ML18101A843

LER 95-006-00:on 950404,TS 3.0.3 for Both Units Was Entered Due to Inability of CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys to Automatically Actuate.Operability Determination Has Been Completed

ML18101A843
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	07/14/1995
From:	Pastva M Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Shared Package
ML18101A842	List: ML18101A841 ML18101A843
References
LER-95-006-01, LER-95-6-1, NUDOCS 9507260138
Download: ML18101A843 (7)

Text

NRC FORM 366 (5*92) . U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, ANO TQ THE PAPERWORK RE.OUCTION PROJECT OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) II PAGE (3) Salem Generating Station Unit 1 05000 272 1OF6 TITLEl 4 I Technical Spe<::ificatio_µ 3.0.3 Entry for Both Units Due Ipability of Both Un ts Control Room Emergencv Air Conditionine Svstems to Automaticallv Actuate. EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6 REPORT NUMBER (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8\ MONTH DAY YEAR 04 04 95 YEAR 95 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 006 REVISION NUMBER 00 FACIUlY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 311 DAY YEAR MONTH Salem Unit 2 FACIUlY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 7 14 95 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: ICheck one or more (11) MODE (9) 1 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)Qv) 73.7.1 (b) I POWER I LEVEL (10) 94 . 20.405(a)(1)0i) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

OTHER -20.405(a)(1)0ii)

X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Specify in Abstract 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) TeX!, NRC 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER pnclude Area Code) M. J. Pastva Jr. LER Coordinator 609/339-5165 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13\ CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION DATE (15) I YES pr yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) From approximately 0920 hours0.0106 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.5006e-4 months <br /> on 4/4/95 until approximately 0342 hours0.00396 days <br />0.095 hours <br />5.654762e-4 weeks <br />1.30131e-4 months <br /> on 4/5/95, Units 1 and 2 Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning Systems (EACSs) would not have automatically actuated into the emergency recirculation mode in response to a high radiation signal. During this event, Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 applied to both Units. Event discovery occurred at approximately 0324 hours0.00375 days <br />0.09 hours <br />5.357143e-4 weeks <br />1.23282e-4 months <br /> on 4/5/95, when the Unit 2 EACS was manually placed into the recirculation mode. TS 3.0.3 applied to Unit 1 until Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) channel 2RlA was returned to service. This event is attributed to personnel error by the Nuclear Shift Supervisor and Nuclear Control Operator who failed to verify RMS channel 2R1B unblocked prior to blocking RMS channel 2RlA on 4/4/95. Appropriate action has been taken with the involved personnel.

A procedure revision request has been generated to require verifying complementary/redundant channel operability during RlA/B calibrations.

I&C and Operations procedures for other RMS channels, will be reviewea to identify any changes to ensure channel functionality is verified.

EACS TSs are undergoing review to identify appropriate changes. This event will be reviewed during upcoming licensed operator training to emphasize lessons learned. The submittal of this report has been discussed with NRC Region I Management.

NRC FORM 366 (5-92) 9507260138 950714 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Docket Number LER Number Page 2 of 6 Unit # 1 50-272 95-006-00 Plant and System Identification:

Westinghouse

-Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear in the text as {XX/XX}. Identification of Occurrence:

Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry For Both Units Due To Inability Of Both Units Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning Systems To Automatically Actuate Into The Recirculation Mode In Response To A Unit 2 High Radiation Signal Event Date: April 4, 1995 Report Date: July 14, 1995 The late submittal of this report, which resulted from additional time required for design verification activities, was previously discussed with NRC Region I Management This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.95-349 and 95-351. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 1 Mode 1 Unit 2 Mode 1 Reactor Power 94% Reactor Power 99% Description of Occurrence:

Unit Load 1090 MWe Unit Load 1110 MWe From approximately 0920 hours0.0106 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.5006e-4 months <br /> on April 4, 1995 until 0342 on April 5, 1995, the Unit 2 Control Room radiation monitors {IL} would not have automatically actuated the Unit 1 or Unit 2 Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System (EACS) into the emergency recirculation mode, in response to a Unit 2 Control Room high radiation signal. The design for a Control Room high radiation signal is comprised as an alarm from either Control Room Area Radiation Monitor (RlA) or the Control Room Ventilation LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Docket Number LER Number Page 3 of 6 Unit # 1 50-272 95-006-00 Description of Occurrence: (cont'd) Intake Duct Radiation Monitor (RlB). This rendered the EACSs of Units 1 and 2 inoperable.

During this occurrence, requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 applied to both Units. This occurred due to inability to meet TS surveillance requirement 4.7.6.1.d.2, which requires both EACS fans and ventilation system air intake dampers for both units to be operable.

Discovery of this occurrence was made by the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS), at approximately 0324 hours0.00375 days <br />0.09 hours <br />5.357143e-4 weeks <br />1.23282e-4 months <br /> on April 5, 1995. At approximately 0342 hours0.00396 days <br />0.095 hours <br />5.654762e-4 weeks <br />1.30131e-4 months <br /> (same day), the Unit 2 EACS was manually placed into the recirculation mode of operation in accordance with the system operating procedure.

With the Unit 2 EACS in the recirculation mode, the necessity for a high radiation signal to initiate recirculation mode on Unit 2 was removed and therefore TS 3.0.3 no longer applied to Unit 2. At 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br /> (same day), the Unit 2 EACS was returned to normal service. The effect of the blocked Unit 2 high radiation signal on the Unit 1 EACS was not recognized.

Consequently, the Unit 1 Control Room Area Air Conditioning System (CAACS) was maintained in its normal mode throughout the occurrence.

At 1237 hours0.0143 days <br />0.344 hours <br />0.00205 weeks <br />4.706785e-4 months <br /> on April 5, 1995, the Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) channel 2R1A {IL/MON} was restored to normal, returning the Unit 2 High Radiation Actuation Signal, thereby TS no longer applied to Unit 1. Operation of the Unit 1 CAACS in normal mode with the Unit 2 EACS in the recirculation mode was not in compliance with TS interpretation LC0-3.7.6.1/3.7.6.

On January 27, 1995 Unit 2 Control Room CAACS Intake Duct Radiation Monitor System (RMS) channel 2RlB {IL/MON} was placed in block due to intermittent failure causing the CAACS to automatically actuate into the emergency recirculation mode. On March 21, 1995 corrective maintenance on the channel was completed.

Following satisfactory Operations retest activities, on April 1, 1995, the channel was left in block. Subsequently, at approximately 0920 hours0.0106 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.5006e-4 months <br /> on April 4, 1995, Unit 2 Control Room general area radiation channel, 2RlA, was placed in block, per procedure during a channel calibration.

However, prior to blocking 2RlA, the status of 2RlB had not been verified.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Docket Number LER Number Page 4 of 6 Unit # 1 . 50-272 95-006-00 Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The root cause is attributed to "Personnel Error", as classified in NUREG-1022, Appendix B. This occurred when the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) and Nuclear Control Operator (NCO) on April 4 failed to verify RMS channel 2RlB unblocked prior to blocking 2RlA. Contributors include: Lack of information availability and understanding of the Control Room EACS system design basis. Failure to properly restore a channel to an operable status upon retest completion.

Lack of procedural guidance on operability requirements for RMS channels RlA and RlB. Inadequate TS and TS interpretation guidance for inoperable Control Room RMS channels.

Prior Similar Occurrence:

Review of documentation did not reveal a prior similar occurrence.

Safety Significance:

This occurrence is reportable pursuant to the requirements of lOCFRSO. 73 (a) (2) (i) (B). The safety significance of this occurrence was minimal. Nuclear Engineering has assessed the safety significance of this event and has concluded that at no time during the event would the health and safety of the general public or plant personnel at Salem or Hope Creek Generating Stations have been adversely affected.

PSE&G performed an Engineering evaluation of these radiation monitoring instruments.

For the majority of design basis accidents for which ventilation realignment is required, the ventilation system would have automatically realigned as intended LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Docket Number LER Number Page 5 of 6 Unit# 1 50-272 95-006-00 Safety Significance: (cont'd) (e.g., due to automatic SI actuation on an accident signal in Unit 1 or Unit 2, or due to a valid high radiation signal sensed by the Unit 1 RlA and RlB monitors).

Throughout the time that 2R1A and 2R1B monitors were blocked, the corresponding Unit 1 monitors remained OPERABLE.

For the remaining credible design basis radiological occurrences which would not result in automatic system alignment, operator action would be required.

Crediting operator action for these instances is not unreasonable in that: 1) sufficient indications are available to ensure ready recognition of the event; and 2) mitigative actions could be completed in a timeframe commensurate with the anticipated progress of the event. Corrective Action: Appropriate action has been taken with the involved personnel in accordance with the positive discipline process. An Operability Determination has been completed, which addresses the operability of the CAACS/EACS with one of the four (two per Salem Unit) Control Room radiation monitors out of service. The Control Room console logs have been revised to add channels 1(2)R1A and 1(2)R1B to verify operability for all operating modes (1-6) An Instrumentation and Control (I&C) channel calibration procedure revision request has been generated to require verification of complementary/redundant channel operability when performing RlA/B calibrations.

The Control Room Action Statement Log has been revised to require logging of "tracking" action statements for inoperable equipment/instruments associated with TS. The TS for Control Room EACS is undergoing review to identify any appropriate changes to be incorporate RMS specifications as well as other equipment requirements to further clarify system operability requirements.

,, " LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Docket Number LER Number Page 6 of 6 Unit # 1 50-272 95-006-00 Corrective Actions: (cont'd) I&C procedures involving other RMS channels, which provide input signals to TS system/components) will be reviewed to identify any revisions needed to ensure that redundant/complementary channel functionality is verified.

Operations procedures, which control removal of channel components from service, will be reviewed to identify any required revisions to ensure verification of redundancy/complementary component functionality.

This occurrence, including the current design basis documentation of the Control Room EACS and supporting radiation monitoring equipment, will be reviewed during upcoming licensed operator training, in order to emphasize lessons learned from this occurrence.

Before restart of either Salem Unit from the current imposed shutdown of both Units, the current design basis of the Control Room EACS and supporting radiation monitoring equipment will be appropriately documented.

Appropriate design changes will be implemented, as necessary.

MJPJ:vs REF: SORC Mtg.95-077 General Manager -Salem Operations

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit July 6, 1995 U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Attn: Document Control Desk SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 95-009-00 This Licensee Event Report is submitted to meet the Special Reporting requirements for a valid test failure of 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) on June 1, 1995 and subsequent inoperability of two (2) EDGs, while in cold shutdown on June 7, 1995. On July 3, 1995, Region I NRC Management was notified that reporting of the lB EDG valid test failure would be made by July 7, 1995. SORC Mtg.95-071 MJPJ:vs c Distribution LER File 9507110215 950706 . PDR ADOCK 05000272 s PDR l lL' jYl\\'c'l b i1; \\lllr

.. J. c. Summers General Manager -Salem Operations

/(;Ytd'j I 95-2168 REV. /94