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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 07200077/20240012024-06-18018 June 2024 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 - NRC Inspection Report No. 07200077/2024001 ML24157A3672024-06-13013 June 2024 Updated Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report Request for Additional Information Transmittal Letter ML24135A1972024-06-13013 June 2024 – Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0091 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting)) ML24151A6482024-06-0303 June 2024 Changes in Reactor Decommissioning Branch Project Management Assignments for Some Decommissioning Facilities ML24120A3242024-05-24024 May 2024 TMI-2 Email to Fws RS-24-055, 2023 Corporate Regulatory Commitment Change Summary Report2024-05-17017 May 2024 2023 Corporate Regulatory Commitment Change Summary Report ML24120A2552024-04-29029 April 2024 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report ML24121A2472024-04-29029 April 2024 and Three Mile Island, Unit 2 - 2023 Occupational Radiation Exposure Annual Report ML24113A0212024-04-18018 April 2024 (TMI-2), Supplement to Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation RS-24-002, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Annual Property Insurance Status Report2024-04-0101 April 2024 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Annual Property Insurance Status Report ML24065A0042024-03-28028 March 2024 Submittal of 2023 Aircraft Movement Data Annual Report ML24092A0012024-03-28028 March 2024 (TMI-2), Decommissioning Trust Fund Annual Report ML24088A0122024-03-28028 March 2024 Notification of Amended Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(7), Revision 6 ML24085A2152024-03-25025 March 2024 (TMI-2) - Annual Notification of Property Insurance Coverage RS-24-023, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding.2024-03-22022 March 2024 Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding. ML24052A0602024-03-20020 March 2024 – Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0061 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting)) ML24074A3922024-03-14014 March 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information for the TMI-2 Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report, Rev. 5 ML24075A0062024-03-14014 March 2024 List of Threatened and Endangered Species That May Occur in Your Proposed Project Location or May Be Affected by Your Proposed Project ML24073A2312024-03-13013 March 2024 and Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 - Management Change ML24044A0092024-02-12012 February 2024 License Amendment Request – Three Mile Island, Unit 2, Historic and Cultural Resources Review, Response to Request for Additional Information IR 05000320/20230042024-02-0707 February 2024 TMI-2 Solutions, LLC, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 - NRC Inspection Report 05000320/2023004 ML24038A0222024-02-0505 February 2024 Achp Letter on Section 106 Programmatic Agreement Participation IR 05000289/20230062024-01-29029 January 2024 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 - NRC Inspection Report No. 05000289/2023006 ML23342A1242024-01-0909 January 2024 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Plan ML23325A1092024-01-0505 January 2024 Review of the Management Plan for Three Mile Island Station, Unit No. 2, Debris Material ML23354A2112023-12-20020 December 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information for the TMI-2 Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report, Rev. 5 ML23354A2062023-12-20020 December 2023 (TMI-2), Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation IR 05000320/20230032023-11-28028 November 2023 TMI-2 Solutions, LLC, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2, NRC Inspection Report No. 05000320/2023003 ML23243A9082023-08-29029 August 2023 Shpo Letter to TMI-2 Regarding Section 106 Activities IR 05000320/20230022023-08-17017 August 2023 TMI-2 Solutions, LLC, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 - NRC Inspection Report 05000320/2023002 ML23216A1772023-08-14014 August 2023 Consultation Letter to Rebecca Countess for TMI-2 ML23216A1742023-08-14014 August 2023 Consultation Letter to David Morrison for TMI-2 ML23216A1752023-08-14014 August 2023 Consultation Letter to Joanna Cain for TMI-2 ML23216A1732023-08-14014 August 2023 Consultation Letter to Christine Turner for TMI-2 IR 05000289/20230052023-08-14014 August 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 - NRC Inspection Report 05000289/2023005 ML23216A1782023-08-14014 August 2023 Consultation Letter to Steve Letavic for TMI-2 ML23221A1402023-08-0808 August 2023 (TMI-2), Response to Requests for Additional Information for the TMI-2 Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report, Rev. 5 ML23200A1882023-07-31031 July 2023 TMI-2 Correction Letter Amendment 67 ML23209A7632023-07-28028 July 2023 Letter from PA Shpo to TMI-2 Solutions on Cultural and Historic Impacts of Decommissioning ML23192A8272023-07-10010 July 2023 TMI-2 Solutions, LLC - Response to Shpo Request for Additional Information for Er Project 2021PR03278.006, TMI-2 Decommissioning Project ML23167A4642023-07-0505 July 2023 Letter - TMI-2- Exemption 10 CFR Part 20 Append G Issuance ML23167A0312023-06-28028 June 2023 Acceptance Review and Schedule for the Request for Exemption from a Requirement from 10 CFR 20, Appendix G, Section Iii.E, EPID L-2023-LLE-0016 ML23171B0222023-06-19019 June 2023 (TMI-2) - Notification Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.140(d) Regarding Application of Previously Approved TMI-2 Quality Assurance Program to Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Activities ML23138A0662023-05-17017 May 2023 TMI-2 NHPA Section 106 Shpo Letter to NRC 5-17-23 ML23137A2822023-05-17017 May 2023 (TMI-2), Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 20, Appendix G, Section Iii.E ML23026A3132023-05-0202 May 2023 Issuance of Exemption from 10 CFR 70.24 (EPID-L-2023-LLE-0003) ML23122A1842023-05-0101 May 2023 Shpo_Er_Summary_Letter 2024-06-03
[Table view] Category:Report
MONTHYEARML23073A3982023-03-31031 March 2023 TMI-2 ISFSI Biennial Update Report for 2023 TMI-23-005, Updated Spent Fuel Management Plan2023-03-21021 March 2023 Updated Spent Fuel Management Plan ML22335A4632022-12-0101 December 2022 Chronology of Significant Events in Operator Licensing Since the Three Mile Island Accident (1979) ML22101A0792022-03-23023 March 2022 TMI2-EN-RPT-0001, Revision 1, Determination of the Safe Fuel Mass Limit for Decommissioning TMI-22-008, 2021 Aircraft Movement Data Annual Report for TMI-12022-02-28028 February 2022 2021 Aircraft Movement Data Annual Report for TMI-1 ML22105A0932021-12-16016 December 2021 Attachment 3 - RSCS Technical Support Document (Tsd) No. 21-078 Rev 00 TMI-2 Source Term Limitations and Administrative Controls to Prevent Exceeding the 1 Rem EPA PAG ML21236A2882021-08-10010 August 2021 TMI-2 Pdms SAR Update 14 & QA Plan (Rev 18 & 19) Biennial Submittal 08-10-21 ML21133A2642021-05-0505 May 2021 Supplemental Information to License Amendment Request Decommissioning Technical Specifications ML21084A2292021-03-17017 March 2021 Notification of Amended Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report Accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(7), Revision 4 ML21085A6922021-03-15015 March 2021 Plan for Management of Debris Material ML21056A0052021-02-25025 February 2021 2020 Aircraft Movement Data Annual Report ML21133A2652021-02-0101 February 2021 Calculation TMI2-EN-RPT-0002, Revision 0, MCNP Version 6.2 Bias Determination for Low Enrichment Uranium Using the ENDF/B-VIII.0 Cross Section Library ML18107A2152018-04-10010 April 2018 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports for 2016 and 2017 ML17289A0532017-10-15015 October 2017 Case Study Overview ML17165A4092017-06-14014 June 2017 T1R22 Refuel Outage MRP-227-A Reactor Internals Scope Deferral Review RS-16-104, Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Assessment Submittal2016-06-29029 June 2016 Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Assessment Submittal RS-16-087, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)2016-06-29029 June 2016 Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049) ML15306A5032015-12-17017 December 2015 Closure Evaluation for Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.46 Requirements Related to Thermal Conductivity Degradation ML15223A2152015-08-14014 August 2015 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the NTTF Review of Insights TMI-15-076, Submittal of TMI White Paper-TMI Bwst Cleanup Path Issue2015-06-22022 June 2015 Submittal of TMI White Paper-TMI Bwst Cleanup Path Issue ML15043A1442015-02-13013 February 2015 Review of Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report for Fall 2013 Outage ML14297A4112014-12-19019 December 2014 Letter and Non-Proprietary Safety Evaluation of Reactor Vessel Internals Inspection Plan RS-14-301, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima.2014-12-17017 December 2014 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima. RS-14-277, Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI, Division 12014-09-24024 September 2014 Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI, Division 1 ML14163A0242014-06-10010 June 2014 Response to Request for Additional Information - Review of the Cycle 20 Core Operating Limits Report ML14189A2852014-04-30030 April 2014 Topical Report 213, 40th Year Reactor Building Tendon Surveillance (Period 10), (Rev 0) ML14189A2862014-04-17017 April 2014 Final Report for the 40th Year (10th Period) Tendon Surveillance at Three Mile Island, Unit 1 TMI-14-053, Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Report for 2012 and 20132014-04-16016 April 2014 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Report for 2012 and 2013 ML13225A5522013-12-17017 December 2013 Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049 (Mitigation Strategies) ML13338A6712013-12-0909 December 2013 Mega-Tech Services, LLC, Technical Evaluation Report Regarding the Overall Integrated Plan for Three Mile Island, Unit 1, TAC MF0803 ML14189A2872013-11-12012 November 2013 TMI 40TH Year Tendon Surveillance, Tendon No. 1-146-34, Tendon End Buddress 4 TMI-14-061, 40th Year Tendon Surveillance Engineering Report (Topical Report 213), Precision Surveillance Corporation in-Service Inspection Quality Control Procedure, Monitoring Tendon Force (Lift-Offs)2013-09-0303 September 2013 40th Year Tendon Surveillance Engineering Report (Topical Report 213), Precision Surveillance Corporation in-Service Inspection Quality Control Procedure, Monitoring Tendon Force (Lift-Offs) TMI-13-107, Attachment 1 - Areva Document No. ANP-3102Q1, Response to NRC Ria Regarding License Amendment Request to Update Pressure -Temperature Limit Curves for Three-Mile Island Unit 1, Revision 0, Dated August 20132013-08-31031 August 2013 Attachment 1 - Areva Document No. ANP-3102Q1, Response to NRC Ria Regarding License Amendment Request to Update Pressure -Temperature Limit Curves for Three-Mile Island Unit 1, Revision 0, Dated August 2013 ML13232A2172013-07-31031 July 2013 Attachment 2 - Areva Document No. ANP-3102, Revision 3,Three-Mile Island Unit 1 Appendix G Pressure-Temperature Limits at 50.2 EFPY with Mur, Revision 3, Dated July 2013 TMI-13-041, Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report Submittal2013-06-28028 June 2013 Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report Submittal TMI-12-148, Plant-Specific Path and Schedule for Resolution of Generic Letter 2004-022013-05-16016 May 2013 Plant-Specific Path and Schedule for Resolution of Generic Letter 2004-02 IR 05000456/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee ML13008A2192013-01-31031 January 2013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000454/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000461/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000237/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000373/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000352/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000219/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000277/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000254/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000272/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000289/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee ML12362A0422012-11-0707 November 2012 Report No. 12Q0108.70-R-001, Rev. 1, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for Three Mile Island Unit 1, Page C-1 Through Page C-161 ML12362A0432012-11-0707 November 2012 Report No. 12Q0108.70-R-001, Rev. 1, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for Three Mile Island Unit 1, Page C-162 Through Page C-284 2023-03-31
[Table view] Category:Miscellaneous
MONTHYEARTMI-23-005, Updated Spent Fuel Management Plan2023-03-21021 March 2023 Updated Spent Fuel Management Plan ML22335A4632022-12-0101 December 2022 Chronology of Significant Events in Operator Licensing Since the Three Mile Island Accident (1979) TMI-22-008, 2021 Aircraft Movement Data Annual Report for TMI-12022-02-28028 February 2022 2021 Aircraft Movement Data Annual Report for TMI-1 ML21085A6922021-03-15015 March 2021 Plan for Management of Debris Material ML21056A0052021-02-25025 February 2021 2020 Aircraft Movement Data Annual Report ML18107A2152018-04-10010 April 2018 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports for 2016 and 2017 ML17289A0532017-10-15015 October 2017 Case Study Overview ML17165A4092017-06-14014 June 2017 T1R22 Refuel Outage MRP-227-A Reactor Internals Scope Deferral Review RS-16-104, Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Assessment Submittal2016-06-29029 June 2016 Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Assessment Submittal ML15306A5032015-12-17017 December 2015 Closure Evaluation for Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.46 Requirements Related to Thermal Conductivity Degradation ML15223A2152015-08-14014 August 2015 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the NTTF Review of Insights TMI-15-076, Submittal of TMI White Paper-TMI Bwst Cleanup Path Issue2015-06-22022 June 2015 Submittal of TMI White Paper-TMI Bwst Cleanup Path Issue ML15043A1442015-02-13013 February 2015 Review of Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report for Fall 2013 Outage ML14297A4112014-12-19019 December 2014 Letter and Non-Proprietary Safety Evaluation of Reactor Vessel Internals Inspection Plan RS-14-301, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima.2014-12-17017 December 2014 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima. ML14163A0242014-06-10010 June 2014 Response to Request for Additional Information - Review of the Cycle 20 Core Operating Limits Report TMI-14-053, Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Report for 2012 and 20132014-04-16016 April 2014 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Report for 2012 and 2013 TMI-13-041, Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report Submittal2013-06-28028 June 2013 Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report Submittal TMI-12-148, Plant-Specific Path and Schedule for Resolution of Generic Letter 2004-022013-05-16016 May 2013 Plant-Specific Path and Schedule for Resolution of Generic Letter 2004-02 IR 05000456/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000272/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000254/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000277/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000219/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000352/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000289/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000373/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee ML13008A2192013-01-31031 January 2013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000454/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000461/20132012013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee IR 05000237/20132022013-01-31031 January 2013 Exelon Generation Co., LLC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) Investigation; Summary of 01 Report No. 3-2010-034; NRC Inspection Report Conference Letter - Licensee ML12178A2152012-08-0202 August 2012 Closeout of Bulletin 2011-01 Migrating Strategies. E910-11-007, Gpu Nuclear, TMI 2 Defueling Completion Report2011-04-11011 April 2011 Gpu Nuclear, TMI 2 Defueling Completion Report ML1023505272010-08-18018 August 2010 Buried Piping - Inspecting Something You Can'T See TMI-10-029, Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports for 2008 and 20092010-04-15015 April 2010 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports for 2008 and 2009 ML0828804502008-10-14014 October 2008 2008 PA Fishing Summary - Summary of Fishing Regulations and Laws ML0824101022008-06-12012 June 2008 Report of Tornadoes in Dauphin County, PA Between 01/01/1950 and 05/31/2008, NCDC ML0815801742008-05-30030 May 2008 License Renewal Environmental Impact Statement ML0824100852008-05-0101 May 2008 Comprehensive Plan for the Water Resources of the Susquehanna River Basin, Draft ML0819807102008-04-0303 April 2008 C2-WHC 2005 - Site Assessment and Wildlife Management Opportunities Report for Exelon Corporation'S Three Mile Island Generating Station. October ML0830502322008-03-11011 March 2008 Pjm 2007 State of the Market Report ML0816106632008-02-14014 February 2008 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Pdms SAR Report for Years 2006 & 2007 ML0612100392006-04-19019 April 2006 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Report for 2004 and 2005 ML0505301682005-02-17017 February 2005 Background Discussion Material for February 24-25, 2005 NRC Meeting Relating to Replacement for BAW-2374, Revision 1, Evaluation of OTSG Thermal Loads During Hot Leg Loca. ML0309006042003-03-19019 March 2003 Additional Information Regarding Notice of Proposed Amendments to Trust Agreement to Implement Assignment of Decommissioning Trust Funds for Amergen Energy Company, LLC ML0303506252003-01-23023 January 2003 Request for NRC Written Consent to Proposed Amendments to Trust Agreement to Implement Assignment of Decommissioning Trust Funds for Amergen Energy Company, LLC ML0231803602002-11-0404 November 2002 (TMI-1) Emergency Notification System Warning Sirens ML0224802942002-08-28028 August 2002 Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Data (FFD) for the Period - January 2002 Through June 2002 ML0224901882002-08-27027 August 2002 Fire Hazards Analysis Report (Fhar), Rev 20, Appendix R Evaluation Report, Cables & Components in Fire Area/Zone, Volume II, Attachment 3-7 ML0224901792002-08-27027 August 2002 Fire Hazards Analysis Report (Fhar), Rev 20, Appendix R Evaluation Report, Component Availability for a Fire in Fire Area/Zone, Volume II, Attachments 3-51 - 3-61 2023-03-21
[Table view] |
Text
Three Mile Island Unit 1 ,)
Route 441 South, P.O. Box 480 Middletown, PA 17057 Telephone 717-948-8000 April 1 0, 201 8 TMl-18-023 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 NRC Docket No. 50-289
Subject:
Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and CommitmentI Revision Reports. for 2016 and 2017 I
Enclosed are the 2016-2017 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports as required by 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and SECY-00-0045 (NEI 99-04).
There are no new regulatory commitments established by this submittal. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mike Fitzwater, of Regulatory Assurance, at (717) 948-8228.
Respectfu Ily, (9W CL}
E.W. Callan, Jr.
Site Vice President, Three Mile Island Unit 1 Exelon Generation Co., LLC
Enclosure:
BIENNIAL 10 CFR 50.59 AND COMMITMENT REVISION REPORTS cc: NRC Senior Resident Inspector -TMl-1 NRC Project Manager, NRR-TMl-1 NRC Administrator - Region I (w/o attachment)
R. R. Janati, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania S. L. Martin, PA Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Radiation Protection -
Nuclear Safety Division
2016-2017 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-289 BIENNIAL 10 CFR 50.59 AND COMMITMENT REVISION REPORTS I
TABLE OF CONTENTS 10 CFR 50.59 Report 2 Modifications 3 Procedure Changes 8 Commitment Revision Report 9 1
2016-2017 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports EXELON CORPORATION THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-289 BIENNIAL 10 CFR 50.59 REPORT JANUARY 1,* 2016 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2017 10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATION SUMMARIES 2
2016-2017 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports Modifications
Title:
Enable Loss of Phase Relay Automatic Trip Feature Year Implemented: 2017 Evaluation Number: TMl-17-E-0001; EC 593110 Description of Activity:
The proposed activity will enable the automatic trip function of an existing relaying scheme to detect a loss-of-phase condition on the 230kV side of the Unit 1 Station Auxiliary Transformers (SATs) to isolate the SATs and to alarm the condition so that the appropriate operator action can be taken.
The equipment for the loss-of phase system was previously installed under EGR 12-00240 during T1R20 in an alarm-on I~ mode. This activity will evaluate the enabling of the a~tomatic trip feature of the relay which wilLisolate the affected SAT on a detection of a loss-of-phase condition. Note that the relays will detect an open phase condition in one or in two phases in the zone of protection from the SAT high side back to its respective 230kV bus breaker. Throughout the remaining discussion the use of "open phase" refers to either or both conditions.
The protective relay scheme monitors the current input from existing CTs on the high side of the SATs to detect a loss-of-phase and to provide an alarm when the MIN LOAD (Generator Offline) setpoint is reached (as defined in analysis C-1101-700-E420-019). The loss-of-phase relays compare the positive sequence currents, the negative sequence currents and the zero sequence currents at both of the SAT's 230kV side, and on a detected loss-of-phase, these relays will, depending upon transformer loading respond as follows:
- When the primary current in the SAT is above the established relay MIN LOAD (Generator Offline) setpoint (as defined in analysis C-1101-700-E420-019), the associated relay will initiate a SAT lockout for an open phase condition via actuation of the existing SAT lockout relays and initiate a Loss of Phase Alarm.
- When the primary current in the SAT is below the established relay MIN LOAD (Generator Offline) setpoint (as defined in analysis C-1101-700-E420-019), a Low Load alarm will actuate in the control room and the trips that may be susceptible to spurious actuation will be blocked.
Under Revision 002 to EC 593110, the associated trip contact output test switches are being closed which will enable the loss-of-phase relays to provide the trip function to the SAT lockout relays.
Reason for Activity:
The activity is being undertaken to address a vulnerability identified during an event that occurred on January 30, 2012 at Byron Station, when the mechanical failure of a porcelain insulator on the 3
2016-2017 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports "C" phase of the 345kV feed to SAT 242-1 and SAT 242-2 created a single-phase voltage condition in the switchyard that propagated through the SATs to the buses fed from the SATs, thereby causing a degraded power condition on those buses. The plant transient that followed resulted in a reactor trip, but the 4kV engineered safety features (ESF) buses remained in a degraded condition until operator action isolated the defective (open phase) power supply to the 4kV ESF buses.
The intent of the loss-of-phase detection scheme is to enhance the protection for1, the Class lE I
system from, and to alert the operators to, a potential degraded condition caused by a loss of a single, or two phases that could adversely affect both the Class lE and the non-Class lE systems.
In addition, the proposed change is consistent with Industry guidelines provided by NEI in "Industry Initiative on Open Phase Condition", Project Number: 689, dated March 16, 2015. This guideline identifies that it is.important that an open phase in the off-site power circuit~ not prevent functioning of important to safety SSC's.
Effect of Activity:
This activity will enable previously installed relaying scheme to: (1) detect a loss-of-phase upstream ofthe SAT and (2) actuate the existing SAT lockout relays to isolate the affected SAT upon detection of a loss-of-p~ase, when in the relay operating regions as described ~bove. When a SAT is isolated, its associated'4kV ES bus will experience an under-voltage condition.: This will start the emergency diesel generator (EDG), load shed the bus, and then load the bus with the required ES loads. When the SAT is isolated, the feed to the associated 6.9kV and 4kV non-ES bus(es) will automatically be transferred from the affected SAT to the unaffected SAT, if it is available. That is, the actuation of the loss-of-phase scheme will produce the same results as the actuation of the existing SAT protection devices.
The loss-of-phase relay scheme does not impact the manual opening or closing of the 230kV bus breakers or of the feed breakers to the 4kV and 6.9kV buses, and will not alter the method of operating the SATs or the 4kV or 6.9kV buses. The manual realignment of power supplies to the 4kV and 6.9kV buses, described in UFSAR Sections 8.2.2.3 and 8.2.2.4, are not affected. Therefore, there is no change in how the SAT, 4kV bus, or 6.9kV bus UFSAR-described design functions are performed or controlled.
The proposed activity, EC 593110 Rev. 2, is based, in part, on an engineering evaluation of the plant design and licensing basis (Operability Evaluation 12-002) which concluded that the Byron event was caused by a failure of a switchyard component and that detection down to the level of this type of failure is beyond the requirements of GDC 17 and was not contemplated as part of the original plant design. Therefore, the function of automatically separating the offsite source during this event was not specifically identified as an automatic action within the original plant design criteria. As such, the proposed activity has been developed as an enhancement to plant safety that addresses a condition that is outside the current design and licensing basis for the plant.
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2016-2017 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports Summary of Conclusion for the Activity's 50.59 Review:
Since the proposed activity is considered an enhancement of the preferred (offsite) power source to protect the Class lE system from a condition that is outside the current design and licensing basis for the plant, the failure of the loss-of-phase system to perform its intended function of isolating the affected SAT upon detection of a loss-of-phase upstream of a SAT does not adversely affect any UFSAR-described design function.
The proposed activity will enable a previously installed relaying scheme to detect *and alarm a loss-of-phase condition on the 230kV side of the Unit 1 SATs so that the degraded offs1te source can be removed from the onsite electrical distribution system'. The proposed activity does not adversely affect SAT capacity or the existing automatic and manual switching capabilities involving the normal, alternative and/or emergency feeds to the 4kV ES buses, 4kV non-ES buses or the 6.9kV buses. The proposed activity does not adversely affect the existing equipment protection, including protection from overcurrent, under-voltage, or degraded voltage conditions.
If a loss-of-phase is detected as discussed above, the protective relay system will actuate the associated SAT lockout relays to isolate the affected SAT and will alert the operators to the degraded condition of the offsite power source feeding the SAT. These actions will produce the same results as actuation of existing SAT protection devices -that is, isolation of the station electrical distribution system from the problem and re-alignment of the affected buses to alternate AC sources. The procedure changes involved with this activity do not involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how UFSAR-described SSC design functions are performed or controlled.
However, the installation of equipment whose spurious actuation, due to a relay malfunction, could result in a loss of offsite power to a 4kV ES bus or (if the unaffected SAT feeds to the 6.9kV or 4kV non-ES buses were not available) reactor trip adversely affects the UFSAR (Section 8.1 described design function that: "provisions must be included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from the transmission network", as is required by GDC-17. Therefore, a 50.59 evaluation was performed for 50.59 Screening Question 1.
The 50.59 Evaluation determined that due to the balancing ofthe positive effects (isolating a degraded power source) and the potential unlikely negative effects (inappropriate isolation of a functioning power source), the proposed activity does not result in more than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR or result in a more then minimal increase in the frequency of a malfunction of an SSC.
Existing protective features protect the SATs in the event of various electrical system failures. The loss-of-phase protective feature utilizes the SAT lockout in a similar manner to isolate a degraded or faulted offsite power supply from the 4kV and 6.9kV busses. Therefore, this manner of utilizing the SAT lockout is not outside the reference bounds of the design for the SAT nor is it inconsistent with .
analyses or descriptions in the UFSAR. The proposed activity involves the enabling of an additional feature so that the power supply to a 4kV ES bus will be controlled in the same manner as at present - that is, an unreliable power supply to the 4kV bus will be disconnected. Therefore, the proposed activity does not involve a test or experiment not described in the UFSAR, where an SSC is 5
2016-2017 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or is inconsistent with analysis or description in the UFSAR.
The loss-of-phase protection and alarm scheme does not affect the times or functions of the existing required degraded or under-voltage protective relay systems or single auxiliary transformer operation that are described in the Technical Specifications. Existing SAT protection features are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.
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2016-2017 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports
Title:
MU-P-lC Performance Requirement Revision Year Implemented: 2017 Evaluation Number: TMl-17-E-0002; EC 621381 Description of Activity:
Revise makeup pump (MU-P-lC} minimum performance requirement in accordance with C-1101-211-E540-091 "TMl-1 IST Acceptance Criteria for HPI Pumps" Rev lC.
Reason for Activity:
OP-TM-211-211 "HPI Test" completed in 1R22 showed MU-P-lC performance was below the acceptance criteria (IR 4055126}. The revised acceptance criteria reduces conservative margin.
Effect of Activity:
This design change package demonstrates that MU-P-lC performance meets or exceeds all design requirements. There is no impact on plant operations. The revised acceptance criteria are based on the existing ECCs analysis, and HPI performance requirements described in the UFSAR. There is no change to safety analysis.
Summary of Conclusion for the Activity's 50.59 Review:
The modified performance requirement for MU-P-lC ensures that the pump can deliver the flow assumed in the safety analysis. Based on the attached evaluation this design change can be completed without prior NRC approval.
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2016-2017 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports Procedure Changes There were no 10 CFR 50.59 required procedure changes for this reporting period.
End of 10 CFR 50.59 Revision Report 8
2016-2017 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports EXELON CORPORATION THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-289 BIENNIAL COMMITMENT REVISION REPORT JANUARY 1, 2016 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2017 9
2016-2017 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports Letter Source: GL 83-28 ITEM 4.2.2: Trending of reactor trip breaker parameters to forecast Exelon Tracking No.: 1122355-05/1985T0042 Nature of Commitment: GPUN Committed internally to revise procedures to incorporate data gathering requirements needed for the B&WOG reactor trip breaker reliability program.
Summary of Justification:
The original commitment to participate in the B&WOG reliability program was for two years and was for approval for a previous breaker design. TMI has satisfied this commitment and therefore it can be closed. Amendment No. 255 (August 2005) changed the frequency of the RPS surveillance tests from monthly to quarterly. In addition, Amendment No. 274 (January 2011) updated the TMI Technical Specification to remove the surveillance test interval frequencies and place them in the licensee controlled Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP).
Letter Source: IEB 88-04: Potential safety related pump loss Exelon Tracking No: 1122355-47/1989T0012 Nature of Commitment: GPUN committed to the NRC:
- 1) The OHR pump minimum recirculation capacity was adequate to ensure that pump operability was not affected by minimum recirculation operation.
- 2) Additional vibration readings were incorporated into the surveillance test procedures.
- 3) The revision by June 1989 of procedures to provide additional guidance that will apply when higher vibration levels are encountered at blade passing frequency while operating or testing the OHR pumps at minimum recirculation flow rate.
- 4) The completion of steps to minimize the time that OHR pumps are operated at minimum flow during testing.
- 5) The notification of the NRC by letter of any additional actions that may be required in the future. Also, to provide the justification for continued operation as requested by IEB 88-04.
Summary of Justification:
Theist commitment is unchanged and has been addressed by analysis under RCMT 1122355-34, formerly 1988T0078.
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2016-2017 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports The remaining 4 commitment changes/deletions are addressed individually below:
- 2) Safety Evaluation, SE-945100-196, provided the basis for revising UFSAR section 6.1.2.1.b, which deletes the description concerning minimizing DH pump operation at minimum recirculation conditions and how this operation is minimized. Pump testing has shown that minimum recirculation operation is not a short-term concern. The DH pump can operate continually at flow rates below that which is obtained with the bypass line only. (TR-9640, Rev. 0 Hydraulic Evaluation by Ingersoll Dresser Pump Co. of Decay Heat Pumps IDP Model 8HN194, March 12, 1997, provides the technical basis for this conclusion.) Thus, it was demonstrated that the DH Pumps can operate satisfactorily over its entire range of flow while also having vibration levels at all flows remain satisfactory. Therefore, only vibration readings as required by the 1ST Program are required to be taken: This is documented in the surveillance test procedures OP-TM-212-201, OP-TM-212-202, OP-TM-212-203, OP-TM-212-204, OP-TM-212-205, OP-TM-212-206, OP-TM-212-213, and OP-TM-202-214.
- 3) Safety Evaluation, SE-945100-196, provided the basis for revising UFSAR section 6.1.2.1.b, which deletes the description concerning minimizing DH pump operation at minimum recirculation conditions and how this operation is minimized. Pump testing has shown that minimum recirculation operation is not a short-term concern. The DH pump can operate continually at flow rates below that which is obtained with the bypass line only. (TR-9640, Rev. 0 Hydraulic Evaluation by Ingersoll Dresser Pump Co. of Decay Heat Pumps IDP Model 8HN194, March 12, 1997, provides the technical basis for this conclusion.) Thus, it was demonstrated that the DH Pumps can operate satisfactorily over its entire range of flow while also having vibration levels at all flows remain satisfactory. Therefore, additional guidance is not needed when operating or testing the DHR Pumps at minimum recirculation flow rate.
- 4) Safety Evaluation, SE-945100-196, provided the basis for revising UFSAR section 6.1.2.1.b, which deletes the description concerning minimizing DH pump operation at minimum recirculation conditions and how this operation is minimized. Pump testing has shown that minimum recirculation operation is not a short-term concern. The DH pump can operate continually at flow rates below that which is obtained with the bypass line only. (TR-9640, Rev. O Hydraulic Evaluation by Ingersoll Dresser Pump Co. of Decay Heat Pumps IDP Model 8HN194, March 12, 1997, provides the technical basis for this conclusion.) Thus, it was demonstrated that the DH Pumps can operate satisfactorily over its entire range of flow while also having vibration levels at all flows remain satisfactory. Therefore, procedural steps to minimize the time that DHR Pumps are operated at minimum flow during testing are not applicable.
- 5) The changes described above occurred in 1997, well beyond the two-year time-frame that IEB 88-04 states that our "actions in response to this bulletin should be documented and maintained at the plant site for a minimum of two (2) years." Thus, these changes do not require notification by letter. All changes described above do not impact operability of the DHR Pumps and therefore the intent of IEB 88-04 is not affected by these changes.
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2016-2017 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Revision Reports Letter Source: 311-90-2127 TMI Unit 1 Response to Generic Letter 90-03 (RELAXATION OF STAFF POSITION IN GENERIC LETIER 83-28, ITEM 2.2 PART 2 "VENDOR INTERFACE FOR SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS")
Exelon Tracking No: 1122355-07/1990T0043 1122355-08/1985T0060 1122355-56/1985T0062 Nature of Commitment: In response to GL 90-03 Item 2, GPUN described how an adequate vendor interface program for TMl-1 was being maintained which included periodic contact with vendors of key safety related components (beyond those provided by the NSSS supplier).
Summary of Justification:
The policy to periodically contact vendors of safety related equipment to determine if there is new product information relevant to the installed plant equipment will be eliminated. This change will be implemented by a revision of CC-AA-204 (CONTROL OF VENDOR EQUIPMENT MANUALS). The revision of the commitment does not affect 6170-QAP-7207.09 "QA Evaluation of Suppliers".
The vendor "re-contact" program has been implemented for more than 25 years and has not proven to be an effective use of resources. From its inception the program was understood to be one method among many which serve to ensure the reliability of plant equipment. This program was intended to provide a qualitative improvement in reliability by enforcing regular communications with vendors of key safety related components.
Significant resources are required to implement the program. In the last six years, 459 vendors have been contacted to determine if there is new information which would be relevant to the reliability of key TMI safety related components. For each contact the existing vendor guidance is compared to the latest guidance. Of the 459 contacts, evaluation of the differences identified 33 cases where the site vendor guidance document was updated. A large fraction of those changes were non-technical changes.
The communication of those technical changes is not dependent upon the vendor "re-contact" program. If a NQA vendor identifies a design or performance deficiency with NQA component, then the 10CFR21 notification process applies. Improvements in vendor guidance are typically normally available through web based applications.
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