ML20011E160

LER 90-001-00:on 900102,RCIC Removed from Svc & HPCI Rendered Inoperable,Placing Unit in Tech Spec 3.0.3.Caused by Personnel Error.Individual Counseled & Standing Instruction 90-003 issued.W/900201 Ltr

ML20011E160
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	02/01/1990
From:	Harness J, Jones T CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
BSEP-90-0084, BSEP-90-84, LER-90-001, LER-90-1, NUDOCS 9002080244
Download: ML20011E160 (4)

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, Brunswick Nuclear Project- J

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February 1, 1990-i s .

FILE: B09-13510C 10CFR50.73 SERIAL: BSEP/90-0084 :i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

'A1TN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555' BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 1 j DOCKET NO. 50-325 '

, LICENSE NO.'DPR-71 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-90-001 y- . Gentlemen:

s In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed 'j

-Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for ~

1 a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours, (f

J. L. Harness, General Manager-l' Brunswick Nuclear Project

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i Enclosure cc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. E. G. Tourigny BSEP NRC Resident Office .

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787'*' Coincident Inoperability of HPCI and RCIC Placing Unit 1 in Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 for Two Minutes caused by Personnel Error While Researching a' Clearance SVONT DATS (98 LlR 86UhlDim 16) RSPORT Daf t 176 OTHth p Acettitt8 terv0LV60 51 MONT H DAY YEAR YEAR QQ, "*lM MONT H DAY vtAR ' AC' Lit s Nauss Docnti NvMetRisi j 0l5l0l0l0l l l l

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( On January 2, 1990, the Unit I reactor was operating at 100*. power. RCIC was l removed from service. !!PCI, ADS, CS, and LPCI systems were operable in standby readiness. At 1542 IIPCI was rendered inoperable for approximately two minutes which placed the unit in Technical Specification 3.0.3. The cause of l the event was personnel error on the part of a Senior Reactor Operator who failed to research plant drawings in accordance with the Equipment Clearance Procedure. The failure resulted in the circuit breaker which supplies power to ,

the llPCI inverter being opened under a clearance for RCIC. The circuit has both llPCI and RCIC loads. The involved SRO was counseled, a memo was written q to licensed personnel highlighting the requirements of the Equipment Clearance Procedure, clearances are currently being researched separately by two NRC i: licensed personnel and compared for discrepancies prior to approval. This event had minimal safety significance.

9 NRC F.rm 384 (659) .

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Coincident inoperability of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (llPCI/E41)

(rIIS/BJ) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC/E51) (EIIS/BN) systems.

I_njtial n Conditions The Unit I reactor was operating at 100*4 power. The RCIC system was removed from service for mal'.tenance under Limiting Condition for Operetion (LCO)

Al-89-2341. The HPCI system, the Automatic Depressurization. System (ADS)

(EI.TS/*), the A and B Core Spray (CS) (EIIS/BM) system and the A.and B Residual llent Removal / Low Pressure Coolant Injection (RHR/LPCI/ Ell) (EIIS/BO) systems were operable in standby readiness. Equipment cicarance 1-0002 was being hung on the RCIC system. ,

Event Description On January 2, 1990, clearance 1-0002 was being hung to replace the RCIC Supply L Drain Pot Inboard Drain Valve (EIIS/DN/DRN/V), 1-E 1+V57, body to bonnet gasket.

• l At 1542 the 125 volt direct current (vdc) distribut wa panel 3A circuit breaker i

number 2 (EIIS/EI/PL/bRR) was deenergized to remove power to the RCIC Steam Supply Drain Pot Drain valve, 1-E51-F025 (EIIS/BN/DRN/V).

When the circuit breaker was opened power was also removed from the HPCI steam supply drain valves and annunciation was received in the Control Room [1-A-1 l (2-5) on panel P601) (EIIS/ ANN) indicating that the power to the llPCI inverter *

(EIIS/BJ/INVT) had been lost. (Loss of the inverter resulted in the loss of l~ HPCI flow control capability.) The circuit breaker was closed and power was restored to the inverter at approximately 1544.

This event resulted in Unit 1 HPCI being inoperable and being unabic to meet i the ACTION requirement of Technical Specification (T/S) 3.7.4, which placed the unit in T/S 3.0.3 for approximately two minutes. LCO Al-90-0001 was initiated and canceled to document the applicability of T/S LCO 3.0.3.

Past similar events include LER 1-89-015, 1-89-008, 2-89-015, 2-89-016.

Event Investigation On December 27, 1989, a clearance was requested on the 1-E51-V57 valve to replace the body to bonnet gasket in accordance with work request and job order (WR/J0) 89-AXUII. The clearance was developed by a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) in the Clearance Center on January 1, 1990. Contrary to Section 5.3.3.8 of the Equipment Clearance Procedure [ Administrative

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Instruction (AI) 58), applicable plant drawings were not utilized to identify the equipment loads off of the power supply to the 1-E51-F025 which was required to be deenergized for work on the V57 valve. Instead, the RCIC operating procedure (0P.-16) was utilized. The OP Indicated that the power ,

supply was circuit breaker two of 125 Vdc distribution panel 3A. It also l Indicated that this circuit powered the, RCIC Condensate Pump Discharge l Outboard Drain Valve to the Main Condenser (EIIS/BN/DRN/V), 1-E51-F005.

Belleving that the OP was complete, the SRO researchir.g the clearance did not reference plant drawings and consequently f ailed to identify the !!PCI equipment' loads powered from the same breaker.

Root Cause .

The cause of this event was personnel error on the part of the involved SR0; failure to research plant drawings in accordance with the Equipment Clearance ,

Procedure. A lluman Performance Evaluation was performed which determined that the SRO had used this process in the past for clearance development.

Corrective Actions The involved SRO has b,een counseled.

A memorandum was, written from the Operations Manager to 1,1 censed Personnel highlighting the requirement in AI-58 to research plant drawings and not rely on Operating Procedures when researching a clearance.

y As a result of this event, standing instruction 90-003 was' issued. The l instruction dictates that clearances be separately researched and written by two NRC licensed individuals if they are on systems which require independent verification (i.e., systems indicated in Administrative Procedure Volume 1 Book 1, Table 11.7.1). After each individual finalizes the clearance they are compared. Any_ existing dif ferences are resolved prior to authoriz.ing the clearance to be placed. This requirement is to be included in the next revision of Ale 58 which is. expected to be complete by February 28, 1990. The requirement will remain until management decides it is no longer appropriate.

Event Assessment This event had minimal safety significance because of the immediate awareness of the event and its short duration (i.e., approximately two minutes). A similar occurrence under other reasonable and credible circumstances would not have been more severe because possible involved safety related equipment is o designed to either actuate in the fall safe direction or provide a warning L annunciation.

N.C Fenn 3e6A (649)

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