ML20029D005

LER 94-005-00:on 940404,two PCIS Group 6 RIP Valves Had Dual Open/Closed (Red/Green) Indications.Cause Was Personnel Error.Corrective Action:Individuals Involved Counseled on event.W/940428 Ltr

ML20029D005
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	04/28/1994
From:	Cowan J, Mcgowan J CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
BSEP-94-0162, BSEP-94-162, LER-94-005-01, LER-94-5-1, NUDOCS 9405030236
Download: ML20029D005 (4)

Text

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CP&L i Carolina Power & Light Company ICLTJE!siErJM20S3rsmE*J#XtG2EEEE Brunswick Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461-0429 APR 2 81994 SERIAL: BSEP-94-0162 10CFR50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Cor. trol Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 850-324/ LICENSE NO. DRP-62 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2-94-005 Gentlemen:

In accordance wh.h the Cade of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73, Carolina Powcr &

Light Company st/bmits the enclosed Licensee Event Report. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is

• submitted in accordance with the format set fccth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Please refer any questions regardirag this submittal to Mr. Mark Turkal at (910) 457-3066.

Very truly yours, 1

I g

J. Cowan, Director-Site Operations Brunswick Nuclear Plant JFM/jfm Enclosures

1. Licensee Event Report

2. Summary of Commitments cc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region 11 Mr. P. D. Milano, NRR Project Manager - Brunswick Units 1 and 2 Mr. R. L. Prevatte, Brunswick NRC Senior Resident Inspector 6o

-J 9405030236 DR 940428 ADOCK 05000324 ((/

PDR l

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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5/92) EXPIRES: 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (L.ER) '"7"uTS O " 'GARo

'7EG BuRDS ESriA ~TO ENrORuE AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUGEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON. DC 20565-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-01041 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON. DC 20503 FACluTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE(3)

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2 05000324 1 of 3 TITLE I4)

Isolation of the Primary Containment Isolation System Containment Atmospheric Monitoring Valves While Hanging an Equipment Clearance.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 05000 04 04 94 94 00 04 28 94 F ACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING THIS HEPORT IS SUBMirTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or rnore of the followingH11)

MODE (9) 5 20.402(b) 20.405(c) X 50.7 3(a H 2Hiv) 73.71(b)

POWER 20.405(aH1HO 50.36(cH U 50.73(aH2Hv) 73 R c)

LEVEL (10) 0 20.405(aH 1 Hii) 50.36(cH2) 50.7?(a)(2)(vid OTHER 20.405(a H 1 Heii) 50.73(aH2Hi) 50.73(aH2HvciMA) (Specif y in Abstract 20.405(aH i Hiv) 50.73(aH2Hii) 50.73(aH2HviiiHB) and Textl 20.405(aH1Hv) 50.73(aH2Heid 50.73(aH2Hx)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER Jeanne F. McGowan, Regulatory Affairs Specialist (910) 457-2136 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUF ACTURE R O PD SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY WAR YES NO lif yes. comNete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

X DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, Le. approximately fifteen single space typewntten lines) (16)

On April 4, 1994, Unit 2 was in Refuel. At 0522 hours0.00604 days <br />0.145 hours <br />8.630952e-4 weeks <br />1.98621e-4 months <br />, a clearance was placed on the containment Atmospheric Monitoring (CAM) valve isolation logic in preparation for a scheduled modification. At 0600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br />, the Shift Supervisor noticed that two Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 Reactor Instrument Penetration (RIP) valves had dual open/ closed (red / green) indications. These valves typically display dual valve position when an isolatien signal has been received. A detailed Reactor Turbine Gauge Board (RTGB) walkdown reveal'd that the CAM valves on RTGB Panel XU-51 had closed (the valve switches were still in the cpen position). A review of the recent evolutions determined that the clearance evolution at 0522 had caused the Group 6 CAM valves to reposition. The cause of the event was personnel error. The Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) preparing the clearance improperly diagnosed the logic and failed to recognize that the associated PCIS relay operation would cause both division I and II CAM valves to isolate. Corrective actions include counseling the involved SRO and reviewing the event with shift Operations. The safety significance was minimal. The isolation logic operated as designed. The CAM system was previously removed from service for the outage.

The cause classification for this event per the criteria of NUREG-1022 is personnel error.

NRC FdRM 366A U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 15/92) EXPIRES: 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS

- INF ORM ATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50 0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTSREcARD,NooVRDENEST,MA1,TOTHE,N,ORMAT,0NAND TEXT CONTINUATION RtCORDS M ANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBC 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR

• REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHtNGTOE DC 20055-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150 01041, OrFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION Brrmewick Steam Electric Plant ""*"*" """""

Unit. 2 05000324 2 of 3 94 00 TEXT ll1 more space is required, use additionalNRC form 366A 's) (17)

TITLE Isolation of the Primary Containment Isolation System Containment Atmospheric Monitoring Valves While Hanging an Equipment Clearance.

INITIAL CONDITIONS On April 4, 1994, Unit 2 was in a Refuel Outage which started on March 26, 1994. Equipment Alignment Sheet (EAS) Tags were in place on the CAM valve switches associated with a Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC) System monitor (CAC-AT-1260) with the valves in the open position. The EAS tags were in place to support a Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT).

EVENT NA'RRATIVE At 0522 hours0.00604 days <br />0.145 hours <br />8.630952e-4 weeks <br />1.98621e-4 months <br />, a clearance was placed on the CAM valve isolation logic in preparation for a scheduled modification to provide divisional separation for two valves in the Containment Atmospheric Dilution system. The clearance was placed on 120V breaker 15 in Panel 2-32B and 120V breaker 1 in Panel 2-2A. These circuits feed the Containment Atmospheric Control System CAM valve isolation logic and generate a simulated isolation signal when deenergized. There were no annunciators in the Control Room associated with the isolation once the logic was deenergized.

At 0600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br />, the Unit 2 Shift Supervisor noticed that two PCIS Group 6 RIP valves had dual open/ closed (red / green) indications. These valves typically display dual valve position when an isolation signal has been received. A detailed RTGB walkdown revealed that the CAM valves for the CAC- AT- 1260 monitor had also closed (the valve switches were still in the open position). A review of recent evolutions on Unit 2 determined that the clearance evolution at 0522 had caused the Group 6 CAM valves to reposition.

There were EAS tags on the CAM valves switches for the CAC-AT-1260 at the time of the CAM isolation. The tags were in place to support an LLRT. The LLRT was not affected by the isolation of the CAM valves because the test had been completed prior to the isolation.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv) . While the Primary Containment Isolation System is not required in Operational Condition 5 (Refuel), the event is reportable as an unnecessary challenge of an engineered safety feature.

CAUSE OF EVENT The cause of the event was personnel error. The Senior Reactor Operator preparing the clearance improperly diagnosed the agic and f ailed to recognize that the associated PCIS relay operation would cause both division I and II CAM valves to isolate. The SRO was not aware that special procedures were available as resources for determining the effects of deenergizing 120V circuits powered from the Emergency Busses.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The SRO involved in the clearance preparation was counseled on the event.

2. A Standing Instruction has been issued to inform Operations and Clearance Center

}

C FORM 366A U. S. NUCLEAR REGULAVORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5/92)

• EXPlRES: 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORM ATION AND TEXT CONTINUATION RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON. DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3160 0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603.

l FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL RtVISION Brunswick Steam Electric Plant """*'" " # "'"

Unit 2 05000324 3 of 3 94 00 TEXT Uf more space is required, use additionaltvRC form 366A 's) (17)

Personnel of the existence of the Emergency Bus load list special procedures.

3. The event will be reviewed with shift Operations.

All corrective actions will be completed by June 30, 1994.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT The safety significance was minimal. The Primary Containment Isolation System is not required in Operational Condition 5 (Refuel). The isolation logic operated as designed.

The CAM system had previously been removed from service for the outage.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS Previous similar events are described in LERs 1-92-013 and 2-92-004.

EIIS COI?PONENT IDENTIFICATION System / Component EIIS Code Containment Atmospher?.c Control System BB Containment Atmospheric Monitoring System IK Primary Containment Isolation System JE

a

. Enclosure List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by Carolina Power &

Light Company in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by Carolina Power & Light Company. They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Manager-Regulatory Affairs at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.

Committed Commitment date or outage

1. Review this event with Shift Operations. June 30, 1994 3

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