20E-06 -5.0362 Regression Outt:

Cotns 4.96954 Std Er ofY Est 0,342488 R Sqiwro 0.961802 No. of O bservatonu 4 Oegr o Fredom 2 X Coefllrcint(s) 0.4950857 Sd Errd Cool. 0.0475606 Figure 4: BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 4 Attachment 1 of L-05-192 Page 5 of 16 BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1- GROUP 5 HUMAN ACTIONS EVALUATION PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M 0 T N R M 0 T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E I I T R E E D I T F 0 X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M INPUT TO RISKMAN FOR Ncn,.PSF Weijt 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.14 1.00 HER DISTRIBUTION OPERATOR ACTIONS PSF RANKINGS FLI HER LOG(HER) OPERATOR ACTIONS PSF WEIGHTS RANGE FACTOR MEDIAN MAX HER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9.97E-01 4.0012 ZHECCI 2 6 6 7 2 2 5 4.37 4.21E-03 Z3761 ZHECC1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 1.99E-03 ZHECC2 2 6 7 7 2 4 6 4.883 6.92E-03 -21597 ZHECC2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 3.27E-03 ZHEC12 1 2 4 1 3 3 3 2.403 6.22E-04 42061 ZHECI2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 10 234E.04 Z7HEHH1 1 7 5 5 2 0 6 3.644 Z52E-03 -Z5980 ZHEHH1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 1.19E403 ZHEHH2 2 2 3 1 3 3 4 2.545 7.15E-04 -3.1459 ZHEHH2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 10 2.68Ei04 ZHEMAI 2 5 4 2 6 0 2 3.123 .285E-03 -Z9021 ZHEMAI 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 5.92E-04 ZHEMA2 2 3 1 2 8 0 5 3.104 1.23E-03 .Z9103 ZHEMA2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 5.81E-04 ZHEOD1 2 3 5 2 5 0 5 3.53 1.42E-03 -28473 ZHEOD1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 6.71E-04 ZHEPI1 0 0 1 5 3 2 5 2.2 5.52E-04 -3.2582 ZHEPI1 5 5 5 5 5 5 -5 35 10 2.07E-04 ZHEPK1 0 1 1 5 3 2 5 2A29 6.38E-04 -1952 ZHEPK1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 10 2.40E-04 ZHERE5 1 2 8 9 9 2 5 5266 1,00E-02 -1.9961 ZHERE5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 5 6.22E-03 ZHERRI 2 2 5 5 4 2 2 3.195 1.34E-03 .Z8719 ZHERRt 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 6.34E-04 ZHESE1 2 5 2 3 4 4 4 3.403 1.64E-03 -Z7843 ZHESE1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 7.7tE-04 ZHESL2 3 2 8 5 4 2 a 4.649 5.52E03 -2258 ZHESL2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 Z614-03 ZHESL3 7 10 9 9 10 0 10 8.149 1.6SE-01 -0.7819 ZHESL3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 3 1.32E-01 ZHEWAI 5 5 5 4 7 4 4 4.698 7.01E.03 -2.1543 ZHEWAI 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 3.31E-03 ZHEAF1 8 a 2 5 5 0 5 4.7 5.24E-03 -2t203 ZHEAF1 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 30 7.5 2.48E-03 ZHEDF1 6 1 5 2 6 1 6 3.955 281E-03 -Z5515 ZHEDF1 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 30 7.5 1.33E.03 ZHEIA1 6 6 6 4 4 1 5 4.7C9 5.84E-03 -Z2337 ZHEIA1 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 30 7.5 2.78E-03 ZHEIA2 4 6 5 4 4 1 5 4.26 3.78E03 -Z4227 ZHEIA2 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 30 7.5 1.78E-03 ZHEIA4 7 7 5 3 4 1 3 4.422 4.42E-03 -Z3542 ZHEIA4 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 30 7.5 2.09E-03 ZHEOS6 2 4 2 5 3 0 2 2675 8.11604 -3.0911 ZHEOS6 5 5 5 5 5 0 0 25 10 3.046-04 ZHEPNA 8 9 8 9 8 7 9 8331 1.97E-01 4.7052 ZHEPNA 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 3 1.58E.01 MIN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .03E-05 -4.2196 NORMLAIZED PSF 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.14 WEIGHTS Figure 5: BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 5 Attachment 1 of L-05-192 Page 6 of 16 CALIBRATION TASKS PSF RANKINGS FU HER LOG(HER)

MAXHER 10 10 ¶0 10 10 10 10 10 1.00E+00 0.0000 STP HEO03 6 S 6 6 a 6 9 6.578 4.38E-02 -1.3585 STP HEOSLI 3 4 5 3 3 4 6 3.987 2.13E-03 -2,6716 STP HEOCO0 3 3 6 4 4 2 4 3.779 2.31E-03 .2.6364 MIN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.90E-05 4.1612 RegressibOutpt Coraw 4.21965 SW ErrofY Est 0.098056 R Squired 0.997057 No. of Observaeio 5 Degreesof Freedom 3 X Coolldert(s) 0.4218417 StWErrOfCoe. 0.013232 Figure 5 (Cont.): BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 5 Attachment 1 of L-05-192 Page 7 of 16 BEAVERVAILEY UNIT 1 GROUP 6 HUMAN ACIlONS EVALUATON PBT0CAEM-INWMFPCtM F EAMCFACrUS C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M 0 T N R M O T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E D I T R E E D I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M IN UTTORSKWNFCR Narm PSFU (00 03 aso Wx n0 D 0as ao0 1.00 HERCISTMOTiilN CFE4TCACTC PSFR*JS RFI HER WLW PSF M\GMTS R4GFASOR MIAN MOXFER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9I9soi 4.0W7 al3U 6 6 6 5 3 2 5 4 201E43 -Z61 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 10 7.5 9.51E04 aEIT1 4 5 2 3 3 7 5 6 1.iE2 -1.79M6 aErr 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 10 5 987E43 MN KR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3216a 4.4M NCRVUZEDF¶ a.0.50 ax aoD aoo aso ax0 VOs C4A1EATICNTASS PFF RMNGS RI HER LC MkXFER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1f.OfE0 oxo STP HIEO1 3 4 5 3 3 4 6 4 21V03 -26716 DCZECKI 1(1) 6 6 6 5 3 3 5 4.5 a12E3 .24949 MNHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 aEO5 4.4949 4.4493D (1)R4N0S AREMlIDE CR SMLbR adflrdYEgt A~CNINEBV1 9HMOL)

Na. dQSian5 4 R fFresd 2 XO~5) 0.449229 Sld Erd. 00M7 Figure 6: BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 6 Attachment 1 of L-05-192 Page 8 of 16 BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1 - GROUP 7 HUMAN AClIONS EVALUAllON PERFOREAN SHAPING FACTORS PERFO)RMACE SHAPING FACTORS C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M 0 T N R MO T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E D I T R E E D I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M INFUTTO RISKAN FOR 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.25 HER ISTRISLRMON Nonm PSF U 0.10 0.25 FU IER LOG(; OPERATOR ACTIONS PSF WEIG1S RANGE FACTOR MEDIAN OPERATOR ACTIONS PSF RANINGS MAX HER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9.9E4-1 4.0005 2 3 3.5 223E-03 -Z6512 ZEC1 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 10 7.5 1.05E403 2 5 3 3 5 8 5.7 1.76E02 .1.7541 D ECD5 5 10 5 5 5 5 10 45 5 1.0602 ZHECD5 1 6 8 5 7 1 8 5.55 1.53E02 -1.8152 ZHEOB2 5 10 5 5 5 5 10 45 5 9.48E403 ZHEB2 2 9 3 2 4 2 MN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 &35E-05 4.0785

. . _ . . _ NORMALIED PSF 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.25 I WEICGTS CmLI6RAmlON TASKS PSF RANKINGS FU HER LOG(HER)

MAX HER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.00E+00 Q000X STP HEOB02 4 3 6 4 7 2 8 S05 &80E-03 -20555 OPR4 (1) 2 9 3 2 4 1 8 545 1.0CE-02 -20X0 DC ZhEOB1 5 7 7 6 6 4 8 6.55 5.49E-02 -1.264 FMN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9WE05 *4.0458 NOTE: Reon O*Lt Car~ 4.078M5 (1) RANKINGS ARE THOSE FOR SMLAR Std ErrofY Est 0.12Z121 ACT1ON INEVI (ZIHEOB2) R SqLWW 0.9B483 No. d Obaswmo 5 Debes d Freedom 3 X Co ert(s) 0.4O76612 SW dECoef. 0.0169732 Figure 7: BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 7 Attachment 1 of L-05-192 Page 9 of 16 BEAVER VALLEY UNIT I GROUP 8 HUMAN ACTIONS EVALUATION PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M 0 T N R M 0 T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R e E D I T R E E D I T F 0 X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I Ft I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M INPUT TO RISKMAN FOR Norm.PSFWeight 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.31 0.11 1.00 HER DISTRIBUTION OPERATOR ACTIONS PSF RANKINGS FLI HER LOG(HER) OPERATOR ACTIONS PSF WEIGHTS RANGE FACTOR MEDIAN MAXHER 10 10 10 10 10 to 10 10 9.96E.01 40.0018 ZHEFL4 3 3 3 5 7 4 3 3.971 2.34E-03 -2.6305 ZHEFL4 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 S 7.5 1.11-03 ZHETT2 4 3 2 3 3 5 3 3.657 1.71E-03 .2.7675 ZHETT2 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 7.5 8.07E-04 ZHEWA2 6 a 6 7 7 6 5 6.1 1.98E402 .1.7023 ZHEWA2 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 5 1.23E-02 ZHEBV2 3 3 3 4 7 2 2 3.129 1.00E-03 -2.9080 ZHESV2 5 5 5 5 5 10 S 40 7.5 4.74E-04 ZHESV3 5 7 7 9 9 8 6 7.371 7.11E-02 .1.1479 ZHEBV3 5 5 5 0 5 10 5 35 5 4.41E402 ZHEBV4 5 6 3 4 7 5 5 5.057 6.97E-03 .2.1571 ZHEBV4 5 5 5 5 5 10 5 40 7.5 3.29E-03 ZHECD1 2 5 8 3 5 2 4 3.657 1.71E-03 .2.7675 ZHECD1 5 S 5 5 5 10 S 40 7.5 8.07E-04 ZHECTI 2 6 6 7 2 6 5 5.014 6.67E-03 -2.1758 ZHECTI 5 5 5 5 5 10 S 40 7.5 3,15E-03 ZHEIA3 6 6 6 4 4 10 5 6.714 3.68E-02 .1.4345 ZHEIA3 5 5 5 5 5 10 5 40 5 2.28E-02 ZHERI1 1 0 1 0 0 5 7 2.6 S.91E-04 -3.2285 ZHERII 5 5 5 5 5 10 5 40 10 2.222-04 ZHEIC2 2 6 4 3 4 5 4 4.214 2.99E-03 .2.5246 ZHEIC2 5 5 0 5 5 10 8 35 7.5 1.41E-03 ZHEtC1 6 7 6 2 6 2 3 4.129 2.74E-03 -2.5620 ZHEICI 5 5 0 0 0 t0 0 20 7.5 1.29E403 MIN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.34E4-05 -4.3622 NORMALIZED PSF 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.31 0.11 WEIGHTS CALIBRATION TASKS PSF RANKINGS FLI HER LOG(HER)

MAXHER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.00E+00 0.0000 FERMIHERS1 2 7 2 3 2 4 6 3.829 1.75E-03 .2.7570 STP HEOS01 4 3 6 10 10 6 3 5.671 1.804-02 -1.7447 MINHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.60E-05 .4.3372 Regression Output:

Constant 4.36218 Std Er ofY Est 0.058576 R Squared 0.999309 No. of Observations 4 Degree of Freedom 2 X CoeltsenI(s) 0.43804 Std Errof Cost. 0.0081103 Figure 8: BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 8 Attachment 1 of L-05-192 Page 10 of 16 BEAVERVALLEY UNIT 1- GROUP 9 HUMAN ACTIONS EVALUATION PEIT-CM9,10E SHAPING FACMIRS PEIT-vW~ICESKAPING FACTOIR C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M 0 T N R M O T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E D I T R E E D I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M lOIN Tf&SlqWI"FCR Num PSF WRs 00. Q117 0.17 Q17 0.17 0.17 017 1.CO HERSTRO~MN OEATCORAcIONS PSF RANINGS OPPA~TORAcTIONS PSF WEIGS PRNGE FACTIOR FKEIAN MX FIER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9gOSSOI 40.0 ZED6 2 9 5 3 7 2 9 5.833 4.40E472 -1.3584 ZHECD 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 Z77E-42 ZHECD7 2 9 8 5 8 3 9 7 1.05E.01 -109768 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 &44E.M MN HER 0 0 0 0 0 :00° 0 557E.04 42542 NIZF&WED PSF Q00 (17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 1 WBGHTS CAlURAT11OITASKS PSF RAHNGS FU HER LOtG;

..... - .11.. . . _

MAXHER 10 10 io 10 10 tO tO SrP HOD 6 5 6 6 8 6 9 MR7 4.38E-(2 -1.3585 EFRSHI(1) 2 9 5 3 7 3 9 6 1.OCE.01 -1.0=

MN INER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5X2E.04 -3.284

- -I -- Wps+/-

42542 (1)RAMNGS AFETHOFOR SMLAR Sd Err ofY Eg 02842 AMO1N INBV(1 M-EC0) I I1 ~ I RSc~ze MM975575 4

~. ----L~ -.1.-.-.- 11.-- D0 g mudFree fat i 2 X Oxfidert~s) (1325W5 SMtETOD. 0.040552 Figure 9: BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 9 Attachment I of L-05-192 Page 11 of 16 BEVERVALLEY UNT 1 - GROUP 10 HUAN AClCNS EVALIATION PFNRESNIAN3FACrICF P31CESM~-NG FAC:TCS C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M 0 T N R M O T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E D I T R E E D I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M INJTTORSKAN FOR NrbPSFVMts 0.11 axD o.z 0 0.11 0 0.11 HRCISTRlUJICN CPEFTCRACliCNS FSF PANWGS RJF ER WeG CFEPATCRA PSF Vues R*GEFACTCR MEDAN MXH110 0 10 10 10 10 110 0 amw -amm a 7 1 7 5 3 3 6 6111 I.sMsQ .1X7 a 5 0 10 10 5 10 5 45 5 9741E-ZFEOS4 7 1 7 5 3 8 8 6,444 4.855(2 -1.3120 a3EOS4 5 0 10 10 5 10 5 45 5 aca2 MNHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 204 -a"B N LSF Q11 Q00 0Z 0Z 0.11 0.22 0.11 1 UOG1S Ci^UBRATICNTASG FPSFFR>NWGS U HER LOG" MAXHER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1..0E+O 0.0XO STF F7 5 4 7 4 6 5 6 5444 28Z -1.619 MN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ZOE-04 .a6W Wwal l~p

-a4677 SlderdYE a0.1415 R~pwed Iki d~eeti 3 EweyeedFnit 1 XOdOS) Q3BW144 SWErrdCod. 0.0B99 Figure 10: BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 10 Attachment I of L-05-192 Page 12 of 16 BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1-GROUP 11 HUMAN AClnONS EVALUAMON PERFOANE SKAPFNG FACrORS PEWOR E SHAPING FACTORS C P C P I P 0 R I P O R N R M 0 T N R M 0 T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E 0 I T R E E D I T F 0 X U N T R F 0 X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M INPUTTO RSMAN FOR Nom PSF Wobt 0.13 0.13 028 0.11 Q13 0.13 013 1.00 HER D9STR18LMON CPERATORCTI09NS PSFRAWINGS FLI HER LOG01-ER OPERATORACTIONS PSF WIGHTS RANGE FACTCR MEDIAN MAXHER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 ass;0 4.0X6 2HEOF1 5 5 5 5 4 1 2 3,979 1.58904 .8aX5 ZFE0F1 5 5 10 5 5 5 5 40 10 594E.05 ZiEOF2 5 5 5 5 4 1 3 4.106 1.91E44 4.7199 ZIE0F2 5 5 10 5 5 5 5 40 10 7.15E55 ZFIEOF3 5 6 5 5 8 1 5 4.745 4.8ZEC4 43171 5 5 10 5 5 5 5 40 10 1.81E-04 ZEOF4 5 6 5 5 4 1 4 4.362 Z76E04 455- 8 ZiEOF4 5 5 10 5 5 5 5 40 10 1.04604 ZHEOF5 5 6 5 5 6 1 5 4.745 4.82E4-4 43171 DEfOF5 5 5 10 5 5 5 5 40 10 1,81E.04 ZHEXT1 8 9 10 1 4 4 8 6872 1.0BE02 -1.9744 ZFEXT1 5 5 10 0 5 5 5 35 5 6.57E4-MN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.88E07 -63114 N0RM4JZED PSF 0.13 0.13 0.2 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.13 WEIGHT5 CAUBRATIONTASKS PSFRANKINGS FLI FER LOG(-ER)

MAX HER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.0DE00 0.0X0 SEABROOKON 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0.511 1.00E-9 460.0 MN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.00E47 -63010 Rew-n1 OL41t CwWw 43113 SWErdY Es 0.015023 RSqmmed 0.99991 Nm d Obvfa 3 De m Fftevn XCodide*(s) 0.631081 SWEffdCw. 0.061882 Figure 11: BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 11 Attachment 1 of L-05-192 Page 13 of 16 BEAVERVAllEY UNIT 1- GROLP 12 HUMAN AClTONS EVAUJAlON PEFW 9SANPWANGCFT F EIC*M 344RtNG FA:IrM C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M 0 T N R M O T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E 0 I T R E E DI T F 0 X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M 6

NIUTTOR3Q4 NFCR Nam PSF Vs Gb 0G11 0.22 il il a 011 l1 1.00 HER D37~eJflN CATCRflff PSFFNSS FL HER LCG PSF VYEGS RANGEFACTCR Mv3#

MAXHER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9O.32 4a aE 9 8 8 5 2 5 6 6657 a37E02 -1.4725 10 5 10 5 5 5 5 45 5 Z09-C affCR 9 5 9 4 4 5 8 6889 42£E42 -1.3764 10 5 10 5 5 5 5 45 5 2.6E402 ZiESF 9 5 9 4 4 5 8 688 42E -1.37E4 10 5 10 5 5 5 5 45 5 260-C MN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,4015 4363 NORuL 3PPa 0. ill G220.11 Gll Gll Gil 1 VOWTS CAUIBRATONTAK PRSF R4NGS RI HR LOc(m WFXER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.0 E-C0 Qi0.0 BGROK 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5657 1.4. -1.9 ENGRCLZ 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4.111 1.03 4=0 SECU5HCr1 2 3 5 0 4 2 2 2778 1.8E3 -27447 MNHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37%05 4.4D aderdVBI GL343813 RSqmui ND,d mwiat 5 DumdFcb, 3 Xmffids1(S) G4 Sl E5rd CW. a0mm Figure 12: BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 12 Attachment 1 of L-05-192 Page 14 of 16 BEAVERVALLEY LNT 1-GROP 13 HUIAN ACTIONS EVALUAllCN FST04#Nm SAMSFACTM FM C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M 0 T N R M O T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E D I T R E E D I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M Nokm PSF~t~ OA0 0.(8 0.0 cm08a27 0.27 0.14 i.m CPERTCRACTI8 WSPAWN3 RU KR LOG"" ATCRAN PSw GMs R6*. FAC~TR MMM 8-PA a a 5 8 7 6 7.324 Sl1E40 .1.2912 3 3 3 3 10 10 5 37 5 11750 U MNHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.6S 47897 NCRMJM)PS: 0.08 QCB no3 03. 027 027 0.14 V4GS C~A11k~CNTA9G PSFPA4NOS RJ I-ER LOG" WFR10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.OO4W) 0.=

SEOL'A*RFH3C 4 1 3 0 4 4 5 3AB 58M04 -a35 SECOYDRAM 6 8 0 8 4 4 6 4757 44EB0.3 -23R 883"A4RL'81R 4 1 3 0 4 2 8 ais aez44 a422 SM"'AiRJ4R 4 1 3 0 4 4 5 a486 5.0O -az MNHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ZME0 -4%

-478M ad~rrdYEqt aL1234 RSwRWi Mm~

ND.d Omar 8

~Dogedbii 4 XCI~d e1( ) 0.4M51 ShlerdQadt 0.0167m5 Figure 13: BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 13 Attachment 1 of L-05-192 Page 15 of 16 BEA\ERVAllEY INT GROP 14 IMN ACnlCN EVALUALT1CN FSWCR*NEX 9SFR4 FACrCRS PCF#* E 9ING FACT C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M 0 T N R MO T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E CL E A S R E E D I T R E E D I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M 1NRJTTOR9TNFCR Nam PSF2!ts 013 013 0.13 013 00 0Q 0Q13 1.00 ATCRSPSPAN3NGS RF FR LCEF CEATCR OCNS P9 VUGSW RA.3EF5CR KM MWFKR 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9\1 4Q0182 Z-Ee a 6 8 5 4 4 5 5579 -21819 4343 ZH34SF 5 5 5 5 10 3 5 7.5 a11603 MNKER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 4.9123 NaEDPSF 0.13 013 013 013 026 08 0Q13 1 UE43ai CAU5ABPATTAS6 WR4MNNS RI KER LOG-E MoXKER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.X)CO Q0C0 RQGCALa3 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 6S 1.41R2 A1.M PFGCA-3.2 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4.079 1.3 -a00 FLGCALa3 7 6 7 6 7 6 6 652 26 -1.A PLGC.La4 9 8 9 9 9 9 9 aq 1.501 4M9 MNKER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.CE05 6&]0

.491225 SW8rdYEt 4.98MZ NDd Cbmaio 6 DVudieeu.m 4 XOizDs1(s) Q4E9C9 d rdC. Q016M Figure 14: BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 14 Attachment 1 of L-05-192 Page 16 of 16 BEAVERVAEYUNIT 1- GROUP 15 HUMN AClONS EVALUAON PTF$ S1AN3 FACRM PFB RV4MSWPINGFACTCRS C P C P I P 0 R I P O R N R M 0 T N R M O T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E D I T R E E D I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M Nom PSF t1s 0.11 0.11 OZ 011 0l11 OM a11 1.0D CffRATRACR; PSFRMNGS FL HER LOGW COERWAORAcMN PSF VSGMS R*M3EFACTR MMN MWXHER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 RO9301 40022 a-BXT2 8 9 10 1 4 9 9 7.%7 12Er01 48911 Z EXT2 5 5 10 5 5 10 5 45 3 1.E601 MNHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 154EC4 -18117 NIUZEDPEF 0.11011 0. 0.11 0.11 0al Qa11 MEGHIS CMBRATIONTASM PSF R WN04S RU IER - LOIG WHXHER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.0EtO0 QDDD DCZE1 2 2 1 5 5 3 4 2889 1SED3 -Z8ZS STPH1E7 7 5 5 4 5 6 6 5444 Zl;02 -1.J19 MNHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.75604 -17570 Pobwln O~pt:

481172 Sd rBrdYE RSrwom ND. dCba~mve 4 Dag d Fao 2

XF1rdis) OSni tS SWrfdEsd. 0013M9 Figure 15: BVPS-1 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 15 Aftachment 2 of L-05-192 BVPS-2 Sensitivity Study HRA Worksheets

Enclosure 2 Attachment 2 of L-05-192 Attachment 2 of L-05-192 Page 1 of 11 BEAVERVAl+/-EY LNT2 - GF.P 1 HU\IINTCNIS EVALUA1aN BFECEW 9R-G FFCrS FE 9TM34AMGFACIrS C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R MO T N R M O T T E PC R T E P C R E C LE A S E C L E A S R E ED I T R E E D I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M INRJr7ORSWMF:CR NImPSFW9" 0116 a233 Q116 Q116 a116 0233 (007 1 I-5CaSTRBwNc~

CPATCR S PSFF1 RU FER L1M43l tPEPATCRKl@ PSFVetB<S a8HR 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 4A01 419W1 affm 2 8 4 2 3 9 6 565 3AWE -1A 5 10 5 5 5 10 5 45 5 Z13EIQ aim 5 8 4 5 5 7 5 60 53 -127EOW Z-EFR1 5 10 5 5 5 10 5 45 5 U-ZH3AA1 7 8 7 5 5 6 5 6A0 7SE42 -1.1C 2HE&A 5 10 5 5 5 10 0 40 5 491652 Z 3 7 8 7 5 5 6 5 640 72X-(2 -1.1t0 5 10 5 5 5 10 0 40 5 491602 Dew 7 8 7 7 10 6 6 7.8 21401 47MO 5 10 5 5 5 10 5 45 3 1.7150 MNFER 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 57EC04 432W Q116 02Z3 0a116 a116 (1116 0M ao07 I CAUMTIONTAS FRFt4N3 RS R KU LOG"R MkXKR 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 1.00 ODOE+W FEFM 4 6 4 4 5 4 4 4.S14 431E,03 -2310 STPIE3U 7 7 8 5 8 8 6 7.1628 1201 40701 MNFER 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.(1W -a15EP Qrda -4216M71 SdErdY~t 0.411078t6 R84we agofim N36dCiaefs 4 Degdsd1in 2 Xnlidos) 0.48724584 Sd rrdQt. 0.087443MB Figure 16: BVPS-2 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group I Attachment 2 of L-05-192 Page 2 of 11 BEAVERVAILEY UNIT 2 - GROUP 2 HUMAN ACTIONS EVALUATION P8WK SHAMNG FACIRS PEWR'E SHAPINAG FACTIO C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M 0 T N R MO T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E D I T R E E 0 T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M NornPSFVftgMts 00.111.111 om 0.111 0.111 om.0111 1 HER DSTBLITICI OPERTORICNS PS PRNKNGS PU HER LO3(H3 RA1GEFACrOR lMMIA MkXHER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.541.01 -1113041 a<W1 1 7 7 6 9 2 4 5 9.15SI03 -Z.04E0 5 5 10 5 5 10 5 45 7.5 4.3203 Z ED 1 8 8 8 9 2 5 U.W7 133E12 -1.88E+00 5 5 10 5 5 10 S 45 5 82E0 DE0S3 1 8 8 8 9 5 7 6,55W 2201-02 -1.66E+.0 5 5 10 5 5 10 5 45 5 1.36E.42 ZDO4 1 8 8 8 9 8 8 73W3 3A41E2 -1.47EtC0 5 5 10 5 5 10 5 45 5 21IE.02 Z-ESL4 2 8 8 9 9 7 8 7333 3.41E42 -1.47Et00 5 5 10 5 5 10 5 45 5 2.11E.02 ZHtT2 8 9 10 1 4 9 9 7.65T 4.12E42 -1.39E.C0 ZFIEScrA 5 5 10 5 5 10 5 45 S 2.54MO ZFET4 8 9 10 5 4 9 9 &1111 529E42 -12 0 5 5 10 5 5 10 5 45 5 3.2BE.02 MN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 A44EC4 4C0E4 0.111 0.111 0.22 0.111 Q111I 022 0.111 CAUBRATICNTASKS PSF RANNGS FU HFER LOG(HER MAX ER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5.00E01 -3.01E01 DC3-EOS1 2 2 1 5 5 3 4 Z09 1.5003 -Z82E.00 EWL (1) 1 8 8 8 9 4 5 W1111 Z0E-W -Z70E4W STPHWOR 7 5 5 4 5 6 6 54444 Z0812 -1.61E00 MN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5603 -Z82Et00 RB n-OV cmsart .a26408562 (1)PAKIAEHSMSNA SW Oro YEst 0.W9738723 AC11CN INSW2(Z-1190 RS~aW0,6979M8 No diQm velicri S Degsd~meeftn 3 XQ tdm1(s) 0.24507073 SdEeT of0. Q00333Sw Figure 17: BVPS-2 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 2 Attachment 2 of L-05-192 Page 3 of 11 BEAVERVALLEY UMT 2- GRCUP 3 HLKN ONS BVALUATICN FP8WCR*NMSPt4FACTC FEWCE9SFWINGFACICR C P C P I P O R I P O R N R M O T N R MO T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E D I T R E E D I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S M

E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S INUTkTORSqN^FCR Norm PS:Whi~fil11 o 0.1110.11 0.167 M222 I FRUFSTRAO N CAETCRACfJ PSRFRNI RIJ IER LOG"" CPEPATCRACrK PSFMO-rrS R4NGE FP CM MON MkB 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2IE-01 *&iO M2 4 1 8 5 10 8 8 7.16S7 6.7M02 -1.17E4W 5 0 5 5 10 10 10 45 5 4.15FQ ZE 1 2 8 9 9 7 7 6.7Z2 5eE'02 -12500 5 5 5 5 5 10 10 45 5 3,46E-M MNiR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.47SE -*Z4E(

NIvWJZEDPSF 0.11106 0.111 111 Q167 022 om maimr C T1ACNTAM PSFRRhHNG Ri FER LWe*

MVXF61 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.&bE4W 00.&EO SlPiF 1 6 4 6 3 10 10 3 64444 1BMQ -1,74E4t FEFM RE7 6 7 6 8 6 5 8 6.5 1 2 -*14W MNER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 &aE3 -Z1E4W ivessi-iPtn C3*at -Z459 SadrdYEV 0J74510D RSqmad 06013401 Nhdfua#= 4 DEg dFReatn 2 Xmdider(s) i179351546 SWird0. 0.1i Figure 18: BVPS-2 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 3 Attachment 2 of L-05-192 Page 4 of 11 BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2- ACTION GROUP 4 HUMAN ACTIONS EVALUAllON PERFOCE SH4AING FACTRS PERFNCE SHAPING FACTS C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M O T N R M O T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E D I T R E E D I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M INPIUT TO RISKQWA FOR NcrrnPSFW 0.125 0125 0.125 Q125 0.125 0.125 0.25 1 HER DSTRIBlrION (PERATORAClTONS PSFRA4NNGS FU HER LOGQ OPRATCRTNS PSF WBGHTS RANGE FACTOR NIAN MAXHER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.76B01 -7.55E41 ZFW1 2 4 8 4 6 3 8 5.38 5,97E03 -222E00 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 40 7. Z82E503 ZHU2 2 4 8 4 6 1 8 5.13 4.97E.03 -2.3E4W0 ZHEMU2 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 40 7.5 Z35603 ZFEUW 2 4 8 4 6 7 8 5.88 8.60E03 -Z07Et00 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 40 7l5 4.05E43 ZFEM4 2 4 8 4 6 9 8 6.13 13E002 -15E9200 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 40 5 6840E-03 ZFEWM1 2 5 8 6 6 0 8 5.38 5.97.03 -22E400 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 40 7.5 Z82E403 UN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.17E44 4a93E200 NOFWALUZEDPSF 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.25 WEIGHTS CNJRATICNTASKS PSFRANQNNS FU HER LCG(HER M4X HER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.00E-31 -1.00E+C0 STP HERC4 3 2 1 8 5 6 6 4.625 9.82604 -. 010E+0 TMHTIBI(1) 2 4 8 4 6 4 8 5.50 624602 -1292400 FERM HECT3 4 6 3 3 3 3 3 a50 1.15E403 .294E#00 MNHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0E04 *40D2E+

ca7art -3.9307 (1)RAWNGS ARETSE ORSMLAR StdErc(Y Ed 0.66739322 ACN INBfBV2 CZHE2) RSqcp1 0.79766980 ND.d Obewvabiav S Deg dF nemb. 3 X Coeffid(s) 0.317487722 SWErr dCo. 0.t 18i6 Figure 19: BVPS-2 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 4 Attachment 2 of L-05-192 Page 5 of 11 BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2 -ACTION GROUP 5 HUMAN ACTIONS EVALUATION PEPIORFANCE SHAPING FACTORS PWRFOF*ANCE SHAPING FACTORS C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M 0 T N R M 0 T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E 0 I T R E E D I T F 0 X U N T R F 0 X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M INIJT TO RISKUAN FOR NmwPAF Weak*4 0t145 0.145 (114 0145 0.14 0.14 0145 1 HER ISTRIBUllON OPERATOR ACTIONS PSF RPANINGS FU HER LOG"" OPERATOR ACTIONS PSF WEIGHTS RANGE FACTOR MEEDIAN MAX HER 10 10 10 10 10 10 9.75E-01 -1.12E-02 ZHEAF2 2 3 3 2 2 201 3.3BE-04 -. 47E+O0 ZHEAF2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 10 1.26E-04 ZHEAF3 2 3 3 2 2 201 3.38E-04 4.47E600 ZHEAF3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 10 126E-04 ZHEOCt 2 6 6 7 2 4.30 3.31E-03 -Z48E600 ZHEC1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 1.56E603 ZHECC2 2 6 7 7 2 4.87 582E-03 -Z24E+00 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 Z75E-03 ZHECD1 2 4 3 3 2 101 9.10E-04 -3.04400 ZHECD1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 10 3.42E-04 2 5 8 5 6 4.70 4.93E-03 -Z31E+00 ZHEC2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 Z33E03 ZHEC12 1 2 4 1 3 242 5.05E-04 4.3E6400 ZHEC12 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 10 1.90E-04 ZHECS1 3 7 7 7 7 8.14 Z20E5-2 -1.69E400 ZHECS1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 5 128E-02 ZHEFL1 2 7 6 4 7 428 325E-03 -249E40D a EFLI 5 5 5 5 0 0 5 25 7.5 1.53E403 ZHEHH1 1 7 5 5 2 430 3.2E-03 -Z48E+00 ZHEHH1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 1.56E-03 ZHEHH2 2 2 3 1 3 257 5.87E-04 -423E400 ZHEHF1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 10 2.206-04 ZHEMA2 2 6 5 3 8 4.99 6.56E-03 -Z18E400 ZHENIA2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 3.10E-03 ZHEO61 5 3 5 3 3 173 1.87E-03 -Z73E+D0 ZHEOB1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 8.81E604 ZHEOt 2 3 5 2 5 314 1.04E-03 -298E+D0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 4.92E-04 ZHEOF1 2 4 5 2 3 115 1.05E-03 -298E400 ZHEOF1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7,5 4.94E-04 ZHEOF2 2 1 1 2 2 1.87 293E-04 -3.3E+00 ZHEOF2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 10 1.10E-04 ZHEOR1 2 3 5 3 4 143 1.38E-03 -Z858E00 ZHEORI 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 8.53E04 ZHEOR2 2 3 5 3 4 185 Z10E-03 -Z68E+00 ZHEOF2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 9.93E-04 ZHEOS5 1 4 2 2 4 286 7.88E-04 4.10E600 ZHEOS5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 30 10 Z96E-04 ZHEP1 0 0 1 5 3 Z29 4.45E-04 4 35E600 ZH11E5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 10 1.67E-04 ZJERE5 1 2 8 9 9 513 7,54E.03 -212E+00 ZHERE5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 3.565E3 ZHERED 1 2 2 6 2 230 4.48E-04 4335E800 ZHERED 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 10 1.68E-04 ZHERR1 2 2 5 5 4 3,14 1.04E-03 -Z98E+00 ZHERR1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 4.89E-04 ZHERR2 2 2 5 5 4 314 1.04E-03 -.Z98E400 ZHERFR2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 4.89E-04 ZHESE2 2 7 1 2 5 287 7.92E-04 4 10E+00 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 10 Z97E-04 ZHESE5 5 4 5 2 7 4.14 Z82E-03 -Z55E800 ZHESE5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 1.33E-03 ZHESL2 3 2 8 5 4 429 328E-03 -Z48E400 ZHESL.2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 1.55E-03 ZHESL3 7 10 9 9 10 7.88 1.18E-01 -9.288-01 ZHESL3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 3 9.41E-02 ZH-EIB(ICI) 2 7 1 2 5 287 7.92E-04 410E40D ZHETB1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 7.5 3.74E-04 MINHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.55E-05 -4.34E800 NORAAIZED PSF 0.145 0.145 0.14 0.145 0.14 0.14 .145 WBGHTS Figure 20: BVPS-2 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 5 Attachment 2 of L-05-192 Page 6 of 11 CALIBRATION TASKS PSF RANKINGS FLI HER LOG(HER)

MAXHER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9.00E-01 -4.58E-02 TMI HSRI (1) 2 3 5 3 4 5 5 3.85 4.74E.02 -1.32E+00 TMI HSR2 (2) 2 3 5 3 4 2 5 3.43 1.27E.04 -3.90E+00 STP HEOD03 6 6 6 5 6 6 9 6.57 4.38E402 -1.36E+00 TM HCD1(3) 2 4 3 3 2 3 4 3.01 1.27E-04 -3.90E+00 STP HEOSLI 5 3 4 3 3 3 6 3,87 2.13E-03 *2.67E+00 STP HEOC01 6 3 2 3 4 4 4 3.72 2.31 E-03 -2.64E+00 MIN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.00E-04 4.OOE+00 NOTES: Regression Output (1) RANKINGS ARE THOSE FOR SIMILAR Constant -4.34244300 ACTION IN BV2 (ZHEOR1) SWEn of Y Est 0.792487245 (2) RANKINGS ARE THOSE FOR SIMILAR R Squared 0.747130953 ACTION IN BV2 (ZHEOR2) No.of Observations a (3) RANKINGS ARE THOSE FOR SIMILAR Degrees of Freedom 6 ACTION IN (ZHECD1) g XCoelicdent(s) 0.433127309 StdErrof Coet. 0.10287016 Figure 20 (Cont.): BVPS-2 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 5 Attachment 2 of L-05-192 Page 7 of 11 EAVERVAWEYLNT2 -A MCIN GROLP 6 lJVIANNICN1C EVAIWflh FE9GRWX~qVFACrCR F 5?NCE9GMFiCrfi; C P C P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R M O T N R MO T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E CL E A S R E E D I T R E E D I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M PiAffMRSWM^FCR a13 a3a0143 013 0.143 0 0as 1 FEROSIRTH1JCN FU FER CFATCRACIS PSFVaGOS 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 174501 MWM~

a133 2 0 2 O 3 2 7 aW 3.84603 -Z42E#0 NMI 5 5 5 5 5 0 10 35 75 1.81E43 MNFER 0 53K04 LtX NDWX031SF O.13 as a143 a143 a143 0.00 0f VWS F5FR*43 FU FER 101010 10 10 10 10 10 snow 405E01 DCX1 (1) 2 0 2 0 3 2 7 WD 1.7(E03 -277E#0 FW FBM2 3 4 3 3 5 5 8 4m 1.18iE2 -1S>CO MNlRR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14i3m AMEOW NOME PFQipt Cb C4 O (1)R*MAMM1EERR9MLAR SdrirdYEt 32T401 ACNIND9H3M) RS~wW 9SE101 NhdCbiOU 4 DsmdFtwin ZaW x~dmi"S) 0.241745 SdBrdO. 0.04S3 Figure 21: BVPS-2 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 6 Attachment 2 of L-05-192 Page 8 of 11 BEAVERVAllEY UNIT 2 - ACTION GROUP 7 HUMAN AC1TONS EVAUWAllON PFNCEW' S-4AIAN FCTRS FfVNSH*AR4N3 FACTORS C P C P I P O R I P O R N R M O T N R MO T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E D I T R E E D I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M Nonn PSF VV~t 0.12 024 014 012 0.12 0.12 0.14 1 EPATCRAcTIS PSFR S FUJ HIER L O OPAXORACTIONS PSFWQBGHTS RbJ FAC~TOR ?MAN MXFER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5.2mW *27eW ZHB=1 5 8 5 6 2 8 58 1.84E42 -1.74E400 ZFEM5 5 10 5 5 5 5 10 45 5 1.14E42 ZH1 5 7 3 2 5 2 a77 7.2EW -Z.12EOO 2HWI 5 10 10 5 5 5 5 45 7.5 3.55E03 ZI 3 7 2 2 2 5 6 424 1.04E42 -1.961OW ZFEL42 5 10 5 5 5 5 5 40 5 643E43 ZIA3 3 8 7 9 9 9 6 7.35 &67E42 -1.0E1WD ZHELA3 5 10 5 5 5 5 5 40 5 5,37E42 ZHE0i2 5 9 5 3 3 2 8 533 24E42 -1.0D ZKm 5 10 5 5 5 5 5 40 5 I aZim 2 9 1 2 5 1 6 4.35 1.12E42 *1.95EO ZFEM 5 10 5 5 5 5 5 40 5 69eE43 ZHESE4 2 9 2 2 7 1 6 4.73 1.45E -i1.4E4O ZHESE4 5 10 5 5 5 5 5 40 5 &97E ZEM 2 9 1 2 5 1 6 435 1.1242 -1.94W zwm 5 10 5 5 5 5 5 40 5 69E03

-EIM3 2 9 2 2 7 1 6 4.73 1.45E42 -1.84E+O ZHETB3 5 10 5 5 5 5 5 40 5 &97E-03 FANHM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 573E41 124EP4D NOMKOM~PSF0.12 0.2430.135 0,122 0.122 (122 0.135 M~GMl CNUfBfATICNTASKS PSFR*ANS FU FER LO SMe MfX HER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.0(E.W OODE400 STP HEWI02 6 4 2 3 4 7 8 4.76 &8D43 -ZO*E+00 PA6(1) 5 9 5 3 3 7 6 5.86 1.0DE42 -ZO*E#

DCZI-S1 7 5 4 7 6 6 8 6.00 5.49S4 -124W INHER 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 01OE3 -&OE+

_a -324218576 (1)R*1INGS AETKW ORSMALAR ACTION INBv2 R(EOB) RSWWW .n0'09 NM da~mmakm 5 Deg ed Fiesch. 3 XCd&dwts) 0.29W=

SW rff 0.055441061 Figure 22: BVPS-2 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 7 Attachment 2 of L-05-192 Page 9 of 11 BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2 - ACTION GROUP 8 HUMAN ACTIONS EVALUATION PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS C P C P I P O R I P 0 R N R M 0 T N R M 0 T T E P C R T E P C R E C L E A S E C L E A S R E E D I T R E E D I T F 0 X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G r s G E S M E G Y S G E S NI INPUT TO RISKMAN FOR Norm.PSF Weights 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.116 0.118 0.256 0.128 1 HER DISTRIBUTION OPERATOR ACTIONS PSF RANKINGS FU HER LOG(HER) OPERATOR ACTIONS PSF WEIGHTS RANGE FACTOR MEDIAN MAX HER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 3.535-01 -4.53E-01 ZHECD3 2 3 3 2 2 0 5 2.13 1.21E-03 .2.92E+00 ZHECD3 5 5 5 5 5 10 5 40 7,5 5.72E-04 ZHECD4 2 5 8 5 6 4 7 5.12 1.04E-02 -1.98E+00 ZHECD4 5 5 5 5 5 10 5 40 5 6.47E-03 ZHEIA1 1 3 2 5 2 7 3 3.76 3.91E-03 -2.41E+00 ZHEIA1 5 5 5 5 5 10 5 40 7.5 1.85E-03 ZHEOT1 1 0 1 0 0 5 B 2.30 1.37E-03 -2.86E+00 ZHEOT1 5 5 5 0 5 10 5 35 10 5.15E-04 ZHEREE 1 2 2 6 2 4 5 3.23 2.68E-03 -2.57E+00 ZHEREE 5 5 5 5 5 10 5 40 7.5 1.27E-03 ZHERI1 1 0 1 0 0 5 7 2.43 1.515-03 -2.82E+00 ZHERII 5 5 5 5 5 10 5 40 7.5 7.11 E-04 ZHESE1 2 4 2 1 4 7 5 4.03 4.79E-03 -2.32E+00 ZHESEI 5 5 5 5 5 10 5 40 7.5 2.26E-03 ZHESLI 2 1 5 2 3 4 6 3.40 3.02E-03 -2.52E+00 ZHESL1 5 5 5 5 5 10 5 40 7.5 1,435-03 ZHESL.5 2 4 5 2 4 8 8 5.17 1.09E-02 -1.96E+00 ZHESL5 5 5 5 5 5 10 5 40 5 6.74E-03 ZHEWA2 2 3 7 4 2 5 5 4.15 5.20E503 -2.28E+00 ZHEWA2 5 5 5 5 0 10 5 35 7.5 2.45E-03 ZHEWA4 2 8 7 7 10 5 6 5.94 1.89E-02 -1.72E+00 ZHEWA4 5 5 5 5 5 10 6 40 5 1.17E-02 MIN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.61E-04 -3.58E+00 NORMALIZED PSF 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.115 0.116 0.256 0.128 WEIGHTS CALIBRATION TASKS PSF RANKINGS FU HER LOG(HER)

MAX HER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.00E+00 0.00E+00 STP HEOSLI 5 3 4 3 3 3 6 3.77 2.13E-03 -2.87E+00 FERMI HERSI 2 7 2 3 2 4 a 3.78 1.75E-03 -2.76E+00 STP HEOS01 6 4 6 3 10 10 3 6.50 1.80E-02 -1.74E+00 DC ZHEOXI (1) 2 1 5 2 3 7 6 4.16 3.20E-03 -2.49E+00 MIN HER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.00E-03 -3.00+E00 NOTE: Regression Outpu8.

Constar m -3.583059682 (1) RANKINGS ARE THOSE FOR SIMILAR Sid Err of Y Est 0.455189634 ACTION IN BV2 (ZHESL1) R Sque red 0.867599013 No. of C0bservations 6 Degrewi of Freedom 4 X Coeff Ident(s) 0.31302434 Sid Err of Coef. 0.061141234 Figure 23: BVPS-2 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 8 Attachment 2 of L-05-192 Page 10 of 11 AV5VPElEYVI NLT2 - CTNGRLP9 HUMNMPUhCNS EVPLU0TICN PHEV¶SRNG FfiC1aI Fa 9WFPi C P C P I P O R I P 0 R N R MO T N R M O T T E P C R T E P C R E CL E A S E C L E A S R E E D I T R E E DI T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I R I I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S m E G Y S G E S M WJT1OR94~CRN NmPSV3FW 0 Q176 Q.176Q176 0176 a11180.176 1 FEROSTrRwT4N CPERkTCRXTO P3FR4*FU R FKR LUX4 CFERSATCllaqG~ PFV5G4 RB*EFA<CR M3O1M M4XFER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 62E01 .26O 2H=6 2 9 3 3 7 3 9 582 7.2 -1.12EC 3-EI 6 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 474E2 3H 2 9 8 5 8 4 9 7.5 1.6W -7*W 34=7 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 132E1 3136 2 4 5 4 5 2 1 359 2A40 -1.61E.XW ae5w 0 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 15E02 MNFER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 4C -2.ECO kCRVJMP E 0 0.176 0178 0.176 0.176 0.118 0.176 MvZDP3 Cq5AfTlCNTA9G P8FRJNG* RF FER LOXE WFER 10 1010 10 10 10 10 10 1EE.D Q'E0 STPFEMI 6 6 6 5 6 8 9 6&M 4.E02 -1i.O E3- 8Il (1) 2 9 3 3 7 3 9 WO lICOl -1.&E.W MNFER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5aEC -2CO NOE Om~ -3O371 (1)RF4MAFETHtIE-CR9M*AR SdE~rdYst 0.3D ACMCN INve2 6 RSaWW 09151131 NbdCOMfus 4 DdRuebni 2 Xciftos) 02zm17s41 SdBrdo. aIm67"8 Figure 24: BVPS-2 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 9 Attachment 2 of L-05-192 Page 11 of 11 EA\ERVAIlEYlSr2- GRPIO HILfNMl5NSBAW61CN c P c P I P 0 R I P 0 R N R MO T N R MO T T E PC R T E P C R E C LE A S E CL E A S R E ED I T R E ED I T F D X U N T R F D X U N T R A I I RI I E S A I I R I I E S C N T E N M S U C N T E N M S U E G Y S G E S M E G Y S G E S M PR~frMR9MFCRN NiiIW 014 1140,2 9 QM01 014 014 1 KROSnREUNa CPSWF H0c FGRAN3S RI KR lUM lUCCD FEROSW R*MFP M3A XFR 10 10 - 10 10 10 10 10 10 99B1 -4.78 8

6l 9 10 t 4 4 8 7.5 28R -1.54ECO 5 5 10 0 5 5 5 5 176 MNFER 0 0 0 0 0 00 GD05T 43c G14 G014 29 O Q14 a14 014 I O PAKTA6S PF R RI KR t MWFER 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.OXeW 0k scE3mXKC 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0&14 1.XEt -8a MNKR 0-0 0 -0 0 0 0 0 SOEM -Wm10

-- Peff::dX :I:Lt L :

- - - Sd1rdYs 4ZEC2 RS9uwi QS115

-- Cf--wO" 3 dReb1n 1 Fexgees) SiLou WFffd O. QQ58m Figure 25: BVPS-2 Pre-EPU Sensitivity Model SLIM Worksheet Group 10

L-05-192, Supplemental PRA Information in Support of License Amendment Request Nos. 302 and 173, Extended Power Uprate (EPU)

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