IR 05000334/2009003
Download: ML092160021
Text
August 4, 2009
Mr. Peter P. Sena, III Site Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Beaver Valley Power Station P. O. Box 4, Route 168 Shippingport, PA 15077
SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2009003 AND 05000412/2009003
Dear Mr. Sena:
On June 30, 2009, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on July 22, 2009, with members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, this report documents one NRC-identified finding and one self-revealing finding, both of very low safety significance (Green). These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. Additionally, a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of low safety significance is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance and because the issues have been entered in the corrective action program, the NRC is treating the findings as non-cited violations (NCVs)
consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any of the findings in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley. In addition, if you disagree with the characterization of the cross-cutting aspect of any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region 1 and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at the Beaver Valley Power Station.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the P. Sena, III 2 NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at 610-337-5200 if you have any questions regarding this letter.
Sincerely,/RA/
Ronald R. Bellamy, Ph.D., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412 License Nos: DPR-66, NPF-73
Enclosures:
Inspection Report 05000334/2009003; 05000412/2009003
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc w/encl:
J. Hagan, President and Chief Nuclear Officer J. Lash, Senior Vice President of Operations and Chief Operating Officer D. Pace, Senior Vice President, Fleet Engineering K. Fili, Vice President, Fleet Oversight P. Harden, Vice President, Nuclear Support G. Halnon, Director, Fleet Regulatory Affairs Manager, Fleet Licensing Company R. Lieb, Director, Site Operations D. Murray, Director, Maintenance M. Manoleras, Director, Engineering R. Brosi, Director, Site Performance Improvement C. Keller, Manager, Site Regulatory Compliance D. Jenkins, Attorney, FirstEnergy Corporation M. Clancy, Mayor, Shippingport, PA D. Allard, Director, PADEP C. O'Claire, State Liaison to the NRC, State of Ohio Z. Clayton, EPA-DERR, State of Ohio Director, Utilities Department, Public Utilities Commission, State of Ohio D. Hill, Chief, Radiological Health Program, State of West Virginia J. Lewis, Commissioner, Division of Labor, State of West Virginia W. Hill, Beaver County Emergency Management Agency J. Johnsrud, National Energy Committee, Sierra Club P. Sena, III 3 NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at 610-337-5200 if you have any questions regarding this letter.
Sincerely,/RA/ Ronald R. Bellamy, Ph.D., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects
Distribution w/encl: S. Collins, RA M. Dapas, DRA D. Lew, DRP J. Clifford, DRP R. Bellamy, DRP G. Barber, DRP C. Newport, DRP J. Greives, DRP D. Werkheiser, DRP, SRI D. Spindler, DRP, RI P. Garrett, DRP, Resident OA L. Trocine, RI OEDO R. Nelson, NRR N. Morgan, PM, NRR R. Guzman, NRR S. West, DRS-RIII C. Pederson, DRP-RIII ROPreportsResource@nrc.gov Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
ML092160021 SUNSI Review Complete: RRB (Reviewer's Initials) DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH6\+++BEAVER VALLEY\BV INSPECTION REPORTS & EXIT NOTES\ BV INSPECTION REPORTS 2009\BVREPORT-IR2009-003.DOC After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public . To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP NAME DWerkheiser/DW RBellamy/ RRB DATE 07/29/09 08/04/09 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 1 Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I
Docket Nos. 50-334, 50-412
Report Nos. 05000334/2009003 and 05000412/2009003
Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)
Facility: Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077
Dates: April 1, 2009 through June 30, 2009
Inspectors: D. Werkheiser, Senior Resident Inspector D. Spindler, Resident Inspector J. Ayala, Resident Inspector P. Kaufman, Senior Reactor Inspector T. Moslak, Health Physicist O. Ayegbusi, Reactor Inspector Approved by: R. Bellamy, Ph.D., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects
2 Enclosure TABLE of
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
.............................................................................................................. 3
REPORT DETAILS
..........................................................................................................................
REACTOR SAFETY
............................................................................................................ 5 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection ) ..................................................................................... 5 1R04 Equipment Alignment ................................................................................................. 6 1R05 Fire Protection ............................................................................................................ 7 1R06 Flood Protection Measures .......................................................................................... 8 1R08 Unit 1 Inservice Inspection .......................................................................................... 8 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program ............................................................ 11 1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation ........................................................................... 11 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control .................................. 12 1R15 Operability Evaluations ............................................................................................. 12 1R18 Plant Modifications .................................................................................................... 13 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing ........................................................................................ 14 1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities ............................................................................... 16 1R22 Surveillance Testing
RADIATION SAFETY
............................................................................................................... 17 2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas .................................................. 17 2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls
OTHER ACTIVITIES
[OA] ..................................................................................................... 21
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
........................................................................... 21
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
...................................................................... 22
4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
.................................... 25
4OA5 Other Activities ........................................................................................................... 26 4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit ............................................................................................. 27 4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations .................................................................................... 28
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
...................................................................................................... A-1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
.......................................................... A-1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
.......................................................................................... A-2
LIST OF ACRONYMS
............................................................................................................... A-10
Enclosure
- OF [[]]
- FINDIN [[]]
- GS [[]]
IR 05000412/2009003; 04/01/2009 - 06/30/2009; Beaver Valley Power
Station, Units 1 & 2; Post-Maintenance Testing, Problem Identification and Resolution
The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, regional reactor
inspectors, and a regional health physics inspector. Two (GREEN) findings were identified. The
significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using
Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609,
NRC management review. Cross-cutting aspects associated with findings are determined using IMC
0305, "Operating Reactor Assessment Program," dated January 2009. The NRC's program for
overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
- NUR [[]]
EG-
1649,
- AR eactor Oversight Process,@ Revision 4, dated December 2006. Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems * Green. A non-cited violation (
NCV) of 10CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" was identified for failure to specify and perform
an adequate post-maintenance test (PMT) after replacing a safety-related river water
check-valve. Specifically, the PMT under work order 200233562 was not adequate to
verify the proper function of the valve
PMT was
subsequently performed successfully. This issue was entered into the licensee's
corrective action program as condition report 09-59866. The failure to specify and perform an adequate PMT after replacing a safety-related river
water check-valve was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor in
accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B (Section 1-3), "Issue Screening," because the
failure to specify and perform an adequate PMT is associated with the procedure quality
performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the associated
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated
with resources because the licensee did not have complete, accurate, and up-to-date
maintenance work procedures [IMC 0305 Aspect:
- H. [[2(c)] (Section 1R19). * Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (]]
- FENOC failed to maintain safety-related cables in an environment for which they were designed. Since
NRC Information
Notice 2002-12 was issued,
- FEN [[]]
OC has had several opportunities to trend as-found
data, implement effective maintenance programs, and identify and thoroughly evaluate
long-term adverse conditions for underground safety-related cables exposed to
continuous submerged environments. Cables affected include those for Unit 1 river
water and Unit 2 service water. The issue was entered into the licensee's corrective
action program (CR 09-60496) to initiate a review of the current manhole and cable
monitoring programs, and to initiate long-term corrective actions.
Enclosure Failure to maintain safety related cables in an environment for which they were designed is considered a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor in accordance
with IMC 0612, Appendix B (Section 1-3), "Issue Screening," because if left uncorrected,
the performance deficiency has the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern.
Specifically, the deficiency did not result in the present loss of operability or functionality and did not represent a risk significant external event such as flooding. The issue was
entered into the licensee's corrective action program (CR 09-60496) to initiate a review of
the current manhole and cable monitoring programs, and to initiate long-term corrective
actions.
The performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem
Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, because the licensee did not
thoroughly evaluate problems such as resolutions, address causes, and evaluate the
effectiveness of corrective actions [IMC 0305 Aspect:
- P. [[1 (c)] (Section 4]]
OA2.3). Other Findings A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been
reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have
been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This violation and corrective
actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
Enclosure
- REPORT [[]]
DETAILS Summary of Plant Status: Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On April 1, the unit began a
planned coastdown, on April 16 reduced power to 82 percent for planned condenser
waterbox cleaning, and shut down on April 19 to commence a refueling outage (1R19).
On May 21, the unit was restarted and synchronized to the grid, achieving full power on
May 24. The unit remained at 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection
period. Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On April 18, the unit was
down-powered to 97 percent for planned turbine valve testing and returned to full power
later the same day. On May 30 through May 31 the unit was reduced to 96 percent to
address first-point feedwater heater level control issues and returned to full power. The
unit remained at 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
1.
SAFETY Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity [R]
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
.1 Seasonal Susceptibility
a. Inspection Scope (2 samples - Hot Weather / Hurricane, Offsite and Alternate
- FEN [[]]
OC's implementation of procedures to protect risk significant mitigating systems from
adverse weather effects due to summer weather and hurricanes. The inspectors
conducted interviews with various station personnel to gain insights into the station's hot
weather and hurricane readiness and reviewed the status of various work orders
categorized as warm weather preparation activities. The inspectors reviewed the
corrective action program database, operating experience, and the Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report (UFSAR), to determine the types of adverse weather conditions to which
the site is susceptible, and to verify that the licensee was appropriately identifying and
resolving weather-related equipment problems.
The inspectors also reviewed
FENOC's implementation of
procedures to handle issues that could impact offsite and alternating current (AC) power
systems. The inspectors reviewed
- FEN [[]]
OC's procedures and programs which discussed
the operation and availability/reliability of offsite and alternate AC power systems during adverse weather. The inspectors verified that communication protocols between the
transmission system operator and
- FEN [[]]
OC existed, and the appropriate information
would be conveyed when potential grid stress and disturbances existed. The inspectors
also verified that
- FEN [[]]
OC's procedures contained actions to monitor and maintain the
availability/reliability of offsite and onsite power systems prior to and during adverse weather conditions.
Enclosure b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1 Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q)
a. Inspection Scope (4 samples) The inspectors performed four partial equipment alignment inspections during conditions
of increased safety significance, including when redundant equipment was unavailable
during maintenance or adverse conditions. The partial alignment inspections were also
completed after equipment was recently returned to service after significant
maintenance. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems,
including associated electrical distribution components and control room panels, to verify
the equipment was aligned to perform its intended safety functions: * Unit 1, on April 14, emergency diesel generator No. 1 during the performance of
- 1OST -36.2, "Diesel Generator No. 2 Monthly Test;" * Unit 1, on April 16, train 'A' high head safety injection during the performance of 1
OST-7.19D, "Safety Injection Relay Test (Slave Relay K610)-Train B;" * Unit 1, on April 21, train 'B' residual heat removal system while 'A' electrical train was cleared for maintenance; and * Unit 1, on April 29, containment penetrations during the core reload.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete System Walkdown (71111.04S)
a. Inspection Scope (2 samples) The inspectors performed complete system walkdowns of the following systems to verify
that the critical portions, such as valve positions, switches, and breakers, were correctly
aligned in accordance with procedures, and to identify any discrepancies that may have
had an effect on operability.
The inspectors also reviewed outstanding maintenance work orders to verify that the
deficiencies did not significantly affect the system function. In addition, the inspectors
discussed system health with the system engineer and reviewed the condition report
database to verify that equipment alignment problems were being identified and
appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the
Attachment. * On June 4, alignment and condition of the Unit 2 'C' service water pump and 'A' service water train while the 'D' main intake bay (affecting the 'A' service water
pump) was out of service for planned cleaning; and
Enclosure * On June 6, alignment of 'A' and 'B' motor-driven auxiliary and dedicated feedwater pumps while the turbine-driven feedwater pump was out of service for
planned maintenance.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
.1 Quarterly Sample Review (71111.05Q)
a. Inspection Scope (7 samples) The inspectors reviewed the conditions of the fire areas listed below, to verify compliance
with criteria delineated in Administrative Procedure 1/2-ADM-1900, "Fire Protection,"
Rev. 19. This review included
- FEN [[]]
OC's control of transient combustibles and ignition
sources, material condition of fire protection equipment including fire detection systems,
water-based fire suppression systems, gaseous fire suppression systems, manual
firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and the adequacy of compensatory measures for any fire protection impairments. Documents reviewed are
listed in the Attachment: * Unit 2,
RC-1); and * Unit 1, Rod Control Motor Generator Room (Fire Area MG-1)
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Annual Fire Drill Observation (71111.05A)
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors observed personnel performance during response to an indicated fire in
the Emergency Response Facility sub-station (also see Section 40A3.1) by the fire brigade on June 18. The inspection evaluated the station's demonstration of readiness
in fire fighting response. The inspectors observed the fire brigade members using
protective clothing, turnout gear, and self-contained breathing apparatus and entering the
fire area in a controlled manner. The inspectors also observed the fire fighting
equipment brought to the fire scene to evaluate whether sufficient equipment was
available to effectively control and extinguish the simulated fire. The inspectors
evaluated whether the permanent plant fire hose lines were capable of reaching the fire
area and whether hose usage was adequate. The inspectors observed the fire fighting
directions and communications between fire brigade members. The inspectors verified
Enclosure that the pre-fire plan was used and observed the post-event critique to evaluate fact-finding, lessons-learned and whether any immediate deficiencies needed addressed.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample - underground cables) The inspectors reviewed a sample of internal flood protection measures regarding cables
located in underground manholes. The inspectors selected a
- FEN [[]]
OC inspection of
manholes 8A and 8B that contain Unit 1 and Unit 2 safety-related power and control
cables near the main intake structure. These cable manholes are underground and also
the focus of a focus problem identification and resolution review (see section 4OA2.3).
This review was conducted to evaluate
- FEN [[]]
OC's protection of the enclosed safety-
related systems from internal flooding condition. The inspectors entered the confined
area with
- FEN [[]]
OC personnel, inspected the manhole, and monitored licensee
maintenance activities. The inspectors also reviewed the
- UFS [[]]
AR, related internal
flooding evaluations, and other related documents. The inspectors examined the as-
found equipment and conditions to ensure that they remained consistent with those
indicated in the design basis documentation, flooding mitigation documents, and risk
analysis assumptions. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the
Attachment.
b. Findings One finding of significance was identified and documented in section 4OA2.3.
1R08 Unit 1 Inservice Inspection (IP 71111.08)
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The purpose of this inspection was to assess the effectiveness of the licensee's in-
service inspection (ISI) program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system
boundary, risk significant piping system boundaries, and the containment boundary for
Unit 1. The inspector assessed the inservice inspection activities using the criteria
specified in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section
NRC Regulatory Requirements. The inspector
selected a sample of nondestructive examination (NDE) activities from the Unit 1 in-
service inspection plan for the 1R19 outage for observation, documentation and record
review, and evaluation for compliance with the requirements of the
- BV [[]]
PS Unit 1 Risk-
Informed Inservice Inspection Program and
XI. A sample of activities
associated with the repair/replacement of safety related pressure boundary components
was also reviewed. The sample selection was based on the inspection procedure
objectives, risk significance, availability, and specifically on components and systems where degradation would result in a significant challenge to the integrity of pressure
boundary components. The inspector also conducted a review of TI 2515/172, Reactor
Coolant System Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds for Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1.
Enclosure The inspector reviewed in-process
NDE personnel to evaluate the technician skills and performance, test equipment capabilities, and examination techniques and to verify that the activities, including calibration, set-up, examination techniques, data analysis, and that indications
and defects were evaluated and dispositioned in accordance with
- AS [[]]
ME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code, 2001 Edition to 2003 Addenda Section
ASME Code
Cases, selected relief requests,
- BV [[]]
PS Unit 1 Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection
Program, the Materials Reliability Program (MRP) recommendations, and compliance with 10CFR 50.55a.
The inspector also verified that observed indications and deficient conditions were being
adequately entered and dispositioned in the
- BV [[]]
PS corrective action program.
Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) and Welding Activities
The following dye penetrant testing (PT), ultrasonic testing (UT), magnetic particle testing
(MT), and visual testing (VT) activities performed during 1R19 outage were reviewed by
the inspector.
The inspector observed and reviewed a sample of NDE examinations and
documentation records of manual
RCS) 'A'
loop cold and hot leg nozzle-to-safe-end dissimilar metal (DM) welds
LOOP3-7-S-02 performed
as follow-up UT examination for a flaw indication initially identified in March 1996. The
inspector reviewed visual bare metal inspections (BMI) records and photos of the Unit 1
reactor pressure vessel lower head penetration nozzles. The resident inspection staff
directly observed VT boric acid walk-down inspections inside the Unit 1 containment.
The inspector also performed a document review of UT thickness examination data
records of the Unit 1 containment liner, which was an examination in the area around a
through-wall hole that was identified during 1R19 outage and magnetic particle and UT
examinations of the liner replacement repairs, UT thickness examination data records of
the Unit 1 containment liner area #3, and PT examination data record of residual heat
removal (RHR) welded attachment RH-1-1-A-02.
Qualified
- FEN [[]]
OC inspectors visually examined the condition of accessible portions of the
containment, including the inside surface of the containment liner for corrosion,
mechanical damage and other degradation mechanisms during the 1R19 outage. As a
result of an observed blister in the protective paint coating and protruding rust on the
inside surface of the containment liner at the 738' elevation, a work order was written to
clean the area to allow further evaluation. The cleaning activity uncovered a through-wall
corrosion rectangular hole approximately 1" (horizontal) x 3/8" (vertical) in the
containment liner which was documented in CR 09-57589 and 09-57762 and reported to
the
CFR50.72 on April 23, 2009. Manual UT thickness examinations of the
containment liner of the affected area were taken as part of
XI,
Subsection IWE to determine the extent of the liner corrosion. The inspectors observed
various aspects of the containment liner NDE inspections, liner plate replacement, repair
welding, and testing activities during the 1R19 outage. A more detailed inspection and
assessment of the containment liner through-wall corrosion hole is documented in
inspection report 05000334/2009006.
Enclosure The inspector examined disposition for continued operation, without repair or rework, of non-conforming condition indications identified during 1R19 outage ISI activities. The
inspector reviewed a liquid penetrant (PT) examination report PT-09-1003 and evaluation
report
RH-1-1-A-02, located on an RHR system elbow
for spring can hanger SH-40, which identified a liner indication at the attachment/elbow
interface area that was determined acceptable after light filling of the surface indication.
Repair/Replacement Consisting of Welding
Ultrasonic (UT) examinations performed on base material per the Materials Reliability
Program (MRP) MRP-146 recommendations identified two circumferential indications
approximately 3/8 inches in length in the stainless steel base material adjacent to a
socket weld on the horizontal portion of
RC-41, a 2-inch drain line connected to the
"A" reactor coolant system (RCS) Hot Leg. The deficient condition was documented in
CR 09-58004 and work order 200367565 was initiated to replace the affected piping
segment of the 2-inch drain line. To verify suitability of materials, welding activities
performed, applicable
ISI implementing procedures were in
accordance with the
- AS [[]]
ME code requirements the inspector reviewed the work scope,
activity sequence, weld filler metal selection, welding procedure, non-destructive examination tests, acceptance criteria and post work testing.
Reactor Pressure Vessel Lower Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection
The inspector verified the inspection results of the visual BMI of the Unit 1 reactor
pressure vessel lower head penetration nozzles that was conducted by
- FEN [[]]
OC personnel during 1R19 by reviewing visual inspection documentation record
results and photos of the BMI inspection. No boric acid leakage was observed around
the annulus area on the 43 penetrations inspected.
Pressurized Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection
No inspections were performed of the
- BV [[]]
PS Unit 1 reactor vessel upper head during
1R19 outage because the Unit 1 reactor vessel head was replaced in 2006 during 1R17
outage. The inspector reviewed applicable
Code,Section XI, to verify that no examinations were required of the Unit 1 reactor
vessel upper head.
Boric Acid Corrosion Control (BACC) Inspection Activities
The inspector discussed the boric acid control program controlled by
- BV [[]]
ER-2001, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program with the boric acid corrosion
control program owner and sampled photographic inspections of boric acid found on
safety significant piping and components inside Unit 1containment during Mode 3 walk
downs conducted by
- FEN [[]]
OC personnel in April 2009. The walk down was directly
observed by the resident inspection staff, to verify that the visual inspections were
performed in accordance with the procedure and checklists which emphasized the areas
and locations where boric acid leaks could cause degradation of safety significant
components and that deficient conditions were identified and documented.
Approximately 138 locations were identified with boric acid during 1R19 walk down
inspections.
Enclosure A sample of engineering evaluations/corrective actions associated with these boric acid deficiencies and a sample of these items on the Unit 1 mode hold list were reviewed by
the inspector. The inspector confirmed that condition reports were assigned corrective
actions consistent with the requirements of the
CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion XVI. The inspector reviewed various condition reports and work orders to
resolve the identified deficient boric acid conditions.
Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspections The inspectors reviewed the
- BV [[]]
PS Unit 1 1R18 steam generator degradation
assessment
- BV [[]]
PS Unit 1
steam generator tubes during 1R19 outage because the Unit 1 steam generators were
replaced in 2006 during 1R17 outage. The inspector reviewed applicable
XI to verify that no examinations
were required during 1R19.
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspector reviewed a sample of condition reports related to
MRP-139, and MRP-
146 program activities to assess
- FEN [[]]
OC's effectiveness in problem identification and
resolution and determined that deficiencies are being appropriately identified, and
entered into and resolved by the corrective action program.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q)
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors observed Unit 2 licensed operator simulator training on June 23. The
inspectors evaluated licensed operator performance regarding command and control,
implementation of normal, annunciator response, abnormal, and emergency operating
procedures, communications, technical specification review and compliance, and
emergency plan implementation. The inspectors evaluated the licensee staff training
personnel to verify that deficiencies in operator performance were identified, and that
conditions adverse to quality were entered into the licensee's corrective action program
for resolution. The inspectors reviewed simulator physical fidelity to assure the simulator
appropriately modeled the plant control room. The inspectors verified that the training
evaluators adequately addressed that the applicable training objectives had been
achieved.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12Q)
a. Inspection Scope (2 samples) The inspectors evaluated Maintenance Rule (MR) implementation for the issues listed
below. The inspectors evaluated specific attributes, such as MR scoping,
characterization of failed structures, systems, and components (SSCs), MR risk
characterization of
SSC performance criteria and goals, and appropriateness of
Enclosure corrective actions. The inspectors verified that the issues were addressed as required by
category (a)(1) and (a)(2) performance monitoring. MR System Basis Documents were
also reviewed, as appropriate.
- Unit 1, Solid State Protection System does not achieve
CR 09-60127.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a. Inspection Scope (5 samples) The inspectors reviewed the scheduling and control of five activities, and evaluated
their effect on overall plant risk. This review was conducted to ensure compliance with
applicable criteria contained in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Documents reviewed during the
inspection are listed in the Attachment. * On April 20, Unit 1 refueling outage defense-in-depth report re-assessment for changes in calculated time-to-boil values, as document in
EDG 1-1 autoload test; * On May 3, Unit 1 change in shutdown risk profile for repairs to "B" Residual Heat Removal Pump (1DRH-P-1A) (CR 09-58513); * Week of June 1, Unit 1 and Unit 2, review of station risk during planned 'D' main intake bay cleaning; and * During June 15-21, Unit 1 and Unit 2, review of changed and emergent work coordination for that planned week's activities, including a review of station
processes and procedures for risk determination. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a. Inspection Scope (6 samples) The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of selected immediate operability determinations (IOD), prompt operability determinations (POD), or functionality assessments (FA), to verify that determinations of Technical Specifications (TS)
operability were justified, as appropriate. In addition, the inspectors verified that
- UFS [[]]
AR design basis
requirements were properly addressed. In addition, the inspectors reviewed
Enclosure compensatory measures implemented to ensure the measures worked and were adequately controlled. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. * April 12 -14, Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (FW-P-2) steam isolation valve (MOV-1MS-105) failed to open electrically as documented in
- CR 09-57275; * On April 21, Unit 1 primary component cooler inlet temperature indicator failure to containment penetration cooling coils documented in
- CR s 09-57589, 09-57762; * On May 6, Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 1-2 original governor re-installation due to issues documented in
- CR 09-58435; and * On June 16, Unit 2 licensee's functional assessment regarding fire protection safe shutdown report analysis of station air documented in
CRs 09-60058, 09-
60162, 06-6932.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18) .1 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope (2 samples) The inspectors reviewed the following temporary modifications (TMOD) based on risk
significance. The
CFR 50.59 screening were reviewed against
the system design basis documentation, including the
TS. The
inspectors verified the
- TM [[]]
ODs were implemented in accordance with Administrative
(ADM) Procedure, 1/2-ADM-2028, "Temporary Modifications," Rev. 9. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment. *
- TMOD [[]]
ECP 09-0174 to provide an alternate discharge path for Unit 1 river water from the outlet of 'A' emergency diesel generator heat exchanger (1EE-E-1A) to
the normal discharge catch basin; and *
- TMOD [[]]
ECP 09-01453 to provide additional mitigating configuration and control of plant operations during solid plant operation while shutdown.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Permanent Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample)
Enclosure The inspectors evaluated the design basis impact of the modification to the Unit 1 reactor trip breaker circuit under ECP 08-0134-002. The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of
the associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening, verified that attributes and parameters within
the design documentation were consistent with required licensing and design bases, as
well as credited codes and standards, and observed portions of the modification to verify
that changes described in the package were appropriately implemented. The inspectors
also verified the post-modification testing was satisfactorily accomplished to ensure the
system and components operated consistent with their intended safety function.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a. Inspection Scope (7 samples) The inspectors reviewed the following activities to determine whether the post-
maintenance tests (PMT) adequately demonstrated that the safety-related function of the
equipment was satisfied given the scope of the work, and that operability of the system was restored. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the applicable acceptance criteria to
verify consistency with the design and licensing bases, as well as TS requirements. The
inspectors witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify results adequately
demonstrated restoration of affected safety functions. The inspectors also verified that
conditions adverse to quality were entered into the corrective action program for
resolution. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. * On April 3,
- 1OST -30.3, after planned maintenance on Unit 1 'B' train river water; * On April 14, Unit 1, new-fuel frame hoist motor (1
- KVS [[-1AE-1E9) control circuit; * On May 6, Unit 1, emergency diesel generator No. 1-2 (1EE-EG-2) governor replacement; * On May 8, Unit 1, final painting and baseline volumetric scan after containment plate liner repair; * On May 19, Unit 1, replacement of number 2 seal on 'A' reactor coolant pump; and * On May 30, Unit 1, replacement of]]
CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" was identified for failure to specify and perform
an adequate PMT after replacing a safety-related river water check-valve. Specifically,
train 'A' river water was declared operable after replacement of check valve 1RW-57 per
work order 200233562 without an adequate PMT.
Enclosure Description: On May 25, 2009, the 'A' main intake bay was removed from service for planned bay cleaning. This rendered the 'A' safety-related river water pump (1WR-P-1A)
inoperable. The spare 'C' river water pump (1WR-P-1C) was aligned to service the 'A'
river train. During the bay cleaning, the 'A' river water pump discharge check valve
(1RW-57) was replaced on May 28 by mechanical maintenance per work order
200233562. This work order did not specify PMT requirements. The work order was
signed complete and the 'A' intake bay was returned to service on May 28. On May 29
the 'A' river water train was re-aligned, placing the 1WR-P-1A pump in service and
operable at 12:25 p.m. At 2:40 p.m., it was identified that PMT was not performed for
replacement of 1RW-57. The shift manager immediately declared 'A' train river water
inoperable and aligned the WR-P-1C to serve the 'A' river water train.
The inservice testing coordinator was contacted to identify post-maintenance testing
requirements.
- ASME [[]]
- IS [[]]
TC-5221 requires a forward flow and reverse-
closure verification for post-maintenance testing following a check valve replacement.
The PMT was accomplished satisfactorily on June 1.
The licensee's post-maintenance process failed to specify an adequate PMT for the
check valve replacement. The work order lacked any operational PMT and was the
apparent cause of the performance deficiency. The licensee documented this issue in
CR 09-59866.
Analysis: The failure to specify and perform a PMT after replacing a safety-related river water check-valve was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the
performance deficiency was not similar to the examples for minor deficiencies contained
in IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues". The finding was more than minor
in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B (Section 1-3), "Issue Screening," because the
failure to specify and perform a PMT is associated with the procedure quality
performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the associated
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
In accordance with IMC 0609.04 (Table 4a), "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and
Characterization of Findings," the finding was determined to be of very low safety
significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency
which resulted in a loss of function.
This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with
resources because the licensee did not have complete, accurate, and up-to-date
maintenance work procedures H.2(c).
Enforcement: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires, in part, that procedures for performing maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment
should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures,
documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. Contrary to this
requirement, in May 2009,
PMT after replacement
of check value 1RW-57 prior to returning the system to operable status. Because this
deficiency is considered to be of very low safety significance (Green), and was entered
into the corrective action program (CR 09-59866), this violation is being treated as an
Enclosure 5000334/2009003-01, Inadequate Post-Maintenance Testing Specified for Safety-Related River Water Check Valve)
1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities (71111.20)
.2 Unit 1 Refueling Outage (1R19)
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors observed selected Unit 1 outage activities to determine whether
shutdown safety functions (e.g. reactor decay heat removal, spent fool pool cooling,
and containment integrity) were properly maintained as required by TS and plant
procedures. The inspectors evaluated specific performance attributes including operator
performance, communications, and instrumentation accuracy. The inspectors reviewed
procedures and/or observed selected activities associated with the refueling outage. The
inspectors verified activities were performed in accordance with procedures and verified
required acceptance criteria were met. The inspectors also verified that conditions
adverse to quality identified during performance of selected outage activities were
identified by the licensee's corrective action program. Documents reviewed are listed in
the Attachment. The inspectors also evaluated the following activities: * Pre-outage shutdown safety review / defense-in-depth reports; * Pre-outage temperature and power coastdown; * Reactor plant shutdown and cooldown, including evaluation of cooldown rates; * Solid plant operations; * Configuration management, compliance with
- TS [[when taking equipment out of service; * Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were hung properly; * Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities; * Monitoring of decay heat removal and spent fuel cooling; * Fuel handling and activities that could affect reactivity; * Final containment walkdown and closeout inspection; * The digital video documenting the core reload and verification that fuel assembly placement was consistent with the reload map; * Subsequent shutdown and cooldown to replace 'A' reactor coolant pump seals after initial startup for physics testing; and * Final startup and power ascension to full power. During the refueling outage]]
FENOC identified a degradation of the containment liner
during planned containment inspections. The review of this issue is documented in a
separate report 05000334 / 2009006 (ADAMS ML091870328, on July 6, 2009). The
inspectors also verified that refueling outage activities were in compliance with TS during
the containment liner repair and retest. This issue was also reviewed for operability (section 1R15, 1R19) and event follow-up (section 4OA3.1)
The inspectors also observed selected management review activities associated with
restart readiness of Unit 1, following completion of the 1R19 refueling activities. The
restart readiness review meeting was accomplished as required by
OM-4010,
"Restart Readiness for Plant Outages" Rev. 4, during the week of May 11. The purpose
Enclosure of the review, in part, was to assure that the plant's material condition, programs/processes, and personnel were ready for startup and safe, reliable operation
after completion of outage activities.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope (8 samples: 1 isolation valve, 1 leak rate, 1 in-service testing and 5 routine.) The inspectors witnessed the performance of or reviewed test data for the eight following
Operation Surveillance Test (OST) and Maintenance Surveillance (MSP) packages. The reviews verified that the equipment or systems were being tested as required by
- UFS [[]]
AR, and procedural requirements. The inspectors also verified that the licensee
established proper test conditions, that no equipment pre-conditioning activities occurred,
and that acceptance criteria were met. * On March 26,
- 1OST [[-13.7B, Rev. 4, "Containment Depressurization System Operating Surveillance Test" [in-service testing]; * On April 14, 1]]
- CIA [[On-line Valve Relay Test" [isolation valve]; * On April 15, 1]]
- 1BVT -1.21.2, Rev. 15, "Trevitest Method for Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Check"; * On April 20, 1
- 1OST [[-15.1, Rev. 22, "[1]]
- CC [[-P-1A] Quarterly Test"; * On May 10,]]
OST-6.2A, Rev. 27, "Computer Generated Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance" [leak rate].
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 2.
- RADIAT [[]]
- ION [[]]
- SAFETY [[Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety []]
OS]
2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01) a. Inspection Scope (10 samples) During the period April 27 - 30, the inspector conducted the following activities to verify
that the licensee was properly implementing physical, administrative, and engineering
controls for access to locked high radiation areas, and other radiologically controlled
areas during the Unit 1 refueling outage. Implementation of these controls was reviewed
against the criteria contained in
TS, and the licensee's procedures.
Enclosure This inspection activity represents the completion of ten (10) samples relative to this inspection area. Plant Walkdown and Radiation Work Permits (RWP) Reviews * The inspector toured accessible radiologically controlled areas in the Unit 1 reactor building containment (RBC), primary auxiliary building, and radwaste building and with the assistance of a radiation protection technician, performed independent
radiation surveys of selected areas to confirm the accuracy of survey data, and the
adequacy of postings. Radiation protection technicians were questioned regarding
their knowledge of plant radiological conditions for selected jobs, and the associated
controls. * The inspector identified radiologically significant jobs being performed in the Unit
AP), and the
electronic dosimeter dose/dose rate set points, for the associated tasks, to determine
if the radiological controls were acceptable and if the set points were consistent with
plant policy. Jobs reviewed included steam generator sludge lancing (RWP 109-
4015,
remove/replace core exit thermocouples (RWP 109-4019, 09-1-26), and in-service
inspections (RWP 109-4023, AP 09-1-29). * For the jobs reviewed, the inspector determined that there were no significant dose gradients requiring relocation of dosimetry. The inspector determined that tele-
dosimetry was extensively used to monitor and control worker exposure for dose
intensive jobs. * There were no current radiation work permits for airborne radioactivity areas with the potential for individual worker internal exposures to exceed 50 mrem during the 1R19
outage. The inspector reviewed air sampling records for ongoing jobs to confirm that
airborne contamination was insignificant. * The inspector evaluated the effectiveness of contamination controls by reviewing personnel contamination event reports (and related condition reports), and observing
practices at various work locations in the RBC and at the step off pad. High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls * The inspector reviewed procedures related to the control of high dose rate, high radiation area and very high radiation areas. The inspector discussed these
procedures with Radiation Protection Supervision to determine that any changes
made to these procedures did not reduce safety measures. * Keys to locked high radiation areas (LHRA) located in Unit 1 were inventoried, and accessible
- LH [[]]
RAs were verified to be properly secured and posted during plant tours. * The inspector reviewed the preparations made for various potentially high dose rate jobs including removal of core exit thermocouples, and insulation modifications made
to various systems in the RBC. Included in this review were evaluating the
effectiveness of contamination control measures, source term controls, and use of
temporary shielding.
Enclosure Radiation Worker and Radiation Protection Technician Performance * During tours of radiologically controlled areas in the Unit 1 RBC, the inspector questioned radiation workers and radiation protection technicians regarding the
radiological conditions at the work site and the radiological controls that applied to
their task. Additionally, radiologically-related condition reports, including dose/dose
rate alarm reports, were reviewed to evaluate if the incidents were caused by
repetitive radiation worker or technician errors and to determine if an observable
pattern traceable to a similar cause was evident. * The inspector attended the pre-job
- RWP briefings for a spent resin transfer, and for steam generator foreign object search and retrieval (
FOSAR) to determine if workers
were properly informed, including discussions of past operating experiences,
identification of the radiological conditions associated with their tasks, electronic
dosimetry dose/dose rate set points, and dose mitigation measures. Problem Identification and Resolution * The inspectors evaluated the licensee's program for assuring that access controls to radiologically significant areas were effective and properly implemented by reviewing
various Nuclear Oversight Field Observation Reports, radiation protection supervisory
daily logs, and relevant condition reports. The inspector determined if problems were
identified in a timely manner, that an extent of condition and cause evaluation were
performed when appropriate, previous radiation surveys remained valid, and
corrective actions were appropriate to preclude repetitive problems.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)
a. Inspection Scope (9 samples) During the period April 27 - 30, the inspector conducted the following activities to verify
that the licensee was properly implementing operational, engineering, and administrative
controls to maintain personnel exposure as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) for
activities performed in the 1R19 refueling outage. Implementation of these controls was
reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, and the licensee's procedures.
This inspection activity represents the completion of nine (9) samples relative to this
inspection area. Radiological Work Planning * The inspector reviewed pertinent information regarding site cumulative exposure history, current exposure trends, and the ongoing exposure challenges for the Unit 1
outage. The inspector reviewed the 1R19 Outage
- ALA [[]]
RA Plan. * The inspector reviewed the exposure status for tasks performed during the Unit 1 outage and compared actual exposure with forecasted estimates contained in
Enclosure various project
- ALA [[]]
RA reviews for those jobs whose actual dose approached 75% of the forecasted
estimate. Outage jobs reviewed included scaffolding installation (AP 09-1-35),
insulation modifications (AP 09-01-33), reactor disassembly/reassembly (AP 09-1-
25), routine valve work (AP 09-1-41), and replacing incore detectors (AP 09-1-19). * The inspector evaluated the departmental interfaces between radiation protection, operations, maintenance crafts, and engineering to identify missing
- ALA [[]]
RA program
elements and interface problems. The evaluation was accomplished by interviewing
site staff, reviewing outage Work-in-Progress reviews, attending a Station
- ALA [[]]
SAC meeting
addressed planning for cutting/replacing a reactor coolant drain line (RC-41), and
revising the exposure estimate for insulation modifications. Verification of Dose Estimates * The inspector reviewed the assumptions and basis for the 1R19 outage
- ALA [[]]
RA plan. The inspector also reviewed the revisions made to various outage project dose
estimates due to emergent work; e.g., insulation modifications (RWP 109-4048),
authorized by the Station
- ALA [[]]
RA Committee. * The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures associated with monitoring and re-evaluating dose estimates when the forecasted cumulative exposure for tasks was
approached and the implementation of these procedures during the outage. The
inspector reviewed the exposures for the ten (10) workers who received the highest
doses to confirm that no individual exceeded any regulatory limit. Job Site Inspections * The inspector reviewed the
CH-I-1A to a disposal container (RWP 109-0507,AP 09-1-58, procedure 1/2 -HPP-
3.03.007), and attended the pre-job
- ALA [[]]
RA briefing. The inspector also reviewed the
controls used for manually transferring a spent filter (CH-FL-2) to a storage drum
(RWP 109-1020,
OM-18.4A.E), the trouble shooting plan
for removing the filter when it became disengaged from the transfer grapple, and the
post-job debrief.
- During tours of the
FOSAR (RWP 109-4015), eddy current testing on the recirculation
spray heat exchanger (RWP 109-4043), valve repairs, and de-mobilization activities. Workers were questioned regarding their knowledge of job site radiological
conditions and
- ALA [[]]
- RA measures applied to their tasks. Source Term Reduction and Control * The inspector reviewed the status and historical trends for the Unit 1 source term. Through review of survey maps and interviews with the Senior Nuclear Specialist-
- ALA [[]]
RA, the inspector evaluated recent source term measurements and control
strategies. Specific strategies being employed included use of macro-porous clean
Enclosure up resin, zinc addition, increased filtration flow, enhanced chemistry controls, system flushes, and temporary shielding. Declared Pregnant Workers * The inspector reviewed the procedural controls for managing declared pregnant workers (DPW) and determined that no DPW was employed during the Unit 1
outage. Problem Identification and Resolution * The inspector reviewed elements of the licensee's corrective action program related to implementing the
- ALA [[]]
RA program to determine if problems were being entered
into the program for timely resolution. Condition reports related to programmatic
dose challenges, personnel contaminations, and the effectiveness in predicting and
controlling worker exposure were reviewed.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 4.
- OTHER [[]]
ACTIVITIES [OA]
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
a. Inspection Scope (6 samples total) The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for Performance Indicators (PI) listed below
for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to verify accuracy of the data recorded from April 2007 through
June 2009. The inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Reports, condition reports, portions
of various plant operating logs and reports, and PI data developed from monthly
operating reports. Methods for compiling and reporting the
- PI s were discussed with cognizant engineering and licensing personnel. To verify the accuracy of the
PI data
reported during this period, PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy
Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, were
used for each data element.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems (2 samples) * Unit 1 and 2 Safety System Functional Failure [MS05]
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity (4 samples) * Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Coolant System Activity [BI01] * Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate [BI02] b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure 4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 - 2 samples total)
.1 Daily Review of Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"
and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into
- FEN [[]]
OC's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing
summary lists of each
FENOC's
computerized CR database.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Annual Sample: Review of Final Cause and Corrective Actions of Inadvertent Unlatch of a Control Rod Drive Shaft during Refueling 2R13
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors selected
PI&R)
sample for a detailed follow-up review. CR 08-39693 documented on May 2, 2008, an
inadvertent unlatching of a control rod drive shaft during its transfer from its storage
location to its core location by vendor personnel after planned split pin replacements.
The tool used in the drive shaft installation was specific to the split pin replacement
project. Review of the initial event is documented in report 05000412 / 2008003.
The inspectors reviewed the vendor apparent cause and assessed
- FEN [[]]
OC's cause
analysis, extent of condition, operability determination, and prioritization and timeliness of corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Documents reviewed for this inspection are
located in the Attachment.
b. Findings and Observations No findings of significance were identified.
The inspectors determined that
- FEN [[]]
OC properly evaluated the degraded condition and
implemented appropriate immediate and long term corrective actions. The CR was
complete and included cause evaluations by
- FEN [[]]
OC and the vendor. No human
performance deficiencies were noted. It was determined that the handing tool is not fail-
safe and can unlatch if the drive shaft weight is relieved by interference with a guide
card. The licensee discontinued use of the vendor's special tool during the issue and
has revised applicable procedures to prevent future use.
.3 Annual Sample: Review of Submerged Safety Related Cables a. Inspection Scope (1 sample)
Enclosure The inspectors selected
PI&R sample for a detailed follow-up review. CR 08-42380 documented the identification of safety related cables found submerged in
water on June 25, 2008 for an indefinite period of time. The issue was identified during
routine manhole inspections. The inspectors assessed
- FEN [[]]
OC's problem identification
threshold, operability determination, extent of condition review, and the prioritization and timeliness of corrective actions to determine whether
- FEN [[]]
OC was appropriately
identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these issues and
whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate to prevent
recurrence. Additionally, the inspectors observed manhole and cable inspections on
June 9-10, 2009 and interviewed engineering personnel. The inspectors reviewed the
specification, testing and long term moisture resistance qualification report for the subject
cables. Specific documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this report.
b. Findings and Observations Introduction: The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of
- FEN [[]]
OC did not maintain safety related cables in an environment for which they were designed. The licensee failed to
demonstrate that the cables are qualified for continuous submerged conditions, and that
they will remain operable, although the cables are presently operable.
Description: Safety related and non-safety related power and control cables may be submerged in water on a continuous basis. The affected cables included cables from
the Unit 1 River Water and Unit 2 Service Water from the Main Intake Structure carrying
power to the Class 1E load through electrical manholes
EMH-8B.
A review of the licensing basis and licensee documentation reveals the cables are
selected and purchased for dry, wet, and immersed in water conditions. The inspectors
determined, after discussions with additional NRC specialists, that this does not include
continuous submerged conditions. The inspectors reviewed the specifications used to
purchase these cables and noted that the subject cables are not designed for continuous
submergance.
The environmental conditions in the manholes can be dry, wet, and immersed in water.
A review of the licensee's underground cable duct drawings showed that the manholes
are constructed below grade and expected to accumulate water. However, the cables
can become continuously submerged in water if the accumulation is not managed or
manhole degraded conditions not effectively corrected. Presently, the licensee relies on
cable penetration seal integrity and manual dewatering of the manholes annually (for
1EMH-8A and 8B only) or biennially to manage water accumulation. The most recent
inspection (June 9, 2009) of manholes identified approximately 2 feet of water in 1EMH-
8A and 11 feet of water in 1EMH-8B; conditions of apparent continuous submergence for
manhole 1EMH-8B cables. The licensee failed to ensure that the cables were
maintained in a design condition for the anticipated environmental conditions by not
thoroughly evaluating the effect of continuous cable submergence apparent in CRs
09-60591; 08-43594; 08-42380; 06-6305; 06-04144; 04-03545; 02-02348 and evaluating
the effectiveness of prior corrective actions.
The licensee had previously documented an engineering evaluation of cable suitability to submerged conditions (CR 02-02348, March 21, 2002) to address NRC Information
Notice 2002-12, Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables. The licensee concluded
Enclosure that based on cable construction, qualification testing performed, and operational performance, the cables in manholes 1EMH-8A and 8B were acceptable. This
evaluation had also been the basis for subsequent evaluations for as-found manhole
conditions. Corrective actions were taken to annually inspect and dewater the manholes
and address as-found degraded conditions, however the licensee has not adequately
addressed the apparent continuous submergence of safety related cables in the subject
manholes.
The licensee has pumped down water from the manholes to minimize water, and
inspected the cables, seals, and tray supports. An immediate operability assessment was also performed for as found conditions and CRs written (09-60316; 09-60445;
09-60591). The inspectors questioned the licensee on the need to re-evaluate the
frequency of manhole inspections, based on as-found conditions.
A review of the licensee's response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01, "Inaccessible or
Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause
Plant Transients," did not identify any past cable failures at Beaver Valley.
Analysis: Failure to maintain safety related cables in an environment for which they were designed is considered a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the
performance deficiency was not similar to the examples for minor deficiencies contained
in IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues". The finding was more than minor
in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B (Section 1-3), "Issue Screening," because if
left uncorrected, the performance deficiency has the potential to lead to a more
significant safety concern. Traditional enforcement does not apply since there were no
actual safety consequences or potential for impacting the NRC's regulatory function, and
the finding did not have willful aspects.
In accordance with IMC 0609.04 (Table 4a), "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and
Characterization of Findings," the finding was determined to be of very low safety
significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency
which resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for
greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, did not represent an actual
loss of safety function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment
designated as risk-significant for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and was not potentially risk
significant due to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event. The performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem
Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, because the licensee did not
thoroughly evaluate problems such as the resolutions, address causes, and evaluate the
effectiveness of corrective actions [P.1 (c)].
Enforcement: Title
III, "Design Control," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to ensure that applicable regulatory
requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings,
procedures, and instructions. Contrary to the above,
- FEN [[]]
OC did not maintain safety
related cables in an environment for which they were designed. The issue was entered
into the licensee's corrective action program (CR 09-60496) to initiate a review of the
current manhole and cable monitoring programs, and to initiate long-term corrective
actions. Because this finding was of very low safety significance, and it was entered into
Enclosure the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as an
NCV 05000334, 412/2009003-02, Continuously Submerged Cables Design Deficiency) 4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153 - 7 samples total)
.1 Plant Event Review a. Inspection Scope (6 samples) For the plant events below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant parameters,
reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating systems.
The inspectors communicated the plant events to regional personnel and compared the
event details with criteria contained in IMC 0309, "Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for
Reactors," for consideration of additional reactive inspection activities. The inspectors
reviewed
- FEN [[]]
OC's follow-up actions related to the events to assure that appropriate
corrective actions were implemented commensurate with their safety significance.
Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 1: On April 20, 2009, main feedwater isolation (P14 actuation on high 'B' steam generator water level) during plant shutdown for refueling outage 1R19.
The high steam generator water level was caused by a failed main feedwater
bypass regulating valve (1FW-489) controller, causing it to inadvertently fully
open. Operators responded appropriately and mitigating systems performed as
designed. The licensee documented this issue in CR 09-57474. This issue was
also reviewed under
ESS FY2009-02, "Negative Trend and Recurring
Events Involving Feedwater Systems;" * Unit 1: On April 20, 2009, invalid actuation of the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (FW-P-2) during plant shutdown for refueling outage 1R19. An apparent
failed solid state protection relay caused one of two steam admission valves (TV-
1MS-105B) to open, causing the pump to inject. The auxiliary feedwater flow control system responded appropriately to mitigate the effect on plant cooldown.
The licensee documented this issue in CR 09-57499. This issue was also
reviewed under
ESS FY2009-02, "Negative Trend and Recurring Events
Involving Feedwater Systems;" * Unit 1: On April 23, 2009, identification of a degraded containment liner plate during a planned visual inspection in refueling outage 1R19. The degradation
was repaired and declared operable on May 7, 2009. The licensee documented
this issue in CRs 09-57589 and 09-57762. Also see section 1R08, "Inservice
Inspection." This issue is documented in NRC Inspection Report
05000334/2009006 (ADAMS ML091870328, on July 6, 2009); * Unit 1: On April 26, 2009, identification of two circumferential ultrasonic examination indications on base material of a 2 inch reactor coolant loop drain
line (BV-1RC-41) on the 'A' loop hot leg. The drain line material was replaced
and returned to service. Also see section 1R08, "Inservice Inspection." The
licensee documented this issue in CR 09-58004;
Enclosure * Unit 1: On May 6, 2009, inadvertent train 'A' safety injection signal was generated, while in mode 5, due to a faulty safety injection block switch.
Operators responded appropriately and no safety injection actually occurred.
Faulty switches were replaced. The licensee documented this issue in CR 09-
58765; and * Unit 1 and Unit 2: On June 18, 2009, at 9:39 p.m., a dual-unit Unusual Event (UE) was declared in response to a fire alarm and CO2 system actuation in the
Emergency Response Facility (ERF) substation. The licensee entered emergency action level (EAL) 4.1. The onsite fire brigade responded and no fire
was discovered, and determined there was a spurious actuation of the CO2
system. The UE was terminated at 10:36 p.m. The licensee is still investigating
the cause, but is preliminarily attributed to a fire protection panel fault. The
licensee documented this issue in CR 09-60763.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) (1 sample) (Closed) LER 05000334/2009-001-00: Surveillance Test Inadvertently Violates Technical Specification 3.6.1 for Containment Operability.
During a planned surveillance flow test on one of two outside recirculation spray system (RSS) pumps while in Mode 1, the suction and discharge containment isolation valves on
the RSS train of piping were closed, but not de-energized. These valves receive an
auto-open signal during a phase 'B' containment isolation. After the test, when the pump
casing drain valve was opened to drain the system to restore to a normal configuration,
the operations crew realized that the containment isolation valves needed to be de-
energized in order to maintain containment operability. This condition existed in excess of seven hours, twice, during filling and draining sequences. This is contrary to the requirement in TS 3.6.1, "Containment". The crew immediately de-energized the
affected valves. The inspectors reviewed the LER, verified the appropriateness of corrective actions and
extent of condition reviews, interviewed engineers and licensed operators, and
completed a plant walkdown with
- FEN [[]]
OC engineers to identify the pump casing drain
valve. Corrective actions include revising affected procedures to properly include TS
3.6.1. The enforcement aspects of the violation are discussed in Section 4OA7,
Licensee Identified Violations. This
OA5 Other Activities .1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
a. Inspection Scope During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted the following observations of
security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with
Enclosure licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working
hours. Specific examples include: * Observed operations within the central and secondary alarm stations; * Toured selected security towers and security officer response posts; * Observed security force shift turnover activities; and * Reviewed security logs and corrective action program documents which discussed security issues.
These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an
integral part of the inspectors' normal plant status review and inspection activities.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 TI 2515/172, Reactor Coolant System Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds (Unit 1)
a. Inspection Scope Temporary Instruction, TI 2515/172 provides for confirmation that owners of pressurized-
water reactors (PWRs) have implemented the industry guidelines of the Materials
Reliability Program (MRP) -139 regarding nondestructive examination and evaluation of certain dissimilar metal (DM) welds in reactor coolant systems containing Alloy
600/82/182. The TI requires documentation of specific questions in an inspection report.
The questions and responses were previously documented in NRC Inspection Report
05000334, 412/2008003, Attachment
- B. The hot and cold leg nozzle-to-safe end dissimilar metal (DM) welds of the "A" S/G were examined during this 1st period inspection interval (1R19 outage). These welds were Risk-Informed
- ISI [[]]
UT examined during 1R19. During the S/G replacement project 1R17,
these particular nozzle welds were replaced with Alloy 52 and are resistant to stress-
corrosion cracking and are considered Category "A" welds per MRP-139, Revision 1, and
therefore the required examinations are per
- XI. [[]]
XI, Table
IWB-2500-1, B5.70 requires a volumetric and surface exam once per interval of the
dissimilar metal welds for the S/G cold and hot leg nozzle-to-safe end welds. The
Risk-Informed examination of these
UT examination (no surface
exam) since these welds were selected in a particular piping segment per the Risk-
Informed,
ASME Section XI Code exam. The inspector
reviewed the manual UT examination data records of the "A" S/G cold and hot leg
nozzle-to-safe-end
RC-E-1A-N11 and RC-E-1A-N12.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Enclosure .1 Access Control /
- ALA [[]]
RA Planning and Control The inspector presented the inspection results of 2S01 and 2S02 to Mr. Kevin Ostrowski,
Director of Site Operations, and other members of
- FEN [[]]
OC staff, at the conclusion of the
inspection on April 30, 2009. No proprietary information is presented in this report.
.2 Inservice Inspection The inspector presented the inspection results 1R08 to Mr. Kevin Ostrowski, Director of
Site Operations, and other members of the
inspection at an exit meeting on May 7, 2009. Some proprietary information was
reviewed during this inspection and was either returned or properly destroyed, but no
proprietary information is presented in this report.
.3 Problem Identification and Resolution Submerged Cable Focus Sample The inspectors presented the inspection results Mr. Peter Sena, Beaver Valley Site Vice
President, and other members of
- FEN [[]]
OC staff, at the conclusion of the inspection on
June 11, 2009. No proprietary information is presented in this report.
.4 Quarterly Exit Meeting Summary On July 22, the inspectors presented the normal baseline inspection results to Mr. Ray
Lieb, Director of Site Operations, and other members of the
- FEN [[]]
OC staff. The
inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not retained at the conclusion of
the inspection period. 4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the
licensee and is a violation of
VI of
the
- NCV. * Technical Specification 3.6.1, "Containment," requires that containment operability be maintained in Mode 1, restored within one hour, or the reactor be shutdown to Mode 3 within six hours. Contrary to this requirement,
FENOC failed
to maintain containment operability or restore containment operability in the allowed time. Specifically,
- FEN [[]]
RS-156B were closed and de-energized prior to
opening the
CR 09-56250. The finding was more than
minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the
barrier integrity cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring
containment boundary preservation under postulated design-basis accident
scenarios. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety
significance (Green), based on IMC 0609, Appendix H, Table 4.1 because this is
a Type B finding and the affected pipe size is less than 2 inches in diameter.
- ATTACH [[]]
- MENT [[:]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- ATION [[]]
- KEY [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
CONTACT Licensee personnel
G. Alberti Steam Generator Program Owner
S. Baker Site, Radiation Protection Manager
R. Bologna Plant Engineering, Manager
L. Freeland Director Performance Improvement
J. Freund Supervisor, Rad Operations Support
NDE Level III
W. Klinko, Diesel System Engineer
E. Lauck System Engineer
R. Lubert Electrical I&C/Plant Engineering, Supervisor
C. Miller Senior Radiation Protection Technician
J. Miller Site Fire Marshall
B. Murtagh Design, Supervisor
P. Sena Site Vice President
B. Sepelak Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
D. Schwer Manager, Work Management
G. Storolis Unit 2 Shift Manager
J. Tweddell License Renewal
Other Personnel
NRC Region I
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ITEMS [[]]
- AND [[]]
- DISCUS [[]]
SED Open/Closed
05000334 / 2009003-01 NCV Inadequate Post-Maintenance Testing Specified for Safety-Related River Water Check Valve. (Section 1R19)
05000334, 412 / 2009003-02
OA2.3)
Attachment Closed
05000334 / 2009001-00 LER Surveillance test Inadvertently Violates Technical Specification 3.6.1 for Containment Operability. (Section
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
- NTS [[]]
- REVIEW [[]]
ED Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures 1/2OM-53C.4A.35.1, Rev. 4, "Degraded Grid,"
OP-1007, Rev. 5, "Risk Determination,"
Condition Reports 09-60033 09-60106
Work Orders 200150639
200316056
200317926
200319210
200319961
200320671
Miscellaneous
PA-09-02, Summer Readiness PMS not Completed by June 1st
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures 1DBD-24, Design Basis Document for Feedwater System
2OST-30.4, Service Water System A Header Valve Test
2DBD-30, Design Basis Document for Service Water System
2OM-30.4.D, Spare Service Water Pump Startup
Drawings 10080-RM-0411-001, Rev. 15, "Valve Oper No. Diagram Low/High Head Safety Injection
08700-RM-0436-001, Rev. 11, "Valve Oper No. Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start System" 8700-RM-0436-002, Rev. 9, "Valve Oper No. Diagram Emergency Diesel Gen. Fuel Oil System"
10080-RM-430-1,
- VO [[]]
ND Service Water Supply & Distribution
10080-RM-430-2,
- VO [[]]
ND Service Water Primary Cooling
10080-RM-430-3,
- VO [[]]
ND Service Water Primary Cooling
Attachment Section 1R05: Fire Protection Procedures 1OST-33.21, Containment Penetrations Area Fire Protection Test
Condition Reports 02-11507 08-49244 09-57425* 09-57811 09-60284 09-60911
09-60761 09-60762
Miscellaneous Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report; RTL# A1.080J, Addendum 28
- BV [[]]
- BV [[]]
PS Event Logs, dated June 18, 2009
Section 1R06: Flood Protection Documents reviewed are listed in section
- NDE -VT-513, Visual Examination of the Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Instrumentation (BMI) Nozzles, Rev.
ECP-2, Steam Generator Examination Program, Rev. 21
1&2
BVPS ISI Ten-Year Plans, Rev. 8
1&2
ER-2001, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program, Rev. 7
Unit 1/2,
- NDE [[]]
- PWSCC Susceptibility Assessment of the Alloy 600 and Alloy 82/182 Components in Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2, dated December 2003
CDME-07-24, BV Unit 1 Steam Generator Degradation Assessment 1R18 Refueling Outage, Rev.1
Attachment Work Orders 200367661 200366975 200367239 200367242
Condition Reports 07-25709 09-52089 09-54434 09-57589 09-57762 09-57665
09-57804 09-58004 09-58156
Section 1R12: Maintenance Rule Implementation Procedures 1OST-15.1, Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water Pump Operating Surveillance Test Condition Reports 07-27037 09-60127 09-59359
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control Calculations 8700-DMC-1669, Rev. 1, Add. 1, "Time to RCS Boiling Calculation for the Pre-outage Shutdown Defense-in-Depth Report."
Procedures
OP-1007, Rev. 5, "Risk Determination"
1/2-ADM-2033, "Risk Management Program"
Work Orders
Condition Reports 09-57463 09-58491 09-58771 09-58775 09-58815
Other 1R19 Defense-In-Depth review for April 21, 2009
Unit 1 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary for the week of June 15, Revs. 0 & 2
Unit 2 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary for the week of June 15, Revs. 0 & 2
Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations Calculations 8700-UR(B)-511
10080-UR(B)-510
241-UR(B)-427 Procedures 1OST-24.15B "Auxiliary Feedwater System Solid State Protection System Testing Train B"
Condition Reports 04-05251
06-01122
09-57966
09-58000
09-58798
09-59713
Attachment Miscellaneous Event Notification 45015, dated April 23, 2009
Engineering Change 09-0365-01, Repair Containment Liner Plate Hole
BV1-IWE-2-2, dated April 28, 2009
Mode Hold Resolutions for 09-57589, 09-57762
- NO [[]]
- NUR [[]]
EG-1522, Assessment of Inservice Conditions of Safety-Related Nuclear Plant Structures
RIS 2009-02, Rev. 1, "Use of Containment Atmosphere Gaseous Radioactivity Monitors for
Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Equipment at Nuclear Power Reactors"
- TS [[]]
TF-513
WO 200124471, 200367013, 200367242
Unit 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications
Condition Reports 09-57390
Regulatory Applicability Determination and 10 CFR 50.59 Screens 09-01453 09-0174
Procedures 1OM-52.4.R.1.F, Station Shutdown from 100% Power to Mode 5.
Drawings 8700-6.24-158 sheet1, Rev. 7
8700-6.24-158 sheet 8, Rev. 2
8700-6.24-158, sheet 9, Rev. 2
8700-RM-0430-001, Rev 30
8700-RM-407-1, Rev. 28
8700-2.19-0036, Rev. A
Work Orders 200359549 200359555 200313752 200313753
Miscellaneous
EA-5826, TER Evaluation Report of the Overpressure protection System for the Beaver
Valley Power Station Unit 1, dated March 1982.
Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing
Procedures
AN, Rev. 2, "Diesel Generator No. 2 Fast Start"
Work Orders 200124471 200308605 200284373 200296714 200296713
200367242 200369010 200233562
Attachment Condition Reports 09-57435 09-57813 09-58940
Miscellanous Section 1R20: Refueling and Outage Activities
Procedures
- 1BVT -1.1.1, Rev. 4, "Rod Position Indication System Calibration Verification and Control Rod Drop Test" 1
AO, Rev. 20, "Isolating and Draining a Reactor Coolant Loop"
1OM-20.4E, Rev. 31, "Draining The Refueling Cavity"
1OM-50.4D, Rev. 49, "Reactor Startup From Mode 3 to Mode 2"
RCS Cooldown Determination Tables. 1OST-47.2B, Rev. 7, "Containment Closeout Inspection"
1OST-49.2, Rev. 22, "Shutdown Margin Calculation (Plant Shutdown) (Updated for Cycle 19)"
1MSP-9.04-M, Rev. 8, "Containment Sump Inspection"
1RP-3.2, Issue 0, Rev. 3, "Fuel Transfer System"
1RP-3.26, Rev. 7, "Refueling Procedure Upper Internals Assembly Installation"
1RP-3.28, Rev. 4, "Lower Internals Assembly Removal / Installation"
1RST-2.1, Rev. 11, "Initial Approach to Criticality After Refueling"
WM-5003, Rev. 1, "Rigging, Lifting, and Load Handling"
Drawings 8700-02.102-0050, Rev. A, "General Arrangement Transfer System"
Cable Drive Installation, Transfer System -
- BV [[]]
PS1, Rev. 1
Work Orders Repetitive Task 10001 99-0201123-000 200285260 600426477
Miscellaneous 1R19 Outage Handbook
Defense-In-Depth Report, 1R19, dated April 6, 2009 and updated May 16, 2009
Operating Experience Handbook for
BV1 and BV2 Tave / Power Coastdown, Master Package
8700-02.102-0010,
- BV [[]]
PS-1 Shift Operating / Refueling Logs dated April 19 - May 22, 2009
- NUR [[]]
EG-0612
Primavera Schedule, 1R19
Attachment Condition Reports 09-57474
09-57499
09-57762
09-57106
09-57589
09-59677
09-59702
09-60367
09-60572
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing Procedures
- 1BVT [[-2.15.1, Rev. 5, " Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water Pumps [1]]
CC-P-1A], [1CC-P-1B], [1CC-P-1C] Performance Curve Development"
Condition Reports 09-56250 09-57623 09-60127
Work Orders & Notifications
- NO [[]]
TF 600537878
Miscellaneous Unit 1 Shift Operating Logs dated March 26 - 28, 2009
Sections
- ALA [[]]
RA Planning and Controls
Procedures 1/2-ADM-1601, Rev 15, Radiation Protection Standards
1/2-ADM-1611, Rev 9, Radiation Protection Administrative Guide
1/2-ADM-1621, Rev 3,
- ALA [[]]
RA Program
1/2-ADM-1630, Rev 10, Radiation Worker Practices
1/2-ADM-1631, Rev 5, Exposure Control
1/2-HPP-3.02.004, Rev 4, Area Posting
1/2-HPP-3.03.007, Rev 3, Transfer of Highly Radioactive Material from Plant Systems to Solid Waste 1/2-HPP-3.04.002, Rev 5, Bioassay Administration
1/2-HPP-3.05.001, Rev 4, Exposure Authorization
1/2-HPP-3.07.002, Rev 5, Radiation Survey Methods
1/2-HPP-3.07.013, Rev 3, Barrier Checks
1/2-HPP-3.08.001, Rev 8, Radiological Work Permit
1/2-HPP-3.08.003, Rev 10, Radiation Barrier Key Control
1/2-HPP-3.08.005, Rev 4,
- ALA [[]]
RA Review Program
1/2-HPP-3.08.006, Rev 1, Shielding
RP-0013, Rev 2, Radiation Protection Risk Assessment Process
Attachment
- ALA [[]]
- ALA [[]]
WM-7021, Rev 1, Radiological Postings, Labeling, and Markings
1/2-OM-18.4A.E, Rev 6, Removal of Spent Filter Cartridge From Filter Transfer Cask Nuclear Oversight Field Observation Reports Week of 4/20-26/2009 Condition Reports 09-58093 09-58195 09-58182 09-58115 09-58029 09-58162
09-58104 09-58043 09-58042 09-57896 09-57877 09-57843
09-57918 09-57701 09-57747 09-57797 09-57790 09-57810
09-57914 09-57901 09-55024 09-56516 09-56588 09-57570
09-57882
- ALA [[]]
RA Plans & related Work-in-Progress /Post-Job Reviews 09-01-35, Permanent Scaffolding
09-01-33, Insulation Modifications (except Cavity Work)
09-01-25, Reactor Disassembly
09-01-41, Routine Valve Work
09-01-19, Replace/Dispose of Incore Detectors
09-01-24, Secondary Side Steam Generator Sludge Lancing/FOSAR
09-01-58, Flush/Change Resin
09-01-11, Changeout/Replace
FL-2 Filter
09-01-33, Insulation Removal/Replacement Modification
09-01-26, Remove/Replace Incore Detectors
09-01-29, In-Service Inspections
09-01-31, Scaffolding
- ALA [[]]
RA Committee Meeting Minutes Meeting Nos. 09-01m/s, 09-02 m/s, 09-03 m/s, 09-04m/s, 09-05 m/s, 09-06 m, 09-07 m,
09-08 m, 09-09 m (m-manager's, s-subcommittee) Miscellaneous
- EP [[]]
RI Standard Radiation Monitoring Program - Unit 1 Source Term Measurements
High Dose Individuals for 2009
Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Reports for 2009 Section
NORM-ER-3112, Rev. 1, Cable Monitoring
1/2-PMP-E-75-001, 4160 Rev. 8, VAC Motor Inspection and Lubrication
1/2-75-MANHOLE-1E, Rev. 4, Inspection of Manholes for Water Induced Damage Completed Procedures 1/2-PMP-E-75-001, 4160 VAC Motor Inspection and Lubrication, Rev. 8 dated 12/27/07
1/2-PMP-E-75-001, 4160 VAC Motor Inspection and Lubrication, Rev. 8 dated 02/08/08
Attachment 1/2-PMP-E-75-001,
PMP-E-75-001, 4160 VAC Motor Inspection and Lubrication, Rev. 8 dated 07/01/08
1/2-PMP-E-75-001, 4160 VAC Motor Inspection and Lubrication, Rev. 8 dated 05/19/08
1/2-PMP-E-75-001, 4160 VAC Motor Inspection and Lubrication, Rev. 8 dated 02/24/08
1/2-75-MANHOLE-1E, Inspection of Manholes for Water Induced Damage, Rev. 4 dated 09/26/06 1/2-75-MANHOLE-1E, Inspection of Manholes for Water Induced Damage, Rev. 4 dated 11/07/08
Miscellaneous:
- BV [[]]
UFSAR Unit 1, Rev. 20
Kerite Letter dated December 5, 1991
Kerite Letter dated February 18, 2009
- GL 2007-01, Inaccessible of Underground Power Cable Failures That Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients
IEEE Guide for Field Testing of Shielded Power Cable Systems Using Very Low Frequency (VLF) Westinghouse Issue Report 08-124-M001
Condition Reports: 02-02302
2-02348
06-04144
06-06305
08-39693
08-42380
08-43594
09-60316
09-60387
Section 4OA3: Event Response
Condition Reports 09-57474
09-58477
09-58873
09-58900
09-58905
09-59155
09-60763
09-60768
Procedures 1/2-EPP-IP-1.1, Rev. 43, "Notifications", Att B. Unusual Event - Control Room
1/2-EPP-IP-1.2, Rev. 35, "Unusual Event"
1/2-EPP-IP-1.1.F01, Nuclear Power Plant Initial Notification Form, dated June 18, 2009
ESF Signal Reset By Alternate Method"
Attachment Work Orders 200366604
200306521
200366962
200366752
200351634
200306527
200390431
Event Notification 45000, dated April 20, 2009
45001, dated April 20, 2009
45001 (retraction), dated May 12, 2009
45015, dated April 23, 2009
45022, dated April 26, 2009
45099, dated May 28, 2009
45143, dated June 18, 2009
Miscellaneous:
- SI Signal on May 6, 2009 Mode Hold Resolutions for CRs 09-57499, 09-57474, 09-57762, 09-57589, 09-58004
ESS 2009-02, "Negative Trend and Recurring Events Involving Feedwater Systems"
Shift Logs dated, June 18, 2009
Event Timeline, June 18, 2009
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ACRONY [[]]
- ALA [[]]
- AP [[]]
- AS [[]]
- BA [[]]
- BV [[]]
PS Beaver Valley Power Station
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR Condition Report(s)
DM Dissimilar Metal
DPW Declared Pregnant Workers
- FEN [[]]
- FOS [[]]
AR Foreign Object Search and Retrieval
IOD Immediate Operability Determinations
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
IP Inspection Procedure
ISI Inservice Inspection
LCO Limiting Conditions for Operations
Attachment
LHRA Locked High Radiation Area
MR Maintenance Rule
MRP Materials Reliability Program
MSP Maintenance Surveillance Package
MT Magnetic Particle Testing
NDE Non-Destructive Examination
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OST Operations Surveillance Test
PI Performance Indicator
PI&R Problem Identification and Resolution
PMT Post Maintenance Testing
POD Prompt Operability Determinations
PT Penetrant Testing
PWR Pressurized-Water Reactor
RBC Reactor Building Containment
RSS Recirculation Spray System
ALARA Committee
SSC Structures, Systems, and Components
TS Technical Specification
- UFS [[]]
AR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
UT Ultrasonic Testing