ML18095A545

From kanterella
Revision as of 11:20, 12 December 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Special Rept 90-5:on 900917-1008,listed Fire Barriers Impaired for More than 7 Days in Support of Planned Work. Caused by Support Design Change Work.Hourly Roving Fire Watch Patrol Will Continue Until Subject Areas Resolved
ML18095A545
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 10/17/1990
From: LABRUNA S
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
90-5, NUDOCS 9010260115
Download: ML18095A545 (4)


Text

. ' i I JI ---() , -Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station . U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 90-5 October l7, 1990 This Special Report addresses fire barrier penetration seal impairments which have not been restored *to functional status *. within seven (7) days. This report has been prepared in accordance with the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2. MJP:pc Distribution 9010260115 901017 ADOCK 05000272 PDC The Energy People ' Sincereiy

yours,
s. LaBruna General Manager Salem Operations 95-2189 (_10M) 12-89

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station -Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.7.11; Fire Barriers Impaired For Greater Than Seven (7) Days in Support of Planned Work Event Dates: 9/17/90, 9/20/90, 9/21/90 and 10/08/90 Report Date: 10/17/90 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.90-675, 90-685,90-686, 90-733, and 90-734. CONDITIONS PRIOR. TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 (Power Operation)

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

This report addresses the planned impairment of fire barrier penetration seals. The impairments have lasted greater than seven (7) days in support of the associated design change. work, therefore, a Special Report is required as per Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a.

On September 10, 1990 and September 13, 1990, nineteen (19) fire barrier penetrations were impaired in support of design change work (i.e., DCP lSC-2154).

These penetrations are located as follows: Date of No. of Impairment Penetrations 9/10/90 9/13/90 1 1 1 2 1 8 4 1 Location 84' El. il Spent Fuel Pit Heat Exchanger

& Pump Area 78' Containment Radiation Monitor Room 100' El. Aisle #1 (East & West) 100' El. Corridor 64' El. Control Area.#1 4 KV Vital Bus Area Relay Room .* 84' El. Control Area fl Transformer Bus Room lA Diesel Generator Control Room On September 14, 1990, four (4) fire barrier* penetrations were* impaired in support of design change work (i.e., DCP lSC-2161).

Two (2) of these penetrations are located in the 84-" El. Aisle No. 1 East Section, one (1) is located in the 100' El. Main Corridor, and one (1) is located in the 84' El. NIS Corridor Unit 1 & 2 Common Area. On October 1, 1990, three (3) fire barrier penetrations were impaired in support of design change work (i.e., DCP lSC-2161).

Two (2) of these penetrations are located in the 84' El. Corridor East Section, and one (1) is located in the 100' El. Main Corridor.

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 9. . .. DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) On October 1, 1990, one (1) fire barrier penetration was impaired in support of design change work (i.e., DCP lSC-2160).

It is located in the Unit 1 Relay Room. An hourly roving fire watch had been established for the above fire areas previously due to other fire protection concerns.

Therefore, the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, were met. Technical Specification 3.7.11 states: "All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related*areas shall be functional." Action Statement 3.7.11.a states: "With one (1) or more of the above required fire penetrations non-functional, within one hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of. the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the fire *barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other *report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification

6.9.2 within

the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status." APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The root cause of the impairment of the fire barrier penetration was to support design change work. ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to *adjacent portions of the facility.

This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility.

The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.

This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification

6.9.2 since

the time between discovery and eventual repair of the fire barrier impairments is greater than seven * (7) days. Appropriate actions were already in place in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a to establish an hourly roving fire watch patrol for the impaired fire barriers once the impairments were identified

.. The subject fire areas contain detection in addition to the roving fire watch patrol. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a fire in the areas would be detected before it could involve an adjacent

, UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 9'-5 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) area. This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public. CORRECTIVE ACTION: The hourly roving fire watch patrol, as addressed in the Description of Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns associated with the subject areas are resolved.

The repair of the penetrations was not accomplished within seven (7) 'days due to the time required to support the associated design change work. Upon completion of the design change work, the penetrations*

will be sealed. The hourly fire watch, as addressed in the Description of .Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns associated with these areas are resolved.

MJP:pc SORC Mtg.90-143 <?/'de? o4r o°'-' General Manager -Salem Operations