ML20028H691

LER 90-016-00:on 901220,senior Reactor Operator Licensed Group Shift Supervisor Left Control Room W/O Replacement, Resulting in Lack of Operator in Control Room for 4 Minutes. Both Operators Returned to Control room.W/910121 Ltr

ML20028H691
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	01/21/1991
From:	J. J. Barton, Godknecht M GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
C321-91-2012, LER-90-016, LER-90-16, NUDOCS 9101280148
Download: ML20028H691 (4)

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GPU Nuclear Corporation G: u. duclear nit 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731-0388 609 971 4000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

January 21, 1991 C321-91-2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Dear Stri Subjects Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

( Docket No. 50-219 I

Licensee Event Report This letter forwards one (1) copy of Licensee Event Report (LER) No.90-016.

Very truly yours, j C"' / K f

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rt o 1 e e, Oyster Creek Enclosure cci Mr. Thomas Martin, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prur,sia, PA 19406 t

Mr. Alexandet W. Dromerich U.S. Nuclear F99ulatory Ccmmission Mall Station PI-137 Washington, DC 20555 NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Ganerating Station Forked River, NJ 0873t I

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} NO l l l Auf n ACT n-., a, . . .- . . . .e-. n .,. . n.. .. , H ei on December 20, 1990 at 0326 hours0.00377 days <br />0.0906 hours <br />5.390212e-4 weeks <br />1.24043e-4 months <br />, the SRO licensed Group Shift Supervisor (GSS) left the GSS office after informing the SRO licensed Group Operating Supervisor (GOS). At 0349 hours0.00404 days <br />0.0969 hours <br />5.770503e-4 weeks <br />1.327945e-4 months <br /> the GOS left the control room without ensuring that the GSS had returned to the control room. As a result, there was no SRO in the control room for a four minute period, until approximately 0353 hours0.00409 days <br />0.0981 hours <br />5.83664e-4 weeks <br />1.343165e-4 months <br />. This is a violation of Technical Specification 6.2.2.c which requires that an SRO be present in the control room under the plant conditions which existed at the time of the occurrence. Corrective actions included the immediate return of.the GOS and GSS to the control room when it was discovered that there was no SRO in the control room. Plant Operations Management counselvl the individual involved about the occurrence.

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011 16 -0 D _0 12 OP Op DATE OF OCCUE ItiG This event occurred on December 20, 1990 at 0349 hours0.00404 days <br />0.0969 hours <br />5.770503e-4 weeks <br />1.327945e-4 months <br />.

IDENTIFICATICN OF OCCURRENG A Senior Reacto- Operator (SRO) was not present in the control room for a four minute period while the plant was operating. This is a violation of Technical Specification 6.2.2.c. This event to considered reportable in accordance with 10CRF50.73(a)(2)(1)(B).

CONDITION PRIOR TC, DIsCOVht ,

The reactor was in the RUN mode operating at approximately 93% power. Thermal power was at 1789 HWt and generator load was $96 HWe, DydQRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On December 20, 1990 at 0326 hours0.00377 days <br />0.0906 hours <br />5.390212e-4 weeks <br />1.24043e-4 months <br />, the SRO licensed Group Shift Supervisor (GSS) left the control room e*ter informing the SRO licensed Group Operating Supervisor (COS) of hin intention a si required by plant administration directives. Approximately 23 minutes later, at 0349 hours0.00404 days <br />0.0969 hours <br />5.770503e-4 weeks <br />1.327945e-4 months <br />, the GOS also lef t the control room. The 00S thought he saw the CSS in the control room befcre he left but did not make a face to face verification. Several minutes later, the Control Room Operatore (CRO's) realized that both SRO's were absent from the control room and recalled the 00S to the control roc.7. The GOS immediately returned to the control room arriving at 0353 hours0.00409 days <br />0.0981 hours <br />5.83664e-4 weeks <br />1.343165e-4 months <br />. The CSS returned to the control room at the same time. (The times were ascertained by a review of computer records). The Hanager Plant Operationn was immediately notified of this occurrence.

APPAPENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the evant was personnel error in that the COS failed to properly verify that the OSS had returned to the control Room, and to inform him of his intention to leave the Control Room. A contributing cause was the failure to ensure that the guidance provided in the administrative directive issued as a result of a previous occurrence was incorporated into plant admintotrative procedures.

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, . o is to lo lo I ? 11 P 9 10 01116 0;0 013 or 0l 3 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT The CSS and 008 hold a Senior Reactor Operator licence. Both supervise and direct the CRos and the Equipment operators. Both the CSS and COS are cognizant of plant conditions, operating plans and requirements. Both conduct plant tours and respond to plant problems and follow up as necessary.

If an unusual plant event were to occur in the absence of both SRO's, the CRos would not have the advantage of the SRO's overall plant perspective which could provide direction in mitigating the event.

The safety significance of this event is considered minimal due to the short time period (4 minutes).that an SRO was absent from the control room. .

CORRECTIVE ACTIO]Q

_Immediate

1. The GOS and CSS insnediately returned to the control room when informed that there was no SRO in the control room.

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2. The Plant operations Director discussed the occurrence with the individuals involved, reviewing the plant adminircrativo directive that a GSS or 00S communicate directly with the other ORO on shift, clearly stating his intentions prior to leaving the control room.

Lono Term

1. This 1.ER will be assigned as required reading to all licensed personnel and all personnel presently in licenced training to ensure it is understood ,

_that direct communication between SROs is neccesary when one will be leaving the control room.

2. The guidance contained in the administrative directive will be incorporated into the control of Operations Procedure (106 Procedure).

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3. A Iluman Factors study will be made by the Human Engineering Department as to the feasibility of devising some means of preventing both SROs from d

leaving the control Room at the same time.

SIMILAR OCCURRENCES LER 89-22 1

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