ML20006A843
| ML20006A843 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1990 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006A842 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9001300325 | |
| Download: ML20006A843 (34) | |
Text
'
, gly l,l' *l., @
- y,. ..
, n: , ,
f ENCLOSURE 1' p
PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE s
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328.
I (TVA-SQN-TS-89-30) g.u- .
I \
l7 LIST OF.AFFECTED PAGES Unit 1
-t 3/4 3-55 l 3/4 3-56 ,
3/4 3-56a
~3/4 3-56b 3/4 3-56c 3/4 3-57 i;
3/4 3-57a l; B3/4 3-3 m B3/4 3-4 J B3/4 6-4 J. i
. Unit 2. i i . 3/4 3-56
-3/4 3-57 l 3/4 3-57a 3/4 3-57b i 3/4 3-57c ;
3/4 3-58 i.
- 3/4 3-58a .)
B3/4 3-3 i B3/4 3-4. I B3/4 6-4 !
I d
I 3001300323 900122 '
hDR ADOCK 03000327 PDC
- I
[, y r
p,,,
.q; '
3 .' - . .
f, L- '
' INSTRUMENTATION-1 ACCIDENT MONITORiflG INSTRUMENTATION
'~
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATI0li l
3.3.3.7 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 '
o shall be OPERABLE. ,
APPLICABILITY:~ MODES 1, 2 and 3.
ACTION: A$ .5kwn i,3 Tdle 3. 8-10
'\
- a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels, except for the RCS subcooling margin monitor, less than /
R44 the Required Humber of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10, restore th '
' operable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be i at ast HOT SHUTDOW within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- b. With the imber of OPERABLE accident monitoring instru ntation "
channels le -
Table 3.3-10, thantore the MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE re the inoperable channel (s) rements of OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> o te in at least HOT. SHUTDOW ithin the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. N '
Ci c. With the subcooling margin onitor i the minimum shift crew (per member who shall be dedicated t erable for more than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, le . -1) will be increased by one
.)
t nd capable of determining the sub. R4 6
-cooling margin during an acc ent ng existing instrumentation, i
- d. With the number of OPE .
LE channels for he containment area monitor, shield building exh st vent monitor, and c vent monitor les han the Minimum Channels OP ensor vacuum exhaust Table 3.3-10,
- itiate an alternate method of mon BLE requirements of .' I parameter ( within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and either restore theoring the appropriate to OPER operable channel status within 7 days, or prepare and submi Special R116 Repor to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2
- hin 14 d i that provides actions taken, cause of the inoperability d plans nd schedule for restoring the channels to OPERABLE status.
- e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
1 SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.3.3.7 Each accident monitoring instru.aentation chann'el shall be demon-strated OPERA 8LEsby p:.rferr. ant:. of the CR""EL CHECK and C"2'N:L CALIDRATION
- Ope r;ti er.: at th: fr;quen:i n showr in T;ble ".2-7 ct.. E very at da s f er Esc ane-e, a f a- Quw>EL d'ncat , and.
- b. Gw I8 mo8 s pedr~ ue e. of a. CHAMCL &lltB2A17ord
- SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-55 Amendment No. 40, 112 for (enknmed /?rra R4).<.Y.e'n/do.Mors,a. 4'#/WEL April 28, 1989 .
d$Y!
e $c .WFf n $
I I- -
h ilI l uu ulhd h ' E
-M .,
g
- a. . Flo R
+ ep r ,_ ,& 3, _ ,,,, _ g,y, __ ,,,y l j,4,,, ,ag,, ' gj,4,,, y,Q,( 5 -
- 6. vala fos;% LA/chaon . . . . 3/s w p ac- i 3/ G m k- 5 - '~
c r.s A,,4 s., gs a- iby,-/dfd,-'72,'82 -'** TABtb*3-10 -
^
p - 173,- + s, - 19 BA, - 17+,- 171, * '' A>~S ) ..
S ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION g he=4ro E (Dsfra edLeefs48-01e,-ovi,-oso#-o85) TOTAL . MININUM i REG.;IREO NO. CHANNELS e INSTRUMENT OF CHANNELS OPE C LE Acreerf
, z -_
j (hsins.edliefS 68-ect,-024,-o43,-%C) 1.QeactorCoolantTygg (Wide Range) 4 (.t/RCst.oet) 1lRCS20*! $ .
( 2. _ Reactor Coolant TCold (Wide Range) _ _{ . -B-4(1/#t.5 /eer) 1/ACS toot' I
- 3. Containment Pressure (W dE Range) par 9oQ 2 +2 ~1
- 4. tZastromo t Loofv 3o- o+s Refueling Water Storage, Tank) Level 04C -- -
RSO 2 +1 1 (Zastronen JoofS 65- OSo OSI)
- 5. Ryactor C lant Pressure,-(Wide Ranae) -e- 3 3 g
.I.,sfrw Loofs 6V- 062-o66 os9)
- 6. Pressurizer Level (Wide dan - 3 3 2.
C t esfiv+t Laofx 6g- 2no,-
- 339)
- 7. Stsam Line Pressure 2/ steam line 2.t/ steam line i us lusironenf LaofS l-cola te -ee9A
) 8. Steam Generator Level ,w(Wi,de Ra,nge ,-ogcA,-6308;ot1A;Citie)1/ steam generator 1/ steam generator 1 (r.sh.nat e...ps a-ov3,-ase,-oes - n Y 9. Narr kan 1 w
Steam Cras %Gebn rator3-o Leers Level n o'b2,-eS1,-esh,e)ss,-o97,-*T,1
-o 1 so)2.+/ steam generator ' Et/ steam generator
- 10. Auxiliary Feedwater T(,;w note 1/;tc;; sc.cretor 1/:tc; ;;;cratcr RllS 11.
r Co Reactpf"M plant System Subcogling Margin Monitor 2 -&- 2 (o Ab.
f,I"f_
3 8 b J .J kJ & 34b5_ITn ,8 ,79.~#/>_~#L*x __u _* e i.. . i . . _ m , i.. . i . . _
5 VHT 5 VJ 5 b 5 V4 5 4 5 5%5 3 bu bV 5 LF W LA 5 W b F3 AI *%* **h *
- 12. Picssurizir PORY Dieck Volva Position Indicator ** 2/valvc 1/vche li. Safety Vahc Position Indicator 2/valvcf 1/vahc 12 -+"19- Containment Water Level (Wide Range) 2 -t- 2. I c1sstem ent' Loefs 63- ng#-tyg) i3 --+ -16. In Core Thermocouples 65 1/: - ;;;dr:nt i f/ core quadrant /tre*. 3 r.50 h."E 17 "ccctor Vcsici Level Instr;;cr.tation .,,_ m a x
$ *Not app i he associated block.
- valve is in the closed position.
7 **Not applicable if the verified in the closed position wit e valve operator removed.
~F
- This Technical Specification and survei ~ ement ~ e implemented until Sequoyah Spscific tSO Instructions are developed for the use of as to in the TVA response to Supplement 1 of '
$; NUREG-0737.
,, At le annel shall be'the acoustic monitors.
E' a w 1 ..
4 t
R a *+ W H
=
W b
to LJ
-J J 3 z! !
Q ege4 ,< ,,,4 ,,g %q q
$ ggC E ?.iis N
5
= .
Y O
kN m . . .
NN i
- C,
- Qbb g*. * *
- i' C. * *5 Q
Q $ gC{ *C g 3:35 3: 2::: 353:
g a; ip a m C $o 8 !E 9>
/"\
9 *U s a i
W o
m
,d
(
J v
"
- J E 7
^ n b
m @ S
- o
~
i.%
e %w 1nt e ag ,
< i- i. -43 +4 ma -4 .
3- <l 5 a
j!l 5'Eg O
.o VI
. , <a
<> li"? 1! li 'li V ' i 'h' ' {
i: : a <J a:,3 N, N E JJ
.
- i1
- : =
ss 3: C g
% d W 43 [$l$' $ [!l0M g C -
1 1
2 e-m' <>
ll J:
o 4gis cu g
a; A4% &
q g .b J J3*- x .cl e- EN N d
j)J3 LJ
<>s2 .E.a w q
- dE dE m % %h dS 4 D l$ v p! is a
- -'
o c: in
<c o
&i o
T p;t 7 4 d i: '?
c El5 s slllc- s o v +a Xd o
v t
o v
-- c: e u u w g c c5 u
su 3i3i U
3 8E Bi3i .5 8
&M E 3l A Cc &3i*l 4 tj'l dd b
- )
c=:
lE 2:
o on i!
u o .
o n o
v mc dws d " 14 ".
!wq 3
o G 2 4 -o 9 z
~ C) c1 T
F r
M V)
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-56a Amendment No. 112 April 28, 1989
__m.__m_- - _ - _ _ _ __
6.,ll. .. . . . . . .. ..,,,,,
I bh. I 7,3;],,.s!**
o , ,
Attachment (Unit 1)
Table 3.3-10 (Continued)
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - NOTE: Also refer to the applicable action requirements from Tables 3.3-1, 3.3-3, and 3.3-9 since they may contain more restrictive actions.
- a. With.the number of channels one less than the minimum-channels required, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN.within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- b. With the number of channels two less than the minimum channels required, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE. status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
ACTION 2 - NOTE: Also refer to the applicable action requirements from Table 3.3-1 since it may contain more restrictive actions.-
- a. With the number of channels one less than the minimum channels required, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 31 days 4 or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- b. With the number of channels two less than the minimum-channels required, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- c. With the number of channels three less than the minimum channels required, restore one channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
ACTION 3 - a. With the number of channels less thdn the minimum channels required, restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
3/4 3-56b
(
. o ;
.jpl' , c.; * [ . ;
. c. 4 ;' !
1 Table 3.3-10'(Continued)
ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued) l 1
ACTION 4 - a. With.the number of channels less=than the minimum channels 1 required, initiate an alternate method of monitoring )
"^
containment area radiation within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and either !
restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2.1 within ,
14 days that'provides actions tchen, cause of the i inoperability, and plans and schedule for restoring the channels to OPERABLE status.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4-are not applicable.
ACTION 5 - NOTE: : Also refer to the applicable action requirements from
-Table 3.3-9 since it may contain more restrictive-t actions.
- a. With the number of channels on one or more steam <
generators less than the minimum channels required for
,, either flow < rate or valve position, restore the inoperable channel to operable status- within' 7 days or be in'at least '
hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- b. With the' number of channels on one or more steam generators'less than the minimum channels required for ,
flow rate and valve position, restore the inoperable channel (s) to operable' status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. -
f
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
^
ACTION 6 - a. . With the number of channels one less than the minimum channels required, restore =the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or increase by one the minimum shift crew per Table 6.2-1. The additional shift crew member shall be dedicated to and capable of determining the subcooling margin during an accident using
. existing instrumentation.
- b. With the number of channels two less than the minimum -
, channels required, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or' increase by one the minimum shift crew per Table 6.2-1. . The additional shift crew member.shall be dedicated to and. capable of determining the subcooling margin during an accident using existing instrumentation.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
3/4 3-56c r
-- e e- , - a
.--_--________-_____; _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ -- . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - . .
~
~
, s .;-
i.
!- - TABLE 4.3-7 -
f.
~g
) '
ACCIDENT MONITORING wINSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS -
- ts I
I -} INSTRUMENT CHANNEL CHECK
~
CHANNEL -
CALIBRATION j 1. Reactor Coolant THo -(Wide Range) 'M-R-
) ] 2. Reactor Coolant T ide Range)
Cold M R 3.
Containment Pressure (Wide. nge) M -
R
! 4. Refueling Water Storage Tank Le lR50 M- R-
- 5. Reactor Coolant Pressure (Wide Range :i M R
- 6. Pressurizer Level- ' \ R50 .-
M R
- 7. Steam Line Pressure
- ' .
M R
- 8. Steam Generator Level - Wide R
R' 9.
s Steam Generator Level - Narrow .
R
- 10. Auxiliary Feedwater Flowrate M R
$ 11. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin nitor
- M~ R i
- 12. Pressurizer PORY Position Indicator M R -
l'3. Pressurizer PORV Block Valve Pos ion Indicator : M I R
- 14. Safety Valv6 Position Indic or M R "
i
- 15. Containment Water Leve ide Range)
M f _
j .R
- 16. In Core Thermocoup s ' ,
]R50 M R
- 17. Reactor Vesse evel Instrumentation ** M' R lR50 4
j . B} ?
& g. **This)thinical ' Specification and surveillance requirement'will not be implemented until Sequoyah Sp 2
sg f'6 REG-0737. Instructions are developed for the use of this syst'em as committed to in the TVA response R50 to-Suppleme !
e s
~
7
- [ .
.' N
\.
i, .q II
- d. #'* . ,
.r--
L -
7 -
+ _.
, ,. p.y . ..e. 4n. . - , ~ , . . < - . , , s ,..,m.~ g n n, m---s., w ..n -e- ,-
, e.~< ,...~,-.,p. w ~,,--a
,n ~ -= .
w
' ^
D- -
.~
. . . ;.. -
1 TABLE 4.3-7-(Continued); - '
I-
.M ~
. ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS'-
SE .
CHANNEL ~ - CHANNEL g
, INSTRUMENT CHECK ' CALIBRA ION-
- 18. Shield Building Exhaus nt
~
, a. Higti Range Noble Gas Moni M ~R*
- b. Mid Range Noble Gas Monitor M R*
- 19. Condenser Vacuum Exhaust Vent -
^
- a. High Range Noble Gas Monitor M R* Rll6
- b. Mid Range Noble' Gas Monitor -
R*
- 20. Containment Area .
R* a. Upper Corppartment M R*
Y b. Lower Compartee M R*
w
- CHANNEL C L RATION may consist of an electronic calibration of the channel, not including t elector, for r e decades above 10R/h and a sin a 'nstalled or portable gamma source. gle point calibration check of the detector below-10R/h wi either t3
- - ;l 8
-a 03 5 O 2-O m
i a _- _ - _ _ _ _ _ . ~ -
_ .a . - .. , - -
a- - , . - ____a..-- ,, , .. . , _ . . _
_ , a:,w., e.,,
t
. p,, 2 g . . , r.V
..t . .
- 1. ' -
' INSTRUMENTATION X:
! l BASES
- V, ;
i design basis'for the facility to determine if plant shutdown i required pursuant to Appendix "A" of 10 CFR Part 100. All specified meo urement ranges i represent the minimum ranges of the instruments. This instrumentation is R.
consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12, " Instrumentation 4
for Earthquakes," April .1974.
a h
3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need
' for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public and is consistent-with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.
3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that Y sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT. >
.g O. . STANOBY of the facility and the potential capability for subsequent cold shut-down from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required BR i in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General f Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR 50.
3/4.3.3.6 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS R66'
. This specification' deleted.
l; 3/4.3.3.7 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION LITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation e
, Jgr . sufficient'informa 11able on selected plan rs to monitor and assess these~ variables foi ow This capability is consistent
. ;A, with the recommendations o ory Guide "
trumentation for Light-u Water-Cooled o.wer Plants to Assess Plant Condition and Following t
J n " December 1975.
i
' /' N September 1,1988 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-3 Amendment No, f/ 81
,,,m _ , . , . - -
, ,_, , . +
s
~;,) ^ :, . ' .
, p.- ESTRUMENTATION BASES l
( i haquoyah has four separate methods of determining safety valve position (i.e.
opIn r closed).
- a. Acoustic w monitors mounted on each safety valve line ( per' valve).
A flow indic ng module in the main control room is ca rated to detect -
failure of a ve. to reclose. An alarm in the mai ontrol room will actuate when any va is not fully closed.
- b. Temperature sensors downstr of each s perature indication and alarm y valve (one per valve). Tem-pr ed in the main control room. R47
- c. Pressurizer relief tank tempe ute, sure and level indication, and alarm in main control roo
- d. Pressurizer pressu indication and alarm in the in control room.
Although all the ove position indicators for the pressurize afety valves and the PORV re acceptable as one of the channels,.the acousti be one of e two required operable chanels. In addition to the fou ethods onitors must descr d above, the PORVs use an electromagnetic " reed"-switch to dete v e e position. The' stem mounted switches are no longer in use since the P s y
, were changed.
~
O 75 k
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-4 Amendmer.t No. 43 -
Revised 08/18/87
r-1 Inser t A l
The primary purpose of the accident monitoring instrumentation is to display plant variables that provide information required by the control room operators. This inf ormation is necessary to perform the manual actions,
- including long-term recovery action,s f or which no automatic control is provided, specified in the plant Emergency E Operating " :::dar:: ' COP:} associated with design basis events.i These variables are designated as Type A, Category fi, i r :::;r d;.n;; .i th C:;ury:F "C P Ch:pt:r '...vType A,
' (MdrucSt*16 - ' Category 1 design.and. qualification. requires.' seismic and /
environmental qualification, the application of single f ailure criteriorf utili:ation of emergency standby power, f immediat g tre"/ ding . gcessible di spl ay,-F.17. continuous r,eadout, and
% e OPERABILITY of the accident (z ' monitoring instrumentation ensures that there is suf ficient-3 '
inf armation available on selected plant parameters to -
, monitor and assess plant status and behavior f ollowing an .
< accident to allow the operator to take Rreplanned manual action. This capability is consistent with the
-@h l
,(V recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97 Rev. 2, "Ihstrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power
- Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an
._. Accident," December 1980. . .
i
~ .
Y fo~r ], , & re l~ d /,as,,,<]
6t,) $N 6,- An ,cdAN/w rf o,sm nss cf .,
7Wu) -Asw &,,,,e / 1'[ ea <h J+ea ,
4., A '
i
/w$ -N-e Cero Y fla w / <^bnckNo e f -h{aue. '
(/ -
M ~a ) vuANz p20ib idedors- (ko /e w / eo, 4 /
. g,
- m. Y V.?[ ~
!:- 'n IYIe b
'98n W 4Yh
, )}.t Gn_ det L/t def 0-,"bal s/d- w, Y'{t. Y*vtb,,a:,
-]c+ AEuj -L p/A) fe eac4
~ ~ - - - s&n, pak _
.- . .----,---...~.-,.,,..,-.....~.,.,--...,.a . - , . . . . - - . - - . . ..w..- w-.we,.....--,------...,--,.--r
' . g , g
.g 8
{
AY h Yes et*'d b ,
to ns ,A
%a., ~..Ly_c1 .Js are day deler e & L + ~ .,. h a ,,y i a h e s,+s t.'-
( p A As a4y % -a.Lu u'A &y ug A.A 1. 9 7.
d s a2%c- a /&pa ds opnLg Ec 4L ,o ,o g a n , L + m e . L ay k gavaaJ y spcs s , a u .> Ar &&+ yy-n,oe.htc. 4 e is i 9 l f*-- _ Wr g
" ~- ~ ~ ~
TJe / Yrp n enca. bl*C of fed 0e . J
- prt d A aa:de.,+
n . .A_ u ,q.1 p ' CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS "" "" f,,'fel.b, ) .Er/nweYhIY as Tge.A,OegoQ L n I^ ^ nn-BASES des;0na\ T w.% reka,lai<rj 6 .A.1. V 7. L'ev,s.m L
- ded W deM-
%,4 6e L U - der 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL g
\*3,,d.,,,,['/ds4ArrecAce de or Bl/cwons _er n
+/ Arin9
, Otes.es r 199 0 _
h<f ead V The OPERABILITY of the equipment. ana 4ystems required for ThF detection - and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to c maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit-during post-LOCA conditions. -Either recombiner unit or the hydrogen mitigation system, consisting of 68 hydrogen ignitions per unit, is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions, 2) radiolytic decomposition of water and 3) corrosion of
. metals within containment. These hydrogen control systems are designed to BR mitigate the effects of an accident as described in Regulatory Guide 1.7,
" Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations ' in Containment Following a LOCA",
revision 2 dated November 1978. The hydrogen mixing systems are provided to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA. This mixing action will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit. The operability of at least 66 of 68 ignitors in the hydrogen mitigation system will maintain an effective coverage throughout the containment. This - system of ignitors will initiate combustion of any significant amount of BR hydrogen released after a degraded core accident. This system is to ensure burning in a controlled manner as the hydrogen is released instead of allowing it.to be ignited at high concentrations by a random ignition source.
-3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER The requirements associated with each of the components of the ice con-denser ensure that the overall system will be available to provide sufficient pressure suppression capability to limit the containment peak pressure tran-sient to less than 12 psig during-LOCA conditions.
3/4.6.5.1 ICE BED The OPERABILITY of the ice bed ensures that the required ice inventory will 1) be distributed evenly through the containment bays, 2) contain suffi-cient boron to preclude dilution of the containment sump following the LOCA and 3) contain sufficient heat removal capability to condense the reactor system volume released during a LOCA. These conditions are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. The minimum weight figure of 1200 pounds of ice per basket contains a 10% conservative allowance for ice loss through sublimation which is a factor of R7 10 higher than assumed for the ice condenser design. The' minimum weight
. figure of 2,333,100 pounds of ice also contains an additional 1% conservative.
allowance to account for systematic error in weighing instruments. In the E' Amendment 4, 5 gg SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-4 Revised 08/18/87 ' '
[ .,
,, ; *
- 7> , ..
V ;* ' INSTRUMENTATION ACCIDENT' MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION ', LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION o h 3.3.3.7 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 F shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3. ACTION: As slown ir, Table 3 s-to With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels, except for the RCS subcooling margin monitor, less than / 432 he Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10, restore th i .erable c'aannel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be i at leas OT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours,
- b. With the n ber of OPERABLE accident monitoring instru tation channels les han the MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE m rements of Table 3.3-10,-r tore the inoperable channel (s) t PERABLE status within 48 hours or e in at least HOT SHUTDOWN ithin the next 12 hours..
- c. With the subcooling margin onitor ino rable for more than 48 hours, the' minimum shift crew (per le 6 -1) will be increased by one )
member who shall be dedicated to d capable of determining the R32/- subcooling margin during an a de using existing instrumentation.
- d. With the number of OPERA channels for he-containment ~ area monitor, shield building exhau vent monitor, and denser vacuum exhaust vent monitor less n the Minimum Channels 0 ABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10, i iate an alternate _ method of mo toring the appro-priate parame r(s) within 72 hours and either res e the inoperable uo2 channel to ERABLE status within 7 days, or prepare submit a Special eport'to the Commission pursuant to Specificati 6.9.2 with 14 days that provides actions taken, cause of the in erability a plans and schedule for restoring the channels to OPERABLE atus, e ThkprovisionsofSpecification3.0.4arenotapplicable.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.3.4.7 Each accident monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demon-strated OPERABLE:by performance Of the CHANNEL CHEC4-en&GHANNEL CALIBRATMN
. ope 9ati^m at the 'requencic: :hcrin in TABLE 1.3-7.
g, her 31 da s b3 ferforenet of w fRAM EL blEcK, b, &er l% mon 02s by ferbrmnce o( a. CHAME1. OW825Toor) i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2
% - Fc'r Gda'nn enf 14ra. $Ndw.a Mle,l.1&rs , a 61naal 3/4 3-56 Amendment No. 32, 102 CAL,gph*N I9
'd-e! l a t~ a n d ra"S*NL
.abses <1eck:e to R h, a'd cal.br4;o,.,
9 4'3 l e l..d i &l. of 4La. cL,,eI; rwf inc/
/u h r . ,~1 belvus A to dde$r R /1, w for W hen of A. ,
e b r an unila or fcrfSe ra " w ree--
.]
~
. new Me.
~
~_ . ~
p %.y.uac V%&r 5 a,,de,,,e,,} 4 3-42,-ISC,-197,-170) L* %1u. Pos% T,,Zeddn '/sM sm<Ar 3/s+mwdr -3L ,
'p a,s+<. a,+ hqs 3-!'*,-AMr n 1,-1% b --
~
g -1544,-/73,-rV8,-/#FA,-17#, ACCIDENT DONITORING INSTRUENTATION
- 171, ~171 A , -l TS,) g,gg
~
'# Al- NIIIIFUN E (Ls%ed LooIs At-018,-04I,-060,-otB) WQtifRE9- NO. CHA880ELS DF CHANNELS -0PERABt4- Aeriorr t
g INSTRUNEN p ,,,,,,) g,,q,, g g.o ,,,-e2 4,.oq3,-gg g ) M 4 D/ecs Loop) 1/Ac5 tapF I 1.heactorCoolantTHot (Wide Range)
-B- 4(1/Act 4*of) 1/tesiod 1
- 2. Reactor Coolant TCold (Wide Range) 2 4- 2.
R38 y-3.Conta,inseptPressure cra,s -an toops 3e-o A/ =arrow)
. 4. Refueling ter Storaae Tan evel 2 4- 2 .
1, s a.s tw o., Loops ss-erSo oi Ranae '- f- 3 3 R38 -2. 1
- 5. actor C lant Pressurtog-oh ,-(Wi-os6,-osp )
.3 Ze ctroa,en Loops 4- 3
- 6. Pressurizer Level (Wide ange) -a- 3 -
2". ! J CIns+reent WP5 (of-32o3 -335,-339) 2.4/ steam line i
- 7. Steam Line Pressure CCns+rennt WPS 8-002A -0628,-e01A-0018 -c20A,-QapB;O27A;0276)2/ steam line 1/ steam generator 1/ steam generator i.. l w 8.SteamGeneratorLevel,-gideR'a CLSfra-est Loops 3-c43 -o s-698 2.-t/ steam generator h 9. Steam Generator Level ,- (Narrow, Range) #. W steam generator 1, l
i &.sh.am<nt , , , , _ _ _ _ _ , _ w _ _m,. n104 m, 10.}uxiliaryfee S 3-o3Qovg,_oS1,-oSS,-o94,-o?7,-l*7,-11o) ater .. o. ~ .--- . .~.-- - 2- 4 lo i stem Subcoolin '
- 11. lieactor Coolant Sgt/.?.!..z..~'.t5._?.
- n. J.r?R.
- .. - :.*..tM. . t..L...
.g Margin,
-,1. w.. Monitor
- ,1-
~ - - .--
1/v;h;
- 13. Pressu.-ih. PG;V Olv d Live resitien Iediceter** 2/nin 2/v:hef 1/ :h:
-14. Safety Va he Pssitica Indicator l 2 4- 2. 1 !
12 -- -M. Containment Water Level (Wide Range) 1 -9/ core quadran%m. 3 L L >trv~ent Loops 63-av -p79) (a6 t/cci 7 :t ::t R38 jg- = -16. In Core Thermocouples g* 2 1 if g 17. " ::ter '!asse? L : I Ir.stracat;ti;r. Syste;*** , I m a, g 3 - e ~
"Not appH if the associated block valve is in the closed position. operator removed.
3 i
**Not applicable if e e is verified in the closed position with power tn ed until Sequoyah Specific 35
' ***This Technical Specification and su .1:n-- m airement _- willMed to in the TVA response to Supplement 1 ofR38 l z - . P Instructions are developed for the use of this ) i w NUREG-0737. -- i m g ^ p... nne shall be the acoustic monitors. l y .. j b . _,._._n w- e._
* '" 1
.m
- - m -?
~ _,:u.
, .j" ' - y:f
%. r . :.
~
~ '
,,1-
^
4.x . e, 9
~
J' - '
,G
~
' TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)
+
m- . 8 ~ ACCIDENT NONITORING INSTRUNENTATION. ~ 5 .RGeworp. ' total ' NININUN: 7 " EQUI"E" NO.
. CHANNELS t c- INSTRUMENT . --
OF CHANNELS
.x OPEaaa' E AcreAl-.
% 18. ' Shield Building Ex5:::t Vent m s
- 2. "igh Rang: " ble a .o....r
____ _< . .,i._ ,C :'"_Onit r
- u. .
. u. ..
o o.n. 1 2
- 19. Conden: r Y::eu: Exh:::t Yent R102
- a. High R:nge "cble C:: "^ niter " ^
l
- b. "id Rang: " b1: Ca ". nitor "^
lY1 Containment Area Aed.ab Mon.Yors m s b a-w 4 b. U P Loser DerCompartaent Compartment .(5,$_[y, go.271,-272) -N-A,- 2.
--M-4,- 2, 1 +
1 4- ! a". (L5b'sd lys 16-273,-27f) is. Neuk Rox - e . S'wa A y e )_ 2# L -
- c r,,sLe + y 12- Sm~, - %C s.Zdened
- de. Aye 2. 2. L
c nsnad bap 92-foos,- M) ' es et tD W3
- 1 >= Q.
9 N fD OD 3 hgyf[g Ron & 04,/ W - $K O ' 4
% L.,y %+.c ~i<~.y .) S~e p-ld.
e q l m .. ..-.y- , , - . ,y._ - , w s . . . - . .
- -.m ,y.. m ,- g .,w ., -g 7 .eE r_ . .. ~
w v ee sr- 4.- + -. e ~ e n .. -' >=Y'
n - . {: , ,
. . 4 y . '; u , y j.
n . .'*:" Attachment (Unit 2) 1 Table 3.3-10 (Continued) ACTION STATEMENTS i ACTION 1 - NOTE: Also refer to the applicable' action requirements from
- Tables- 3.3-1, 3.3-3, and 3.3-9 since_they may contain more restrictive actions.
g
- a. With the number of channels one less than the minimum
, channels required, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7' days or be in at least ;
J HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. With the number of channels two less than the minimum O , channels required, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours. t
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
ACTION 2 - NOTE : Also refer to the applicable action requirements from i Table 3.3-1 since it may contain more restrictive actions.
~
I
- a. With the number of channels one less than the minimum i channels required, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 31 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within-the next 12: hours.
1 b.- With'the number of channels two less than the minimum l '. channels required, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within-7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within~the next 12 hours. L 'c. With the number of channels three less-than the minimum H channels required, restore one channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the L next 12 hours.
- d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
ACTION 3 - a. With the number of channels less thsn the minimum channels required, restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours. l l b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. l l , 3/4 3-57b l ~ L ( ..
- 7 QL !
; ,1..
a.- -
*.4 : L =* 0 -
4 l 7
.c Table;3.3-10 (Continued) -
i ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued) ! J
' ACTION 4 - a.- With the number of channels.less than the minimum channels-required, initiate an alternate method of monitoring I s
containment area radiation within 72 hours and either i restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or' prepare and submit a special report to l the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2.1 within 14 days that providesLactions taken, cause of the t p' inoperability, and plans and schedule for restoring the channels'to OPERABLE status. j
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. ,
[
- s. ACTION 5 - NOTE: Also refer-to the applicable action requirements from.
Table 3.3-9 since it may contain more restrictive actions. I
- a. With the number of channels on one or more steam generators less than the minimum channels required for. .
either flow rate or valve. position, restore the inoperable
~c hannel to operable status within 7 days or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.
- b. With the number of channels-on one or more steam generators less.than the minimum-channels required for ,
' flowrate and valve position, restore the inoperable channel (s)'to operable status within 48 hours or be in at least. hot shutdown within the next 12 hours. .t
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
q ACTION 6 - a. ' With the number of channels one less than the minimum y channels required, restore the inoperable-channel to OPERABLE status within.7 days or increase by one the minimum shift crew per Table 6'.2-1~. The additional shift crew member shall be dedicated to and capable of determining the subcooling margin during an accident using existing instrumentation.
- b. With the number of channels two less than the minimum channels required, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or increase by one the :
f
' minimum shift crew per Table 6.2-1. The additional shift crew member shall be dedicated to an'd, capable of i determining the subcooling margin during an accident using existing instrumentation.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
3/4 3-57c
,
- 3 *
- ' s TABLE 4.3-7 -
- m.
E ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
-' 'I 8
5 CHANNEL 1 CHANNEL
-t 7 INSTRUMENT CHECK CALIBRATION ,
E 1. Reactor Coolant THot ide Range) M R.
] 2. Range) M Reactor Coolant TCold ( i R
- 3. Containment Pressure (Wide Ra e) M R
} lR38..-
- 4. Refueling Water Storage Tank Leve M R +'
- 5. Reactor' Coolant Pressure (Wide Range) M R. ht38 - I
- 6. Pressurizer Level .M R -
- 7. Steam Line Pressure R
- 8. Steam Generator Level - (Wide) M 'R 4
{ 9. Steam Generator Level -(Narrow) R w 10. Auxiliary Feedwater Flowrote M R
.E 11. Reactor Coolant System Subccoling Marg Monitor M- R
- 12. Pressurizer FORV Position Indicato M R
- 13. Pressurizer PORV Block Valve P ition Indicator M R 1 14. Safety Valve Position Indi tor M R
- 15. Containment Water Lev (Wide Range) i M R h38
- 16. In Core Thermocou es M . R
- 17. Reactor Vesse evel Instrumentation System
- M R -
l R38 yY ~
@ *This T nical Specification and surveillance requirement will not be implemented until Sequoyah Specifi
@}g. Ins uctions are developed for the use of this system as committed to in the TVA response to Supplement.1 o 138 Ea EG-0737.
m ._
.O .
- g. _
e, a h s g y ...w.- .s. , f .C - ' ' - - e --r- - me- f*v- 'e'v T r --t =
sE . D
, . TABLE 4.3-7 (Continued) --
m - y -ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUNENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS h CHANNEL CHANNEL e INSTRUNENT CHECK: CALIBRA t' c-j 18. Shield Building Exhaust Ve
- a. High Range Noble Gas Monitor ~M R*
- b. Mid Range Noble Gas Monitor M R*
, R102 ,.
- 19. Condenser Vacuum Exhaust Vent - -
- a. High Range Noble' Gas Monitor R* *
- b. Mid Range Noble Gas Monitor M R*
- 20. Containment Area to -
2 a. Upper Compartment M R* y b. Lower Compartment M E o,
- CHANNEL CALIB ON may consist of an electronic calfbration of. the channel, not including the detector r range. decades above 10R/h and a single point calibration check of the detector below /h with either an installed or portable gamma source.
4
- 18 -
~ g. . 8 , .e .. ,c 0 m-0 e
- a
. p. g 3 e +* .
' INSTRUMENTATION
' ['N BASES '!
3_/4. 3. 3. 3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) [ design basis for the facility to' determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant _to Appendix "A" of 10 CFR Part 100. All specified measurement ranges represent the minimum ranges of the instruments. The instrumentation is
, R72
' consistent with.the recommer,dations of Regulatory Guide 1.12. " Instrumentation >
for Earthquakes," April 1974.- - 3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION
'The 0PERABILITY of the' meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public and is _ consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.
3/4.3.3.'5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the remote siTutdown instrumentation ensures that suf-ficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maint~enance of HOT
.Q
~
STANDBY of the facility and the potential capability for subsequent' cold shut-T - down from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required BR
'y - in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of,10 CFR 50.
3/4.3.3.6 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS This specification deleted. ! 3/4.3.3.7 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION l The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures tha.t / suf t information is available on selected plant parameters to m or ' and assess e variables following an accident. This.capabil s consistent with the recomme ions of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instru ation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuc Power Plants to Assets P1 onditions During and - Following an Accident," Dec 1975. J.p66AT Sequoyah has four separate methods o .ining safety valve position (i.e., open or closed),
- a. Acoustic flow ors mounted on each safety valve e (one per valve). R35 Q A flow i fai ating module in the main control roo'm.is ca ted to detect of a valve to reclose. An alarm in the main control r will ctuate when any valve is not fully closed.
A Revised 08/18/87
\ Amendment No. 25/46/54;72 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-3 September 1, 1988 A
e --se+- o- e opp, ,,, , p w-- - - - - , m 4 , m- y y --g,~,
y -
;
9 .
,.j.- -.-
. .< c , , , , . ,
;. _.* . INSTRUMENTATION 5
BASES-3/4.3.3.7 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (continued) [( i Temperature sensors downstream of each safety valve (one per valve). pe m-re indication and alarm cre provided in the main control . o c. Pressurizer r f tank temperature, pressure and'l x alarm'in main contr indication, and oom.
- d. Pressurizer pressure: indication arm in the main control room.
Although all the above posit indicators for ressurizer safety valves and the PORVs are acce e as one of the channels, < be one of the tw quired operable chanels. In addition tocoustic monitors must described four methods
, the PORVs use an electromagnetic " reed"-switen t =W ne R35 valv ition. The stem mounted switches are no longer in use since t e changed. kVs 3/4.3.3.8 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate I . warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This
- capability stages. is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early Prompt' detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety related fire protection program.
equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is ((k inoperable, the establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY. R35 3/4.3.3.9 -RADI0 ACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT INSTRUMENTATION The radioactive liquid effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effuents during actual ~ or potential releases of liquid effluents. The alarm / trip setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated in accordance with, the procedures in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm / trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. The OPERABILITY a'nd use of this
- instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63 and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
R35 3/4.3.3.10 RADI0 ACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT INSTRUMENTATION The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive' materials in gaseous effluents during actual or potential releases of gaseous effluents. The alarm / trip setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated in accordance with the procedures in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm / trip will occur prior SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-4 Amendment No. 35,46 March 16,1987
- w. . . .
an- - 1 Insert 4 I The primary purpose of the accident monitoring instrumentation is to display p1 ant variables that provide I information required by the control room operators. This
~
information is necessary to perform the manual actions, including long-term recovery actions f or which no automatic control is provided, specified in the plant Emergency p Cpc,m..,q,Il m an o 'CCIt! associated with design basis , I events... These variables are designated as Type A, Categoryl ild r cccord mcc ..i t h Sc a uc ,'cb "EP Chcpter 'fType A, .- 1 7, y 1 g' Category 1 design.and qualification. requires.' seismic and X W StreT404 I environmental qualification, the application of single failure criteriorff utilitation of emergency standby power, immgdiate continuous r.eadout, and trepding g;gcessi bl e di spl ay,p.1,. 'The OPERAEdILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that there is suf ficient information available on selected plant parameters to
. monitor and assess p1 ant status and behavior f ol1owing an accident to allow the operator to take Rreplanned manual s action. This capability.is consistent with the i
recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97 Rev. 2,
.j " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power i Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an ,
_. _ Accident," December 1980. ! I t b w w f , f~ km 5 webW~Y Nnu donSC N fet. m Si g AEw' -f4w_ (Lw/ $_xd JL &a,& , I' nNL & % d' & w / a A g, _ o f g w . nzw n psw,;6 G (n_iw w _yaAn n - w % ___f4. 4 9 f an &[fwg ; h -L _aw s am_ 4c
. _ _ _ _ I ead 5, pafc.-
Ane AEW ELp]A)b
- s. -q
'4 ;'4 " .g-JY4.t$dfI & sky.g u
- ;*) _
~
% cod,-ed A d e,,
gy ~dcy_.cLeal.s arr day ded ac n&Lf ~~.ing mdendt (5p a.,.edaycq x ) aackca._wA Ayld,.y A:4 1. 9 v. ed s,_aAce e ya u d.s o p A /Jg ne & pqo g acc,4 + a,:.Li,, ;< yav_ d_ 1 3 , pac.& L _ a._ v . > 4 e e,A,,: a Ly Ay -
~ ,. b .
4
+.
4 o D 9 N 9
,/**g,
/
- - - ~ ~ ~ . - _ _ , , , .
e-e e - me -w w 4
A aaofMqu. n~w im.k,u?mI wkeA %. M s; , p y}<,p, n.rces [
'N,:7.(CONTAINMENT-SYSTEMS
+a
- BASES'
- D *d"4 t s ,3&
"i. <r 7@ru c,e. , MA a y/' hGwr- &le<l /Lbcl tar ho.s,aven 1
c.,+a-hen hk l ~ far La. k wer han$$. fo Assesc f%f Gdates s 14ra ,9 *& 3/4.6.4 .. COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL g // g 9 % g g f g f),,y ,,, Q /7 p o ,
^
The OPERABILITY of the equipment and system tiction and control' of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either_recombiner unit or the hydrogen mitigation system, consisting of 68 hydrogen igniters per unit, is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water BR reactions, 2) radinlytic decomposition of water and 3) corrosion of metals ' within containment. These hydrogen control systems are designed to mitigate the effects of an accident as described in Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control of
* ' Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment following a LOCA," Revision 2, dated November 1978. 4
~
The hydrogen mixing systems are provided to ensure adequate mixing of the 4 containment atmosphere following a LOCA. This mixing action will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit. The operability'of at-least 66 of 68 igniters in the hydrogen control R21 distributed ignition system will maintain an effective coverage throughout the containment. This system of ignitors will initiate combustion of any signifi-cant amount of hydrogen released after a degraded core accident. This system is to ensure burning in a controlled manner as the hydrogen is released instead of allowing it to be ignited at high concentrations by a random ignition-source. 3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER ( The requirements associated with each of the components of the ice condenser ensure that the overall system will be available to provide sufficient pressure suppression capability to limit the containment peak pressure transient to less than 12 psig during LOCA conditions. 3/4.6.5.1 ICE BED The OPERABILITY.of the ice bed ensures that the required ice inventory will 1) be distributed evenly through the containment bays, 2) contain suffi-
. cient boron to preclude dilution of the containment sump following the LOCA and 3)-contain sufficient heat removal capability to condense the reactor system volume released during a LOCA. These conditions are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
The minimum weight figure of 1200 pounds of ice pe- basket contains a 10% conservative allowance for ice loss through sublimation which is a factor of
. 10 higher than assumed for the ice condenser design. The minimum weight figure of 2,333,100 pounds of ice also contains an additional 1% conservative allowance-to account for' systematic error in weighing instruments. In the event that observed sublimation rates are equal to or loser than design predictions after three years of operation, the minimum ice baskets weight may be adjusted downward. In addition, the number of ice baskets required to be weighed each 9 months may be reduced after 3 years of operation if such a reduction is supported by observed sublimation data.
i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-4 Amendment No. 21 Revised: August 18, 19 } Bases Revision (BI') M
, _ , _ _ _ _ , , _ ._.m__-- - - - - - - - - - ~ - " - - - " - ' "-- ' '
r:0 . h > JIl *'1-e ' . * . ' ' .
...i .'*
it
- s b.
; ENCLOSURE 2 <t t
.i PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE -
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328
,. a (TVA-SQN-TS-89-30) .;
}
~ DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR I
-GENERAL REVISION OF ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION -[
SPECIFICATION 3.3.3.7 AND i, ASSOCIATED BASES 3/4 3.3.7
?
~-4
, 2 5
.\ 1 k
/
5 3 l L l
>c
-[
;
l t
+ ,
., y ..\. [
;,; .'
- ENCLOSURE 2 Description of Change -
. Tennessee Valley Authority proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2 technical specifications (TSs) to revise accident monitoring iustrumentation TS 3.3.3.7 and associated Bases 3/4 3.3.7. . The proposed change is a general revision that provides requirements for i 16 different plant variables associated with accident monitoring instrumentation. Plant variable types and categories are defined in NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled .
Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and , Following an Accident." Type A variables provide primary information ,' (information that is essential for the direct accomplishment of specified safety functions) to the control room operators to permit.them to take specified manually controlled actions for which no automatic action is provided and that are required for safety systems to accomplish their j safety functions for design basis events. Category i variables must have design requirements for seismic and environmental qualification, the ; application of single failure criteria, utilization of emergency standby ! power, control room display, continuous readout, and recording - capability. The following instrumentation has been designated for SQN as Type A, Category 1, in accordance with the guidance given in RG 1.97 and a review of SQN's emergency procedures; functional restoration ~ guidelines; and SQN's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapter 15 (design basis accidents):
- 1. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot Leg Water Temperature (Wide Range) ,
- 2. RCS Cold Leg Water Temperature (Wide Range)
- 3. Containment Pressure (Narrow Range) 4.
Refueling Water Storage Tank Level '
- 5. Reactor Coolant Pressure (Wide Range)
- 6. Pressurizer Level
- 7. Steam Line Pressure
- 8. Steam Generator (SG) Level (Wide Range)
- 9. .SG Level (Narrow Range)
- 10. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Flow Rate
- 11. RCS Subcooling Margin Monitor
- 12. Containment Sump Water Level (Wide Range)
- 13. Incore Thermocouples.
- 14. Containment Area Radiation Monitors (Upper and Lower)
- 15. Containment Hydrogen Monitors
- 16. Neutron Flux Monitors (Source and Intermediate Range) l The proposed TS change incorporates the above variables into SQN's accident monitoring instrumentation Table 3.3-10. TVA's selection of Type A. Category 1 instrumentation is documented in SQN calculation SQN-SQS4-0052. Inclusion of Type A, Category 1 instrumentaticn for TS operability is based on guidance provided in the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Methodically Engineered, Restructured, and Improved Technical Specifications (MERITS) program.
i
. .a .
aL.< o , .. ,
,. . ~ '
Table 3.3-10 has been revised-to reflect RG 1.97 requirements for each Type A variable. Channel numbers (loop numbers) have been added to provide-the operator with a clear identification of those channels that are qualified as accident monitoring channels. Various footnotes that are no longer applicable have been deleted. The format of Table 3.3-10 has q also been changed. Table notation has been added as a guide to the J Loperator for certain accident monitoring instruments that are contained in other TSs (i.e., reactor trip system instrumentation, engineered safety feature actuation system instrumentation, and remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation). Action requirements for each variable have been included to ensure inoperable channels are either. restored within a specified timeframe or a plant shutdown is initiated. Action times associated with each variable were selected in accordance with the MERITS guidelines. In addition to the format changes in Table 3.3-10, surveillance requirements contained in Table 4.3-7 have been deleted and consolidated under 4.3.3.7 (4.3.3.7(a) and 4.3.3.7(b]). Surveillance frequencies for performance.of a channel check every 31 days and a channel calibration every 18 months remain unchanged. The footnote associated with the containment area radiation monitors, which describes a previously approved methodology used in performing channel calibrations, has been retained from Table 4.3-7. The TS bases for accident monitoring instrumentation have been revised to:
- 1. -Provide TVA's licensing position for inclusion of Type A, Category 1 variables within TSs. ,
- 1. Update the RG 1.97 reference to reflect TVA's commitments for Revision 2 of RG 1.97 dated December 1980.
- 3. Delete portions of the bases involving the use of acoustic monitors as
-one of the two required channels for determining pressurizer safety-valve position.
- 4. Describe the redundant channel capability for AFW flow instrumentation and'AFW valve position indication.
- 5. Reference TS 3.6.4.1 to specify operability requirements for SQN's containment hydrogen monitors.
The.TS bases for combustible gas control (3/4.6.4) have also been modified to reference SQN's containment hydrogen monitors as RG 1.97 accident monitoring instrumentation. Reason for Change By letter dated February 12, 1987, NRC issued Amendment No. 53 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 45 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for SQN Units 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments provided TVA's implementation schedule for compliance with RG 1.97 1
=. t 3 .
*- ;
requirements (reference SQN's license conditions, paragraph 2.0.(24) for l Unit 1 and paraEraph 2.C.[14) for Unit 2). In accordance with the SQN ' license conditions for both units, plant modifications to comply with , RG 1.97 are required by start-up from the Unit 2 Cycle 4 refueling outage. ' Modifications have been scheduled for the Cycle 4 refueling outage on each ; unit. Unit 1 is the lead unit with the Cycle 4 refueling outage projected to begin in March 1990 (Unit 2 Cycle 4 is proaected to begin in i October 1990). The majority of the RG 1.97 modifications involve instranentation that can only be installed or mooified during plant shutdown. The proposed TS change is being submitted at this time to i coincide with the Unit 1 modification schedule. SQN's Unit 1 TSs will thereby reflect compliance with RG 1.97 for Type A, Category 1 variables prior to start-up following the Unit 1 Cycle 4 refueling outage. Unit 2 TS compliance will follow Unit 1 and should be implemented prior to start-up following the Unit 2' Cycle 4 refueling outage. Justification for Change RG 1.97, Revision 2, established guidelines for defining postaccident . monitoring instrumentation on a plant-specific basis. For SQN, the i variables that require monitoring were selected based on a comprehensive < review of SQN's emergency procedures, functional restoration guidelines, and the FSAR. This review is documented in SQN Calculation SQN-SQS4-0052. The criteria and the results cf SQN's calculation provide the basis for TVA's ; proposed TS change. It can be noted that certain instrumentation contained ; in the accident monitoring Table 3.3-10 was not designated as Type A, '
, Category 1 variables and has been deleted from the table. Justification to support removal of these non-Type e A variables is provided below.
- 1. Pressuriter Power-Orerated Relief Valve (PORV) Positian Indication ;
4
.Pressurizar PORV position is used by the operator to ensure the reactor coolant pressure boundary is intact when RCS pressure is decreasing. -
p- However, RCS prersure ess been included as a Type A variable and is j' considered to provide the primary information to the operator. If RCS pressure is decreasing, the operator can take conservative actions by , l~ attempting to close the pressurizer PORV.or block valve even if the position indication is not available. Thus, the pressurizer PORV position does not meet tha criteria of a Type A variable. SQN's PORV position indication is designated as a Type D, Category 2 variable (reference SQN Calculation SQN-SQS4-0068), which is consistent with the requirements of RG 1.97. In addition to the above justification, the footnote associated with PORV position indication no longer remains applicable and therefore has been deleted.
- 2. hep urizer PORV Plock Valve Position Indication l Pressurizer PORV block valve position provides a backup to the PORV for ensuring the reactor coolant pressure boundary is intact when RCS pressure is decreas.ing. RCS pressure has been included as a Type A
. variable. and is considered to provide the primary information to the
. . , _m w , , . . . . . . . , , ,-. - - -
i operator. If RCS pressure is decreasing, the operator can take conservative actions.by attempting to close the pressuriser PORV or block valve even if the position indication is not available. Thus. the pressuriser PORV block valve position does not meet the criteria ' of a Type A variable. SQN's PORV block valve position indication is i designated as a Type D. Category 2 variable (reference SQN Calculation SQN-SQS4-0068), which is consiste,at with the requirements of RG 1.97.
- In addition to the above justification, the footnote associated with j PORV block valve position indication no longer remains applicable and therefore has been deleted.
- 3. Safety Valve _ Position Indication Safety valve position can be used by the operator to determine if the >
v reactor coolant pressure boundary is intact when RCS pressure is ; decreasingt however, these valves are just three of many RCS valves ' that could be open and breach the reactor coolant pressure boundary. RCS pressure has been included as a Type A variable and is considered , to provide the primary information to the operator that RCS pressure is decreasing. Thus, safety valve position does not meet the criteria . of a Type A variable. SQN's safety valve position indication is designated as a Type D Category 2 variable (reference SQN Calculation SQN-SQS4-0068), which is consistent with the requirements of RG 1.97. 4 Reactgr Vessel _L(yel Indication System (RVLIS1 Table 2 of 14 . 97 Revision 2, provides a list of Type B variables. Type B variapies provide information to the operator to indicate whether plant safety functions are being accomplished. 7ho plant safety function associated with RVLIS is specific to core cooling. RVLIS is considered to be a direct indication of core cooling and was designated for SQN as Type B, Category 1 in accordance with RG 1.97 Table 2. In addition to the above justification, the footnote associated with RVLIS no longer remains applicable and therefore has been deleted.
- 5. Shield Building Exhaust Vent (High-Range /Mid-Range Noble Gas)
Table 2 of RG 1.97, Revision 2, providet a list of Type E variables. Type E variables are those variables to be monitored for determining the magnitude of the release of radicactive materials and the continual assessment of such releases. For SQN, the shield building exhaust vent serves as a nonisolable primary release point for detection of airborne radioactive material. Thus, the high-range /mid-range noble gas monitors for SQN's shield building exhaust vent do not meet the criteria of a Type A variable. In accordance with the requirements of RG 1.97, SQN's noble gas monitors have been designated as Category 2. In addition to being Type E. TVA has also designated the shield building vent (noble gas) as a Type C variable because of its role in providing information that would indicate a breach in containment integrity. i H
. . . . , n -
[ o {
, ;. ,,
- 6. Condenser Vacuum Exhaust Vent (High-Range /Mid-Range Noble Gas) ;
The function of SQN's condenser vacuum exhaust is the detection of secondary-side radiation. Main steam line radiation levels, SG blowdown radiation levels, and SG sampling provide similar information for detecting secondary-side radiation. SQN's emergency instructions direct the operator to use secondary-side radiation levels to diagnose , a SG tube rupture event. Identification of this event and the 6 subsequent required manual actions are taken based on increasing SG 1evel with no AFW flow. SG 1evel (narrow range) and AFW flow are both i classified as Type A, Category 1 variables. Consequently, SQN's condenser vacuum exhaust vent (high range /mid-range) noble gas moniturs have been designated as a Type E. Category 2 variable (reference SQN Calculation SQN-SQS4-0068). In addition to being ; Type E. TVA has also designed the condenser vacuum exhaust (noble gas) : as a Type C variable because of its role in providing inforration that j vould indicate a breach in the reactor coolant pressure boundary of ' containment integrity. l By letters dated December 28, 1988, and September 14, 1989, TVA submitted its licensing position regarding variable selection. If a variable was determined to meet the full extent of a Type A variable as defined by RG 1.97, the variable war classified as Type A. TVA established a licensing position in its December 1988 submittal that all Type A , variables are also designated Category 1. The proposed TS change to ' incorporate Type A. Category 1 variables into SQN's accident monitoring specifications is consistent with the guidance provided by the WOG MERITS program. Environmental Inanet Evaluation The proposed change request does not involve an unreviewed environmental , question because operation of SQN Unita 1 and 2 in accordance with this l change would not
- 1. Result in a significant increase in any adverse environmental impact l previously evaluat9d in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) as modified by the Staff's testimony to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, supplements to the FES, environmental impact appraisals, or in any decisions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
- 2. Result in a significant change in effluents or power levels.
- 3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licensing basis for SQN that may have a significant environmental impact.
- - g - -
h -afr ' n
.! . ,r<
- g. ff- 1 i,
r' a ;S.m, r.
;. . ,=*
t ,- < .s , y i ' ENCLOSURE 3 4 ( PROPOSED TECHNICAL. SPECIFICATION CHANCE-- U t n.
-SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT-UNITS 1 AND 2 .. !
e p- ' DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 c , l i h i n -(IVA-SQN-TS-89-30) : f DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS > ;
' f
,_ - <; t- >
.i e :
- p. ..
i
- h. d .; #
~
.f 4
- f t,
' .; v f i- 'i t
- 1 i
[' i o r h i e r l'l ., , , e { L! 3 -l d
-a ;;
t I: ,f 4 p
;$
t .i r 4 r
.{
k-i 6 b
, * * - r f
, , - , , ,.w., a-m .~,.-..w
~enne. -+-*-#>- *- ~"' "
E 1 l
; d % ... ,..
l by . *
- ENCLOSURE 3 Significant Hazards Evaluation TVA has evaluated the proposed TS change and has determined that it does i not represent a significant hazards consideration based on criteria i established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of SQN in accordance with the proposed amendment will nott ]
(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of ! an accident previously evaluated. ' RG 1.97 describes a method acceptable to the NRC for providing instrumentation to monitor plant variables and systems during and i following an accident in a light-water-cooled nuclear power plant. 1 The primary purpose of the accident monitoring instrumentatica is to I display plant variables that provide information required by the < control room operators for manual actions and long-term recovery actions. Determination of variable types and category designations for SQN was established from a review of SQN's emergency procedures, {
' functional restoration guidelines, and SQN's FSAR, Chapter 15 (design basis accidents). This selection process and review are documented in SQN calculation SQN-SQS4-0052. TVA's proposed TS change provides a general revision to TS 3.3.3.7 to incorporate the designated '
Type A. Category 1 variables. This selection of Type A. Category 1 I instrumentation for TS operability is based on the guidance provided in the WOG MERITS program. Operability of these instruments for accident monitoring ensures there is sufficient information available . on sclected plant parameters'to monitor and access plant status and - behavior during and following an accident. Based on the above, the 4 proposed change does not increase the probability or consequences of ' an accident previously evaluated. (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. t The proposed TS change provides regulatory compliance with NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirements and is consistent with the , recommendations of RG 1.97, Revision 2. " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident " December 1980. e 4 w A- _ _ - _- - 4 - - r . - w
sp ll
+ . .
o' L - . .s j ' ' l l The increased reliability of the accident monitoring instrumentation and the availability of information to the operator will significantly improve accident mitigation capabilities for SQN. The inclusion of the Type A, Category 1 variables into TS 3.3.3.7 is based on guidance provided by the WOG MERITS program for TS improvement. Consequently, the improvements provided by this TS change do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously analyzed. (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. TVA's RG 1.97 program ensures sufficient instrumentation is available to the operator to maintain SQN in a safe condition during and following a design basis accident. Accomplishment of critical safety functions by the operator, such as reactivity control, reactor core cooling and heat removal, maintaining reactor coolant system integrity, radioactivity control, and maintaining containment integrity, is significantly improved. Upgrading the quality of accident monitoring instrumentation, improving instrument ranges, and the including multiple instruments with overlapping ranges improve the operator's ability to take appropriate action for accident mitigation. Consequently, the accident monitoring capabilities provided by this change would not involve a reduction in the margin of safety. __L_-_--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " '}}