ML20042D355

LER 89-019-00:on 891208,Group 6 Isolation Occurred W/Standby Gas Treatment Sys Auto Start During Performance of MST-SCIS21R.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Work Crew Counseled.Calibr Procedures May Be revised.W/900102 Ltr

ML20042D355
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	01/02/1990
From:	Harness J, Harris T CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
BSEP-89-1122, LER-89-019-01, LER-89-19-1, NUDOCS 9001090050
Download: ML20042D355 (5)

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Carolina Power & Light Company ,

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, Brunswick Nuclear Project P. O. Box 10439 j-" g - -

Southport, NC' 28461-0429 January 2, 1999

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' FILE: 'B09-135100- 10CFR50 '. 73 '

' SERIAL: BSEP/89-1122-.

'U.S..' Nuclear Regulatory Commission l a: -ATIN: ' Document Control Desk

'- > JWashington,,DC 20555 a 4:' BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2 DOCKET-NO. 50-324 LICENSE No.~ DPR-62 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2-89-019 4

Gentlemen: >

In accordance with Title 10 to'the Cod'e of-Federal Regulations, the enclosed

+ Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for: - ,

a written report within thirty (30) days of-a reportable occurrence and is in

.accordance.with:the~ format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours, J

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• J. L. Harness, General Manager. l Brunswick Nuclear Project-J5: TH/jlh .

-Enclosure

. cc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. E. G. Tourigny BSEP NRC Resident Office .

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NAME TELEPHONE NUW4th ARE A CODt Tony Harris, Regulatory Compliance Specialist 9l1l9 4 l 51 7 l- 12 l0l3 l 8 COMPLEf t ONE Lifst 50m EACM C0esPONENT F AILumt Ot0CRISED IN THIS REPORT 1131

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-] vis tir .. <- exPrerto suewwC4 OA Tr1 r Y] 9eo l l l AssTR ACT n, < M rue - . ... ,.. , a, ,. ,,,. . ev-, . , nei Unit 2 received a Group 6 isolation with Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System auto start during the performance of MST-SCIS21R. The technician performing the test was relanding energized leads to the B channel temperature switch when the lead popped off the screwdriver and grounded against the terminal box. This caused a blown fuse, which resulted in a loss of power to an installed jumper. The loss of pc,wer to the jamper initiated relays which in turn led to the Group 6 isolation and SBGT auto start.

A lluman Performance Evaluation was performed on the event. The cause of the event was the inadequate work practice of one handed termination of a hot lead due to not having a means of easily accessing the terminal box; Corrective actions include counseling of the involved work crew, Real Time Training for the event, and evaluation of the possibility of revising the calibration procedure to allow power to the temperature switch to be removed during the calibration. This event involved little safety significance.

NRC Perm 300 (6498

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Event ix t Group,6 isolation while performing IMST-SCIS21R'.

'Indtial Conditions / Event Description On 12/8/89,. Unit 2 was in day 91 of a 160. day scheduled refuel outage. . The reactor (EIIS/AC) was defueled, the' spent fuel pool gates (EIIS/DA/ GATE) were~ ,

installed and the vessel drained for recirculation pipe (EIIS/AS/ PSP)

> replacement.- Secondary containment (EIIS/JM) was not in affect. The Reactor ,

, . Building vcntilation fans (EIIS/VA/ FAN) were shutdown and the Reactor Building '

doors.(EIIS/NG/DR) were open. Instrumentation and Control (I&C) technicians were performing a channel calibration test of the Reactor Building Vent

Exhaust Radiation Monitoring System Channel B (EIIS/IK/ MON) per Unit 2 L Maintenance / Surveillance Test (MST)-SCIS21R, Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation L Monitoring System Channel Calibration. The A channel of the Vent Exhaust i' L

Radiation Monitoring System had been calibrated.

Event Description The B channel test required the removal of temperature switch 2-D12-TS-N010B (EIIS/IK/ MON / TIS), Reactor Building Ventilation Temperature High, for calibration. Operation of the N010B switch deenergizes relay l (EIIS/IK/ MON /RLY) D12-K83, which in turn doenergizes relay K82. Operation of the K82 relay results-in the following:

~1. . Shutdown and isolation'of the Reactor Building Ventilation System. ,

E 2. Auto start of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System (EIIS/BH).

3. Closure of the Containment Atmospheric Control Purge and Vent valves (EIIS/JM/VTV).

Deenergizing the K82 relay during this portion of the test is prevented by a previously installed jumper per procedure.

Following completion of calibration of the NC10B switch, step 7.5.95 states

" Replace and Reconnect Temperature Switch D12-TS-N010B." The technician was reloading the leads to the N010B switch when a switch lead popped off the holding screwdriver and struck the terminal box, resulting in a ground, and causing fuse (EIIS/IK/ MON /FU) D12-F11B to blow. The blown fuse removed the power from the jumper, causing the K83 and K82 relays to deenergize and complete the isolation signal circuit. This signal results in the 3 initiations described above.

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PAPtnwo AtYu [N N 3 to 04 0, MANAGiutNT AND 90DCET,wA.JHINGTON.DC 20603-I

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The technicitans performing the HST immediately informed the Control Operator o '(00) that they had caused the isolation signal. The technicians completed termination of the N010B switch wiring and initiated Work Request (VR/J0) 89-BBBS1 to replace the blown fuse. Upon completjon of the fuse changeout, the SBGT system was returned to standby, the valves repositioned and the isolation signal reset. The MST was then completed without further incident.

Event Investigation The terminal box in which the N010B switch is located.is mounted on a wall approximately 7 feet above floor level. The floor has a ventilation opening with a wire screen cover just under the switch. The wall on which the switch is mounted has openings for the Ventilation Fan suction. The technician was assessing the switch by stepping on the lower lip of the fan and holding onto the top 'ip of the fan for balance. This allowed the technician only one free hand to make the switch lead connections.

The switch leads were taped during installation until termination. The first lead was untaped and terminated. As the technician was terminating the second lead, the screw used-to secure the lead came off the holding screwdriver, allowing the lead to spring back and strike the terminal box, causing the ground and resulting in a blown fuse with subsequent completion of the isolation circuit.

A Iluman Performance Evaluation (IIPE) is being completed on this event. The primary cause of this event is attributed to the inadequate work practice of one-handed termination of a hot lead. The surrounding environmental conditions contributed to this event as a result of not having a means of easily accessing the terminal box due to a ventilation opening on the work site floor which was covered by a screen that would not support weight, and the required use of protective clothing for this work. This resulted in a shortcut being evoked of using the top of the fan as a means of reaching the required height instead of undressing and finding a more suitable method.

A secondary factor contributing to this event was the holding screwdriver being used. Although the screwdriver and screw involved in this event were not damaged, there is a holding screwdriver available for purchase which provides a more secure grasp of the screw. These screwdrivers have a bulkier tip and are not capable of being used for all applications. There are

_ currently no screwdrivers of this type available on site.

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010 0l4 text ar = w m.wwe s aan.w on Corrective-Actions Which Have Been Taken The involved work crew has received counseling on maintaining positive control-

,over the work environment.

Corrective Actions To Be Taken To Prevent Recurrence Maintenance will review this item, in terms of maintaining positive' control over the work environment, during Real Time Training scheduled for the first quarter of 1989.

I&C will investigate the feasibility of procuring the improved screwholding screwdriver. This item will be completed by May 22, 1990. In addition, I&C will evaluate.the possibility of revising the calibration procedure to install

-additional jumpers which would allow power to the temperature switch to be removed during the calibration. The necessary evaluation will be completed prior to the upcoming Unit 1 Refuel Outage 8, currently scheduled to start June 22, 1990.

Event Assessment This even't involved little safety significance. Involved systems functioned as designed and secondary containment was not in effect at the time of the event. The procedure contains prerequisites of the reactor being in nonoperational condition and no activities in progress which involve'the handling of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment. Therefore, this event would not have been more severe under other reasonable and credible alternative conditions.

LER 2-88-04 described a similar Group 6 isolation with SBGT auto start during the performance of this MST. The 1988 event was due to test equipment being left unattended, and was not related to the 1989 event.

%C Perm 10.A (649)