ML13094A211
| ML13094A211 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/2013 |
| From: | Hoffman A, Leichtling D The DAB Safety Team |
| To: | NRC/SECY |
| References | |
| LTR-13-0283 | |
| Download: ML13094A211 (7) | |
Text
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET Date Printed: Apr 03, 2013 13:12 PAPER NUMBER: LTR- 13 -0283 LOGGING DATE: 04/03/2013 ACTION OFFICE: -h EonD
/Lei To ft6,O-'Oj AUTHOR: Don Leichtling AFFILIATION:
ADDRESSEE: Chairman Resource
SUBJECT:
Provides Media alert: San Onofre is unsafe at any power and Nuclear Experts explain why ACTION: Appropriate DISTRIBUTION: RF. SECY to Ack.
LETTER DATE: 04/03/2013 ACKNOWLEDGED Yes SPECIAL HANDLING: EDO/OPA Lead office to publicly release 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after SECY's assignment, via SECY/EDO/DPC.
NOTES: Two similar e-mails from D. Leichtling and Ace Hoffman dtd 4/3/13.
FILE LOCATION: ADAMS DATE DUE: DATE SIGNED:
Remsburg, Kristy From: Capt.D [captddd@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 03, 2013 9:29 AM To: Capt D
Subject:
Media Alert: San Onofre is unsafe at any power and Nuclear Experts explain why!
Media Alert The DAB Safety Team: April 3, 2013 Media
Contact:
Don Leichtling (619) 296-9928 or Ace Hoffman (760) 720-7261 Titled: ConcurrentMain Steam Line Break and Steam GeneratorTube Ruptures in Unit 2 at 70% Power-Which explains in detail why any restart at San Onofre puts Southern California at risk of a nuclear accident.
A complete five (5) part presentation (see the eight (8) titles listed below), which are posted on the web at this link: DAB Safety Team Documents._
The DAB Safety Team has transmitted the following to the Offices of the Chairman of the NRC, California Attorney General and Senator Barbara Boxer's Committee on Environment and Public Works (EPW).
A great enforcement example: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station is a nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio. On March 5, 2002, maintenance workers discovered that corrosion had eaten a football-sized hole into the reactor vessel head of the Davis-Besse plant. Corrosion had been clogging the plant's filters for months, requiring repeated filter replacement, but the cause was not investigated until after a worker leaned against a control rod drive mechanism, and it toppled over. Although the corrosion did not lead to an accident, this was considered to be a serious nuclear safety incident. Some observers have criticized the NRC's Commission work as an example of regulatory capture [See Note 1] and the NRC has been accused of doing an inadequate job by the Union of Concerned Scientists. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission kept Davis-Besse shut down until March 2004, so that FirstEnergy was able to perform all the necessary maintenance for safe operations. The NRC imposed its largest fine ever-more than $5 million-against FirstEnergy for the actions that led to the corrosion. The company paid an additional $28 million in fines under a settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice. The NRC closely monitored FENOC's response and concluded in September 2009 that FENOC met the conditions of the 2004 order. From 2004 through 2009 the NRC reviewed 20 independent assessments conducted at the plant and verified the independent assessors' credentials. The agency also conducted its own inspections and reviewed FENOC's reactor vessel inspections conducted in early 2005. NRC inspectors paid particular attention to the order's focus on safety culture and safety conscious work environment to ensure there were no new signs of weakness. The NRC task force concluded that the corrosion, occurred for several reasons:
NRC, Davis-Besse and the nuclear industry failed to adequately review, assess, and follow up on relevant operating experience at other nuclear power plants; Davis-Besse failed to ensure that plant safety issues received appropriate attention; and I
NRC failed to integrate available information in assessing Davis-Besse's safety performance.
Questionableenforcement at San Onofre by Region IV and the NR.. The papers shown below have been obtained from Public Domain written by Dr. Joram Hopenfeld and a former SONGS Employee based on his investigation of the steam generator issues, review of the plant data and discussions with several Key SONGS Insiders. These papers confirm that Southern California Edison wants to restart unsafe Unit 2 nuclear reactor at 70% power under false pretenses, just for profits, and as an unapproved risky experiment by subverting the NRC and Federal regulatory process. The true Root Cause (See Note 2) of the unprecedented tube-to-tube wear in Unit 3 has NOT been officially established, as required by NRC Confirmatory Letter Action 1 for restarting the defectively designed and degraded Unit 2. NRC has not even completed their review of Unit 2 Return to Service Reports, nor have they finished Special Unit 2 Tube Inspections, nor have they (publicly?) reviewed SCE's Response to NRC's Requests for Additional Information (RAIs). Now, SCE wants the NRC to approve a new shady License Amendment, undermining public safety and do it without the involvement of Public Safety Experts/Attorneys and Citizens/Ratepayers. After the review of the Mitsubishi Root Cause Evaluation and the Draft SCE License Amendment, it is crystal clear that the NRC needs to follow the example of their own enforcement at David Besse together with the lessons learned from Fukushima, when it comes to approving this new Shady License Amendment for restartingSan Onofre Unit 2's defectively designed and degraded replacementsteam generators. In light of the unanticipated/unprecedented tube leakage at SONGS 3, the health and safety, along with the economic concerns/objections of 8.4 million Southern Californians' MUST OVERRIDE and PREVENT the restarting of Unit 2 at 70% or ANY power level. In a Democratic Society, truth must prevail over profit motivations, misleading propaganda of electricity service disruption and/or projected probabilistic temporary inconveniences to the public based on phony data, because America cannot afford a trillion dollar nuclear eco-disaster!
Safety must override SCE profits and prevent Unit 2 from restarting.
Notes:
1: Regulatory capture occurs when a regulatory, agency, created to act in the public interest, instead advances the commercial or special concerns of interest groups that dominate the industry or sector it is charged with regulating. Regulatory capture is a form of government failure, as it can act as an encouragement for firms to produce negative externalities. The agencies are called "captured agencies".
- 2. Human performance errors resulting from the negative safety culture of production (profits) goals overriding public safety obligations.
The complete five (5) part presentation (see the eight (8) titles listed below Part 1, First Part https://docs.qoogle.com/folder/d/OBweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRIo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=l &docld=l GcD uOONvUdBBRVqCinM3Gr9bhmsJDClbOq65rwdtiBY Part 1, Second Part https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRio4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1&docld=1v Uc RLUlwmhtVDbftGcROPkF-cuiiGa_-qgUJ7i2WIM Part 1, Third Part https://docs.google.com/folder/d/OBweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRio4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1 &docld=1 yCOQ diw8Qixl clG3i7MC6F2VfclMoFOidxiJdlBrobaO 2
Part 1, Fourth Part https://docs.gooale.com/folder/d/OBweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRIo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=l Part 2 https://docs.google.com/folder/d/OBweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRIo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=l &docld=lwkyT GWUy0plXiBXc91JWr6 ACB3d-AIQbuVVZtDRZvl Part 3 https://docs.q'oogle.com/folder/d/0BweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRio4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1 &docld=1 6Vm Gtq9oYGS2-bpR4nBt9d-YB21 E2xrjFplJoxFJ4s4 Part 4 https://docs.google.com/folder/d/OBweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRIo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=l &docld=0BweZ 3cOaFXcFMC1 BNIpMeDQvM2M Part 5 https://docs.google.com/folder/d/OBweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRIo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=l &docld=0BweZ 3cOaFXcFX2qxRDFCRW9CVzq The DAB Safety Team: Don, Ace and a BATTERY of safety-conscious San Onofre insiders plus industry experts from around the world who wish to remain anonymous. These volunteers assist the DAB Safety Team by sharing knowledge, opinions and insight but are not responsible for the contents of the DAB Safety Team's reports. We continue to work together as a Safety Team to prepare additional: DAB Safety Team Documents, which explain in detail why a SONGS restart is unsafe at any power level without a Full/Thorough/Transparent NRC 50.90 License Amendment and Evidentiary Public Hearings. For more information from The DAB Safety Team, please visit the link above.
Our Mission: To prevent a Trillion Dollar Eco-Disaster like Fukushima, from happening in the USA.
Copyright April 3, 2013 by The DAB Safety Team. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast or redistributed without crediting the DAB Safety Team. The contents cannot be altered without the Written Permission of the DAB Safety Team Leader and/or the DAB Safety Team's Attorney 3
Joosten, Sandy From: Ace Hoffman [rhoffman@animatedsoftware.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 03, 2013 9:46 AM
Subject:
Media Alert: San Onofre is unsafe at any power and Nuclear Experts explain why!
The DAB Safety Team: April 3, 2013 Media
Contact:
Don Leichtling (619) 296-9928 or Ace Hoffman (760) 720-7261 Titled: Concurrent Main Steam Line Break and Steam Generator Tube Ruptures in Unit 2 at 70%
Power -
Which explains in detail why any restart at San Onofre puts Southern California at risk of a nuclear accident.
A complete five (5) part presentation (see the eight (8) titles listed below), which are posted on the web at this link: DAB Safety Team Documents.
The DAB Safety Team has transmitted the following to the Offices of the Chairman of the NRC, California Attorney General and Senator Barbara Boxer's Committee on Environment and Public Works (EPW).
A great enforcement example: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station is a nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio. On March 5, 2002, maintenance workers discovered that corrosion had eaten a football-sized hole into the reactor vessel head of the Davis-Besse plant. Corrosion had been clogging the plant's filters for months, requiring repeated filter replacement, but the cause was not investigated until after a worker leaned against a control rod drive mechanism, and it toppled over. Although the corrosion did not lead to an accident, this was considered to be a serious nuclear safety incident. Some observers have criticized the NRC's Commission work as an example of regulatory capture [See Note 1] and the NRC has been accused of doing an inadequate job by the Union of Concerned Scientists. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission kept Davis-Besse shut down until March 2004, so that FirstEnergy was able to perform all the necessary maintenance for safe operations.. The NRC imposed its largest fine ever-more than $5 million-against FirstEnergy for the actions that led to the corrosion. The company paid an additional $28 million in fines under a settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice. The NRC closely monitored FENOC's response and concluded in September 2009 that FENOC met the conditions of the 2004 order. From 2004 through 2009 the NRC reviewed 20 independent assessments conducted at the plant and verified the independent assessors' credentials. The agency also conducted its own inspections and reviewed FENOC's reactor vessel inspections conducted in early 2005. NRC inspectors paid particular attention to the order's focus on safety culture and safety conscious work environment to ensure there were no new signs of weakness. The NRC task force concluded that the corrosion, occurred for several reasons:
NRC, Davis-Besse and the nuclear industry failed to adequately review, assess, and follow up on relevant operating experience at other nuclear power plants; Davis-Besse failed to ensure that plant safety issues received appropriate attention; and NRC failed to integrate available information in assessing Davis-Besse's safety performance.
Questionable enforcement at San Onofre by Region IV and the NRC: The papers shown below have been obtained from Public Domain written by Dr. Joram Hopenfeld and a former SONGS Employee based on his investigation of. the steam generator issues, review of the plant data and discussions with several Key SONGS Insiders. These papers confirm that Southern California 1
.Edison wants to restart unsafe Unit 2 nuclear reactor at 70% power under false pretenses, just for profits, and as an unapproved risky experiment by subverting the NRC and Federal regulatory process. The true Root Cause (See Note 2) of the unprecedented tube-to-tube wear in Unit 3 has NOT been officially established, as required by NRC Confirmatory Letter Action 1 for restarting the defectively designed and degraded Unit 2. NRC has not even completed their review of Unit 2 Return to Service Reports, nor have they finished Special Unit 2 Tube Inspections, nor have they (publicly?) reviewed SCE's Response to NRC's Requests for Additional Information (RAIs). Now, SCE wants the NRC to approve a new shady License Amendment, undermining public safety and do it without the involvement of Public Safety Experts/Attorneys and Citizens/Ratepayers. After the review of the Mitsubishi Root Cause Evaluation and the Draft SCE License Amendment, it is crystal clear that the NRC needs to follow the example of their own enforcement at David Besse together with the lessons learned from Fukushima, when it comes to approving this new Shady License Amendment for restarting San Onofre Unit 2's defectively designed and degraded replacement steam generators. In light of the unanticipated/unprecedented tube leakage at SONGS 3, the health and safety, along with the economic concerns/objections of 8.4 million Southern Californians' MUST OVERRIDE and PREVENT the restarting of Unit 2 at 70% or ANY power level. In a Democratic Society, truth must prevail over profit motivations, misleading propaganda of electricity service disruption and/or projected probabilistic temporary inconveniences to the public based on phony data, because America cannot afford a trillion dollar nuclear eco-disaster!
Safety must override SCE profits and prevent Unit 2 from restarting.
Notes:
1: Regulatory capture occurs when a regulatory agency; created to act in the public interest, instead advances the commercial or special concerns of interest groups that dominate the industry or sector it is charged with regulating. Regulatory capture is a form of government failure, as it can act as an encouragement for firms to produce negative externalities. The agencies are called "captured agencies".
- 2. Human performance errors resulting from the negative safety culture of production (profits) goals overriding public safety obligations.
The complete five (5) part presentation (see the eight (8) titles listed below Part 1, First Part https://docs.google.com/folder/d/OBweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=l&docId=lGcDuO@NvUdBBR VqCinM3Gr9bhmsJDCIbOg65rwdtjBY Part 1, Second Part https://docs.google.com/folder/d/OBweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=l&docId=lv-UcRLUlwmhtV DbftGcROPkF-cujiGa_-qjUJ7i2WIM Part 1, Third Part https://docs.google.com/folder/d/@BweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRlo4aX3CT2s/edit?pli=l&docId=lyCOQ-diw8Qixl qG3j7MC6F2VfcqMoFOidxjJdIBpbaO Part 1, Fourth Part https://docs.google.com/folder/d/eBweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=l Part 2 https://docs.google com/folder/d/0BweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRlo4aX3CT2s/edit?pli=1&docld=lwkyTGWUyOpIXj BXc9l3Wr6_ACB3d-AIQbuWZtDRZvI Part 3 https://docs.google.com/folder/d/OBweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRlo4aX)CT2s/edit?pli=l&docId=16VmGtq9oYGS2-bpR4nBt9d-YB21E2xrjFpI)oxFJ4s4 2
Part 4 https://docs.google.com/folder/d/OBweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1&docId=OBweZ3c~aFXcFM C1BNlpMeDQyM2M Part 5 https://docs.google.com/folder/d/OBweZ3cOaFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=l&docId=OBweZ3c~aFXcFX 2gxRDFCRW9CVzg The DAB Safety Team: Don, Ace and a BATTERY of safety-conscious San Onofre insiders plus industry experts from around the world who wish to remain anonymous. These volunteers assist the DAB Safety Team by sharing knowledge, opinions and insight but are not responsible for the contents of the DAB Safety Team's reports. We continue to work together as a Safety Team to prepare additional: DAB Safety Team Documents, which explain in detail why a SONGS restart is unsafe at any power level without a Full/Thorough/Transparent NRC 50.90 License Amendment and Evidentiary Public Hearings. For more information from The DAB Safety Team, please visit the link above.
Our Mission: To prevent a Trillion Dollar Eco-Disaster like Fukushima, from happening in the USA.
Copyright April 3, 2013 by The DAB Safety Team. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast or redistributed without crediting the DAB Safety Team. The contents cannot be altered without the Written-Permission of the DAB Safety Team Leader and/or the DAB Safety Team's Attorney Ace Hoffman, computer programmer, author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry Free download: acehoffman.org Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman Phone: (760) 720-7261 Address: PO Box 1936, Carlsbad, CA 92018 Subscribe to my free newsletter today!
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