ML20024F746

LER 90-020-00:on 901117,primary & Secondary Containment Isolation Signals Received & Standby Gas Treatment Sys auto- Started.Caused by Scan Overload on Microprocessor.Updated Microprocessor Will Be obtained.W/901213 Ltr

ML20024F746
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	12/13/1990
From:	Harness J, Harris T CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
BSEP-90-0822, BSEP-90-822, LER-90-020-01, LER-90-20-1, NUDOCS 9012170186
Download: ML20024F746 (4)

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Carolina Power & Light Company rammammstaramanzmem Brunswick Nuclear . Proj ec t

-P. O. Box 10429 Southport, N.C. .28461-0429 December 13, 1990 FILE: B09 135100 10CFR50. 73

SERIAL: BSEP/90-0822 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

-ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 I- BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 1

. DOCKET No. 50-325 LICENSE'NO. DRP-71 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-90-020

. Gentlemen:

i-In <accordance with Title .10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report. fulfills the requirement for a written ' report within thirty . (30) days of a reportable occurrence - and is submitted in accordance with the format set forth in NUREC-1022, September 1983.  :

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! Very truly yours, b

J. L' ilarness, General Manager.

l- Brunswick Nuclear Project

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l' Enclos'ure cc: Mr. S . "D. ~ Ebneter Mr. N.'B. Lo ,.

BSEP.NRC'ResidentLoffice

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e s sm. a.e U.S NUCLEAR REGA.ATO4V COVV$SION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) EcEi" ""

FACILliY NAME (1) DOCKEI NUMBER (2l PAGb @

St. Lucie Unit 2 0l510l0l0l3l8l9 1 OF 0 3 I" (4) INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT DURING TIME RESPONSE TESTING DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR 3 3Mh dhhk MONTH Al DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKEI NUMBER (S) 015101010l l l 0l0l4 0l 0 1l 2 '

d0 1 l1 0l 9 909 0 1l 0 i i- i l l t l THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR OPERATINO (Check one or more of the followingI (11)

, 5 20.402(b) 20 405(c) X 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

O 20.405(a)(1)(1) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)

EE (10) 0 0 l0 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER 3 Q'{ Q 20.405(a)(1)(lii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) Pj #[ "g 87

. ff 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) NRC Form 366A)

). jf h 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA COm M. W. Wolaver, Shift Technical Advisor 4l0l7 4l 6l 5l - l3 l 5l 5l0 COMPLE T E ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORI (13)

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i I I I l i l I I I l I I SUPPLEMENT AL REPORT EXPECIED (14) EXPFCTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION q YES (If yes, conplote EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) y NO DA3 E (15) l l l ABSTR ACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. epproximately fifteen single space typewritten lines)(16)

On November 9, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 during a refueling outage, an inadvertent actuation of assorted Engineered Safeguards equipment, including the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator, occurred during Engineered Safeguards Features testing. This equipment belongs specifically to the 'A'skje Safety injection Actuation System / Containment Isolation Actuation System (SlAS/CIAS), Group 5.

The root cause of tho event was personnel error, instrumentation and Control personnel misread information in the testing procedure, and inadvertently actuated the wrong equipment.

Corrective actions: The test procedure was reviewed for errors. The testing was completed satisfactorily following this procedure. A Control Room Engineering Design Integration team reviewed color coding.

placement and design of equipment labehng; workspace location and the procedure involved. No deficiencies were noted with respect to the criteria of NUREG 0700. An independent INPO Human Performance Enhancement System review was also performed on this event. The instrument and-Control personnel involved were counseled.

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~~ u3 wou w mo w om cu,,w w as LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION $$N,f "

FACluiY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

St. Lucie Unit 2 0 l 5l0l0 l0 l3 l8 l9 9l0 0 0 4 0l0 0l2 OF 0l3 TEXT (11more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)(17)

DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT On November 9, Unit 2 was in Mode 5 during a refuehng outage. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) (Ells:AB) loops were full and on solid pressure control, with venting in progress. Instrument and Control (l&C) personnel were performing Engineered Safeguards (Ells:JE) time response testing as per ISC procedure 2-1400053. According to the procedure, the Operations crew were briefed and given a list of equipment that were expected to actuate during that portion of the testing.

The equipment listed belonged to the 'A' side Safety injection Actuation Signal / Containment isolation Signal (SIAS/CIAS)(Ells:JM), Group 3. However, at 1959 hours0.0227 days <br />0.544 hours <br />0.00324 weeks <br />7.453995e-4 months <br />, l&C personnel depressed the wrong pushbutton and unexpectedly actuated a different group of Engineered Safeguards equipment, the Group 5 equipment. The Operations crew immediately realized that the actuations were incorrect and notified the I&C personnel, then proceeded immediately to review Plant conditions and realign equipment. The major equipmaa' that actuated included: 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (Ells:EK),2A Intake Cooling Water Pump,2A Component Cooling Water Pump (Ells:CC), 2A and 2B Boric Acid Makeup Pumps (Ells:CA), and the Emergency Borate Valve.

Testing was terminated, the Engineered Safeguards actuations were reset, and Mode 5 operations were resumed.

C AUSE OF THE EVENT A Control Room Engineering Design Integration Team reviewed color coding, placement, labeling, workspace location, and the procedure involved. No deficiencies were noted with respect to the criteria of NUREG 0700. An independent INPO Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) review was also performed on this event.

The root cause of this event was cognitive personnel error. Utility I&C personnel misread a correct and approved l&C testing procedure. The wrong pushbutton was depressed on an Engineered Safeguards cabinet actuation module. This caused the actuation of a different group of Engineered Safeguards equipment than anticipated. There were no adverse conditions at the work location that affccted the job, and the pushbuttons were clearly and logically labeled.

AN ALYSIS OF THE EVENI This event is reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.73.a.2.iv as an event that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safeguards Feature.

The portion of the testing being performed at this time concerned the actuation of 'A' side SIAS/CIAS, Group 3 equipment. As a result of the error, Group 5 equipment was actuated. The Unit was configured in Mode 5 such that those actuations had no affect on Plant operation. All Group 5 equipment actuated correctly and properly as called upon. Therefore, there were no equipment operability concerns.

There is no possibility that this scenario could effect power operations due to the f act that this test is performed only in modes 3,4,5, or 6.

Thus, the health and safety of the public were not at risk at any time during this event.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION ^"lQOf[,NO ""

FACILIIY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGid (3)

YEAR 3@fdhAL ".gg St. Luc,e i Unit 2 0 l 5l0l0 l0l3 l8l 9 9l0 0l 0l 4 0l 0 Ol 3 OF 0l3 TE XT (Ir more space Is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)(17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. An HPES review was performed on this event.

2. A Control Room Engineering Design Integration Team review was performed on equipment, procedures, and work environment. No deficiencies with respect to NUREG 0700 were noted.

3. The Engineered Safeguards time delay testing was completed satisf actorily.

4. l&C personnel were counseled as to the need to follow test procedures closely.

ADDITION AL INFORM ATION Failed Comoonent identification:

NONE N; Previous Sir ilar Events:

LER 389-89 003 describes an inadvertent Containment isolation actuation due to a Licensed Operator mistakenly resetting one channel while a second channel was in the tripped condition.

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