ML19246A573

LER 79-020/01T-0 on 790613:secondary Containment Integrity Breached When Reactor Bldg Airlock Doors Were Opened Simultaneously.Caused by Failure of Procedure to State Correct Method for Securing Airlock Doors.Procedure Revised

ML19246A573
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	06/27/1979
From:	Ross D JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19246A572	List: ML19246A569 ML19246A573
References
LER-79-020-01T, LER-79-20-1T, NUDOCS 7907030381
Download: ML19246A573 (3)

Text

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o O l when both reactor building railroad airlock doors were open simultane- l o 4 i ously. The inner door had been open for several days prior to the event. I o s l The outer door swung open when normal reactor building ventilation was l o 16 l Switched to the Standby Gas Treatment System in order to effect fan  ;

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repairs. The shutdown was terminated when the inner door was secured in l

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the closed position and containment integrity was restored.  ;

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44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i O l The cause of the event is attributed to the failure of the procedure to l i state the correct method for securing the airlock doors. The procedure i i l

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Donald A. Ross PHONE.

201-455-8784 _. -e t NAME OF PREPARER ..

Jersey Central Power & Light Company

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Monistown, New Jersey 07960 (201)455-8200 f

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report ,

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Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/79-20/lT-0 Report Date June 27,1979 Occurrence Date _

June 13, 1979 Identification of Occurrence Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.B.1, when secondary containment integrity was not maintained for eleven minutes when both reactor building railroad airlock doors were open. This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraphs 6.9.2.A.2 and 6.9.2.A.6.

Cond! ions Prior to Occurrence The plant was operating at steady state power.

4 Flow: Recirculating, 14.4 x 10 gpm Feedwater, 6.98 x 10 6 lb/hr Power: Generator, 643 MWe Reactor, 1870.2 MWt Stack Gas: 3.36 x 104 pCi/sec Description of Occurrence On Wednesday, June 13, 1979, at approximately 1039 hours0.012 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.953395e-4 months <br />, the secondary containment integrity was breached when both reactor building raliroad airlock doors were open simultaneously. The inner railroad airlock door was open and the outer door was in the close position several days prior to the in-cident. The outer door swung open when normal reactor building ventilation system was switched to the Standby Gas Treatment System in order to repair the dampers on the reactor building supply fans SF-1-13 and SF-1-14. At 1040, the Control Room Operators were p eparing for an orderly shutdown while investigating the cause for loss of secondary containment. The shutdown was terminated at 1052 when the inner airlock door was secured in the close1 q e, q<

-a) c-Jersey Central Power & Ught Company is a Member of the G< .ier, I Pubhc Utthfies ystem _

Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/79-20/lT-0 Page 2

, June 27, 1979 position. The reactor building ventilation was restored to normal operation at 1107 hours0.0128 days <br />0.308 hours <br />0.00183 weeks <br />4.212135e-4 months <br /> and Standby Gas Treatment was secured. A leak rate test was performed to check the integrity of the secondary containment and was found to be acceptable. The secondary containment leak rate test was performed with only the outer doors closed.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence The procedure for operating the reactor building railroad airlock doors was inadequate in that it failed to state the correct method in which the rail-road airlock doors are to be secured. Additionally, persor..-al operating the doors failed to secure the upper mechanism on the outer door.

Analysis of Occurrence Secondary containment is required to minimize ground level release of airborne radioactive materials, and to provide for controlled, elevated release of the building atmosphere under accident conditions. The ability of secondary containnent to perform its function with both airlock doors open was degraded.

Considering the length of time concerned, the safety significance of this event is considered to be mininal.

Corrective Action The Plant Operations Review Committee discussed this problem with the staff maintenance engineer. The procedure for operating the railroad airlock door was rewritten, and the correct method to secure the door was incorporated into the procedure. An engineering regoest will be submitted to determine a more positive means of dogging the railroad airlock doors closed from the ground level. This shall also consider an interlecking/ alarm scheme to be used to ensure only one rail road airlock dcor is gen at any one time. In the interim, proper precautions will be posted in the iri. mediate area of the railroad airlock doors to ensure they are properly dogged closed.

Failure Data N/A oe. :

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