ML19347B095

LER 80-067/03L-0:on 800829,while in Mode 5,main Steam Isolation Bypass Valve MS101A Failed.Caused by Failed Solenoid Valve Operator SV101-1.Solenoid Replaced

ML19347B095
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	09/26/1980
From:	Isley T TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML19347B094	List: ML19347B093 ML19347B095
References
LER-80-067-03L, LER-80-67-3L, NUDOCS 8010010513
Download: ML19347B095 (2)

Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULAT2RY COMMISSION N1tC FoRW 366 (7 77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFoRMATION)

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REPORT OATE 7 8 60 61 OOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROB ABLE CONSEQUENCES h a 2 l (NP-33-80-80) On 8/29/80 at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br />, operations personnel experienced a failure of l l

f5 TT1 l the Main Steam Isolation Bypass Valve MS101A. The bypass valve is normally closed l and was f ailed in the closed position. The valve was declared inoperable.

Being in l 0 4 There was l I O l s) l Mode 5, the station did not enter the action statement of T.S. 3.7.1.5.

Q E l no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The valve was l 0 7 l failed in its safety actuated position, Closed. This is being reported to document a j l

iO Ie I l component failure. 80 S BC E COMPONENT CODE SUSCOdE SU E E CODE Q7

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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h l

y l The cause of the failed bypass valve was its failed solenoid valve operator SV101-1.

l lilijl Further checking showed that the burned coil in the solenoid was AC and was in a DC l

TTTT'l I circuit. Although functional, this use of an AC coil in a DC circuit reduces Under Facility Change Request 80-214, the failed solenoid was i

, 3 l the life of the coil.

l l j 4 l l replaced with a qualified DC solenoid valve. 80 7 8 9 OTHIR ST ATUS ISCO Y DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION STA S  % POWER 1 5 (_!ljh l 0 l 0 l 0 l@l NA l l C l@l Safety Features Actuation System Reset Vhrif,

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ACTivlTY CO0 RENT LOCATION OF RELE ASE l RELE ASED OF RELE ASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY l l NA l l t 6 @ l NA PERSONNEL E EPOS ES NUUsE R TYPE DESCRIPTION I

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-80 DATE OF EVENT: August 29, 1980 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Failure of Main Steam Isolation Bypass Valve MS101-A Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 5 with Power (MWT) = 0 and

. Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On August 29, 1980 at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br />, operations personnel were attempting to stroke MS101A in preparation for some special test verification and found it would not operate. This valve is the bypass around the main steam line isolation valve MS101. The bypass is normally closed and was failed in the closed position. The valve was declared inoperable. Being in Mode 5, the station did not enter the action statement of Technical Specification as 7.1.5. This technical speci-fication requires the main steam isolation valves to be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3.

This finding is being reported to document a component failure.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of the failed bypass valve was its f ailed scienoid control valve SV101-1. The coil in the solenoid had burned up. It was noted that this was an AC coil installed in a DC circuit. The result bef e, that even though this arrangement will work, such application significantly re-daces the life of the coil. A check of the instrument records showed that the solenoid valve as installed was per the architect / engineer's specifications. It appears tri-error came in specifying the coil number for the valve.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. The valve fails in its safety position, closed.

l Corrective Action: Under Facility Change Request (FCR)80-214, the AC solenoid valve was replaced with a qualificu DC solenoid valve. At 1525 hours0.0177 days <br />0.424 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.802625e-4 months <br /> on August 30, 1.980, MSI-1-A was successfully stroked and the valve declared operable. The similar valve MS100-A although still operable was alsu found to have an AC coil installed in its ,

solenoid control valve. It was also replaced under the same FCR.  !

I Failure Data: No previous reports of valve operator failures due to design error.

l l

LER #80-067

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