ML20045F520

LER 93-010-00:on 930604,hourly Fire Watch TS Surveillance Missed During Radiography Due to HP & Operations Failed to Establish Other Means of Communication W/Radiographers. W/930702 Ltr

ML20045F520
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	07/02/1993
From:	Mcgowan J, Warren C CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
BSEP-93-0102, BSEP-93-102, LER-93-010, LER-93-10, NUDOCS 9307070401
Download: ML20045F520 (4)

Text

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Caro!!nm Power & Light Company l-Brunswick Nuclear Plant P C. Box 10429 l

Southport, N.C. 28461-0429 July 2,'1993 FILE: B09-13510C 10CFR50.73 SERIAL: ESEP-93-0102 l

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-325 j LICENSE NO. DRP-71 l 1.ICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-93-010 )

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Gent 1emen: l In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed .)

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Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a .l written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is l submitted in accordance with the format set f orth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours, _

C C. C. Warren, Plant Manager - Unit 2-Brunswick Nuclear Plant JFM/

Enclosure cc: Mr. S. D. Ebreter Mr. P. D. Milano BSEP NRC Resident Office 9307070401 930702 PDR GIa  ;

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REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC20$55-0001. AND TO '

THE FAITRWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). OFOCE OF  ;

MANAGEME NT AND DVDGET WASHINGTON. DC 20503. f FACILITY NAME di DOCKET NUMMR (2) PAGE13)  !

Bmnswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 1 05000325 1 of 3 l TITLE 141 i HOUlu,I FIRE WATCH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATICN SURVEILLANCE MISSED DURING RAEIOGRAPHY  :

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (E) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOL/ED (B)

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MONTH DAY W AR W AR MONT H DAf YEAR wuMR NuuM R 05000 93 -010 - 00 07 02 53 n a in NAME oOCro wuerR 06 04 93 {

05000 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFP 5: (Check one or more of the followmgM11)

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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAMF TELEPHONE NUMMR Jeanne F. McGowan, Regul nory Compliance Specialist (919) 457--2136 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

C AUSE FYSTiM CDMITNI NT M ANUF ACT URER CAUSE SY STE M COMPONE NT MANUF ACTURf R t

SUPPLEMENT AL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED

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NO YES X DATE (15) m va c-m tmoto sueMeoN DaTo ABSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces. 4 e. appronmately htteen smgle spaw typevvntten hnes) (1f,1 5 On June 4, 1993, Unit I was in a Refuel Outage. A Fire Protection Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was in effect for the Unit 1 Reactor Building South Residual Heat Removal (RHR) area. At 1225 hours0.0142 days <br />0.34 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.661125e-4 months <br />, a briefing was held for the planned radiography in the South i RHR area. The LCO requirement for an hourly firewatch in the South RHR area was discussed. Arrangements were made for the firewatch to notify the Health Physics (HP)

Technician prior to entering the South RHR area so that the radiography job could be ,

secured and the firewatcn could be escorted through the area.  ;

At 1320 hours0.0153 days <br />0.367 hours <br />0.00218 weeks <br />5.0226e-4 months <br />, the firewatch entered the HP field of fice and requested permission to make t the required hourly surveillance. The HP attempted to contact the radiographers by way of the Public Address ( PIs) phone in the HP field office. When no contact was made, access was denied to the firewatch. The Fire Protection Auxiliary Operator and the Control Room were notified. At 1415 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.384075e-4 months <br />, Operations contacted the radiographers and the radiography job was secured. The firewatch then conducted the required inspection.

During a post job briefing which was held with the involved individuals, it was determined that the HP office PA phone was malfunctioning.

The cause of the event was the failure of the HP and Operations to establish other means of communication with the radiographers. Contributing factors to this event were the malfunctioning PA phone in the HP field office and inadequate Operations involvement.

The safety significance of the event was minimal. The firewatch did not enter the  ;

radiography area while the job was in progress. Had there been a fire, the radiographers  !

would have contacted the Control Room and the fire suppression system would have actuated as required.

The cause classification for this event per the criteria of NUREG-1022 is Personnel Error

NRC FORM 366A U. S. NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5/92) EXPIRES: 5/31/95 E STIM ATED BURDEN PER PE SPONSE TO COMPL Y WITH THIS INFORM A1 CN COLLECTION RE QU(ST: 50.0 HR1 FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) cOuMms m-uG auRoEN tsTu ATc TO TsoNrORu AToN ANo TEXT CONTINUATION REcoRos uANActe eeANcn iuNes 7714i, u.s. NuctEAR REGUL ATORY COMM!S$10N. WASHINGTON. DC20555-0001. AND TO i T HE PAPfRWOFtK REDUCi TON PROJE CT (3150-0104L OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503, f ACluTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENT 6AL RfVISON Brunswick Steam Electric Plant """ ""

05000325 2 of 3 '

Unit 1 93 - 010 - 00 TEXT tif nuwe space is required, use addaionar r#1C form 3%A 's! (17) - - -~

e TITLF HOURLY FIRE WATCH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE MISSED DURING RADIOGRAPHY INITIAL CONDITIONS I

On June 4, 1993, Unit 1 was in a Refuel Outage. Fire Protection Limiting Condition for .

Operation (LCO) Al-93-F0457 was in effect on the Unit 1 Reactor Building Fire Detection  !

System Zone 3. The LCO had been initiated en May 25, 1993, due to the local fire detection panel alarm being disabled for Zone 3 due to spurious fire alarms. The alarms were caused by ongoing welding in the area. The LCO required an bourly firewatch in the area until the fire detection system could be restored to the area. At 1305 hours0.0151 days <br />0.363 hours <br />0.00216 weeks <br />4.965525e-4 months <br />, on June 4, 1993, radiography commenced on the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System E11-F024 valve in the South l RHR room. The fire suppression system was operable at the time.

EVENT NAFRATIVE On June 4, 1993, radiograp.hy had been scheduled on the RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Isolation Valve, E11-F024B, located in the overhead area of the South RHR pump room. At approximately 1225 hours0.0142 days <br />0.34 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.661125e-4 months <br />, a briefing was held for the upcoming radiography in the Unit 1 Reactor Building HP field office. In attendance were the radiographers, three Health Physics Technicians, and the Firewatch Foreman. The requirement for the hourly firewatch tour was discussed and arran;ements were made to allow the tour. The required surveillance of the South RHR area was to ce performed between 1320 and 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br />. The firewatch was to contact the Health Physics (HP) technician before entering the South RHR room. The HP would contact the radiographers by way of the Public Address (PA) smtem and have the radiography source secured. The firewatch would then be escorted through the area. The radiographers had a dedicated person standing under the PA speaker to ensure the PA would be heard.

,After the briefing, the lead radiographer went to the Control Room to meet with the Unit 1 Senicr Reactor Operator. They discussed the scope of the radiography job and the approximate time of completion. They also discussed t a required firewatch tour of the South RHR area and the arrangements that had been made co ensure the required tour would be performed. The radiographer was to contact the Coat. 71 Room prior to commencing the radiography.

At 1305 hours0.0151 days <br />0.363 hours <br />0.00216 weeks <br />4.965525e-4 months <br />, the Control Room was notified and radiography commenced in the South RHR area. At apprcximately 1320 hours0.0153 days <br />0.367 hours <br />0.00218 weeks <br />5.0226e-4 months <br />, the firewatch entered the HP field of fice and requested .

entry into the RHE area. The HP attempted to contact the radiographers by the PA phone located in the Unit 1 Reactor Building HP field of fice. When no contact was made, access was denied to the firewatch. The firewatch contacted the firewatch foreman who immediately contacted the Radwaste Fire Protection Auxiliary Operator (FPAO), The firewatch foreman told the FPAO t. hat access to the RHR area had been denied and would not be restored until .

1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br />. The reason for the access denial was not relayed to the firewatch foreman or to the FPAO. Af ter discussion with the Radwaste Supervisor, the FPAO initiated an Adverse Condit4cn Report (ACR) on the missed Technical Specification surveillance. He delivered i the ACk to the Control Room and at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />, the Unit 1 Shift Supervisor and SRO were told of the missed surveillance.

The SRO went to the Unit 1 Reactor Building HP of fice to further investigate the missed surveillance. Operations contacted the radiographers and the SRO informed them of the missed surveillance. He had the radiographers secure the radiography source and at 1415

r NRChURM 366A U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO, 3150-0104 (5^/92) EXPlRES: 5/31/95  !

E STfM AT ED BURDE N PLR RE SPONSE TO COMPLY WITH T HIS MORMATION COLLECTION RE QUE ST: 50.0 HHS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) couMENTS REGinD,Nc BuRoEN ,SmA1E 10 Ts ORM AT,0N ANO TEXT CONTINUATION RE CORDS M AN AGEME NT BRANCH IMNBB T714). U.S. NUCLEAR REGJLATORY COMMIS$ ION. WASHINGTON. DC205554001. AND TO THE PAPE MWORK REDUCTION PROJE CT 13150 0104h OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON. DC 20503.

FACIUTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SE CUE NTIAL RE VtSION Brunswick Steam Electric Plant """ """*'"

05000325 3 of 3 Unit 1 93 - 010 - 00 TEXT Uf more space is reqwred. use additiornal NRC form 366A's) till

• hours, 45 minutes past the time the surveillance was required, the firewatch conducted the  !

required inspection.

The SRO secut ed the radiography jcb and at 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br />, the radiography postings were removed and normal access restored to the area. The SRO conducted a post job briefing with  !

all involved individuals. During the post job briefing, it was determined that the PA phone in the Unit 1 Reactor Building HP field office was malfunctioning. t CAUSE OF EVENT The primary cause of the event was the f ailure to establish other methods of communication with the radiographers. Communications were attempted using only the PA phone located in the HP field office. There are several PA phones located throughout the Reactor Building.

They also could have contacted the Control Room with the telephone in the HP field of fice and requested that the Control Room notify the radiographers. Contributing f actors to this event.were the failure of the PA phone in the HP field office and inadequate Operations involvement.

COFFECTIVE ACTIONS Corrective actions include the following:

1. Counsel the individuals involved in the event.

2. A Work Order / Job Request (WR/JO 93-APL21) has been submitted to repair the PA phone in the Unit 1 Reactor Building HP field office.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT The safety significance of this event is minimal. The firewatch contacted the HP before entering the radiography area and did not enter the area when radiography was in progress.

The fire suppression system was cperable at the time and would have actuated had an actual fire occurred. Welding was not in progress during the radiography which also lessened the probability of' a fire. Had there been a fire during this time, the radiographers were in i the area and would have been able to contact the Control Room.

PREVIOUS SIMILAP EVENTS NONE l

l EJTS COMPONENT TDFNTIFICATION System /Comoonent EITS Code FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM IC I