IR 05000244/2008003
Download: ML082110555
Text
July 25, 2008
Mr. John Vice President, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC 1503 Lake Road Ontario, New York 14519
SUBJECT: R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000244/2008003
Dear Mr. Carlin:
On June 30, 2008, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 14, 2008, with you and members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
This report documents one NRC-identified and two self-revealing findings of very low safety significance (Green). Two of these findings were determined to be violations of NRC requirements. However, because of their very low safety significance, and because they were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a written response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the 2 NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web Site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/
Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-244 License No. DPR-18
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 05000244/2008003 w/
Attachment:
Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: M. J. Wallace, Vice - President, Constellation Energy B. Barron, President, CEO & Chief Nuclear Officer, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC P. Eddy, Electric Division, NYS Department of Public Service C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law C. Fleming, Esquire, Senior Counsel, Nuclear Generation, Constellation Nuclear Energy Nuclear Group, LLC D. Wilson, Director, Licensing, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Plant , LLC P. Tonko, President and CEO, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority G. Bastedo, Director, Wayne County Emergency Management Office M. Meisenzahl, Administrator, Monroe County, Office of Emergency Preparedness T. Judson, Central New York Citizens Awareness Network
3 NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web Site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/ Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Distribution w/encl: S. Collins, RA M. Dapas, DRA D. Lew, DRP J. Clifford, DRP S. Williams, RI OEDO R. Nelson, NRR D. Pickett, PM, NRR B. Vaidya, PM, NRR G. Dentel, DRP N. Perry, DRP J. Hawkins, DRP K. Kolaczyk, DRP, Senior Resident Inspector M. Marshfield, DRP, Resident Inspector H. Jones, DRS M. Rose, DRP, Resident OA Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
ROPreports@nrc.gov (All IRs)
SUNSI Review Complete___NSP_____ (Reviewer's Initials) DOCUMENT NAME: T:\DRP\BRANCH1\Ginna\Reports\2008-003\2008-003 Draft Shell.doc After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public. ML082110555 To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP NAME *KKolaczyk/MJM For NPerry/NSP GDentel/GTD DATE 07/24/08 07/24/08 07/25/08 *Concurrence received via telecon OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 1 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I
Docket No.: 50-244
License No.: DPR-18
Report No.: 05000244/2008003
Licensee: R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC
Facility: R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
Location: Ontario, New York Dates: April 1, 2008 through June 30, 2008
Inspectors: K, Kolaczyk, Senior Resident Inspector M. Marshfield, Resident Inspector K. Mangan, Senior Reactor Inspector M. Modes, Senior Reactor Inspector N. Perry, Senior Emergency Response Coordinator K. Young, Senior Reactor Inspector H. Jones, Reactor Inspector R. Rolph, Health Physicist
Approved by: Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects 2 Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
.........................................................................................................3
REPORT DETAILS
.....................................................................................................................5
REACTOR SAFETY
...........................................................................................................5 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection ...............................................................................5 1R04 Equipment Alignment .........................................................................................6 1R05 Fire Protection ....................................................................................................7 1R07 Heat Sink Performance ......................................................................................8 1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities .............................................................................8 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program .......................................................9 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness .................................................................................9 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control ..........................10 1R15 Operability Evaluations .....................................................................................11 1R18 Plant Modifications ............................................................................................11 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing ................................................................................12 1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities ..............................................................13 1R22 Surveillance Testing .........................................................................................16 1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation...........................................................16 1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System..........17 1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes...................................18 1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses......................................19
RADIATION SAFETY
.......................................................................................................19 2OS1 Access Control To Radiologically Significant Areas ..........................................19 2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls ..........................................................................20 2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment ......................23
OTHER ACTIVITIES
.........................................................................................................23
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification ....................................................................23 4OA2
Identification and Resolution of Problems .........................................................24
4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion ..............................26 4OA5
Other Activities...................................................................................................27
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit.....................................................................................29
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
..................................................................................................A-1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
......................................................A-1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
......................................................................................A-1
LIST OF ACRONYMS
.A-10
Enclosure
- OF [[]]
- FINDIN [[]]
GS
IR 05000244/2008003; 04/01/2008 - 06/30/2008; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna),
Refueling and Other Outage Activities, Emergency Response Organization Staffing and
Augmentation System, and
- ALA [[]]
RA Planning and Controls.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and region-based
inspectors. Three Green findings, two of which were non-cited violations (NCVs) were identified.
The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using
Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). The NRC's
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
- NUR [[]]
- A. [[]]
- NRC -Identified and Self-Revealing Findings Cornerstone: Initiating Events Green. The inspectors identified a self-revealing
- NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a when control room operators closed the inlet and outlet Residual Heat Removal (
RHR)
system isolation valves while conducting a plant heat-up with the 'A' reactor coolant
system loop inoperable. This was contrary to procedural requirements which require
operators to verify that two reactor coolant system loops are operable and at least one is
operating prior to isolating the
system, the control room operators recognized they were not complying with the
procedure, and restored power to the
system was isolated from the reactor coolant system was 15 minutes. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) using Phase 1,
Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 4 of IMC 0609. This finding was of very low safety
significance because the finding did not increase the likelihood of a loss of RCS inventory,
degrade the ability of Ginna to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory when needed,
nor degrade the ability to recover RHR. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area
of human performance because operators did not adhere to the procedural requirements
prior to removing the
NCV of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) for failure of Ginna's process for maintaining timely augmentation of on-shift staff. Ginna's nuclear
emergency response plan (NERP) states that the survey team member position will be
staffed by six individuals reporting onsite within one hour of the declaration of an
- ALE [[]]
or higher classification. Results from testing the off-hours notification of the response
organization for the four quarters, starting in June 2007 through March 2008, indicated
that fewer than six individuals would have responded for the survey team member position
within one hour of event declaration. Plant management entered the issue into their
corrective action program and took appropriate immediate corrective actions following
identification of the issue by the inspectors.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the emergency response organization (ERO) performance attribute and affected the objective of the Emergency
Preparedness cornerstone to ensure timely augmentation of on-shift staff. In accordance
with the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, this finding is of
Enclosure very low safety significance because the failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) was a planning standard problem, but not a planning standard functional failure. The inspectors
determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because Ginna did not take appropriate corrective actions to qualify more
individuals for the survey team position in 2007 (P.1.d per
EP3) Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety Green. The inspectors identified a self-revealing finding of very low safety significance associated with occupational exposure control. During the planned refueling outage,
Ginna did not effectively manage its radioactive source term and work activities to prevent
unnecessary occupational exposure to workers during 'B' sump strainer modification and
steam generator inspections. Specifically, the collective occupational radiation dose
received by individuals for these two activities exceeded the planned or intended dose that
Ginna determined was as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) for the work activities.
This finding is more than minor because each of the two work activities exceeded their
initial estimates by more than 50 percent and each accumulated more than five person-
rem, as described in Appendix E of IMC 0612, example (6.b). Additionally, the finding
affected the program and process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety
cornerstone to ensure the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from
exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operations. This finding is of very low safety significance because the 3-year rolling
average exposure for Ginna was less than 135 person-rem. This finding has a
crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance work control because Ginna did not effectively coordinate work activities to incorporate actions to address the impact of
changes to the work scope or activity that were appropriate under the circumstances
(H.3.b per
OS2)
B. Licensee-Identified Violations None.
Enclosure
- REPORT [[]]
DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna) began the inspection period operating at full rated
thermal power (FRTP) and operated at essentially full power until April 20, 2008, when the plant
was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage (RFO). On May 11, the plant was restarted, and
the turbine synchronized to the grid. On May 14,
- FR [[]]
TP was reached. On May 15, power was
rapidly reduced to 50 percent when both heater drain pumps tripped during maintenance
activities. On May 16, power ascension was started, and
- FR [[]]
TP was reached on May 17. For the
remainder of the report period, with the exception of minor power reductions for testing, the plant
remained at full power. 1.
SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - Two samples) .1 Hot Weather Preparations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Ginna's preparations for hot weather and performed walkdowns
of plant areas during the week of May 12, 2008. To perform the review, the inspectors
used the criteria and design criterion outlined in Ginna procedure O-23, "Hot Weather
Seasonal Readiness Walkdown," Rev. 00300, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Rev. 20. As part of the walkdown, local area temperatures were
checked, as well as the operability of ventilation and air conditioning cooling systems, to
ensure that the plant was prepared to handle warm weather conditions. Areas of focus
were the relay room, the 'A' and 'B' battery rooms, and the 'A' and 'B' emergency diesel
generator rooms. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Grid Stability
a. Inspection Scope Using the criteria in Ginna procedure O-6.9, "Ginna Station Operating Limits for Station
13A Transmission," during the week of May 12, the inspectors evaluated the readiness of
offsite and alternate AC power systems. The inspectors verified that communication
protocols between the transmission system operator and the plant were specified in
Ginna's procedures to ensure appropriate information was being exchanged. The
inspectors verified that the procedures addressed measures to monitor and maintain
availability and reliability of these systems during adverse weather conditions. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Enclosure b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04) .1 Partial System Walkdown (71111.04Q - Three samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the alignment of system valves and electrical breakers to ensure
proper in-service or standby configurations as described in plant procedures, piping and
instrument drawings (P&ID), and the
- UFS [[]]
AR. During the walkdown, the inspectors
evaluated the material condition and general housekeeping of the system and adjacent
spaces. The inspectors also verified that operators were following plant technical
specifications (TS) and system operating procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in
the Attachment.
The following plant system alignments were reviewed:
- On April 21 and 22, 2008, the inspectors used procedure "Alignment and Operation of the Reactor Vessel Overpressure Protection System," Rev. 04701 to conduct a
walkdown of the reactor vessel overpressure protection system when the system was
aligned to support Mode 5 plant operations;
- On April 24, 2008, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the 'C' safety injection pump lineup established by O-2.3.1, "Draining and Operation at Reduced Inventory of
the Reactor Coolant System," Rev. 08500, to verify that the system was aligned
properly to support drain down for mid-loop operations; and * On April 30, 2008, during refueling operations, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the 'A' residual heat removal system line-up as established by O-15.2, "Valve
Alignment for Head Lift, Core Component Movement and Periodic Status Checks,"
Rev. 30. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete Walkdown (71111.04A - One sample)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system to
identify any discrepancies between the existing equipment lineup and the specified lineup.
The AFW system was chosen because of its risk significant function to provide makeup
water to the steam generators. The inspectors verified proper system alignment as
specified by
- P& [[]]
IDs. Documentation associated with
open maintenance requests and design issues were reviewed and included items tracked
by plant engineering to assess their collective impact on system operation. In addition,
the inspectors reviewed the associated corrective action database to verify that any
equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved.
Enclosure Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
.1 Quarterly Inspection (71111.05Q - Five samples)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed walkdowns of fire areas to determine if there was adequate
control of transient combustibles and ignition sources. The material condition of fire
protection systems, equipment and features, and the material condition of fire barriers
were inspected against Ginna's licensing basis and industry standards. In addition, the
passive fire protection features were inspected including the ventilation system fire
dampers, structural steel fire proofing, and electrical penetration seals. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The following plant areas were inspected:
- Auxiliary Building Mezzanine Level (Fire Zone
IBN-1); and * Containment Vessel (Fire Area RC). b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Annual Inspection (71111.05A - One sample) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed an announced test of Ginna's fire brigade on June 4, 2008. The
test involved a simulated fire in the all volatile treatment (AVT) room located in the
basement of the technical support center structure. The inspectors observed fire brigade
personnel obtain their protective equipment, travel to the simulated fire location, and
demonstrate how they would extinguish a fire in the AVT room. Following the drill, the
inspectors observed the post-drill critique, and verified that performance issues were
discussed and documented in Ginna's corrective action program. The inspectors
evaluated the performance of the brigade using the criteria outlined in the following
procedures: SC- 3.1.1, "Fire Alarm Response (Fire Brigade Activation)," Rev. 17;
SC- 3.4.1, "Fire Brigade and Control Room Personnel Responsibilities," Rev. 38; and
FRP- 28, "All-Volatile Treatment Room," Rev. 6.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure 1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07 - Two samples) a. Inspection Scope During the planned
HX) for the 'A'
and 'C' containment recirculating fans, which had been opened for inspection as part of
Ginna's Service Water System Reliability Optimization Program (SWSROP). The
inspectors verified the HX were inspected in accordance with the applicable procedure
and the
HX inspections
conformed to Ginna's commitments to Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System
Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment." The inspectors compared the inspection results for the HX to the established acceptance
criteria to verify that the results were acceptable and that the HX operated in accordance
with design. The inspectors reviewed system health reports and interviewed applicable
system engineers. The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports (CRs) related to the containment
air recirculation fan coolers to ensure that Ginna was appropriately identifying,
characterizing, and resolving problems related to these systems and components within
regulatory requirements and Ginna's commitments. Documents reviewed are listed in
the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08 - One sample) a. Inspection Scope The purpose of this inspection was to assess the effectiveness of Ginna's Inservice
Inspection (ISI) program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system
boundary, risk significant piping system boundaries, and the containment boundary. The
ISI activities were evaluated against the criteria specified in the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI
requirements, and applicable NRC Regulatory Requirements. Documents reviewed are
listed in the Attachment. In evaluating the effectiveness of the steam generator degradation management system,
the inspectors reviewed a number of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) eddy
current examination technique specification sheets to determine whether eddy current
probes and equipment were qualified for the expected degradation mechanisms. The
sheets corresponded to the degradation mechanism being evaluated. A Ginna qualified
examination technique was reviewed to determine if the technique qualification conformed
to the qualification requirements specified by
- EP [[]]
RI guidelines, "Pressurized Water
Reactor Steam Generator Examination Guidelines, 100318, Appendix H." The procedure
was qualified in accordance with the guideline. The inspectors witnessed the calibration
and evaluation of a wear indication on R78C24 by a senior eddy current analyst.
Enclosure The inspectors performed an observation of an ultrasonic volumetric examination and the
visual surface examination of the contaiment liner. The inspectors reviewed a work order
package for ultrasonic examination on service water (SW) piping from reactor
compartment cooler. This examination was initiated to verify the minimum pipe wall
thickness of the 2-inch and 21/2-inch SW piping. The inspectors also observed the
ultrasonic examination of weld 14B-F5 using a 70 degree search unit. The ultrasonic examination disclosed that piping/fittings near penetration 209 inside the containment, in some local areas, were 0.064 inch, and 0.066 inch which were less than
code required minimum wall of 0.070 inch. These areas were less than 1-square inch
each. As corrective action, the piping in question was replaced. A CR (2008-3243) was
initiated to document, track, and disposition these findings in Ginna's corrective action
program.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - One sample) a. Inspection Scope On June 13, 2008, the inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training that
focused on emergency action level (EAL) event evaluation, classification, and
assessment. One scenario was run during the approximately 90-minute training session,
which was periodically stopped at different times to provide operators a chance to classify
the event given the plant conditions. Once operators classified the event, training
instructors discussed with operators the basis for the event classification and possible
alternative EAL classification scenarios. While reviewing the training session, the
inspectors verified that the instructors were following the guidance contained in a pre-
established lesson plan that was entitled "EAL Simulator Scenario Lesson Plan" dated
June 9, 2008.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - Two samples) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated work practices and follow-up corrective actions for two issues
involving degraded conditions of safety-related systems, structures, and components
(SSCs) for maintenance effectiveness. The inspectors reviewed Ginna's implementation
of the maintenance rule and verified that the conditions associated with the referenced
CRs were evaluated against applicable maintenance rule functional failure criteria as
found in Ginna's scoping documents and procedures. The inspectors reviewed Ginna's
problem identification and resolution actions for these issues to evaluate whether Ginna
had appropriately monitored, evaluated, and dispositioned the issues in accordance with
procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the
Effectiveness of Maintenance." In addition, the inspectors discussed these issues with
Enclosure system engineers and maintenance rule coordinators to verify that they were tracked against performance criteria and goals, and corrective actions were taken or planned to
verify whether the actions were reasonable and appropriate. Documents reviewed are
listed in the Attachment. The following conditions were reviewed: *
AOV 966B and AOV 953 leaking by
XE-6851and XE-6853 found out of position
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - Six samples) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of Ginna's maintenance risk assessments
required by 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(4). The inspectors discussed with control room
operators and scheduling department personnel regarding the use of Ginna's online risk
monitoring software. The inspectors reviewed equipment tracking documentation and
daily work schedules, and performed plant tours to verify that actual plant configuration
matched the assessed configuration. Additionally, the inspectors verified that risk
management actions, for both planned and emergent work, were consistent with those
described in
- IP [[]]
PSH-2, "Integrated Work Schedule Risk Management." Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Risk assessments for the following out-of-service SSCs were reviewed: * A planned monthly surveillance on the 'A' emergency diesel generator while the 'A' service water pump was out for maintenance, and the plant was in adverse weather
conditions under
SC.1, for high winds (April 2, 2008); * Planned surveillance of emergency diesel generator sequence test while simultaneously conducting tests of safety injection logic circuitry and containment
radiation monitor calibrations (April 21, 2008); * Planned maintenance on the pressurizer level indicating system performed using
SD, "Reactor Trip Logic Test Train B," Rev. 14. (May 8, 2008);
- Unplanned maintenance on the level indicating system for the heater drain tank (May 15 and 16, 2008); * Unplanned maintenance to replace a cracked actuator for valve 4629, service water return from 'A' containment recirculation fan cooler (May 21 and 22, 2008); and * Planned surveillance testing of the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump (June 11, 2008).
Enclosure b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - Six samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations and/or condition reports (CRs) in order to
verify that the identified conditions did not adversely affect safety system operability or
plant safety. The evaluations were reviewed using criteria specified in NRC Regulatory
Issue Summary 2005-20, "Revision to Guidance Formerly Contained in NRC Generic
Letter 91-18, Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections
on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability" and
Inspection Manual Part 9900, "Operability Determinations and Functionality
Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality
or Safety." In addition, where a component was inoperable, the inspectors verified the TS
limiting condition for operation implications were properly addressed. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The inspectors performed field walkdowns, interviewed personnel, and reviewed the
following items: *
- CR 2008-2745, 320A and/or 388A are leaking-by in containment, active boron leak in Chemical and Volume Control System impacting
- CR 2008-3968, Eddy current inspection detected foreign material wear in A & B generator at lattice grid structures and lattice grid wear in the B steam generator; * Part 21-2008-04, "Notification Regarding Identification of Defect:
CR 2008-5653, D Standby auxiliary feedwater discharge check valve failed prompt closure test.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - Two samples)
.1 Temporary Modification (One sample) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed temporary plant modification 2008-0011, "Disconnect
- RC [[]]
DT in Containment," to determine whether the
temporary change adversely affected system availability or adversely affected a function
important to plant safety. The inspectors reviewed the associated system design bases
including the
TS and assessed the adequacy of the safety determination
screening and evaluation. The inspectors also assessed configuration control of the
temporary change by reviewing selected drawings and procedures to verify whether
appropriate updates had been made. The inspectors compared the actual installation with
Enclosure the temporary modification documents to determine whether the implemented change was consistent with the approved, documented modification. The temporary modification
was reviewed by the inspectors in the field to verify it had been installed in conformance
with the instructions contained in procedure
DES-3, "Temporary Modifications,"
Revision 19. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Permanent Modification (One sample) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed plant change record (PCR) 2008-0004, "Main Steam Check Valve Upgrade," which was installed during the RFO to address several material condition
issues with the valves including excessive packing leakage and repetitive failures of the
valve counterweight assemblies. The inspectors reviewed the PCR to ensure that the
change was performed in accordance with Ginna's licensing basis; and the post-
modification test would provide reasonable assurance that the valves would operate in
accordance with design criteria. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - Seven samples) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed portions of post-maintenance testing (PMT) activities in the field
to determine whether the tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
The inspectors assessed each test's adequacy by comparing the test methodology to the
scope of maintenance work performed. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the test
acceptance criteria to verify that the tested components satisfied the applicable design
and licensing bases and TS requirements. The inspectors reviewed the recorded test
data to determine whether the acceptance criteria were satisfied. Documents reviewed
are listed in the Attachment.
The following PMT activities were reviewed:
WO 20803111, "Troubleshoot and Repair AOV 9710B-Stroke Time Failure," which corrected the
stroke time failure of
PT-36Q-D, "Standby Auxiliary Feedwater
Pump D - Quarterly," Rev. 54 (April 13, 2008); *
CR 2008-3414, Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inlet Valve MOV 3505A
in an Over Thrust Condition (April 25, 2008); *
STP-O-R-1.4, "Valve Interlock Verification - Reactor Coolant
Enclosure System," Rev. 00000, after repairs were performed during the
WO 20700680, "PORV-430 is Leaking-by, Perform Inspection/Repair/Replace Internals,"
and
PORV-431C"
(May 4, 2008); * M-64.1.2, "MOVATs Testing of Motor Operated Valves (MOVs)," Rev. 35, after
MOV-516 using WO 20602545, "Perform Major
Inspection of
- MOV -516" (May 6, 2008); * S-23.3.A , "Reactor Compartment Cooling System Pre-startup Procedure," Rev.15, which was done, in part, for
WO 20803196, "Cut Out and Replace Service Water
Piping at Penetrations 209 and 201" (May 8, 2008); *
- PCR 2008-0004, "Main Steam Check Valve Upgrade," Rev. 0, Post-Maintenance Test Activities (May 12, 2008); *
MOV 814" (June 23, 2008). b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20 - One Sample) a. Inspection Scope On April 20, 2008, the inspectors observed the plant shutdown for a scheduled refueling
outage (RFO). The shutdown included a trip of the main turbine from approximately
percent power. Prior to the shutdown, the inspectors observed surveillance testing
activities for systems that would be placed in service during the RFO.
With one exception, the shutdown activities went as planned. The exception involved
difficulties encountered during testing of turbine protective trips when operators
determined the low lube oil pressure trip would not reset. The inspectors observed Ginna
troubleshooting operations and the implementation of compensatory actions.
Shortly after the plant entered Mode 4, the inspectors toured the containment structure to
examine the condition of plant structures and components. Particular attention was paid
to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) oil leakage collection systems, the condition of the 'B'
containment sump, and Ginna's efforts to identify and assess boric acid leakage from
plant systems and components.
While the plant was in Mode 5, the inspectors walked down fire hose stations in
containment to ensure they had been correctly aligned. The inspectors also walked down
both trains of the residual heat removal (RHR) system to ensure they were available to
provide decay heat removal. During the RHR system walkdown, the inspectors verified
that both trains had electric power, and maintenance was not being performed on
protected systems.
Enclosure Using Operating Experience Smart Sample (OESS)
IP-71111.20, a review of reactor head lift
plans was performed. The inspectors identified that Ginna had a valid load-drop analysis
and the movement of the head was performed both on and off in accordance with the
requirements of the analysis. A review of plans for movements of the 'A' RCP motor was
also performed to verify the activities were performed in accordance with the load drop
analysis.
Once the plant entered Mode 6, the inspectors toured the refueling cavity and examined
the sandbox area that had been removed for life extension-related inspection activities.
The inspectors verified that Ginna personnel were aware of potentially degraded areas in
the sandbox region, and had assessed the significance of the as-found condition.
The inspectors verified preparations for refueling and observed several hours of fuel
shuffle operations in containment and the control room. Ventilation line-ups and
equipment line-ups were verified prior to the commencement of refueling.
Several normally locked high radiation areas, that are not normally accessible during plant
operations because of high radiation levels, were walked down for general cleanliness
conditions, equipment performance, and boric acid leaks. Areas examined included the
rooms for volume control tank, reactor coolant pump seal injection filter, reactor coolant
filter, waste holdup tank, and non-regenerative heat exchanger.
When refueling was completed, the plant transitioned to Mode 5 in preparation for plant
startup. The inspectors toured containment to verify Ginna personnel were removing
refueling-related equipment and to ensure issues identified during boric acid walkdown
inspections had been resolved. Specific attention was devoted to the 'B' sump which was
walked down by the inspectors to ensure no foreign material was present that could
impact the performance of the emergency core cooling system pumps. The conditions of
the sump screens, which were modified during the outage were examined to ensure they
were intact and not obstructed. Sump walls were also verified to be intact.
While the plant was in Mode 5, the inspectors verified Ginna had established adequate
controls to ensure electrical power to safety-related equipment was protected.
The inspectors observed portions of the reactor coolant system (RCS) heat-up and toured
the containment when the 350 and 1,000 pound leak test inspections were being
performed by Ginna non-destructive evaluation personnel. When observing the leak test
inspections, the inspectors verified that examination points were identified in procedure,
ISI System Leakage Test RCS," personnel were following the procedure, and
maintenance personnel were appropriately briefed on salient aspects of the examination.
b. Findings and Observations Introduction: A Green
TS 5.4.1.a "Procedures" was identified for a failure of control room operators to correctly implement procedure O-1.1, "Plant Heat-up from Cold
Shutdown to Hot Shutdown," while conducting a plant heat-up following completion of the
- RFO. Description: On May 8, 2008, at approximately 9:00 a.m. while the plant was in Mode 4 and conducting a plant heat-up per procedure O-1.1, control room operators isolated the
RHR inlet and outlet isolation
Enclosure valves MOVs 700, 701, 720 and 721, and de-energized the power supply breakers to the valves. At the time of the event, the 'A' reactor coolant system loop was not operable
because the lift pump for the 'A' reactor coolant pump was not functioning properly, which
prevented starting the reactor coolant pump. The 'B' loop pump was operable. Closing the inlet and outlet RHR system valves with the 'A' reactor coolant system loop
inoperable was contrary to the requirements of step 6.8.9(9)(a) of O-1.1, which stated that
prior to isolating the RHR system, operators shall verify that two reactor coolant system
loops are operable and at least one is operating. Several minutes after isolating the RHR system, the control room operators recognized
they were not complying with O-1.1, and they restored power to the RHR isolation valves.
The time that the RHR system was isolated from the reactor coolant system was 15
minutes. The performance deficiency associated with this finding was a failure of
operators to correctly implement O-1.1. A Ginna investigation into this event attributed the error to an inadequate understanding of
the requirements to meet the applicable governing TS 3.4.6, and a misreading of a step
6.8.9(9)(a) in procedure O-1.1. Analysis: This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those
events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as
well as power operations. This finding was determined to be of very low safety
significance (Green) using Phase 1, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 4 of IMC 0609.
This finding screened to Green because of the following: * The finding did not increase the likelihood of a loss of
RCS inventory when needed. * The finding did not degrade the ability to recover Decay Heat Removal once it had been lost. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance because operators did not adhere to the procedural requirements outlined in O-1.1 prior to
removing the
IMC 0305). Enforcement: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a "Procedures" requires, in part, that the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A,
February 1978, be established, implemented, and maintained. Regulatory Guide 1.33
requires, in part, that procedures be implemented for heat-up of the reactor coolant
system. Procedure O-1.1 is required by Regulatory Guide 1.33. Step 6.8.9(9)(a) of O-1.1
states that operators shall verify that two reactor coolant system loops are operable and at
least one operating prior to isolating the RHR system. Contrary to the requirements of step 6.8.9(9)(a), during the May 8 plant heat-up,
operators isolated the RHR system when the 'A' reactor coolant system loop was
inoperable. Because this issue was determined to be of very low safety significance and
has been entered into Ginna's corrective action program (CR 2006-0370), this violation is
being treated as an
NCV 05000244/2008003-01, Failure to Correctly Implement Reactor Coolant Heat-up Procedure)
Enclosure 1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - Seven samples) a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the performance and/or reviewed test data for the following
surveillance tests that are associated with selected risk-significant
TSs
were followed and that acceptance criteria were properly specified. The inspectors also
verified that proper test conditions were established as specified in the procedures, no
equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and acceptance criteria were met.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- STP -O-R-2.2, "Diesel Generator Load and Safeguard Sequence Test," Rev. 00000 (April 21, 2008) (IST) *
- PT -17.2, "Process Radiation Monitors R-11 - R-18, R-20 - R-22 Iodine Monitors R-10A and R-10B," Rev. 12600 (April 21, 2008) *
IST) b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness 1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation a. Inspection Scope (71114.02 - One sample) An onsite review was conducted to assess the maintenance and testing of Ginna's alert
and notification system (ANS). During this inspection, the inspectors interviewed
emergency preparedness (EP) staff responsible for implementation of the ANS testing
and maintenance. Condition reports pertaining to the ANS were reviewed for causes,
trends, and corrective actions. The inspectors interviewed the system engineer regarding
the ANS siren system performance from January 2007 through May 2008. The inspectors
reviewed the
ANS design report to ensure compliance with those
commitments for system maintenance and testing. In addition, the inspectors reviewed
changes to the design report and how these changes are captured. The inspection was
conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 2. Planning
standard
CFR 50 Appendix E
were used as reference criteria.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
- 1EP 3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System a. Inspection Scope (71114.03 - One sample) A review of Ginna=s emergency response organization (
ERO) augmentation staffing requirements and the process for notifying the ERO was conducted. This was performed to ensure the readiness of key staff for responding to an event and to ensure timely facility
activation. The inspectors reviewed procedures and
notification system and drills, and reviewed records from call-in drills. The inspectors
interviewed personnel responsible for testing the ERO augmentation process, and
reviewed the training records for a sampling of ERO to ensure training and qualifications
were up to date. The inspectors reviewed procedures for ERO administration and
training, and verified a sampling of ERO participated in exercises in 2007 and 2008. The
inspectors also reviewed records of offsite agency training and the June 2, 2008,
respirator and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) qualification list. The
inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114,
3. Planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and related requirements of
CFR 50 Appendix E were used as reference criteria.
b. Findings Introduction: The inspectors identified a Green
CFR 50.47(b)(2). Ginna failed to maintain timely
augmentation of on-shift staff regarding the radiological survey team member position.
Description: Ginna conducts a quarterly call test to ensure the
NERP),
Section 4.2, Emergency Organization, states that the survey team member position will be
staffed by six individuals reporting onsite within one hour of the declaration of an
- ALE [[]]
or higher classification. During review of results of the previous four quarterly call tests,
the inspectors identified that the survey team member position had not been filled with six
individuals for any of the tests. For the testing conducted in June 2007 through March
2008, the survey team member position would not have been staffed by six responders
within one hour of event classification; only three or four individuals were able to respond
within one hour.
The survey team member position is a "pooled" position, meaning that the personnel are
not assigned on-call ERO duties, but are notified and are expected to respond as a group.
Ginna's ERO designated eight or nine individuals as survey team members during the four
quarter tests. However, during each test two of the individuals were identified as living
more than 60 minutes away and are noted as second shift only for off hours. This means
that all, or nearly all, of the identified individuals would have been required to respond
within 60 minutes. Ginna initiated CRs for each of the first two quarterly tests where the
positions were not filled. However, corrective actions to qualify more individuals for the
survey team position were not completed. The failure to maintain timely augmentation of
on-shift staff is a performance deficiency.
Following identification of the issue by the inspectors, Ginna entered the concern into their
corrective action program. The week following the inspection, Ginna indicated that they
had qualified three more individuals for the survey team position and were planning on
qualifying several additional individuals in the near future.
Enclosure Analysis: This finding is more than minor because it affected the Emergency Response Organization Readiness attribute of the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone to ensure
Ginna is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of
the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The inspectors assessed the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix B, Emergency
Preparedness Significance Determination Process, and determined the finding to be of
very low safety significance. IMC 0609, Appendix B, Sheet 1, "Failure to Comply," and
Section 4.2 of Appendix B were used to reach this determination. Using IMC 0609,
Appendix B, Sheet 1, the failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) was a planning
standard problem, but not a planning standard functional failure. Ginna had other
qualified ERO survey team members who would have arrived, but later than one hour.
Therefore, the inspectors determined the planning standard function had been degraded,
and this finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The staffing deficiencies did
not affect the outcome of protecting the health and safety of the public. The inspectors
determined that this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because Ginna did not take appropriate corrective actions to qualify more
individuals for the survey team position in 2007 (P.1.d per
- CFR 50.47(b)(2) requires, in part, timely augmentation of response capabilities is available. Ginna's
- NE [[]]
RP, Section 4.2, Emergency Organization, states that
the survey team member position will be staffed by six individuals reporting onsite within
one hour of the declaration of an
- ALE [[]]
RT or higher classification. Contrary to the above, results from testing the off-hours notification of the response
organization for the four quarters, starting in June 2007 through March 2008, indicated
that fewer than six individuals would have responded for the survey team member position
within one hour of event declaration. Because this finding is of very low safety
significance and because it was entered into Ginna's corrective action program
(CR 2008-5153), this violation is being treated as an
EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes a. Inspection Scope (71114.04 - One sample) Prior to this inspection, the NRC had received and acknowledged changes made to Ginna's nuclear emergency plan and implementing procedures. These changes, which
Ginna had determined did not result in a decrease in effectiveness to the Plan and
concluded that the changes continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and
Appendix E to
CFR 50.54(q). During this
inspection, the inspectors conducted a review of Ginna's 10 CFR 50.54(q) screenings for
all the changes made to the EALs and all of the changes made to the Plan from June
2006 through May 2008 that could potentially result in a decrease in effectiveness. This
review of the EAL and Plan changes did not constitute an approval of the changes, and as
such, the changes are subject to future NRC inspection. The inspection was conducted in
accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 4. The requirements in
CFR 50.54(q) were used as reference criteria. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure 1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses
a. Inspection Scope (71114.05 - One Sample) The inspectors reviewed a sampling of self-assessment procedures and reports to assess
Ginna's ability to evaluate their performance and programs. The inspectors reviewed CRs
from January 2007 through May 2008 initiated by Ginna from drills, self assessments, and
audits. Other drill reports reviewed included medical/health physics, fire, integrated, and
call-in. In addition, the inspectors reviewed two Unusual Event Reports and audits for
2007 and 2008 required by 50.54(t). This inspection was conducted in accordance with
CFR 50.47(b)(14)
and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E were used as reference criteria.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 2.
- RADIAT [[]]
- ION [[]]
- SAFE [[]]
TY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety (OS) 2OS1 Access Control To Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01 - Eleven samples)
a. Inspection Scope From April 28 to May 2, 2008, the inspectors performed the following activities to verify
that Ginna was properly implementing physical, administrative, and engineering controls
for access to locked high radiation areas (LHRA), and other radiologically controlled areas
(RCA) during the RFO. Implementation of these programs was reviewed against the
criteria contained in
TSs, and Ginna's procedures.
Plant Walkdown and Radiation Work Permits (RWP) Reviews The inspectors identified exposure-significant work areas and reviewed associated Ginna
controls, surveys, postings, and barricades for acceptability. The inspectors toured
accessible RCA, and with the assistance of a radiation protection technician, performed independent radiation surveys of selected areas to confirm the accuracy of survey data
and the adequacy of postings. The inspectors reviewed
HRA and for
airborne radioactivity areas with a potential for internal exposures of greater than 50 mrem
committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE). During the period of the inspection and
since the start of the
CEDE.
The inspectors examined controls for highly activated or contaminated materials within the
spent fuel pool. Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed Ginna's self assessments, audits, and special reports related to
the access control program since the last inspection to determine if identified problems
were entered into the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed eight CRs
related to access control to ensure follow-up actions were timely and effective. The
inspectors reviewed repetitive deficiencies to ensure these issues were also identified and
addressed in self assessments.
Enclosure Jobs-in-Progress Review
The inspectors selected the 'B' sump strainer modification, repack of valve 311C, and
steam generator activities for observation. The inspectors attended the management
oversight board,
- ALA [[]]
RA brief, and observed the work from the radiation monitoring
system cameras for the repack of valve 311C. The inspectors reviewed the radiological
job requirements and observed the performance with respect to the requirements. The
inspectors questioned workers to assess the workers' knowledge of the radiological
conditions in the area and the radiological job requirements. The repack of valve 311C
required that the whole body dosimeter be relocated to the individual's head.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02 - Thirteen samples)
a. Inspection Scope From April 28 to May 2, 2008, the inspectors performed the following activities to verify
that Ginna was properly implementing operational, engineering, and administrative
controls to maintain personnel exposure
operations. Implementation of these controls was reviewed against criteria contained in
CFR 20, applicable industry standards, and Ginna's procedures. Inspection Planning
The inspectors reviewed pertinent information regarding cumulative exposure history,
current exposure trends, and ongoing activities. The inspectors reviewed Ginna's
3-year rolling average dose and compared Ginna's average with industry average. The
inspectors verified that Ginna's
RWP procedure
include job estimating and tracking.
Radiological Work Planning The inspectors received a list of the five work activities ranked highest by estimated exposure for the
these work activities. The inspectors reviewed the results achieved with the intended
dose established in Ginna's
- ALA [[]]
RA planning for these work activities.
Verification of Dose Estimates
The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating work activity exposures. The inspectors reviewed Ginna's method for
adjusting exposure estimates. The inspectors attended an
- ALA [[]]
RA committee meeting
where adjustments to the outage dose estimate were presented.
Job Site Inspections
The inspectors observed three job sites: 'B' sump strainer modification, 'A' reactor coolant
pump work, and work in the pressurizer area. The inspectors evaluated if the workers
received appropriate on-the-job supervision and appropriate briefings of radiological
Enclosure conditions.
Radworker Performance
The inspectors observed individual worker performance to determine if the workers
demonstrated
- ALA [[]]
RA philosophy. The inspectors questioned workers about the
radiological conditions in the work area and if the workers knew where the highest and
lowest dose rates were in their area.
Source Term Reduction and Control
The inspectors reviewed the status and historical trends of source terms. The inspectors
reviewed the shutdown clean-up and chemistry controls prior to and during shutdown.
Declared Pregnant Workers
The inspectors selectively reviewed accumulated dose, controls, and monitoring for
declared pregnant workers. Ginna established an administrative limit (300 mrem) for a
declared pregnant worker.
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed audits and self assessments since the previous inspection to
verify identified problems were put in the corrective action program. The inspectors
reviewed elements of the corrective action program related to implementing the
- ALA [[]]
program to determine if problems were being entered into the program for timely
resolution. Four
- ALA [[]]
RA resources were reviewed.
b. Findings and Observations Introduction: The inspectors identified a self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) associated with occupational exposure control. Specifically, Ginna
failed to implement effective occupational exposure control for two work activities ('B'
sump strainer modification and steam generator inspections) once plant radiation
conditions changed.
Description: During the RFO, Ginna did not effectively manage work activities to prevent unnecessary occupational radiation exposure to workers involved with the 'B' sump
strainer modification (RWP No. 5800) and the steam generator inspections (RWP Nos.
5711 and 9711) once plant radiation conditions changed. Specifically, three weeks prior
to plant shutdown, Ginna replaced demineralizer resins that changed reactor coolant
system (RCS) pH causing chemical shocks that resulted in several unexpected crud
bursts prior to plant shutdown. In addition, once the plant was shut down, cleanup of the
RCS was delayed following an induced crud burst (hydrogen peroxide addition), when the
purification system was isolated for greater than the expected 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> to facilitate
performance of a test of the safety injection system. The extended isolation of the
letdown system and pre-outage crud bursts caused an increased source term that was
not expected or planned relative to performance of reactor work activities to assure the
work was performed with occupational exposure
- ALA [[]]
RA.
The initial dose estimates for the specified RWP were primarily based on historical dose
Enclosure rates for the same or similar work activities, person-to-hour estimates provided by maintenance and engineering groups to accomplish the work activities, and were
reviewed by Ginna management. However, Ginna failed to revise the RWP estimates
when the actual work environment and conditions were different than originally anticipated
due to the crud bursts and the expected work scope increased. For example, the 'B'
sump strainer modification had additional scope added and steam generator inspections
included significant rework which was not expected. Further, Ginna did not perform timely
in-progress reviews for these work activities even though actual dose accumulation was
significantly more than originally estimated.
The inspectors assessed this issue as a single performance deficiency for the failure to reassess work planning and controls following changes in working conditions that were
different than anticipated or planned and affected the ability to assure the occupational
exposure was maintained
- ALA [[]]
RA. These two work activities were determined to have
exceeded Ginna's original
- ALA [[]]
RA planning and estimation, i.e., occupational exposure
greater than five person-rem and greater than 50 percent of their initial estimated dose.
Specifically, as of May 1, 2008, the 'B' sump strainer modification work had an actual
accrued dose of 11.400 person-rem compared to Ginna's estimate of 5.427 person-rem;
and as of April 30, the steam generator inspections had an actual accrued dose of 11.932
person-rem compared to Ginna's estimate of 5.750 person-rem. The inspectors
determined that Ginna should have been able to recognize changes in the radiological
conditions and the emergent work affecting both of these activities and reassess the
conditions to assure that the radiological work exposure to personnel was
- ALA [[]]
- RA. The emergent and changed radiological conditions were not fully recognized and effectively assessed to assure occupational exposure to personnel was maintained
- ALA [[]]
RA relative to work involving the 'B' sump strainer modification and the steam
generator inspections. Accordingly, the occupational exposure that was originally planned
and expected for these work activities was exceeded without sufficient reassessment,
planning, and work control to assure that, to the extent practical, occupational exposure
for these activities was maintained
- ALA [[]]
RA. As a result, the activities resulted in
unplanned, unintended occupational collective dose, a condition that was well within
Ginna's ability to recognize, foresee, correct, and prevent by reassessment of the
conditions and implementation of commensurate planning and work control.
The failure to implement controls to achieve occupational doses that are
- ALA [[]]
RA and which resulted in unplanned, unintended occupational collective dose is a performance
deficiency that was reasonably within Ginna's ability to foresee and correct and which
should have been prevented.
Analysis: This finding is more than minor because each of the two work activities exceeded their initial estimates by more than 50 percent and each accumulated more
than five person-rem, as described in Appendix E of IMC 0612, example (6.b).
Additionally, the finding affected the program and process attribute of the Occupational
Radiation Safety cornerstone to ensure the adequate protection of the worker health and
safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operations. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance
(Green) because Ginna's 3-year rolling average was less than 135 person-rem, as
described in Appendix C of
IV, Step 2 (b).
This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance work control area, because Ginna did not effectively coordinate work activities to incorporate actions to
Enclosure address the impact of changes to the work scope or activity that were appropriate under the circumstances, i.e., radiological conditions changed and emergent work was required, a circumstance for which it was appropriate to reassess the changed work conditions and
environment to assure that continued work was adequately planned, controlled, and
monitored to assure that occupational exposures were maintained
- ALA [[]]
RA requirement will be judged on
whether Ginna has incorporated measures to track and, if necessary, to reduce
exposures and not whether exposures and doses represent an absolute minimum or
whether Ginna has used all possible methods to reduce exposures. Further, consistent
with Appendix B of IMC 0612, since Ginna does have a defined program to track and
reduce occupational exposure and this finding is considered an isolated example and not
an
CFR 20.1101(b). This issue was entered into Ginna's corrective action program (CR 2008-3957). (FIN 05000244/2008003-03 Failure to Implement Effective Occupational Exposure
Control) 2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03 - One sample)
a. Inspection Scope From April 28 to May 2, 2008, the inspectors performed the following activities to evaluate
that Ginna was utilizing properly calibrated and source-checked radiological instruments
to monitor radiological conditions. Implementation of these programs was reviewed
against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable industry standards, and Ginna's
procedures.
The inspectors observed 10 radiological instruments in use in the containment and
auxiliary building during the RFO. The inspectors verified the calibration due dates were
not expired and the instrument source checks were current. The inspectors reviewed six
CRs related to radiological instruments. The inspectors also observed a radiation
protection technician perform pre-use checks of an instrument.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4.
- OTHER [[]]
ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151) .1 Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
a. Inspection Scope (71151 - One sample)
Using the criteria specified in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, the inspectors verified the
completeness and accuracy of the performance indicator (PI) data for safety system
functional failures. To verify the accuracy of the data, the inspectors reviewed monthly
Enclosure operating reports, NRC inspection reports, and Ginna event reports issued from January 2007 to March 2008.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
a. Inspection Scope (71151 - One sample)
The inspectors reviewed Ginna's operations logs and chemistry surveillance records to
verify the accuracy of data reported under the reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate PI.
The inspectors used the guidance provided in NEI 99-02, Revision 5, to assess the
accuracy of Ginna's collection and reporting of the PI data. The inspectors also observed
a sample of S-12.4, "RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions," which determines
RCS leak rate
encompassed the period from August 2007 until March 2008.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness a. Inspection Scope (71151 - Three samples) The inspectors reviewed data for the emergency preparedness PIs which are: (1) Drill
and Exercise Performance; (2)
ANS Reliability. The
inspectors reviewed supporting documentation from drills and tests for April 2007 through
March 2008 to verify the accuracy of the reported data. The review of these PIs was
conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151. The acceptance criteria
used for the review were
NEI 99-02, Revision 5.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
.1 Semi-Annual Review (71152 - One sample) a. Inspection Scope In order to identify trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety
issue, the inspectors reviewed CRs initiated from June 2007 to June 2008, the 4th quarter 2007 and 1st quarter 2008 corrective action trend reports, the daily plant status report, and the 1st quarter 2008 and 2nd quarter 2008 system health reports. The inspectors also discussed trends and potential trends with appropriate plant personnel.
Enclosure b. Findings and Observations No findings of significance were identified. No trends were noted that indicated a potential
significant safety issue. Trends identified by the inspectors had already been recognized
by Ginna, and corrective actions initiated as necessary.
.2 Continuous Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program (71152 - One sample) a. Inspection Scope As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"
and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into
Ginna's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing condition
reports, periodic attendance at daily screening meetings, and accessing Ginna's
computerized corrective action database.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Operator Workarounds (71152 - One sample)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the operator workaround program to verify that workaround
problems were identified at an appropriate threshold and entered into the corrective action
program. To perform this review, the inspectors performed a control room walkdown and
discussed deficiencies with control room operators to determine if deficiencies were
appropriately identified and that their impact on operations was assessed. Operator
workarounds that affected a mitigating system's function or the operator's ability to
implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures were reviewed more closely.
For example, one item that had been identified by Ginna as a degraded condition, the
need for operators to verify that an appropriate gap is maintained between the main
steam safety valves and their dead weight supports, was walked down by the inspectors.
As part of this review, the inspectors reviewed the procedure for workaround control and a
recent self-assessment report regarding the aggregate impact of the active operator
workarounds, challenges, and degraded operability items.
b. Findings and Observations No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
- 4OA 3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153 - Three samples) a. Inspection Scope .1 Seal Injection Indications Identified During
ISI Activities
On May 1, 2008, during a periodic non-destructive examination, Ginna Inservice
Inspection (ISI) personnel found three small circular indications on an elbow in the seal
injection line for the 'B' reactor coolant pump (RCP). The depth of the deepest indication
was 0.125 to 0.375 inches and appeared to have been made by a drill bit. A Ginna
evaluation determined that the indications did not affect the structural integrity of the pipe
which had a pipe wall thickness of 0.4 inches. The elbow was last inspected in 1997
during the last 10-year ISI examination. No indications were noted during that inspection.
A subsequent Ginna investigation concluded that the indications were probably caused
during the process of installing insulation on the pipe elbow. As part of an extent of
condition review, the pipe elbow on the 'A' RCP was examined and no indications were
identified. Inspectors' follow-up of this issue included examining the elbow on the 'B' RCP
seal injection line, reviewing the operability determination which evaluated the significance
of the indications, and verifying Ginna was following the appropriate event evaluation
procedures.
.2 Heater Drain Tank Pump Trip
On May 15, 2008, control room operators rapidly reduced reactor power to 50 percent
when both heater drain tank pumps tripped. Prior to the event, instrumentation and
control (I&C) technicians were troubleshooting failed level indicating and control systems
on the heater drain tank. A Ginna investigation determined that the most probable cause
for the loss of heater drain tank pumps was a low level in the heater drain tank, a
condition that was unknown to control room operators since the drain tank level indicating
systems were not functioning. The inspectors reviewed Ginna's investigation of this
event, verified that the failed level indicating systems had been restored to service, and
that, prior to the event, the troubleshooting actions that I&C personnel had performed on
the level indicating system were prudent given the plant conditions that existed at the
time.
.3 Unplanned Power Transient
On June 29, 2008, an unplanned reactor power decrease to 97 percent occurred when
control room operators added boric acid to the volume control tank (VCT). Prior to the
event, the chemical volume control system was automatically adding a blend of boric acid
and water to the VCT when operators noticed a decrease in Tavg followed by an increase
in Tavg. To compensate for the increase in Tavg, the operators added boric acid to the
VCT and reduced load off the turbine. No safety limits were exceeded. A Ginna
investigation determined that the most probable cause for the decrease and subsequent
increase in Tavg was malfunction of valves 110A, 110B, and 110C. The inspectors
reviewed Ginna's investigation of this event and verified operator actions were adequate.
An incident response team was assembled and troubleshooting actions were initiated by
operations and I&C personnel.
Enclosure b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. 4OA5 Other Activities .1 Hemyc Compensatory Measures Review
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors completed a walkdown of plant areas containing systems protected by
Hemyc fire wrap and reviewed the commitments Ginna made to the NRC in a letter from
Ginna, dated June 9, 2006, in response to Generic Letter 2006-03, "Potentially
Nonconforming Hemyc and MT Fire Barrier Configuration," dated April 10, 2006. The
inspectors also reviewed the adequacy of compensatory measures outlined in Ginna's
documented evaluation (Fire Protection Program and Appendix R Conformance Review
Screen, Attachment A; and A-202 Evaluation of Compensatory Measures for Degraded
Hemyc, dated June 30, 2006) for deviations taken to the commitments previously made in
Ginna's June 9, 2006, letter. The review verified that the alternate compensatory
measures outlined in Ginna's evaluation would not adversely affect the ability to achieve
and maintain safe shutdown in the event of fire. The inspectors verified that Ginna
continues to track Hemyc installations as protection system impairments and the alternate
compensatory measures using staff guidance provided in Regulatory Issue Summary
2005-07, Compensatory Measures to Satisfy the Fire Protection Program Requirements,"
dated April 19, 2005, remain in place pending completion of the modifications and
evaluations.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .2 (Closed) Temporary Instruction 2515/172, Reactor Coolant System Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds
a. Inspection Scope The purpose of this Temporary Instruction (TI) was to support the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation/Division of Component Integrity by inspecting and reporting on
Ginna's performance on implementing MRP-139. Specifically, the inspectors provided a
qualitative description of the effectiveness of Ginna's dissimilar metal butt weld inspection
and mitigation program.
No welds exist at Ginna that fall under the jurisdiction of
TI.
The inspectors reviewed with the engineering staff at Ginna how this was determined, the
records reviewed, and the conclusion supported.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure .3 (Closed) Temporary Instruction 2525/166, Pressurized Water Reactor Containment Sump Blockage a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed the inspection in accordance with TI 2515/166, Pressurized
Water Reactor Containment Sump Blockage. The
GL) 2004-02, "Potential
Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at Pressurized Water
Reactors." Specifically, the inspectors verified implementation of the modifications and
required procedure changes were consistent with the proposed actions committed to in
the GL response. The inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensing and design
documents to verify that they were either updated or in the process of being updated to
reflect the modifications. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the strainer installation
to verify it was performed in accordance with the approved design change package. In
addition, the inspectors walked down the containment to assess the adequacy of the
coatings on surfaces in containment. Finally, the inspectors verified that there were no
choke-points not accounted for by Ginna's calculations that could prevent water from
reaching the recirculation sump during a design basis accident. Documents reviewed are
listed in the Attachment.
Evaluation of Inspection Requirements
The TI requires the inspectors to evaluate and answer the following questions:
Did Ginna implement the plant modifications and procedure changes committed to in their
GL 2004-02 response? The inspectors verified that actions implemented by Ginna as
described in response to GL 2004-02 were complete related to the installation of the sump
screen. The inspectors determined that the procedures to programmatically control
potential debris generation sources were updated. Finally, the inspectors reviewed
Ginna's emergency operating procedures and verified that the procedures ensured the
assumptions described in Ginna's supplemental response to the GL were in alignment
with the procedure guidance.
Has Ginna updated its licensing basis to reflect the corrective actions taken in response to
GL 2004-02? The inspectors verified that changes to the facility or procedures as
described in the
GL 2004-02 response were
reviewed and documented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. As part of this review, the
inspectors verified that Ginna did not require NRC approval prior to implementing those
changes. The inspectors also verified that Ginna intends to update the
- USF [[]]
AR to reflect
the final modification and associated procedure changes taken in response to GL 2004-
2. Finally, the inspectors verified that Ginna intends to provide a final response to GL
2004-02 within 60 days of startup from the RFO.
Based on the inspectors' review of the hardware modifications, and the procedure and
licensing bases changes, the inspection requirements of the
TI is
closed.
This documentation of TI-2515/166 completion, as well as any results of sampling audits
of Ginna's actions, will be reviewed by the NRC staff (Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation) as input, along with the
GL 2004-
and Generic Safety Issue-191 (GSI), "Assessment of Debris Accumulation on
Enclosure Pressurized Water Reactor Sump Performance." The
GSI-191 and GL 2004-02 have been
satisfactorily addressed at Ginna.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
l4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
.1 Management Site Visit On April 28, 2008, a site visit was performed by Mr. J. Clifford, Deputy Director, Division of
Reactor Projects for Region I. During Mr. Clifford's visit, he toured portions of the plant
including the containment structure and met with Ginna managers.
.2 Exit Meeting Summary On July 14, 2008, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to
Mr. John Carlin and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The
inspectors verified that none of the material examined during the inspection is considered
proprietary in nature.
- ATTACH [[]]
- MENT [[:]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- ATION [[]]
- KEY [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
CONTACT Licensee Personnel
J. Carlin Vice President, Ginna
D. Blankenship Manager, Radiation Protection
D. Dean Assistant Operations Manager (Shift)
M. Giacini Scheduling Manager
E. Hedderman Chemistry Supervisor
T. Hedges Emergency Preparedness Manager
D. Holm Plant Manager
J. Pacher Manager, Nuclear Engineering Services
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ITEMS [[]]
- AND [[]]
- DISCUS [[]]
SED Opened and Closed
05000244/2008003-01 NCV Failure to Correctly Implement Reactor Coolant Heat-up Procedure (Section 1R20)05000244/2008003-02
ERO Augmentation of On-shift
Staff (Section 1EP3)05000244/2008003-03 FIN Failure to Implement Effective Occupational Exposure
Control (Section 2OS2)
Closed
05000244/2515/172 TI Reactor Coolant System Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds
(Section 4OA5)
05000244/2515/166 TI Pressurized Water Reactor Containment Sump Blockage
(Section
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
- NTS [[]]
- REVIEW [[]]
ED Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection Document Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Rev. 20
Attachment Procedures
- EP [[]]
SC.3 Low Screen House Water Level, Rev. 02000
O-6.9 Ginna Operating Limits for Station 13A Transmission, Rev. 03100
O-23 Hot Weather Seasonal Readiness Walkdown, Rev. 00300
Condition Reports 2008-2834
2007-5821
2007-0012
2007-3616
2007-6286
Work Orders 20704997
20703056
20703617
20705288
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment Documents
Diesel Generator Emergency Power System Health Report (Q2-2008)
- UFS [[]]
AC Sources
4S Diesel Generator Emergency Power System
Integrated work schedule week 336L
Procedures O-7 Alignment and Operation of the Reactor Vessel Overpressure Protection System, Rev. 04701 O-2.3.1 Draining and Operation at Reduced Inventory of the Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 08500 O-15.2 Valve Alignment for Head Lift, Core Component Movement and Periodic Status Checks, Rev. 30 T-27.1 EDG 'A' Pre-Startup Alignment, Revision 05600
T-27.2 EDG 'B' Pre-Startup Alignment, Revision 05800
T-27.4 Diesel Generator Operation, Revision 039
Drawings 33013-1239 Diesel Generator 'A' and 'B', rev 4
33013-1247 Auxiliary Coolant Residual Heat Removal (AC)
- P& [[]]
ID, Rev. 40
33013-1263 RCS Overpressure Protection Nitrogen Accumulator System, Rev. 10
33013-1261 Containment Spray (SI), Rev. 37
33013-1262 Safety Injection and Accumulators, Rev. 10
Attachment Condition Report 2008-004728
2008-003377
Section 1R05: Fire Protection Document Ginna Fire Protection Program, Rev. 4d
Procedures O-2.2 Plant Shutdown from Hot Shutdown to Cold Conditions, Rev. 14900
SC- 3.1.1 Fire Alarm Response (Fire Brigade Activation), Rev. 17
SC- 3.4.1 Fire Brigade and Control Room Personnel Responsibilities, Rev. 38
FRP- 28 All-Volatile Treatment Room, Rev. 6
Drawings 33013-1991 Fire Protection Fire Service Water Auxiliary Building, Intermediate Building, and Containment Building
- CNMT Structure and Intermediate Building Plan, Basement Floor Elev. 235 feet 8 inches 33013-2545 Containment Fire Response Plan
- CN [[]]
MT, Structure and Intermediate Building Plan, Intermediate Floor Elev. 253 feet 3 inches
Condition Report 2008-5098
Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance Documents Service Water System Reliability Optimization Program, Rev. 8
RECIRCFANA, Rev. 000500
Section 1R08: Inservice Inspection Documents
UT-08-117, UT Data Sheet Report
Drawings C381 to C358, Station SW inside Reactor Containment from Penetration 209 to Reactor Cavity Cooler, Sheets 28, 30, 32
Condition Reports 2008-3243
2008-3244
Attachment Work Orders
SW System Piping at P209
Scope Expansion to Include Piping at P201, Rev. 5
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Document EAL Simulator Scenario Lesson Plan, June 9, 2008 Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness Documents System Health Report for Radiation Monitoring, Qtr 1, 2008
Record
MR5, Maintenance Rule Goal Determination, Rev. 4
Record
MR5, Maintenance Rule Goal Determination, Rev. 4
Ginna IST Program for Valves 951, 966B, and 966C
Procedures P-9, Radiation Monitoring System, Rev. 09801
S-14, Area and Process Radiation Monitoring System, Rev. 02601
S-14.8, Operation of Containment Ventilation, Rev. 14
S-14.7, Operation of Area Radiation Monitors, Rev. 7
S-14.10, Operation of Process Radiation Monitors, Rev. 16
IIT-3.1, Containment Isolation Valve Leak Rate Testing, Rev. 1
PTT-23.12A, Containment Isolation Valve Leak Rate Testing Pressurizer Steam Sample Pen 207A, Rev. 3
Drawing 33013-1278 Nuclear Sampling
- P& [[]]
ID, Sheets 1 and 2
Condition Reports 2008-5377
2008-5331
2008-5260
2008-5224
2008-5094
2008-4846
2008-4836 2008-4680 2008-4628
2008-4494
2008-3299
2006-1591
2006-6011
2007-3865 2008-1200 2008-3201
2008-4144
2008-4648
2008-4649
2008-4947
2008-5445 Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation Documents
SC.1, Adverse Weather Plan, Rev. 17
STP-O-R-2.2, Diesel Generator Load and Safeguard Sequence Test, Rev. 00000
PT-17.2, Process Radiation Monitors R-11 - R-18, R-20 - R-22 Iodine Monitors R-10A and
R-10B, Rev. 12600
STP-I-32.1-A, Plant Safeguard Logic Test Train 'A'
Attachment S-23.1, Containment Recirculation Fan 'A' Alignment, Rev.
- 18 UFS [[]]
AC Sources
Diesel Generator Emergency Power System Health Report, 2nd Qtr. 2008
Drawings 33013-1239 Diesel Generator 'A' and 'B', Sheets 1 and 2, Rev. 4
33013-1923 Feedwater Heater Drain System, Rev. 22
Condition Reports 2008-4728
2008-3377
2008-4627
Work Order 20803854 Actuator for Valve 4629 Cracked
Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations Documents Part 21-2008-04, Notification Regarding Identification of Defect:
- IS [[]]
CV-9700B
Procedures STP-O-2.9, Check Valve and Manual Valve Exercising, Rev. 00100
COMP-D, Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pump D - Comprehensive Test, Rev. 00500
Drawing 33013-1238 Standby Auxiliary Feedwater
- P& [[]]
ID, Rev. 25
Condition Reports 2008-2745
2008-4166
2008-3968
2008-3477 2008-3687 2008-3318
2008-4203
2008-5653 Section 1R18: Plant Modifications Document PCR 2008-0004, Main Steam Check Valve Upgrade
Condition Reports 2008-4291
2008-4292
Attachment Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing Documents M-64.1.2,
- MOV [[]]
ATs Testing of Motor Operated Valves, Rev. 35
PT-36Q-D, Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pump D, Quarterly, Rev. 05400
- PO [[]]
RV Operability Verification, Rev. 0
STP-O-R-1.4, Valve Interlock Verification - Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 0
Ginna ISI Program, Rev. 7
Condition Reports 2008-2854
2008-3928
2008-4139
2008-4177
2008-4198
Work Orders 20803111 Troubleshoot and Repair AOV-9710B, Stroke Time Failure
20602545 Perform Major Inspection of
- 20700680 PO [[]]
RV-430 is Leaking-by Perform Inspection/Repair/Replace Internals
20704149 Perform a Major Inspection of
- PO [[]]
RV-431C
Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities Documents NRC Inspection Report Docket No. 50-244 /86-02
Rigging Plan for Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Change Out
Final Report for the Reactor Head Drop Analysis for Ginna, Job # 83084, Cygna Energy
Services, March 9, 1984
Procedures O-2.1A Alternate Shutdown to Hot Shutdown with Reactor Trip at 30% Power, Rev. 00000
O-2.3 Draining the Reactor Coolant System to <84" but >64", Rev. 04400
O-2.3.1 Draining and Operation at Reduced Inventory of the Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 08500 STP-O-R-2.2 Diesel Generator Load and Safeguard Sequence Test, Rev. 00000
O-15.2 Valve Alignment for Reactor Head Lift, Core Component Movement, and Periodic Status Checks, Rev. 03100
Condition Reports 2008-2937
2008-3110
2008-3192
2008-3432
2008-3438
2008-3470
2008-3508
2008-3514
2008-3518
2008-3557 2008-3604 2008-3613
2008-3627
2008-3646
2008-3761
2008-3762
2008-3787
2008-3806
2008-3903
2008-4025 2008-4120 2008-4124
2008-4326
2008-4291
2008-4132
2008-4171
2008-4181
2008-4201
2008-4230
2008-4257 2008-4271 2008-4284
2008-4291
Attachment Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing Procedures PT-2.3 Safeguard Power Operated Valve Operations Rev 10500
- PT -17.2 Process Radiation Monitors R-11 to R-18, R-20 to R-22 Iodine Monitors R-10A and R-10B, Rev. 12600 S-12.4
RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions, Rev. 54
STP-O-12.1 Emergency Diesel Generator 'A', Rev. 00201
- SD [[]]
PORV Operability Verification Rev. 0
Condition Report 2008-2831
Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification System Evaluation Condition Reports 2008-5155
2007-7713
Section
- EPIP 5-9, Testing the Off-Hours Notification of the Response Organization and Quarterly Telephone Number Checks, Rev. 01700
EPIP 1-5, Notifications, Rev. 07800
Ginna's Nuclear Emergency Response Plan, Rev. 02800
Condition Reports 2008-4938
2008-5153
2007-8076
2007-8075
2007-4782 Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Condition Reports 2007-4228
2007-6652 Section 1EP5: Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses Document Unusual Events Reports for July 4, 2007, and January 30, 2008-07-03 Condition Report 2008-0391
2008-3990
Attachment 2008-0929 2007-8729
2008-0962
2008-3927
2007-5951
2008-4533
Section
RWP Preparation, Rev. 1
Condition Reports 2008-0411
2008-0895
2008-1196
2008-1423 2008-1482 2008-2132
2008-2228
2008-2231
Audits and Assessments 2007-0078 Radiography/Boundary Control
4th Quarter 2007 Quarterly Report Section
- ALA [[]]
RA Job Reviews, Rev. 8 Condition Reports 2008-1087 2008-1964
2008-2506 2008-3957
Audits and Assessments 2007-0076
- ALA [[]]
RA Planning
2007-0093 Source Term Control
4th Quarter 2007 Quarterly Report Section 2OS3: Radiological Instruments and Other Protective Equipment Condition Reports 2008-0246 2008-0368
2008-1007 2008-2448
2008-2525
Section
NEI 99-02, Nuclear Energy Institute Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Rev. 5, July 2007
Attachment S-12.4,
OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems Documents 4th Quarter 2007 and 1st Quarter 2008 Corrective Action Trend Reports 1st and 2nd Quarter 2008 System Health Reports for All Systems Available
Condition Reports 2008-4567
2007-6158
2008-0935
Section
CR 2008-5802, June 30, 2008
Drawing 33013-1266 Auxiliary Building Chemical Volume and Control System, Boric Acid
- P& [[]]
ID
Condition Report 2008-5802
Section 4OA5: Other Activities Documents A202, Evaluation of Compensatory Measures for Degraded Hemyc, June 30, 2006
EP-3-S-0306, Change Impact Evaluation Form, Rev. 3
Generic Letter 2006-03, Potentially Nonconforming Hemyc and MT Fire Barrier Configuration
PCR 2007-0018, Containment Recirculating Fan Cooler System Duct Removal, Rev. 0
PCR 2007-0021, Containment Permanent Sump 'B' Strainer Upgrade, Rev. 0
Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-07, Compensatory Measures to Satisfy the Fire Protection Requirements, April 19, 2005 Security Training PowerPoint Concerning Vehicle Searches Supplementary Response to GL 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation during Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors, February 29, 2008 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 20
Procedures A-3.1, Containment Storage and Closeout Inspection, Rev. 39
- EC [[]]
CS Sump Strainer Replacement installation Procedure for Ginna, Rev. 2
EP-3-P-0601, Containment Coating Condition Assessment Procedure, Rev. 0
ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, Rev. 42
GC-76.11, Painting Application and Inspection, Rev. 5
Attachment
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ACRONY [[]]
- MS [[]]
- ADA [[]]
MS Agency-Wide Documents Access and Management System
- ALA [[]]
RA As low as is reasonably achievable
- AS [[]]
ME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
- CE [[]]
DE Committed effective dose equivalent
CR Condition report
- EC [[]]
CS Emergency core cooling system
- EP [[]]
RI Electric Power Research Institute
- FR [[]]
TP Full rated thermal power
- GIN [[]]
NA R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
GSI Generic Safety Issue
HX Heat exchangers
I&C Instrumentation and control
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
- LH [[]]
RA Locked high radiation areas
MOV Motor operated valve
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
- NE [[]]
RP Nuclear emergency response plan
- OE [[]]
- P& [[]]
- PA [[]]
RS Publicly Available Records
PCR Plant change record
PI Performance indicator
PMT Post-maintenance testing
RCA Radiologically controlled area
RCP Reactor coolant pump
RFO Refueling outage
RWP Radiation work permit
- SC [[]]
BA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
SSC Systems, structures, and components
- SWSR [[]]
OP Service water system reliability optimization program
TI Temporary instruction
- UFS [[]]
AR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
VCT Volume Control Tank