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NRC FORM 366 (5*92)
. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)
ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:
50.0 HRS.
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, ANO TQ THE PAPERWORK RE.OUCTION PROJECT (31~0-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
II PAGE (3)
Salem Generating Station Unit 1 05000 272 1OF6 TITLEl4I Technical Spe<::ificatio_µ 3.0.3 Entry for Both Units Due T~* Ipability of Both Un ts Control Room Emergencv Air Conditionine Svstems to Automaticallv Actuate.
EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6 REPORT NUMBER (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8\\
MONTH DAY YEAR 04 04 95 YEAR 95 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 006 REVISION NUMBER 00 FACIUlY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 311 DAY YEAR MONTH Salem Unit 2 FACIUlY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 7
14 95 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: ICheck one or more (11)
MODE (9) 1 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)Qv) 73.7.1 (b)
I POWER I LEVEL (10) 94 l
i--r.2~0~.4~05~(a~)(~1)~(i~)~~~~--t~r.5~0.~36~~~)~(1);.--~~~~-+-+-5~0~.7~3~*~~)~~)~~~)~~~-+---t-:7~3.~t.~1(~c)~__J 20.405(a)(1)0i) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
OTHER 20.405(a)(1)0ii)
X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
(Specify in Abstract 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
~:::"3";6~;" TeX!, NRC 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER pnclude Area Code)
M. J. Pastva Jr.
LER Coordinator 609/339-5165 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13\\
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION DATE (15)
I YES pr yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
X NO ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
From approximately 0920 hours0.0106 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.5006e-4 months <br /> on 4/4/95 until approximately 0342 hours0.00396 days <br />0.095 hours <br />5.654762e-4 weeks <br />1.30131e-4 months <br /> on 4/5/95, Units 1 and 2 Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning Systems (EACSs) would not have automatically actuated into the emergency recirculation mode in response to a high radiation signal. During this event, Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 applied to both Units. Event discovery occurred at approximately 0324 hours0.00375 days <br />0.09 hours <br />5.357143e-4 weeks <br />1.23282e-4 months <br /> on 4/5/95, when the Unit 2 EACS was manually placed into the recirculation mode. TS 3.0.3 applied to Unit 1 until Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) channel 2RlA was returned to service. This event is attributed to personnel error by the Nuclear Shift Supervisor and Nuclear Control Operator who failed to verify RMS channel 2R1B unblocked prior to blocking RMS channel 2RlA on 4/4/95.
Appropriate action has been taken with the involved personnel. A procedure revision request has been generated to require verifying complementary/redundant channel operability during RlA/B calibrations. I&C and Operations procedures for other RMS channels, will be reviewea to identify any changes to ensure redundant/co~plementary channel functionality is verified. EACS TSs are undergoing review to identify appropriate changes.
This event will be reviewed during upcoming licensed operator training to emphasize lessons learned. The submittal of this report has been discussed with NRC Region I Management.
NRC FORM 366 (5-92) 9507260138 950714 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S
PDR
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Docket Number LER Number Page 2 of 6 Unit # 1 50-272 95-006-00
Plant and System Identification
Westinghouse -
Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear in the text as {XX/XX}.
Identification of Occurrence:
Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry For Both Units Due To Inability Of Both Units Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning Systems To Automatically Actuate Into The Recirculation Mode In Response To A Unit 2 High Radiation Signal Event Date:
April 4, 1995 Report Date: July 14, 1995 The late submittal of this report, which resulted from additional time required for design verification activities, was previously discussed with NRC Region I Management This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.95-349 and 95-351.
Conditions Prior to Occurrence:
Unit 1 Mode 1 Unit 2 Mode 1 Reactor Power 94%
Reactor Power 99%
Description of Occurrence:
Unit Load 1090 MWe Unit Load 1110 MWe From approximately 0920 hours0.0106 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.5006e-4 months <br /> on April 4, 1995 until 0342 on April 5, 1995, the Unit 2 Control Room radiation monitors {IL}
would not have automatically actuated the Unit 1 or Unit 2 Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System (EACS) into the emergency recirculation mode, in response to a Unit 2 Control Room high radiation signal.
The design for a Control Room high radiation signal is comprised as an alarm from either Control Room Area Radiation Monitor (RlA) or the Control Room Ventilation
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Docket Number LER Number Page 3 of 6 Unit # 1 50-272 95-006-00 Description of Occurrence: (cont'd)
Intake Duct Radiation Monitor (RlB).
This rendered the EACSs of Units 1 and 2 inoperable.
During this occurrence, requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 applied to both Units.
This occurred due to inability to meet TS surveillance requirement 4.7.6.1.d.2, which requires both EACS fans and ventilation system air intake dampers for both units to be operable.
Discovery of this occurrence was made by the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS), at approximately 0324 hours0.00375 days <br />0.09 hours <br />5.357143e-4 weeks <br />1.23282e-4 months <br /> on April 5, 1995.
At approximately 0342 hours0.00396 days <br />0.095 hours <br />5.654762e-4 weeks <br />1.30131e-4 months <br /> (same day), the Unit 2 EACS was manually placed into the recirculation mode of operation in accordance with the system operating procedure.
With the Unit 2 EACS in the recirculation mode, the necessity for a high radiation signal to initiate recirculation mode on Unit 2 was removed and therefore TS 3.0.3 no longer applied to Unit 2. At 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br /> (same day), the Unit 2 EACS was returned to normal service.
The effect of the blocked Unit 2 high radiation signal on the Unit 1 EACS was not recognized.
Consequently, the Unit 1 Control Room Area Air Conditioning System (CAACS) was maintained in its normal mode throughout the occurrence.
At 1237 hours0.0143 days <br />0.344 hours <br />0.00205 weeks <br />4.706785e-4 months <br /> on April 5, 1995, the Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) channel 2R1A
{IL/MON} was restored to normal, returning the Unit 2 High Radiation Actuation Signal, thereby TS 3.0~3 no longer applied to Unit 1.
Operation of the Unit 1 CAACS in normal mode with the Unit 2 EACS in the recirculation mode was not in compliance with TS interpretation LC0-3.7.6.1/3.7.6.
On January 27, 1995 Unit 2 Control Room CAACS Intake Duct Radiation Monitor System (RMS) channel 2RlB {IL/MON} was placed in block due to intermittent failure causing the CAACS to automatically actuate into the emergency recirculation mode.
On March 21, 1995 corrective maintenance on the channel was completed.
Following satisfactory Operations retest activities, on April 1, 1995, the channel was left in block. Subsequently, at approximately 0920 hours0.0106 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.5006e-4 months <br /> on April 4, 1995, Unit 2 Control Room general area radiation channel, 2RlA, was placed in block, per procedure during a channel calibration.
However, prior to blocking 2RlA, the status of 2RlB had not been verified.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Docket Number LER Number Page 4 of 6 Unit # 1.
50-272 95-006-00 Apparent Cause of Occurrence:
The root cause is attributed to "Personnel Error", as classified in NUREG-1022, Appendix B.
This occurred when the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) and Nuclear Control Operator (NCO) on April 4 failed to verify RMS channel 2RlB unblocked prior to blocking 2RlA.
Contributors include:
Lack of information availability and understanding of the Control Room EACS system design basis.
Failure to properly restore a channel to an operable status upon retest completion.
Lack of procedural guidance on operability requirements for RMS channels RlA and RlB.
Inadequate TS and TS interpretation guidance for inoperable Control Room RMS channels.
Prior Similar Occurrence:
Review of documentation did not reveal a prior similar occurrence.
Safety Significance
This occurrence is reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10CFRSO. 73 (a) (2) (i) (B).
The safety significance of this occurrence was minimal.
Nuclear Engineering has assessed the safety significance of this event and has concluded that at no time during the event would the health and safety of the general public or plant personnel at Salem or Hope Creek Generating Stations have been adversely affected.
PSE&G performed an Engineering evaluation of these radiation monitoring instruments.
For the majority of design basis accidents for which ventilation realignment is required, the ventilation system would have automatically realigned as intended
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Docket Number LER Number Page 5 of 6 Unit# 1 50-272 95-006-00
Safety Significance
(cont'd)
(e.g., due to automatic SI actuation on an accident signal in Unit 1 or Unit 2, or due to a valid high radiation signal sensed by the Unit 1 RlA and RlB monitors).
Throughout the time that 2R1A and 2R1B monitors were blocked, the corresponding Unit 1 monitors remained OPERABLE.
For the remaining credible design basis radiological occurrences which would not result in automatic system alignment, operator action would be required.
Crediting operator action for these instances is not unreasonable in that:
- 1) sufficient indications are available to ensure ready recognition of the event; and
- 2) mitigative actions could be completed in a timeframe commensurate with the anticipated progress of the event.
Corrective Action
Appropriate action has been taken with the involved personnel in accordance with the positive discipline process.
An Operability Determination has been completed, which addresses the operability of the CAACS/EACS with one of the four (two per Salem Unit) Control Room radiation monitors out of service.
The Control Room console logs have been revised to add channels 1(2)R1A and 1(2)R1B to verify operability for all operating modes (1-6)
An Instrumentation and Control (I&C) channel calibration procedure revision request has been generated to require verification of complementary/redundant channel operability when performing RlA/B calibrations.
The Control Room Action Statement Log has been revised to require logging of "tracking" action statements for inoperable equipment/instruments associated with TS.
The TS for Control Room EACS is undergoing review to identify any appropriate changes to be incorporate RMS specifications as well as other equipment requirements to further clarify system operability requirements.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Docket Number LER Number Page 6 of 6 Unit # 1 50-272 95-006-00
Corrective Actions
(cont'd)
I&C procedures involving other RMS channels, which provide input signals to TS system/components) will be reviewed to identify any revisions needed to ensure that redundant/complementary channel functionality is verified.
Operations procedures, which control removal of multiple-channel components from service, will be reviewed to identify any required revisions to ensure verification of redundancy/complementary component functionality.
This occurrence, including the current design basis documentation of the Control Room EACS and supporting radiation monitoring equipment, will be reviewed during upcoming licensed operator training, in order to emphasize lessons learned from this occurrence.
Before restart of either Salem Unit from the current self-imposed shutdown of both Units, the current design basis of the Control Room EACS and supporting radiation monitoring equipment will be appropriately documented.
Appropriate design changes will be implemented, as necessary.
MJPJ:vs REF:
SORC Mtg.95-077 General Manager -
Salem Operations
PS~G*
Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit July 6, 1995 U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Attn:
Document Control Desk SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO.
DPR-70 DOCKET NO.
50-272 UNIT NO.
1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.
95-009-00 This Licensee Event Report is submitted to meet the Special Reporting requirements for a valid test failure of 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) on June 1, 1995 and subsequent inoperability of two (2) EDGs, while in cold shutdown on June 7, 1995.
On July 3, 1995, Region I NRC Management was notified that reporting of the lB EDG valid test failure would be made by July 7, 1995.
SORC Mtg.95-071 MJPJ:vs c
Distribution LER File 9507110215 950706 PDR ADOCK 05000272 s
PDR l lL' jYl\\\\'c'l b i1; \\\\lllr h~mJ..
J. c. Summers General Manager -
Salem Operations
/(;Ytd'j
~ I 95-2168 REV. /94
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| 05000311/LER-1995-001, :on 950212,manually Initiated Esfa to Effect MSIS in Order to Increase RCS T-avg Above 541 Degrees F. Caused by Less than Conservative Decision Making.Temporary Hold Placed on Startup Activities |
- on 950212,manually Initiated Esfa to Effect MSIS in Order to Increase RCS T-avg Above 541 Degrees F. Caused by Less than Conservative Decision Making.Temporary Hold Placed on Startup Activities
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-001-01, :on 950201,both Ssps Trains Declared Inoperable After Discovery That AC Power Distribution within Ssps Susceptible to Common Mode Failure.Caused by Aged Components.New Power Supplies Installed |
- on 950201,both Ssps Trains Declared Inoperable After Discovery That AC Power Distribution within Ssps Susceptible to Common Mode Failure.Caused by Aged Components.New Power Supplies Installed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000272/LER-1995-002-01, :on 950224,required TS 1 H Timeframe Not Met Re Closing Associated Block Valve.Caused by Personnel Error. Positive Discipline Has Been Taken |
- on 950224,required TS 1 H Timeframe Not Met Re Closing Associated Block Valve.Caused by Personnel Error. Positive Discipline Has Been Taken
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1995-003-01, :on 950228,four Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maintenance Analog Rod Position Indication Drift.Drift Caused by Mfg,Design,Const/Installation.Internal Adjustments to Rods Made |
- on 950228,four Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maintenance Analog Rod Position Indication Drift.Drift Caused by Mfg,Design,Const/Installation.Internal Adjustments to Rods Made
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-003-02, :on 950311,three Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maint to Correct Analog RPI Drift Affecting Rod 2SB4.Caused by Design Mfg Const/Installation.Ts 3.0.3 Was Exited |
- on 950311,three Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maint to Correct Analog RPI Drift Affecting Rod 2SB4.Caused by Design Mfg Const/Installation.Ts 3.0.3 Was Exited
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000311/LER-1995-003-03, :on 890309,failed to Perform Type C Local Leak Rate Testing Following Piping Mod to 21 Containment Spray Piping Sys Due to Not Identifying Need to Perform Required Testing.Enhanced Business Procedures |
- on 890309,failed to Perform Type C Local Leak Rate Testing Following Piping Mod to 21 Containment Spray Piping Sys Due to Not Identifying Need to Perform Required Testing.Enhanced Business Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000272/LER-1995-004-01, :on 790515,used Ten Containment Air Temp Points to Determine Primary Containment Average Air Temp.Caused by Mgt/Qa Defeciency.Implemented Procedure Revs to Satisfy TS SR |
- on 790515,used Ten Containment Air Temp Points to Determine Primary Containment Average Air Temp.Caused by Mgt/Qa Defeciency.Implemented Procedure Revs to Satisfy TS SR
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000311/LER-1995-004-02, :on 950607,ESFA RT Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by RHR Sys Inoperability.Replaced All SBF-1 Failed Protection Relays on 500 Kv Breakers |
- on 950607,ESFA RT Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by RHR Sys Inoperability.Replaced All SBF-1 Failed Protection Relays on 500 Kv Breakers
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-004, :on 950607,EFS Actuation Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by Inadequate Mgt Oversight of Operability Determination Process.Trained All Licensed Operators |
- on 950607,EFS Actuation Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by Inadequate Mgt Oversight of Operability Determination Process.Trained All Licensed Operators
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000311/LER-1995-005-02, :on 950705,failure to Analyze Second Sample W/ Radiation Monitor Inoperable Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Second Sample Analyzed & Determined to Be in Agreement W/First Sample |
- on 950705,failure to Analyze Second Sample W/ Radiation Monitor Inoperable Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Second Sample Analyzed & Determined to Be in Agreement W/First Sample
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-005-01, :on 900508,seven Occurrences Noted That Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Util Supplemented Rept W/Results of Vendor Conducted Root Cause |
- on 900508,seven Occurrences Noted That Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Util Supplemented Rept W/Results of Vendor Conducted Root Cause
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-005, Forwards LER 95-005-00 Re Failure to Analyze Second Sample W/Radiation Monitor Inoperable | Forwards LER 95-005-00 Re Failure to Analyze Second Sample W/Radiation Monitor Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-005, :on 950508,eight Occurrences Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Caused by Testing Intrument Error. Counseled Personnel Involved |
- on 950508,eight Occurrences Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Caused by Testing Intrument Error. Counseled Personnel Involved
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000311/LER-1995-006, Revises Corrective Action Due Date in LER 95-006-00 to Correspond W/Due Dates in Restart Action Plan,Consisting of 960501 for Reviews & 960630 for Applicable Procedure Revs | Revises Corrective Action Due Date in LER 95-006-00 to Correspond W/Due Dates in Restart Action Plan,Consisting of 960501 for Reviews & 960630 for Applicable Procedure Revs | | | 05000272/LER-1995-006-01, :on 950404,TS 3.0.3 for Both Units Was Entered Due to Inability of CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys to Automatically Actuate.Operability Determination Has Been Completed |
- on 950404,TS 3.0.3 for Both Units Was Entered Due to Inability of CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys to Automatically Actuate.Operability Determination Has Been Completed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-006-02, :on 950822,surveillance Was Missed & Charcoal Absorber Testing Exceeded TS SR Time Limit.Caused by Informal Process to Monitor Charcoal Absorber Run Time Hs Being Used.Assigned Responsibility to Operations Dept |
- on 950822,surveillance Was Missed & Charcoal Absorber Testing Exceeded TS SR Time Limit.Caused by Informal Process to Monitor Charcoal Absorber Run Time Hs Being Used.Assigned Responsibility to Operations Dept
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000311/LER-1995-007-02, :on 900503,diesel Surveillance Required by TS Was Missed.Revised Process for Modifying EDG Surveillance Frequency |
- on 900503,diesel Surveillance Required by TS Was Missed.Revised Process for Modifying EDG Surveillance Frequency
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1995-007, :on 950505,EDGs 1A,1B & 1C Simultaneously Paralleled to Electrical Grid,Resulting in Potential for Common Mode Failure of All Three Edgs.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Procedures Revised |
- on 950505,EDGs 1A,1B & 1C Simultaneously Paralleled to Electrical Grid,Resulting in Potential for Common Mode Failure of All Three Edgs.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-008-02, :on 951215,Tech Spec 4.9.9 Missed Isolation Testing Discovered.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls to Ensure All Testing Requirements Addressed.Procedure S2.IC-FT.RM--0088(Q) Revised |
- on 951215,Tech Spec 4.9.9 Missed Isolation Testing Discovered.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls to Ensure All Testing Requirements Addressed.Procedure S2.IC-FT.RM--0088(Q) Revised
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-008-01, :on 950517,controlled Shutdown Completed Due to Inoperability of Switchgear & Penetration Area Ventilation Sys (Spavs).Three Spavs Supply Fans Will Be Inspected & Fan Motors Replaced |
- on 950517,controlled Shutdown Completed Due to Inoperability of Switchgear & Penetration Area Ventilation Sys (Spavs).Three Spavs Supply Fans Will Be Inspected & Fan Motors Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-009, :on 950601,valid Test of 1B EDG & Subsequent Inoperability of 1B & 1C EDGs Identified.Caused by Inadequate Vibration Tolerant Design of Original Equipment. Cracked Nipple Replace to Restore EDG 1B Availability |
- on 950601,valid Test of 1B EDG & Subsequent Inoperability of 1B & 1C EDGs Identified.Caused by Inadequate Vibration Tolerant Design of Original Equipment. Cracked Nipple Replace to Restore EDG 1B Availability
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-010-01, :on 950615,RHR Pumps for long-term Flow Requirements for Both Units Declared Inoperable Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Evaluated EOPs |
- on 950615,RHR Pumps for long-term Flow Requirements for Both Units Declared Inoperable Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Evaluated EOPs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-010, :on 950615,both Units RHR Pumps Inoperable for long-term Flow Requirements Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Further Evaluated New EOP Setpoint for RHR Pump Operation |
- on 950615,both Units RHR Pumps Inoperable for long-term Flow Requirements Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Further Evaluated New EOP Setpoint for RHR Pump Operation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000272/LER-1995-011, :on 880222,inconsistency Between WCAP-11634 Analysis Used for Postulated Steam Line Breaks Outside Containment & Updated FSAR Was Discovered Due to Inadequate Design Review |
- on 880222,inconsistency Between WCAP-11634 Analysis Used for Postulated Steam Line Breaks Outside Containment & Updated FSAR Was Discovered Due to Inadequate Design Review
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000272/LER-1995-012, :on 761211,adequacy of Turbine Driven Auxiliary FW Pump Encls Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Verification of Assumptions in Calculations Performed to Evaluate Previously Identified.Calculation Assumptions Reviewed |
- on 761211,adequacy of Turbine Driven Auxiliary FW Pump Encls Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Verification of Assumptions in Calculations Performed to Evaluate Previously Identified.Calculation Assumptions Reviewed
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-012-01, :During Nov 1995,TDAFWP Encl Not Matching as- Built Conditions of 761211.Caused by Inadequate Verification of as-build Design Deficiency Calculations.Helb Calculations Reviewed |
- During Nov 1995,TDAFWP Encl Not Matching as- Built Conditions of 761211.Caused by Inadequate Verification of as-build Design Deficiency Calculations.Helb Calculations Reviewed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-013-01, :on 950703,surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Was Performed Approx Six & One Half Hr Late Due to Personnel Error.Provides Appropriate Levels of Discipline to Personnel Involved |
- on 950703,surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Was Performed Approx Six & One Half Hr Late Due to Personnel Error.Provides Appropriate Levels of Discipline to Personnel Involved
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-014-01, :on 951211,SI Throttle Valve Was Inoperable. Caused by Inadequate Deficiency.Installed Orifice in Cold Leg Branch Lines Prior to Startup |
- on 951211,SI Throttle Valve Was Inoperable. Caused by Inadequate Deficiency.Installed Orifice in Cold Leg Branch Lines Prior to Startup
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-015-01, :on 950711,failed to Complete Documentation of EDG TS Surveillance.Caused by Lack of Procedural Clarity Re Method of Timing EDG Start & Standby Performance.Developed Special Surveillance Testing Procedures |
- on 950711,failed to Complete Documentation of EDG TS Surveillance.Caused by Lack of Procedural Clarity Re Method of Timing EDG Start & Standby Performance.Developed Special Surveillance Testing Procedures
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-016-01, :on 950720,difference Between Containment Design Parameters & Accident Analysis Was Discovered.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 SEs for Changes in Containment Temp Profiles.Changed UFSAR & TS |
- on 950720,difference Between Containment Design Parameters & Accident Analysis Was Discovered.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 SEs for Changes in Containment Temp Profiles.Changed UFSAR & TS
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-016, Informs That Revised Date for Submission of Suppl to LER 95-016 Will Be 960329 | Informs That Revised Date for Submission of Suppl to LER 95-016 Will Be 960329 | | | 05000272/LER-1995-017, :on 950718,CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys Failed to Meet GDC 19 Criteria.Performed Calculactions to Identify Alternative Operating Mode for Eacs to Ensure That Requirements of GDC 19 Satisfied |
- on 950718,CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys Failed to Meet GDC 19 Criteria.Performed Calculactions to Identify Alternative Operating Mode for Eacs to Ensure That Requirements of GDC 19 Satisfied
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-018, :on 950720,improper Range Gauges Used for Ist. Caused by Inadequate IST Program & Lack of IST Program Maint & Implementation Processes & Associated Controls.Issued Stop Work Order by QA 950731 |
- on 950720,improper Range Gauges Used for Ist. Caused by Inadequate IST Program & Lack of IST Program Maint & Implementation Processes & Associated Controls.Issued Stop Work Order by QA 950731
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000272/LER-1995-019, :on 950726,operability Functional Test Was Not Performed Prior to Mode Entry.Caused by Lack of Managerial Oversight & Organizational Breakdowns.Entered Tracking as for 1VC1 & 1VC2 for Mode 6 |
- on 950726,operability Functional Test Was Not Performed Prior to Mode Entry.Caused by Lack of Managerial Oversight & Organizational Breakdowns.Entered Tracking as for 1VC1 & 1VC2 for Mode 6
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000272/LER-1995-020, Forwards LER 95-020-00 Re Inoperable Volt Motor Control Ctrs Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Attachment a Contains Commitments Currently Outstanding Related to Issue | Forwards LER 95-020-00 Re Inoperable Volt Motor Control Ctrs Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Attachment a Contains Commitments Currently Outstanding Related to Issue | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-020-01, :on 950914,vital 230 Volt MCCs Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Caused by Stress Corrosion Cracking.Design Change Package DCP-1ER-0098 Implemented to Replace Bus Bolts W/Carbon Steel Bolts |
- on 950914,vital 230 Volt MCCs Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Caused by Stress Corrosion Cracking.Design Change Package DCP-1ER-0098 Implemented to Replace Bus Bolts W/Carbon Steel Bolts
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-021-01, :on 930403,both Reactor Vessel Level Indication Sys Trains Inoperable Due to Inadvertent CO2 Actuation Due to Water Intrusion.Completed RVLIS & Cabinet Sealing Repaired |
- on 930403,both Reactor Vessel Level Indication Sys Trains Inoperable Due to Inadvertent CO2 Actuation Due to Water Intrusion.Completed RVLIS & Cabinet Sealing Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000272/LER-1995-022, :on 950916,ABV Sys Exceeded Allowable Bypass Leakage Due to Tear in Expansion Joint Fabric.Caused by Equipment Failure.Expansion Joint Fabric Replaced |
- on 950916,ABV Sys Exceeded Allowable Bypass Leakage Due to Tear in Expansion Joint Fabric.Caused by Equipment Failure.Expansion Joint Fabric Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-023-01, Forwards Supplemental LER 95-023-01 Re Failure to Plug SG Tubes Due to Missed Eddy Current Indications.Suppl Being Submitted to Discuss Cause & Safety Significance of Event | Forwards Supplemental LER 95-023-01 Re Failure to Plug SG Tubes Due to Missed Eddy Current Indications.Suppl Being Submitted to Discuss Cause & Safety Significance of Event | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-023, :on 940106,failed to Plug SG Tubes.Caused by Lack of Contractor Oversight in Area of Eddy Current Testing.Analyst Guidelines Specific to Salem,Units 1 & 2 & Performance Demonstration Program Were Developed |
- on 940106,failed to Plug SG Tubes.Caused by Lack of Contractor Oversight in Area of Eddy Current Testing.Analyst Guidelines Specific to Salem,Units 1 & 2 & Performance Demonstration Program Were Developed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-024, :on 950911,determined Fuel Handling Bldg Low Differential Pressure Surveillance Testing Did Not Ensure Compliance W/Ts Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Basis Info.Fuel Handling Bldg Changed |
- on 950911,determined Fuel Handling Bldg Low Differential Pressure Surveillance Testing Did Not Ensure Compliance W/Ts Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Basis Info.Fuel Handling Bldg Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-025, :on 951012,identified Plant Procedures Did Not Contain Specific Instructions to Limit Sys Flow for Pump Accident Alignments.Caused by Limited Appreciation of Significance of Operating.Baseline Document Revised |
- on 951012,identified Plant Procedures Did Not Contain Specific Instructions to Limit Sys Flow for Pump Accident Alignments.Caused by Limited Appreciation of Significance of Operating.Baseline Document Revised
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-026, :on 951023,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Cause Under Investigation.Appropriate Enhancements Will Be Made to Safety Valve Program Based on Results of Root Cause Determination |
- on 951023,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Cause Under Investigation.Appropriate Enhancements Will Be Made to Safety Valve Program Based on Results of Root Cause Determination
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000272/LER-1995-026-01, :on 951023,main Steam Safety Valves Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Use of Furmanite Trevitest Equipment That Had Inaccuracies.Rebuilt MSSV That Failed Lift Setpoint Test or Exceeded Allowable Seat Leakage Limits |
- on 951023,main Steam Safety Valves Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Use of Furmanite Trevitest Equipment That Had Inaccuracies.Rebuilt MSSV That Failed Lift Setpoint Test or Exceeded Allowable Seat Leakage Limits
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1995-027-01, :on 761211,doses During LOCA Exceeded Plant Licensing Basis Due to Inaccurate Assumptions in Dose Calculations.Revised Procedures in August 1994.W/forwarding Ltr |
- on 761211,doses During LOCA Exceeded Plant Licensing Basis Due to Inaccurate Assumptions in Dose Calculations.Revised Procedures in August 1994.W/forwarding Ltr
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-028-01, :on 950920,effective Leakage Monitoring Program Did Not Meet TS 6.8.4a Requirements Due to Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Consolidated Program Under Single Organization to Assure Plant Design Basis Satisfied |
- on 950920,effective Leakage Monitoring Program Did Not Meet TS 6.8.4a Requirements Due to Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Consolidated Program Under Single Organization to Assure Plant Design Basis Satisfied
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-029, :on 951219,all 4 Kv Vital Busses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.Replaced All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear |
- on 951219,all 4 Kv Vital Busses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.Replaced All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1995-029-01, :on 951219,4 Kv Vital Buses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear, Vital & Group Busses Replaced |
- on 951219,4 Kv Vital Buses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear, Vital & Group Busses Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability |
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