IR 05000317/2006004
Download: ML063130320
Text
November 9, 2006
Mr. James A. Spina, Vice PresidentCalvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.
Constellation Generation Group, LLC 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657-4702
SUBJECT: CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATEDINSPECTION REPORT 05000317/2006004 AND 05000318/2006004
Dear Mr. Spina:
On September 30, 2006, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on September 29, 2006, with you and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.This report documents two NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green) thatwere determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because these issues were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its 2J. Spinaenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/Arthur L. Burritt, Acting Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.50-317, 50-318License Nos. DPR-53, DPR-69
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000317/2006004 and 05000318/2006004
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Informationcc w/encl:M. J. Wallace, President, Constellation Generation J. M. Heffley, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer President, Calvert County Board of Commissioners C. W. Fleming, Senior Counsel, Constellation Generation Group, LLC Director, Nuclear Regulatory Matters R. McLean, Manager, Nuclear Programs K. Burger, Esquire, Maryland People's Counsel State of Maryland (2)
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
...................................................iii
REPORT DETAILS
..........................................................1
REACTOR SAFETY
.........................................................11R01Adverse Weather Protection .......................................1
1R04 Equipment Alignment.............................................2
1R05 Fire Protection..................................................3
1R06 Flood Protection Measures........................................41R07Heat Sink Performance...........................................4
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program............................4
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness........................................51R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control..............51R15Operability Evaluations...........................................61R19Post-Maintenance Testing.........................................91R22Surveillance Testing..............................................9
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications.....................................10
1EP6Drill Evaluation.................................................10Radiation Safety...........................................................112OS1Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas.....................11 2OS2ALARA Planning and Controls ....................................122OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation ...............................12 2PS3Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)................13OTHER ACTIVITIES........................................................144OA1Performance Indicator (PI) Verification ..............................14 4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems............................154OA3Event Followup................................................18 4OA6Meetings, Including Exit..........................................19ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
................................................A-1
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED...........................A-1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
..........................................A-2
LIST OF ACRONYMS
......................................................A-7
EnclosureiiU.S.
- COMMIS [[]]
SIONREGION I
Docket Nos.50-317, 50-318License Nos.DPR-53, DPR-69
Report Nos.05000317/2006004 and 05000318/2006004
Licensee:Constellation Generation Group, LLC
Facility:Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location:Lusby, MD
Dates:July 1, 2006 through September 30, 2006
Inspectors:John Giessner, Acting Senior Resident InspectorMarlone Davis, Resident Inspector
Todd Jackson, Health Physicist
Randolph Ragland, Health Physicist
C.J. Fong, Reactor InspectorApproved by:Arthur L. Burritt, Acting ChiefProjects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
EnclosureiiiSUMMARY
- OF [[]]
FINDINGSIR 05000317/2006-004, 05000318/2006-004; 07/01/06 - 09/30/06; Calvert Cliffs Nuclear PowerPlant, Units 1 and 2; Operability Evaluations; Problem Identification and Resolution.The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announcedinspections performed by reactor and health physicist inspectors. Two Green findings both of
which were non-cited violations (NCVs) were identified. The significance of most findings is
indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC)
0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply
may be Green or be assigned a severity level after
NRC's
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing FindingsCornerstone: Mitigating SystemsGreen. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) for the Service Water(SRW) and Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) systems being inoperable without completing the
actions required by Technical Specifications. Constellation did not declare
SRW trains inoperable when water tight doors providing a High Energy Line Break
(HELB) barrier were opened for maintenance or testing. Station personnel wrote
condition report (CR)
HELB barriers and
have provided guidance to declare the trains inoperable if the water tight doors are
open.This finding is more than minor because it had a credible impact on the objective for themitigating system cornerstone and the attribute of component availability during design
basis events, specifically
SDP phase 1 review determined a phase 2
evaluation was required since both
AFW subsystems could have been
impacted with the
- HE [[]]
LB barrier removed. The phase 2 evaluation yielded a very low
safety significance (Green), because of the low exposure time when the watertight doors
were open. A contributing cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting aspect in
the area of problem identification and resolution (PI&R) because Constellation did not
implement and institutionalize operating experience (OE) related to control of the
- HE [[]]
- LB barriers through changes to station processes or procedures. (Section 1R15) Green. The inspectors identified a
TS 5.4.1.a because Constellation did notinitiate a condition report (CR) to document the adverse performance of the service
water (SRW) heat exchanger salt water (SW) strainers during high debris loading as
required in the Service Water Heat Exchanger Alarm Manual. Constellation also did not
assess the operability of the strainers as required by the Corrective Action Program.
Station personnel initiated
- CR [[]]
IRE-017-018 to address the issue and assess operability
of the strainers.
EnclosureivThe finding was more than minor since it had a credible impact on the objective for themitigating system cornerstone and the attribute of component reliability during design
basis events where the SRW system was required. This finding was determined to be a
finding of very low safety significance (green) because only one subsystem of the SRW
system was inoperable at any time, and the subsystem inoperability time was less than
the maximum allowed by TS. A contributing cause of this finding was related to the
cross-cutting aspect of PI&R because Constellation did not implement the corrective
action program with a low threshold for identifying the problems with the SRW heat
exchanger
OA2)B.Licensee-Identified ViolationsNone.
EnclosureREPORT
- DETAIL [[]]
SSummary of Plant StatusUnit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On July 7, 2006 during an influx ofaquatic life (jellyfish) at the plant intake structure, operators rapidly reduced Unit 1 power to
around 35 percent power to facilitate removal of two circulating water pumps. Power was
restored to 100 percent on the same day. On August 26, operators reduced power to
approximately 85 percent power for planned waterbox cleaning and main turbine valve testing.
Power was restored to 100 percent the next day. Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent reactor power. On September 1, 2006,operators reduced power to approximately 78 percent due to storm related debris at the intake
from tropical storm Ernesto. Power was restored to 100 percent the same day. On September
9, 2006 operators reduced power to approximately 85 percent power for planned waterbox
cleaning and main turbine valve testing. Power was restored to 100 percent the next day.
- 1.REACT [[]]
- OR [[]]
- SAFE [[]]
TY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 3 samples).1Adverse Weather Seasonal Preparations - Hot Weather a.Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the adverse weather preparations and mitigating strategies forhot weather operations. This review included an assessment of Operations
Administrative Policy 94-5, "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Operations Support For Electric
System Operation and Planning Department Transmission System Operations." The
inspectors assessed the effectiveness of Constellation preparations for hot weather and
stressed grid conditions. Risk-significant systems affected by hot weather and a heavily
loaded grid were selected for review. The review included the service water, saltwater,
and selected auxiliary building ventilation systems. The inspectors performed a partial
walkdown of ultimate heat sink components and safety related ventilation systems. The
inspectors conducted interviews with control room operators and system engineers to
ensure protective measures applicable to these risk-significant systems were available.
This inspection satisfied two inspection samples for review of risk-significant systems.
Documents reviewed for each section of this report are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
2Enclosure.2Adverse Weather Conditions - Tropical Storm a.Inspection Scope On September 1, 2006, Calvert Cliffs entered Emergency Response PlanImplementation Procedure (ERPIP) 3.0, "Immediate Actions," for severe weather
conditions due to high winds and heavy rains from tropical storm Ernesto. The
inspectors reviewed the adverse weather preparations and mitigating strategies for
severe weather events. This review included an assessment of Emergency Response
Plan Implementation Procedure (ERPIP) 3.0, "Immediate Actions," Attachment 20,
"Severe Weather," Emergency Planning (EP) 1-108, "Severe Weather Preparation,"
3, "Severe Weather Preparation Checklist Operations," and Operations
Administrative Policy (OAP) 00-01, "Severe Weather Operations." The inspectors
conducted discussions with control room operators to verify severe weather mitigating
strategies and measures were appropriate for the event. This inspection satisfied one
inspection sample for the onset of adverse weather. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified. 1R04Equipment Alignment .1Partial Walkdown (71111.04Q - 4 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the following four systems to verify theoperability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was
inoperable. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could impact
the function of the system, and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors
reviewed applicable operating procedures, walked down system components, and
verified that selected breakers, valves, and support equipment were in the correct
position to support system operation. The inspectors also verified that Constellation had
properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause
initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered
them into the corrective action program. *Unit 1 Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) during dewatering of the
MOV654 being out of service
- Unit 1 Component cooling (CC) water system after cleaning of the
EDG) during maintenance on the 2B EDG
3Enclosure b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2Complete Walkdown (71111.04S -1 sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of the accessible portions of theservice water system. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup using
OI-15, Attachment 1, "Service Water Valve Alignment (Unit 1 Valves)," as well as
appropriate piping and instrument drawings. The inspectors reviewed the open
maintenance work requests on the system for any deficiencies that could affect the
ability of the system to perform its function. Inspectors also reviewed the unresolved
design issues such as temporary modifications, operator workarounds, and items
tracked by plant engineering to assess their collective impact on system operation. In
addition, the inspectors reviewed the condition report database to verify that equipment
alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R05Fire Protection (71111.05Q - 6 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors conducted a tour of the six areas listed below to assess the materialcondition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that
Constellation controlled combustibles and ignition sources in accordance with their
administrative procedures and that fire detection and suppression equipment was
available for use. The inspectors also verified that station personnel maintained passive
fire barriers in good condition and that Constellation implemented compensatory
measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment in
accordance with their fire plan.*Unit 1 Service water pump room (Room 226)*Unit 2 Service water pump room (Room 205)
- Unit 1 Auxiliary feedwater pump room (Room 603)
- Unit 2 Component cooling water pump room (Room 201)
- Unit 1 Emergency core cooling system pump room (Room 118)
- 2B Emergency diesel generator room (Room 416) b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
4Enclosure1R06Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 - 1 external flooding sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed flood protection measures associated with external floodevents. These events were described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis (UFSAR)
and the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE). The inspectors
walked down risk significant areas at the site which included the intake structure and
outside areas near plant structures. The inspectors evaluated the integrity of watertight
doors, floor drains, and penetrations for these selected areas. The inspectors also
walked down external drains identified by the
- IPE [[]]
EE to verify their ability to mitigate the
effects of external flood events. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R07Heat Sink Performance (71111.07 - 1 sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed the 12 A and 12B service water heat exchanger thermalperformance tests. The inspectors reviewed the performance data and evaluated the
test acceptance criteria from this completed test to ensure that design basis
requirements were satisfied. The inspectors also evaluated existing heat transfer
capabilities based on completed flow verification test results to ensure that specific
safety functions could be performed in accordance with design specifications. The
inspectors also reviewed Calvert Cliffs' periodic maintenance methods to verify that they
conformed to the guidelines delineated in
NP-7552, "Heat Exchanger
Performance Monitoring Guidelines." b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R11Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - 1 sample) a.Inspection ScopeOn September 6, 2006, the inspectors observed a licensed operator simulator trainingscenario to assess operator performance and the adequacy of the licensed operator
training program. The training scenario involved a turbine malfunction requiring
operators to perform a manual reactor trip. Following the trip, equipment failures
occurred resulting in a loss of all vital 4Kv buses. The inspectors focused on high-risk
operator actions performed during implementation of the abnormal and emergency
operating procedures, emergency plan implementation, and classification of the event.
The inspectors evaluated the clarity and formality of communications, the
5Enclosureimplementation of appropriate actions in response to alarms, the performance of timelycontrol board operations and manipulations, and the oversight and direction provided bythe shift supervisor. The inspectors also reviewed simulator fidelity to evaluate the
degree of similarity to the actual control room, especially regarding recent control board
modifications. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R12Maintenance Effectiveness Quarterly Review (71111.12Q - 2 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the two samples listed below for items such as: (1) appropriatework practices; (2) identifying and addressing common cause failures; (3) scoping in
accordance with
MR); (4) characterizing
reliability issues for performance; (5) trending key parameters for condition monitoring;
(6) charging unavailability for performance; (7) classification and reclassification in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); and (8) appropriateness of performance
criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) classified as (a)(2) and/or
appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as
(a)(1). *Unit 2 Wide range nuclear instrumentation power supplies*Unit 2 21A reactor coolant pump seal flange leakage b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 6 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the following six activities to verify that station personnelperformed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work.
When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the plant risk was
promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors compared the risk assessments
and risk management actions performed by station procedure NO-1-117, "Integrated
Risk Management," to the requirements of
- NUMA [[]]
RC 93-01, Revision 2, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," and approved station procedures. In addition,
the inspectors assessed the adequacy of Constellation's identification and resolution of
problems associated with maintenance risk assessments and emergent work activities.
6Enclosure*High grid stress during an electric system operator declaration for maximumemergency generation*Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater testing
- 1A emergency diesel generator planned maintenance activities
- Unit 1 11 & 14 4kV busses transferred to and from their alternate power sourceto support maintenance on 11 4kV bus normal feeder breaker*Unit 2 high pressure safety injection and low pressure safety injection checkvalve closure test*11 and 23 battery chargers planned maintenance activities b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R15Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - 5 samples) a.Inspection ScopeFor the five operability evaluations described below, the inspectors evaluated thetechnical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that Constellation properly justified TS
operability and that the subject component or system remained available such that no
unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors reviewed the
- UFS [[]]
AR to verify
that the system or component remained available to perform its intended function. In
addition, the inspectors reviewed compensatory measures implemented to verify that
the measures worked as stated and that they were adequately controlled. The
inspectors also reviewed a sampling of condition reports to verify that Constellation
identified and corrected any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. *Unit 1 core exit thermocouple reading lower than hot leg temperatures *Unit 2 scaffolding in safety related switchgear room
- Unit 2 shutdown cooling heat exchanger inlet throttle valve for componentcooling due to difficult valve operation*Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater pump room water tight door open during test
- 1A emergency diesel generator room fan performance with switches installedimproperly b.FindingsSafety Related Watertight DoorsIntroduction. The inspectors identified a Green
TS) forthe service water (SRW) and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) systems being inoperable for
longer than the allowed time without completion of the actions required by TS, including
placing the plant in hot shutdown. Constellation did not declare the associated AFW
and SRW trains inoperable when the watertight doors that provide a high energy line
break barrier were opened for maintenance or testing.
7EnclosureDescription. On August 30, 2006, during the testing of Unit 1 #12 Turbine-DrivenAuxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump, in accordance with STP-O-5A-1, the inspectors
noted that the procedure directed operators to open a set of watertight doors for the
room that houses the #11 and #
- 12 TDA [[]]
FW pumps. These doors are opened to the
non-safety related turbine building and are different from the watertight door used for
normal ingress and egress. The watertight doors that the procedure requires to be open
are maintenance doors, which are larger and do not automatically close and latch.
Station personnel opens these watertight doors to allow for quick egress during testing,
and stations a fire watch while the doors are open. The inspectors discussed the operability of the
- TDA [[]]
FW pumps with Operationspersonnel, since it would be unlikely that the doors could be closed fast enough to
mitigate a high energy line break event and prevent a harsh environment in the
- TDA [[]]
IN) 2000-20,
"Potential Loss of Redundant Safety Related Equipment Because of A Lack of High
Energy Line Barriers" and Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2001-009, "Control of
Hazard Barriers." The inspectors determined that since a
- HE [[]]
LB was considered a
credible design basis accident, and the
- TDA [[]]
FW pump had a specified safety function for
that accident, then in accordance with the definition of operability in TS section 1.1, both
pumps were inoperable. Constellation subsequently determined that both
- TDA [[]]
pumps were inoperable during this test. The Technical Specification Action Statement
(TSAS) 3.7.3c requires, in part, that the remaining operable pump be aligned for
automatic initiation and the verification of the other unit's motor-driven
pump as well as the AFW cross-tie valve to the opposite unit is operable in one hour.
Station personnel performed the required actions when they determined the
- TDA [[]]
- HELB barriers including an extent of condition evaluation. As part of the extent of condition evaluation for the last three years, Constellationdiscovered that the
- TDA [[]]
FW pump room doors for both units had been opened
periodically for testing and maintenance activities without declaring the associated
pumps inoperable. In addition, the Service Water (SRW) rooms for each unit, which
contain the three SRW pumps, Salt Water/Service Water heat exchanger components,
and the 13 or 23 AFW pump, had watertight doors which had been opened periodically
without declaring the associated pumps inoperable. Having all three SRW pumps
inoperable on both trains of the service water system would have required entry into
shutdown
HELB barrier (watertight door) was opened for other than normal ingress and
egress was a performance deficiency. The inspectors considered the deficiency was
more than minor since it had a credible impact on the objective for the mitigating system
cornerstone and the attribute of component availability during design basis events,
specifically
SDP phase 1 review determined a phase 2 evaluation was
required since both
HELB barrier
removed. For the
system was impacted due to open watertight doors.
8EnclosureThe phase 2 evaluation used an unavailability of both
- TDA [[]]
FW pumps in theconservative 3-30 day range. Constellation's data shows calculated unavailability times
in the last year for unit 1 and 2 of 85 hours9.837963e-4 days <br />0.0236 hours <br />1.405423e-4 weeks <br />3.23425e-5 months <br /> and 64 hours7.407407e-4 days <br />0.0178 hours <br />1.058201e-4 weeks <br />2.4352e-5 months <br />, respectively. Inspectors
determined that these times were reasonable. To account for possible cases where the
opposite unit's
- MDA [[]]
FW may not have been available and some cases where the logs
were not complete, the inspectors conservatively assumed only one train of AFW
remained. SRW pump or component unavailability was 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> for Unit 1 and three
hours for Unit 2. The inspectors used the initiating event of Main Steam Line Break
Outside Containment (Table 3.10) of the Risk Informed Inspection Notebook, revision 2,
for Calvert Cliffs. The phase 2 worksheet resulted in a very low safety significance
(green) for both units because of the low exposure time when the watertight doors were
open. Constellation performed their own detailed risk assessment using their risk model
and determined the highest Incremental Core Damage Probability was green. The inspectors identified that a contributing cause of this finding was related to thecross-cutting aspect in the area of PI&R because Constellation did not implement and
institutionalize
HELB barriers, from a 2004 site
self-assessment,
IN 2000-20, through changes to station processes
or procedures.Enforcement. With the watertight doors open in the respective rooms,
SRW, andSW subsystems would be inoperable. TS 3.7.3c, "Auxiliary Feedwater System,"
requires, in part, action to verify the other unit's motor-driven AFW pump is operable
within one hour. In addition, the
SW TS require both trains operable in modes
1-4. There is no
TS 3.0.3 is
applicable and requires action to be in mode 3 within seven hours. Contrary to the above, on several occasions on both units, most recentlyAugust 30, 2006, Constellation did not verify the other unit's AFW pump operable in one
hour from the inoperability of the
- TDA [[]]
FW pumps. Additionally, contrary to the
requirements for
SW operability, on December 9, 2004, Unit 1 SRW pump
room doors were open for more than nine hours, exceeding TS 3.0.3 requirement to be
in mode 3 within seven hours. This violation is documented in Constellation's corrective
action program as
EDG Room Fan Performance The inspectors identified that the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) roomventilation fan temperature switches were installed with the shipping protectors over the
sensing element. On September 24, 2006, while observing a 1A EDG surveillance test,
the inspectors noted the temperature in the room slowly rising while the EDG was being
loaded. The system design is such that at approximately 85F, the second ventilationfan starts and around 95F, the third ventilation fan starts. The inspectors observed thelocal temperature over 95F (with a maximum peak of 97F) with only one fan running.
9EnclosureThe inspectors discussed the observation with the Constellation staff, and theysubsequently determined the fan temperature switches were installed with the shipping
protectors over the sensing element which created a delay in activation of the
temperature switch. Station personnel initiated a condition report IRE-017-390 and
removed the shipping protectors to restore the EDG to the intended design
configuration. This item is unresolved pending an investigation and operabilityassessment by the station personnel. Unresolved Item (URI 05000317/2006004-03,1A EDG Ventilation Fan Performance1R19Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 5 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the five post-maintenance tests listed below to verify thatprocedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The
inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the procedure adequately tested
the safety function(s) that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the
acceptance criteria in the procedure were consistent with information in the applicable
licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedure had been
properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed
test data, to verify that the test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the
affected safety function(s).*22 shutdown cooling heat exchanger component cooling water solenoid valve(2SV3830) replacement*High pressure safety injection (HPSI) main header isolation motor operated valve(2MOV-654) maintenance*22
- EC [[]]
CS pump room cooler
- U-4000-12 transformer out of service (supply to 4kv safety bus)
- Fire system containment isolation motor operated valve (2MOV-620), circuitbreaker inspection b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified. 1R22Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 5 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed and/or reviewed the five surveillance tests listed below,associated with selected risk-significant
TS compliance and that
Constellation properly specified test acceptance criteria. The inspectors also verified
that station personnel established proper test conditions as specified in the procedures,
no equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria had been
satisfied.
10Enclosure*Unit 1 reactor coolant system leakage surveillance (STP O-27-1)*11 auxiliary feedwater pump inservice surveillance test (STP O-5A-1)
- Unit 2 reactor coolant system leakage surveillance (STP O-27-2)
- Unit 1 remote shutdown and post accident monitoring instrumentation channelcheck (STP O-63-1)*Unit 2 high pressure safety injection and low pressure safety injection checkvalve closure test (STP O-65-2) b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R23Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23 - 1 samples) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed one temporary modification to verify that safety systems did notdepart from the design basis and system success criteria. The inspectors reviewed the
associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against the system design bases documentation,
including the
- UFS [[]]
AR. The inspectors walked down each modification to verify that
proper configuration control was maintained to ensure continued system operability. In
addition, the inspectors verified that the licensee controlled the modification in
accordance with the requirements of procedure
- MD -1-100, "Temporary Alterations."*Disabling an alarm relay in the 0C diesel generator battery monitor alarm circuit b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (
EP)1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed a site emergency response drill training exercise conducted onJuly 26, 2006, to assess licensed operators' and site Emergency Director performance
in the area of emergency preparedness. This training exercise focused on equipment
failures and operator challenges that would typically exist during a significant event
which resulted in protective action recommendations (PARs) to state and local officials.
The inspectors also observed and evaluated the required procedural transitions and
associated event classifications. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
11Enclosure2.Radiation SafetyCornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety (OS)2OS1Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01) a.Inspection Scope (7 Samples)The inspectors reviewed radiological work activities and practices and proceduralimplementation during observations and tours of the facilities and inspected licensee
Performance Indicators (PIs) relative to the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone. The
licensee had one PI in this cornerstone for the period from October 2005 -
September 15, 2006 (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 5000317/2006002 and
5000318/2006002)The inspectors reviewed corrective action reports related to access controls. This reviewincluded any high radiation area radiological incidents, identified by the licensee, in highradiation areas <1R/hr that have occurred since the last inspection in this area.
Additionally, the inspector reviewed any pertinent problem identification and resolution
issues identified in this area, and assessed the licensee's self-assessment activities.The inspectors reviewed licensee documentation packages relative to possible PIevents occurring since the last inspection to determined if any events involved dose
rates >25 R/hr at 30 centimeters or >500 R/hr at 1 meter, what barriers failed or
remained available to prevent personnel access. The inspectors reviewed unintended
exposures >100 mrem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) (or >5 rem Skin Dose
Equivalent (SDE) or >1.5 rem Lens Dose Equivalent (LDE)), to determine if there were
any overexposures or substantial potential for overexposure. There were no licensee
events which occurred between October 2005 - September 15, 2006 which met any of
the above criteria. The inspectors conducted radiation worker performance observations during dry storagecask movement and lid welding activities to determine if radiation workers were aware of
significant radiological conditions in the work place, the required RWP controls, and to
assess the level of radiological hazards present.The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports relative to radiation worker errorssince the last inspection to examine the licensee's cause assessments, including the
determination of any observable pattern traceable to a similar cause; and, the
effectiveness of the licensee's efforts to resolve the reported problems. The inspectors
discussed corrective actions with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM). The
inspectors verified the adequacy of postings and verified the integrity of Locked High
Radiation Areas, and Very High Radiation Areas (if reasonably accessible).
2EnclosureThe inspectors conducted radiation protection technician observations during drystorage cask movement and lid welding activities to determine if job coverage
technicians were aware of significant radiological conditions in the work place, therequired RWP controls; and to assess their appreciation of the radiological hazards.
The inspectors reviewed any radiological problem reports associated with radiation
protection technician performance errors. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.2OS2ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02) a.Inspection Scope (3 Samples)The inspectors reviewed the integration of
RWP documents.The inspectors evaluated the radiation protection group generated shielding requestswith respect to dose rate reduction problem definition and assigning value (dose savings
or dollars). In addition, the inspectors evaluated engineering shielding responses for
follow through.The inspector determined if there have been any declared pregnant workers during thecurrent assessment period, and reviewed the exposure results and monitoring controls
employed by the licensee with respect to requirements of
OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71121.03) a.Inspection Scope (1 Sample)The inspectors verified the calibration expiration and source response check currencyon radiation detection instruments staged for use. The inspector interviewed radiation
protection technicians and observed technicians select and self verify instrument
operability prior to use. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
13EnclosureCornerstone: Public Radiation Safety (PS)2PS3Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) a.Inspection Scope (10 Samples)The inspector reviewed the current Annual Radiological Environmental MonitoringReport and recent licensee assessment results to verify that the
- RE [[]]
MP was
implemented as required by technical specifications (TS) and the offsite dose calculationmanual (ODCM). The review included changes to the
- OD [[]]
CM and environmental
monitoring program commitments concerning sampling locations, monitoring and
measurement frequencies, land use census, inter-laboratory comparison program, and
data analysis. In addition, the inspector reviewed station self-assessments and audits,
licensee event reports, inter-laboratory comparison program results, the
- UFS [[]]
AR for
information regarding the environmental monitoring program and meteorological
monitoring instrumentation, and the scope of the audit program to verify that it met the
requirements of 10 CFR 20.1101(c).The inspector walked down four (of five) air particulate and iodine sampling stations;one (of 3) vegetation sampling locations; one (of one) shoreline sediment location; two
(of two) bay water composite sampling locations; and eight (of 23) thermoluminescent
dosimeter (TLD) monitoring locations, and determined that these were located as
described in the
- OD [[]]
CM and determined the equipment material condition to be
acceptable.The inspector observed the collection and preparation of a variety of environmentalsamples (listed above) and verified that environmental sampling was representative of
the release pathways as specified in the
- OD [[]]
CM and that sampling techniques were in
accordance with procedures.Based on direct observation and review of records, the inspector verified that themeteorological instruments were operable, calibrated, and maintained in accordance
with guidance contained in the
NRC Safety Guide 23, and station procedures.
The inspector verified that the meteorological data readout and recording instruments in
the control room and at the tower were operable. The inspector reviewed each event documented in the Annual Environmental MonitoringReport which involved a missed sample, inoperable sampler, lost TLD, or anomalous
measurement for the cause and corrective actions. The inspector conducted a review of
Constellation's assessment of any positive sample results.The inspector reviewed any significant changes made by the licensee to the
- OD [[]]
CM asthe result of changes to the land census or sampler station modifications since the last
inspection. The inspector also reviewed technical justifications for any changed
sampling locations and verified that the licensee performed the reviews required to
ensure that the changes did not affect its ability to monitor the impacts of radioactive
effluent releases on the environment.The inspector reviewed the calibration and maintenance records for air samplers, as
14Enclosurewell as technical descriptions of new air sampling equipment purchased and beingintroduced into the field by Constellation. The inspector reviewed: the results of Calvert
Cliffs' interlaboratory comparison program to verify the adequacy of environmental
sample analyses performed by the station; the station's quality control evaluation of the
interlaboratory comparison program and the corrective actions for any deficiencies;
Calvert Cliffs' determination of any bias to the data and the overall effect on the
- RE [[]]
MP;
and quality assurance audit results of the program to determine whether the licensee
met the
ODCM requirements. The inspector verified that the appropriate detection
sensitivities with respect to
ODCM are utilized for counting samples and reviewed
the results of the quality control program including the interlaboratory comparison
program to verify the adequacy of the program.The inspector observed several locations where the station monitors potentiallycontaminated material leaving the radiologically controlled area, and inspected the
methods used for control, survey, and release from these areas, including observing the
performance of personnel surveying and releasing material for unrestricted use verifying
that the work is performed in accordance with plant procedures.The inspector verified that the radiation monitoring instrumentation was appropriate forthe radiation types present and was calibrated with appropriate radiation sources. The
inspector reviewed Constellation's criteria for the survey and release of potentially
contaminated material; verified that there was guidance on how to respond to an alarm
which indicates the presence of licensed radioactive material; and reviewed the
licensee's equipment to ensure the radiation detection sensitivities were consistent with
the
IE Circular 81-07 and IE Information Notice 85-92 for
surface contamination and
- HPPOS -221 for volumetrically contaminated material. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4.
- OTHER [[]]
- ACTIVI [[]]
TIES (OA)4OA1Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 - 2 Samples) a.Inspection ScopeCornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety*Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (OECE)(02.01)
The inspectors interviewed cognizant personnel and selectively examined records usedby the licensee to identify occurrences involving high radiation areas, very high radiation
areas, and unplanned personnel exposures for the time period from October 2005 to
September 15, 2006. The reviewed records included selected corrective action program
records and the periodic
PI. This review was conducted against
the applicable criteria specified in Nuclear Energy Institute's (NEI) Regulatory
Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline No. 99-02 (Revision 3), with an effective
date of April 1, 2005.
15EnclosureThe inspectors determined that the licensee had one occurrence during the periodspecified which met the applicable criteria and this event was properly reported as a PI.
This event is documented in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 5000317/2006002;
5000318/2006002. This review and examination did not identify any problems with the
PI accuracy or completeness and thus, verified this performance indicator. This
inspection activity represents the completion of 1 sample relative to this inspection area
(i.e., inspection procedure section 02.01) for one performance indicator (i.e.,
- OECE ). *Radiological Effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation ManualRadiological Effluent Occurrences (
RETS/ODCM REOs)(02.01)The inspector interviewed cognizant personnel and selectively examined records use bythe licensee to identify any occurrences involving gaseous or liquid effluent releases for
the time period from October 2005 - September 15, 2006. The reviewed records
included selected corrective action program records and the periodic PI data records for
this PI. This review was conducted against the applicable criteria specified in Nuclear
Energy Institute's (NEI) Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline No.
99-02 (Revision 3), with an effective date of April 1,
PI accuracy orcompleteness and, thus, verified this performance indicator. This inspection activity
represents the completion of 1 sample relative to this inspection area (i.e., inspection
procedure section 02.01) for one performance indicator (i.e.,
- ODCM [[]]
OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems.1Review of Items Entered Into the Corrective Action ProgramThe inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into Constellation'scorrective action program as required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification
and Resolution of Problems." The review facilitated the identification of potentially
repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up
inspection. Inspectors reviewed each issue report, attended screening meetings, and
accessed Constellation's computerized database. .2Annual Sample: Review of Operator Workarounds a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed an in-depth review of workarounds in accordance withIP 71152. This included an evaluation of the cumulative effects of documented
workarounds, field walkdown to determine potential undocumented workarounds, review
of Condition Reports (CRs) and Control Room walkdowns. The evaluation followed the
guidelines in 71152 paragraph 03.02 b and assessed potential workarounds not
evaluated by station personnel, workarounds that have been formalized as long-term
16Enclosurecorrective actions, and workarounds that increase the potential for human performanceerrors. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..3Annual Sample: Review of Safety Related Salt Water System Performance DuringDebris Intrusion a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors conducted a review of Constellation's safety related salt water (SW)system, which takes a suction on the Chesapeake Bay and acts as an ultimate heat
sink. Inspectors selected this sample since there were several events which challenged
the system. Specifically, in July and August 2006 there was an unusually high number
of jellyfish at the traveling screens which remove debris from the suction of the
circulating and salt water systems. The jellyfish clogged the traveling screens to the
point were circulating water pumps had to be removed from service. In September
2006, there was an excessive amount of debris in the bay caused by high winds. The
inspection involved a system evaluation by reviewing logs, procedures, design basis
documents, performance monitoring, interviewing site personnel, and walkdowns of
plant equipment. The inspection focused on possible common mode failure conditions
and susceptible equipment, as well as equipment and personnel performance during
this time. b.FindingsIntroduction. The inspectors identified a Green
TS 5.4.1.a, "AdministrativeControls - Procedures," for failure to follow the Alarm Manual for the service water
(SRW) system. Specifically, the operators did not initiate
SRW heat
exchanger salt water (SW) strainer trouble alarms. Constellation also did not assess
system operability as required by the Corrective Action Program.Description. During a jellyfish intrusion on July 19, 2006, the inspectors walked downthe traveling water screens and noted some carryover of debris from the front side of
the screen to the backside of the screen. A review of control room logs for that day
identified several SW strainer trouble alarms. Further investigation showed that the 22A
SW strainer valve was not in its correct position. The alarm response procedure directs
the operator to attempt to reset the circuitry, determine which valve failed, and if the
flushing valve is fully or partially open, consider placing the control system to "Off" for
that strainer to allow the other strainer on the same train to function in automatic.
Finally, the alarm response procedure directs initiation of a condition report for
equipment deficiencies. Operators performed a manual flush of the strainer and the
alarm cleared. The manual flush is not described in this alarm response procedure, no
CR was written, and station personnel did not assess system operability. On July 21,
2006, following a discussion with the inspector, Operations personnel initiated
- CR [[]]
IRE-
016-074. Constellation categorized this
CR to trend, with
no actions taken. The operability explanation noted that "the alarm was apparently
caused by influx of jellyfish and was promptly resolved per the Alarm Manual." The
17Enclosureinspectors also discussed with engineers that if manual action was required duringdebris intrusions, then SW strainer operability could be challenged. Constellation
created an Incident Response Team (IRT) and performed an apparent cause evaluation
for the jellyfish intrusion but did not perform an evaluation on the potential impact to
safety-related systems. On September 1, 2006, following high winds from tropical storm Ernesto inspectorsreviewed the control room logs and found several cases where condition reports were
not written for SW strainer trouble alarms. The alarms came in and cleared with no
action taken on a number of occasions. The system is design for the strainer to
autoflush before an alarm is received. In one case, a 12B SW strainer valve was not in
its correct position and the control room logs indicate the actions taken for the alarm
were unsuccessful. On other occasions operators were dispatched to observed the
- SW strainer going into an autoflush or to manually flush the strainer following an alarm.In response to the inspectors observations and discussions regarding strainerperformance, the Constellation staff initiated
CRs were
initiated for these issues. The inspectors concluded that with the SW strainer valve in
the wrong position, the automatic backwash feature of the associated subsystem
strainer would not function, and therefore the SW strainer was inoperable. The
inspectors also concluded that there was an adverse impact to the SW strainers from
debris intrusion and that Constellation, by not documenting the adverse conditions in
their corrective action process as required by their procedure, missed an opportunity to
assess the impact on system operability as well as determine the corrective actions
needed to address the issue. The inspectors determined that on July 19, 2006 a SW
strainer was inoperable for one subsystem on Unit 2 for less than one hour. On
September 1, both subsystems were inoperable, but not at the same time and for less
than one hour. Analysis. The failure to follow the Alarm Response Manual for the salt water system isthe performance deficiency in that the Constellation staff did not initiate CRs to address
salt water strainer trouble alarms or assess system operability as required by the
procedure. The performance deficiency more than minor since it had a credible impact
on the objective for the mitigating system cornerstone and the attribute of component
reliability during design basis events where the SW system was required. The finding
was determined to be of very low safety significance, Green, using phase 1 of the SDP
since the TS allowed outage time for one subsystem inoperable was not exceeded. The
inspectors identified that a contributing cause of this finding was related to the cross-
cutting aspect of PI&R because Constellation did not implement the corrective action
program with a low threshold for identifying the problems with the
TS 5.4.1a, "Administrative Controls - Procedures," requires, in part, thatwritten procedures be established and implemented for activities recommended in
Regulatory Guide 1.33, revision 2, Appendix A of February 1978. Paragraph 6 of
Appendix A requires procedures for safety-related alarm conditions. The SW strainers
are safety-related and have alarm response procedures associated with each of its
service water heat exchangers. Contrary to the above, on July 19 and
September 1, 2006, Constellation failed to adequately implement the alarm response
procedures because no condition report was written. This violation is documented in
Constellation's corrective action program as IRE-017-018 and is being treated as a
18Enclosurenon-cited violation consistent with Section
TS 5.4.1 for Salt Water
Strainers. .4Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector reviewed the Constellation's Licensee Event Reports, Special Reports,and audits related to the radiological environmental monitoring program performed since
the last inspection. The inspector determined that identified problems were entered into
the corrective action program for resolution. The inspector also reviewed corrective
actions affecting environmental sampling, sample analysis, or meteorological monitoring
instrumentation. b.Findings and ObservationsNo findings of significance were identified.4OA3Event FollowupReduction of Power Generation due to Jellyfish IntrusionThe inspectors assessed operator performance associated with a Unit 1 event thatinvolved a rapid reduction of power. On July 7, 2006, at approximately 4:30 p.m., a
large number of jellyfish entered the intake basin of the plant. The jellyfish challenged
the circulating water and screen wash systems. Unit 1 control room operator (CRO)
received high differential pressure (D/P) alarms on several traveling screens in the
control room. The CRO immediately dispatched outside operators to investigate the
cause and subsequently gave directions to clear the traveling screens. The outside
operators used fire hoses to deflect the jellyfish away from the intake. At approximately
4:59 p.m., The Unit
AOP) - 7L,
"Circulating Water / Intake Malfunction," due to continuos high D/P alarms on the
traveling screens and securing two circulating water pumps. Unit 1 required a rapid
reduction of power in accordance with AOP-7L. The inspectors observed plant
operation, procedure adherence and system performance during this time. The
inspectors assessed the plant response and conditions specific to the event, and
evaluated the performance of licensed operators. The inspectors reviewed control room
procedures and operator logs to determine if operators performed the appropriate
actions in accordance with their training and established station procedures. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
19Attachment4OA6Meetings, Including ExitExit Meeting SummaryOn September 29, 2006, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to MrSpina and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors
asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should
be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.ATTACHMENT:
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
- CONTA [[]]
CT Constellation PersonnelJ. Spina, Vice President
J. Pollock, Plant General Manager
REMP Laboratory, Ft. Smallwood
L. Bartal, Laboratory Supervisor, Ft. Smallwood
REMP Program Manager
S. Dean, General Supervisor Operations
J. Detechemundy, Health Physics Technician
B. Erdman, Radiological Engineering Supervisor
S. Etnoyer, Plant Health Physicist
H. Evans, Health Physics Leader
M. Flaherty, Engineering Services Manager
P. Furio, Supervisor Licensing
J. Gaines, Director Calvert Cliffs Licensing
D. Geneva, General Supervisor, Chemistry
T. Hickey, Welder
J. Johnson, Licensing
P. Jones, Senior Plant Health Physicist
R. Kellner, Senior Plant Health Physicist
T. Kirkham, Principle Plant Health Physicist
L. Larragoite, Constellation Licensing Director
R. Marshall, Health Physics Technician
NSSS Systems
S. Marie Reichard, Engineering Analyst
C. Neyman, Engineering Analyst
E. Roach, General Supervisor of Health Physics
D. Scroggy, Health Physics Technician
A. Simpson, Sr. Licensing Engineer
B. Snuse, Licensing
M. Stanley, Operations, Fire Brigade
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ITEMS [[]]
- CLOSED [[]]
- AND [[]]
SRW andAFW With Watertight Doors Open
A-2Attachment05000317-318/2006004-02NCV Failure to comply with
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- REVIEW [[]]
QSS Week 0629 - Risk Evaluation Rev. 3, July 14, 2006
Abnormal Operating Procedure, AOP-7M, Major Grid Disturbances, revision 1
Operations Administrative Policy 94-5, Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Operations Support For
Electric System Operation and Planning Department Transmission System Operations Unit,
revision 10
CW001 temperature indication uncertainty,
August 2, 2006
Rep task ID 20421009, Cross Calibration of Circulating Water temperature detectors, August 1,
2006
Drawing Bechtel 63-077-B, Block Diagram
TR17, revision 4
Emergency Response Plan Implementation Procedure (ERPIP) 3.0, "Immediate Actions,"
20, "Severe Weather," revision 39.
Emergency Planning (EP) 1-108, "Severe Weather Preparation," Attachment 3, "Severe
Weather Preparation Checklist Operations," revision 0
Operations Administrative Policy (OAP) 00-01, "Severe Weather Operations," revision
- ECCS Pump Air Cooler, September 12, 2006Simplified Drawing 84304, Circulating and Salt Water Cooling System, revision 6
- UFS [[]]
AR Table 9-17A, Single Failure Analysis, revision 34
Simplified Drawing 64311, Safety Injection and Containment Spray, revision 9
Operating Instruction (OI) OI-3A Unit 2, Safety Injection and Containment Spray, revision 22
Drawing 62731 Sheet 1, Safety Injection and Containment Spray, revision 72
OI 29 Unit 1 and 2, Salt Water System, revision 52
OI-15, Service Water System, revision 43,
CA03387, Unit 1 Service Water Flow Analysis, revision 1.
Maintenance Order (MO) 2200601499
Clearance
CA02243, revision 1IRE-016-887, Combustible Load calculation underestimates quantity of Armaflex Insulation,
August 31, 2006
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.9,
- CCN [[]]
PP Fire Protection Program, revision35
SA-1, Fire Protection Program, revision 6.
FP-2, Fire Hazards Analysis Summary Document, revision 0.
A-3AttachmentSection 1R06: Flood Protection MeasuresRAN 97-031, Individual Plant Examination of External Events Summary Report, MN-1-319, Structure and System Walkdowns, rev. 7
BG&E 62308, Area & Equipment Drains Containment and Auxiliary Building Unit 2 Plan at
Elevation.45'-0", revision 14Section 1R07: Heat Sink PerformanceCA04879, rev. 0, (93-074 Rev. 3), Salt Water
SRWHX-4, rev.9, Service Water Heat Exchanger Cleaning and Inspection
CA03387, rev. 1, Unit 1 Service Water Flow Analysis
- EPRI [[]]
- NP -7552, Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines, dated December 1991Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program Drill Simulator Guide
KV Bus, revision 1Section 1R12: Maintenance EffectivenessMN-1-101, Control of Maintenance Activities, revision 31Maintenance Order (MO) 2200504499
Maintenance Order (MO) 2200500523
Maintenance Order (MO) 2200602453
Maintenance Order (MO) 2200600776
Maintenance Order (MO) 2200602796
Maintenance Order (MO) 2200602679
SP-0556, Reactor Coolant Pump - Seal Area, Attachment 1, revision 2.
IRE-015-378
IRE-008-929
IRE-014-698
IRE-009-026Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work ControlIntegrated Work Schedule 0631, August 1, 2006Integrated Work Schedule 0635, August 29, 2006
Integrated Work Week 0636, September 3 - September 10 2006.
Integrated Work Schedule 0638, September 20, 2006
Maintenance Order (MO) 2200600937
Maintenance Order (MO) 1200600619Section 1R15: Operability EvaluationsIRE-014-572,
ICI Thimble in the Area ofthe CET, May 11, 2006
Engineering Services package (ESP) ES199600729-000, revision 0
CET printout August 3, 2006
Drawing 12021A-0037, ICI Thimble Assembly, revision 0B
Maintenance Order (MO) 2200602722, Scaffold and Insulation Support for
- SWGR [[]]
HVAC Duct,
A-4Attachment8/8/2006Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Administrative Procedures MN-1-203, Scaffold Control,
revision 15
- TDA [[]]
FW Pump Doors opened and not risked assessed,
September 11, 2006
ECCS Pump room Air Cooler Maintenance PRA did not assess water tight
doors open on opposite Unit1, September 13, 2006
AFW Steam Train Operability with AFW Pump Room Double Watertight Door
Open, August 30, 2006
Reasonable Expectation of Continued Operability (RECO)
- 22 SDC [[]]
throttle valve, unable to fully shut, August 29, 2006
EDG room fan switches have shipping protectors installed over the sensing
element, September 27, 2006
Unit 1 and 2 AOP-9A, Control Room Evacuation and Safe Shutdown Due to Severe Control
Room Fire, revision 12
- DWG [[]]
HX Outlet
2SV3830
Unit 2 Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) -5, Loss of Coolant Accident, revision 21
Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) O-65G-2, Component Cooling Valve Quarterly Operability
Test, performed August 29, 2006
Purchase Order (PO) 41590, Solenoid 3 way valve
NPEFL8300382ERF, August
11, 2005
- 2 SI [[]]
ECCS Pump Room Cooler, September 12,
2006
STP O-27-1/2, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Evaluation (Unit 1 and 2), revision 19, change5
Information Technology System Type Screening Form
- IT [[]]
SF-2000-0051, Operations
Calculations, July 20, 2000
Nuclear Engineering Unit Memo
DE05497, RCS Volume Change with Replacement
Steam Generator, January 21, 2002
U1 and U2
AFW,
August 30, 2006
- NRC [[]]
STP O-027 1&2 software does not meet standards to ensure full compliance with
TS, August 25, 2006
Administrative procedure
ASME Inservice testing of Pumps, revision 1
Calvert Cliffs IST Program Plan, revision 2
A-5AttachmentSection
- EP 6: Emergency Response DrillCalvert Cliffs Emergency Response Drill Scenario, State Participation -1, dated August 1, 2005Calvert Cliffs Emergency Response Plan Implementation Procedures (
ERPIP) 3.0, Immediate
Actions, revision 39
Emergency Action Level (EAL) Technical Basis Document, revision 10
IRE-016-353, Emergency Director training using judgment, August 3, 2006
Emergency Preparedness Unit File 9.5 - Drill/Exercise Reports for July 25, 2006 Emergency
Response Plan Implementation procedure Drill, July 27, 2006Section
- OS 3: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation andProtective EquipmentProcedures and DocumentsCCNPP Administrative Procedure,
- CCN [[]]
- CCN [[]]
- ALA [[]]
RA Review Checklist
SWP 2006-0126
Temporary Shielding Request Nos. 1-06-001; 1-06-002; 1-06-003; 1-06-004; 1-06-006;
1-06-008; 1-06-610; 1-06-011; 1-06-017; 1-06-018; 1-06-023; 1-06-025; 1-06-027;
2-05-024; 2-03-056; 0-05-030;Maintenance Work Order Nos. 2200604664; 1200600392; 0200600987;2200601047;
200600738; 1200403667;
A-6AttachmentSection
REMP)Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power PlantUnits 1 and 2 and the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (January 1 - December 31,
2005)
Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power PlantUnits 1 and 2 and the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (January 1 - December 31,
2004)
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Revision 8 (August 2004)
Land Use Census Around Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (August 2005)
Chemistry Audit CHE-05-01-C, dated May 5, 2005
Focused Self-Assessment of H-3, and potential risks associated with the release of H-3 to the
environment (Focused Self-Assessment Report FSA-2006-79, performed April 3-June 30,
2006. Tritium Groundwater Protection Action Plan, Rev. 0, July 25, 2006
CP-103, Rev 10, Chemistry Quality Assurance and Quality Control Program
CP-235, Rev 4, Specification and Surveillance Unconditional Release
CP-301, Rev 2, Setup, Calibration, and Operational Checks of the Gamma Spectroscopy
Counting System
CP-340, Rev 5, Verification of Lower Level of Detection
CP-438, Rev 7, Operation of the Environmental Trailers and Sampling of Intake and Outfall
CP-509, Rev 2, Land Use Census
SN 417 and SN 5236
CFR 50.75(g) and 10 CFR 72.30(d) Documentation Requirements
RSP 1-113, Rev 9, Release of Items, Material and Vehicles from a Contaminated or
Radiologically Controlled Area
STP--461-0, Rev 13, Meteorological Calibration, including calibration data sheets dated June
21, 2006
Lab Services Section, Procedure
Detector and the
- GENIE [[]]
PC Counting System
Lab Services Section, Protocol for Packing Solver Zeolite Cartridges
IRE-008-461, IRE-005-
087,
IRE-009-037, IRE-
010-219,
SW Strainer and manual flushes, September 7, 2006
Control Room Logs September 6-7 2006; July 6-7, 2006; September 1, 2006
LCO TS 3.5.2A caused by jellyfish intrusion, July 7, 2006
Operational Decision-Making Checklist, Increased Jellyfish Concentration, July 7, 2006
IRE-016-781, Three occasions since June 2006, shift compliment was reduced below minimum
staffing per AOP-9A, August 25, 2006
IRE-016-727, Broken Control room hand switches are not identified as priority 3 or Control
room deficiencies, August 23, 2006
A-7AttachmentControl room Deficiency list, August 23, 2006Operation Administrative Policy (OAP) 04-01, Managing Operator Impacts, February 26,
- 2004LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ACRONY [[]]
- ALAR [[]]
- AO [[]]
PAbnormal Operating Procedure
- CCNP [[]]
- CC [[]]
- CE [[]]
- CF [[]]
RCode of Federal Regulations
- CR [[]]
OControl Room Operator
D/PDifferential Pressure
- ECC [[]]
- ED [[]]
GEmergency Diesel Generator
EPEmergency Preparedness
- ERPI [[]]
- HPS [[]]
- ICCD [[]]
- IM [[]]
CInspection Manual Chapter
- IPEE [[]]
- IR [[]]
TIncident Response Team
KvKilivolt
- LD [[]]
- LPS [[]]
- AFW [[]]
- MO [[]]
VMotor-Operated Valve
MRMaintenance Rule
mremMillirem
- NC [[]]
- NE [[]]
- NR [[]]
- OA [[]]
- ODC [[]]
MOffsite Dose Calculation Manual
- OO [[]]
- PA [[]]
- PA [[]]
- PAR [[]]
SPublicly Available Records
PIPerformance Indicators
QAQuality Assurance
A-8AttachmentPI&RProblem Identification & ResolutionRRoentgen
- RC [[]]
- RC [[]]
PReactor Coolant Pump
- REM [[]]
- RET [[]]
- RI [[]]
- RP [[]]
- RW [[]]
- SD [[]]
- SDH [[]]
- SD [[]]
- SR [[]]
- SRWH [[]]
- SS [[]]
- ST [[]]
PSurveillance Test Procedure
- AFW [[]]
- TED [[]]
- TL [[]]
DThermoluminescent Dosimeter
- TSA [[]]
- UFSA [[]]
- UR [[]]
- WRN [[]]