ML18057A627
| ML18057A627 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1990 |
| From: | CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18057A625 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9012130037 | |
| Download: ML18057A627 (34) | |
Text
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ENCLOSURE 1 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE REQUEST MAIN FEEDWATER. ISOLATION PROPOSED CHANGED PAGES Decefuber 7, 19QO' 3 Pages
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TABLE 3.16.l ,, Engineered Safety Features Svstem Initiation Instrument Setting Limits
- Functional Unit Channel Setting Limit
- 1. High Containment Pressure a. Safety Injection 3.70 - 4.40 Psi~
- b. Containment Spray
- c. Containment Isolation d.
e. Containment Air Cooler DBA Mode Main Feedwater Isolation~' I e I I
- 2. Pressurizer Low Pressure Safety Injection ~1550 111 Psia for Nominal Operating:
Pressures < 1900 Psia '
~ 1593 Psia 121 for Nominal Operating Pressures ~ 1900 Psia
- 3. Containment High Radiation Containment Isolation s 20 R/h
- 4. Low Steam Generator Pressure
- a. Steam Line Isolation > 500 Psia 1
~
- b. Main Feedwater Isolation*~ i 500 Psia Pl
- 5. SIRW Low-Level Switches Recirculation Actuation s 27-lnch~~~ Above _Tank Bottom
- 6. Engineered Safeguards Pump Engineered Safeguards s 2.2 x 106 CPM Room Vent - Radiation Monitors Pump Room Isolation 111 May be bypassed below 1600 psia and is automatically reinstated above 1600 psia.
121 May be bypassed below 1700 psia and is automatically reinstated above 1700 psia. 131 May be bypassed below 550 psia and is automatically reinstated above 550 psia. 141 By closing both the main feedwater r.egul.ating valve and bypass valve. 3-75 Amendment 'No~~'
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TSPR9006
Table 3.17.3 Instrument Operating Conditions for Isolation Functions Minimum Minimum Permissible Operable Degree of Bypass . No Functional Unit Channels Redundancy Conditions 1 Containment Isolation
- a. Containment High 2ca,c) 1 During Leak Test Pressure
- b. Containment High 2<c> 1 none Radiation
- c. Manua 1 1 none none 2 Steam Line Isolation
- a. Low Steam Gen 2/Steam<c> 1 Below 550* psia
Pressure Gen
- b. Manual I/Steam none none Gen
- c. Containment High 2ca,c) 1 During Leak Test Pressure
- 3. Main Feedwater Isolation<d>
- a. Low Steam Generator 2/Steam<c> 1 Below 550 psia
Pressure Gen
- b. Manual I/Steam None None Geri .
- c. Containment High 2ca,c) 1 During Leak Test High Pressure (a) Right and left actuation circuits each have 2 channels.
(b) Bypass automatically reinstated above 550 psia. (c) One of the inoperable channels must be in the tripped position. (d) By closing both main feedwater regulating valve and bypass valve. 3-80 Amendment No. TSPR9006
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r;". TABLE 4.1.2 Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations and Testing of Engineered Safety Feature Instrumentation .controls (Contd) Surveillance Channel Description Function Freguenc)! Surveillance Method
- 13. Safety Injection Tank Level a. Check s a. *verify that level and pressure indication is between and Pressure Instruments independent high high/low alanns for level and pressur~.
- b. Ca 1ibrate R b. Known pressure and different i a 1 pressure app 1i ed to pressute and leve 1 sensors. I i
- 14. Boric Acid Tank Level Switches a. Test R a. Pump tank below low-level alann point to verify switch \operation.
- 15. Boric Acid Heat Tracing System a. Check D a. Observe temperature recorders for proper readings.
- 16. Main Steam Isolation Valve 1- a. Check s a. Compare four independent pressure indications.
Circuits
- b. Test 131 R b. 'Signal to mete~ relay adjusted with test device to veri,fy MSIV circuit logic. '
- 17. SIRW Tank Temperature a. Check M a. 'compare independent temperature readouts.
Indication and* Alarms b. Ca 1ibrate R b. Known resistance applied to indicating loop.
- 18. Low-Pressure Safety Injection a. Check p a. Observe valve is open with air supply isolated.
Flow Control Valve CV-3006
- 19. Safety Injection Bottle a. Check p a. Ensure each valve open by observing valve position inditation Isolation Valves and valve itself. Then lock open breakers and control: power key switches.
- 20. Safety Injection Miniflow a. Check p a. Verify valves open and HS-3027 and 3056 positioned to !
Valves CV-3027, 3056 maintain them 0 pen. I
- 21. Main Feedwater Isolation a. Check R a. Verify main feedwater regulating valve and.bypass valve both close on a simulated CHP Signal and on a simulated S/G Low Pressure Signal.
NOTES: ~~(!)Calibration of the sensors is perfonned during calibration of Item 5(b), Table 4.1.1. (2)A 11 monthly tests will be done on only one channe 1 at a time to prevent protect ion system actuat iori. (3)Calibration of the sensors is perfonned during calibration of Item 7(b), Table 4.1.1, (4)Required when PCS is >1500 psia. 4-8 Amendment No. UI, 1111; ~01. U0. TSPR9006
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- - - - - - - - - ------~-*- - - - - - - - - - - - ~- ------~-- --~- * - ~--- - --~ - ~- -** - --- - -----r------- - - - - - -- - ENCLOSURE 2 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE REQUEST MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION* EXISTING PAGES WITH PROPOSED CHANGES MARKED Decembe~ 7, 1990 3 Pages
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......... e.retr Peature* fJJ*tem Initiation lnetnmetat Belthl!I tl*lt*
~1amt**1 Cllmlli9el Bettly Ll*lt
- 1. * .... a.tat-.& ....... ** lafetr l*JecUe111
** C..tal-.a\
** Contal.-ent 8pre.J
- 1. 70-lt .lto Psig l*
l*l*tl*
- t. Coatal..t Air e..
Cooler DBI Mode
/IJ111h Fi1ti->T.-a.I:s-ol0Ti.-{¥) (ll i,. ,e I. fr111a1 ... a..ta11Jae llllf*tr 111,Jectl* ?. 1550 hla tor ._lnal Operating
............ c 1900Pal* .
?. 1591 Patal2J tor ._lnal Operating
........... ?. 1900 ....
J. um..-i_ _ , ..... llilldl* !. 20 I/la
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.......... ....
........ ..,.....,......... '--.
~ - - .... l*l*t**
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llMlrnlatl* Aet*U*
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- b. ,.._, ~Jwo-,... rroJJi,:,.. l"I)
,. 500 ....(J)
.?, S'OO f.s1"t:a(':J
!, 2'f-llldl (-6 AboN Yaal lotto.
. !. 2.2 a 105 Cfll
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........ .,,, 111 .., . lfeo ,.1....... *omUeallr relaatate4 a1Mtw 1'80 ,. ***
(I)., .. 1111. nl W* I,_ ,.1. _. la --tleau, rel*taW alMn* lTOO ,.1 ** ~ IJ._ '9 lttr 111 . .I * ' ' ° ,.1. . . . I* -'<<Wet.leallr relutat.94 at.ow 550 pela. ...... ~11 11 ... * ~ ...... ct ot1
., {I/) S 'f C./0SIA0~ bo-l'h rJ.A. ,,,,,,_,n/ntJ,,,,Pl'°.- l-~'u/o'T/n6 110/,,t.. tlHld by,*.3r y111/r1L
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,; 11:111i-- 11111~-- hniui'ble OpuUl.e
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DICNe ot Bnua
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llo Punct1oml Ullit Cozrta~maa' I.alation Chan*la Coaditiou 1
- a. ~ ll1P 2Ca,c) 1 Dlr1lll Leak Ten Pre*ftft
- b. Coat*1meat mp 2(c) 1
....
Rldiat1on
- c. 1 2 Stea L1ae Ieolat1on
&. Lav Steaa Preewre Ga 2/Staa(c) a.
1 B9lov ° .. ia('b)
- b. *Maau*l l/Staa Bo*
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a.
- c. C. t1>t'UN;. __-,- J..(o..,a) . I (),,,.,,;. Le.*k. lc~T Hi~ P>1A1>uM-.
!3. /)'/'11/v~tlivol#,F.:c/4/i~ (d)
CL. J.. ow S "no.n G ...,.. p.......,UM_ -2./sre.o...~> I ea ....
- b. fJ1 """~o I 1-S7UMr1 6..,
NONI'. c... Ctm'101n~T JJ.(~e) I
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(a) Richt &DI! left actuatioll eirmiu wll !aft 2 w.-1 ** ('b)* tnu* auto.ti~ reimtate4 &bow° .-sa. ( c) o.. ot tm im~* cmmael* mn 'be 1D tm vtpp.t poaitioa.
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(d) 6'f a/01'1N6 ho-#, +.k rmo1;,/*d1Uor.,. Ht>11/07iti11 v~i,~ 0no' ~pAt14 volr~. l
!-80 . .
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TABLE 4.1.2 Mlnilnim Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations and Testing of Engineered Safety Feature lnatru11entatlon Controls (Contd) Surveillance
<Jwtnel Deacrlptlan Function Frequency Surveillance Method U. Safety Injection Tank Level a. a.eek s a. Verify that level and pressure Indication la and Preaaure lnatnmente between independent high hlgh/lov alal"llS for level and pressure.
- b. Calibrate R b. lnovn pressure and differential pressure applied to pressure and level sensors.
Vt. Boric Acid rant Level Swltcbea a. Teat R a. Puap tanlt below lov-level alani point to verify switch operation.
- 15. Boric Acid Heat Tracing Syst* a. <Jleclt D a. Observe te11~rature recorders for proper readings.
- 16. Main Ste* Iaolatlon Valve a. <2leck s a. Compare four independent pressure Indications.
Clrculte
- b. Teat(]) R b. Signal to meter relay adjusted vltb test device to verify MSIV circuit logic.
- 17. SIIW Tank *ruperature a. Qaeck M a. Collpare Independent temperature readouts.
lndlcatlon and Alana b. C.Ubrat~ R b. ICnovn resistance applied to Indicating loop.
- 18.
- Low-Preanre Safety Injection a. a.eek p a. Observe valve la open with air supply Isolated.
flow r.c.trol Valve CV-3006
- 19. Safety Injection Bottle 1801atlan Valv..
- a. <Jleck p
** Ensure each valve open by observing valve f:ltlon Indication and valve Itself. lben .
- It open breaker* and control power ltey switches.
- 20. Safety Injection Mlnlflov a. Check p a. Verify valvea open and HS-3027 and 3056 poaltioned Valv.. CV-3027, 3056 to .. tntaln th*~* 1 Q..., J/...,i£'( .-,Glit ~,cJ,,,,_-Z,,,_~~,,JoU:.d ,,,o/.c.. -.cJ J,~:PIW.4
~I. /1101il F..w<L;;z;.rs-~.71""" ~l..c oo?'holo.r x::' o.... ~1,.e1/~f4d C11Psu*-I-"'-. 0 Cltwtlil*"T'id (l)Callbratlon of the aensors ts perfonned during calibration of It* 5(bJ, Yable 4.1.l.
.....,. /o"41P>.44ou1Jl,. .$/G,...,o/
(2)All 11e>nthly teata will be done on only one channel at a ti.Ille to prevent protection system actuation.
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*(3)Callbratlon of the senaora la perfol'lllld during calibration of Item 7(b), Table 4.1.l.
(4)Required tlben PCS la > 1500 psla. 4-8 Amendment No. U, _,, tft,-H&- MarGla 23, 1 990 TSP0289-0025-NL04
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---~---- ENCLOSURE 3 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE REQUEST MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION RESULTS OF PALISADES MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK ANALYSIS FOR THE STEAM GENERATOR REPLACEMENT PROJECT December 7, 1990
'~1111 1
- ASEA BROWN BOVERI
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July 21-,--1990- -- -- --- --- -- *- - - NT-90-0975 Mr. R. J. Gerling Palisades Nuclear Plant Consumers Power Company 27780 Blue Starr Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043-9530
Subject:
Results of Palisades Main Steam Line Break Analysis for the Replacement Steam Generator Project
References:
(1) William G. Dove, Jr. letter NT-89-1188, dated October 30, 1989, Revised Palisades MSLB Containment Analysis Proposal (Proposal No. 89-244-AUC). (2) William G. Dove, Jr. letter NT-90-0244, dated May 31, 1990, Completion of MSLB Phase 0 Analysis for the SG Replacemenf Effort. (3)_ William G..Dove, Jr. letter NT-90-1007, dated July *24, 1990, Transmittal of MSLB and SGTR Input Data for Palisades Replacement Steam Generator Analyses. (4) R. J. Gerling (CPCo) letter dated July 23,1990, Acceptance of Input Data used for Palisades MSLB and SGTR Analyses. Attachments: (1) Summary of Replacement Steam Generator Full Scope Analysis. (2) Results of Analysis: Sequence of Events and Plots. _
Dear Bud:
This letter transmits the final results of the Palisades Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) Analysis for the Replacement Steam Generator (RSG) Project. This "Full Scope" effort was originally proposed in Reference (1) and_wa~ performed in accordance with the NRC's Standard Rev1ew Plan, Sections 6.2.1.1.A and 6.2.1.4. The primary objective o~ the analysis was to determine containment peak pressure and compare the results with the design containment pressure of 55 psig, in response to a double-ended MSLB. Per Reference (1), a Main Steam Line Break was initiated from five different power levels with offsite power available. Once the worst peak containment pressure case was determined, a loss of offsite power case was run to verify that the worst single failure had been selected for the five base cases. In addition~ although originally proposed as an option in Reference (1), ABB C-E also selected the peak containment temperature case and determined the temperature response when crediting an 8% re-evaporation fraction allowed by the NRC for Environmental Equipment Qualification (EEQ). ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power Combustion Engineering Inc. 1000 Prospect Hill Road Telephone (203) 688-1911 Post Office Box 500 Fax (203) 285-9512 Windsor. Connecticut 06095-0500 Telex 99297 COMBEN WSOR
.. . I ,
Mr. R. J. Gerling
** July 27, 1990
~--- ---- --As--described-with-in-; -th-e-peaR 1fress-ure results of all Main Steam Line Break cases analyzed fell below the design value of 55 psig. In addition, the base case single failure of the loss of two containment spray pumps with offsite power available was verified.to be limiting when a comparable case, with an assumed Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP), was found to produce less severe containment pressure and temperature results. The EEQ case showed a reduction in peak containment temperature of approximately 16 deg-F when re-evaporation was credited. Consequently, the peak containment temperature from this fell well below the currently accepted peak EEQ temperature of 407.47 deg-F. This transmittal provides an overview of the overall MSLB "full scope" effort. Provided as Attachments (1) and (2} are the overall summary of the analysis ana the detailed results, respectively. This is the end product of an effort which began with the Phase 0 analysis of Reference (2} during which much of the ground breaking was completed. Since Reference (2) provided a detailed summary of the sensitivity of peak pressure to various plant and containment initial conditions, this document will concentrate primarily on the final "full scope" cases described within, and simply reference that document where appropriate. Per the ground rules of Reference (l); all significant data used in this analysis has be~n reviewed by CPCo during different phases of the analysis. This input data was summarized in Reference (3) and accepted for use in Reference (4). At this point, a significant effort has been made to independent 1y verify the input and. output of the cases described within. This has included various mass and energy balances, -performed via spread sheet - calculations, and also additional checks -using the CONTRANS code, all of which will be *includ~d in the recorded calculations to be provided to CPCo. Completion of this quality assurance effort will now consist of wrapping up the recorded calculation and completing other miscellaneous internal. documentation. It has been a pleasure to work with CPCo over the last several months on both the replacement and original steam generator projects. Per our discussions, the quality assured recorded calculation(s) of all full sc.ope results and a DRAFT of the FSAR write-up of the MSLB analysis, for your review, are expected sometime in August. If any questions arise, please do not hesitate to call *ither me at {203)-285-3445 or Mike Gancarz at (203)-285-4600. Very truly yours, ictu-q,~L William G. Dove, Jr. Supervisor, Operations Analysis cc: A. B. Spinell (Director, Western Division) w/o enclosure G. C. Bischoff (ABB C-E Windsor) w/o enclosure M. J. Gancarz (ABB C-E Windsor) M. c. Janke (ABB C-E Windsor) R. Taylor (ABB C-E RSSM) w/o enclosure T. Duffy (CPCo)
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*ATTACHMENT ( 1)
Summary of Replacement Steam Generator Full Scope Analysis
Per the requirements of Reference (1), the Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) "Full Scope" analysis has been completed. The purpose of this analysis was to demonstrate that the peak cont~i nment_ ,p~essure_ r-esulting---from th-is -event- doe*s - - - not**exceed--thEf Palisades -peak containment design pressure of 55 psig. _As outlined in Reference (1), five base MSLB cases were run at the power levels of 102%, 75%, 50%, 25%, and 0%. Although past ABB C-E in-house analyses have shown that having offsite power available is the most limiting for the MSLB containment events (primarily due to greater primary to secondary heat transfer with the primary coolant pumps running), an additional loss of offsite power (LOOP) case was run for the limiting peak containment pressure case (75% power) to verify this assumption. Also, per CPCo's request, an environmental equipment qualification (EEQ) run was made of the limiting peak containment temperature case (102% power). The results of this analysis, performed with the NRC approved SGNIII coupled primary/secondary plant and containment code, showed peak containment pressure to remain below 55 psig for all cases. While the specific case by case results for this "full scope" analysis are shown in Table 1, this is the end product of a multi-faceted effort which began with the Phase 0 analysis documented in Reference (2), the findings of which lead to analyses performed for the original steam generators (Ref. 4). References (2) & (4) summarize in detail the findings which showed the need for a plant fix to initiate main feedwater regulating valve closure on containment high pressure, thereby limiting the amount of main feedwater available for release to containment. Reference (2) also provides the results of a parametric study which showed the sensitivity of peak containment pressure to various plant and containment initial conditions. With the majority of ground breaking done in the above analyses, the intent of this "full scope" effort was to utilize the findings of References (2) & (4)
- to revise past generalized over-conservatisms, such as a universally applied large volumetric expansion factor and full primary and secondary, latent metal heat, and produce a more realistic (but yet conservatively biased per SRP guidelines) set of final cases. Also used for this final set of cases was CPCo's main feedwater flow algorithm (CPCo reference EA-P-SOW-90-002-01) which was incorporated into the SGNill code during a CPCo visit to ABB C-E. This algorithm accounted for "feedwater spiking" by diverting the correct flow to each steam generator based on each generator's pressure. It also initiated closure of the main feedwater regulating valves based on the containment high pressure trip signal (CHPS). Normally the main feedwat~r pumps are ramped back; however, the pumps- remain at full speed foi this analysis in the event that the pump speed controller is in the manual mode and not automatic.
The entire MSLB effort was structured to allow CPCo to be actively involved in all aspects of the analysis including input data reviews and various output comparisons with their CONTEMPT code. The result of working in this close fashion was a very precise, plant specific analysis. From a quality assurance standpoint, the fact that CPCo was the primary reviewer of the Reference (3) input data package, allowed the independent review process to progress in a smooth orderly fashion. As stated above, some of the generalized over-conservative assumptions used in the past were modified. However, the outline of Refer,ence (1), together with
that stated in subsequent meetings with the NRC, mandated that this analysis follow the NRC's Standard Review Plan (Sections 6.2.1.1.A and 6.2.1.4). For completeness, the followi_f!g --~~~~Jon _wUJ_state_the-major -f!equi-rements- of- those- --- -- ---- --- ------gutdeli nes- -a-nd tiow-eact\ was addressed by ABB C-E. SRP Section 6.2.1.1.A Requirement How Addressed in Analysis Sub-section 11.e
- 1. The analysis should be based on CPCo determined this to be a failure the most severe single active of an electrical component causing the failure. loss of two containment spray pumps with offsite power available. ABB C-E confirmed this by running a LOOP case.
The assumption not to assume a failure of an MSIV or MFW regulating valve was verified with per NRC SER, dated Feb. 28, 1986.
- 2. The analysis should be based on The full scope analysis focused on a spectrum of power levels and five different power levels (102%,
break sizes. 751, SOS, 251, and OS). Per SRP Section 6.2.1.4, with no liquid entrainment in the blowdown, the break size selected should result in the maximum release rate. Since critical flow out the break (based on the flow restrictor area) produced a single - phase steam discharge, no additional break studies were required. SRP Section 6.2.1.4 Regyirement How Addressed in Analysis Sub-section 11.1
- 1. The sources of energy which All inventory related energies were should be considered are: conside~ed including that in the steam
- a. Affected SG metal. and feedwater lines to the isolation
- b. Vessel tubing. valves. All metal energies were
- c. Feedwater line metal. considered except that of the steam
- d. Steam line metal. lines, which for dry steam conditions
- e. Affected SG- water. - - have a very low heat transfer .
- f. Affected SG feedwater prior coefficient and empty within the first to closure of isolation valves 10 seconds. This assumption was in feedwa.ter line. approved as part of ABB C-E's
- g. Unaffected SG steam prior to containment methodology.
isolation valve closure in cross-over lines.
- h. Primary coolant to affected SG during blowdown.
- 2. The MSLB should be analyzed for a See response to Section 6~2.l.1.A.11.e spectrum of break sizes and power Item #2.
levels from hot standby to 1021 of full power.
SRP Section 6.2.1.4 Regyirement How Addressed in Analysis Sub-section 11.2 - - - - -- - - -- -- - - -- - - - ------ L The ma_s_s_ releasif_r-ates should be As stated in Reference (3), the CRITCO calculated using the Moody model flow correlation was used since it was or one that is demonstrated to be demonstrated to be slightly more equally conservative. conservative than Moody.
- 2. Calculations of heat transfer to This is part of the SGNIII methodology water in the affected SG should be based on nucleate boiling.
- 3. The sources of mass release to All cited sources of mass release were be considered are: considered per Ref. (3).
- a. Affected SG water.
- b. Affected SG feedwater line inventory.
- c. Affected SG feedwater prior to closure of the isolation valves in the feedwater lines.
- d. Affected SG steam.
- e. Unaffected SG steam prior to closure of the isolation valves in the SG cros$-over lines.
- 4. A single active failure in the Although these failures were not steam or feedwater line isolation considered, CPCo obtained NRC provisions or feedwater pumps approval for this assumption, should be assumed. _ reference SER, dated Feb. 28, 1986.
- 5. Feedwater flow to the affected CPCo's main feedwater flow algorithm, SG should be calculated based documented in CPCo reference on the diversion of flow from EA-P-SDW-90-002-01, addressed this the other SG(s). item.
- 6. Aftei feedwater isolation, the This volume was calculated by CPCo unisolated feedwater line mass and incorporated into the SGNIII code.
should be added to the affected steam generator.
- 7. An acceptable computer code for The SGNIII coupled primary/secondary calculating mass and energy and containment code was used for all releases for MSLBs is the mass and energy release rates as well SGN I II code. as the calculation of containment pressure and temperature.
Table 1 provides a sununary of the case results. As shown, the 75S power ,case was shown to produce the highest peak containment pressure, while the 1021 power case produced the highest peak containment temperature. This non-linearity can be attributed to the trade-off between the higher steam generator inventory at lower power levels versus the corresponding reduction in main feedwater flow added to the ruptured steam generator. This same trade-off, along with the energy levels of the initial S/G inventories, can be used to explain why the DI power case has a higher peak pressure than the 25S and SOI cases.
The peak pressures calculated for the final cases fell a couple ~f p94n~-~ b~J.Qw__ _ - - - -- -tha-t-- of-the-boundtng-Phase o-ca-su--prTmarlly-aue -tcf tile folTowlng changes. I. Initial containment pressure reduced from 16.0 psia to 15.7 psia per Technical Specification Limit. *
- 2. Step function containment sprays used which initiate approximately a half minute earlier than that assumed in prior analyses, per Ref (3).
- 3. The installation of CPCo's Main Feedwater flow algorithm into SGNIII with the valve closure time decreased from 30 seconds to 22 seconds.
- 4. The use of realistic volumetric expansion multipliers based on actual manufacturing tolerances and more precise pressure and temperature
*additions. These were applied to all inventories, resulting in less available discharge mass.
- 5. The *use of more realistic primary and secondary heat capacities (HCp's),
based on conservative heat conduction equations, versus including all met!ll for heat transfer to the affected steam generator.
- 6. Crediting steam flow to the turbine prior to reactor trip.
- 7. Correcting the break area seen by the intact unit to the flow restrictor area versus the actual break area. *
- 8. In addition, the SG tube to secondary UA factor (based on information provided from Chatt~nooga) input to SGNllI was conservatively a~sumed to be cons is tent for a11 power 1eve ls for the fu 11 scope effort. Due to a subtle code input shortcoming, this value was not explicitly used for the filial 102i Phase O case (# AHZJ) of Reference (2) .. Although the correct value was input, a code option was in-advertently unchanged which allowed the code to override the intended value and instead use a more realistic, less conservative steady state value which it calculated for the given power level. Since for low power levels the SGNIII code
- uses the actual input value, the correct UA value was used for the zero power case. This _inconsistency in the Phase 0 cases was most likely the primary reason that the zero power case was more limiting than ro2i power case for that Ref. (2-) effort.
As also shown in Table 1, the LOOP case at 75i power produced results appreciably lower than the corresponding case with offsite power available. Although this test was not performed for each case, the 75i power case showed that crediting the coastdown of the primary coolant pumps resulted in less primary to secondary heat transfer which extended the blowdown time. This
- consequently allowed the containment heat ramoval devices more time in which to remove energy which resulted in a lower peak pressure and temperature.
The final case run was that for environmentalequipment qualification.* The peak containment temperature, 102i power case was run crediting 8" re-evaporation of wall condensate. This is allowed by NUREG-0588 and its successor Regulatory Guide 1.89 specifically for this purpose. Per CPCo's request, this was run for
10, 000 seconds and showed a reduct ion tn _te1m~e.r_1tur_e_o_f_ app.roximatel.v--16---- -- - - ---- degrees to-384--deg~*F-.- --since -CPto-,-s currently reported peak EEQ containment temperature is 407.74 deg-F, this run quantified the actual margin for the replacement steam generator units. Attachment (2) provides plots of containment pressure and temperature versus time for the cases listed in Table 1. Also provided is a sequence of events table of the limiting 751 power case. As discussed with CPCo, the FSAR write-up will include plots of containment pressure and temperature versus time and a sequence of events only for the limiting containment pressure case. Also included will be a spread sheet calculation of the mass and energy balance performed for that case. As mentioned earlier, mass and energy balance checks were performed for all cases and will be included in the quality assured recorded calculation(s) ~o be provided to CPCo. (,
TABLE 1 RESULTS OF *FULL SCOPE* REPLACEMENT STEAM GENERATOR MSLB ANALYSIS CASEI DESCRIPTION POWER LEVEL PEAK PRESSURE PEAK TEMPERATlJRE (PSIG) (OEG-F) AU1W BASE CASE 102CMI 52.29 400.35 (2) AUUO BASE CASE 75CMt 52.45 (1) 396.74 AUUX BASE CASE 50CMt 50.80 393.08 AUVH BASE CASE 2SCMI 48.46 390.22 AUWH BASE CASE OCMt 51.03 388.87 BAZH LOOP 75CMt 42.91 371.21 ADJF EE0(3) 102CMt 52. 12 384.18 (1) PEAK CONTAINMENT PRESSURE (2) PEAK CONTAINMENT TEMPERATIJRE (3) 8CMt REEVAPORATION CREDITED
ATTACHMENT (2) Results of Analysis Attachment contents:
- 1. Sequence of Events for Limiting 75% Power Case
- 2. Containment Pressure and Temperature Plots versus time for:
- 102%, 75%, 50%, 25%, &0% Base Cases
- 75% Power Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) Case
- 102% Power Equipment Environmental Qualification (EEQ) Case _ _
. e SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK, PALISADES REPLACEMENT STEAM GENERATOR
~~-- TIME (SECONDS) EVENT PESCRIPTION SETPOINT I VALUE 0.0 Double-ended Main Steam Line Break occurs 0.01 AFAS signal generated manual trip 1.64 Reactor Trip Signal on Containment High 3.7 psig Pressure 2.01 Containment High Pressure Signal (CHPS) 4.3 psig MSIS: MSIV closure signal sent
- HFW Reg. Valve closure signal sent CSAS: Containment Fans/Sprays Systems actuation signals sent 3.64 Turbine Trip (TAVs Shut) 4.01 HSIVs Shut (Slowdown from Intact SG is Terminated) 5.01 Auxiliary Feedwater flow begins to. 200 gpm affected steam generator 5.31 Three Containment Fan Coolers Start 25.01 HFW Reg. Valves shut (Hain Feedwater flow terminated) 34.96 . Containment Spray Flow (1 pump) begins 51~38 Containment Peak Temperature Reached 396.74 deg-F 57.00 Containment Spray Fl ow ( 1 pump) 1978.90 gpm reaches maximum flow 168.58 Containment Peak Pressure Reached 52.45 psig 194.00 Slowdown of Affected Steam Generator Essentially Complete
FINAL RUN: 102% POWER CONTAINMENT PRESSURE VS. TIME 0 80 120 160 200 TIME (SECONDS)
l
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.FINAL RUN: 1 02% POWER CONTAINMENT TEMPERAnJRE VS. TIME 420 400 380 360 340
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.
180 160 140 0 80 120 160 200 240 TIME (SECONDS)
FINAL RUN: 75% POW*ER CONTAINMENT PRESSURE VS. TIME 50 ,.... 40 .. (.') ll1 -fl. L-' rr 30
- >
ll1 ll1
.... ~
Q.. 20 10 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 TIME (SECONDS)
FINAL RUN: 75% POWER CONTAINMENT TEMPERAnJRE VS. TIME 420 400 380 360 340
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........ 300 ...;r
- >
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~ 240 Lt.I t-220 200 UJO 160 140 0 80 120 160 200 240 TIME (SECONDS)
FINAL RUN: 25% POWER CONTAINMENT PRESSURE VS. TIME 50 -- C> en* n.
......,
4'0 .. w (k'. 30
- >
en en I.a.I or= IL 20 10 0 80 120 160 . 200 240 TIME (SECONDS)
FINAL RUN: 25% POWER . *~ CONTAINMENT TEMPERAnJRE VS. TIME 420 ... 400 380 360 340 ""' ~ \ I 320 C> ..... -.... 0 300
- ':::> 280 t-
~
0:: 260
.....
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~ . 240 ..... ....
220 200
.
180 160 140 0 80 120 160 200 240 TIME (SECONDS)
FINAL '~U*N: 50% POWER* ~: . CONT, .NMENT PRESSURE VS. TIME 60---~--~----~~~~~-------_--------------------------~ 50
,.... 4.0
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IL 20 10 !: 0 40 80 12.0 160 . 200 240 TIME (SECONDS)
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FINAL RUN: 50% POWER CONTAINMENT TEMPERAnJRE VS. Tl~E
..
FINAL RUN: 0% POWER CONTAINMENT PRESSURE VS. TIME .. 50 40 .. "C> 111
-...
n. 30 r'
- >
111 111
....It:
Q. 20 10 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 TIME (SECONDS)
FINAL RUN: 0% POWER CONTAINMENT TEMPERAnJRE VS. TIWE 420 400 380 360 ,...., 340
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- 160 14'0 0 80 120 160 200 TIME (SECONDS)
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FINAL RUN:75-% POWER(LOOP) ~I
<... * .
CONTAINMENT PRESSURE VS. TIME 50
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....
rr 30
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VI VI I.a.I DI: IL . 20 10 0 100 200 . 300 TIME (SECONDS)
FINAL RUN:75% POWER(LOOP) CONTAINMENT TEMPERAnJRE VS. TIME 420
~o 380 360 340
". ~ I 320 C> Lal - 0 L6I rr 300 280
- >
~ < Iii: 260 LaJ CL ~ 240 ... LaJ 220 200 180 160 140 0 100 200 300 TIME (SECONDS)
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PALISADES MSLB RE~LACEMENT SG ANALYSIS
~ .
102% POWER, 8% REEVAPORATION EEQ CASE 60 50 w - a: 40
- >
en en w a: a.. ....z 30 w
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.1 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
- TIME, SEC (Thousands}
I: PALISADES MSLB REPLt.~EMENT SG ANALYSIS I' I 102% POWER, 8% REEVAPORATION EEQ CASE
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400 380
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360 I
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- 320 ..
w a:
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w 1-. 240 I-z 220 w
~ 200
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0 140 120 100
.1 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 TIME, SEC (Thousands}}}