ONS-2018-017, Revised Evaluation of Emergency Plan

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Revised Evaluation of Emergency Plan
ML18081A745
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/15/2018
From:
Duke Energy Carolinas
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ONS-2018-017
Download: ML18081A745 (5)
v • d • e


Text

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, and -287 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PLAN 10 CFR 50.54 (q)

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES ATIACHMENT 1 Page 1 of 5

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, and -287 Part I. Description of Activity Being Reviewed (event or action, or series of actions that may result in a change to the emergency plan or affect the implementation of the emergency plan):

  1. Page Current Proposed Change

/Section

1. Section B Rev. 2016-003 Revision No. 2017-002 all pages December 2016 March 2017
12. Section B Oconee Rural Fire Association Oconee County Emergency Services page B-4 Fire/Chemical Spill
3. Section B 12. Communications 12. Communications page B-6 Operations Operations Safety Assurance Organizational Effectiveness Training Training Nuclear Assurance f4. Section D Revision No. 2017-001 Revision No. 2017-002 all pages lower March 2017 March 2017 right
5. Section D Confinement Barrier Confinement Boundary page D-14
6. Section D OP/1,2,3/A/1502/000 OP/1,2,3/A/1502/009 pD-13(4.1.7) page D-14
7. Section D Basis-Related Requirements from deleted, upgraded ONS Fire Program to be Page D-126 Appendix R fully NFPA 805 compliant Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, states in part:

Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part specifies that "Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions."

When considering the effects of fire, those systems associated with achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions assume major importance to safety because damage to them can lead to core damage resulting from loss of coolant through boil-off.

Because fire may affect safe shutdown systems and because the loss of function of systems used to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents under post-fire conditions does not per se impact public safety, the need to limit fire damage to systems required to achie_ve and maintain safe shutdown conditions is greater than the need to limit fire damage to those systems required to mitiqate the consequences of desiqn Page 2 of 5

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, and -287 basis accidents.

In addition, Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, requires, among other considerations,

  • the use of 1-hour fire barriers for the enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train (G.2.c). As used in HU4.2, the 30-minutes to verify a single alarm is well within this worst-case 1-hour time period.
8. Section D Once the Control Room is evacuated, Once the Control Room is page D-136 the objective is to establish control of evacuated, the objective is to establish important plant equipment and control of important plant equipment and maintain knowledge of important maintain knowledge of important plant plant parameters in a timely manner. parameters in a timely manner. Primary Primary emphasis should be placed emphasis should be placed on components on components and instruments that and instruments that supply protection for supply protection for and information and information about safety functions.

about safety functions. Typically, Typically, these safety functions are these safety functions are reactivity reactivity control (ability to shutdown the control (ability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it shutdown), RCS reactor and maintain it shutdown), inventory (ability to cool the core), and RCS inventory , and secondary heat secondary heat removal (ability to maintain a removal. heat sink).

~- Section D / If an initial manual reactor trip is If an initial manual reactor trip is page 170 unsuccessful, operators will promptly unsuccessful, operators will promptly take page 167 take manual action at another manual action at another location(s) on the location(s) on the reactor control reactor control consoles to shutdown the consoles to shutdown the reactor reactor. Depending upon several factors, (e.g., initiate a manual reactor trip) the initial or subsequent effort to manually using a different switch) ..... trip the reactor, or a concurrent plant condition, may lead to the generation of an automatic reactor trip signal. If a subsequent manual or automatic trip is successful in shutting down the reactor, core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within t_he capabilities of the plant's decay heat removal systems.

10. Section D / This threshold is based on an This threshold is based on an page 206 UNISOLABLE RCS leak that results in UNISOLABLE RCS leak that results in the the inability to maintain pressurizer level . inability to maintain pressurizer level within within specified limits by operation of a specified limits by operation of a normally normally used charging (makeup) used charging (makeup) pump, but an ES pump, but an ES actuation has not actuation has not occurred. The threshold is occurred. The threshold is met when met when an operating procedure, or an operating procedure, or operating operating crew supervision, directs an action crew supervision, directs that a HPI to restore and maintain pressurizer level due (makeup) pump be placed in service to to exceeding NORMAL MAKEUP restore and maintain pressurizer level. CAPABILITY.
11.
  • Section D / Note 8: A manual trip action is Note 8: A manual trip action is any page 166 any operator action, or set of actions, Control Room operator action, or set of page 169 which causes the control rods to be actions, which causes the control rods to be paQe 172 rapidly inserted into the core, and does rapidly inserted into the core, and does not Page 3 of 5

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, and -287 not include manually driving in control include manually driving in control rods or rods or implementation of boron implementation of boron injection strategies.

injection stratei:iies.

12. Section D / Containment pressure > 10 psig with < Containment pressure > 10 psig with < one page 231 one full train of containment heat full train of containment heat removal system page removal system (1 RBS with> 700 gpm " (1 RBS with> 700 gpm spray flow AND 2 179(SU8.1) spray flow OR 2 RBCUs) operating per RBCUs) operating per design for 2: 15 min.

page 191 design for 2: 15 min. (Note 1) (Note 1)

13. Section H Rev. 2016-002 updated to Rev 2017-002 September 2016 March 2017
14. Section H H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES inserted page break to move title to top of page H-4 AND EQUIPMENT page H-5
15. Section H Eberline RM14 Eberline RM14 page H-24 or Instrument Ludlum 177 Type column
16. Section H Eberline R020 Eberline R020 page H-24 or Instrument Ludlum 9-3 Type column
17. Section H Eberline RO? Eberline RO?

page H-24 or Instrument Ludlum 9-7 Type column

18. Section H Has alarm setting. Speaker indication. Has alarm setting. Speaker indication. 50 page H-24 50 hr operation on fully charged battery. hr operation on fully charged battery.

Additional Ludlum 177 has additional scale, x 1000 = 0-Information 500 kcpm.

column

19.Section I Rev. 2015-002 Rev. 2017-002 March 2015 March 2017
20.Section I Emergency Action Level Procedures Emergency Action Level Procedures 1-1 Implementing procedures to the Implementing procedures to the Oconee Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Nuclear Station Emergency Plan have been Plan have been developed. These developed. These procedures have been procedures have been developed by developed by many sections of the station.

many sections of the station. The The Oconee Nuclear Station Implementing Oconee Nuclear Station Implementing Procedures make up Volumes B and C of Procedures make up Volumes B and C the station emergency plan. The Emergency of the station emergency plan. The Classification procedure (RP/0/A/1000/001)

Emergency Classification procedure identifies plant parameters that can be used (RP/0/A/1000/001) identifies plant to determine emergency situations that parameters that can be used to require activation of the station emergency determine emergency situations that plan. Revision 6 of NEI 99-01 has been require activation of the station issued which incorporates resolutions to emergency plan. NUMARC/NESP-007 numerous implementation issues including (Rev. 2) which was approved by the the NRC EAL Frequently Asked Questions

'

NRC in Rev. 3 of Regulatory Guide (FAQs). Using NEI 99-01 Revision 6, 1.101 and subsequent guidance "Methodology for the Development of provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, the Eme'rgency Action Levels for Non-Passive NEI guidance as endorsed in RIS 2006- Reactors," November 2012 (ADAMS 12 and to support implementation of Accession Number ML12326A805). ONS NEI 03-12 has beeri used as i:iuidance. conducted an EAL implementation uoarade Page 4 of 5

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, and -287 See BASIS document Section D. project that produced the EALs, see BASIS document Section D.

21.Section I Source Term of Releases of Source Term of Releases of Radioactive 1-3.a Radioactive Material within Plant Material within Plant Systems Systems*

Operations (Control Room Operations (Control Room Personnel) will use the EAL Wallchart of Personnel) will use Enclosure 4.8 & RP/0/A/1000/001 to determine if radiation 4.9 of RP/0/A/1000/001 to determine monitor readings will require classification.

if radiation monitor readings will This enclosure is a simplified predetermined require classification. This enclosure dose calculation for vent and in-containment is a simplified predetermined dose radiation monitors. Operations can also get calculation for vent and in- offsite dose projections from on-shift containment radiation monitors. Radiation Protection technicians using Operations can also get offsite dose procedure AD-EP-ALL-0202. AD-projections from on-shift Radiation EP-ALL-0202 uses release paths of unit Protection technicians using vents and the main steam relief valves.

procedure AD-EP-ALL-0202. Assumptions for the calculations are based AD-EP-ALL-0202 uses release paths on the following:

of unit vents and the main steam relief valves. Assumptions for the calculations are based on the following:

122. Section P Rev. 2016-003 Revision No. 2017-002 all pai::ies December 2016 March 2017 123. Section P The Manager of Emergency The Manager of Emergency Preparedness page P-1 Preparedness at the Oconee Nuclear at the Oconee Nuclear Site shall have the P.2 &P.3 Site shall have the responsibility for the responsibility for the development, review development, review and coordination and coordination of the site emergency of the site emergency plans with other plans with other response organizations and response organizations and shall be shall be responsible for conducting the responsible for conducting the biennial biennial exercise, drills and training sessions exercise, drills and training sessions to to test the Oconee Nuclear Site Emergency test the Oconee Nuclear Site Plan. This person is employed in the Emergency Plan. This person is Organizational Effectiveness Group.

employed in the Safety Assurance Group.

124. Section P OCl507-N Appendix R deleted, ONS fully compliant with NFPA 8~5 page P-16 Training 04.10 125. Appendix 5

  • DELETED - Dominion Nuclear deleted page 1 Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) Superseded by letter from GO RP
26. Appendix 5
  • Safe Industries deleted page 2 Page 5 of 5
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