ML17212A076
| ML17212A076 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/2017 |
| From: | Dominion Nuclear Connecticut |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17212A038 | List:
|
| References | |
| 17-208 | |
| Download: ML17212A076 (650) | |
Text
MPS-3 FSARMillstone Power Station Unit 3 Safety Analysis Report Chapter 6 MPS-3 FSAR 6-i Rev. 30CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES Table of ContentsSection Title Page
6.0INTRODUCTION
......................................................................................6.0-16.1ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE MATERIALS................................6.1-16.1.1Metallic Materials.......................................................................................6.1-16.1.1.1Materials Selection and Fabrication...........................................................6.1-16.1.1.2Composition, Compatibilit y, and Stability of Containment Spray and Safety Injection Coolants.......................................................................................6.1-36.1.2Organic Materials.......................................................................................6.1-46.1.2.1Protective Coatings.....................................................................................6.1-46.1.2.2Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.54...................................................6.1-46.1.2.3Other Organic Materials Used in the Primary Containment.......................6.1-56.1.3References for Section 6.1..........................................................................6.1-56.2CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS....................................................................6.2-16.2.1Containment Functional Design.................................................................6.2-16.2.1.1Containment Structure................................................................................6.2-16.2.1.1.1Design Bases...............................................................................................6.2-16.2.1.1.2Design Features...........................................................................................6.2-26.2.1.1.3Design Evaluation.......................................................................................6.2-36.2.1.2Containment Subcompartments................................................................6.2-156.2.1.2.1Design Basis.............................................................................................6.2-156.2.1.2.2Design Features.........................................................................................6.2-186.2.1.2.3Design Evaluation.....................................................................................6.2-186.2.1.2.4Short-term LOCA Mass and Energy Releases.........................................6.2-306.2.1.3Mass and Energy Release Analyses for Postulated Loss-of-Coolant Accidents.
6.2-326.2.1.3.1Mass and Energy Release Data.................................................................6.2-336.2.1.3.2Sources of Mass and Energy.....................................................................6.2-336.2.1.3.3Blowdown Model Description..................................................................6.2-356.2.1.3.4Refill Model Description..........................................................................6.2-356.2.1.3.5Reflood Model Description......................................................................6.2-356.2.1.3.6Post-Reflood Model Description..............................................................6.2-356.2.1.3.7Decay Heat Model....................................................................................6.2-366.2.1.3.8Single Failure Analysis.............................................................................6.2-376.2.1.3.9Metal-Water Reaction...............................................................................6.2-376.2.1.4Mass and Energy Release Analysis for Postulated Secondary System Pipe Rupture Inside Containment.....................................................................6.2-386.2.1.4.1Mass and Energy Release Data.................................................................
6.2-38 MPS-3 FSARCHAPTER 6 -ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title Page 6-ii Rev. 306.2.1.4.2Single Failure Assumptions......................................................................6.2-396.2.1.4.3Initial Conditions......................................................................................6.2-406.2.1.4.4Description of Blowdown Model.............................................................6.2-406.2.1.4.5Energy Inventories....................................................................................6.2-426.2.1.4.6Additional Information Required for Confirmatory Analyses.................6.2-436.2.1.5Minimum Containment Pressure Analysis for Performance Capability Studies of Emergency Core Cooling System........................................................6.2-456.2.1.5.1Mass and Energy Release Data.................................................................6.2-456.2.1.5.2Initial Containment Internal Conditions...................................................6.2-466.2.1.5.3Containment Volume................................................................................6.2-466.2.1.5.4Active Heat Sinks.....................................................................................6.2-466.2.1.5.5Steam Water Mixing.................................................................................6.2-466.2.1.5.6Passive Heat Sinks....................................................................................6.2-466.2.1.5.7Heat Transfer to Passive Heat Sinks.........................................................6.2-476.2.1.5.8Other Parameters.......................................................................................6.2-476.2.1.6Testing and Inspection..............................................................................6.2-476.2.1.7Instrumentation Requirements..................................................................6.2-476.2.2Containment Heat Removal System.........................................................6.2-476.2.2.1Design Bases.............................................................................................6.2-486.2.2.2System Design..........................................................................................6.2-496.2.2.3Design Evaluation.....................................................................................6.2-556.2.2.4Inspection and Testing Requirements.......................................................6.2-646.2.2.4.1Quench Spray System...............................................................................6.2-646.2.2.4.2Containment Recirculation System..........................................................6.2-656.2.3Secondary Containment Functional Design.............................................6.2-676.2.3.1Design Bases.............................................................................................6.2-686.2.3.2System Description...................................................................................6.2-686.2.3.3Safety Evaluation......................................................................................6.2-696.2.3.4Inspection and Testing Requirements.......................................................6.2-706.2.3.5Instrumentation Requirements..................................................................6.2-716.2.4Containment Isolation System..................................................................6.2-726.2.4.1Design Bases.............................................................................................6.2-726.2.4.1.1Governing Conditions...............................................................................6.2-726.2.4.1.2Isolation Criteria - Fluid Systems Penetrating the Containment..............6.2-736.2.4.1.3Isolation Criteria - Flui d Instrument Lines Penetrating the Containment6.2-736.2.4.1.4Design Requirements for Containment Isolation Barriers........................6.2-736.2.4.2System Design..........................................................................................6.2-746.2.4.3Design Evaluation.....................................................................................6.2-816.2.4.4Tests and Inspections................................................................................6.2-816.2.4.5Instrumentation Requirements..................................................................6.2-816.2.5Combustible Gas Control in Containment................................................
6.2-81 MPS-3 FSARCHAPTER 6 -ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title Page 6-iii Rev. 306.2.5.1Design Bases.............................................................................................6.2-816.2.5.2System Design..........................................................................................6.2-836.2.5.3Design Evaluation.....................................................................................6.2-846.2.5.4Inspection and Testing Requirements.......................................................6.2-876.2.5.5Instrumentation Requirements..................................................................6.2-876.2.6Containment Leakage Testing..................................................................6.2-896.2.6.1Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Test (Type A)..............................6.2-896.2.6.2Containment Penetration Leakage Rate Test (Type B)............................6.2-916.2.6.3Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Rate Test (Type C)......................6.2-926.2.6.4Scheduling and Reporting of Periodic Tests.............................................6.2-936.2.6.5Special Testing Requirements..................................................................6.2-946.2.7References for Section 6.2........................................................................6.2-946.3EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM............................................6.3-16.3.1Design Bases...............................................................................................6.3-16.3.2System Design............................................................................................6.3-36.3.2.1Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams........................................................6.3-36.3.2.2Equipment and Component Descriptions...................................................6.3-46.3.2.2.1Accumulators..............................................................................................6.3-46.3.2.2.2Tanks...........................................................................................................6.3-56.3.2.2.3Pumps..........................................................................................................6.3-66.3.2.2.4Containment Recirculation Coolers............................................................6.3-86.3.2.2.5Valves.........................................................................................................6.3-96.3.2.2.6Accumulator Motor Operated Valve Controls..........................................6.3-126.3.2.2.7Motor Operated Valves and Controls.......................................................6.3-126.3.2.3Applicable Codes and Classifications.......................................................6.3-136.3.2.4Material Specifications and Compatibility...............................................6.3-136.3.2.5System Reliability.....................................................................................6.3-136.3.2.6Protection Provisions................................................................................6.3-176.3.2.7Provisions for Performance Testing.........................................................6.3-176.3.2.8Manual Actions.........................................................................................6.3-176.3.3Performance Evaluation............................................................................6.3-196.3.4Tests and Inspections................................................................................6.3-216.3.4.1ECCS Performance Tests..........................................................................6.3-216.3.4.2Reliability Tests and Inspections..............................................................6.3-226.3.5Instrumentation Requirements..................................................................6.3-246.3.5.1Temperature Indication.............................................................................6.3-256.3.5.2Pressure Indication....................................................................................6.3-256.3.5.3Flow Indication.........................................................................................6.3-266.3.5.4Level Indication........................................................................................
6.3-26 MPS-3 FSARCHAPTER 6 -ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title Page 6-iv Rev. 306.3.5.5Valve Position Indication..........................................................................6.3-276.3.6Reference for Section 6.3..........................................................................6.3-276.4HABITABILITY SYSTEMS.....................................................................6.4-16.4.1Design Bases...............................................................................................6.4-16.4.2System Design............................................................................................6.4-26.4.2.1Control Room Envelope.............................................................................6.4-26.4.2.2Ventilation System Design.........................................................................6.4-46.4.2.3Leaktightness..............................................................................................6.4-66.4.2.4Interaction with Other Zones and Pressure-Containing Equipment...........6.4-66.4.2.5Shielding Design.........................................................................................6.4-76.4.3System Operational Procedures..................................................................6.4-76.4.4Design Evaluation.......................................................................................6.4-86.4.4.1Radiological Protection...............................................................................6.4-86.4.4.2Toxic Gas Protection..................................................................................6.4-96.4.5Testing and Inspection................................................................................6.4-96.4.6Instrumentation Requirements..................................................................6.4-106.4.7References for Section 6.4........................................................................6.4-106.5FISSION PRODUCT REMOVAL AND CONTROL SYSTEMS............6.5-16.5.1Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Filter Systems......................................6.5-16.5.1.1Design Bases...............................................................................................6.5-16.5.1.2System Description.....................................................................................6.5-26.5.1.3Safety Evaluation........................................................................................6.5-36.5.1.4Inspection and Testing Requirements.........................................................6.5-36.5.1.5Instrumentation Requirements....................................................................6.5-46.5.1.6Materials.....................................................................................................6.5-46.5.2Containment Sprays as a Fission Product Cleanup System........................6.5-56.5.2.1Design Bases...............................................................................................6.5-56.5.2.2System Design............................................................................................6.5-66.5.2.3Design Evaluation.......................................................................................6.5-76.5.2.3.1Iodine Removal Coefficients......................................................................6.5-76.5.2.3.2Range of Spray pH......................................................................................6.5-76.5.2.3.3Ultimate Sump pH......................................................................................6.5-76.5.2.4Inspection and Testing Requirements.........................................................6.5-76.5.2.5Materials.....................................................................................................6.5-76.5.3Fission Product Control Systems................................................................6.5-86.5.3.1Primary Containment..................................................................................6.5-86.5.3.2Secondary Containment..............................................................................
6.5-8 MPS-3 FSARCHAPTER 6 -ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES Table of Contents (Continued)
Section Title Page 6-v Rev. 306.5.4References for Section 6.5..........................................................................6.5-86.6INSERVICE INSPECTION OF CLASS 2 AND 3 COMPONENTS.........................................................................................6.6-16.6.1Inservice Inspection Program.....................................................................6.6-16.6.2Accessibility................................................................................................6.6-16.6.3Augmented Inservice Inspection to Protect Against Postulated Piping Failures.
6.6-1 MPS-3 FSAR 6-vi Rev. 30CHAPTER 6-ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES List of Tables Number Title6.1-1Typical Materials Employed fo r Components of ESF Systems6.1-2Parameters for Ultimate Sump pH Calculation (1)6.1-3Painted Surface Area Inside Containment6.1-4Other Organic Materials Used Inside Containment6.2-1Containment Peak Pressure and Temperature Results Following a Main Steam Line Break Inside Containment6.2-2Passive Heat Sinks (1)6.2-3Containment Design Evaluation Parameters6.2-4LOCA Peak Pressure Results6.2-5LOCA Peak Pressure - DEHL Br eak - Initial Condition Sensitivity6.2-6LOCA Sequence of Events - Containment Peak Pressure6.2-6ALOCA Peak Temperature Results6.2-6BLOCA Sequence of Events -
Containment Peak Temperature6.2-6CLOCA - Containmen t Depressurization Results - DEPS - Break6.2-6DLOCA Sequence of Events -
Containment Depressurization6.2-6ELOCA-Containment Sump Water Te mperature at RSS Pump Start6.2-6FLOCA-Accident Chronology for Pump Su ction Double Ended Rupture-Limiting Case for Containment Sump Temperature6.2-6GAccident Chronology for Full Double-Ende d Rupture Main Steam Line Break at 0% Power-Limiting Case for Containment Pressure6.2-6HAccident Chronology for Full Double-Ende d Rupture Main Steam Line Break at 102% Power-Limiting Case fo r Containment Temperture6.2-7System Parameters Initial Conditions for LOCA Mass and Energy Release Analysis6.2-7ALOCA Mass and Energy Analysis Core Decay Heat Fraction6.2-8Double Ended Hot Leg Break Blowdown Mass and Energy Release6.2-9Double Ended Pump Suction Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Blowdown Mass and Energy Release6.2-10Double Ended Pump Suction Break with Maximum ECCS Flows Blowdown Mass and Energy Release MPS-3 FSAR List of Tables (Continued)
Number Title 6-vii Rev. 306.2-11Double Ended Cold Leg Break with Mi nimum ECCS Flow Blowdown Mass and Energy Releases6.2-12Deleted by PACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008 6.2-13 3.0 Ft 2 Pump Suction Split Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Blowdown Mass and Energy Releases6.2-14Double Ended Hot Leg Minimum ECCS Flows Reflood Mass and Energy Releases6.2-15Double Ended Pump Suction Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Reflood Mass and Energy Releases6.2-16Double Ended Pump Suction Break with Maximum ECCS Flows Reflood Mass and Energy Releases6.2-17Double Ended Cold Leg Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Reflood Mass and Energy Releases6.2-18Deleted by PACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008 6.2-19 3.0 Ft 2 Suction Split Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Refl ood Mass and Energy Releases6.2-20Double Ended Hot Leg Break with Mi nimum ECCS Flows Reflood Principal Parameters6.2-21Double Ended Pump Suction Break with Minimum ECCS Flow s Reflood Principal Parameters6.2-21ADouble Ended Pump Suction Break with Maximum ECCS Flows Reflood Principal Parameters6.2-21BDouble Ended Cold Leg Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Reflood Principal Parameters6.2-21CDeleted by PACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-0086.2-21D3.0 Square Feet Pump Su ction Split Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Reflood Principal Parameters6.2-21EDouble Ended Hot Leg Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Mass Balance 6.2-21FDouble Ended Hot Leg Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Energy Balance6.2-21GDouble Ended Pump Suction Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Mass Balance 6.2-21HDouble Ended Pump Suction Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Energy Balance 6.2-21IDouble Ended Pump Suction Break wi th Maximum ECCS Flows Mass Balance MPS-3 FSAR List of Tables (Continued)
Number Title 6-viii Rev. 306.2-21JDouble Ended Pump Suction Break with Maximum ECCS Flows Energy Balance6.2-21KDouble Ended Cold Leg Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Mass Balance6.2-21LDouble Ended Cold Leg Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Energy Balance6.2-21MDeleted by PACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-0086.2-21NDeleted by PACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-0086.2-21O3.0 ft 2 Pump Suction Split Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Mass Balance6.2-21P3.0 Square Feet Pump Su ction Split Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Energy Balance6.2-22Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-23Main Steam Line Break Mass and Energy Releases Inside Containment - Initial Conditions Assumptions6.2-24Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-25Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-26Steam Generator Cubicle Peak Differen tial Pressures Feedwater Line Break6.2-27THREED Input for Analysis at Pressurizer Cubicle6.2-28THREED Input for Analysis of Steam Generator Cubicle B6.2-29Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-30Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-31Mass and Energy Release Rates for a Spra y Line DER in the Pressurizer Cubicle6.2-32Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-32AMass and Energy Release Rates for a Surg e Line DER in the Pressurizer Cubicle6.2-33Pressurizer Cubicle Peak Differential Pressures6.2-34Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-35Mass and Energy Release Rates for a D ouble Ended Guillotine Break of the Pressurizer Surge Line (Used for a 196.6 S quare Inch Hot Leg LDR in the Steam Generator Cubicle)6.2-36Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-36AMass and Energy Release Rate s for a Feedwater Line SE S in the Steam Generator Cubicle MPS-3 FSAR List of Tables (Continued)
Number Title 6-ix Rev. 306.2-36BDeleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-37Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-37ADeleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-37BDeleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-38Steam Generator Cubicle P eak Differential Pressures, Pressurizer Surge Line LDR6.2-39Steam Generator Cubicle Peak Differential Pressures, Residual Heat Removal Line LDR6.2-40Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-41Deleted by PKF FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-42Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-43Subcompartment Design and Maximum Calculated Differential Pressures6.2-44Omitted6.2-45Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-46Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-47Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-48Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-49Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-50Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-51Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-52Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-53Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-54Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-55Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-56Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-57Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-58Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-59Balance of Plant Parameters Used in Steam Line Break Mass and Energy Release Calculation MPS-3 FSAR List of Tables (Continued)
Number Title 6-x Rev. 306.2-60Parameters for ECCS Contai nment Backpressure Analysis6.2-61Containment Heat Remova l Systems Component Data6.2-62Containment Heat Removal Systems - Consequences of Components Malfunctions6.2-63Supplementary Leak Collection and Re lease System Princi pal Component and Design Parameters6.2-64Containment Enclosure Building Design Parameters6.2-65Containment Penetration (12)6.2-66Omitted6.2-67 Hydrogen Recombiner System Design Parameter6.2-68Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-0106.2-69Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-0106.2-70System Alignment for Type A Tests6.2-71Pipe Insulation Inside Contai nment (8 Inches and Larger)6.2-72DECLG Mass and Energy Releas es for the Limiting Transient6.2-73Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-74Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-75Deleted By FSARCR 02-MP3-0176.2-76Deleted By FSARCR 02-MP3-0176.2-77Passive Heat Sink Data fo r Minimum Post LOCA Contai nment Pressure Analysis (1)6.2-78Input Data for Minimum Containment Pressure Analysis6.3-1Emergency Core Cooling System Component Parameters6.3-2Emergency Core Cooling System Relief Valve Data6.3-3Motor Operated Isolation Valves in the Emergency Core Cooling System6.3-4Materials Employed for Emergency Core Cooling System Components6.3-5Single Active Failure Analysis for Em ergency Core Cooling System Components6.3-6Emergency Core Cooling System Recircul ation Piping Passive Failure Analysis *6.3-7Switchover Procedure
- MPS-3 FSAR List of Tables (Continued)
Number Title 6-xi Rev. 306.3-8Emergency Core Cooling System Shared Functions Evaluation6.3-9Normal Operating Status of Emergenc y Core Cooling System Components for Core Cooling6.3-10Failure Mode and Effects Analysis - Em ergency Core Cooling System - Active Components6.3-11Net Positive Suction Head for Em ergency Core Cooling System Pumps6.4-1Control Room Component Performance Ch aracteristics for Ha bitability Systems6.5-1Comparison of ESF Filter Systems with Respect to Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2 Positions6.6-1Inservice Inspection Program Class 2 & 3 Systems MPS-3 FSARNOTE: REFER TO THE CONTROLLED PLANT DRAWING FOR THE LATEST REVISION.
6-xii Rev. 30CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES List of Figures Number Title6.0-1Engineered Safety Features6.2-1Containment Pressure Response -
Double Ended LOCA (Break Location)6.2-2Containment Pressure Response -
Pump Suction LOCA (Break Size)6.2-3Containment Vapor Temperature Response - LOCA6.2-4Containment Liner Temperature Response 6.2-5Containment Depressurization Response - LOCA6.2-6Containment Sump Temperature Response6.2-7Containment Pressure from
1.4 square
foot MSLB at 0% Power No Entrainment -
Limiting Peak Pressure Case6.2-8Containment Liner Temperature From 1.4 square foot MSLB at 100% Power, No Entrainment - Limiting Peak Temperature Case6.2-9Containment Liner Temperature From
1.4 square
foot at 0% Power, No Entrainment - Peak Temperature Case6.2-10Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 6.2-11Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-12Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-13Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 6.2-14Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-15Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-16Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 6.2-17Pressurizer Subcompartment Elev ation View with Nodal Arrangement6.2-18Plan View for the Pressurizer Subcompartment Elevation 95.3 feet6.2-18APlan View for the Pressurizer Subcompartment Elevation 74.2 feet6.2-18BPlan View for the Pressurizer Subcompartment Elevation 51.3 feet6.2-18CPlan View for the Pressurizer Subcompartment Elevation 25.7 feet6.2-18DPlan View for the Pressurizer Subcompartment Elevation 12.75 feet6.2-19Steam Generator Subcompartment Elevation with Nodal Arrangement6.2-20Plan View for the Steam Generator Su bcompartment Elevation 3 feet 8 inches MPS-3 FSAR List of Figures (Continued)NOTE: REFER TO THE CONTROLLED PLANT DRAWING FOR THE LATEST REVISION.
Figure Title 6-xiii Rev. 306.2-21Plan View for the Steam Generator Su bcompartment Elevation 28 feet 6 inches6.2-22Plan View for the Steam Generator Su bcompartment Elevation 51 feet 4 inches6.2-23Upper Reactor Cavity Subcompartment Plan Elevation and Nodal Arrangement6.2-24Pressurizer Subcompartme nt Nodalization Diagram6.2-25Steam Generator Subcompart ment Nodalization Diagram6.2-26Staggered Mesh Approximation fo r Nodes and Internal Junctions6.2-27General Flow Chart for THREED6.2-28Pressure Response Pressurizer Cubicle 6.2-28APressure Response Pressurizer Cubicle6.2-29Pressure Response Pressurizer Cubicle6.2-29APressure Response Pressurizer Cubicle6.2-29BPressure Response Pressurizer Cubicle 6.2-29CPressure Response Pressurizer Cubicle 6.2-29DPressure Response Pressurizer Cubicle 6.2-30Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-31Pressure Response Steam Generator Cubicle 6.2-32Pressure Response Steam Generator Cubicle6.2-33Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-34Pressure Response Steam Generator Cubicle 6.2-34ADeleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-34BDeleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-34CDeleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-34DDeleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-0066.2-35Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-36P&ID Quench Spray and Hydrogen Recombiner6.2-37(Sheets 1-3) P&ID Low Pressure Safe ty Injection/Contai nment Recirculation6.2-38Typical Containment Structure Sump 6.2-39Spatial Droplet Size Distribution of Sp raco 1713A Nozzle A pplying Surface Area MPS-3 FSAR List of Figures (Continued)NOTE: REFER TO THE CONTROLLED PLANT DRAWING FOR THE LATEST REVISION.
Figure Title 6-xiv Rev. 30 Correction and Spraying Water at 40 psig Under Laboratory Conditions6.2-40Containment Recirculation Pumps Characteristic Curves6.2-41Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-42Containment Recirculation Spray Cove rage Bend Line (Elevation 104 feet), Elevated Temperature (275°F), Spray H eader at Elevation 141 feet 9 inches6.2-43Containment Recirculation Spray Cove rage Bend Line (Elevation 104 feet), Elevated Temperature (275°F), Spray H eader at Elevation 145 feet 3 inches6.2-44Unobstructed Quench Spray Coverage at the Bend Line (Elevation 104 feet), Elevated Temperature (275°F), Spray H eaders at Elevation 153 feet and 168 feet6.2-45Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-0386.2-46Auxiliary Building Ventila tion System and Supplementary Leak Collection & Release System6.2-47Containment Isolation System 6.2-48Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-0106.2-49Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-0106.2-50Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-010 6.2-51Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-0106.2-52Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-0106.2-53P&ID Containment Monitoring System 6.2-54Quench Spray Pumps Characteristic Curves6.2-55Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-0106.2-56Containment Internal Structure Openings 6.2-57Expected Long-Term Circulat ion Patterns in Containment6.2-58Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System6.2-59Containment Pressure Limiting Break 6.2-59ADeleted by FSARCR 02-MP3-0176.2-60Condensing Wall Heat Transfer Coefficient Limiting Break6.2-61Deleted by PKG FSC 07-MP3-0246.2-62Deleted by PKG FSC 07-MP3-024 MPS-3 FSAR List of Figures (Continued)NOTE: REFER TO THE CONTROLLED PLANT DRAWING FOR THE LATEST REVISION.
Figure Title 6-xv Rev. 306.3-1Safety Injection / Residual Heat Re moval System Process Flow Diagram Notes to Figure 6.3-16.3-2(Sheets 1-2) P&ID High Pr essure Safety Injection6.3-3Residual Heat Removal Pump Performance Curve 6.3-4Charging Pump Curve Assumed for Safety Analysis6.3-5High Head SI Pump Curve Assumed for Safety Analysis6.3-6Refueling Water Stor age Tank Water Levels6.4-1Control Room Area6.4-2Control Room Intake and Haza rdous Material Storage Locations6.5-1Post DBA Minimum Containment Sump pH MPS3 UFSAR6.0-1Rev. 30CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES
6.0 INTRODUCTION
The engineered safety features (ESF) serve to mitigate the consequences of postulated events such as a loss-of-coolant accide nt (LOCA) and to protect the public by preventing or minimizing the release of fission products. The ESFs are designed to provide emergency coolant maintain the core and the containment structure within desi gn maximum conditions duri ng accidents, thereby preventing or minimizing the release of fission products to the environment.
The following ESFs, each separate and indepe ndent, are provided to satisfy the functions indicated:Containment Structure The containment structure is a carbon steel-lined, reinforced concrete structure, which contains all components and piping that constitute the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
During normal operation, the containment atmos phere is maintained at a subatmospheric pressure. After a LOCA, the containment is depressurized to limit outle akage of radioactivity which may be present in the containment atmosphere.
Sections 6.2.1 and 3.8.1 describe the containment structure in detail.
Containment Heat Removal Systems The pressure of the containment atmosphere is maintained below the design pressure during accidents by the containment heat removal systems consisting of the quench spray and containment recirculation systems.
The combination of the quench spray and contai nment recirculation systems is capable of reducing the containment pressure to 19 psig in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following a design basis accident (DBA). The containment recirculation system is capable of maintaining the reduced pressure inside the containment structure following the DBA. Section 6.2.2 descri bes containment heat removal systems in detail.Emergency Core Cooling System The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) provides a borated emergency cooling water supply to the reactor core for the entire spectrum of reactor coolant system (RCS) breaks and main steam and feedwater line breaks to limit core temperatur e, maintain core integrity, and provide negative reactivity for additional shutdown margin.The ECCS automatically initiates safety injection coolant delivery into the reactor core on receipt of a safety injection signal (SIS) coincident with a cold leg inje ction permissive (P-19) signal.
During the injection mode of the ECCS operation, a minimum of one charging pump, one safety MPS3 UFSAR6.0-2Rev. 30 injection pump, and one residual heat removal pump deliver chil led borated water from the RWST to the RCS. The duration of the injection mode depends upon the nature and severity of the accident. In addition, four nitr ogen pressurized safety injecti on accumulators, which require no initiation signal, inject their c ontents of borated water into the RCS when RCS pressure drops below a predetermined value (Section 6.3). Th e order in which these components function depends on the loss rate of the reactor coolant.
The operator manually aligns the ECCS for the r ecirculation mode to provide long term cooling for the reactor core. Initiation of recirculation is governed by th e nature and severity of the accident. The RWST is isolated, and two of the containment recirculation pumps recirculate water from the containment sump directly to the cont ainment recirculation spray headers and to the RCS or to the suctions of the charging and sa fety injection pumps, depending on RCS pressure.
The water is cooled by the containment recirculatio n coolers. The ECCS is described in detail in Section 6.3. Figure 6.0 1 presents a combined sc hematic of the contai nment depressurization systems and the ECCS.
Auxiliary Feedwater System The auxiliary feedwater system provides an emer gency supply of water to the steam generators for the removal of sensible and decay heat from the reactor core.
For additional information regarding the auxiliary feedwater system, refer to FSAR Section 10.4.9.Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System The supplementary leak collection and release system (SLCRS) includes exhaust fans and two filter banks. Each filter bank consists of a demister, electric heating coil, roughing filter, carbon adsorber, and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. The SLCRS is put into operation automatically by an SIS signal or remote-manually. This system, during accident conditions, maintains a negative pressure within the c ontainment enclosure build ing, auxiliary building, engineered safety features building, hydrogen recombiner building, and the main steam valve building. During system operation the air is filtered and discharged to the atmosphere through the Millstone stack. Radioactivity re leased to the environment is thereby minimized. Section 6.2.3 describes the SLCRS in detail.
Containment Isolation System To ensure containment structure integrity following an accident, containment isolation valves are provided in fluid system piping which penetrates the containmen t structure. The containment isolation valves are located inside and outside of the containment structur e and are either check valves, normally closed manual valves, valves capable of remote manual operation, or valves which either open or close automatically on re ceipt of a SIS, containment isolation phase A (CIA), containment isolation phase B (CIB), f eedwater isolation (FWI) signal, or steam line isolation (SLI) signal.
MPS3 UFSAR6.0-3Rev. 30 Section 6.2.4 describes the containment isolation system, and Section 7.3 describes the actuation of the isolation valves.
System Redundancy Each ESF system is designed with sufficient redundancy to satisfy the system safety function assuming a single failure (Section 3.1.1). Active components of the ES F systems are powered from the emergency buses (Section 8.3.1). Two emergency diesel genera tors are provided to ensure highly reliable power sources to the emergency buses should othe r power sources fail.The operability of ESF equipment is ensured in several ways. Some of the equipment, such as the charging pumps, functions during normal unit opera tion, thus providing a constant check on operational status. The balance of the ESF equipment, such as the pumps in the containment depressurization systems, functions only in the ev ent of an accident. In this case, system and equipment design permits periodic testing. Testing is described in the applicable system sections.To ensure that a high quality level is obtaine d in the ESF components and systems, a quality assurance program (Chapt er 17) is implemented during the design, construction, and operations phases of the ESF systems.
MPS3 UFSAR6.0-4Rev. 30FIGURE 6.0-1 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES MPS3 UFSAR6.1-1Rev. 30
6.1 ENGINEERED
SAFETY FEATURE MATERIALS This section provides a discussion of the materials used in engi neered safety features (ESF) components and material interac tion that could impair operation of ESF. Systems that comprise the ESF are described in Chapter 6.0.
6.1.1 METALLIC
MATERIALS 6.1.1.1 Materials Selection and Fabrication Materials were selected on the basis of their compatibility with the reactor coolant and containment spray solutions. General corrosion, intergranular corrosion, a nd caustic and chloride stress corrosion have been cons idered. Mechanical pr operties of the pressu re boundary materials used in the ESF are in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Ve ssel Code,Section II.
Selection and fabrication of ESF component mate rials are in compliance with the ASME Code,Section III.Table 6.1-1 lists the principal pressure-retaining material specifications for components of the ESF.Integrity of ESF Components The welding materials used for joining the ferritic base materials of the ESF conform to or are equivalent to ASME Materials Specifications SFA 5.1, 5.2, 5.5, 5.17, 5.18, and 5.20. The welding materials used for joining nickel-chromium-iron alloy in similar base material combination and in dissimilar ferritic or austenitic base materi al combination conform to ASME Material Specifications SFA 5.11 and 5.14. Th e welding materials used for jo ining the austenitic stainless steel base materials conform to ASME Material Specifications SFA 5.4 and 5.9. These materials are qualified to the requirements of the ASME C ode Section III and Section IX and are used in procedures which have been qualified to these sa me rules. The methods u tilized to control delta ferrite content in austenitic stainless st eel weldments are discussed in Section 5.2.3.
All parts of components in contact with borated water were fabricated of or clad with austenitic stainless steel or equivalent co rrosion resistant material. The in tegrity of the safety related components of the ESF was maintained during all stages of component manufacture. Austenitic stainless steel is utilized in th e final heat treated condition as required by the respective ASME Code Section II material specification. Austenitic stainless steel materials used in the ESF components were handled, protected, stored, and cleaned according to recognized and accepted methods which are designed to mi nimize contamination which coul d lead to stress corrosion cracking.Westinghouse supplied ESF components within the c ontainment that would be exposed to core cooling water and containment sprays in the ev ent of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) utilize materials listed in Table 6.1-1. These components were manufactured primar ily of stainless steel or other corrosion-resistant material. The inte grity of the materials of construction for ESF equipment when exposed to post design basis accident (DBA) conditions has been evaluated. Post MPS3 UFSAR6.1-2Rev. 30DBA conditions were conservatively represented by test conditions. The test program ("Behavior of Austenitic Stainless Steel in Post Hypothe tical Loss-of-Coolant Ac cident Environment," 1972.) performed by Westinghouse considered spray and core cooling solutions of the design chemical compositions, as well as the design chemical compositions contaminated with corrosion and deterioration products which may be transf erred to the solution during recirculation. The effects of sodium (free caustic), ch lorine (chloride), and fluorine (fluoride) on austenitic stainless steels were considered. Ba sed on the results of this investigat ion, as well as testing by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and othe rs, the behavior of austenitic stainless steels in the post DBA environment will be accepta ble. No cracking is anticipated on any equipment even in the presence of postulated levels of contaminants, provided the core cooling and spray solution pH is maintained at an adequate level. The inhibitiv e properties of alkalinity (hydroxyl ion) against chloride cracking and the inhibitive characteris tic of boric acid on fluor ide cracking have been demonstrated.Susceptibility to intergranular corrosion in the heat-affected zone of austenitic stainless steels is reduced due to controlled weld ing processes to limit sensiti zation, limited tim e at elevated temperatures, and the fact that the chemicals us ed at low concentrations are not significant intergranular corrosives. Because of the soluti on-annealed condition of the base metal, it is immune to intergranular corrosio
- n. Additional informatio n concerning austenitic stainless steel, including the avoidance of sensiti zation and the prevention of intergranular attack, can be found in Section 5.2.3.Cold-worked austenitic stainless steels exhibiting a yield strength in excess of 90,000 psi were not used.Low melting alloys (zinc, lead, mercury, etc.) that can cause stre ss corrosion cracking when in contact with stainless steel were prohibited during fabricat ion of stainless steel parts.Materials such as aluminum and zinc which could be attacked by the caustic spray solution, were restricted within the containment. Extremely limited amounts of these materials were allowed for small, nonfunctioning parts.Copper-nickel (90-10) is subject to only slight general corrosion, which is taken into account when providing corrosion allowances. The Monels are subject to general corrosion only. The rate of corrosion is negligible, since the resistance to coolant or spray solutions improves with increasing nickel content.
Graphite filled asbestos pack ing with Inconel is immune in borated water systems, as demonstrated by previous experience. Carbon a nd tungsten carbide are inert. Note: Products containing asbestos were utilized in original inst allations. Asbestos products shall not be used in new or replacement instal lations unless a suitable substitute does not exist.
Negligible attack of carbon and low-alloy steels is anticipated duri ng a LOCA because these materials are resistant to basic solutions.
MPS3 UFSAR6.1-3Rev. 30 Regulatory Guide Compliance The integrity of safety related components of the ESF was maintained throughout component manufacture and installation through use of the guidance provided in the following regulatory guides:1.Delta Ferrite control is in ac cordance with Regulatory Guide 1.31.2.Insulation for austenitic stainless steel is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.36. (The allowable amounts of leachable chloride, fluoride, sodium, and silicates are limited to the values list ed in Regulatory Guide 1.36).3.Contamination and cleanliness control is provided consistent with Regulatory Guides 1.37 and 1.44, respectively.4.The use of stainless steel is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.44.5.To avoid hot cracking, all production weld ing on austenitic stainless steel is in accordance with Regulatory Guides 1.31 and 1.44.
Section 1.8 lists the degree of compli ance with these Regulatory Guides.
6.1.1.2 Composition, Compatibility, and Stability of Containment Spray and Safety Injection Coolants The method used for controlling th e recirculated sump solution pH is discussed in Section 6.2.2.
Containment spray pH control is required for fission product removal and for purposes of materials compatibility.
Following a design basis accident (DBA) that in itiates the containment quench spray system, the sump solution would be acidic (pH of approxi mately 4.15) for a brief period due to the boron concentration in the RWST water. In the long te rm (greater than four hours after the DBA), the aqueous phase inside the containment reaches an equilibrium pH 7.0 due to the addition of trisodium phosphate from the basket s located at elevation. (-)24 feet 6 inches of the containment.Table 6.1-2 identifies and quantifies the soluble acids and bases in the solution. The parameter values listed in this table are consistent with the appropriate technical specification limits.Stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel pipi ng in simulated pressu re-suppression and fission product absorption sprays were i nvestigated by Griess (1971). It was found that the higher pH borate solutions (pH of 6.5 and 7.5) caused little or no stress corrosion crac king of this material.
Metals subject to corrosion (aluminum and zinc) inside the containment were closely monitored during the plant design and generally not used in safety related components which must function following an accident.
MPS3 UFSAR6.1-4Rev. 30 The vessels storing engineered safety features (ESF) coolants include the safety injection accumulators and the refueling water storage tank.The accumulators are filled with borated wa ter and pressurized with nitrogen gas. The accumulators are carbon steel clad with austenitic stainless steel. Section 6.3 lists their principal design parameters.The refueling water storage tank (the source of borated cooling water for quench spray and safety injection) is austenit ic stainless steel. Sect ion 6.2.2 gives principal design parameters of the refueling water storage tank.Significant corrosive attack on the vessels storing the ESF coolants is not expected because of the corrosion resistance of the materi als and the absence of chlorides.
6.1.2 ORGANIC
MATERIALS 6.1.2.1 Protective Coatings The approximate quantities of pr otective coatings used within the primary containment are identified in Table 6.1-3. These coatings have been tested to demonstrate that they remain intact on the surface to which they are applied dur ing postulated post-DBA conditions. Tests were performed in accordance with Section 4 of AN SI N101.2, Protective Coatings for Light Water Nuclear Reactor Containment Faci lities, to meet or exceed th e DBA conditions described in Section 6.2. Commencing mid-cycle 6, coating mate rials to be applied to surfaces inside containment are tested in accordance with either ANSI N101.2 "Protection Coatings (Paints) for Light Water Nuclear Reactor Containment Facilities," or ASTM D3911, "Evaluating Coatings Used in Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants at Simulated Design Ba sis Accident (DBA)
Conditions."
6.1.2.2 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.54 This guide states that ANSI N101.4-1972, in conjunction with ANSI N45.2-1971, provides an adequate basis for complying with quality assurance requirements for protective coatings applied to ferritic steels, aluminum , stainless steel, galvanized steel, concrete, and masonry.Coatings for large equipment supplied by the NSSS, Westinghouse are specified to meet the requirements of this regulator y guide and are qualified usi ng the standard ANSI tests. Requirements for coatings of large equipm ent supplied by the NSSS are stipulated in Westinghouse process specifications.Quality assurance program recommendations stated in Regulatory Guide 1.54 are followed for all non-NSSS supplied major equipment and structures, except for the inspection defined in Section 6.2.4 of ANSI N101.4-1972. Inspection is in accordance with ANSI N5.12-1974, Section 10, "Inspection for Shop and Field Work." The total area coated in accordance with the Regulatory Guide includes approximately 798,700 square feet of carbon steel surface and 163,850 square feet of concrete surface.
MPS3 UFSAR6.1-5Rev. 30 For these non-NSSS components, the coating materials, including primer, surfacer, and finish coats, are catalyzed epoxies. The primer (steel surfaces) and surfacer (concrete surfaces) are low gloss (flat) materials. A gloss epoxy enamel fi nish coat is used on both steel and concrete.Table 6.1-3 lists the total estimated quantities of protective coatings on such equipment. Those items not specifically listed in Table 6.1-3 (such as valves, hand wheels, valve bodies, control cabinets, emergency lights, loudspeakers, off the shelf compon ents, etc.) require protective coatings on much smaller surface areas and are procured from numerous vendors. For this equipment, the specifications require that high quality coatings be applied using good commercial practices.Protective coatings for use in the reactor containment have been evaluated as to their suitability in post-DBA conditions. Tests have shown that the epoxy and m odified phenolic systems are acceptable for inside containment use. Thes e evaluations (WCAP 7198L, WCAP 7825, Keeler and Long Report 78-0810-1) considered resistance to high temperature and chemical conditions anticipated during a post-DBA, as well as high radiation resistance.
Information regarding quality as surance requirements for protecti ve coatings (Regulatory Guide 1.54) is discussed in Section 1.8. Further compliance information concerning Westinghouse supplied equipment has been s ubmitted and accepted by the NRC (letter dated April 27, 1977, to C. Eicheldinger from C. J. Heltemes, Jr.).
6.1.2.3 Other Organic Materials Used in the Primary ContainmentTable 6.1-4 lists other organic materials used in the primary containmen t and their approximate quantities. These materials have been selected because they have adequate resistance to anticipated radiation exposure a nd there is no significant degradat ion of their properties under a normal operating environment as well as under a post-DBA environment.
6.
1.3 REFERENCES
FOR SECTION 6.16.1-1Greiss, J. C. and Creek, G. E. 1971. Design Considerations of Reactor Containment Spray Systems, The Stress Corrosion Cracking of Types 304 and 316 Stainless Steel in Boric Acid Solutions. USAEC Report ORNL-T M-2412, Part X, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.6.1-2Keeler and Long 1978, Radiation Tolerance, Decontamination, De sign Basis Accident, Physical Properties and Chemical Properties Tests for Carbon Steel and Concrete Coating Systems. (1977 ORNL Test Series) Final Report 78-0810-1.6.1-3WCAP-7198-L (Proprietary), April 1969 and WCAP-7825 (Non- Proprietary), Westinghouse 1971, "Evaluation of Protective Coatings for Use in Reactor Containment", Westinghouse Corporation.
MPS3 UFSAR6.1-6Rev. 30TABLE 6.1-1 TYPICAL MATERIALS EMPL OYED FOR COMPONENTS OF ESF SYSTEMS Component and Material Material Specification Piping 1. Stainless SteelSA-312 TP304, SA-376 TP304, SA-358 TP304 CL1, SA-376, TP3162. Carbon SteelSA-106 Gr. B, C Fittings, Connections, and Flanges
- 1. Stainless SteelSA-182 F304, SA-403 WP304, SA-403 WP304H, SA-182 F3162. Carbon SteelSA-105, SA-234 WPBGaskets Flexitallic, Flexicarb Style CG/CGI TP304SS Bolting 1. StudsSA-193 Gr. B6, SA-193 Gr. B7, SA-453 Gr. 6602. NutsSA-194 Gr. 6, SA-194 Gr. 2H, SA-453 Gr. 660 Valves 1. Stainless Steela. Valve StemsSA-182 F316, SA-187 F304
- b. Body CastingsSA-351 CF8, SA-351 CF8Mc. Body ForgingsSA-182 F304, SA-182 F316d. PackingGrafoil
- b. Bonnet StudsSA-193 Gr. B7c. Valve StemsSA-182 Gr. F6d. Body CastingsSA-216 WCB
- e. Body ForgingsSA-105f. PackingGrafoil Seals and Seal Rings
- 1. MetalsAustenitic Stainless Steel2. PlasticsPolyethylene, Nylon MPS3 UFSAR6.1-7Rev. 303. ElastomersPON2-N, Viton, Natural Rubber Containment Spray Nozzles Austenitic Stainless Steel SA-351 Gr. CF8M Containment Spray Pumps (CRS and QSS)
- 1. Suction CasingSA
-182 F304, SA-312 TP3042. Discharge ColumnSA-312 TP3043. Discharge HeadSA-312 TP304, SA-182 F3044. Discharge FlangeSA-182 F304
- 5. BoltingSA-193 Gr. B86. Mechanical SealTungsten Carbide, CarbonESF Sump Strainer1. PlateStainless Steel Type 304/304L2. FinsStainless Steel Type 304/304L Containment Atmosphere Recirculation Coolers1. Cooling CoilsCu/Cu-Ni (90-10) Alloy SB-111 Alloy 706 (0.049 Wall)2. HousingGalvanized SteelWelding Materials
- 1. Ferritic SteelASME SF A-5.1, 5.2, 5.5, 5.17, 5.18, and 5.202. Austenitic Stainless SteelASME SFA-5.4 and SFA-5.93. Ferritic to AusteniticASFA-5.11 and SFA-5.14
- 1. HeadsSA-240, Type 304
- 2. Nozzle NecksSA-182, Gr. F304; SA-312, Type 304; SA-240, Type 3043. TubesSA-213, Type 304; SA-249, Type 304;4. TubesheetsSA-182, Gr. F304; SA-240, Type 304; SA-516, Gr. 70 with Stainless Steel Cl adding A-8 Analysis5. ShellsSA-240 and SA-312 Type 304 Auxiliary Pressure Vessels, Tanks, Filters, etc.
TABLE 6.1-1 TYPICAL MATERIALS EMPL OYED FOR COMPONENTS OF ESF SYSTEMS Component and Material Material Specification MPS3 UFSAR6.1-8Rev. 301. Shells and HeadsSA-351, Gr. CF8A; SA-240, Type 304; SA-264 Clad Plate of SA-537, C1.1 with SA-240, Type 304 Clad and Stainless Steel Weld Overlay A-8 Analysis2. Flanges and NozzlesSA-182, Gr. F304; SA-350, Gr. LF2 with SA-240, Type 304 and Stainless Steel Weld Overlay A-8 Analysis3. PipingSA-312 and SA-240, Type 304 or Type 316 Seamless4. Pipe FittingsSA-403, Type 304 Seamless5. Closure Bolting and NutsSA-193, Gr. B7 and SA-194, Gr. 2H Auxiliary Pumps
- 1. Pump Casing and HeadsSA-182, Gr. F304 or F316; SA-351 Gr. CF82. Flanges and NozzlesSA-182, Gr. F304 or F316; SA-403 Gr. WP316L Seamless3. Stuffing or Packing Box CoverSA-182, Gr. F304; SA-351 Gr. CF8 or CF8M; SA-240 TP 304 or TP 3164. Closure Bolting and NutsSA-193, Gr. B6 and Gr. B7; SA-453, Gr. 600; and Nuts, SA-194, Gr. 6 and Gr. 75. PipingSA-312 TP 304 or TP 316 Seamless6. Pipe FittingsSA-403, Gr. WP316L SeamlessTABLE 6.1-1 TYPICAL MATERIALS EMPL OYED FOR COMPONENTS OF ESF SYSTEMS Component and Material Material Specification MPS3 UFSAR6.1-9Rev. 30NOTE:1. pH calculated at 77
°F.2.Control of the boron concentration varies the pH in the RCS between a maximum pH that reflects an alkaline solution (8-14) and a mi nimum pH that reflects an acidic solution (1-6). The value of (7) reflects a condition wh ere the alkalinity/acidity of the solution has been balanced, or neutralized.3. Minimum density of the trisodium phos phate dodecahydrate (TSP) is 54 lb/cubic feet4.For range of sump pH, see Section 3.11B.5.2TABLE 6.1-2 PARAMETERS FOR ULTIMATE SUMP PH CALCULATION (1)Minimum pH (2)RWST volume (gal) at sump conditions1,162,609Boron concentration in RWST (ppm)2,900 RCS volume (gallons, excluding pressurizer and surge line) at sump conditions 56,136Pressurizer and surge line mass (lbm)65,627Boron concentration in RCS (ppm)2,900SI accumulator volume (gal) at sump conditions27,946 Boron concentration in accumulators (ppm) (Conservative analytical input to accommodate future change.
6,000Volume of TSP in C ontainment (cubic feet)
(3)974Ultimate Sump pH at 30 days7.05 MPS3 UFSAR6.1-10Rev. 30TABLE 6.1-3 PAINTED SURFACE AREA INSIDE CONTAINMENT Component Painted Surface Area (ft
- 2) Concrete surfaces163,850 Carbon steel surfaces (including equipment listed below)799,015Reactor coolant pump assemblies3,700 Accumulator tanks3,800Refueling machine2,600Other refueling equipment2,125
Remaining equipment (such as valve, auxiliary tanks and heat exchanger supports, transmitters, alarm horns , and small instruments)
< 1,300Polar crane12,900Neutron shield tank3,154 MPS3 UFSAR6.1-11Rev. 30TABLE 6.1-4 OTHER ORGANIC MATERIAL S USED INSIDE CONTAINMENT Item Material Approximate Amount Motor electrical insulationPolyester varnish300 lb Penetration sealing compoundSilicone foam1,500 lbHydraulic oilPetroleum base128 gal Lubricating oilPetroleum base960 galElectrical cable insulationEPR Hypalon cross linked polyethylene82,600 lbFiltersCharcoal8,500 lb MPS3 UFSAR6.2-1Rev. 30
6.2 CONTAINMENT
SYSTEMS
6.2.1 CONTAINMENT
FUNCTIONAL DESIGN 6.2.1.1 Containment Structure 6.2.1.1.1 Design Bases The containment structure is designed in accordance with General Design Criteria 13, 16, 38, 50, and 64. (See Section 3.1). The crit eria are amplified as follows:1.The peak calculated containment pressu re following the design basis accident (DBA) is below the containment design pr essure (45 psig). The loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or the main steam line break (MSLB) accident which results in the highest calculated containment pre ssure is the DBA for the containment structure (Containment Integrity DBA).2.A spectrum of accidents and single active failures combined with simultaneous occurrences such as seismic events and loss of off site power (LOP) are considered to establish the limiting containment peak pressure and long-term temperature and pressure transient.3.The maximum calculated pressure differ ential that results from inadvertent actuation of the containment heat removal systems is less than the containment external design differential pressure.4.The design bases for the containment internal structures (s ubcompartments) are given in Section 6.2.1.2
.5.The sources and rates of mass and ener gy released into the containment for a LOCA and a MSLB accident are described in Sections 6.2.1.3 and 6.2.1.4 , respectively.6.The design bases of the containment heat removal systems are described in Section 6.2.2.7.The capability for post-accident pressure reduction and energy removal from the containment under various single failure conditions in the engineered safety features is discussed in Section 6.2.2
.8.The containment system is designed to limit fission product le akage following an accident.
Section 6.5.2 and Chapter 15 discuss the analysis.9.The basis for the containment back pressure analysis used for the ECCS analysis is discussed in Section 6.2.1.5
.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-2Rev. 3010.Instrumentation capable of operating in the post-accident environment is provided to monitor the containment atmosphere pressure and temperature and the sump water temperature and leve l following an accident.
Chapter 7 describes the equipment (e.g., type, range, accuracy, and response) and the parameters recorded.
A discussion of the qualification of the instrumentation for the post-accident environment is provided in Section 3.11
.11.The containment structure is designate d Safety Class 2 and Seismic Category I (Section 3.2
).6.2.1.1.2 Design Features The containment structure is a cylindrical, pa inted carbon steel lined, reinforced concrete structure which encloses the co mponents and major piping within the reactor coolant pressure boundary. The structure is designed to contain th e radioactive fluids a nd fission products which may result from postulated accidents inside the containment.The containment is a subatmospheric-type containment. During normal operation th e containment structure is maintained at approximately atmos pheric pressure to minimize containment leakage during normal plant operation.
Arrangements and cross sections of the containment structure are shown on Figures 3.8-59 through 3.8-60. The structure design is described in Section 3.8. The design provisions to protect the containment structure and engineered safety feature (ESF) systems ag ainst loss of function from dynamic effects (e.g., missiles and pipe wh ip) that could occur following postulated accidents are described in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. A pplicable codes and standa rds are identified in Section 3.8.1.2.
The containment structure is designed to withsta nd internal pressurization from high energy pipe breaks within it and the external pressurization due to inadvert ent actuation of the containment heat removal systems. The internal maximum de sign pressure is 45 psig. The internal minimum design pressure is 8.00 psia.The internal design of the containment structure precludes the accumulation of hydrogen gas in a local area. All cubicles and compartments within the containment are open at the top and allow circulation.
A further discussion of combus tible gas control in the cont ainment is found in Section 6.2.5.
The containment structure is equi pped with a containment sump locat ed at the outer wall of the containment (Figure 3.8-60). Exte nsive use is made of gratings and openings in the upper floors and structures of the containment to allow wate r entering the containment to drain down to the containment sump. For a more detailed description of the sump, sump area, and water drainage to the sump, refer to Section 6.2.2.2.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-3Rev. 30 Spray water that falls into the refueling cav ity drains to the containment floor through the refueling cavity drain system.
A discussion of the net positive suction head ava ilability for the recircul ation pumps is found in Section 6.2.2.3.
Permissible pressures inside containment are specified in plant technical specifications.The containment atmosphere recirculation system, which controls the atmospheric temperature in the containment during normal operation, is discussed in Section 9.4.7. This system is non-safety related and not designed fo r operation following a DBA.
6.2.1.1.3 Design Evaluation The following paragraphs describe the methods used to evaluate the functional capability of the containment design and also describe the comput er code (GOTHIC) utilized to evaluate the spectrum of pipe ruptures.
Sections 6.2.1.1.3.5 and 6.2.1.1.3.6 give the results of the analysis of a spectrum of pipe ruptures for the primary and secondary systems.
6.2.1.1.3.1 Internal Pressure Response Evaluation A pressure peak occurs near the end of the initi al blowdown of the reactor coolant system (RCS) after a double ended rupture (DER) of either a hot or cold leg. This is referred to as the blowdown peak pressure. Its magnitude is a f unction of the foll owing parameters:1.The containment free volume.2.The mass of air inside the containment structure (a function of initial pressure, temperature and humidity).3.The amount of energy flow out of the break during the initial blowdown of the RCS.4.The rate of heat removal from the c ontainment atmosphere by the passive heat sinks within the containment structure.The largest blowdown peak pressure occurs after a DER of a hot leg. This event releases the most energy to the containment atmosphere during the in itial blowdown since the hot leg pipe size is larger than that of an RCS pump discharge, and there is no resistance to flow due to an RCS pump as is the case with a pump suction DER. The magnitude of the blowdown peak pressure is independent of the active ESF ("minimum" or "normal") because they do not become effective until after the peak pressure is reached. However, the accumulators do have a small effect on the first peak.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-4Rev. 30 Following the core reflooding pe riod, the containment heat re moval systems and containment passive heat sinks remove energy from the containment atmosphere. The double-ended pump suction breaks yield the highest energy flow rates during the pos t blowdown period and consequently result in the most limiting contai nment depressurization scenario. The containment depressurization rate is a functi on of the following parameters:1.The containment free volume.2.The mass of air inside the containment structure.3.The rate of heat transfer between the containment atmosphere and the passive heat sinks within the containment structure.4.The rate of heat removal from the c ontainment atmosphere by the containment heat removal systems (this is dependent on the RWST and the ultimate heat sink temperature).5.The rate of mass and energy release to the containment from the break following the end of core reflooding.6.The mass of nitrogen added to the containment from the safety injection accumulators.After the first day, the heat removal systems continue to remove energy from the containment at a rate sufficient to continually reduce the containment pressure.
6.2.1.1.3.2 Containment Response Analytical Method 6.2.1.1.3.2.1 LOCA - Containment Res ponse Analytical MethodThe GOTHIC computer program wa s developed for the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) by Numerical Applications, Inc. It is used to model the containment system, the passive heat sinks and the containment heat removal systems. A topical report (DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A) described, in detail, the assumptions used and the mathemat ical formulations employed. The NRC approved the use of GOTHIC for contai nment analysis in a letter dated August 30, 2006. For MPS-3, DNC has met the conditions established in the NRC's Safety Evaluati on. All GOTHIC code and DNC methodology limitations and re strictions have been met.GOTHIC solves the conservation equations for mass, momentum and energy for multi-component, multi-phase flow in lumped parame ter and/or multidimensional geometries. The phase balance equations are c oupled by mechanistic models for interface mass, energy and momentum transfer that cover the entire flow regime from bubbly flow to film/drop flow, as well as single phase flows. The interf ace models allow for the possibi lity of thermal non-equilibrium between phases and unequal phase velocities, including countercurrent flow. GOTHIC includes full treatment of the momentum transport te rms in multidimensional models, with optional models for turbulent shear and turbulent mass and energy diffusion. Other phenomena include MPS3 UFSAR6.2-5Rev. 30models for commonly available safety equipment, heat transfer to structures, hydrogen burns, and isotope transport.
6.2.1.1.3.2.1.1 Passive Heat Sinks Thermal conductors are the primary heat sink for the blowdown energy. The conductors can be made up of any number of layers of different materials. One dimensional conduction solutions are used to be consistent with the lumped modeling approach.
The thermal conductor is divided into regions, one for each material layer, with an appropriate thickness and material property for each region.
GOTHIC accepts inputs for material density, thermal conductivity and specific heat. These values are obtained from published literature for the materials present in each conductor. Conductors with high heat flux at th e surface and low thermal conductivity must have closely spaced nodes near the surface to adequately track the steep temperature profile. The node spacing is set so the node Biot number for each node is less than 0.2. The Biot number is the ratio of external to internal conductance.It is not practical or necessary to model each individual piece of equipment or structure in the containment with a separate conductor. Smaller conductors of similar material composition can be combined into a single effective conductor. In this combination, the total mass and the total exposed surface area of the conductors is preser ved. The thickness controls the response time for the conductors and is of secondary importanc
- e. The conductors are grouped by thickness and material type. The effective thickness for a group of wall conductors is calculated by the equation below. The heat sink material types, surface areas and thickness are derived based on plant specific inventories. Concrete , carbon steel and stainless steel are the most common materials.Resistance to heat transfer at the liner-concrete interface is considered in the containment analysis by use of a conservatively low value of thermal contact conductance of 100 Btu/hr-ft 2-°F (Gido 1978). Since the steel liner is used as a form fo r pouring of the concrete, and since the concrete mix is very wet, the liner, in effect, becomes "g lued" to the concrete. This concrete resistance between the containment liner and the concrete is conserva tively modeled in GOTHIC as a separate material layer at the nominal gap thickness with applic able material properties. This overestimates the contact resistance because convection and radiation effects will be ignored. The gap width is determined by dividing the ga p thermal conductivity by the gap conductance.
All containment passive heat sinks are included in the lumped containment volume. The primary system metal and steam generator secondary shells are included in the simplified RCS model that is used for the calculation of long term mass and energy release; however, these conductors are not used for condensation or convection heat tr ansfer with the containment atmosphere. The containment passive heat sinks are summarized in Table 6.2-2.
t effigroupt i A i()igroupA i----------------
=
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-6Rev. 30 6.2.1.1.3.2.1.2 Conductor Surface Heat TransferThe Direct heat transfer options with the Diffusion Layer Model (DLM) condensation option is used for all containment passive heat sinks except the sump floor. With the Direct option, all condensate goes directly to the liquid pool at the bottom of the volume. The effects of the condensate film on the heat and mass transfer ar e incorporated in the formulation of the DLM option. Under the DLM option, the c ondensation rate is calculated us ing a heat and mass transfer analogy to account for the presence of the non-condensing gases.
For a conductor representing the cont ainment floor or sump walls that will ev entually be covered with water form the break and condensate, the Split heat transfer option is used to switch the heat transfer from the vapor phase to the liquid phase as the liquid level in the containment builds. A quicker transition to liquid heat transfer is more conservative fo r containment analysis. The Split option is used with lmax , the maximum liquid fraction, set to lmax = d/H Where D is the transition water depth and H is th e volume height. A reasona ble value for d is 0.1 inch switches in the heat transfer from the vapor phase to the liquid phase as the liquid level in the containment reaches 0.1 inch. Other values may be appropriate depending on the geometry of the floor and sump.
For conductors with both sides exposed to the cont ainment, the Direct option is applied to both sides. Alternatively, if the c onductor is symmetric about the ce nter plane, a half-thickness conductor can be used with the total surface area of the two sides and an insulated back side heat transfer option. The conductor face that is not e xposed to the atmosphere is assumed insulated.
The Specified Heat Flux option is used wi th the minimal heat flux set to zero.
Containment walls above grade and the containmen t dome have a specified external temperature boundary condition with a heat transfer coefficient of 2.0 Btu/hr-ft 2-°F to model convective heat transfer to the outside atmos phere. The GOTHIC heat transfer solution scheme allows for accurate initialization of the te mperature distribution in the cont ainment wall and dome prior to the transient initiation.
A conservative containment line r response is obtained by adding a small conductor that has the same construction and properties as the liner conductor. A conductor surface area of 1 square foot is used to minimize impact on the lumped cont ainment pressure and te mperature response. The inside heat transfer option is the same as that used for the actual liner conductor (Direct with DLM) with a multiplier of 1.2 for conservatism.
6.2.1.1.3.2.1.3 Spray Modeling GOTHIC includes models that calculate the sensib le heat transfer between the drops and the vapor and the evaporation or condensation at the drop surface. The efficiency (the actual temperature rise over the diff erence between the vapor te mperature and the drop inlet MPS3 UFSAR6.2-7Rev. 30temperature) cannot be directly specified in GOTHIC. The efficiency is primarily a function of the drop diameter. The GOTHIC models account for the effect of the diameter through the Reynolds number dependent fall velo city and heat transfer coefficients. A heat and mass transfer analogy is used to calculate the effective mass transfer coefficient, which is used to calculate the evaporation or condensati on. Containment spray is modeled as described in DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A.
6.2.1.1.3.2.1.4 Containment Heat Removal Heat exchangers that remove energy from the containment sump are modeled with the available heat exchanger options in GOTHIC. Use of a GOTHIC heat excha nger option dynamically couples the heat exchanger performance to the predicted primary and s econdary fluid conditions.
This can provide a small benefit compared to other codes (e.g., LOCTIC) that use bounding UA values to cover the fluid conditions predicted over the entire transient.The GOTHIC heat exchanger type that closely matches the actual heat exchanger is selected. The inside and outside heat transfer areas are calculated from the heat exchanger geometry details. For tube and shell arrange ments, the shell side flow area is set to the open area across the tubes at the mid-plane of the heat exchanger and the shell si de hydraulic diameter is set to the tube outer diameter. The GOTHIC option for built in heat transfer coefficients is us ed to determine heat transfer coefficients that depend on the prim ary and secondary side Reynolds and Prandtl numbers. The heat exchanger models in GOTHIC are for basic heat exchanger designs and may not account for the details of a particular heat exchanger (e.g., baffling in a tube-and-shell heat exchanger). A forcing function can be used on th e primary and secondary side heat transfer coefficients to tune the heat exchanger perfor mance to manufacturer or measured specifications. Alternatively, the heat transfer area can be adjusted to match the specifi ed performance. Fouling factors and tube plugging are applied when conservative.
6.2.1.1.3.2.1.5 MSLB - Containment Response Analytical Method The MSLB containment response is performed using the GOTHIC computer code with the methodology in topical report DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A. The containment modeling (geometry, system components, heat structures, and heat transfer options) is consistent with the LOCA model discussed in Section 6.2.1.1.3.2.1. The only change from the LOCA model is the modeling of the break effluent. As describe in Section 6.2.1.4, the mass and energy releas es were developed by Westinghouse for a spectrum of break sizes and power levels (102 percent, 70 percent, 30 percent, and 0 percent power), with and without liquid entrainment, usi ng the LOFTRAN code. The break mass and enthalpy are entered as table forcing functions in GOTHIC. The break junction uses 100 micron droplets for entrained liquid releas e per DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A, Section 3.5.2. All GOTHIC and DNC methodology restrictions and limitations were met for the MSLB containment analysis.Sensitivity studies were performed to determine the separate ef fect impact on the containment pressure and temperature from variations in heat structure surface area, accumulator tank modeling, and RWST temperature. The study results were consistent with the MSLB result in Table 4.7-1 in DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-8Rev. 30 The GOTHIC MSLB analyses employed the conserva tive direction of each input parameter. The results of the MSLB analysis is discussed in Section 6.2.1.1.3.6.
6.2.1.1.3.3 Mass and Energy Releases to Containment1.Loss-of-Coolant AccidentThe rates of mass and energy release to the containment during the blowdown, reflood, and post-reflood peri ods are discussed in Section 6.2.1.3 for pipe failures at the following locations:a.Hot leg (between reactor vessel and steam generator)b.Pump suction (between st eam generator and RC pump)c.Cold leg (between RC pump and reactor vessel)2.Main Steam Line Break AccidentRefer to Section 6.2.1.4 for a discussion of the mass and energy release analysis for secondary system pipe rupture inside the containment.
6.2.1.1.3.4 External Pressure Inadvertent operation of the containment heat rem oval systems causes a decrease in the pressure inside the containment, thereby increasing the external pressure differential on the containment structure.The analysis of maximum external differential pressure assumes inadvertent actuation of the quench spray system caused by a single spurious containment depressurization actuation (CDA) signal. Note that two active component failures are necessary to generate a spurious CDA signal (see Section 7.3.2.2.1, Single Failure Criteria).
The minimum internal pressure is determined by modeling inadvertent quench spray pump start using the LOCTIC computer program. The minimu m internal pressure is calculated to be 8.08 psia occurring approximately 50 minutes after the initiating event. This delay provides sufficient time for the operator to be alerted to the condi tion, reset the CDA signal, and secure the quench spray pumps, thus terminating the event.The parameters used in calcula ting the minimum containment pressure are shown in Table 6.2-78.
Each parameter was selected as representing the most severe allowable initial condition for minimizing pressure. As a result, the calc ulated pressure is a lower bound estimate.See Table 6.2-3 for additional contai nment design evaluation parameters.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-9Rev. 30 6.2.1.1.3.5 Loss-of-Coolant Accident Results 6.2.1.1.3.5.1 Input Parameters, Assumptions and Acceptance Criteria 6.2.1.1.3.5.1.1 Input Parameters and Assumptions The initial containment atmospheric conditions are chosen consistent with the guidance of NUREG-0800, Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.1.1.A. The assumptions vary de pending on the containment design limit that is being verifi ed. For the MPS-3 cont ainment, the influence of the containment initial conditions, as documented in Table 3.6.1 of DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A, was confirmed by running parametric studies using the MPS-3 speci fic GOTHIC model that assumes a Technical Specifications limi t on total pressure and by va rying one input while keep ing the others constant.
The most conservative settings for containment integrity analyses are summarized below. The assumption of maximum temperature for the limiting LOCA Peak Pressure differs from Table 3.6.1 of DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A. This is discussed in additional detail in Section 6.2.1.1.3.5.2.1.The term MAX indicates that the parameter is set to the largest allowable operating value (accommodating instrument uncertainty), while MIN indicates the parameter is set to the smallest allowable operating value. For example, the initia l containment conditions that yield the highest peak calculated containment pressure are th e maximum pressure, maximum temperature and minimum relative humidity.The QSS is assumed to be initiated when containment pressure exceeds 24.7 psia and delivers spray to the containment atmosphere 70.2 seconds later. The QSS spray is assumed to be 75
°F liquid from the RWST.
The recirculation spray system is assumed to start when the RWST level reaches the low level alarm setpoint.
Containment analyses performed to support the stretch power uprate were performed assuming a Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) temperature up to 100
°F and a service water temperature up to 80°F. As a result of Westinghouse NSAL-1 1-5, Reference 6.2-46, new analyses were performed resulting in an increase in the LOCA peak temperature and pressure in containment.
While some of the analyses might assume less restrictive limits, the limiting analytical initial condition ranges that are used in the containment integrity analys is are as follows: 1.Initial containment pressure of 14.2 psia to 10.4 psia.AnalysisPressureTemperatureHumidityLOCA Peak PressureMAXMAXMINLOCA Peak TemperatureMAXMAXMAX Containment DepressurizationMAXMAXMAX MPS3 UFSAR6.2-10Rev. 302.Initial containment temperature of 75
°F to 125°F.3.Initial containment relative humidit y range of 0 percent to 100 percent.4.Service water (ultimate heat sink) temperature of up to 80
°F.5.Refueling water storage ta nk temperature of up to 75
°F.See Table 6.2-3 for additional contai nment design evaluation parameters.
6.2.1.1.3.5.1.2 Application of Single Failure Criterion A single failure analysis is not necessary for the peak containment pressure evaluation since the peak pressure for each break case analyzed occurs early in the transient, before any active ESF system affects the results. For the verification of the remaining containment design criteria, the following single failures have been evaluated:*Minimum ESF (diesel generator failure resu lting in loss of one ESF train, i.e., one charging pump, one safety injection pum p, one RHR pump, one quench spray pump, and two containment recirculation pum ps with associated coolers).*Failure in the EDG load sequencer or a loss of breaker control power which could prevent one train of containment recirc ulation pumps from starting a nd result in two containment recirculation pumps and four ECCS pumps (two charging and two safety injection pumps) running*Another partial failure considered is a loss of a motor control center (MCC) which powers the quench spray pump containment isolation valve, the service water inlet valve on each of the containment recirculati on system heat exchangers, and the cross-connect valves to the ECCS which are used to establish flow from the containment recirculation pumps to the ECCS pumps during reci rculation mode of ECCS.
6.2.1.1.3.5.1.3 Acceptance Criteria The containment analysis acceptance criteria are as follows:*Containment pressure must be less than 45 psig.*Containment liner temperature must be less than 280
°F.In addition to the above, the following design limits should also be verified:*The containment pressure and vapor temperature must be less than the analyzed values for environmentally qualified equipment inside containment.*The containment sump temperature must be less than the design value for various affected system piping and components of ECCS and containment heat removal systems.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-11Rev. 30 6.2.1.1.3.5.2 Primary Containment Func tion Design Results (LOCA)The LOCA containment transient analysis was performed using the GOTHIC computer code for a spectrum of pipe break locati ons and sizes that are documente d in Section 6.2.1.3. The spectrum includes the largest cold and hot leg breaks, and a range of pump suctio n breaks from the double ended break down to a 3.0 square feet split break. These mass and energy (M&E) release rates form the basis of GOTHIC computations to ev aluate the containment response following the postulated LOCA scenarios and to ensure that containment design margin is maintained.
6.2.1.1.3.5.2.1 Peak Pressure Analysis The results of the containment pressure analysis are tabulated in Ta ble 6.2-4. The initial containment conditions that yield the highest p eak calculated containment pressure are the maximum pressure, maximum temperature and minimum relative humidity. The assumption of maximum temperature is different from Table 3.6-1 of DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A. As noted in Table 6.2-5, the maximum temperature is only slightly limiting at the minimum relative humidity. At higher relative humidity values, minimum temp erature is limi ting. The limiting containment pressure transient response for the hot leg, cold leg pump discharge and cold leg pump suction double ended ruptures (DERs) are given on Figur e 6.2-1. The containment pressure transient response for the two pump suction break sizes analyzed are given on Figure 6.2-2. The maximum peak containment pressure occurs after a Double Ended Hot Leg Break. As shown in Table 6.2-4, the calculated containment pressure is below the containment design pressure of 45 psig. The Double Ended Hot Leg is the DBA for the containment structure. The sequences of events for the limiting peak pressure case is shown in Table 6.2-6.
A single failure analysis is not necessary for the peak containment pressure evaluation since the peak pressure for each break case analyzed occurs early in the transient before any of the ESF systems start.
6.2.1.1.3.5.2.2 Peak Temperature Analysis The results of the containment temperature analysis are tabulated in Table 6.2-6A. The initial containment conditions that yield the highest p eak calculated containment temperature are the maximum pressure, temperature and relative humidity. The limiting containment temperature transient response for the spectrum of the LO CA breaks analyzed are given on Figure 6.2-3 and the response for the containment liner temperature is given on Figure 6.2-4.The maximum peak containment temperature oc curs for a Double Ende d Hot Leg Break. The results are insensitive to single failures since the peak temperature occurs before the start of any ESF system. The results of this calculation were used to demonstrate that the calculated containment temperature profile is well bounded by the analyzed values for environmentally qualified equipment inside the c ontainment. The sequence of events for the limiting temperature scenario is shown in Table 6.2-6B.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-12Rev. 30 6.2.1.1.3.5.2.3 Depressurization Analysis The results of the containment depressurization analysis are tabulated in Table 6.2-6. The initial containment conditions that yield the slowest containment depressuri zation are th e maximum pressure, temperature and relative humidity. The limiting containment pressure transient response for the spectrum of the LOCA breaks analyzed is provided on Figure 6.2-5. From Table 6.2-6C and Figure 6.2-5 the conditions that maximize pressure at one hour are different from the conditions that maximize pressure at five hours.
Only a Double Ended Pump Suction break is considered for the long term containment depressurization analysis since, as described earlier, this break produces the highest energy flow rates during the post-blowdown period.
The limiting single failure for this analysis was determined to be a diesel generator failure resulting in loss of one ESF train (i.e., one charging pump, one safety injection pump, one RHR pump, one quench spray pump, and two containment recirculation pumps with associated cooler). This single failure has the combined effect of reducing the containment heat removal capability and minimizing the credit for steam condensation due to steam/water mixing, since SI flow is based on a conservative minimum calculation.
The results of this calculation were used to de monstrate that the calcula ted containment pressure profile is well bounded by the analyzed values for environmentally qualified equipment inside the containment. The sequences of events for the slowest depressurization scenario are shown in Table 6.2-6D.
6.2.1.1.3.5.2.4 Sump Temperature Analysis The results of the containment sump temperatur e analysis are tabulated in Table 6.2-6E. The initial containment conditions that yield th e highest peak calculated containment sump temperature are the minimum pressure, maximum temperature and maximum relative humidity.
The limiting containment sump temperature tran sient response for the spectrum of the LOCA breaks analyzed are given on Figure 6.2-6.The maximum containment sump temperature at the start of the containm ent recirculation pumps occurs after a Double Ended Cold Leg Break at the Pump suction. The limiting single failure for this analysis was concluded to be diesel generator failure resulting in the loss of one train of ESF.
The result of this analysis was used to verify that the design temperature for various affected system piping and components of ECCS and containment heat removal systems remain bounding.
The sequence of events for the limiting sump temperature scenario is shown in Table 6.2-6F.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-13Rev. 30 6.2.1.1.3.6 Main Steam Pipe Break Results 6.2.1.1.3.6.1 Input Parameters and Assump tions and Acceptance Criteria 6.2.1.1.3.6.1.1 Input Parameters and Assumptions Containment initial conditions are biased for conservatism consistent with Table 3.6.1 of DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A. The conservative direction of these biases was confirmed for the Millstone 3 MSLB model as follows.
The MSLB peak pressure analyses assume an in itial containment pressure of 14.2 psia and the MSLB peak temperature analyses assume an in itial containment pressu re of 10.4 psia. These analysis assumptions include 0.2 psi margin to the MPS-3 Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 operating limits of 10.6-14.0 psia to account for instrument uncertainty. For all MSLB analyses, the initial containment temper ature is assumed to be 125
°F and the initial relative humidity is assumed to be 10 percent.
For the containment response, one train of emergency power is assumed to be unavailable, leaving one train of the QSS system with mini mum flow available for containment cooling. The containment recirculation spray system is not credited in the MSLB containment response analysis. The QSS system is initiated when cont ainment pressure exceeds 10.0 psig and delivers spray to the containment atmosphere 70.2 seconds later. The QSS spray is assumed to be 100
°F liquid from the RWST.No credit is taken for RSS initiation.
6.2.1.1.3.6.1.2 Acceptance Criteria The containment analysis acceptance criteria are*Containment pressure must be less than 45 psig.*Containment liner temperature must be less than 280
°F.In addition, the containment pressure and vapor temperature must be less than the analyzed values for environmentally qualified equipment inside containment.AnalysisPressureTemperatureHumidityMSLB Peak PressureMAXMAXMINMSLB Peak TemperatureMINMAXMIN MPS3 UFSAR6.2-14Rev. 30 6.2.1.1.3.6.2 Primary Containment Functional Design Results (MSLB)The MSLB containment transient analysis was performed using the GOTHIC computer code utilizing mass and energy (M&E) release rates fo r a spectrum of power level, break size and single failures that are document ed in Section 6.2.1.4. These M&E release rates form the basis of GOTHIC computation to ev aluate the containment response fo llowing a spectrum of postulated MSLB scenarios and to ensure that containment design margin is maintained.Table 6.2-1 summarizes the peak containment pr essures and temperatures calculated by GOTHIC for 16 combinations of power level and MSLB break size postulated to occur inside containment. The difference between the peak pressure and peak temperature case at the same statepoint is the initial containment pressure. Thus, the resu lts from 32 GOTHIC analyses are shown in Table 6.2-1.
6.2.1.1.3.6.2.1 Containment Peak Pressure The maximum containment pressure of 38.15 psig (52.85 psia) occurs for the 1.4 square feet double ended rupture at 0 percent power and is less than the design limit of 45 psig. This scenario has the largest initial steam generator liquid mass and results in the largest mass release to the containment. The double ended rupture cases consistently produce higher peak pressures than the pipe split breaks for the same initial power le vels. Containment pressure s are also higher when liquid entrainment does not occur, as well as when the MSIV fails to isolate. The results are consistent with expectations sin ce the pressure response is directly related to the quality of vapor added to containment. Table 6.26G shows the ti me sequence of events for the limiting peak containment pressure case. Figur e 6.2-7 shows the containment pressure response from GOTHIC for the same case. Containment pressure decrease s at a more rapid rate after 1800 seconds from the termination of auxiliary feedwater, which stops the break release.
The GOTHIC MSLB containment pre ssure profiles from all 16 cases were confirmed to be less than the analyzed pressures for environm entally qualified equipment in containment.
6.2.1.1.3.6.2.2 Containment Peak Temperature The maximum containment temperature of 343.0 F occurs for the 1.4 squa re feet double ended rupture at 102 percent power. The containment temperature is be low the short-term equipment qualification limit of 350
°F. Short-term vapor temperatures are considerably higher for the double ended ruptures without entrainment. A review of the energy release data shows a decrease in the break flow enthalpy early in the event for the entrainment cases. This lower break flow energy significantly reduces the contai nment temperature response, sinc e containment temperature is directly related to the enthalpy of the fluid in the containment vapor space. The pipe split cases produce peak temperatures that are comparable in magnitude to the double ended ruptures with entrainment. For the split breaks, the higher enth alpy blowdown flow is delayed with respect to the double ended ruptures at the same power level.
This delay means that there is a lower mass flow rate at the time that the higher energy fluid is being released and that there is more time for the heat structures to remove energy from the c ontainment atmosphere prior to the time of peak MPS3 UFSAR6.2-15Rev. 30temperature. The split break analys es also show that failure of an MSIV to isolate increases the peak temperature by only a few degrees.
As initial power level increases, the containment peak temperature increases. However, this relationship is reversed after several hundred seconds, with marginally higher long term temperatures for cases initiated at lower power levels because of the larger amount of steam generator liquid mass that is released from the low power case.Table 6.26H shows the time sequenc e of events for the limiting peak containment temperature case. Figure 6.2-8 shows the containment temperat ure response from GOTHIC for the same case.The GOTHIC MSLB containment temperature profil es from all 16 cases were confirmed to be less than the analyzed temperatures for envir onmentally qualified equipment in containment.
6.2.1.1.3.6.2.3 Containment Liner TemperatureThe MSLB containment response analyses included an additional 1 square foot thermal conductor to determine a conservative containment liner te mperature response in accordance with Section 3.3.3 of DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A. The conductor used a 1.2 multiplier on the Direct/DLM heat transfer coefficient.There is little variation in the magnitude of the maximu m liner temperature between the cases. In general, the results follow the same trends as the long term containment response. The double ended rupture cases without entrainment have marginally higher values than the other cases at the same power levels, and the peak liner temperatures increase slightly at lower initial power level.
The maximum calculated li ner temperature of 246
°F occurs for the 1.4 square foot double ended rupture initiated from 0 percent power. The maximum liner temperature is below the design value of 280°F. Figure 6.2-9 shows the containment liner su rface temperature from the limiting case.
6.2.1.1.3.7 Feedwater Pipe Break ResultsThe feedwater pipe break is not as severe as the main steam pipe break, since the break effluent is at a lower specific enthalpy. A feedwater pipe break analysis for containment pressure and temperature is, therefore, not performed.
6.2.1.2 Containment Subcompartments 6.2.1.2.1 Design Basis The containment subcompartment s are designed in accordance wi th General Design Criteria 4 and 50. (See Section 3.1).
WCAP-10586 and NUREG-1838 document the justificat ion and approval of Leak-Before-Break (LBB) technology to eliminate the postulated pipe breaks in the large primary RCS piping from the design basis for the containment subcompartments. However, some discussion of these MPS3 UFSAR6.2-16Rev. 30eliminated break cases is being retained for historical purpose since these cases provide bounding design loads for subcompartment structures.
Break locations and types (Section 3.6.1.3.3) are chosen as follows for the various subcompartments:1.Upper pressurizer cubicle - Spray line doubled ended rupture (DER) in the upper pressurizer cubicle is the largest break that can occur in the upper pressurizer cubicle. Section 6.2.1.2.3 describes the break types.2.Lower pressurizer cubicle - A surge line limited displacement rupture (LDR) of less than two pipe cross-section areas is the largest break which can occur within the pressurizer cubicle. However, the fu ll DER is chosen as the design basis.3.Lower steam generator subcompartment s - A reactor coolan t system (RCS) 707 square inches hot leg intrados split break is the largest area break which can occur in the lower steam generator subcompart ment. (This break has been eliminated with leak-before-break methodology.)4.Upper steam generator s ubcompartments - A feedwate r line single ended split (SES).5.Upper reactor cavity - RCS 100 square inches cold leg limited displacement break inside the upper reactor cavity. This break area exceeds the maximum which can occur inside the upper reactor cavity. (This break has been eliminated with leak-before-break methodology.)
For the design basis containment subcompartment support, the mass and energy release rates for the various sizes of primary coolant system breaks were computed with the SATAN V program described in WCAP-8264-P-A, Rev. 1 and WCAP-8312-A, Rev. 2, while the feedwater line single ended split (SES) mass and energy release rates were determined by a manual calculation using the frictionless Moody corr elation assuming blowdown liqui d saturated at 102 percent power steam generato r operating pressure. Since the operating pressure and temperature for the postulated break pipes are changed under the stretch power uprate (SPU) conditions, the pre-SPU mass and energy release rates are adjusted at the SPU conditions only if releases are increased. Otherwise, the existing mass and energy release rates remain unchanged. The detailed discussions ar e provided in the analysis results in Section 6.2.1.2.3.
The initial containment conditions selected for the subcompartment analyses are as follows.
Pressurizer Subcompartment 1.Temperature 100
°F MPS3 UFSAR6.2-17Rev. 302.Total pressure 10.4 psia3.Relative humidity 10 percent The initial conditions of pressure and relative humidity used in the Pre ssurizer Subcompartment analyses are conservative based upon sensitivity analysis. Tec hnical Specifications require Containment average temperature to be between 80
°F to 120°F. The resulting peak pressure is not sensitive to initial temperatures in this range, therefore, 100°F was selected for consistency between cases.Steam Generator and Upper React or Cavity Subcompartments 1.Temperature 120
°F2.Pressure 9.9 psia3.Relative humidity 50 percentNote that the Technical Specificat ions for the containment require that the containment operating pressure be between 10.6 and 14.0 psia with
+/- 0.2 psia uncertainty. Theref ore, the initial pressure assumed for steam generator and upper reactor cavity subcompartment s is conservati ve since use of lower initial pressure would result in higher calculated pressure differences across cubicle walls. The differences in other initial conditions (i.e., temperatur e and relative humidity) for the subcompartment analyses are not significant wi th respect to the results of those analyses.Subcompartment nodalization schemes are chosen to provide a conservative load and moment on a given component and structure.
All vent flow paths used in the analysis are considered unobstructed by movable objects throughout the transient. Th ese flow path areas are conservatively calculated. Nomina l reductions to the net vent ar eas are typically made to account for building tolerances. Insulation and associated materials are the only movable obstructions to flow. Vent areas in the steam ge nerator and pressurizer subcompartments are relatively large, and accordingly, the likelihood of signi ficant blockage by displaced insulation is remote. Vent areas local to the break location in the upper reactor cavity subcompartment are, in general, significantly smaller than in ot her subcompartments and are, therefore, more susceptible to blockage. According to the Subcom partment Analysis Procedures (Gido 1979), it is conservative to assume blockage of some vent areas local to the break. However, it is unlikely that the blockage sustains itself because the high local pres sures would immediatel y dislodge the debris.
The flows through all flow paths with the noda lized subcompartment model are based on a homogeneous mixture in thermal equilibrium with the assumption of 100 percent liquid carryover (Section 6.2.1.2.3).Table 6.2-43 shows that the subcompartments' design differential pressure s are, in all cases, greater than the calculated pressure differences. Multinode schemes providing a conservative load and moment on a given component and structure are considered in the subcompartment design.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-18Rev. 30 6.2.1.2.2 Design Features Figures 3.8-59 and 3.8-60 provide detailed plan and section dr awings of the containment subcompartments. They show the arrangement of structures and components within the containment. Views of the upper and lower pr essurizer cubicle are shown in Figures 6.2-17 through 6.2-18D; of the most limiti ng steam generator subcompartme nt (cubicle B) in Figures 6.2-19 through 6.2-22 and of the upper reactor cavity in Figure 6.2-23. Schematic nodalization models of the upper and lower pressurizer c ubicle and the most li miting steam generator subcompartment are given in Figures 6.2-24 and 6.2-25, respectively. Figure 6.2-23 provides the subcompartment plan elevat ion and nodal arrangement for the upper reactor cavity. The corresponding subcompartment vent path and noda l descriptions are given in Tables 6.2-27 and 6.2-28.The updated most limi ting steam generator subcompartment model (cubicle B 26 node model) described in Figures 6.2-19, 6.2-20, 6.2-21, 6.2-22, 6.2-25 and Table 6.2.28 incorporated the permanent installation of selected refueling floor concrete plugs under the SPU conditions.
6.2.1.2.3 Design EvaluationConditions considered in the subcompartment analyses are the development of pressure gradients across the walls, major equipment, and supports.
The resulting asymmetric pressures are used to calculate loads and moments applied to the equipment and its supports. The maximum differential pressure across the walls is used as the de sign basis for the subcom partment structures.
The volume of the subcompartment is divided into a series of nodes with as many connecting vents as there are significant fl ow resistances. A model that pr ovides a conservative load and moment on the given component and structure is used.Break Type Definitions and Areas Two types of breaks are used to analyze containm ent subcompartments. The first is a guillotine break. A guillotine break, which results in a break flow area of two pipe cross sections, is called a double ended rupture (DER). In some subcompartments, pipe restra ints limit the displacement of the two broken ends of the pipe so that the break flow area is less than two pipe cross-sectional areas. This type break is called a limited displacement rupture (LDR). The special case of a LDR of one pipe cross-sectional area is called a single ended rupture (SER).
The second type of break is a longi tudinal split which is equivalent to a hole in the wall of the pipe. A split which results in a br eak flow area of one pipe cross section is called a single ended split (SES).
The containment subcompartment analysis results describe all breaks analyzed within a particular subcompartment. Pipe restraints are provided (see FSAR Section 3.6) to limit break areas to sizes which are less than or equal to those postu lated in subcompartment pressure analyses.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-19Rev. 30 Several subcompartment breaks have been eliminated with the applicati on of leak-before-break (LBB) methodology, approved for use at Millstone Unit 3 by the NRC, associated with the postulated ruptures of th e primary coolant loop piping. The following breaks no longer need to be analyzed with the application of LBB:1.Steam generator inlet nozzle LDR with 196.6 square inches opening (steam generator compartment).2.RCS hot leg intrados split break with 707 square inches opening (steam generator compartment).3.Steam generator outlet nozzle LDR with 500 square inches opening (steam generator compartment).4.Pump suction loop closure weld LDR with 500 square inches opening (steam generator compartment).5.RCS cold leg LDR with 100 square inches opening (upper reactor cavity).
Breaks with less than two cross-sectional flow areas are used in the analysis for the steam generator subcompartment. The mechanical piping analysis shows that less than two surge line cross-sectional areas is the maximum achievable break area in the pressurizer cubicle. However, the full DER mass and energy releases are used in the subcompartment pressure analysis. The mass and energy releases for the feedwater (FW) line single ended split (SES) (Table 6.2-36A) were determined by a ma nual calculation using the Moody correlation with a flow resistance of 1.0 for a saturated liquid at maximum steam generato r (SG) operating pressure (i.e., 0 percent power). Prior to break in itiation, the FW line is filled with subcooled liquid at the FW pump discharge pressure and FW temperature. Th e SG upper downcomer annul us is filled with saturated liquid at the SG operating pressure. Upon break init iation, the pressure at the break in the FW side immediately drops to close to satura tion pressure at the FW temperature, since the piping is sufficiently long and since the break occurs gradually in reality. The liquid flashes as it exits the break. Thus the break flow is governed by the saturation pressure, not the initial FW discharge pressure prior to break initiation. The same is true for the SG side, with the SG operating pressure. Furthermore, due to limited flow area (i.e., J-tube area of 0.9 square feet) from the SG side, the FW side break flow is expected to be dominant over the SG side for combined flow via 1.6585 square foot SES area. Therefore, us e of Moody critical fl ow correlation with a flow resistance of 1.0 assuming blowdown liqui d saturated at 0 percent power SG operating pressure is considered to be conservative.
Vent Loss Coefficient The vent loss coefficients used in the subcompa rtment analyses depend on the geometry of the particular vent. The basis for the coefficients is the Handbook of Hydraulic Resistance (Idelchik 1960). Tables 6.2-27 and 6.2-28 give the values of the loss coefficients utilized in subcompartment analyses.
Subcompartment Analytical Model 1.Functional Description of THREED Code MPS3 UFSAR6.2-20Rev. 30 The THREED computer program is used to calculate the transient conditions of pressure, temperature, and humidity in various subcompartments following a postulated rupture in a moderate or high energy pipeline. The results obtained from such an analysis are used to calcul ate loads on structures and to define environmental conditions fo r equipment qualification.
The THREED computer program is si milar to RELAP4 (Aerojet Nuclear Company 1976; Moore and Rettig 1974) and gives the same results as RELAP4 if similar options are chosen. THREED perf orms subcompartment analyses with capabilities and options extended beyond those available in RELAP4. A significant improvement in THREED is that the hom ogeneous equilibrium mode (HEM) has been extended to include tw o-phase, two-component flow which is encountered in subcompartment analysis.
The current THREED computer program was put into use in October 1978, and has been used in the design of Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2, River Bend Station, and Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2.2.Description of the Model The THREED computer code can be viewed as a numerical integrator for the macroscopic form of the basic field equations describing the conservation of mass, energy, and momentum. The conservation equations, along with the equation of state for the fluid, give a complete solution to the fluid flow phenomena. THREED solves a stream tube form of the field equations based on the assumptions of one-dimensional, homogeneous, thermal-equilibrium flow. Although THREED does not prohibit the use of multidimensional flow paths, the flow paths are modeled to approximate a one dimensional equati on. Subcompartments are modeled in THREED as a hydraulic network which consists of a series of interconnecting user defined nodes (mass and energy control volumes). Nodes are connected by internal junctions (momentum control volumes) wi th the internodal flow rates being determined by the solution of the mome ntum equation. An internal junction control volume is defined as the composite volume between the centers of adjacent nodes. This inconsistency in control volumes (different control volume for momentum than for mass and energy) is illustrated on Figure 6.2-26. This "staggered mesh" approximation is neces sary for purposes of solving the equations.
Fill junctions are dissimilar to internal j unctions in that they have no initial node and their flow rate is dependent only on the junction ar ea and time. These junctions are used to simulate flow originati ng external to the network (blowdown). Mathematically, they are tr eated as boundary conditions.THREED numerically solves finite diff erence equations which account for mass and, momentum, energy flow s into and out of a node.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-21Rev. 30 Figure 6.2-27 summarizes the computationa l approach used in THREED.
The fluid conservation equations used by THREED can be obtained by integrating the stream tube equations over a fixed volume, V. The mass and energy equations are developed for the generalized i nod e, while the momentum equation is developed for the generaliz ed j internal junction connecting nodes K and L. Neglecting kinetic energy effects, th e resulting equations are as follows:
For conservation of mass, the mass equa tion is (Aerojet Nuclear Company 1976): (6.2-13)where: M i = total mass in node i (M i = M wi + M ai)M wi = total mass of water in node i M ai = total mass of air in node i W ij = mass flow rate into node i from junction jFor conservation of energy, the energy equati on for homogeneous flow is (Aerojet Nuclear Energy Company 1976): (6.2-14)where: U i = total fluid internal energy in node i h ij = local enthalpy at junction j of the fluid entering or leaving node i Z ij -Z i = elevation change from the center of mass in node i at Z i to junction j For conservation of momentum, the incompressibl e equation for homogeneous flow is (Aerojet Nuclear Company 1976): (6.2-15)where: I j = geometric "inertia" for junction j dM i dt----------W ij j=dU i dt---------W ij jh ij Z ij Z j-+()=I j dW j dt----------P K P Kgj+()P L PLgi+()-F j-=
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-22Rev. 30 W j = mass flow rate in junction j P K = total static pressure in node K (at center)
P L = total static pressure in node L (at center)
P Kgj = gravity pressure differential fro m the center of node K to junction j P Lgj = gravity pressure differential from junction j to the center of node L F j = static pressure change term For equation of state, the functional form of the equation of state is:
P i = F(U i , M wi , M ai)(6.2-16)where: P i = total static pressure in node i M wi = total mass of water in node i M ai = total mass of air in node i The following assumptions are made in deriving the equation of state:1.The components of water and air form a homogeneous mixture with a uniform temperature.2.Water, if present, occupies the entire volume. Air, if present, occupies the same volume as the water vapor according to the Gibbs-Dalton Law. Air is assumed to be insoluble in water, and there can be no air present if the volume is filled with liquid water.3.Air is treated as a perfect gas.4.If air and liquid water are present, the water vapor is saturated (relative humidity of 100 percent).5.If air is present, the liquid water conditions are the saturated conditions for P wi. A more accurate model would have liqui d water at the subcooled conditions corresponding to P i and T i. This assumption is made to limit calls to the water property routines to one per iteration.
If no water is present in the volume (M w = 0), the detailed form of the equation of state is: U i = M ai C va T i (6.2-17)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-23Rev. 30 (6.2-18)where: C va = constant volume specific heat of air T i = temperature in node i R a = gas constant of air V i = volume of node i If water is present in the volume (M w + 0), the detailed form of the equation of state is:
V ui = V i/M wi (6.2-19)U i = M wi U wi (T i , V wi)+M ai C va T i (6.2-20) (6.2-21)P i = P wi (T i , V wi)+P ai (6.2-22)where: v wi = specific volume of water in node i.
u wi = specific internal energy of water in node i.
P ai = partial pressure of air in node i.
X i = quality in node i.
v gi = specific volume of water vapor in node i.
P wi = partial pressure of water in node i.
It should be noted that the internal code ca lculations are done in SI units. The reference temperature used for the calculation of the internal energy of air is zero degrees Kelvin. The properties of steam are based on the 1967 ASME formulation of the properties of steam.
Fill junctions are normally used to input blowdown (mass and energy release tables) into a node(s). Their functional form is:
W j = f(t) (6.2-23) h ij = f(t) (6.2-24)
P i M ai R a T i V i-----------------------
=P ai M ai R a T i X i M wi V gi T i V wi , ()-----------------
-=
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-24Rev. 30For fan junction - these internal junctions are used to model vent ilation fan operation in situations where such modeling is appropria te. Their functional form is:
W j = f(H j) (6.2-25) where: H j = head difference across the fan junction For choked flow options (internal junctions), since an incompressible flow model has no mechanism to restrict flow thr ough a junction to the maximum allowa ble (choked) flow rate, it is necessary to use a separate calculation to restrict the flow rate. To determine if the flow is choked, the momentum Equation (6.2-15) is solved using a forward finite difference approximation and compared with a calculated choked flow (HEM or Moody). The lesser flow is selected as the junction flow rate for the time step.
Both the homogeneous equilibrium model (H EM) and the Moody flow model are based on stagnation properties. Since it is not usually possible to calculate the velocity in a node, it is assumed that the static and sta gnation properties in a node are the same (neglect kinetic energy effects). This may result in an under prediction of the choked flow rate, which is conservative in most cases.
Homogeneous Equilibrium Model - The homogene ous equilibrium model is approximated in THREED using an "ideal gas" approximation. That is, the c hoked isentropic ideal gas flow equation is utilized and the isentropic expone nt is modified to accommodate two-phase, two-component flow. The isentr opic exponent is defined as: (6.2-26) where:i = isentropic exponent in node i The equation utilized by THREED to calculate the HEM is:
(6.2-27) i V wi P i---------P iV wi------------s-=i 1+2i 1-()------------
W j12A j 2i1+----------=g ci P oi V oi--------
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-25Rev. 30 where: A j = flow area of junction j (square feet) i = isentropic exponent of source node i g c = proportionality constant - 32.174 (ft-lbm)/(lbf-sec
- 2) P oi = stagnation pressure in source node i (psia)
Voi = stagnation specific volume in source node i (cu ft/lbm)
W j = mass flow in junction j (lbm/sec)
Moody Choked Flow Model - th e Moody flow model (Moody 1965), used in THREED, is based on the interpolation of tabl es from Aerojet Nuclear Comp any (1976). The model is for one component flow and, when air is present, the tables are accessed with the total pressure and average enthalpy of the node.
For a junction with a valve, a va lve may be modeled in any non-fa n internal junction as follows:
Normally closed - trips open instantaneously Normally open - trips closed instantaneously For time step control, if the automatic time step control option is selected, the maximum time step is limited by the following cal culation based on the nodal conditi ons (Aerojet Nuclear Company 1976). seconds, for i=1,..., N (6.2-28) where: DT = time step size Assumptions 1.The lumped parameter (control volume) approach is utilized. 2.Adiabatic process. 3.Independent inflow (blowdown). 4.Thermodynamic equilib rium in each node. DTmin 0.01 P i P i=P*i dP i dt--------=
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-26Rev. 305.One dimensional formulation. 6.Staggered-mesh for th e conservation equations. 7.Incompressible form of the momentum equation. 8.Kinetic energy effects are neglected. 9.For the choked flow models, the static properties in the nodes are considered to be stagnation properties. 10.Valves open/close instantaneously.
Containment Subcompartment Analysis Results 1.Pressurizer CubicleThe pressurizer cubicle is analyzed a ccording to the noda lization diagram of Figure 6.2-24. The nodal complexity is consis tent with recommendations of NUREG/CR-1199 (Gido 1979) and is discusse d in detail in the response to NRC Question 480.9.
Eight postulated breaks are evaluated in the pressurizer cubicle analysis. These breaks are described as follows.1.Upper pressurizer cubicle spray line DER in node 15.2.Upper pressurizer cubicle spray line DER in node 11.3.Upper pressurizer cubicle spra y line DER in nodes 16 and 17.4.Upper pressurizer cubicle spray line DER in nodes 14, 15, 16 and 17.5.Lower pressurizer cubicle surge line DER in node 20.6.Lower pressurizer cubicle surge line DER in node 4.7.Lower pressurizer cubicle surge line DER in node 5.8.Lower pressurizer cubicle surge line DER in node 2.The break locations are shown on Figure 3.6-14. The pressurizer is supported from the floor at elevation 51 feet 4 inches which defines the boundary between the upper and lower cubicles.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-27Rev. 30The mass and energy release rates for a spray line DER are given in Table 6.2-31 and for a surge line DER in Table 6.2-32A
.The effect of the SPU and T avg coastdown is a decrease in RCS cold leg temperature from 561.3
°F assumed in WCAP-8264-P-A, Rev. 1 to 533.4
°F for the SPU and T avg coastdown. This decrease in RCS temperature and the increase in assumed RCS pressure from 2250 psia to 2300 psia resulted in an increase in the mass and energy releases for the spray line break of less than ten percent. Since these increases are bounded by the ten percent residual uncertainty that was applied when the pre-SPU analyses we re performed and since it has been determined that the ten percent residual uncertainty can be removed, the existing spray line break mass and energy releases given in Table 6.2-31 bound SPU operation including T avg coastdown. Thus, Table 6.2-31 conservatively remains unchanged for the SPU and T avg coastdown. The effect of the SPU and T avg coastdown is a decrease in RCS hot leg temperature from 623.9
°F assumed in WCAP-8264-P-A, Rev. 1 to 601.6
°F for the SPU and T avg coastdown. This decrease in RCS temperature and the increase in assumed RCS pressure from 2250 psia to 2300 psia resulted in an increase in the mass and energy releases for the pressurizer surge line break. Since the ten percent residual uncertainty was applied when the pre-SPU analyses were perfo rmed and since it has been determined that the ten percen t residual uncertainty can be removed, the net increases in release rates for the SPU and T avg coastdown are 5.23 percent in mass and 1.15 percent in energy. The increased mass and energy releases are given in Table 6.2-32A
.Pressurizer cubicle subcompartment nodal volumes, vent areas, K-factors, and inertias for the THREED analysis are listed in Table 6.2-27
.The pressure response for the pressurizer cubicle (maximum pressure differential across the pressurizer and pressu rizer cubicle walls) is shown on Figures 6.2-28 and 6.2-28A for the spray line break, and on Figures 6.2-29 , 6.2-29A , 6.2-29B , 6.2-29C , and 6.2-29D for the surge line breaks.The peak calculated differ ential pressures between contiguous nodes for the pressurizer cubicle are given in Table 6.2-33. The time of peak differential pressure is given with the peak calculated differential pressure.
A sensitivity study was conducted regardi ng the initial conditions used in the analysis. The variation of the initial temp erature, pressure, and relative humidity within the operating range did not result in a significant increase in peak pressure difference.2.Steam Generator Compartment MPS3 UFSAR6.2-28Rev. 30 The nodalization schematic used in the st eam generator compartment analysis is shown on Figure 6.2-25. Seven postulated breaks are considered for the steam generator analysis. They are as follows.1.Steam generator inlet nozzle with a 196.6 square inch LDR (Break 3).
(1) 2.Pressurizer surge line with a 196.6 square inch LDR (Break 11).3.Residual heat removal line with 196.6 square inch LDR (Break 9).4.RCS hot leg intrados split break with 707 square inches opening (Break 7).
(1)5.Feedwater line 238.8 square inch SES.6.Steam generator outlet nozzle LDR with 500 square inches opening (Break 4). (1)7.Pump suction loop closure weld LD R with 500 square inches opening (Break 12).
(1)Refer to Figures 3.6-12 and 3.6-13 which shows the locations of the various breaks, with the excepti on of the feedwater line SES.
Among those break cases, breaks 3, 7, 4, and 12 have been eliminated due to the application of LBB technology.
The most limiting steam generator subc ompartment (cubicle B) nodal volumes, vent areas, K-factors, and inertias for the THREED analyses are listed in Table 6.2-28 (for the existing breaks 11, 9, and feed water line). Note that cubicle B was conservatively selected to re present all four cubicles fo r analyses of breaks since the volume and vent areas of cubicle B are relatively smaller than other cubicles.Tables 6.2-32A , 6.2-35 , and 6.2-36A give the mass and energy release for the following breaks: Pressurizer Surge Line DER in the Pressurizer Cubicle; Pressurizer Surge Line with 196.6 square inch LDR; and Feedwater Line SES in the Steam Generator Cubicle.
The impact of the SPU and T avg coastdown on the mass and energy release rates for breaks 11, 9, and feedwater line is assessed and concluded as follows.(1) These breaks have been eliminated with LBB methodology; however, the analyses of these breaks are being retained.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-29Rev. 30For break 11, as discussed in the pressurizer cubicle, the pre-SPU mass and energy release rates are increased 5.23 percent in mass and 1.15 percent in energy for the SPU and T avg coastdown.For break 9, the pre-SPU pressurizer surge line (14 inch schedule 160 piping) mass and energy release rates were conservative ly used for the pre-SPU RHR line (12 inch schedule 140 piping) break release rates. Since the reduction in the break area for the actual RHR line offsets more than the increases seen for the pressurizer surge line break releases for the SPU and T avg coastdown, the existing pre-SPU pressurizer surge line mass and energy release rates remain bounding for break 9 under the SPU operation including the proposed T avg coastdown.
For feedwater line break, the pre-SPU mass and energy release rates remain bounding for the SPU, since the reduction in the release rates applying more representative Moody critical flow with a flow resistance of 1.0 instead of the very conservative frictionless Moody critical flow offsets more than the increases seen for the SPU.
Figures 6.2-31 , 6.2-32 , and 6.2-34 show the pressure response for the steam generator cubicle (maximum pressure differential across the steam generator and the cubicle walls for each break).Tables 6.2-26 , 6.2-38 , and 6.2-39 list the peak calculated differential pressure between contiguous nodes of each breaks. The time of peak differential pressure is given with the peak calculated differential pressure.
The main steam line is not routed thr ough any portion of the compartment and is not considered in this analysis.3.Upper Reactor Cavity The postulated 100 square inches cold leg LDR within the reactor cavity has been eliminated by using the LBB methodology. This is the only postulated break within the upper reactor cavity subcompa rtment, thus no further analysis is required for the upper reactor cavity. 4.Primary Shield Wall Pipe Penetrations There are no breaks postulated inside the pr imary shield wall pipe penetrations.
The penetrations are conservatively de signed to withstand the maximum design pressure within the upper reactor cavity.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-30Rev. 30 6.2.1.2.4 Short-term LOCA Mass and Energy Releases Short-term loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) mass and energy (M&E) release calculations were performed to support the lower steam generator subcompartment, upper reactor cavity, lower pressurizer cubicle and the upper pressurizer cubicle. The orig inal licensing basis for these structures were 1) a 707 square inch hot leg intr ados split break, 2) a 100 square inch cold leg limited displacement break, 3) a double ended break in the pressurizer surge line and 4) a double ended break in the pressurizer spray line, respectively.
Short-term releases are linked directly to the critical mass flux, which increases with increasing pressures and decreasing temperat ures. Short-term blowdown transients are characterized by a peak M&E release rate that occurs during a s ubcooled condition; thus the Zaloudek correlation, which models this condition, is used in the shor t-term LOCA M&E release analyses (Reference 6.2-31).As part of the approval for stretch power uprat e (SPU), the NRC reviewed the Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS-3) evaluation of the effect of SPU on the leak-before-break (LBB) methods (Reference 6.2-30). With the elimination of the large reactor coolant system breaks, the only break locations that need to be considered are the largest branch lines off of the primary loop piping. These branch lines include the pressurizer surge line, th e pressurizer spray line, the accumulator line and the residual heat removal (RHR) line from the hot leg to the first isolation valve. The releases associated with these smaller breaks are considerably lower than the large RCS breaks.
LBB has eliminated the 707 square inch hot leg intrados sp lit break from consideration for subcompartment pressurization.
The reduction in break area for the lower steam generator compartments comparing the 707 square inch hot leg intrados split break to a double ended break in the pressurizer surge line is a factor about 3.6. A reduction of this magnitude in pipe break size has been shown to have a significant impact on the subcompartment loadings. For example, based upon available sensitivities (Refer ence 6.2-32), it is estimated th at the peak break compartment pressure was shown to be reduced by a factor of 2.76, and the peak differential across an adjacent wall was reduced by a factor of 3.86.
The 100 square inch cold leg limited displace ment break for the upper reactor cavity has been completely eliminated by the a pplication of LBB and no furthe r consideration is required.The release calculations for the pressurizer lower and upper cubicles are limited by the pressurizer surge line and the pressurizer spray line, respectively. These breaks have not been eliminated by LBB.The pressurizer spray line break LOCA M&E are derived from Reference 6.2-31, Table III-2-6. These mass and energy releases from Reference 6.2-31 are based on a RCS hot leg temperature of 623.9°F and pressurizer saturated liquid temperature at 2280 psia. At 100 percent power, RCS cold leg temperature can be as low as 533.4
°F and an RCS pressure as high as 2300 psia in the pressurizer. These changes in RCS conditions of pressure and temperat ure could increase the spray line mass and energy releases by as much as 3.4 percent. The increase lies within the 10 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-31Rev. 30percent residual margin applied to Table 6.2-31 release and therefore th e spray line mass and energy releases documented in Table 6.2-31 are bounding.The pressurizer surge line break LOCA M&E are derived from Reference 6.2-31, Table III-2-6. These mass and energy releases from Reference 6.2-31 are based on a RCS hot leg temperature of 623.9°F and pressurizer saturated liquid temperature at 2280 psia. At 100 percent power, RCS hot leg temperature can be as low as 601.6
°F and RCS pressure as high as 2300 psia in the pressurizer. These changes in RCS conditions of pressure and temperat ure could increase the surge line mass and energy releases by as much as 15.75 percent on mass released and 11.27 percent on energy released. The LOCA mass and energy releases in Table 6.2-32A reflect these increases. The effect these increases could have on the pressurizer cubicle differential pressures and the steam generator cubicle differenti al pressures are discussed in Section 6.2.1.2.
The steam generator compartmen t RHR line break is addresse d in Section 6.2.1.2 "Containment subcompartments", subsection 6.2.1.2.3 "Design Evalua tion" which describes the breaks analyzed for the steam generator compartment.
They are as follows:1.Steam generator inlet nozzle with a 196.6 square inch limited displacement rupture (LDR).2.Pressurizer surge line with a 196.6 square inch LDR.3.Residual heat removal line with 196.6 square inch LDR.4.RCS hot leg intrados split break with a 707 square inch opening.5.Feedwater line 238.8 square in ch single ended split (SES).6.Steam generator outlet nozzle LD R with a 500 square inch opening.7.Pump suction loop closure weld LDR with a 500 square inch opening.Breaks 1, 4, 6 and 7 have been eliminated due to the application of leak-before-break. Break 2, the pressurizer surge line break, is discussed above. Thus, only break 3, the residual heat removal line, needs to be addressed. The RHR line break for a 12 inch schedule 140 pipe would have a single ended break area of 0.6013 square feet or 86.59 square inches. This break is approximately 44 percent the size of the pressurizer surge li ne break. Thus, the exis ting 196.6 square inch LDR break used in lieu of the RHR line break for the steam generato r subcompartment and the results shown in Table 6.2-39 boun d power operation and T avg coastdown.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-32Rev. 30 6.2.1.3 Mass and Energy Release Analyses for Po stulated Loss-of-Coolant AccidentsThis section presents the mass and energy re leases to the containment subsequent to a hypothetical loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The release rates were calculated for pipe failures at three distinct locations:1.Hot leg (between vessel and steam generator)2.Pump suction (between steam generator and pump)3.Cold leg (between pump and vessel)
During the reflood phase, these breaks have the following different characteristics. For a cold leg pipe break, all of the fluid which leaves the core must vent through a steam generator and becomes superheated. However, relative to breaks at the other locations, the core flooding rate (and therefore the rate of fluid leaving the core) is low, because all the core vent paths include the resistance of the reactor coolant pump. For a hot leg pipe break, the vent path resistance is relatively low, which results in a high core flooding rate, and the majority of the fluid which exits the core bypasses the steam generators in vent ing to the containment.
The pump suction break combines the effects of the relatively high core flooding rate, as in th e hot leg break, and steam generator heat addition, as in th e cold leg break. As a result, th e pump suction breaks yield the highest energy flow rates during the post-blowdown period.The spectrum of breaks analyzed includes the largest cold and hot leg breaks, and a range of pump suction breaks from the double ended break down to a 3.0 square foot break. Because of the phenomena of reflood as discussed above, the pump suction break location is the worst case for long term containment depressuri zation. This conclusion is su pported by studies presented in Reference 6.2-37 which included stud ies for hot leg and cold leg br eaks. Thus, an analysis of smaller pump suction breaks is representative of the spectrum of break sizes. The hot leg break is the worst case for containment pressure due to the high short term blowdown release associated with this break location.The LOCA transient is typical ly divided into four phases:1.Blowdown - which includes the period from accident initiation (when the reactor is at steady state operation) to the time that the RC S and containment reach an equilibrium state.2.Refill - the period of time when the lo wer plenum is being filled by accumulator and ECCS water. At the end of blowdown, a large amount of water remains in the cold legs, downcomer and lower plenum. To conservatively consider the refill period for the purpose of containment M&E releases, it is assumed that this water is instantaneously transferred to the lower plenum along with sufficient accumulator water to completely fill the lower plenum. This allows an
uninterrupted release of M&E to cont ainment. Thus, the refill period is conservatively neglected in the M&E release calculation.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-33Rev. 303.Reflood - begins when the water from the lower plenum enters the core and ends when the core is completely quenche
- d. The reflood calculation for the double ended hot leg break was performed with the model described in Reference 6.2-35, and all other reflood transi ents were calculated usin g the model described in Reference 6.2-37.4.Post-reflood - describes the period fo llowing the reflood phase. For the pump suction break, a two- phase mixture exits the core, passes through the hot legs, and is superheated in the steam generators prior to exiting the break as steam. Later, after the broken loop steam generator cool s, the break flow becomes two phase.
Post-reflood M&E releases were calcula ted for all cases by DNC using the GOTHIC methodology described in Topical Report DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A.
6.2.1.3.1 Mass and Energy Release DataBlowdown Mass and Energy Release Data Tables 6.2-8, 6.2-9, 6.2-10, 6.2-11 and 6.2-13 present the calculated mass and energy releases for the blowdown phase of the various breaks analyzed.The mass and energy releases for the hot leg double ended break, given in Table 6.2-8, terminate 23.6 seconds after the postulated a ccident. Since safety injection does not become effective until about the time blowdown terminates, these releases would apply for both minimum and maximum safety injection.Reflood Mass and Energy Release Data Tables 6.2-14, 6.2-15, 6.2-16, 6.2-17 a nd 6.2-19 present the calculated mass and energy releases for the reflood phase of the various breaks analyzed along with the corresponding safety injection assumption (minimum or maximum). Tables 6.2-20, 6.2-21, 6.2-21A, 6.2-21B, 6.2-21C and 6.2-21D present the principal parameters for the reflood transients analyzed.Two Phase Post-Reflood Mass and Energy Release Data The two phase post-reflood mass and energy releases were calculated by the DNC GOTHIC containment model.
6.2.1.3.2 Sources of Mass and Energy The sources of mass considered in the loss-of-coolant mass and energy (LOCA M&E) release analysis are given in Tables 6.2-21E, 6.2-21G, 6.2-21I, 6.2-21K and 6.2-21O. These sources include the:*RCS water*Accumulator water MPS3 UFSAR6.2-34Rev. 30*Pumped injection (SI)The energy inventories considered in the LOCA M&E release analysis are given in Tables 6.2-21F, 6.2-21H, 6.2-21J, 6.2-21L and 6.2-21P. The energy sources are the following:*RCS water*Accumulator water
- Pumped injection (SI)
- Decay heat
- Core stored energy
- RCS metal (includes steam generator tubes)
- Steam generator metal (includes transition cone, shell, wrapper, and other internals)*Steam generator secondary energy (includes fluid mass and steam mass)*Secondary transfer of energy (feedwater in to and steam out of the steam generator secondary: feedwater pump coastdown after th e signal to close the flow control valve)The analysis used the following energy reference points:
- Available energy: 212
°F; 14.7 psia (energy availabl e that could be released)*Total energy content: 32
°F; 14.7 psia (total internal energy of the RCS)
The M&E inventories are presented at the following times, as appropriate:*Time zero (initial conditions)*End of blowdown time
- End of refill time
- End of reflood time The methods and assumptions used to calculate the release from the various energy sources are given in Reference 6.2-37.The following items ensure that the core energy release is conservatively analyzed for maximum containment pressure.1.Maximum expected operating te mperature of the RCS (100 pe rcent full power operation). 2.Allowance for RCS temperature uncertainty (+5.0
°F which includes a 1
°F bias). 3.Margin in RCS volume of 3 percent (which is composed of 1.6 percen t allowance for thermal expansion and 1.4 percent allowance for uncertainty). 4.Core rated power of 3650 Mwt. 5.Allowance for calorimetric e rror (2.0 percent of power).
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-35Rev. 306.Conservative heat transfer coefficients (i.e
., steam generator primary/s econdary heat transfer and RCS metal heat transfer). 7.Allowance in core stored energy for effect of fu el densification. 8.Allowance for RCS initial pr essure uncertainty (+50 psi). 9.A total uncertainty for fuel temperature cal culation based on a statistical combination of effects and dependent upon fuel type, power level and burnup. 10.A maximum containment back pressu re from the containment analysis. 11.SGTP level (0 percent uniform) *Maximizes reactor coolant volume and fluid release. *Maximizes heat transfer area across the steam generator tubes. *Reduces RCL resistance, which reduces the P upstream of the break for the pump suction breaks and increases break flow. Table 6.2-7 provides the analysis values.
6.2.1.3.3 Blowdown Model DescriptionThe model used for blowdown transient (SATAN-V I) is the same as the model described in Reference 6.2-38 and 6.2-39. Reference 6.2-37 provide s the method by which the model is used.
6.2.1.3.4 Refill Model DescriptionAt the end of blowdown, a large amount of water remains in the reactor coolant system cold legs, downcomer, and lower plenum. To conservatively model the refi ll period for the purpose of containment mass and energy releases, this water is instantaneously transferred to the lower plenum along with sufficient accumulator water to completely fill the lo wer plenum. Thus, the time required for refill is conservatively neglected.
6.2.1.3.5 Reflood Model Description The model used for the reflood transient (WREFL OOD) is a slightly modified version of the models described in Refere nce 6.2-39 and 6.2-30. References 6.2-36 and 6.2-37 describe the methods by which this model is used and the modifications. Tabl es 6.2-20, 6.2-21, 6.2-21A, 6.2-21B and 6.2-21D present the principal parame ters for the reflood transients analyzed.
6.2.1.3.6 Post-Reflood Model Description During a LOCA event, most of the vessel liquid inventory will be disp laced by steam generated by flashing. The vessel is then refilled by the ac cumulators and the high, intermediate and low pressure injection systems. GOTHIC is not suitable for modeling the refill/reflood period because it involves quenching of the fuel rods where film boiling conditions may exist. Current versions of GOTHIC do not have models for quenching and film boiling. Theref ore, for the blowdown, refill and reflood stages, the mass and energy releas e rates are obtained from Westinghouse LOCA MPS3 UFSAR6.2-36Rev. 30analysis. The Westinghouse release data includes th e water from the ECCS accumulators, but the nitrogen release to containment is modeled separately in GOTHIC.
At the end of reflood, the core has been recovere d with water and the ECCS continues to supply water to the vessel. Residual stored energy and decay heat comes from the fuel rods. Stored energy in the vessel and primary system metal will also be gradually released to the injection water and released to the environment via steam ing through the core or spillage into the containment sump. In addition, there may be some buoyancy driven circul ation through the intact steam generator loops that will remove stored energy from the steam generator metal and water on the secondary side. Depending on the location of the break, the two-phase mixture in the vessel may pass through the steam generator on the broken loop and acquire heat from the stored energy in the secondary system. As discussed in Topical Report DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A, for these conditions, GOTHIC is capable of calculating the mass and energy release from the break into containment.
The GOTHIC long term mass and energy release accounts for the transfer of the decay heat and the stored energy in the primary and secondary systems to the containment after the end of reflood. The energy for each source term is acquired at the end of reflood from the Westinghouse mass and energy release analysis. The rate of energy release is determined by a simplified, GOTHIC RCS model that is coupled to the containment volume. Thus, the flow from the vessel to the containment is dependent on the GO THIC calculated containment pressure.
Lumped volumes are used for the vessel, downcomer, cold legs, steam generator secondary side, up-flow steam generator tubes a nd down-flow steam generator tube
- s. Separate sets of loop and secondary system volumes are used for the intact and broken loops with the connections between the broken loop and containment as necessary for the modeled break location. The Westinghouse calculated mass and energy inventory at the end of reflood establ ishes the liquid volume fractions and the fluid temperatures in th e primary and secondary systems.
The primary and secondary syst em geometries, including primar y system resistances, are consistent with the models used for non-LOCA accident analyses. In order to predict the natural circulation through the intact loops and the correct water level in the vessel and downcomer, the volumes are modeled with the correct elevations and heights. The vessel height may be adjusted so that the water and steam inventory at the end of reflood matches the vendor's boundary conditions, but this correction does not affect the hydraulic analysis.
Safety injection fluid is added to the intact and the broken loop cold leg volumes. In both locations, the SI fluid mixes with the resident fluid and any vapor from the intact steam generators. The SI flow is taken from the RW ST until the manual initiation of cold leg recirculation upon the annunciation of low-low level in the RWST, at which time the charging and intermediate head SI pumps are suppl ied water from the containment sump.
6.2.1.3.7 Decay Heat Model American Nuclear Society (ANS) Standard 5.1 wa s used in the LOCA M&E release model for MPS-3 for the determination of decay heat energy. This standard was balloted by the Nuclear MPS3 UFSAR6.2-37Rev. 30Power Plant Standards Committed (NUPPSCO) in October 1978 and subsequently approved. The official standard was issued on August 1979. Table 6.2-7A lists the decay he at curve used in the power uprate M&E release analysis.
Significant assumptions in the generation of th e decay heat curve for use in the LOCA M&E release analysis include the following:1.The decay heat sources considered are fi ssion product decay and heavy element decay of U-239 and Np-239.2.The decay heat power from fissioning isotopes other than U-235 is assumed to be identical to that of U-235.3.The fission rate is constant over the operating history of maximum power level.4.The factor accounting for neutron capture in fission products is taken from American AND Standard 5.1.5.The fuel is assumed to be at full power for 10 8 seconds.6.The total recoverable energy associated with one fission is a ssumed to be 200 MWV/
fission.7.Two sigma uncertainty (two times the standard deviation) is applie d to the fission product decay.Based upon NRC review, (Safety Evaluation Re port of the March 1979 evaluation model, Reference 6.2-37), use of the ANS Standard 5.1, November 1979 decay heat model, was approved for the calculation of M&E releas es to the containment following a LOCA.
6.2.1.3.8 Single Failure AnalysisThe effect of single failures of various ECCS components on the mass and energy releases is included in the data provided in Tables 6.2-8 through 6.2-21P. Two analyses bound this effect for the pump suction double ended rupture. The minimum emergency core c ooling system (ECCS) case, the single failure assumed is the loss of one emergency diesel. This failure results in the loss of one pumped safety injection train. The maximum ECCS case assumes no si ngle failures in the ECCS in determining the mass and energy releases but assumes loss of off site power. For the maximum ECCS case, the single failure is assume d to occur in the containment heat removal systems. The analysis of both minimum and maximum ECCS cases ensures that the effect of all credible single failures is bounded.
6.2.1.3.9 Metal-Water ReactionThe energy releases from the zirconium-water reac tion is considered as part of the Reference 6.2-37 methodology. Based on the way that the energy in the fuel is conservatively released to the vessel fluid, the fuel cladding temperature does not increase to the point were the zirconium-water reaction is significant. This is in contrast to the 10 CFR 50.46 analyses, which are biased to calculate high fuel rod cladding temperatures and therefore a non-significant zirconium-water reaction. For the LOCA M&E calculation, the energy created by the zirconium-water reaction value is small and is not explicitly provided in the energy balance tables. The energy that is MPS3 UFSAR6.2-38Rev. 30 determined is part of the M&E releases, and is therefore already included in the LOCA M&E release.6.2.1.4 Mass and Energy Release Analysis for Post ulated Secondary Sy stem Pipe Rupture Inside ContainmentSteam line ruptures occurring in side a reactor containment struct ure may result in significant releases of high energy fluid to the contai nment environment and elevated containment temperatures and pressures. The magnitude of the releases following a steam line rupture is dependent upon the plant initial ope rating conditions and the size of the rupture as well as the configuration of the plant steam system and th e containment design. These variations make it difficult to determine the absolute worst cases for either containment pressure or temperature evaluation following a steam line break. The main steam line break (MSLB) analysis considers a variety of postulated pipe breaks encompassing wi de variations in plant operation, safety system performance, and break size in determining the mass and energy releases for use in containment analysis. A spectrum of MSLB accidents, covering different break areas and reactor operating power levels, is analyzed (see Table 6.2-1) and di scussed in the following sections. As stated in Section 6.2.1.1.3.7, a feedwater line break is not anal yzed since an MSLB is the most limiting, conservative case with regard to containment design, integrity of the containment pressure boundary and the resulting contai nment environmental conditions.
6.2.1.4.1 Mass and Energy Release DataTo determine the effects of plant power level and break area on the mass and energy releases from a ruptured steam line, spectra of both variables have been evaluated. At plant power levels of 102 percent, 70 percent, 30 percent and 0 percent of nominal full load NSSS power, two break types have been defined. These breaks are defined as the following:1.A full double ended rupture (DER) downstream of the steam line flow restrictor, which is integral with the steam generator nozzle. For this case, the actual break area equals the cross-secti onal area of the steam line, but the blowdown from the steam generator with the broken line is controlled by the flow restrictor throat area (1.4 square feet). The reve rse flow from the intact st eam generators has been conservatively assumed to be controlled by the pipe cross section (4.12 square feet). Actually, the combined flow from th e three steam generators is limited by the seat area of a main st eam isolation valve in the broken steam line, which is 3.4 square feet.2.A split rupture that represents the larges t break that will neither generate a steam line isolation signal from the primary pr otection equipment nor results in water entrainment in the break effluent. Reactor protection and safety injection actuation functions are obtained from c ontainment pressure signals.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-39Rev. 30 6.2.1.4.2 Single Failure AssumptionsIn a manner consistent with the mass and energy release computations using the evaluation model described in WCAP-8822, various single failures have been identified and used in the spectrum of MSLB case analyzed. One of these failures is c onsidered as part of the containment response analysis as discussed in Section 6.2.1.1.3.6. The postulated single failures that increase the MSLB mass and energy releases to containment are discussed below.a.Failure of the main steam isolati on valve (MSIV) in the faulted loop.
The main steam line isolation function is accomplished via the MSIV in each of the four steam lines. Each valve closes on an isolation signal to terminate steam flow from the associated steam generator. The main steam line rupture upstream of this valve, as postulated for the MSLB mass and energy release analysis inside containment, creates a situation in whic h the steam generator on the faulted loop cannot be isolated, even when the MSIV successfully closes. The break location allows a continued blowdown from the fa ulted loop steam generator until it is empty and all sources of main feedwate r and auxiliary feed water addition are terminate. If the faulted loop MSIV fails to close, blowdown from more than one steam generator is terminated by the cl osure of the corresponding MSIV for each intact loop steam generator. Therefore, there is no failure of a single MSIV that could cause continued blowdown from multiple steam generators.b.Failure of the main feedwater isolat ion valve (FWIV) in the faulted loop.If the FWIV in the feedwater line to the faulted steam generator is assumed to fail in the open position, backup isolation is provided via the main feedwater flow control valve (FCV) closure. The inventory between the FWIV and the FCV in the faulted loop plus any additional pumped ma in feedwater until FCV closure would be available to be released to contai nment. The piping volume between the FWIV and the FCV is small; and the closure time of each valve is identical. Thus, the mass and energy releases inside containmen t conservatively assume the failure of the FWIV in the same loop as the rupt ured steam line for all MSLB cases analyzed.c.Failure of the auxiliary feedwa ter (AFW) runout control functions.
If the AFW runout control equipment does not function properly, there would be an increase in the auxiliary feedwater fl ow to the faulted loop steam generator prior to realignment of the AFW system. The additional inventory created by the higher AFW flowrate until th e flow is isolated from the faulted loop steam generator would be available to be released to containment. However, there are flow limiting cavitating vent uris in the AFW piping. The cavitating venturi choke point limits the maximum AFW flow to any steam generator. Thus, this single failure is not applicable to the analysis of the MSLB mass and energy releases inside containment.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-40Rev. 30 6.2.1.4.3 Initial ConditionsSteam line breaks can be postulated to occur with the plant in any operating condition ranging from hot shutdown to full power. Since steam generator water mass decreases with increasing power level, breaks occurring at lo wer power levels will generally result in a greater total mass release to the containment. However, because of increased stored energy in the primary side of the plant, increased heat transfer in the steam generators, and additional energy generation in the fuel, the energy release to the containment from breaks postulated to occur during full power, or near full power, operation may be greater than for breaks occurring with the plant in a low power, or hot shutdown, condition. Additionally, pressure in the steam genera tors changes with increasing power and has a significant infl uence on the rate of blowdown.Because of the opposing effects on mass versus energy release for the MSLB due to a change in initial power level, a single power level cannot be specified as the wors t case for either the containment pressure response or the cont ainment temperature response. Therefore, representative power levels including 102 percen t, 70 percent, 30 percent, and 0 percent of nominal full NSSS power conditions have been i nvestigated based on the information in WCAP-8822.In general, the plant initial conditions are assumed to be at the nominal value corresponding to the initial power for that case, with appropriate uncertainties included. Table 6.2-23 identifies the values assumed for NSSS power, RCS vessel average temperature, RCS flowrate, RCS pressurizer pressure, pressurizer water volume, feedwater temperat ure, steam generator pressure, and steam generator water level corresponding to each power level analyzed. Steam line break mass and energy releases assuming an RCS aver age temperature at the high end of the T avg window are conservative with respect to similar releases at the low end of the T avg window. At the high end, there is more mass and energy availabl e for release into containment. The thermal design flowrate has been used for the RCS fl ow input consistent with the assumptions documented in WCAP-8822.
Uncertainties on the init ial conditions assumed in the analysis have been applied only to the RCS average temperature (+5.0
°F), the steam generator water level (+12 percent narrow range span), and the power fraction (+2.0 percent) at full power. Nominal values are adequate for the initial conditions associated with pressurizer pressu re and pressurizer wate r level. Uncertainty conditions are only applied to those parameters that could increase the amount of mass or energy discharged into containment.
6.2.1.4.4 Description of Blowdown Model The LOFTRAN code (WCAP-7907) calculates mass and energy releases to the containment following a steam line rupture, as specifically described in WCAP-8822 and which is summarized as follows:1.Primary system fluid temperat ures and pressures calculation.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-41Rev. 30 The LOFTRAN code is used for studies of tran sient response of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) system to specified perturbations in process parameters. LOFTRAN is a versatile program suited to both accident evaluations and control system studies. LOFTRAN simulates a multiloop system by a model containing a reactor vessel, hot and cold leg piping, steam generators (tube and shell sides), and the pressurizer. The pressurizer heaters, spray, relief and safety valves are considered in the program. Point-model neutron kinetics and reactivity effects of the moderator, fuel, boron, and control rods are included. The secondary side to the steam generator uses a homogeneous, saturated mixture for the thermal transients and a water level correlation for indication and control. Core decay heat genera tion assumed in calculating the MSLB mass and energy releases is based on the ANS (1979) decay heat + 2 sigma model.Blowdown mass and energy releases determined using LOFTRAN include the effects of core power generation, main and auxi liary feedwater additions, engi neering safeguards systems, reactor coolant system thick-metal heat storage including stea m generator thick-metal mass and tubing, and reverse steam generator heat transfer.
The use of LOFTRAN code for the analysis of the MSLB mass and energy releases is documented in Supplement 1 of WCAP-8822, whic h has been reviewed and approved by the NRC for this application.2.Steam generator fluid mass.A maximum initial steam generator mass in the faulted loop steam generator has been used in the analysis of the MSLB inside containment. The use of a high faulted loop initial steam generator mass maximizes the steam generator inventory available for release to containment. The initial mass has been calculated as the value corresponding to the progr ammed level +12 percent narrow range span and assuming 0 percent tube pluggi ng, plus a mass uncertainty. The initial mass uncertainty is a conservative value with respect to the plant specific value. This assumptions is conservative with respect to the RCS cooldown through the faulted loop st eam generator resulting from the steam line break.3.Steam generator reverse heat transfer.
Once the steamline isolation is co mplete, the steam generators in the intact loops may become sources of energy that can be transferred to the steam generator with the broken steam line. This energy transfer occurs via the prim ary coolant. As the primary plan t cools, the temperature of the coolant flowing in the steam generator tubes c ould drop below the temperature of the secondary fluid in the intact steam generators, resulting in energy being returned to the primary coolant. This energy is then available to be transferred to the steam generator with the broken steam line.4.Reactor coolant system metal heat capacity.As the primary side of the plant cools, the temperature of the r eactor coolant could drop below the temperature of the reactor coolant piping, the reactor vessel, the reactor coolant pumps, and the steam generator thick-metal mass and tubing. As th is occurs, the heat st ored in the metal is available to be transferred to the steam generator with the broken line. The effects of this RCS MPS3 UFSAR6.2-42Rev. 30 metal heat are included in the results using conservative thick-metal ma sses and heat transfer coefficients. 5.Beak flow model.
Blowdown properties are determin ed using the Moody correlation with a discharge coefficient of 1.0. The quality of the blowdown is input as a function of time for mass and energy release calculations. The full DER representing the largest break of th e main steamline producing the highest mass flowrate from the faulted loop steam generator has been analyzed both with entrainment in the break effluent and with no entrainment (saturated steam). The entrainment model for the MSLB mass and energy release anal ysis is discussed in WCAP-8821 and has been applied at each initial power for the Model F steam generator design. When assumed, entrainment in the effluent is from only th e steam generator in the faulted loop. The assumption of saturated steam being released for all breaks is a conservative assumption that maximizes the energy release into containment.6.Loss of off site power.Loss of off site power is not assumed in the MS LB analysis. The assumption of a trip of all the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) coincident with reactor trip is less limiting than with off site power available since the mass and energy releases are reduced due to the loss of forced reactor coolant flow, resulting in less primary to secondary heat transfer (WCAP-8822). Therefore, all MSLB mass and energy release cases are analyzed with the RCPs continuing to operate.7.Core reactivity coefficients.
Since the steam line rupture is a cooldown event, it is conservative to use large negative moderator coefficients and low Doppler coefficients as characteris tic of end-of-cycle (EOC) life. Most limiting core reactivity coefficients at EOC are used to maximize the reactivity feedback effects resulting from the steam line break. Use of maximum reactivity feedback results in higher power generation if the reactor returns to criticality, thus maximizing heat transfer to the secondary side of the steam generators. Also, for all steam line ruptures, the most reactive control rod is assumed to be stuck out of the core.
6.2.1.4.5 Energy Inventories The rapid depressurization that o ccurs following a steam line rupture typically results in large amounts of water being added to the steam generators through the main feedwater system. A rapid closing FWIV and FCV in each of the main feedwater lines limits this effect. The feedwater addition that occurs prior to closing of the FWIV or FCV influences the steam generator blowdown in several ways. First, because the water entering the st eam generator is subcooled, it lowers the steam pressure there by reducing the flowrate out of th e break. As the steam generator pressure decreases, some of the fluid in the f eedwater lines downstream of the isolation valves will flash into the steam generators providing additional secondary fluid which may exit out of the rupture. Secondly, the increased flow causes an increase in the total heat transfer from the primary to secondary systems resulting in greater integrated energy being released out of the break.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-43Rev. 30 Following the initiation of the MSLB, main f eedwater flow is conservatively modeled by assuming an increase in feedwater flow prior to reactor trip. The initial increase in feedwater flow (until fully isolated) is in response to the feedwater pump control valve opening up in response to the steam flow/feedwater flow mismatch, or the decreasing steam generator water level as well as due to a lower back pressure on the feedwater pump as a result of the depressurizing steam generator. This maximizes the total mass additi on prior to feedwater is olation. The feedwater isolation response time, following the safety injection signal, is assumed to be a total of 7 seconds, accounting for delays associated with signal processing plus FWIV stroke time. For the circumstance in which the FWIV in the faulted loop fails to close, there is no effect on the feedwater isolation time since the total dela y for the FCV closure is also 7 seconds.
Following feedwater isolation, as the steam generator pressure decreases, some of the fluid in the feedwater lines downstream of the isolation or c ontrol valve may flash to steam if the feedwater temperature exceeds the saturati on temperature. This unisolable feedwater line volume is an additional source of fluid that can increase the mass discharged out of the break. The unisolable volume in the feedwater line is maximized for the faulted loop. Feedwa ter line piping volume available for steam flashing in this analysis is shown in Table 6.2-59.Generally, within the first minute following a steam line break, the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system is initiated on any one of several protection system si gnals. Addition of auxiliary feedwater to the steam generato rs will increase the secondary mass available for release to containment as well as increase the heat tran sferred to the secondary fluid. The auxiliary feedwater flow to the faulted and intact steam generators has been assumed to be a function of the back pressure on the AFW pumps as a result of the depressurizing steam generator in the MSLB analysis inside containment. Cavitating venturis in each of the AFW supply lines to the steam generators have been assumed to limit the maximum flow. Auxiliary feedwater flow to the faulted loop steam generator has been assumed up until the time of operator action at 30 minutes after event initiation to isolate the flow to the st eam generator near the break location. Auxiliary feedwater system assumptions that have been used in the analysis are presented in Table 6.2-59.
6.2.1.4.6 Additional Information Require d for Confirmatory AnalysesFor the DER cases, the forward flow cross-sectional area from the faulted loop steam generator is limited by the integral flow restrictor area of 1.4 square feet, whic h is less than the actual area of 4.12 square feet for the main steam piping inside containment. The cross-sectional area of the steam piping at this location is nearly as large as the sum of the flow restri ctors in the intact loop steam generators. Therefore, the assumption is made that the larger cross-sectional area, of the ruptured steam line expels steam faster than the smaller cro ss-sectional area of the intact loop steam generator flow restrictors can fill it. The contribution to the mass and energy releases entering containment from the entire main steam and turbine plant piping steam inventory has been included in the mass and energy release calc ulations. The flowrate is determined using the Moody correlation corresponding to saturated steam at the initial steam generator pressure and the pipe cross-sectional area. The initial mass flowrate is assumed to be constant while the entire main steam and turbine plant piping steam inventory is discharged to containment. The steam mass and energy releases in this volume of pi ping depend on the secondary system pressure, which varies with the initial power level. A conservative steam piping volume of 10,111 cubic MPS3 UFSAR6.2-44Rev. 30 feet is used in this blowdow n calculation representing the main steam piping from the steam generators up to and including the moisture separator reheaters and the main turbine throttle valve. Reverse flow for a full DER during this initial emptying of the main steam and turbine plant piping is independent of MS IV failure since the entire pipi ng inventory is e xhausted before the MSIVs close. After the main steam and turb ine plant piping is exhausted to containment, reverse flow to the break from the three unaffected steam generators continues until closure of the MSIVs, at which time reverse flow from the three unaffected steam generators is terminated.
The full DER represents the br eak producing the highest mass flowrate from the faulted loop steam generator. Smaller DER break sizes are represented by a reduction in the initial steam blowdown rate at the time of the break. Th erefore, no other DER break sizes have been considered other than the full DER.
For the split break MSLB cases, the break area is smaller than the area of a single integral flow restrictor. The flowrate from all steam generators prior to MS IV closure and the flowrate from a single steam generator after MSIV closure supply the steam flow to the break. The steam in the unisolable portion of the steam line does not affect the blowdown until the time of steam generator dry out, when the flowrate from the steam generator would decrease below the critical flowrate out of the break. At this point, the additional steam in the piping begins to have an effect o break flowrate until the steam line piping is empty. To model this effect, the mass of the unisolable steam in the steam line is added to the initial mass of the faulted steam generator. This accurately reflects both the total mass and energy that will be released from the break, and the timing of the effect of the uni solable steam line volume on th e blowdown. When all MSIVs are credited to successfully close, the unisolable steam line volume is 947 cubic feet. A failure of the MSIV on the faulted loop increases the unisolable steam line volume to a conservatively large value of 8,074 cubic feet.Steam line isolation is assumed in all four loops to terminate the blowdown from the three intact steam generators. A delay time of 12 seconds, accounting for delays a ssociated with signal processing plus MSIV stroke time, with unres tricted steam flow thr ough the valve during the valve stroke, has been assumed.
The following cases of the MSLB insi de containment have been analyzed.*102 percent power, full double ended (1.4 squa re feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; no entrainment.*102 percent power, full double ended (1.4 squa re feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; entrainment in the faulted loop steam generator.*102 percent power, 0.653 square feet sp lit rupture; FWIV single failure.*102 percent power, 0.653 square feet split r upture; MSIV and FWIV single failures.*70 percent power, full double ended (1.4 squa re feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; no entrainment.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-45Rev. 30*70 percent power, full double ended (1.4 squa re feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; entrainment in the faulted loop steam generator.*70 percent power, 0.659 square feet split rupture at 70 percent power; FWIV single failure.*70 percent power, 0.659 square feet split rupt ure at 70 percent power; MSIV and FWIV single failure.*30 percent power, full double ended (1.4 squa re feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; no entrainment.*30 percent power, full double ended (1.4 squa re feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; entrainment in the faulted loop steam generator.*30 percent power, 0.671 square feet sp lit rupture; FWIV single failure.*30 percent power, 0.671 square feet split rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failure.*0 percent power, full double ended (1.4 squa re feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; no entrainment.*0 percent power, full double ended (1.4 squa re feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; entrainment in the faulted loop steam generator.*0 percent power, 0.512 square feet split rupture; FWIV single failure.*0 percent power, 0.512 square feet split rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failure.
6.2.1.5 Minimum Containment Pressure Analysis for Performance Capability Studies of Emergency Core Cooling System The containment back pressure used for the limiting case break for the emergency core cooling system analysis (Section 15.6.5.2) is depicted on Figure 6.2-59. The containment back pressure is calculated using the methods and assumptions described in Appendix A of WCAP-8339 (1974).
This section describes the input parameters including the cont ainment initial conditions, net containment volume, passive heat sink materials, thicknesses, surface areas, and starting time and performance parameters of containment cooling systems used in the analysis.
6.2.1.5.1 Mass and Energy Release DataThe mass and energy releases to the containment during the blowdown and reflood portions of the limiting break transient are presented in Tables 6.2-72.The mathematical models which calculate the mass and energy releases to the containment are described in Section 15.6.5.2 and conform to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K, ECCS Evaluation Models. A break spectrum analysis is performed (references in Section 15.6.5) that considers various break sizes, break locations, and Moody discharge coefficients for the double ended cold leg guillotines which do affect the mass and energy released to the containment. This effect is considered for each case analyzed. During refill, the mass and energy released to the containment is assumed to be zero, which minimizes the c ontainment pressure. During reflood, the effect of steam water mixing between the sa fety injection water and the st eam flowing through the reactor MPS3 UFSAR6.2-46Rev. 30coolant system intact loops reduces the available energy released to the containment vapor spaces and therefore tends to mini mize containment pressure.
6.2.1.5.2 Initial Containment Internal ConditionsThe following initial values were used in the analysis:1.a containment pressure of 8.9 psia;2.a containment temperature of 80
°F;3.a refueling water storag e tank temperature of 40.0
°F; and4.an outside temperature of -20.0
°F.These containment initial conditi ons are representative ly low values anticipated during normal full power operation.
6.2.1.5.3 Containment Volume The volume used in the analysis is 2.35 x 10 6 cubic feet, the maximum estimated volume. This value was determined by calculating the contai nment gross volume and subtracting the volumes of all of the containment internal structures and equipment.
The gross volume was maximized by assuming the containment liner is erected at the maximum radial tolerance. The internal volume subtracted from the gross volum e was minimized by reducing the nominal values for internal concrete and some equipment by 5 percent.
6.2.1.5.4 Active Heat Sinks The quench spray system operates to remove heat from the containment. Table 6.2-60 gives the pertinent data for this system.
The heat removal capacity of this system is maximized by using the minimum RWST water temperature, the minimum delay time for the system to become effective, and maximum system flow rates.
6.2.1.5.5 Steam Water MixingWater spillage rates from the br oken loop accumulator are determined as part of the core reflooding calculation and are included in the c ontainment code (COCO) calculational model.
6.2.1.5.6 Passive Heat Sinks The passive heat sinks used in the analysis, with their thermophys ical properties, are given in Table 6.2-77. The passive heat sinks and thermophysical properties were derived in compliance MPS3 UFSAR6.2-47Rev. 30with Branch Technical Positi on CSB 6-1, Minimum Containment Pressure Model for PWR ECCS Performance Evaluation.
6.2.1.5.7 Heat Transfer to Passive Heat SinksThe condensing heat transfer coefficients used for heat transfer to the steel containment structures are given on Figure 6.2-60 for the limiting break.
6.2.1.5.8 Other Parameters No other parameters, including the operation of the containment minipurge system, have a substantial effect on the minimum containment pressure analysis.
6.2.1.6 Testing and Inspection Preoperational and periodic test s are performed on the contai nment structure and supporting systems. These are discussed in the sections as referenced.
6.2.1.7 Instrumentation Requirements Indicators are provided on the ma in control board to monitor c ontainment atmosphere pressure and temperature and the containment sump leve l and temperature. Recorders are provided for containment atmosphere temperatur e and pressure. The instrumentati on is discussed in detail in Section 7.5.
6.2.2 CONTAINMENT
HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM The systems provided for containm ent heat removal consist of:1.the quench spray system (QSS) and2.the containment recirc ulation system (CRS)Test Section SectionContainment shell leakage6.2.6Containment valve and penetration leakage6.2.6 Containment spray system6.2.2.4Containment atmosphere recirculation9.4.7.3.4ESF sump test6.2.2.4 High head safety injection6.3.4Low head safety injection6.3.4Residual heat removal (RHR)5.4.7.4 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-48Rev. 30The containment heat removal systems are designed to reduce the containment pressure following a break in either the primary or secondary pi ping system inside the containment. Heat is transferred from the containment atmosphere to the quench and c ontainment recirc ulation system spray water. Heat is transferred from the c ontainment to the service water system via the containment recirculation system heat exchangers.
The quench spray and the contai nment recirculation systems are shown on Figures 6.2-36 and 6.2-37, respectively. System component data is given in Table 6.2-61. The operation and heat removal capabilities of these systems are discussed below.
6.2.2.1 Design Bases The containment heat removal systems are desi gned in accordance with the following criteria.1.General Design Criterion 38 with respect to containment heat removal.2.General Design Criterion 39 with respec t to inspection of the containment heat removal system.3.General Design Criterion 40 with respec t to testing of the containment heat removal system.4.General Design Criterion 50 with respec t to the containment design basis. The containment peak pressure, following the DBA, shall be less than the containment design pressure assuming the worst single active failure.5.Regulatory Guide 1.1 as related to the ne t positive suction head (NPSH) available to the ECCS and containment heat rem oval system pumps (as clarified by SRP 6.2.2).6.Regulatory Guide 1.26 quality group sta ndards. The systems are designed in accordance with ASME III, Class 2 and is designated Safety Class 2.7.Regulatory Guide 1.29 for se ismic classification. The systems are designed to Seismic Category 1.8.Regulatory Guide 1.82 for the design of sumps for ECCS and containment spray systems. See Table 1.8-1 for further information.9.The systems are capable of operating in the post-accident envi ronment for 30 days following the DBA.10.The quench and containment recirculation spray headers are capable of delivering spray water to the containment atmosphere in sufficient quantity over a sufficient area of the containment and with an averag e droplet diameter to ensure adequate heat removal to accomplish design bases 1, 4, and 9 above.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-49Rev. 3011.The design of the containment recirculation system is sufficiently independent and redundant so that an active failure in the recirculation spray mode, cold leg recirculation mode, or hot le g recirculation mode of the ECCS has no effect on its ability to perform its engineered safety function.12.Instrumentation is provided to monitor the containment heat removal systems and system component performa nce under accident conditions in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97.13.Provisions are made to al low drainage of spray and emergency core cooling water to the containment sump. The sources and quantities of energy that must be removed from the containment to meet the design bases are discussed in Section 6.2.1
.14.Trisodium phosphate (TSP) stored in ba skets at the containment sump will dissolve in rising sump water and will maintain the containment sump water final pH 7.0 while not exceeding for any si gnificant duration a spray pH of 10.5.
6.2.2.2 System Design The containment heat removal systems cons ist of two parallel redundant quench spray subsystems feeding two parallel 360 degree spray headers, and two parallel redundant containment recirculation subsystems feed ing two parallel 360 de gree spray headers.
The interconnecting valving between subsystems of the containment recirculation system, with the exception of small drain lines, is locked closed to improve the overall system reliability in that failure in one subsystem does not affect the cap ability of the other s ubsystem to perform its designated safety function.
The containment heat removal syst ems are constructed entirely of corrosion-resistant materials, primarily stainless steel.
The components of the containment heat remova l systems have been selected so that the conditions of service (pressure, temperature, a nd fluid composition) do not prevent the systems from performing their intended functions. Refer to Section 3.11 for a discussion of the environmental design of the containment heat removal systems.Quench Spray System Following a DBA, the QSS is activated immediately upon the receipt of the CDA signal, if power is available. This signal is initiated at or before the safety analysis limit of 10 psig is reached. The QSS becomes effective in approximately 70 seconds event initiation, assuming loss of off site power and only one pump operating; and assuming the CDA signal is generated prior to power being available. Contributor s to the startup delay are:1.Signal generation and process delay MPS3 UFSAR6.2-50Rev. 302.Standby emergency generator startup3.Sequencer delay4.Valve Opening5.Pump Acceleration6.System fill time If both quench spray pumps are operating, the system fill time is less since there are two parallel flow paths.
Each redundant quench spray subsystem draws water independently from the RWST. The quantity of water stored is suffic ient to supply the needs of all of the engineered safety systems.The RWST is a vertical Seismic Category I cylindr ical tank with a flat bottom and hemispherical top, mounted on and secured to a reinforced concrete foundation. The tank is fabricated of Type 304 stainless steel plates. Component design data for the RWST is given in Table 6.2-61.
The minimum pH of the spray from the quench sp ray headers into the containment structure is 4.15. However, the final pH of the water in th e containment structure sump after a DBA, including the contents of the RWST, is 7.0 due to neutralization eff ects of trisodium phosphate (TSP) located in baskets on el evation (-)24 feet 6 inches (see "Containment Recirculation System").The borated water in the RWST is main tained at a maximum temperature of 75
°F by circulating the RWST water through the refueling water cooler s, which use chilled wa ter from the chilled water system (Section 9.2.2.2). The RWST is insulated to limit the temperature rise of the water to 1/2°F, or less, per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period whenever the ch illed water system is inoperable. Periodic sampling of the RWST water monitors the water's chemistry. Provisions are made to purify the water when necessary, by circulating the water through the fuel pool cooling and purification system (Section 9.1.3).
A vortex suppression assembly is installed in the RWST at the quench spray suction lines to eliminate vortex formation. The assembly consists of a single horizontal plate above both suction nozzles, supported off the bottom of the tank by vertical vanes. The quench spray pumps are automatically tripped at the RWST empty level, wh ich is set so that with allowance for negative instrument error, vortex formation does not occur.The RWST also has a connection for supplying water to the ECCS. The RWST is provided with a manhole for inspection access during refueling periods.Refer to Section 6.3.2.8 for a discussion of RWST design relative to instrument error, working allowance, ECCS switchover allowance, most limiting single failure, and compliance with design basis.Each quench spray pump is capable of supplyi ng approximately 4,000 gpm of borated water solution to the two 360 degree quench spray h eaders located approximately 101 and 116 feet above the operating floor in the dom e of the containment structure.
The pumps are located in the MPS3 UFSAR6.2-51Rev. 30engineered safety features building adjacent to the containment structure. Each quench spray discharge line contains a check valve inside containment and a motor-operated isolation valve outside the containment structure.
The preoperational test is described in Sect ion 6.2.2.4. The design evaluation of the system is contained in Section 6.2.2.3.
Containment Recirculation System Each of the two containment recirculation subsys tems consist of two co ntainment recirculation coolers and pumps which share tw o 360 degree spray headers. Ea ch containment recirculation spray header is fed by two risers, each riser ru nning from one of the co ntainment recirculation coolers in each of the subsystems. The two pumps in each subsystem are connected to different spray headers, but they are both connected to the same emergency bus. Failure of one emergency bus does not prevent delivery of sufficient containment recirculation flow.The four containment recirculation pumps take suction from a common containment sump, which is enclosed by a strainer assembly. The strainer consists of multiple fins constructed from corrugated perforated plate with 1/16 inch holes. The fins are erected vertically over the sump and extend beyond the sump to achieve the required surface area. Post accident water covers the strainer and is filtered by th e strainer prior to entering th e containment recirculation pump suctions. Design of the strainer is based on a t horough mechanistic analysis and debris-bed head loss testing to demonstrate that adequate NPSH and pump suction line flashing margin exists under worst-case debris clogging scenarios. Vort ex suppression is provided by the design of the strainer as confirmed by analysis and head loss testing. St rainer design also included structural analysis to demonstrate structural adequacy under all possible conditions of debris blockage.
Thus, water will be available to the suctions of the containment reci rculation pumps under all design basis accident conditions.
The strainer perforated fins have an opening size (1/16 inch) that is smaller than the minimum restriction found in the ECCS systems served by the sump, including the orifice of the spray nozzles (3/8 inch). The ECCS throttle valves ar e set so the minimum valv e clearance is greater than the size of the fine mesh screening.The Robust Fuel Assembly (RFA) implemented in Cycle 7 (Region 9) includes the debris resistant bottom nozzle (DRBN) and the protective bottom grid (P-Grid) fuel features (see Section 4.2). Due to these Region 9 fuel features, the mini mum restriction at the fuel assembly inlet of approximately 0.075 in. that is larger than the fine mesh screening for the sump (1/16 inch =
0.0625 inch).The effects of fibrous debris on the reactor fuel have been evaluated by Westinghouse in WCAP 16793-NP. The WCAP results provide reasonable assu rance that long term co re cooling will be established and maintained post-LOCA consider ing the presence of debris in the RCS and core.The debris composition incl udes both particulate and fiber debr is, as well as post-accident chemical products.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-52Rev. 30 The results of WCAP 16793 ar e applicable to MPS-3.
All four containment recircul ation pumps and motors are located outside the containment structure. The pumps are of the vertical deep well type, each mounted in a separate stainless steel well casing supported by the concrete containment structure mat. The pumps are located adjacent to the containment structure at an elevation suff iciently below the containment structure sump to ensure an adequate available net positive su ction head (NPSH). Access to the motors for inspection and maintenance is pr ovided. Each containment recirc ulation pump has a design flow of approximately 3,950 gpm. The containment reci rculation pumps are started automatically on an RWST Low-Low Level signal coincident wi th a containment depressurization actuation (CDA) signal. Each containment recirculation pump shaft is fitted with a tandem mechanical seal arrangement. The outboard cavity between the mechanical seals is filled with demineralized water, which is maintained at a nominal pressure of 1 psi above the inboard cavity by a seal head tank. A failure of either seal is detected by a level alarm provided for the seal head tank.The seal head tank reservoir will become depleted after approximately 7 days of pump operation. When the seal head tank reservoi r is depleted, the demineralize d water in the outboard cavity between the seals will be replaced with containment recirculation water that leaks into the outboard cavity from the inboard seal. The leakag e of this fluid from th e outer pump seal is accounted for in the dose analysis.
A failure of either seal, within approximately se ven days of pump operati on, will also deplete the head tank reservoir. If the outbo ard seal fails, the full system pr essure will be retained by the inboard seal. If the inboard seal fails, the full system pressure will be re tained by the outboard seal. The dose analysis takes into account the po tential for leakage of containment recirculation water out of an RSS pump in the event eith er the inboard or the outboard seal fails.An orifice is installed on the discharge of each containment recirculation pump. The orifice has been designed to limit pump flow to a maximu m of 3,000 gpm. This maxi mum flow is based on avoidance of suction line flashing and CRS heat exchanger baffle plate load limitations.
The containment recirculation c oolers are conventional shell and tube heat exchangers with containment recirculation water fl owing through the shell, where the water is cooled by service water flowing in the tubes.A conservatively minimum service water flowrate of 5,400 gpm is assumed to each cooler for containment analysis. The heat transfer duty for the coolers varies throughout the DBA. This is due to the reduction in the temperature of the water on the containment structure floor. Each containment recirculation cooler has an overall heat transfer coefficient (UA) of approximately 2.39 x 10 6 Btu/hr/°F which includes an allowance for plugging of 5 percent of the heat exchanger tubes and a fouling factor of 0.0005 hr-ft 2-°F/Btu on the tube side and the shell side. The service water temperature range is 33-80
°F for containment analysis.
The containment recirculation coolers are welded at all points where there is a potential for leakage of radioactive containment recirculation water into the service water. Because the MPS3 UFSAR6.2-53Rev. 30 containment recirculation water pressure in the coolers is greater than that of the service water, only outleakage can occur and dilution of the borated water by service water is not possible. This ensures that the margin necessary for cold shutdown by boron is maintained.
The service water from each pair of the contai nment recirculation cool ers is monitored by a radiation monitor which actuates an alarm if outleakage occurs. If outleakage is detected, the affected pair of coolers is then isolated. Section 11.5 describes the radiation monitoring devices and techniques that are employed.
During normal unit operation, the containment recirculation coolers are kept clean and dry, with maximum heat transfer capability. For long term operation, on the order of weeks, there may be some fouling of the tubes on the service water side, with resultant loss in heat transfer capability. The 8 inch thermal expansion loops on the discharge side of the containmen t recirculation coolers will be maintained filled with borated water during normal plant operation. This will prevent air from becoming trapped in these lines during syst em filling after an acci dent in containment.
In all spray headers, a combination of spray nozzle orientations is used to obtain maximum coverage. The average vertical fall height, considering the location of the spray headers and spray particle trajectories, is in excess of 101 feet fo r the quench spray and 87 feet for the containment recirculation spray.
The four containment recirculat ion pumps and the associated suction line valve and motors outside the containment struct ure are designed and installed to account for the differential movement between the pumps in the ESF building and the containment structure. Restraints and supports are used as appropriate.The containment structure floor is sloped and channeled to ensure that sufficient water is provided to the containment structure sump at the time that the containment recirculation pumps are started.
All cubicles, except the incore instrumentation tunnel (ITT), drai n to the containment structure floor. The ITT will hold up water until its level reaches elevation -11 feet, at which point the water will spill onto the containment floor. This design ensures that almost all water discharged into the containment structure during a LOCA reaches the sump.
Rising sump water due to a LOCA will di ssolve 974 cubic feet of trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) of minimum de nsity of 54 pounds per cubic feet, stored in twelve porous baskets located on elevati on (-)24 feet 6 inches of the containment structure. This amount of TSP is sufficient to raise the final pH of the containment sump water to above 7.0, considering the maximum total volume of borated water that could become available in the sump following a LOCA. The dissolving characteristics of the TSP assure its dissolution at a rate equal or faster than the rate of its submergence in the rising water. The mixing action of the containment recirculation pumps assures evenly distribut ed pH throughout the flooded and sprayed areas.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-54Rev. 30 During recirculation, leakage could occur through va lve packings and from leaks in the suction and discharge piping of the containment recirculation pump. Valves are appropriately selected to reduce this potential leakage to a negligible amount.
Consistent with letters from the ACRS (Ha nover 1969) concerning vital piping which must function during a DBA, passive fa ilure of the containm ent recirculation suct ion piping during a DBA is not considered credible during the short term period fo llowing the start of the DBA.Insulation Removable type encapsulated insulation is used on most piping within containment. Encapsulated insulation consists of multiple layers of 300 series austenitic stainless st eel sheets filled with fiberglass composition and encased by inner and outer jacketing of 300 series austenitic stainless steel sheets. The minimum thickness of the inne r jacketing is 0.010 inches and of the outer jacketing is 0.018 inches. Design de tails permit tight interlocking of adjacent sections of the assembled insulation. Where removal of insulation is required, quick release mechanical fasteners are provided. Some piping 3 inches and smaller is insulated with encapsulated fiberglass blankets enclosed in stainless steel lagging.
The mechanistic analysis of strainer debris cloggi ng includes a detailed a nd conservative debris transport analysis. Significant amounts of debris are postulated to be dislodged by high-energy water and steam break jets from the double-ended guillotine break. All of the dislodged debris is conservatively assumed to end up in the containment sump water in various sized pieces. Debris in the post-accident sump water includes such items as insulation, coatings, dirt, dust, and stickers. Much of the debris is assumed to be reduced to transportable pieces by either the break jets, temperature and humidity in containment, or subsequent erosion fr om break water flows, waterfalls in containment, and containment spray. A portion of the fibrous debris that is dislodged by break flows is assumed to remain intact in stainless steel jacketing or encapsulation. This debris is not subject to subsequent erosion.The strainer is designed to be fully covered with a worst-case debris bed and still able to maintain adequate NPSH and suction line flashing margin for the contai nment recirculation pumps. The worst case debris load is a thin-bed of fiber (nominally 1/8 inch) with particulate debris (from coatings and resident dirt) enmeshed in the de bris bed creating much higher head losses than would be seen from a debris bed composed only of fiber or a thick fibrous bed wh ich has a similar amount of particulate as the thin-bed.
The remaining piping requiring general thermal insulation, is insulated with fiberglass or foam glass type insulation and covere d with stainless steel lagging. Th e lagging serves to minimize dislodging of insulation from the effects of a high energy pipe rupture, thereby, minimizing the potential for containmen t sump screen clogging.
Small amounts of insulation, such as "Min-k" a nd "Foamglas", are utilized in areas where the installation of encapsulated insulation is impractical. Refer to Table 6.2-71 for quantities and locations of the various types of insu lation employed inside the containment.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-55Rev. 30Concerning the effect of insula tion particles on the recirculat ion pumps, based upon testing of similar pumps under plant conditions with identica l bearing configuration, the presence of small particles in the pumped fluid has no long-term ef fect on the operability and performance of the recirculation system pumps.The recirculation system pumps are designed to accommodate the anticipated debris present in the containment sump. Parts of the pump running with close tolerances ar e provided with surface hardness and finish to withstand particulate matter.Specifically the bearings of the pump are carbon/graphite type with flushing grooves. The pump's shaft sleeves are 304L stainless steel with hardfacing. The comb ination of the two provides a highly reliable bearing surface in the presence of particulates.Similarly, the pump's wearing ri ngs, both impeller and bowl, ar e hardened to provide wear resistance if particulate matter is in pumpage.
The impeller wearing ri ng is hardfaced with a carbide material and the bowl ring is a heat treated stainless steel brought to a hardness to provide a difference in Brinell hardness betw een the stationary and rotating ring.The pump's sealing system is a tandem seal arra ngement (two seals) used with demineralized water which is cool and clear of solids, to keep both seals clean. A nominal overpressure of 1 psi is maintained in the seal cavity so that if the inner seal should leak, flow is into the pumpage, and if the outer seal should leak, clean water is lost to the environment. The seal head tank reservoir will become depleted after approximately 7 da ys of pump operation. The demineralized water in the cavity between the seals will then be replaced with containment recirculation water by leakage from the inboard cavity which, due to settlement and low flow velocities through the seal cavity, is relatively free of particles. A seal cooler and circulator ensure s that the seal fluid is properly cooled.Since the pump is open-line shafted, a minor amoun t of wear could be expected across bearings with a differential pressure, however, the degree of wear is less than design and would not impair the function of the bearings.
By design, the materials of constr uction ensure the long-term reliability of the pumps to perform as required.
6.2.2.3 Design EvaluationThe analyses of the effects of the containment heat removal systems on the containment structure are made using the GOTH IC code (Section 6.2.1).
The quench spray system sprays chilled water from the RWST into the containment atmosphere, and the containment recirculation system sprays cooled containment structure sump water into the containment atmosphere.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-56Rev. 30Quench Spray System Quench spray flow is determined as a function of the difference between the containment total pressure and the difference in elevation (converted to psi) between the RWST water level and the quench spray header. This is based upon the degrad ed or worn pump head vs capacity curve, and the pressure losses in the lines, header, and nozzles. The quench spray pump design curve supplied by the manufacturer is degraded in accordance with ASME XI inservice testing allowances to account for pump wear. The degraded curve is used in the safety analysis and is shown on Figure 6.2-54.The thermal effectiveness of the quench and r ecirculation spray in re moving heat from the containment atmosphere following a LOCA is described in detail in Section 6.2.1.1.3.2.1.3.
The QSS and CRS utilize Spray Engineering Company (SPRACo) Model Number 1713A spray nozzles. Droplet size spectrum tests were accomplished by using high speed photography. A special chamber was used to house the photographic equipment. A slot on the roof of the chamber made it possible to penetrate a portion of the spray cone into the photographic chamber.
Photographic equipment was mounted on a traver sing rack which traversed outward from the spray axis.
The images of stopped motion droplets were re corded, measured, and counted. Histograms, which are incremental frequency plots, were constructed for each test condition. A typical histogram is shown on Figure 6.2-39.
Figures 6.2-42 and 6.2-43 are plan views at the containment bend line depicting expected containment recirculation spray c overage and overlap for each header at an elevated containment temperature of 275
°F. Figure 6.2-44 depicts the same for bot h quench spray headers. Analysis at the elevated temperature predic ts the minimum area coverage.
The figures show that a high percentage of the area at the bend line is cove red at elevated temperatures. As the containment temperature decreases, the area coverage increases, and approaches 100 percent.
Containment Recirculation System The containment recirculation system transfers heat from inside th e containment structure via the containment recirculation coolers to the service water system. The amount of heat transferred and the containment recirculation water outlet temp erature are calculated by the standard heat exchanger efficiency method based on the flows and the cooler UA.The containment recirculation system remains in the injection mode of operation until the RWST low-low level is reached and manual actions are performed to realign the containment recirculation system to the cold leg recirculation mode of operation. The RWST low-low level is reached as early as approximately 40 minutes in a large break LOCA scenario with all accident mitigation systems operating as designed (maximum ESF). Twenty fi ve minutes are allocated to allow the operators to manually complete the transfer from the injection m ode of operation to the cold leg recirculation mode of operation. Therefore, the transfer to the cold leg recirculation mode of operation can be completed as early as approximately 65 minutes after event initiation. For the MPS3 UFSAR6.2-57Rev. 30limiting large break LOCA analy zed (minimum ESF), the longest time to reach the RWST low-low level is approximately 90 minutes and therefore, the transfer to the cold leg recirculation mode of operation can be completed as late as approximately 115 minutes after event initiation.
References:
1.RWST low-low level reached reference: 5-04226S3, Rev. 0.2.Twenty five minute allowed time to manually transfer to cold leg recirculation:
US(B)-295.
During this mode, a portion of the containment reci rculation flow is diverted to the low head safety injection lines for use as core injection (Section 6.3). Two pumps are lined up for injection and spray and the remaining two continue to spray only.
For minimum engineered safety features (ESF), one pump is lined up for injection and spray and one will continue to spray only.From the receipt of the RWST Low-Low Level si gnal coincident with a CDA signal, there is a total maximum delay of 5 minutes before the recirculation spray becomes effective. The recirculation pumps requi re less than 3 minutes to fill the system.
The containment recirculation pum p design curve supplied by the manufacturer is degraded in accordance with the recommendations of ASME XI to account for pump wear. Figure 6.2-40 gives the degraded or worn head capacity curv e for the containment recirculation pumps. The degraded curve is used in the safety analysis. The available NPSH (referenced to the first stage impeller) is calculated us ing the following equation:Available NPSH = P + Z - H f - P v where: P = Containment atmosphere total pressure.Z = Elevation head of water above first stage impeller.
H f = Pump suction piping, debris bed and strainer head losses.
P v = Vapor pressure of sump liquid (satur ation pressure at liquid temperature).
All parameters are expressed in feet of head.
This expression can be simplified by making the conservative assumption that the vapor pressure of the pumped liquid is equal to the total containment pressure, as follows:Available NPSH = Z - H f The following tabulation presents the determination of the minimum available NPSH following a small break LOCA inside the reactor cavity and a comparison with the required NPSH to demonstrate adequate margin. Th e parameter values used to ev aluate the minimum available NPSH are taken at the time the available NPSH is at a minimum, which is the time of initial pump MPS3 UFSAR6.2-58Rev. 30 start-up for the spray mode. In addition, water level is minimized by assuming one quench spray pump in operation prior to initiation of the containment recirculation pumps. Losses in the suction piping have been maximized by considering all contributor s, including pipe bends and containment sump screen losses.
The required NPSH is selected from the pump manufacturer's test data.Uncertainties, such as NPSH va riation between similar pumps a nd testing inaccuracies, were considered but not included in the calculations due to the large margin between available and required NPSH.
Recirculation Spray ModeElevation head (feet) (Z) 26.7 Pipe losses (feet) (H) 3.8 Strainer and debris bed loss (feet) 5.5Available NPSH (feet) (Z-H) 17.4 Pump flow (gpm) 3,000 Required NPSH (feet) 4.0 Margin (feet)13.4 The result shown in the above tabulation is sens itive to break size but not initial containment conditions. The assumption that the vapor pressure of the liquid in the sump is as great as the containment total pressure eliminates any depende nce of the ECCS spillage temperature, initial containment pressure and temperature, RWST temperature and service water temperature. The minimum sump level at CRS pump start is estimated using a simplified yet conservative approach of calculating sump water inventory in the containment based on RWST i nventory transferred at the low-low level switchover and water held up in the reactor cavity, instrumentation tunnel, operating floors, heat sink surface s, QSS piping filled, insulation absorption, etc. The minimum sump level is calculated for both large and small break LOCA. For a small break LOCA, the calculation assumes that RCS water remains in the safety injection accumulators and reactor coolant system refilled with cooled water.The margin to suction line flashing is calculated in the same fashion as available NPSH except that the water level is calculated between the pump suction nozzle and the sump water surface.
Considering the water level present when the CRS pumps start, a positive margin exists at the start of CRS pump operation considering maximum CRS pump flow. Subsequently, the drop in pump flow rate as the system becomes filled significantly reduces the suction line losses, causing both the available NPSH and the suction line flashing margins to increase rapidly.For both large break LOCA and small break LOCA sump levels there is no flashing in the strainer at CRS pump start.
Figure 6.2-38 shows plan and elevation views of the containment sump screen assembly.
Following the DBA LOCA, the elevation of wate r inside the containment at the time of MPS3 UFSAR6.2-59Rev. 30switchover to cold leg recirculation is above the top of the screen assembly. After switchover, the sump level increases several more feet until the RWST is empty.The design of the containment sump is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.82, with the following clarification:
The recirculation spray pumps ta ke suction from a single sump.
The sump and strainer were designed to eliminate any credible failure mechanisms which w ould require installation of a redundant sump or strainer and is considered es pecially qualified for service and exempt from passive failure.Insulation Debris Transport to the Containment Emergency Sump The debris at the sump strainer causes a drop in pressure across the strainer. Thus, the available NPSH calculation for the CR S pumps and the submersion of the su ction inlets must consider this time dependent head loss.
Break Size and Location Breaks were considered at a number of loca tions and in all piping systems that rely on recirculation to mitigate the postulated pipe brea
- k. Breaks were considered in the reactor coolant piping, secondary piping, and other high-energy line break piping systems (i.e., safety injection and charging), which may require sump recirculation. Only large break and small break loss of coolant accidents require sump recirculation.The largest sources of insulation are the Steam Generators. Placing the break at the Steam Generator Crossover Leg nozzles will generate the largest amount of debris from the Steam Generator insulation. In addition, placing the break with the largest possible zone of influence in the middle of Steam Generator cubicles will e nvelope the whole cubicle and will generate the largest quantity of other piping an d equipment insulation and coating debris. Therefore, breaks at the four Steam Generator Cross over Leg nozzles envelope all ot her possible break locations for both the total amount of debris and pr oximity to the recirculation sump.
The following break locations were considered:*Breaks in the RCS with the largest potential for debris.*Large breaks with two or more different types of debris.*Breaks with the most direct path to the sump.
- Large breaks with the larges t potential particulate debris to insulation ratio by weight.*Breaks that generate a "thin-bed" (high particulate load w ith a nominal one-eighth inch fiber bed).The largest total piping insulation volume is ge nerated by the Crossover Leg break in Loop 2. This break also produces the largest volume of Microtherm (micro porous debris) which is MPS3 UFSAR6.2-60Rev. 30 detrimental to sump strainer performance. An additional break in loop 1 was analyzed based on proximity and clear debris path to the recirculation strainer. These breaks are considered to envelope all large breaks for debr is generation in terms of type and amount of debris and most direct path to the containment strainer.The quantity of fiber from the limiting large breaks in the Reactor Coolant system is far in excess of the amount of fiber needed for formation of a thin-bed on the ECCS strainer. Many possible high energy line breaks can be postulated where a small quantity of fibrous debris are generated and transported to the strainer, followed by wash down of particulate latent debris and unqualified coatings debris resulting in formation of a thin-b ed. In lieu of analyzing specific breaks for the potential to form a thin-bed, strainer head loss testing specifically tested for worst-case head loss. The worst-case head loss resulted from formation of a thin-bed. This testing included determining the minimum fiber necessary to form a thin-bed in conjunction with the postu lated particulate that would result from the worst large break LOCA. This combination bounds any small break which could form a thin-bed since the particulate incl udes the qualified coating debris load for a large break LOCA which exceeds the qualified coat ing debris load for any small break LOCA. Additionally, this thin-bed testing bounds the case where a large break LOCA occurs but only enough fiber to form a thin-bed is transported to the strainer. Testing of the thin-bed fiber determined the minimum fiber bed thickness nece ssary to form a thin-bed and showed that increases in fiber bed thickness beyond this thin-bed thickness lead to lower head losses across the strainer.Insulation DebrisThe types of insulation considered in debris generation analysis include all of the fiberglass found on loop piping and equipment such as Steam Generators and Reactor Coolant Pumps inside the loop rooms. Additionally, Microthe rm insulation is installed at specific locations on loop piping and is considered part of the debris mix.Paint Debris Both qualified and unqualifie d coatings exist in containment.
For the debris generation analysis, qualified coatings are those that are expected to remain intact following a LOCA except where they are impacted by the break jets. All coating imp acted by the break jets is postulated to fail as 10 micrometer size particulate since that makes the failed coati ng all transportable to the strainer and leads to the worst head loss in a fiborous debr is bed. Unqualified coatin gs (coatings that are not expected to remain intact following a LO CA) are postulated to fail throughout containment due to temperature and humidity.
All unqualified coatings are postulated to fa il as 10 micrometer size particulate similar to qualified coatings impacted by break jets.
Latent DebrisLatent debris is the dirt, lint, hair, dust, sa nd, and other miscellaneous debris resident in containment. This debris is considered to be 85 percent particulate and 15 percent fiber and is MPS3 UFSAR6.2-61Rev. 30largely transportable debris and thus is postulated to be in the strainer debris bed. This material is minimized by containment cleanliness st andards and containment inspections.
Foreign Materials Foreign materials in containment include labels, st ickers, tape, and placards as well as glass and adhesives. Much of this material is expected to be transported to the strainer and be in the strainer debris bed. This material is minimized by containment inspections and procedures to maintain the foreign material within the bounds of design assumptions.Transport Model The Millstone 3 analysis assumes all fiber debris falls to the containment floor. Similarly, all coatings debris is also conservatively modeled as falling to the containment floor. Thus, all LOCA generated debris is conservatively modeled as falling to the floor in the post-accident environment. This is reasonable as large debris should be modeled as falling to the containment floor and small debris that could reach the dome would eventually wash down to the containment floor. Conservatively, no debris is assumed to be intercepted by other structures and retained where it is unable to be transported to the strainer.
All latent debris and fore ign material are likewise modeled as falling to the containment floor via spray washdown or break flows.
Immediately after a break occurs, water spills from the break to th e floor and begins to flood the containment. During this fill-up, the water velocity at the wave front is expected to be much greater than the debris transport velocities. Thus , debris initially deposited on the floor is pushed along with the wave front.Most fine debris is not in the containment sump water immediately following a line break since it is likely still airborne. Nonetheless, for analyzed breaks, all fine debris is conservatively modeled as transporting to the containment floor during blowdown and along the floor during fill-up of the containment sump area.
Debris transport along the floor for low-density fiberglass is dependent on debris size categorization.
Recirculation transport is the hor izontal transport of debris in the active portions of the pool of water in the containment lowe r level by both reactor coolant system break flow, quench and recirculation spray flow and recirculation flow exiting at the sump screen. The recirculation sump is located in the containment annulus. Debris may be transported along with the water. The quantity of and types of debris that will reach the sump strainer are dependent on the flow velocities and flow patterns outside the loop rooms and the flow velocity at which debris transport occurs for each type of debris. In order to accurately model the flow velocities to the strainer, a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis is used.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-62Rev. 30 A three dimensional CFD model was developed to analyze the flow patterns in the containment sump during post-LOCA recirculation.
Detailed recirculation transport analysis that uses the CFD analysis is performed for non-fines fibrous debris only. Detailed reci rculation transport analyses ar e not performed for Microtherm and coatings since they are modeled as 100 percent small fines which all transport to the strainer.Velocity contours at all water elevations are examined in the CFD analysis to ensure that there is not a continuous flow path across multiple elevati ons with velocities in excess of the incipient tumbling velocity.
Small fines of fibrous debris are assumed to tran sport independent of CFD analysis because they are assumed to remain suspended in the containment sump water.
Erosion by spray and break flows is conservative ly assumed to reduce 90 percent of small and large piece fiberglass insulation to small fines and thus allow transport. The transport properties used for the remaining small and large piece fibrous debris are the velocity at which incipient tumbling occurs (transport threshold velocity) and the lift over curb velocity. CFD analysis shows that sufficient velocity exists in containment to allow transport of all small and large piece fibrous debris.All the fibrous debris is conserva tively assumed to transport to the strainer but intact pieces and the 10 percent of the small and large pieces, wh ich do not erode, are not assumed to lift onto the strainer due to inadequate velocity. There is no curb on the strainer, however, a curb can conservatively be assumed to form from floor tran sported debris. The strain er fins (surface area) are approximately 7 inches above the floor. The velocity profiles at the strainer (based on the CFD analysis) are not high enough to lift any of the intact fibrous debris onto the strainer fins independent of whether a curb exists. However, the remainder of the fibrous debris (59 percent of the total) is assumed to lift onto the strainer. Ef fectively then, 59 percent of the fibrous debris is modeled as transporting to the stra iner surface during recirculation.
Debris transport to the strainer for Microtherm, latent fiber, qualified coating, and unqualified coatings is considered to be 100 percent in the analytical transport calculation since all of this material is assumed to fail as , or erode into, small fines.Latent Particulate Transport Latent debris found in containmen t consists of dust, dirt, paint chips, metal grit, hair, lint, wood chips, and tie wraps. In the debris transport calculation, all of the latent particulate was assumed to transport to the strainer.
Drainage from the refueling cavity to the containment drains sump is conservatively neglected.
Single Active Failure MPS3 UFSAR6.2-63Rev. 30 The containment recirculation sy stem (CRS) is designed to acco mmodate a single active failure without adversely impacting th e required minimum flow delivery to core cooling and to containment atmosphere cooling. Two redundant tr ains of active components are provided to ensure that the CRS safety functions are acco mplished. Containment sump inventory to support operation of the CRS pumps is provided via the refueling water storage tank (RWST) and any spilled reactor coolant system inventory. Each tr ain of CRS starts upon receipt of the associated train RWST low-low level signal (present concurrently with a containment depressurization actuation (CDA) signal). When the RWST low-lo w level is reached (considering worst case uncertainties), adequate sump inventory is available to support operation of the CRS pumps.The CRS pumps start upon receipt of the RWST low-low level signal when a CDA signal is present. An EDG failure concurrent with a loss of off site power, will result in the failure of the associated CRS train to operate. An instrumentation failure (e.g., failure to generate all RWST low-low signal) will also result in the failure of the associated CRS train to operate. Adequate minimum CRS flow performance is achieved considering these single active failures. There is no adverse impact to CRS performance due to the fa ilure of a low head safe ty injection pump (i.e., residual heat removal pump) to auto stop when the RWST low-low level signal is generated.
Adequate containment sump i nventory is present to support operation of the CRS pumps. The RWST supply line / line(s) to the low head sa fety injection pumps ar e independent from the supply lines (containment sump lines) to the CR S pumps and therefore there is no impact on the suction line losses due to this failure. The impact to emergency core cooling pump performance (i.e., charging pump and safety injection pump) due to potential head / net positive suction head impact is addressed in Section 6.3. Any RWST i nventory directed to the core via the low head safety injection pump(s) will spill out of the faul ted reactor coolant system and will condense and accumulate in the containment sump.
The piping and supports of the QSS and CRS have been evaluated for system operation at the elevated temperatures associated with the sp ectrum of LOCAs and MSLB
- s. A brief synopsis of significant accidents is provide d within this paragraph. A signi ficant LOCA is the double ended rupture at the reactor coolant pump (RCP) suction (PSDER). This is a significant accident for portions of the CRS piping and por tions of the QSS piping due to the rapid increase to a high sustained containment saturation temperature.
While the containment will reach a higher saturation temperature for a break in the hot le g, both the containment pressure and temperature will be reduced more ra pidly following the initial reactor coolant system (RCS) blowdown phase than for the RCP suction break since the hot leg break will not cause energy from the steam generators to flow into containment. Since the steam generators are an additional source of energy for the RCP suction break, the break will result in a sustained temperature difference for heating the QSS and RSS piping before these systems are filled. A significant accident for portions of the QSS piping is a small main steam line break (MSLB). This accident releases energy into containment at a slower rate than the large LOCAs and larger MSLBs. Relative to the other cases, the small MSLB results in a slower increase in QSS pipi ng temperature and a slower pressure rise in containment. The differential thermal motion of the QSS piping in this case with respect to the containment structure can be gr eater than in the LOCA and other MSLB cases. This larger differential thermal motion can result in governi ng piping and pipe support loads for portions of the QSS piping and pipe supports. The singl e active failures in the study included:
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-64Rev. 30*One service water pump. This failure result s in the loss of cooling to the RSS heat exchangers in the same train as the failed service water pump.*Motor Control Center 32-4T. This failure prev ents the service water supply valve in each RSS heat exchanger and the QSS pump discharg e valve in the same train from opening.
The crossover valve from the RSS to the RHR would also be prevented from opening. Therefore, both RSS pumps on the affected train would continue to spray hot water.*One diesel generator. This results in failure of one train of all engineered safety features.
The failure is generally limiti ng for long term heat removal.*Sequencer failure. Fails to start the RSS pumps in the affected tr ain. Therefore, one RSS pump provides flow to the RSS header and th e second pump provides flow to both trains of ECCS and the second RSS header.Failure Analysis A failure analysis for the components of the containment heat removal systems is given in Table 6.2-62.6.2.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements 6.2.2.4.1 Quench Spray SystemFor the initial system test, pipe plugs are inserted in the spray nozzle sockets in the spray headers. The internals of the containment isolation and spray header check valves of the quench spray flow path not under test are removed, and the flow path to recirculate water to the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) hot and cold legs and the refueling water storage tank (RWST) flush connection is completed by opening the valve in the test line of the pump to be tested. Each quench spray pump is then started individually, and flow through each subsystem is measured in the discharge line. The pump developed head (discharge pressure minus the suction pressure) and the measured flow are compared to the pump head-flow curve (Figure 6.2-54).
Other points on the pump curve will also be measured by recirculating flow back to the RWST via throttled test lines bypassing the spray headers.
These tests will verify the individual pumps performance curves.
For inservice inspection and flow testing, ea ch quench spray pump may be periodically flow tested by recirculating water back to the RWST through the pump test lines with the spray headers isolated. The pump developed head and the measured flow will be compared to the pump head flow curve (Figure 6.2-54), to verify inservice inspection acceptability.
Pressure retaining components are inspected for leaks from pump seals, valve packings, flanged joints, and safety valves during system testi ng. In addition, Safety Classes 2 and 3 pressure retaining components ar e subject to periodic in service inspection, as de scribed in Section 6.6.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-65Rev. 30 The containment isolation check valve inside the containment structure and the containment isolation motor-operated valve outsi de the containment structure in the pump discharge lines will be tested for leakage during the Type C containment isolation valve leakage rate tests described in Section 6.2.6.
Means are provided for spray nozzle in-place testing or inspection when necessary as indicated in Technical Specifications. Spray noz zle in-place airflow testing was performed during the final stage of preoperational testing for this system to verify that the noz zles were not plugged.As part of the initial system test, the refueli ng water recirculation pumps and coolers are aligned to recirculate water in the RWST. Pressure re taining components are inspected for leaks from pump seals, valve packings and fla nged joints during system testing.
6.2.2.4.2 Containment Recirculation SystemFor the initial system test, pipe plugs are inserted in the spray nozzle sockets in the spray headers.
The containment recirculation pump suction well casing, cooler, suction and discharge piping, and containment structure sump are filled by opening the locked closed valves in the pump test line connecting the pump suction to the RWST. After the sump is filled the valves in the pump test line are closed. The containment structure sump is enclosed by a temporary cofferdam to provide adequate sump capacity for pump operation.The internals of the containment isolation check valves of the recirculati on spray flow path not under test are removed, and a flow path to recirculate water to the RPV hot and cold legs is established via test lines in the residual heat removal and low pressure safety injection systems. If necessary, makeup water to the cofferdam can be provided by gravity flow from the RWST through system piping not under test.
Each containment recirculation pump is then started, pumping water from the containment structure sump (cofferdam) to the RPV hot and cold legs.
Flow through each subsystem is measured by flow elements in the pump discharge lines. The pump developed head (discharge pressure minus suction pressure) and the measured flow are compared to the pump head-flow curve (Figure 6.2-40). Other points on the pump curve will also be measured by taking suction directly on the RWST and recirculating back to the RWST via the test lines with the spray headers isolated. These tests will verify the i ndividual pump performance curves. Acceptable pump NPSH is also verifi ed when pumping from the containment structure sump.A portion of the initial preoperational testing of the containment sump vortex control was accomplished by means of a model test as described in Section 14.2.7.11.Vortexing was evaluated during scale model testing. During all scale model tests, water level was set so that module submergence was less than or equal to the minimum strainer submergence in containment. A submergence of 8 inches was used to match the minimum design submergence of the strainer. In a large scale test using a full sized module, a test was also run with the clean MPS3 UFSAR6.2-66Rev. 30 strainer to evaluate vor texing at water levels less than the design submergence. The water level was first set so that only the bottom 10 inches of the fins were submerge d and twice the nominal flow was sent through the test tank and strainer. The submergence level was then raised to 0 inches of submergence (at the top of the fins) again using twice the nominal flow rate. No hollow-core vortices (evidence of air ingestion) were observed at any of these submergence levels in these vortexing tests. No air bubbles were observed in the discharge pi ping during these vortexing tests. These tests confirm that vortex ing for the strainer is not a concern.Additionally, a full flow test of the service wa ter through the tube side of each containment recirculation cooler ensures that the required flow and head for effective system operation is achieved (Section 9.2.1.4). Following the test, the co olers are flushed with demineralized water, and left in a drained and ready condition, maki ng further testing of the coolers unnecessary.
Proper functioning of interlocks , time delays, alarms, instrume nts, and valves during both the spray mode and switchover to recirculation mode will be verified during a simulated system actuation test. Valve speed and positioning will be verified in the control room and by local visual observation.
For inservice inspection and flow testing, the c ontainment recirculation pumps are capable of being flow tested quarterly via miniflow test lines. Full flow testing can be performed during refueling outages by closing the c ontainment isolation valves in the pump suction and discharge, opening the locked closed valves in the test line from the RWST, opening the valve to the low pressure safety injection discharg e line, and opening the valve in the residual heat removal return line to the RWST. The acceptability of pump developed head and the measured flow will be verified by the inservice inspection program.
The pump performance curve and the safety analysis curve are shown on Figure 3.2-40.
Pressure retaining components are inspected for leaks from pump seals, valve packings, flanged joints, and safety valves during system testi ng. In addition, Safety Classes 2 and 3 pressure retaining components ar e subject to periodic in service inspection, as de scribed in Section 6.6.
Means are provided for spray nozzle in-place testing or inspection when necessary as indicated in Technical Specifications. Spray noz zle in-place airflow testing was performed during the final stage of preoperational testing for this system to verify that the noz zles were not plugged.
The containment quench and recirculation spray systems are principal plan t safety features and are normally inoperative during reactor operation. Complete syst em tests cannot be performed when the reactor is operating because a safety injection signal causes reactor trip, and main feedwater and containment isolation. A containmen t spray system test would require the system to be temporarily disabled. The method of assuring operability of this system is, therefore, to combine system tests normally performed during pl ant refueling shutdowns, with more frequent component tests, (i.e., motor-ope rated valves) which can be pe rformed during reactor operation.
The system test, at or between each major fu el reloading, demonstrates proper automatic operation of the containment spray systems. With the pumps blocked from starting, a test signal is applied to initiate automatic actuation and verify that the components receive the safety injection MPS3 UFSAR6.2-67Rev. 30 signal in the proper sequence. The test demons trates the operation of the valves, pump circuit breakers, and automatic circuitry including ope ration of the switches and relays in the containment recirculation pump startup circuit.During reactor operation, the control room instrumentation, which initiates the containment spray system is checked periodically and the initiating circuits tested monthly on a staggered basis. The testing of analog channel inputs is accomplished in a similar manner as the reactor trip system.
The engineered safety features logic system is tested by means of a semi-automatic tester to simulate digital inputs from the analog channels.
The semi-automatic test er uses short duration pulses to prevent master relay actuation. Verification of logic actuation is indicated by a test light.
Upon completion of the logic checks, verification th at the circuit from the master relay to the slave relays is complete, is accomplished by use of a built-in slave relay tester to check continuity.
In addition, the active components (pumps and valves) are tested periodically, as indicated in the Technical Specifications. The test checks the operation of the starting circuits and verifies that the pumps are in satisfactory running order. Testing of containm ent quench and recirculation spray systems instrumentation and contro ls is discussed in Section 7.3.
6.2.3 SECONDARY
CONTAINMENT FUNCTIONAL DESIGN The secondary containment is comprised of th e containment enclosure building, engineered safety features building (parti al), auxiliary building, main steam valve building (partial), hydrogen recombiner building (partial) and the a ssociated supplementary leak collection and release system (SLCRS) provided to mitigate the radiological consequences of postulated accidents of the dual containmen t plant concept for Millstone 3.
The secondary containment is kept under a negative pressure rela tive to atmospheric pressure.
The negative pressure is measured at the A uxiliary Building 24 foot 6 inch elevation and maintained per Technical Specifications at greater at than or equal to 0.4 inches water gauge after a design basis accident (DBA). This single lo cation is considered to be adequate and representative of the entire secondary containment due to the large cross-section of the air passage which interconnects the various buildings within the boundary. The negative pressure is maintained with the SLCRS operating together with the charging pump, component cooling water pump and heat exchanger area, and auxiliary build ing filtration portions of the auxiliary building ventilation system (ABVS). The system fans a nd filtration units are located in the auxiliary building. The SLCRS operating together with the charging pump, reactor plant component cooling water pump and heat exchanger area ventil ation system and auxili ary building filtration portions of the auxiliary buildi ng ventilation system (ABVS) also maintains all contiguous buildings (main steam valve buildi ng (partially), engineered safety features building (partially), hydrogen recombiner building (partially), and a uxiliary building under a negative pressure following a DBA by exhausting air from these areas, filtering and re moving particulate and gaseous iodine from the air before discharging to the atmosphere via the Millstone stack and Turbine Building Stack. The system is designed as Safety Class 3.
The auxiliary building ventilati on system (ABVS) is shown on figure 9.4-2 and described in section 9.4.3. The auxiliary building filtration units discharge to the environment via the ventilation vent on the roof of the tu rbine building discussed in Section 15.6.5.4.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-68Rev. 30 6.2.3.1 Design Bases The SLCRS is designed according to the following criteria:1.General Design Criterion 2 for prot ection against natural phenomena as established in Chapters 2 and 3.2.General Design Criterion 4 for prot ection against adverse environmental conditions and missiles as established in Chapter 2 and 3.3.General Design Criterion 5 for shari ng systems and components important to safety.4.General Design Criterion 41 fo r containment atmosphere cleanup.5.General Design Criterion 64 for monitoring radioactivity releases.6.Regulatory Guide 1.26 for quality group classification of systems and components.
This system is QA Category I, Safety Class 3.7.Regulatory Guide 1.29 for seismic design classification of sy stem components. This system is classified as Seismic Category I.8.Regulatory Guide 1.52 for air filtration and adsorption units as indicated in Section 1.8.1.52.Other design bases include:1.The maintenance of negative pressure in areas contiguous to the containment.2.The filtration and adsorption by impregna ted charcoal of contaminated air for radioactive iodine removal with efficiency as indicated in Table 6.5-1
.3.The provision of continual monitoring for radioactive particulate in the discharge of the air at an elevated release point.4.Containment enclosure building integrity for normal wind load and frame integrity for tornado load; displacement integrit y for LOCA conditions and containment integrated leakage rate test conditions.
6.2.3.2 System Description The containment enclosure building is Seismic Category I building and is comprised of structures with uninsulated metal siding and built up roof ing over an insulated metal roof deck. The containment enclosure building design incorporates horizontal and vertical sliding joints to ensure that the integrity of the containment enclosur e building will be maintained during maximum MPS3 UFSAR6.2-69Rev. 30 possible pressure transients of the containment structure under DBA conditions (Section 3.8.4).
The design parameters for the containment enclosure building are listed in Table 6.2-64.To provide the required air tightness within the enclosure building, the metal siding, metal deck side joints and end laps have two continuous lines of caulking at all joints. Neoprene gaskets and sheets are used to provide a flexible seal between the containment enclosure and the other buildings.
The supplementary leak collection and rel ease system (SLCRS) is shown on Figure 6.2-46.
The principle components and design parameters for the SLCRS are listed in Table 6.2-63.
The SLCRS consist of two exhaus t fans, each supplied from a separate emergency bus, two filter banks and associated ductwork and dampers.Each filter bank includes a moisture separator, electric heater, upstream HEPA filter, a charcoal adsorber, and downstream HEPA filter.The charcoal adsorber is of gasketless nontray type and is designed for a residence time in excess of 0.25 seconds per 2 inches depth for gases at a flow velocity of less than 40 fpm. The actual depth of the absorber is 4 inches.
The SLCRS collects a portion of the primary cont ainment leakage from the buildings contiguous to the containment, which house the various contai nment penetrations and the engineered safety features equipment circulating radi oactive fluids, filters it, and re leases it to atmosphere through the Millstone stack. All leakages from the primary containment fo llowing a DBA flow into these areas. A portion of the auxiliary building atmosphere is exhaus ted via the auxiliary building ventilation system (see Section 9.4.3). In the main steam valve building, hydrogen recombiner building, and engineering safety features building, interior walls serve as the SLCRS boundary, thus separating areas contiguous to the containment from the remainder of these buildings.
All SLCRS boundaries are establis hed by use of low leakage doors (weather stripped), sealed building joints, sealed piping, conduit cable and ductwork penetrations, and boundary isolation dampers for ventilation systems. Therefore, containment leakage is contained in these areas until filtered by the SLCRS and th e ABVS filtration subsystem as described in Section 9.4.3.
6.2.3.3 Safety EvaluationThe SLCRS is not normally in operation. The SLCRS system and the auxiliary building filtration portion of the auxiliary building ve ntilation system (ABVS) start on receipt of a SIS signal and is considered operative when the SL CRS fan gets up to full speed. Th e drawdown flow capacity of each redundant SLCRS filter tr ain is 9,500 cfm with free inle t conditions; i.e., with SLCRS boundaries not isolated in a Safety Injection mode of operation. Th is capacity exceeds the design leakage rate across the boundaries of the building with a differential pressure across the boundaries. The excess margin in fan-filter train capacity, which is augmented by ABVS, is required in order to drawdown the SLCRS area to a negative pressure within 120 seconds after the MPS3 UFSAR6.2-70Rev. 30 accident. The negative pressure is measured at the Auxiliary Building 24 foot 6 inch elevation and maintained per Technical Specifica tions at greater than or equal to 0.4 inches water gauge after a design accident (DBA). This single location is considered to be adequate and representative of the entire secondary containment due to the large cross-section of th e air passage which interconnects the various buildings within the boundary. Ther efore, with the enclosure building and the contiguous buildings sealed and the doors closed, one SLCRS fan-fi lter unit up to full speed in conjunction with the auxiliary building filter system draws down the pressure to the minimum 0.4 inch negative pressure, in 110 seconds from the time of emer gency diesel generator breaker closure. The pressure is drawn down asymptotically, approaching a more negative pressure while the equilibrium flow rate stab ilizes at a value less than 9,500 cfm. The 0.4 inch water gauge negative pressure is measured at the Auxiliary Building 24 foot 6 inch elevation in order to ensure a negative pressure in all areas inside the secondary containment boundary under most on site meteorological conditions.To ensure protection from loss-of-function due to common events, the filter banks are physically separated, with a barrier (12 inch thic k concrete slab) placed between them. Figure 9.4-2 provides indication of the failure position of all air-operated dampers in the SLCRS.
The SLCRS is not specifically designed to rema in functional following a high energy line break outside the primary containment.A radiation monitor which monitors the air being processed by the SLCRS, is located downstream of the filter and warns the operator of a po tential problem that requires operator action.
6.2.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements All SLCRS components are tested and inspected as separate components and as an integrated system. Instrument readings are taken to ensure that all air systems are balanced to exhaust air at flow rates which draw down the SLCRS areas to a negative pressure of 0.4 inch measured in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 24 feet 6 inches within 120 seconds after the SIS.
Capacity and performance of fans conform to the required conditions a nd ratings and are in compliance with AMCA test codes and certified ratings program. SLCRS ductwork is leak-tested after installation to ensure ag ainst any bypass potentials. Th e ductwork is of all-welded construction and is pressure tested to 1.25 times the operating pressure. A thermal dioctylphthalate (DOP) smoke test with 0.3 micron smoke particle diameter at 100 percent and 20 percent rated filter air flow is given to each HEPA filter cell before leaving the manufacturer's facilities. A cold DOP test is conducted after filter installation at the site to ensure that there is no leakage from upstream to downstream of the HEPA filter. Provision is made to inject DOP at the inlet of the HEPA filter banks.Each charcoal adsorber bank is field tested for leakage using a refrigerant and air mixture introduced upstream of the charcoal adsorber a nd a halogen detector of the gas chromatograph type to confirm that the bypass allowables are met. Filter banks are periodically tested for leakage while in place and defective cells are replaced and all leaks eliminated. Test canisters are installed downstream of the adsorber banks to be used for periodic laborator y testing and inspection of the MPS3 UFSAR6.2-71Rev. 30 adsorbent. New adsorbent is laboratory tested for acceptance in accor dance with Regulatory Guide 1.52.Fans, air-operated dampers, and controls are tested once a month by manually starting the system and allowing it to reach rated speed with all da mpers in the operating position before being shut down. The system is automatically started at least once per refueling interval on a simulated SIS signal. The capability of SLCRS and the charging pump, component cooling water pump and heat exchanger area, and auxiliary building filtrati on portions of the auxilia ry building ventilation system (ABVS) to achieve and maintain a nega tive pressure in the enclosure building and contiguous buildings is verified by a test pe rformed at least once per refueling interval.
6.2.3.5 Instrumentation Requirements The SLCRS is actuated on receipt of a SI S. Its logic is described in Section 7.3.Differential pressure switches indicate pressure drop across each filter section locally and alarm high differential pressure remotely in the control room.Each filter heater has two temperature switches for high temperature protection of the heater. One protection temperature switch is an automatic reset type while the other has a local manual reset feature. Heater ON and OFF indicator lights are located on the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room. The heater for each filter bank is interlocked with the respective filter's exhaust fan to deenergize the heater when the fan is stopped.Relative humidity is monitored upstream of each charcoal filter section and indicated locally.The discharge air temperature of each charcoal filter section is continuously monitored. When discharge air temperature reaches 190
°F, a local amber light at the fire detection panel is illuminated, and high temperature c ondition is alarmed on the fire protection panel in the control room. If air temperatures continue to rise reaching 270
°F, a high-high temperature alarm light is illuminated on the fire protection panel located in the control room. Supervis ory circuits are used to monitor the temperature sens ors and actuate a local and cont rol room trouble light for the affected area.Control switches and indicator lights are provided on the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room for each filter bank exhaust fan. Po sition indicator lights ar e also provided on the main heating and ventilation panel for filter inlet dampers.Filter flow is monitored at the inlet of each fan. The standby filter bank is started automatically by a flow switch on low flow in the running filter bank.Radiation monitor (Section 11.5) monitors the common discharg e header of the filters for radiation prior to discharg e via the Millstone stack.Bypass alarms are provided in the control room in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.47 for the SLCRS.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-72Rev. 30
6.2.4 CONTAINMENT
ISOLATION SYSTEM The containment isolation system isolates piping lines which pe netrate the containment boundary to minimize the release of radioactive materials to the environment for postulated accidents within the containment.
6.2.4.1 Design Bases The containment isolation valve arrangement ensures containment integrity assuming the occurrence of a single failure (Section 3.1.1). The c ontainment isolation system provides at least two barriers between the atmosphere outside the containment structure and:1.The atmosphere inside the containment structure2.The reactor coolant system3.Systems which would become connected to either Item 1 or 2 as a result of, or subsequent to, a DBAContainment structure penetrations for ESF system s (Section 6.0), which will function to mitigate the consequences of an accident, will be opened or closed, as required, to allow system operation.
6.2.4.1.1 Governing ConditionsBecause a wide variation exists in accident severity that woul d necessitate a unit shutdown, the containment isolation system is designed to differentiate between the more and less severe accidents.
The engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation signa ls, i.e., safety injection (SIS), containment isolation Phase A (CIA), containment isolation Ph ase B (CIB), steam line isolation (SLI), and feedwater line isolation (FWI) provide this selectivity. Section 7.3 describes the ESF actuation system.The SIS initiates the following:*Operation of the emergency core cooling system (Section 6.3). Note: The charging pumps will not automatically inject into the reactor coolant cold legs unless there is also a cold leg injection permissive [(P-19) - pressurize r pressure low] signal present to open the charging pumps to RCS cold leg injecti on headers parallel isolation valves.*The FWI signal which closes the containment isolation valves in the main feedwater lines (Section 10.4.7
).*Closure of the containment isolation valves in the reactor coolant charging lines (Section 9.3.4
).
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-73Rev. 30*A CIA signal.The purpose of the CIA signal is to isolate systems which are not re quired for an or derly and safe shutdown of the unit in order to protect equipm ent which will be requi red to resume operation once the initiating cause for the CIA signal has been corrected.
In the event of a major design basis accident (D BA), after which normal heat removal systems might not function or might not provide adequate core and contai nment cooling, a CIB signal will follow the CIA signal to complete containment is olation (except for isolation valves required to be open for operation of ESF systems). The CIA and CIB signals which isolate containment, may be initiated by diverse parameters (e.g. reactor coolant system lo w pressure, or containment high pressure), as described in Section 7.3. The contai nment pressure setpoint which initiates the CIA signal (3.0 psig) is set at the minimum value c onsistent with normal subatmospheric operating conditions (Section 6.2.1.5).
Once the cause of the CI A/CIB has been corrected, two manua l operator actions are required to return each affected component to service (Section 7.3).
The FWI signal isolates flow to the steam genera tors in the event of a steam generator high-high level, or a safety injection signa l, or a reactor trip coincident with a low reactor coolant system average temperature. The containment purge supply and exhaust isola tion valves meet the Re quirements of Branch Technical Position CSB 6.4. They automatically close on a high radiation signal from containment area radiation monitors (Section 9.4.7). Pending issuance of Regulatory Guide 1.141, Rev. 1, lines penetrating containment are identified in Table 6.2-65 as being either essential or non-essential, based on SRP Rev. 2, Section 6.2.4, Item II.5.h. All non-essent ial lines which may be open during normal operation are automatically isolated upon initiation of a containment isolation signal. The remaining non-essential lines are isolated with manual valves locked closed during normal operation.
6.2.4.1.2 Isolation Criteria - Fluid Syst ems Penetrating the Containment The design of isolation valving for fluid system lines penetrating the containment structure conforms to the intent of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) 16, 54, 55, 56, and 57. Section 3.1.2 discusses compliance with the GDC. Exceptions for the specific arrangements described in the GD C are discussed in Section 6.2.4.2.
6.2.4.1.3 Isolation Criteria - Fluid Instrument Lines Penetrating the Containment The design of isolation valving fo r fluid instrument lines penetr ating the containment structure conforms to the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.11, as described in Section 6.2.4.2.
6.2.4.1.4 Design Requirements for Cont ainment Isolation Barriers The following are general design requiremen ts for containment isolation barriers:
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-74Rev. 301.The containment isolation valve arrangement ensures containment integrity, assuming the occurrence of a single fail ure, by providing at least two barriers between the atmosphere outside the cont ainment and the cont ainment atmosphere or the reactor coolant pressure boundary.2.The design pressure of all piping and components within the isolation boundaries afforded by the containment isolation system is equal to, or grea ter than, the design pressure of the reactor containment.
Piping, valves, and reactor containment penetrations are designed, constructed, a nd installed in accordance with Safety Class 2 and Seismic Category I Requirements (Section 3.2
).3.Containment isolation system component s, including valves, controls, piping, and penetrations, are protected fr om internally or externally generated missiles, jet impingement, and pipe whip.4.Containment isolation valves are physi cally located as close to the reactor containment wall as practical, thereby, minimizing the length of piping between the valves and their penetrations. Contai nment isolation valves outside reactor containment are located no more than 10 feet from the reactor containment wherever practical. Table 6.2-65 provides actual distances.5.Containment isolation valves which are under "administrative control" are locked closed with a local lock, for manual valves, and a ke y operated switch in the control room, for remotely operated va lves. Local manual operators are only specified for valves which are locked closed during normal unit operation. The operation of the remotely operated valves is directed from the control room.6.Spare penetrations are sealed with a welded closure.7.Piping between isolation valves which could be filled with water is protected from overpressurization due to heatup of trapped liquid following a DBA.
6.2.4.2 System Design General Table 6.2-65 gives details of the design of the cont ainment isolation system for each individual penetration. Piping and instrumentation draw ings for the containment isolation valve arrangements are included on Figure 6.2-47. Descript ions of the design of piping, electrical, and access reactor containment penetr ations are given in Section 3.8.1.
Reactor containment penetrations are classified in accordance with General Design Criteria 55, 56, and 57 and the functions of the resp ective fluid systems, as follows:
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-75Rev. 30 Class A Penetrations Class A penetration piping is connected to the reactor coolant system or is open to the reactor containment atmosphere and is in use duri ng normal operation. Any normally operating system piping, which could become connected to either the reactor coolant system or the reactor containment atmosphere as a result of a DBA, also is classified as Class A.
Class B Penetrations Class B penetration piping is separated from the reactor c oolant system and the reactor containment atmosphere by a membrane barrier (i.e., sealed inside the reactor containment) and is used during normal operation.
Class C Penetrations Class C penetration piping is part of the ESF systems. As such, these penetrations are not isolated by a containment isolation signal following a DBA, so that the system safety function can be accomplished.
Class D Penetrations Class D penetration piping is not in use during normal operation and is isolated from the reactor containment atmosphere by a normally closed valve. The operation of the valves is under administrative control (i.e., locked closed).The ESF actuation signals that initiate closure of the containment isolation valves are discussed in Section 6.2.4.1.1 and described in Section 7.3.1.
GDC Exceptions The containment isolation system conforms to the specification of General Design Criteria 54 through 57 with the following exceptions:1.ESF Penetrations (Section 6.0
)The containment isolation valves for the emergency core cooling system, the quench spray system, and the discharge li nes of the containment recirculation system are not closed by an automatic containment isolation signal, because operation of these systems is required following an acci dent inside the reactor containment. However, each line is fitted with the valving necessary to satisfy the single failure criterion and to remote-manually isolate these lines, when isolation is desired or required.2.Containment Recirculation Pu mp Suction Penetrations (Section 6.2.2
)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-76Rev. 30 The suction piping for the containment recirculation pumps is buried in the reinforced concrete reactor containment base mat. Inclusion of inside containment isolation valves in this piping is impract ical because the valves would have to be encased in concrete or be capable of submerged operation after an accident. Because the containment recirculation sy stem is operated af ter a LOCA, suction line isolation is only required in the even t of a pipe rupture out side of the reactor containment. Outside the reactor cont ainment, single normally open, remotely controlled, motor-operated isolation va lves are provided. Because these lines do not have isolation valves inside the reactor containment, the piping from the reactor containment wall to each valve outlet is individually encapsulated in stainless steel (Figure 6.2-47
). This encapsulation is an extension of the containment structure and prevents a r upture in the suction line between the reactor containment wall and the motor-operated isolation valve from causing a release of fluids from inside the reactor containment to the environment. In addition, both the process pipe and the encapsulation comply with the crack exclusion zone threshold stress limit as defined in SRP 3.6.2 and Branch Technical Position MEB3-1.3.Containment Leakage Monitoring Open Tap Penetrations (Section 6.2.6
)The containment isolation designs for these small instrument lines comply with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.11 inst ead of General Design Criteria 55 and 56 due to their size. All instrument lines are Safety Class 2, up to and including the containment isolation valves. The design, protection and location of these safety class lines minimize the likelihood of accidental damage, prevent failure from pipe whip and allow periodic, visual inspecti on. The lines are sized (or provided with restricting orifices) to restrict leakage flow from the reactor containment to a value which does not significantly affect off site doses (in the event of a line rupture or isolation valve failure). The containment leakage moni toring open tap lines serve safety related instruments. A normally open motor-operated containment isolation valve located in each line outside the containment structure isolates the lines, when remote-manually closed from the control room.4.Containment Vacuum Pump Suction Penetration (Section 9.5.10
)The containment vacuum system must be capable of operating after a DBA. This system has two containment isolation va lves in series outside the reactor containment. The containment isolation valves are closed on a CIA signal. The use of two outside containment isolation valves ensures that the lines are isolated in the event of any single active failure. A passive failure during the short term is not postulated (see Section 3.1.1). Therefore, the intent of General Design Criterion 56 is satisfied. The standard containment isolation valving arrangement is not employed on these lines to ensure reliability. This system is operated after a DBA, and has no isolation valves inside cont ainment capable of preventing out-leakage due to a postulated passive failure in the long term between the containment penetrations and outboard isolation valves. To meet cont ainment isolation criteria, MPS3 UFSAR6.2-77Rev. 30 pipe break exclusion criteria is applie d to these sections of piping outside containment from the containment penetr ations to the firs t isolation valves.
Augmented inservice inspection (AISI) is performed on those sections of piping.5.Containment Atmosphere Monito ring Pump Suction Penetration (Section 12.3.4
) The containment atmosphere monitoring system must be capable of operating after a DBA. Containment isolation is achieved by ut ilizing two containment isolation valves in series outside th e reactor containment. The containment isolation valves are closed on a CIA signa
- l. The use of two outside containment isolation valves ensures that the lines are isolated in the event of any single active failure. A passive fail ure during the short term is not postulated (see Section 3.1.1
). Therefore, the intent of General Design Criterion 56 is satisfied. The standard containment isolation valving arrangeme nt is not employed on these lines to ensure reliability. This system is opera ted after a DBA, and has no isolation valve inside containment capable of preventing out-leakage due to a postulated passive failure in the long term between the containment penetration and outboard isolation valve. To meet containment is olation criteria, pipe break exclusion criteria is applied to this section of piping outside containment from this containment penetration to the first isolation valve. Augmented inservice inspection (AISI) is performe d on that section of piping.6.Hydrogen Recombiner Suction Penetration (Section 6.2.5
)The hydrogen recombiner is designed to be capable of operating after a DBA. The system, though currently installed, is not used to provide any mitigating function.
The containment isolation valve arrangement for the hydrogen recombiner suction lines consists of two lock ed-closed, manually operated valves outside the reactor containment. The use of two outside contai nment isolation valves ensures that the line is isolated in the event of a single active failure. Therefore, this arrangement meets the intent of Genera l Design Criterion 56 and deviates from the standard arrangement to ensure relia bility of operation after th e LOCA. This system is operated after a DBA, and has no isolation valves inside containment capable of preventing out-leakage due to a postulated passive failure in the long term between the containment penetrations and outboard isolation valves. To meet containment isolation criteria, pipe break exclusion criteria is applied to these sections of piping outside containment from the containment penetrations to the first isolation valves.
Augmented inservice inspection (AISI) is performed on those sections of piping.7.Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Water Penetrations (Section 9.3.4
)The valves in the lines that supply seal water to the reactor coolant pumps are normally open and do not receive the contai nment isolation signal. A check valve is provided inside the containment and a motor-operated valve is located outside the containment in each of the seal lines. The lines must remain open to supply seal MPS3 UFSAR6.2-78Rev. 30injection water to the reactor coolan t pumps which may be operating after a containment isolation signal.
This arrangement is shown on Figure 9.3-7
.The operating times for containment isolation valves are given in Table 6.2-65. All motor-operated or air-operated valves, which may be open during unit ope ration, are designed for rapid operation in order to ensure containm ent integrity and to satisfy ESF operational requirements. Valve closure time is limited to as small a period as possible, consistent with the design of the valves and operators.System Requirements The design of fluid piping line s penetrating the containment structure conforms to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.141 (Section 1.8.1.141).
The design of fluid instrument lines penetrating the containmen t structure conforms to the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.11 as described in Section 6.2.4.2.
Piping, valves, and components within the cont ainment isolation barriers are designed, constructed, and installed in accordance with Safety Class 2 (Section 3.2.2) which meets the intent of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.26 (Section 1.8) and Seismic Category I (Section 3.2.1) which conforms to the requirements of NR C Regulatory Guide 1.29 (Section 1.8).
Containment isolation system components, includi ng valves, controls, piping, and penetrations, are protected from internally or externally generated missiles, waterjets, and pipe whip and jet impingement. Details regarding the design of this protection are given in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. All containment isolation system components are locate d in missile protected, heated structures. The Seismic Category I design (Section 3.7B) of th e containment isolation system components provides assurance of pr otection from earthquakes.
The containment isolation valves and valve opera tors are designed to assure operability both during normal plant operating conditions and following a DBA. A detailed description of seismic qualification testing and analysis performed on safety related m echanical equipment to assure operability during and after a postulated earthquake is given in Section 3.9.2.2. Section 3.11B describes the environmental conditions considered in the design of the containment isolation system and includes a discussion of the tests an d analyses conducted to assure the adequacy of components performance under the sp ecified environmental conditions.
All containment isolation valves are designed to maintain their integrity and leak tightness. The most severe reactor containment environmental conditions occur within the first hour following a DBA. With the exception of the instrument air, containment atmosphere monitor discharge, reactor coolant pump seal water return lines, and reactor plant component cooling return header lines, all normally open contai nment isolation valves inside the reactor containment are air-operated valves, solenoid valves, or check valves. The fail closed feature of these valves is not affected by the most severe post-DBA envir onmental conditions. The containment isolation valves for the instrument air, containment atmosphere monitor discharg e, reactor coolant pump MPS3 UFSAR6.2-79Rev. 30 seal water return lines, and reactor plant component cooling return header lines, are motor-operated valves which are designe d to operate under post-DBA conditions.
Closed systems used as one of the isolation barrie rs inside or outside the containment satisfy the following requirements:1.The systems do not communicate with either the reactor coolant system or the containment atmosphere.2.The systems are protected against miss iles, pipe whip and jet impingement.3.The systems are designated Seismic Category I.4.The systems are classified Safety Class 2.5.The systems are designed to withstand temperatures at least equal to the containment design temperature.6.The systems are designed to withstand the external pressure fr om the containment structural acceptance test.7.The systems are designed to withstand th e loss of coolant accident transient and environment.Valves used for containment isolation barriers are designed, construc ted, and installed in accordance with Safety Class 2 and Seismic Ca tegory I Requirements. The design pressure of containment isolation valves is equal to, or greater than, the design pressure of the reactor containment. Containment isolat ion valve type is selected on the basis of fluid system requirements (pressure drops, radioactivity, etc.), seat leak ti ghtness, and the standard industry practices for the applicable valve size. Containm ent isolation valve procurement specifications require strict seat and packing leak tightness tests in addition to the code requirements. Branch lines located between the containment and the outsi de or inside isolation valve meet the same containment isolation criteria as the main line.Design provisions are made to ensure the integrity of containment isolation valves and connecting piping under dynamic forces resulti ng from inadvertent closure. De tails of these provisions are given in Section 3.7.3.
The containment isolation system design provides mechanical and electrical redundancy. The isolation valve arrangement ensures containment integrity, assuming the occurrence of a single failure, by providing at least two barriers between the atmosphere outside the containment and the containment atmosphere or the reactor coolant pressure boundary.Valve actuators are either motors , air or hydraulic pilots (solenoi d actuated), solenoids or local handwheels. All air and solenoid operated containment isolation valves fail in the position of greater safety on loss of control voltage to the asso ciated solenoid valve or on loss of air for the MPS3 UFSAR6.2-80Rev. 30air-operated valves. All motor-operated containm ent isolation valves fail "as-is." Where motor-operated valves are used as containment isolation valves in those systems which must satisfy General Design Criteria 55 or 56, either the "as- is" pos ition is the position of greater safety or redundant motor-operated valves are provided in series or parallel to ensure safety. Motor operators are employed when post-accident operation is necessary or when the "fail-closed" feature of the air-operated valve is undesirable (e.g., auxiliary feedwater and reactor plant component cooling water lines).
The power for redundant containment isolation va lves and their controls is supplied from two independent power sources so that loss of one supply does not prevent the automatic line isolation when required.Physical and electrical separation between controls of redundant containment isolation valves are provided to prevent electrical faul ts or physical damage to one of the containment isolation valve controls from affecting the c ontrols of the redundant valve.
In addition, means are provided for manual initiatio n of the SIS, CIA, CIB, and SLI functions from the control room in the event of malfunction in the automatic circuitry.
Leaks in lines or components with the capabilit y for remote-manual isol ation are detected or inferred in one or more ways, depending on the sy stem involved. For exampl e, leaks in a reactor coolant pump thermal barrier cooling coil cause a high flow indication (Section 9.2.2.1). Leaks in the containment recirculation pump suction and discharge lines are detected by high sump liquid level, and low discharge pressure, respectively (Section 6.2.2). Feedwater heater tube leaks are detected by high drains levels. All such signals are annunciated and alarme d in the control room.
Primary and secondary modes of valve actuation are shown in Table 6.2-65. All remotely-operated containment isolation va lves (actuated by ESF actuation signal or remote-manually operated) have position indication and a manual control switch in the control room.Provisions are made for operabilit y testing (Section 7.3) of contai nment isolation valves and for leakage rate testing (Section 6.2.6) of containment isolation barr iers. As shown on Figure 6.2-47, each penetration which requires testing is provide d with test connections so that the isolation valves may be tested for leakage.All motor-operated containment is olation valves required to operate under post-DBA conditions are qualified under IEEE 323-74 and IEEE 344-75 guidelines. Addi tional information concerning environmental qualifications is provided in Section 3.11B.
Certain piping in the containment penetration area is designated as a break exclusion area as defined in Section 3.6.1. This portion of the piping is designed to meet the requirements of ASME III, Sub-Article NE-1120 and other design requi rements specified in the Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-81Rev. 30 6.2.4.3 Design Evaluation The design of the containment isolation system meets the design basis re quirements for system integrity, response, operation, and reliability. Isolation valv e and piping design and location ensure reactor containment integrity for any postu lated accidents inside the reactor containment. The ESFAS provides automatic reactor containmen t isolation, which is selective for accident severity. The containment isolation valve arra ngements for ESF penetrations ensure system operability and provide th e capability for reactor containment isolation to protect against a single failure.The containment isolation valv es can be reopened only after:1.The isolation signal has been reset2.Each valve must be opened by a single operator actionContainment purge and vent valv es are normally closed during operation and automatically close on a high radiation signal during cold shutdown. These valves are not credited with closure for the fuel handling accident di scussed in Section 15.7.4.
6.2.4.4 Tests and InspectionsTesting and inspection requirement s are described in Section 6.2.6.
6.2.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements Instrumentation required for containment isolation is described in Section 7.3.
6.2.5 COMBUSTIBLE
GAS CONTROL IN CONTAINMENTCombustible gas control is maintained by mixing as described in S ection 6.2.5.3 and the hydrogen monitoring system which monitors the hydrogen concentration within the containment for beyond design basis accidents. Hydrogen recombiners are installed, but are not used for any mitigating function. The hydrogen recombiner system, associ ated controls, alarms (including Regulatory Guide 1.47 bypass alarms) and ventilation damper s have been isolated awaiting abandonment.
The system discussion describes the system as originally installed and operated.
The hydrogen recombiner system is shown on Fi gure 6.2-36 and the system component data are given in Table 6.2-67. The hydrogen moni toring system is shown on Figure 6.2-58.
6.2.5.1 Design Bases The design of the hydrogen recombiner system and the hydrogen monitoring system is in accordance with the following criteria:1.General Design Criterion 41 with resp ect to containment atmosphere cleanup.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-82Rev. 302.Regulatory Guide 1.7, Revision 3, with respect to the generation of combustible gas in containment following a LOCA.3.The containment atmosphere is maintain ed uniformly mixed by the action of the containment spray to prevent local high concentrations of combustible gases (Hilliard et al., 1970), (Knudsen et al., 1969), and (USAEC 1972).4.The capability to monitor and sample th e combustible gas concentrations within the containment during post-accident condi tions in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97.5.Deleted. 6.The hydrogen recombiner system and hydrogen monitoring system are designed to remain operable assuming any single failure.7.The systems are protected from the effect s of tornadoes, exte rnal missiles, pipe ruptures, pipe whip, and jet impingement.8.Regulatory Guide 1.29 for the seismic desi gn classification of components; the systems are classified Seismic Category I.9.The hydrogen recombiner system and the hydrogen monitoring system are capable of operating in the accident e nvironment as described in Section 3.11
.10.General Design Criterion 42 with respect to inspection of the containment cleanup system11.General Design Criterion 43 with respect to testing the atmosphere cleanup system12.The hydrogen recombiners and the hydrogen monitors are located in the hydrogen recombiner building which provides ade quate shielding for each unit and for personnel protection.13.The capability for a controlled purge of the containment atmo sphere to aid in cleanup.14.Leak rate testing is performed peri odically on the system as described in Section 6.2.6.15.Regulatory Guide 1.26 for the quality group classification of components; the recombiner system is designed to Safe ty Class 2, and ASME Class 2 standards.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-83Rev. 30 6.2.5.2 System DesignThe hydrogen recombiner system has two redundant 100 pe rcent capacity trai ns. The recombiner recombines hydrogen with oxygen from the containment atmosphere to form water. Electric power for operation is supplied from the Class IE emergency buses. Electro-hydraulic operated dampers (MOD) on the supply a nd exhaust duct lines are norma lly closed. The MODs on the supply and exhaust duct lines are manually act ivated by a hand-switch located in the Main Control Room on the HVAC VP-1 Panel to open or close. The MODs, through limit switches, are interlocked with the recombiner package system allowing the system to start. However, upon receiving a high radiation signal from its exhaust duct radiation monitor, the corresponding isolation dampers close and the recombiner package system shuts down. Both the hydrogen recombiner and the hydrogen recombiner ventila tion fan are manually activated from individual "AUTO, OFF, HAND" switches mounted on the local hydrogen recombiner control consoles. The hydrogen recombiner ventilation system is described in Section 9.4.11.Each recombiner train is designed to process an average of 35 scfm or greater during post-LOCA conditions.
Each recombiner train utilizes a positive displacement blower for its process gas flow, an electric heater, a thermal recombiner chamber, and a ventilation blower to cool the return process gas and water vapor stream.
The fixed displacement recombiner blower provide s a controlled gas flow from the containment atmosphere to the thermal recombiner chamber.
Initially the gas stream is preheated to 1,200°F before it enters the recombiner chamber. De pending on the gas stream dynamic conditions (i.e., hydrogen concentration percent, flow ra te), hydrogen ignition occurs above 1,000
°F. Once ignition occurs, the process is maintained exot hermically in the recombiner chamber where hydrogen recombines with oxygen producing water vapor. Thereafter, the recombiner chamber temperature is controll ed at approximately 1,300
°F.After passing through the recombiner chamber, the gas and water vapor mixture flows through the air cooler, which reduces its temperature to 150°F. This eliminates the need for a water cooled containment structure penetration and ensures that only a minimum amount of water condenses in the piping, returning the gas and wate r to the containment atmosphere.
The containment atmosphere is drawn through open ended pipes located near the top of the containment structure. Adequa te mixing of the hydrogen in th e containment atmosphere is assured due to the turbulence created by the containm ent spray systems (Section 6.2.2) and by the diffusion of hydrogen in th e containment atmosphere.
The hydrogen recombiner system has two inch c ontainment penetrations which are sized for the flow requirements of the recombiner. These penetrations are dedi cated to the use of the hydrogen recombiner, and the post-accident sampling syst em (Section 9.3.2). A descri ption of containment isolation provisions of these penetr ations is provided in Section 6.2.4.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-84Rev. 30 The containment vacuum system (CVS) is used as a backup purge system for post-DBA combustible gas control within the containment st ructure. This system is described in Section 9.5.10.The Millstone 3 containment hydrogen monitoring system is designed as Category I (Class 1E) with dual redundant trains (Train A and Train B).
Each train contains stand-alone analyzer and control cabinets which analyze, monitor, alar m, and trend containment hydrogen concentration. The containment hydrogen monitoring system samples hydrogen sources on an automatic/manual basis selectable from the control cabinet loca ted in the hydrogen reco mbiner building control area. Withdrawal of the samples from existing hydrogen recombiner lines, measurement of the hydrogen concentration, and return of the total sample to the cont ainment are the basic functional assignments of the hydrogen analyzer cabinet.
The containment hydrogen monitoring system is available for continuous monitoring within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 30 minutes of an accident. This is consistent with Regulatory Guide, 1.7 Revision 3.
The hydrogen analyzer control cabinet provides the data acquisition, computation, and automatic/
manual control of all analyzer functions. The hydrogen monitoring system combines the basic technology of electrochemical se nsing of reactive gases with proven real time process instrumentation concepts and hard ware to provide a simple, reliab le, direct measurement system.
The direct-reading hydrogen sensor measures partial pre ssure with complete independence from factors such as; background gases, free water, carrier gases, refere nce cells, total pressure, sample flow, or sensor face velocity. Hydrogen concentr ation is measured and converted to an analog signal (0-10 percent H) for display on the digital panel meter, mounted on the control cabinet. The system has analog output for display (two meters), recording (Train A only), and alarming in the main control board. Input is also provided to the plant computer.
6.2.5.3 Design Evaluation Mixing of hydrogen in the cont ainment following a postulated lo ss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) results from three mechanisms:
- momentum transfer from the fluid jet exiting the break,*forced and natural convection flows within the contai nment atmosphere, and*molecular diffusion.All these mechanisms work toge ther to enhance mixing within the containment to provide a homogeneous gas mixture and prevent local accumulation of hydrogen. A brief discussion of each mixing mechanism follows.
Good containment compartment mixing occurs during the blowdown period of the postulated LOCA due to the break effluent. The momentum of the jet from the break causes turbulent mixing within the containment. This was demonstrated in a test performed for a high velocity jet source (Bloom 1982). Results from this test showed that "when the jet was initiated, local gas velocities, MPS3 UFSAR6.2-85Rev. 30 even far from the source, increased by a factor of three to five times over background velocities caused by natural convection and fan induced recirculation." Although this test was performed for an ice condenser lower compartment geometry, the test results would be applicable to subcompartments (e.g., steam generator cubicle, pressurizer cubicle) which are open to the containment.Forced convection in the contai nment atmosphere is generated by the containment spray systems which are designed to cool the containment atmosphere (see S ection 6.2.2.). Approximately 3,000 gpm (long-term) recirculation spray flow rate (assuming minimum ESF) is provided.
The spray induces mixing by imparting moment um to the containment atmosphere. Air entrainment by the spray causes bulk mass motion which creates both large and small scale turbulence. Therefore, complete mixing should occur within a few minutes following a LOCA with containment spra y operation (Sandia 1983).
In addition, steam condensation and cooling of th e containment atmosphere by the sprays results in flow to low pressure regions. This does not result in significant mixing within individual compartments, although significant inter compartment fluid tran sfer can occur (IDCOR 1983).Natural convection due to density differences (buoyant effects) is another source which causes mixing to occur in the containment atmosphere. Gas flow occurs whenever there is a temperature difference between the wall and the bulk atmosphere. Gases heated or cooled by the walls rise or fall, respectively, due to the density differences between the gas and the surrounding atmosphere.
This buoyant force imparts momentum to the ga s, and significant turbulence mixing results.The presence of large heat sinks in the containment, such as internal walls, together with localized heat sources, such as hot equipment surfaces, are expected to set up large scal e natural circulation cells. These circulation cells will help decrease any stratification which may occur in areas with the absence of jet-induced or forced-convection flows. Tests conducted during the containment systems experiment (CSE) program in a steam/air atmosphere i ndicated that natural convection caused good mixing in a large vessel (Hilliard/Cole man 1970 and Knudsen 1969).
After completion of the blowdown period of th e postulated LOCA, natural convection flows within the containment atmosphere also are developed due to the break effluent. Cooling water is injected into the reactor core by the ECCS (see Section 6.3). The injected water exits the break as steam/water mixture. Buoyancy for ces cause the released steam to rise. This upward steam flow generates containment mixing due to the entrainment of the atmosphere gases in the steam plume.
The extent of mixing in areas away from the br eak due to the buoyant thermal plume discharging into the containment is a function of geometry, plume to atmosphere density ratio, and ratio of momentum to buoyancy forces (IDCOR 1983).Molecular diffusion is another mechanism whic h would provide mixing within the containment following a postulated LOCA. Diffusion occurs due to concentration gradients. The rate of diffusion is too slow to expect mixing of large containment vol umes in short times by itself, although molecular diffusion w ould add to the other mixing pr ocesses previously discussed.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-86Rev. 30The containment internal structures are designed to be as open as practical to allow the circulation and mixing mechanisms to function. The volume above the operating floor which comprises the majority of the containment volume does not have significant barriers to obstruct mixing from the various mechanisms. The steam ge nerator and pressurizer subcompartments, the annulus between the crane wall and containment wall, and the hoi sting spaces are open at the top and bottom and connect with each other at va rious elevations (see Figure 6.2-56). Extensive use is made of grating at intermediate levels within the compartments. The quench and recirculation spray nozzles are located and oriented to cover as much area as pos sible. This design arrangement enhances mixing by establishing air movement and flow paths. In summary, the design of the internal containment structure allows free circulation and mixing of gases, while the spray system enhances the circulation pro cess throughout the containment.
The lower reactor cavity and incore instrument ation tunnel are the only areas that may not be effectively mixed with the bulk containment volum
- e. Since accumulation of water on the floor in the lower reactor cavity is expected to be insignificant, the generation of hydrogen from radiolysis, in turn, would be insignificant in th is area. Small amounts of hydrogen enter and exit the tunnel area by diffusion; however, hydrogen accumulation and large c oncentration gradients do not occur due to the absence of a hydrogen source.With diffusion being the only mixing mechanism present, the maximum concentration of hydrogen that can occur is equal to the maximum concentration that exists in the well mixed region just outside the entrance to this area.
Figure 6.2-57 depicts the expected predominant circ ulation patterns within the containment after termination of the initial release from LOCA.
The majority of gas mixing results from the spray systems. The recirculation spray entrains air, and its predominantly downward motion forces the gas mixture to the lower elevations and, in turn, up through and between the various compartments.Steam pluming is a secondary mixing effect which assists in the overall gas mixing process. The steam plume from the break is vertically upward from either the steam generator, pressurizer, or upper reactor cavity subcompart ment depending on the break location. This effect generally enhances the mixing process in the region above the operating floor and within the compartment where the break occurs.Hydrogen generation from oxidation of zircaloy fuel cladding, radiolysis of the water in the core, and hydrogen present in the reactor coolant system would be released through the break opening to the containment. Local accumulation of hydr ogen within the compartment where the break occurred is unlikely due to the mixing action of the released effluent and the containment compartment design which does not signi ficantly impede the mixing process.
Hydrogen generation from the radi olysis of water in the sump and corrosion of metals by the spray would be generated over long periods of time. Due to the slow rates of release, diffusion and spray mixing mechanisms would tend to keep the atmosphere mixed (IDCOR 1983).
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-87Rev. 30 Provisions to sample the containment atmos phere following a LOCA are provided (Section 9.3.2).The failure modes and effects analysis perf ormed for the hydrogen recombiner system is described in Section 7.3.
6.2.5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements A preoperational performan ce test was performed by the supplie r of the skid mounted portion of each hydrogen recombiner train before shipment. This test was accomplished by placing the subsystem into operation. The hydrogen recombiner blower was started, the test air inlet was opened, and atmospheric air was allowed to flow through the subsystem. A minimum flow of 50 scfm was maintained and checked by the flowmeter. Hydrogen was added through a test connection to the rotameter of an equivalently-sized recombiner for a demonstration test at the factory (NUREG-0390) until a c oncentration of 4 percent hydrogen was reached in the gas stream. The flow of hydr ogen was increased slowly from one-half percent to 4 percent. Normal operation of the various component s, together with a satisfactor y temperature rise through the electric preheater and thermal recombiner and a check of the hydrogen concentration in the exit stream, indicated proper operation of the train.
6.2.5.5 Instrumentation Requirements The hydrogen recombiner system is initially started and monitored locally in the hydrogen recombiner building once the vent ilation MODs are activated open from the main control room HVAC VP-1 panel. After the init ial heatup of the system, the system operates automatically with common alarms located in the control room to alert the operator of a system malfunction. Each hydrogen recombiner/analyzer train is totally independent of the other, with each train being powered from a separate Class IE emergency bus.
The hydrogen recombiner system operating parame ters are monitored, indicated, and controlled, locally or remotely, as follows:
The following controls and instruments are lo cated on the main board in the control room.
Annunciators that alarm when the following conditions exist:1.Hydrogen recombiner bypassed 2.Hydrogen recombiner trouble3.The hydrogen recombiner BYPASS pushbutt on (when depressed) and loss of control power to hydrogen recombiner c ubicle ventilation dampers are monitored by the plant computer.
The following controls and instruments are lo cated on the hydrogen recombiner panel in the hydrogen recombiner building:
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-88Rev. 30 Control switches for the following:1.Hydrogen recombiner 2.Air blast heat exchanger fan3.Positive displacement blower First out annunciators that alarm when the following conditions exist:1.Hydrogen recombiner air circuit breaker tripped 2.Hydrogen recombiner annunciator ground3.Hydrogen recombiner control switch in "STOP" position4.Reaction chamber ga s temperature low5.Reaction chamber ga s temperature high6.Heater outlet gas temperature high7.Gas return temperature high8.Positive displacement blower not running9.Air blast heat exchanger not running10.Inlet gas flow lowIndicators that monitor the following parameters:1.Inlet gas flow2.Inlet gas pressure3.Return gas pressure The following hydrogen monitoring system contro ls and instruments are located on the main board in the control room:1.Two hydrogen concentration indicators (Train A and B)2.One hydrogen concentration recorder (Train A)3.Hydrogen concentration high annunciator MPS3 UFSAR6.2-89Rev. 304.Hydrogen concentration high-high annunciator5.Hydrogen monitor trouble annunciator The following hydrogen monitoring system controls and instruments are located in the hydrogen recombiner building:1.Hydrogen analyzer cabinets: one hydroge n concentration indi cator per cabinet2.Hydrogen analyzer control cabinets:a.one digital indicator fo r displaying parameters selectable by key pad for each control cabinet.b.Alarm lights for system error, high concentration, high-high concentration, flow failure, analyzer power failure, and ca libration-in-progress.c.Manual auto-start switch.A radiation monitor is provided to monitor the ventilation outlet of each hydrogen recombiner cubicle (one monitor per cubicle.)
6.2.6 CONTAINMENT
LEAKAGE TESTING A testing program is implemente d to measure primary containment leakage prior to initial operation of the plant and periodically throughout its operating life. The testing program includes performance of Type A tests to measure the overall integrated leakage rate, Type B tests to detect and measure local leakage across pressure-cont aining or leakage-limitin g boundaries other than valves, and Type C tests to measure c ontainment isolation valve leakage rates.
The leakage tests are performed in accordance with the requirements of Appendix J of 10 CFR 50, Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water Cooled Power Reactors, as described below.
6.2.6.1 Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Test (Type A)A test program for Type A testing is scheduled and conducted in accordan ce with Appendix J of 10 CFR 50. A preoperational te st was performed at P a , the calculated peak primary containment internal pressure resulting from a design basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and specified in the Technical Specifications. The preoperational Type A test was preceded by a structural integrity test at a pressure of 51.8 psig (1.15 P d).The Type A test establishes the preoperati onal measured containment leakage rate, L am , which verifies that the maximum allowable leakage rate, L a, used in the accident analysis (Chapter 15) is not exceeded.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-90Rev. 30Primary containment integrated leakage rate tests are conducted in accordance with Appendix J of 10 CFR 50.Each Type A test is preceded by a general insp ection of the accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment for structural deterioration.
All defects are reported and resolved prior to conducting the test.Test instrumentation includes an absolute manometer, temperature detectors, and dew point sensors.All containment isolation valves are closed by their normal mode of operation. Where possible, lines subjected to containment atmosphere foll owing a LOCA are draine d and vented during the Type A test. Table 6.2-70 identifi es those systems that penetrat e the containment which are not drained and vented during the Type A tests. Systems that are normally filled with water and operating under post-accident conditions will not be drained a nd vented. For those systems that should be vented and drained but are not, the Type C leakage will be added to the Type A leakage rate.Containment leakage rate testing is performed in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program described in the Technical Specificati ons and referenced codes and standards.
After completion of all procedur al prerequisites, the containm ent is pressurized to above P a and allowed to stabilize for a minimum of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Th e plant computer or portable computer is used for data acquisition and/or leakag e rate calculations. The data acquisition package reads all the analog inputs (pressure, temperature, and dew point temperature), converts these readings into engineering units, and stores/prints these values to be used for leakage rate calculations. The leakage rate is calculated using either the total time or mass point method. Total time calculates leakage rate based on the most recent data point and the data point taken at the beginning of the test. Each successive leakage calc ulation is based on a longer peri od of time. The overall leakage rate is determined by applying a li near regression analysis to the l eakage rates at each data point.
A T distribution for 95 percent confidence limits is added to the calculated leakage rate to determine the upper confidence li mit. The mass point method cons ists of periodically calculating air masses within containment over a period of ti me from pressure, temperature, and dew point observations during the test. The air masses are computed using the ideal gas law. The leakage rate is then determined by plotting the air mass as a function of time, usi ng a least-squares fit to determine the slope. The leak rate is expressed as a pe rcentage of containmen t air mass lost in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. When the containment is at this pressure, a 95 percent conf idence level is calculated using a T distribution. The sum of the leakage rate a nd the 95 percent confidence level is the upper confidence limit. A verification test is performed following each Type A test. This test provides a method of assuring that systematic error or bias is given adequate consideration. The verification test consists of a superim posed leakage rate equal to 75 percent to 125 percent of L a , which is measured independently from Type A instrument ation. This air change and that which is measured by the containment leakage Type A in strumentation must agree within 25 percent.
The containment leakage monitori ng system is shown on Figure 6.2-53.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-91Rev. 30 6.2.6.2 Containment Penetration Leakage Rate Test (Type B)
According to Appendix J of 10 CFR 50, the following classes of penetrations require Type B testing:1.Primary containment penetr ations whose design incorporates resilient seals, gaskets, or sealant compounds, and piping penetrations fitted with expansion bellows and electrical penetrations fitted with flexible metal seal assemblies2.Air lock door seals, including door opera ted mechanical penetrations which are part of the primary containment boundary3.Doors with resilient seals or gasketsThe penetrations requiring Type B testing are: Fuel transfer tube flange, fuel transfer tube bellows, equipment hatch flange, equipment hatch manway and operating shaft, personnel airlock, and electri cal penetrations.
Electrical penetrations fall unde r Class 1. Eighty electrical penetr ations are provided for carrying electrical circuits through an ap erture (nozzle) into the containment pressure barrier. Each electrical penetration utilizes a welded header pl ate design to maintain containment integrity at the aperture. The 6.9 kV penetration design prov ides for the maintenanc e of the containment pressure boundary at each feed-through by incorporating Viton O-ring seals at both ends of the penetration feed-through assembly. The low voltage penetration design utilizes metal compression fittings to maintain in tegrity at the feed-through. Each penetration has a test valve located and connected to the header plate of the penetration outside of the containment and is used to determine seal leakage.
The fuel transfer tube consists of a sleeve welded to the containment liner and attached to the transfer tube by means of a bellows connection.
The area between the tube and the sleeve is provided with a test connection for testing the bellows seal connection to a pressure of P
- a. The fuel transfer tube blind flange is doubl e gasketed and can be pressurized to P a for leakage rate testing.The penetrations falling under Class 2 include personnel access lock, escape hatch, equipment hatch, and equipment hatch manway and operating shaft. These are sealed by means of covers which incorporate double O-ring seals. The spa ce between the seals can be pressurized to P a and leakage rate determined by the makeup air method. The personnel access lock and escape hatch are integral assemblies and are tested as one unit.
The test pressure equal to P a is applied against the penetra tion seals for determination of penetration leakage rate. Either the makeup ai r or the pressure drop method is employed to determine the penetration leakage rate.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-92Rev. 30 The results of the combined containment penetration leakage results are acceptable if, when combined with the total leakage of the Type C test, they are less than 60 percent of L a , as defined by Appendix J.
6.2.6.3 Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Rate Test (Type C)Table 6.2-65 lists all containment isolation valves and identifies those requiring Type C tests along with the test methods used. The followi ng penetrations are excluded for the following reasons:There are two methods used in Type C tests. With either method, each valve to be tested is closed by normal operation without any prelim inary exercise or adjustment.
In Method 1, the section of piping with the cont ainment isolation valves is isolated from the remainder of the fluid system by using valves or blanking flanges as necessary, and the piping is drained (if applicable). The inside and outside containment isolation valves are tested individually with air at a pressure equal to P
- a. Test air is applied at a test connection on the inboard side (toward the inside of the containm ent structure) of the valve to be tested, and the leakage air is vented through a test vent on the outboard side of the valve. A flowmeter, connected to the pressure source is used to measure leakage thr ough the containment isolation valve as a function of time. In this procedure, airflow across the valve seat is al ways in the inside-to-outside containment structure direction.
In Method 2, test pressure is applied between th e two isolation valves where the innermost valve (inside containment) is a diaphragm, symmetric but terfly type valve, or a globe type valve where the test pressure is under the seat. The outermost valve (outside containment) is tested in the outward direction. The innermost valve (inside containment), is te sted in the reverse direction by the test pressure. This test is equally effectiv e for diaphragm and symmetric butterfly valves and at least equally or more conser vative for globe valves with th e test pressure under the seat.Penetrations Reason for Type C Testing Exemption 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,These penetrations are directly 47, 48, 49, 50,connected to the steam generator74, 75, 76, 79,secondary side and, therefore, are80, 81, 82, 122A,considered an extension of the B, C, & D, 123primary containment.
9A, 13C, 33A, 68 Class 2 instrument piping out side containment is not considered to rupture and these instrument lines are leakage tested as a part of the Type A test in accordance with the recommendations contained in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan 6.2.6,Section II.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-93Rev. 30 The section of piping with the cont ainment isolation valves is isol ated from the remainder of the fluid system, using valves or blanking flanges as necessary, and the piping is drained (if applicable).
The inside and outside containment isolation valves are tested simultaneously with air at a pressure equal to P
- a. Test air is applied at a test connect ion inside the containment between the two valves, and leakage air is ve nted through a test vent on the opposite side of each valve. A flowmeter connected to the pressu re source is used to measur e leakage through the containment isolation valves as a function of time.
Some containment isolation valves may be tested against a static head of fluid on its downstream side. For these valves, the test pressure is corrected to include the pressure attributable to the static pressure, therefore, providing a P equal to P a plus the static head.The acceptance criteria for the combined leakage for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C testing are equal to or less than 60 percent of the maximum allowable leakage rate of the containment.
6.2.6.4 Scheduling and Reporting of Periodic Tests Surveillance frequency of primary containment integrated leakage rate tests (Type A) is based upon performance of leakage tests that meet the requirements of Appendix J. Type A tests are only conducted while the plant is in the shutdown condition.
Containment resilient seal penetration tests, including electrical penetrations, (Type B tests) are performed prior to initial criticality and periodically thereafter. An extended test interval for Type B tests may be increased up to a maximum of once per 120 months.
The personnel air lock full volume test is performed prior to initia l fuel load and at least once per thirty month intervals thereafter. If the air lo ck is open during periods when the containment integrity is not required, door seals must be tested prior to establishing containment integrity. If the air lock is opened when containment integrity is required, door seals should be tested within 7 days after such opening. If the air lock door is routinely used for access more frequently than once every 7 days, the air lock door seals are tested at least once every 30 days. The air lock door has testable seals and testing of the seals fulfills th e 7 day requirement. The te st pressure is no less than Pa. Seal tests are not to be subs tituted for the 30 month air lock test.Containment isolation valve testing (Type C tests) is performed prior to initial criticality and at a frequency up to a maximum of 60 months, based on performance.A report of each periodic Type A test is maintained at the site and made available to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for review upon reque st. Any instance of leakage exceeding the authorized limits in the technical specifications of the license are reported to NRC. The report contains an analysis and interpretation of the Type A test results. In addition, the report has a summary analysis of the periodic Type B and C tests performed since the last Type A test.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-94Rev. 30If any periodic Type A test fails to meet the ac ceptance criteria, acceptable performance should be reestablished by performing a Type A test within 48 months following the unsuccessful Type A test.6.2.6.5 Special Testing RequirementsType A, B, and C tests, as applicable, are conducted following containment structure modifications in accordance with Paragraph IV.A of Appendix J, 10 CFR 50.
The containment structure enclosure is evacuat ed by the supplementary leak collection and release system (SLCRS) to slightly negative pressure immediately fo llowing the design bases accident initiation of the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS). This ensures all leakage from the primary containment is passed through the high-efficiency particulate air filters of the SLCRS prior to release from the containment structure enclosure, engineered safety feature building, main steam valve building, hydrogen reco mbiner building or auxiliary building which are all connected to the SLCRS.This filtration will ensure a reduction of effect ive primary leakage released to the environment. The SLCRS was tested prior to initial fuel loading to verify that a slightly negative pressure can be obtained and maintained following an ESFAS actuation in the areas mentioned above. This test will be conducted again at each refueling or at intervals not to exceed once per refueling. Some leakage through piping systems may bypass the secondary containment. This leakage is limited to the design leak rates through thes e piping systems. The bypass leakage penetrati ons, identified in Table 6.2-65, in addition to the T ype B bypass leakage penetrations which consist of the fuel transfer tube and the fuel transfer tube enclos ure, are tested in acco rdance with Section 6.2.6.2 and 6.2.6.3, and the combination of their leakage ra tes is compared with the maximum allowable rate. When the actual leakage rate approaches this limit, corrective action will be taken.
6.
2.7 REFERENCES
FOR SECTION 6.26.2-1Aerojet Nuclear Company, 1976. RELAP4/MOD5: A Computer Program for Transient Thermal Hydraulic Analysis of Nuclear Reactors and Related Systems. User's Manual Vol I-III, Report ANCR-NUREG-1335.6.2-2American Nuclear Society (ANS) 1979, American National Standard for Decay Heat Power in Light Water Reacto rs, ANSI/ANS-5.1-1979, August 1979.6.2-3Atomics International Di vision Rockwell International. Test Procedure - Hydrogen Analyzer Systems, No. N019DTP120003.6.2-4Baer, Robert L. (Office of Reactor Regulation Division of Project Management, (USNRC) 1978. Letter to Mr. Gordan Pinsky (Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation).6.2-5Bloom, G.R., et al., "Hydrogen Distribution in a Containment with a High Velocity Hydrogen-Steam Source." Presented at the Second International Workshop on the Impact of Hydrogen on Water Reactor Safety, Albuquerque, New Mexico, October 3-7, 1982.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-95Rev. 306.2-6Brocard, D.N. Buoyancy, Transport and Head Loss of Fibrous Reactor Insulation.
NUREG/CR-2982, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Prepar ed by Alden Research Laboratory, Worcester Polytechnic Instit ute, Holden, Massachusetts. November 1982.6.2-7Crank, J. The Mathematics of Diffusion. Oxford University Press, 1956, pp 186-199.6.2-8Gido, R.G. Liner-Concrete Heat Transfer Study for Nuclear Power Plant Containments, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, LA-7089-MS Informal Report NRC-4, issued January 1978.6.2-9Gido, R.G. Subcompartment Analysis Procedures. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. NUREG/CR-1199, LA-8169-MS, Informal Report R-4. December 1979.6.2-10Hanover, Stephen H. (Chairman Advisory Committee of Reactor Safeguards) 1969. Letter to Hon. Glenn T. Seaborg (Chairman USAEC) Report on Brunswick Steam Electric Plant.6.2-11Hanover, Stephen H. (Chairman Advisory Committee of Reactor Safeguards) 1969. Letter to Hon. Glenn T. Seaborg (Chairman USAEC)
Report on Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant.6.2-12Hilliard, R.K., et al., 1970. Removal of Iodine and Particle s from Containment Atmosphere by Sprays. Battelle-Northwest, Richland, Wash. BNWL-1244.6.2-13Hilliard, R.K., and Coleman, L.F. Natural Transport Effects on Fi ssion Product Behavior in the Containment Systems Experiment. BNWL-1457, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Richland, Washington. December 1970.6.2-14IDCOR Program Report, Technical Re port 12.2, Hydrogen Distribution in Reactor Containment Building. September 1983.6.2-15Idel'chik, I.E. 1960. Handbook of Hydraulic Resistance, Published pursuant to an agreement with the U.S. Atomic Ener gy Commission and the National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C.6.2-16Knudsen, J.G. and Hilliard, R.K. 1969. Fission Product Tran sport by Natural Processes in Containment Vessels. Battelle-Northwest, Richland, Wash. BNWL-943.6.2-17LOCTIC - A Computer Code to Determine the Pressure and Temperature Response of Dry Containments to a Loss-of-Coolant Acci dent, SWND-1, (SWEC), 1971. Letter from W.J.L. Kennedy to P.A. Morris et al.6.2-18Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Reactor Safety and Technology Quarterly Progress Report, 1976. LA-NUREG-6447-PR, p 53.6.2-19Moody, L.J. 1965. Maximum Flow Rate of a Single Component, Two-Phase Mixture. Journal of Heat Transfer Transactions, ASME Vol. 87, p 134-142.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-96Rev. 306.2-20Moore, K.V. and Regilt, W.H. 1974. RE LAP4 - A Computer Program for Thermal Hydraulic Analysis. Report ANCR-1127 Aerojet Nuclear Company.6.2-21NS-TMA-2075. 1979. A letter from T. M. Anderson, Westinghouse, to J. F. Stolz, 1979. "Westinghouse LOCA Mass and Energy Release Model for Containment Design," March 1979 Version.6.2-22AECL Test Report MIL3-34325-TR-001, Rev. 0, "Test Report for Reduced-Scale Testing for Millstone 3 Replacement Containment Sump Strainers," Dated March 20, 2007.6.2-23Report MIL3-34325-TR-002, Rev. 0, "Large-Scale Testing for Millstone 3 Replacement Containment Sump Strainers, Domin ion - Millstone," Dated April 2007.6.2-24NS-TMA-2075. 1979. A letter from T. M. Anderson, Westinghouse, to J. F. Stolz, 1979. Westinghouse LOCA Mass and Energy Release Model for Containment Design - March 1979 Version.6.2-25Nystrom, J.B. Experimental Evaluation of a Reactor Containment Sump, MNPS-3, Alden Research Laboratory, Report No. 114-82/M10XXF, October 1982.6.2-26Sandia National Laboratory and Genera l Physics Corporation. NUREG/CR-2726, SAND 82-1137, R3, Light Water Reactor Hydrogen Manual. June 1983.6.2-27Spray Engineering Company. Spray Anal ysis on SPRACo M odel 1713A Nozzles.
Nashua, New Hampshire.6.2-28USAEC 1974b. Evaluation of LOCA Hydrodynamics. Regulatory Staff: Technical Review.6.2-29WCAP-6174, 1974, Bordelon, F. M. et al., "SATAN-VI Program: Comprehensive Space-Time Dependent Analysis of Loss-of-Coolant."6.2-30WCAP-8170, 1974. Collier, G. et al., 1974, "Calculational Model for Core Reflooding After a Loss-of-Coolant Accident (WREFLOOD Code)."6.2-31WCAP-8264-P-A (Proprietary) and WC AP-8312-A (Nonproprietary), Revision 2, Westinghouse Corp. 1975, "Westinghouse Mass Energy Release for Containment Design."6.2-32WCAP-8339, 1974, Burdelon, F. M.; Massie, H. W.; Zordum, J. A. "Westinghouse Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model - Summary."6.2-33WCAP-9220, 1978, "Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model."
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-97Rev. 306.2-34NUREG-1838, "Safety Evaluation Report Re lated to the License Renewal of the Millstone Power Station, Un its 2 and 3, Docket Nos. 50-336 and 50-423, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc." October 2005.6.2-35WCAP-8264-P-A, Rev. 1, August 1975 (Proprietary) and WCAP-8312-A, Rev. 2 (Nonproprietary), "Topical Report Westinghouse Mass and Energy Release Data Containment Design."6.2-36WCAP-12035, "Containment Subcompartment Analysis Utilizing Leak Before Break Technology for Watts Bar Units 1 and 2," November 1988.6.2-37WCAP-10325-P-A, May 1983 (Proprie tary), WCAP-10326-A (Nonproprietary), "Westinghouse LOCA Mass and Energy Release Model for Containment Design," March 1979 Version.6.2-38WCAP-8302, June 1974 (Proprietary), "SATAN VI Program: Comprehensive Space-Time Dependent Analysis of Loss-of Coolant."6.2-39WCAP-9220-P-A, February 1978 (Proprietary), Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model, February 1978 Version.6.2-40Dominion Topical Report, DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A, "GOTHI C Methodology for Analyzing the Response to Postulated Pipe Ruptur es Inside Containment," September 2006.6.2-41NRC Letter, "Kewaunee Power Station (Kewaunee), Millstone Power Station, Units Nos.
2 and 3 (Millstone 2 and 3), North Anna Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (North Anna 1 and 2) and Surry Power Station, Unit Nos.
1 and 2 (Surry 1 and 2) - Approval of Dominion's Topical Report DOM-NAF-3, "
GOTHIC Methodology for Analyzing the Response to Postulated Pipe Ruptures Inside Containment" (TAC Nos. MC8832, MC8833, MC8834, MC8835 and MC8836", dated August 30, 2006.6.2-42WCAP-8821-P-A (Proprie tary) and WCAP-8859-A (Nonproprietary), Land, R.E., "TRANFLO Steam Generator C ode Description," June 2001.6.2-43WCAP-8822 (Proprietary) and WCAP-8860 (Nonproprietary), Land R.E., "Mass and Energy Releases Following a Steam Line Rupture", September 1976; WCAP-8822-S1-P-A (Proprietary) and WCAP-8860-S1-A (Nonproprietary), Osborn, M.P. and Love, D.S. "Supplement 1 - Calculations of Steam Superheat in Mass/Energy Releases Following a Steam Line Rupture," September 1986; WC AP-8822-S2-P-A (Propr ietary) and WCAP-8860-S2-A (Nonproprietary), Butler, J.C. and Linn, P.A., "Supplement 2 - Impact of Steam Superheat in Mass/Energy Releases Following a Steam Line Rupture for Dry and Subatmospheric Containment Designs," September 1986.6.2-44WCAP-7907-P-A (Proprietary) and WCAP-7907-A (Nonproprietary), Burnett, T.W.T, McIntyre, C.J. and Buker, J.C., "L OFTRAN Code Description," April 1984.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-98Rev. 306.2-45WCAP-10586, June 1984, Technical Basis for Eliminating Large Primary Pipe Rupture as a Design Basis for Millstone Unit Three. 6.2-46Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter NSAL-11-5, "Westinghouse LOCA Mass and Energy Release Calculation Issues," July 25, 2011.
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-99Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-1 CONTAINMENT PEAK PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE RESULTS FOLLOWING A MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT Power Level
(%)Break Size (ft 2)Break TypeMass/Energy Assumed Failure (1) Entrainment (2)Pressure (3)Temperature (4)Peak (psia)Time (sec)Peak (°F)Time (sec)1021.4DERMSIVNo47.58150.3343.012.810214DERMSIVYes45.59126.2250.3120.21020.653SplitNo40.19290.2245.067.1 1020.653SplitMSIVNo42.02314.3245.067.7701.4DERMSIVNo48.2178.3341.312.8701.4DERMSIVYes45.54148.3248.6142.3 700.659SplitNo40.56332.3245.062.3700.659SplitMSIVNo42.51358.3247.9274.4301.4DERMSIVNo48.77158.2339.812.6 301.4DERMSIVYes45.01115.1246.4113.1300.671SplitNo42.21282.2248.5276.5300.671SplitMSIVNo44.24310.3252.7302.501.4DERMSIVNo52.85194.3338.112.601.4DERMSIVYes47.56140.2253.1138.300.512SplitNo44.92412.4253.4406.4 00.512SplitMSIVNo46.95444.4257.2438.5 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-100Rev. 30(1) All cases assume a MFIV failure. This column identifies whether the mass and energy release analysis also assumed an MSIV failure. The GOTHIC containment analyses assume the failure of an emergency bus to minimize containment cooling.(2) Identified cases with entrainment in the faulted loop steam generator assess the effect of this assumption.(3) Cases assume maximum initial containm ent pressure of 14.2 psia to maximize containment pressure.(4) Cases assume minimum initial containm ent pressure of 10.4 psia to maximize containment temperature.
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-101Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-2 PASSIVE HEAT SINKS (1) Case No.Case DescriptionArea Square FeetBeginning BoundarySlab DescriptionEnding BoundaryExposurePaint Coeff. BTUx(hr-ft 2-°F)WidthMaterialPaint Coeff. BTUx(hr-ft 2-°F)Exposure1Refueling Cavity Floor and Liner784Containment (2)0.450 in.Stainless Steel 1,000 Containment4.320 ftConcrete2Refueling Cavity Wall and Liner6,944Containment (2)0.450 in.Stainless Steel 1,000 Containment3.00 ft.Concrete3Interior Concrete120,58 4Containment1,0001.360 ft.Concrete0Insulated4Interior Concrete16,218Containment1,0002.11 ftConcrete0Insulated5Interior Concrete5,938Containment1,0003.00 ftConcrete0Insulated6Supporting Pedestals for SG1,815Containment1,0001.75 ftConcrete0Insulated7Containment Shell (above ground)34,827Containment1,0000.514 in.Carbon Steel1,000Atmosphere4.50 ftConcrete8Containment Shell (below ground)22,325Containment1,0000.514 in.Carbon Steel0Insulated4.50 ftConcrete9Containment Floor11,000Water1,0002.00 ftConcrete0Insulated0.250 in.Carbon Steel 10.0 ftConcrete10Containment Dome30,852Containment1,0000.554 in.Carbon Steel1,000Atmosphere2.56 ftConcrete MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-102Rev. 30(1) The containment analysis was performed utilizing the most up to date structural heat sink data for MPS-3 in accordance with the Millstone mass tracking program. Millstone Nuclear Power Station Common E ngineering Procedure C EN 114, "Containment Mass Tracking" provides instructi ons for reporting and tracking the amount and type of the identi fied changes to materials insi de containment as well as containment volume as a result of various design modifications.
The impact of variati ons in structural h eat sink data on containment analysis is routin ely evaluated prior to each design modification. If required, the analyses of record are reanalyzed and the associated documentation updated.(2) Surface is not painted.11Valves1,409Containment (2) 1.29 in.Stainless Steel0Insulated12Valves452Containment1,0000.710 in.Carbon Steel0Insulated13Piping Wall < 0.4 inches11,970Containment (2)0.240 in.Stainless Steel0Insulated14Piping Wall > 0.4 inches1,867Containment (2)0.658 in.Stainless Steel0Insulated15Piping Wall < 0.4 inches8,112Containment1,0000.277 in.Carbon Steel0Insulated16Piping Wall > 0.4 inches1,160Containment1,0000.990 in.Carbon Steel0Insulated17Structural Steel Supports, etc.
453,77 6Containment1,0000.218 in.Carbon Steel0Insulated18Racks, Ducts, and Misc.
Sinks 163,03 7Containment1,0000.113 in.Carbon Steel0Insulated19Equipment9,027Containment (2)0.365 in.Stainless Steel0Insulated20Equipment30,328Containment1,0000.781 in.Carbon Steel0InsulatedTABLE 6.2-2 PASSIVE HEAT SINKS (1) Case No.Case DescriptionArea Square FeetBeginning BoundarySlab DescriptionEnding BoundaryExposurePaint Coeff. BTUx(hr-ft 2-°F)WidthMaterialPaint Coeff. BTUx(hr-ft 2-°F)Exposure MPS3 UFSAR6.2-103Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-3 CONTAINMENT DESIGN EVALUATION PARAMETERS I. General Informati on - ContainmentA. Interior minimum design pressure (psia) 8.0B. Internal design pressure (psig45C. Containment liner design temperature (°F) 280D. Minimum free volume (ft
- 3) 2.26 x 10 6 E. Design leak rate (weight percent/day) 0.3II. Initial Conditions A. Reactor and Reactor Coolant System1. Reactor - maximum calculated power MWt 3,7232. Reactor coolant system volume (ft
- 3) (excluding pressurizer and surge line) 10,5973. Temperature (°F) (vessel average) 594.54. System pressure, maximum (psia) 2300B. Emergency Core Cooling System (Safety Injection Accumulators)1. Safety injection accumulat ors minimum water volume (ft 3/unit) 8852. Pressure range (psia) 636-6943. Temperature (°F) 80-120C. Containment 1. Pressure 10.4-14.22. Inside Temperature (°F) 75-1253. Outside Temperature (°F) 1034. Relative Humidity (percent) 0.0-1005. Service Water Temperature (°F) 33-80 (1) D. Refueling Water Storage Tank1. Minimum Usable Volume (gal) 1,072,886 (1) 2. RWST Temperature (°F)40-100 (1) NOTE:(1) These parameters are conservative for the c ontainment analysis but are not applicable for the Service Water System or Refueling Water Storage Tank Design. Design bases for these systems can be found in Technical Specifications 3/4.7.5 and 3/4.5.4, respectively.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-104Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-4 LOCA PEAK PRESSURE RESULTS Break Location Peak Pressure (psia) Time of Peak Pressure (sec) DE Hot Leg56.5321.13DE Pump Suction54.6321.21 Pump Suction (3 ft 2)51.7132.66DE Pump Discharge48.1216.82 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-105Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-5 LOCA PEAK PRESSURE - DEHL BREAK - IN ITIAL CO NDITION SENSITIVITY Initial Pressure (psia)Initial Temperature (°F)Initial RH (%)Peak Pressure (psia)14.21250 56.09 aa.The sensitivity studies were performed for the SPU project, and the conclusions remain valid for the current plant configuration. However, the results have not been updated from the SPU project. The limiting case reanalyzed with correct mass and energy data yields a peak pressure of 56.53 psia. 14.275056.0314.21255055.5714.2755055.86 14.212510055.1514.27510055.81 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-106Rev. 30
- Double Ended Hot Leg BreakTABLE 6.2-6 LOCA SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - CONTAINMENT PEAK PRESSURE Event Time (sec) Accident begins0.0CDA setpoint reached (10 psig)1.93
- Containment peak pressure occurs (56.53 psia) 21.13End of Blowdown23.6 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-107Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-6A LOCA PEAK TEMPERATURE RESULTS Break LocationPeak Temperature (°F)Time of Peak Temperature (sec)DE Hot Leg266.8920.83DE Pump Suction264.0721.12 Pump Suction (3 ft 2)258.9932.36DE Pump Discharge263.5716.82 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-108Rev. 30
- Double Ended Hot Leg Break TABLE 6.2-6B LOCA SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - CONTAINMENT PEAK TEMPERATURE EventTime (sec)Accident begins0.0CDA setpoint reached (10 psig)1.93
- Containment peak temp erature occurs (266.89
°F)20.83End of Blowdown23.6 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-109Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-6C LOCA - CONTAINMENT DEPRESSURIZATION RESULTS - DEPS - BREAK Initial Pressure (psia)Initial Temperature (°F)Initial Relative Humidity (%)Single FailurePressure at 1 Hour (psia)Pressure at 5 Hours (psia)14.27501 EDG28.5 22.6 a a.The sensitivity studies were performed for the SPU project, and the conclusions remain valid for the current plant configurat ion. However, the results have not been updated from the SPU project. The limiting case reanalyzed with corrected mass and energy data yields a pressure of 25.1 psia at 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. 14.212501 EDG30.222.114.275501 EDG28.422.310.4125501 EDG2516.914.2750MCC22.422.5Initial Pressure (psia)Initial Temperature (°F)Initial Relative Humidity (%)Single FailurePressure at 1 Hour (psia)Pressure at 5 Hours (psia)14.27501 EDG28.625.1 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-110Rev. 30
- Double Ended Pump Suction BreakTABLE 6.2-6D LOCA SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - CONTAINMENT DEPRESSURIZATION EventTime (sec)Accident begins0.0* Containment peak pressure occurs (54.62 psia)21.2End of Blowdown25.8
Safety Injection becomes effective45.5Quench spray becomes effective71.9Recirculation spray become effective5105
Switchover to recirculation mode5855Quench spray terminates10907 Maximum post-Quench Spray peak pressure occurs (25.2 psia)15709 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-111Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-6E LOCA-CONTAINMENT SUMP WATER TEMPERATURE AT RSS PUMP START Break Type Single Active FailureInitial Containment Pressure (psia)
Initial Containment Temperature (°F)RWST Temperature (°F)Sump Temperature at RSS Start (°F)Double ended pump discharge1EDG14.2125100221.2Double ended pump suction1EDG14.2125100 230.7 aa.Limiting sump temperature case based upon a 100
°F RWST temperature was re-run using an 80
°F RWST temperature. Other cases should experience a similar sump temperature reduction. Double ended pump suction1EDG14.212580 220.6 (1) Double ended hot leg1EDG14.2125100187.9Pump suction - 3 square feet1EDG14.2125100211.9 Cold leg slot break - 8 inches1EDG14.2125100199.7Hot leg slot break - 8 inches1EDG14.2125100190.9 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-112Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-6F LOCA-ACCIDENT CHRONOLO GY FOR PUMP SUCTION DOUBLE ENDED RUPTURE-LIMITING CASE FOR CONTAINMENT SUMP TEMPERATURE EventTime (sec)Accident begins0.0Containment peak pressure occurs21.51 End of Blowdown25.8 Nitrogen accumulator injects26.6Safety Injection actuates45.5Quench spray actuates72.1 RHS auto setpoint actuates4,366RSS pump flow begins4,535 Switchover to recirculation completed5,270Quench spray terminates11,390 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-113Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-6G ACCIDENT CHRONOLOGY FOR FULL DOUBLE-ENDED RUPTURE MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK AT 0% POWER-LIMITING CASE FOR CONTAINMENT PRESSURE Time (sec)Event0.0Accident occurs, ruptured steam gene rator and turbine plant piping blowdown into containment begins0.47Steam Line Isolation setpoint for closing the MSIV and FWIV is reached4.0Containment pressure setpoint for spray initiation is reached7.47FWIV is fully closed12.47MSIV is fully closed74.24Quench spray enters containment atmosphere194.3Peak containment pressure is reached 1800.0AFW is isolated by operator action1801.6Steam release to containment ends MPS3 UFSAR6.2-114Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-6H ACCIDENT CHRONOLOGY FOR FULL DOUBLE-ENDED RUPTURE MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK AT 102% POWER-LIMITING CASE FOR CONTAINMENT TEMPERTURE Time (sec)Event0.0Accident occurs, ruptured steam gene rator and turbine plant piping blowdown into containment begins0.73Steam Line Isolation setpoint for closing the MSIV and FWIV is reached6.06Containment pressure setpoint for spray initiation is reached7.73FWIV is fully closed12.73MSIV is fully closed12.81Peak containment temperature is reached76.34Quench spray enters containment atmosphere1800.0AFW is isolated by operator action1802.0Steam release to containment ends MPS3 UFSAR6.2-115Rev. 30 Notes:Core thermal power, RCS total flow rate, RCS coolant temperatures, and steam generator secondary side mass incl ude appropriate uncertain ty and/or allowance.a. RCS coolant temperatures include +4.0
°F allowance for instrume nt error and deadband and a +1.0
°F bias.b. Does not include accumulator line volume.TABLE 6.2-7 SYSTEM PARAMETERS INIT IAL CONDITIONS FOR LOCA MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE ANALYSIS ParametersValueCore Thermal Power (MWt)3650.0RCS Total Flow Rate (Lbm/sec)37,343.6Vessel Outlet Temperature (a) (°F)627.6Core Inlet Temperature (a) (°F)561.4Vessel Average Temperature (a) (°F)594.5Initial Steam Generator Steam Pressure (psia)948Steam Generator DesignFSGTP (%)0Initial Steam Generator Secondary Side Mass (Lbm)128,622.0AccumulatorWater volume (ft
- 3) per accumulator (minimum) (b) 884.7 N 2 cover gas pressure (psia) (minimum)664.7Temperature (°F)120SI start time, (sec) [total time from beginning of event, which includes the maximum delay from reaching the setpoint 45.3 Auxiliary Feedwater Flow (gpm/steam generator) (Minimum Safeguards)0 Auxiliary Feedwater Flow (gpm/steam generator) (Maximum Safeguards)0 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-116Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-7A LOCA MASS AND ENERGY ANALYSIS CORE DECAY HEAT FRACTION Time (sec)Decay Heat Gen eration Rate (Btu/Btu)100.053876150.050401200.048018 400.042401600.039244800.037065 1000.0354661500.0327242000.030936 4000.0270786000.0249318000.023389 10000.02215615000.01992120000.018315 40000.01478160000.01304080000.012000 10,0000.01126215,0000.01009720,0000.009350 40,0000.0777860,0000.00695880,0000.006424 100,0000.006021150,0000.005323200,0000.004847400,0000.003770 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-117Rev. 30600,0000.003201800,0000.0028341,000,0000.0025802,000,0000.001909 4,000,0000.001355TABLE 6.2-7A LOCA MASS AND ENERGY ANALYSIS CORE DECAY HEAT FRACTION Time (sec)Decay Heat Gen eration Rate (Btu/Btu)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-118Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-8 DOUBLE ENDED HOT LEG BREAK BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)0.00.00.00.00.00.00147795.431187.647794.131185.8 0.142089.22774627283.5177620.237063.524362.624082.915581.70.33631523799.121267.413572.7 0.435130.823005.119907.4124760.534461.722564.819100.511760.20.634401.122532.318577.511262 0.734011.522320.718189.310886.70.833265.321907.717912.910609.10.932508.621507.717702.310392.8 1.032122.321369.217535.910218.51.131782.62127017459.710109.31.231368.721113.117463.710055.2 1.330819.220857.117509.110031.41.430179.620527.817581.510028.71.529585.820215.817666.310039.2 1.629101.919971.117755.9100581.728662.719752.417840.710079.41.828141.719468.817910.510097.3 1.927520.519101.717959.610108.52.026889.618717.517989.410112.72.126354.81839518000.310109.92.225888.818118.917994.210100.42.325421.617834.417969.110082.6 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-119Rev. 302.424937.217527.517924.910056.22.524445.517205.117863.610021.72.623999.616907.917788.49980.63 2.723612.416650.817701.89934.122.823255.116410.617607.698842.922900.716164.7175019827.5 3.02257815935.817388.29767.833.122263.415705.717266.69703.513.221987.415498.817141.29637.08 3.321743.115311.917010.79567.943.421517.315133.816878.19497.63.521317.614971.216740.99424.62 3.621135.614818.216601.99350.593.720972.114675.716460.49275.033.820825.814543.516314.79197.19 3.920702.214426.7161699119.194.020600.114324.116016.49037.334.220488.614185.6156058813.46 4.42037114048.815167.48576.814.620262.613939.814752.58354.854.820178.11386114473.18211.46 5.020107.613784.314163.78047.925.220114.413725.713698.27794.135.420178.413691.413337.57602.615.620262.513659.212990.97418.655.820387.513640.3126737250.68TABLE 6.2-8 DOUBLE ENDED HOT LEG BREAK BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-120Rev. 306.020553.513636.612378.67094.926.220763.913658.412069.96929.536.421016.413701.211771.46769.89 6.621350.113786.211493.86621.866.81455610347.511221.66476.467.016475.511454.310956.76334.12 7.216605.61147210692.36191.757.41666111428.710458.96066.947.616756.811430.510224.25939.91 7.816796.111400.29992.515814.228.016842.6113539771.095694.368.216933.311370.69556.075578.08 8.416927.711318.49346.135464.538.616937.711265.29136.245350.98.816985.311240.18930.955240.13 9.017004.511205.38729.35131.629.216691.110984.98527.15022.929.416754.610968.58327.724916.06 9.616817.310955.48128.624809.949.816852.410930.27933.44706.2810.016831.810875.27740.254604.09 10.216779.310805.47551.134504.4310.416692.610719.67365.354406.9210.616563.810613.37180.424310.1910.816386.810484.17001.594217.1411.016157.610329.16823.024124.43TABLE 6.2-8 DOUBLE ENDED HOT LEG BREAK BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-121Rev. 3011.215887.610154.96647.974034.0511.415597.79972.916476.873946.1511.615306.19792.526310.43861.16 11.815021.39618.716148.793778.9912.014739.99449.145992.513699.9812.214456.59281.335842.573624.37 12.414165.29111.685697.333551.3212.613864.58939.445557.783481.2512.813554.58764.525422.353413.33 13.0132408589.535292.773348.4913.212922.88415.375167.883286.0713.4126048242.885046.813225.6 13.612284.78072.584929.643167.1613.811964.87904.794815.273110.2114.011646.67740.794704.873055.27 14.211328.57579.524598.043002.1214.410997.67413.964493.212949.8114.610632.17233.74386.252896.45 14.810240.57042.954273.692840.4115.09822.796841.574148.262779.0115.29392.246636.914007.082711.84 15.48949.26425.383851.262639.6315.68456.376162.983674.972558.1115.87166.785786.123497.552476.2716.06348.185511.533317.72390.9916.25737.025201.313139.232304.18TABLE 6.2-8 DOUBLE ENDED HOT LEG BREAK BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-122Rev. 3016.45259.754910.092967.812222.2316.64863.214659.342805.682146.1116.84532.784443.572649.882075.1 17.04284.664247.942500.912008.9417.24043.494061.982360.031947.817.43805.063865.942228.41890.51 17.63547.563666.192104.031837.0517.83272.063469.811987.131787.7218.02988.863268.811878.91742.58 18.22705.923066.821774.671701.2818.424502868.181681.051658.7418.62244.072678.571588.911622.82 18.82106.832548.371489.731584.0219.02000.772445.541400.31545.5819.21912.512333.41317.81499.94 19.41825.292230.411256.71454.9419.61727.512116.451205.711412.7719.81622.441993.681164.331375.66 20.01532.621885.161141.231358.8720.21447.221782.911102.091319.7320.41361.411681.651064.531279.33 20.61267.891575.971035.651248.8720.81192.961486.35990.231203.1121.01117.621397.21916.341122.5221.21038.321300.3844.531039.0221.4968.661216.12788.94973.58TABLE 6.2-8 DOUBLE ENDED HOT LEG BREAK BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-123Rev. 30(1) Mass and energy released on the vessel side of the break.(2) Mass and energy released on the broken loop steam gene rator side of the break.21.6899.271127.21736.05910.321.8851.791068.32614.87760.422.0815.771021.15543.08675 22.2787.71978.98432.07537.8522.4765.06944.16378.25472.2122.6744.05915.75342.57429.03 22.8723.57891.73308.08385.8123.0496.84629.76174.13218.9323.2169.74216.45149.68189.62 23.40.00.091.4116.123.60.00.00.00.0TABLE 6.2-8 DOUBLE ENDED HOT LEG BREAK BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-124Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-9 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)0.00.00.00.00.00.00188648.54944942509.523658.5 0.141996.323442.321623.312021.70.242487.923874.924076.613397.40.343176.224484.824423.713602.8 0.443978.125224.723738.613234.70.544539.325860.622689.612659.40.64451626159.821810.612174.3 0.743684.725951.721036.5117450.84235325404.220417.711401.60.940930.424764.420001.111172.9 1.03959924148.819765.7110441.138436.613616.819625.510967.61.237482.223199.319538.410919.8 1.336689.922874.819478.510886.61.435987.922605.419434.310861.61.535338.422367.81940710845.7 1.634678.122129.819398.910840.51.733989.621881.219398.310839.61.83324721604.519381.210829.3 1.932360.121237.719338.410804.42.031453.620854.719273.910767.42.130505.720434.819182.610715.62.22954319997.119072.310653.42.328563.719534.418923.410569.8 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-125Rev. 302.427427.618942.918724.410458.22.525805.917990.118261.6101982.623651.916622.717966.810034.2 2.721395.115147.617740.49908.442.820574.614679.817496.19772.482.919461.813948.617244.19632.46 3.018363.413218.217002.29498.523.11741512586.316793.79383.73.216473.411948.316606.39280.88 3.315616.811368.516423.29180.483.414888.31087816259.49091.13.514307.210490.216110.89010.36 3.613841.810180.215965.48931.353.713459.89923.7615829.18857.553.813146.49712.2215706.58791.51 3.912873.59526.1815586.98727.114.012625.79354.2215468.18663.134.212211.29060.9115259.78551.69 4.411887.38821.215046.48437.534.6116448629.314843.58329.344.811455.88469.2514648.58225.69 5.011323.78345.6314482.58138.235.211265.48270.1514331.48058.845.411240.48214.6215583.38772.625.611205.48153.2315490.98723.825.811191.98107.815473.68720.84TABLE 6.2-9 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-126Rev. 306.011208.98085.0815342.28651.596.211201.68050.6515202.78578.46.411151.57994.95150568500.69 6.611075.27927.8414892.58412.966.810983.1785514714.98316.687.010869.17772.5614556.58230.29 7.210751.47693.814444.38169.167.410646.27623.0914381.68134.557.610549.17550.6814251.88059.92 7.810506.57504.214106.37976.338.010705.17607.9513999.27915.268.210470.97638.914013.77923.41 8.49274.327338.8713808.87804.538.68736.477031.58136027686.418.88709.416957.113432.77592.88 9.08740.756892.8813321.27531.99.28758.586826.6413142.47429.939.48808.096784.3212948.87319.52 9.68867.986742.6912824.87249.249.88921.63669912677.97165.310.089736659.9612506.37067.25 10.29002.726613.0112375.96992.9210.4018999.626554.0712239.46914.9210.4028999.536553.7212238.56914.4410.4038999.456553.3712237.66913.9410.68973.896490.9512093.66831.63TABLE 6.2-9 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-127Rev. 3010.88922.246418.4411964.56757.9611.08843.096336.15118356684.1911.28741.276247.211707.86611.74 11.48622.776154.4211584.86541.6811.68491.986059.7111464.76473.4311.88347.965961.6411347.66406.912.08202.985868.211232.26341.3812.28056.375776.9211118.36276.8112.47906.665685.4811006.86213.68 12.67759.675598.0310897.16151.5712.87615.515514.1410786.86089.1213.07473.245432.5410679.86028.69 13.27333.435353.5210573.15968.4113.47197.45277.3410465.65907.7613.67064.485203.1110361.45849 13.86935.795131.5310256.55789.9114.06806.675060.510156.75733.8814.26685.484996.5610051.55674.7 14.46563.854930.19946.295615.8614.66441.214860.659830.145551.1414.86310.694784.449693.585475.4 15.061724700.999558.165401.4315.26031.554612.189422.535327.7515.45899.944523.439293.195257.1515.65783.944440.39172.445190.8115.85680.864362.79057.485127.56TABLE 6.2-9 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-128Rev. 3016.05590.94292.458953.65070.7516.25509.854228.238851.695015.3816.45435.364170.288756.444964.63 16.65363.614117.168660.744914.5116.85291.874067.538567.84867.0617.05219.584021.328475.194816.3 17.25144.393976.958332.734722.7817.45040.413917.368177.694602.5817.64882.423829.828048.124469.99 17.84678.693717.797885.244294.8818.04461.983597.447783.244142.2218.24251.113474.267462.813881.05 18.44082.743368.387251.543689.2518.63974.233290.336872.953443.6518.83896.583264.996634.763282.93 19.03740.843262.646334.693100.919.23492.523245.396049.462929.2419.43217.033219.365781.052772.52 19.62940.743179.645515.572623.8119.82684.963113.715085.552394.4420.02465.892988.994716.142165.32 20.22240.212756.514415.941962.5920.42057.892546.354328.331862.0320.61888.292344.74485.31878.8820.81717.82139.25286.872177.1121.01566.151955.55205.412124.82TABLE 6.2-9 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-129Rev. 30(1) Mass and energy exiting the stea m generator side of the break.(2) Mass and energy exiting the pump side of the break.21.21459.321826.313939.961599.0721.41370.241717.73407.61381.0521.61286.231615.032759.731113.19 21.81191.641498.082325.58896.6122.01090.051372.752748.16985.6922.2997.731258.123760.491289.5 22.4909.181147.854614.161543.8622.6817.451033.724519.491489.2422.8731.88926.834052.761321.82 23.0653.99828.943613.11167.1723.2584.19741.173289.881051.0823.4534.38678.623028.83954.76 23.6487.95619.832784.66864.7823.8417.96531.332525.85772.2924.0357.36454.682246.42676.28 24.2311.62396.82013.5596.9624.2313.89399.951773.15517.9924.6301.06383.741541.2443.82 24.8179.82229.321279.52363.525.091.75117.32993.5327925.21.62.06694.06193.25 25.40.00.0374.46103.925.60.00.0169.8147.1825.80.00.00.00.0TABLE 6.2-9 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-130Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-10 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)0.00.00.00.00.00.00188648.54944942509.523658.5 0.141996.323442.321623.312021.70.242487.923874.924076.613397.40.343176.224484.824423.713602.8 0.443978.125224.723738.613234.70.544539.325860.622689.612659.40.64451626159.821810.612174.3 0.743684.725951.421036.5117450.84235325404.220417.711401.60.940930.424764.420001.111172.9 1.03959924148.819765.7110441.138436.623616.819625.510967.61.237482.223199.319538.410919.8 1.336689.922874.819478.510886.61.435987.922605.419434.310861.61.535338.422367.81940710845.7 1.634678.122129.819398.910840.51.733989.621881.219398.310839.61.83324721604.519381.210829.3 1.932360.121237.719338.410804.42.031453.620854.719273.910767.42.130505.720434.819182.610715.62.22954319997.119072.310653.42.328563.719534.418923.410569.8 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-131Rev. 302.427427.618942.918724.410458.22.525805.917990.118261.6101982.623651.916622.717966.810034.2 2.721395.115147.617740.49908.442.820574.614679.817496.19772.482.919461.813948.617244.19632.46 3.018363.413218.217002.29498.523.11741512586.316793.79383.73.216473.411948.316606.39280.88 3.315616.811368.516423.29180.483.414888.31087816259.49091.13.514307.210490.216110.89010.36 3.613841.810180.215965.48931.353.713459.89923.7615829.18857.553.813146.49712.2215706.58791.51 3.912873.59526.1815586.98727.114.012625.79354.2215468.18663.134.212211.29060.915259.78551.69 4.411887.38821.215046.48437.534.6116448629.314843.58329.344.811455.88469.2514648.58225.69 5.011323.78345.6314482.58138.235.211265.48270.1514331.48058.845.411240.48214.6215583.38772.625.611205.48153.2315490.98723.825.811191.98107.815473.68720.84TABLE 6.2-10 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-132Rev. 306.011208.98085.0815342.28651.596.211201.68050.6515202.78578.46.411151.57994.95150568500.69 6.611075.27927.8414892.58412.966.810983.1785514714.98316.687.010869.17772.5614556.58230.29 7.210751.47693.814444.38169.167.410646.27623.0914381.68134.557.610549.17550.6814251.88059.92 7.810506.57504.214106.37976.338.010705.17607.9513999.27915.268.210470.97638.914013.77923.41 8.49374.327338.8713808.87804.538.68736.477031.58136027686.418.88709.416957.113432.77592.88 9.08740.756892.8813321.27531.99.28758.586826.6413142.47429.939.48808.096784.3212948.87319.52 9.68867.986742.6912824.87249.249.88921.63669912677.97165.310.089736659.9612506.37067.25 10.29002.726613.0112375.96992.9210.4018999.626554.0712239.46914.9210.4028999.536553.7212238.56914.4410.4038999.456553.3712237.66913.9410.68973.896490.9512093.66831.63TABLE 6.2-10 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-133Rev. 3010.88922.246418.4411964.56757.9611.08843.096336.15118356684.1911.28741.276247.211707.86611.74 11.48622.776154.4211584.86541.6811.68491.986059.7111464.76473.4311.88347.965961.6411347.66406.912.08202.985868.211232.26341.3812.28056.375776.9211118.36276.8112.47906.665685.4811006.86213.68 12.67759.675598.0310897.16151.5712.87615.515514.1410786.86089.1213.07473.245432.5410679.86028.7 13.27333.435353.5210573.15968.4113.47197.45277.3410465.65907.7613.67064.485203.1110361.45849 13.86935.795131.5310256.55789.9114.06806.675060.510156.75733.8814.26685.484996.5610051.55674.7 14.46563.854930.19946.295615.8614.66441.214860.659830.145551.1414.86310.694784.449693.585475.4 15.061724700.999558.165401.4315.26031.554612.189422.535327.7515.45899.944523.439293.195257.1515.65783.944440.39172.445190.8115.85680.864362.79057.485127.56TABLE 6.2-10 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-134Rev. 3016.05590.94292.458953.65070.7516.25509.854228.238851.695015.3816.45435.364170.288756.444964.63 16.65363.614117.168660.744914.5116.85291.874067.548567.84867.0617.05219.584021.328475.194816.3 17.25144.393976.958332.734722.7817.45040.413917.368177.694602.5817.64882.423829.828048.124469.99 17.84678.693717.797885.244294.8818.04461.983597.447783.244142.2218.24251.113474.267462.813881.05 18.44082.743368.387251.543689.2518.63974.233290.336872.953443.6518.83896.583264.996634.763282.93 19.03740.843262.646334.693100.919.23492.523245.396049.462929.2419.43217.033219.365781.052772.52 19.62940.743179.645515.572623.8119.82684.963113.715085.552394.4420.02465.892988.994716.142165.32 20.22240.212756.514415.941962.5920.42057.892546.354328.331862.0320.61888.292344.74485.31878.8820.81717.82139.25286.872177.1121.01566.151955.55205.412124.82TABLE 6.2-10 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-135Rev. 30(1) Mass and energy exiting the stea m generator side of the break.(2) Mass and energy exiting the pump side of the break.21.21459.321826.313939.961599.0721.41370.241717.73407.61381.0521.61286.231615.032759.731113.19 21.81191.641498.082325.58896.6122.01090.051372.752748.16985.6922.2997.731258.123760.491289.5 22.4909.181147.854614.161543.8622.6817.451033.724519.491489.2422.8731.88926.834052.761321.82 23.0653.99828.943613.11167.1723.2584.19741.173289.881051.0823.4534.38678.623028.83654.76 23.6487.95619.832784.66864.7823.8417.96531.332525.85772.2924.0357.36454.682246.42676.28 24.2311.62396.82013.5596.9624.4313.89399.951773.15517.9924.6301.06383.741541.2443.82 24.8179.82229.321279.52363.525.091.75117.32993.5327925.21.62.06694.06193.25 25.40.00.0374.46103.925.60.00.0169.8147.1825.80.00.00.00.0TABLE 6.2-10 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-136Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-11 DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOW BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)00.00.00.00.00.00131491.517526.731490.117525.3 0.0023347718632.633383.718578.20.126504.114755.759777.333425.10.223883.113323.160699.633947.2 0.323446.713085.158792.632871.70.423218.112960.458688.632812.30.523006.612849.558552.532735.7 0.622830.312764.357754.332285.80.72273812733.256081.931347.60.82264512707.555514.831026.1 0.922459.712634.354544.730483.71.022217.512532.353725.330028.91.121952.612420.853848.230109.7 1.221681.912307.952800.6295421.321479.212235.651646.628917.41.421287.112170.350396.428238.7 1.521106.712111.249527.227770.11.620877.412022.849067.227531.41.720665.311942.748639.727314.3 1.820526.61190446704.426257.71.920450.211900.445059253602.020342.811876.744151.224869.72.1200061171742901.124180.72.219660.111548.841970.823670.3 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-137Rev. 302.318957.811165.641141.223219.22.417776.710495.840007.622598.82.5168109948.1939586.622378.4 2.615958.69464.5637290.221095.12.715227.39049.0137277.921097.52.814634.38713.0136793.320829.7 2.914155.98444.2536361.220592.23.013813.68256.3535597.820168.13.113556.88119.5834636.519632 3.213326.47998.863451419568.83.313094.77877.8334171.219378.93.412864.97759.2133633.219075.8 3.512645.47648.553275918578.73.612438.57548.223137917791.33.712246.77459.8929712.616838.7 3.812056.67376.0328294.716024.73.911863.47294.0427570.415604.74.011672.97217.4227230.315405 4.211299.67080.4226632.8150604.410902.26940.426200.914813.34.610502.76804.2725891.914641 4.810072.26639.8825669.514519.35.09692.686490.9525437.214395.75.29367.96635125118.314230.95.49098.446220.712482914099.35.68852.486086.8924679.514034.8TABLE 6.2-11 DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOW BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-138Rev. 305.88655.35985.0124536.813972.36.08446.375888.0624222.213822.86.28199.085781.322387813662.2 6.47915.95657.5323481.613478.46.67612.495514.7223162.413346.16.87333.315375.1522786.213189 7.07078.875235.5322419.8130337.26848.615094.4322048.412862.47.46653.14960.2521670.82683.7 7.66488.24831.862129312510.27.86353.494709.220920.2123428.06265.714607.4620905.212405.9 8.26322.254599.8320287.212151.58.46366.194568.6320095.912103.98.66536.024644.6819629.711936.8 8.86630.854748.7419150.811818.99.06422.234765.5418691.311728.49.25934.314646.0517387.711177.1 9.45452.944433.241622410705.79.65181.634242.8514897.910143.89.85050.154104.313649.79605.4710.04971.464000.1112669.29116.2510.24888.683898.2311834.98715.2810.44822.213822.1610885.38287.7710.64750.593755.1410473.38063.8510.80054667.23690.73100477826.43TABLE 6.2-11 DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOW BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-139Rev. 3010.80154666.83690.4610045.97825.5410.80244666.43690.1810044.77824.6610.803346663689.8910043.67823.77 10.80424665.643689.6410042.67822.9811.05153.883676.889819.687659.1511.26373.423836.979630.267474.45 11.46774.253835.039462.27311.5811.66791.363767.549285.447150.5711.86702.663691.29157.827007.1312.06596.523625.179033.746867.9812.26479.533561.78925.226739.0412.46353.083495.078821.576614.4 12.66232.153428.38717.996495.8512.86122.393364.888610.296380.2613.06020.673305.688489.776263.41 13.25926.53251.558323.756135.9813.45835.173200.198164.786006.0513.65743.963149.898030.725869.16 13.85646.633095.927807.895675.1114.05531.023029.447424.335415.8714.25398.192957.096928.735137.33 14.45248.312886.646378.054862.1114.65079.262815.715995.04460914.84898.562744.635831.814379.6815.04717.062676.535440.084237.3315.24550.682621.395627.924009.25TABLE 6.2-11 DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOW BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-140Rev. 3015.44391.652562.65171.013898.9215.64250.772493.375631.93659.6415.84157.532470.535231.273470.83 16.04032.372455.615346.623293.8916.23687.52211.825037.863082.1716.43253.711714.765031.472892.26 16.63256.081652.114872.272741.416.83202.871565.614700.972586.6917.03152.511499.84729.552427.45 17.23107.831445.234930.982346.8917.43057.731388.095075.742296.0817.63002.031329.435168.262250.61 17.82949.431275.295182.792189.5118.02892.351216.935131.772110.0418.22844.611165.895022.32013.21 18.42793.141111.374868.511905.4318.62740.481058.644676.51789.5918.82690.391007.334471.311674.23 19.02645.04958.554291.811573.7619.22591.22905.274187.341503.3419.42542.69855.614086.741436.68 19.62476.46801.223958.391362.6719.82402.47745.033833.771291.3620.02304.63684.763724.761227.0520.22153.9613.633612.061163.6620.41846.61505.393506.011104.46TABLE 6.2-11 DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOW BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-141Rev. 30(1) Mass and energy exiting the br oken loop side of the break.(2) Mass and energy exiting the vessel side of the break.20.61346.78355.33428.111055.8120.80.00.03376.541016.721.00.00.03395.61999.4 21.20.00.03396.02978.5321.40.00.03377.7955.6521.60.00.03822.431053.02 21.80.00.04305.791152.4222.00.00.04138.911084.7722.20.00.03244.48836.36 22.40.00.01964.81500.9222.60.00.00.00.0TABLE 6.2-11 DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOW BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-142Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-12 DELETED BY PACK AGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-143Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-13 3.0 FT 2 PUMP SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec)0.00.00.0 0.00124452.413609.70.1343402.224243.10.2543326.224292.7 0.3841771.823538.50.540778.723115.80.6339474.622519.2 0.7538218.621939.10.8837170.421463.21.036365.121107.6 1.1335771.9208551.253533720681.41.3834848.220467.8 1.534307.2202141.6333797.719970.11.7533444.419813.6 1.8833056.819635.22.032380.319283.42.1331689.618921.1 2.2530888.818490.22.3829970.6179882.528788.517325.5 2.6327854.816805.92.7527647.616725.82.8827353.116596.93.026963.716411.23.1326519.716189.8 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-144Rev. 303.2526093.715971.43.3825723.515786.4 3.525364.515612.33.6324972.615418.53.7524576.615216 3.8824231.9150394.023916.414879.84.2523238.814524.5 4.522677.214205.44.7522105.313859.34.021613.513534.1 5.2521191.113242.65.520827.112988.75.7520593.312800.8 6.020806.1128236.2520679.3127196.520535.212596.1 6.7520311.512449.87.020041.512290.87.2519823.112159 7.519652.912068.27.7519542.312000.58.019480.111950.4 8.2519445.111913.48.519427.211890.38.7519456.111894.99.019749.612168.5TABLE 6.2-13 3.0 FT 2 PUMP SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-145Rev. 309.251956111874.49.519434.711803.6 9.751970411618.610.018616.411420.810.25117926.511118.8 10.25317920.811116.110.517331.810848.710.7516911.110648.311.016696.510526.511.2516565.310443.511.516465.310361.9 11.7516363.810287.312.016216.510197.112.2516090.710119.4 12.515952.210035.312.7515824.39951.3913.0157239875.63 13.25156469811.3913.515588.39757.4213.7515536.79707.59 14.015480.59654.9314.2515420.19600.1714.515356.29544.22 14.7515288.29487.4315.015215.59429.6915.2515135.29369.8715.515045.99306.69TABLE 6.2-13 3.0 FT 2 PUMP SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-146Rev. 3015.7514947.69240.6616.014840.89171.17 16.2514728.79100.0216.514612.49028.0716.7514493.98955.93 17.014370.28881.8717.2514243.18806.9917.514113.38731.57 17.7513982.68656.491813823.78564.818.25136958492.4 18.5135618417.5718.7513428.18344.0619.013293.98270.23 19.25131608197.1719.513025.28123.9819.75128918051.54 20.0127577979.5920.25126237907.9620.512489.77836.99 20.7512356.27766.221.012224.37696.5321.2512092.27627.02 21.511959.77557.621.7511828.97489.3622.011695.17419.722.2511558.27348.28TABLE 6.2-13 3.0 FT 2 PUMP SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-147Rev. 3022.511406.27268.6722.7511235.47180.15 23.011044.97080.8323.2510849.26979.423.510662.56881.52 23.7510489.16788.6724.010332.66702.5624.2510188.56621.49 24.510053.36545.0524.759921.866471.4225.09792.186400.26 25.259606.496301.2525.59384.856168.5125.759149.586033.59 26.08903.245901.2126.258633.355762.0226.58343.025612.53 26.758078.185458.2227.07880.185311.7227.257750.125176.58 27.57760.455093.0927.757732.54998.9228.07591.844857.86 28.257393.824703.5828.57190.064561.728.756875.444394.2129.06477.334206.86TABLE 6.2-13 3.0 FT 2 PUMP SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-148Rev. 3029.256045.674012.4929.55618.823820.8 29.755224.083641.6730.04854.53477.330.254541.263342.69 30.54286.983229.3430.753971.113084.4231.03704.722950.72 31.253536.112837.9331.53458.672740.2231.753395.352641.54 32.03366.262549.1732.253269.152436.2432.53004.52287.62 32.753090.132205.2933.03213.12099.5633.253014.921929.97 33.52475.671711.0333.752399.581617.6334.02373.681548.27 34.252136.361408.834.51926.51273.2734.751808.991145.88 35.01541.131006.4835.251337.12894.4835.51301.37804.1235.751075.41678.78TABLE 6.2-13 3.0 FT 2 PUMP SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-149Rev. 3036.0805.6583.3736.25648.72525.06 36.5589.02489.0136.75543.04462.937.0529.54438.01 37.25452.27415.6737.5437.9397.2637.75441.45387.37 38.0433.65374.5338.25425.98366.0438.5406.48356.82 38.75520.83356.3539.0633.38363.8739.251356.34493.68 39.51667.62577.7439.751587.22545.6440.01366.94469.72 40.251149.94403.3640.5938.35352.4740.75756.15306.73 41.0611.49268.1841.25481.19231.2741.5352194.1 41.75221.58156.1842.087.39108.4142.250.00.0TABLE 6.2-13 3.0 FT 2 PUMP SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path No. 1Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-150Rev. 30(1) Mass and energy released on the vessel side of the break. (2) Mass and energy released on the broken loop steam generator side of the break. TABLE 6.2-14 DOUBLE ENDED HOT LEG MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path 1 (1) Break Path 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)23.6122.5143.90.00.023.80.00.00.00.0 23.90.00.00.00.024.2610.7450.40.00.024.2383.5448.70.00.0 271437.3694.90.00.030.42236.7873.40.00.033.62535.2937.51921.4184.9 50.02198.4829.31586.7138.750.62184.5825.1157413751.22170.5779.70.00.0 62.3904.95350.00.071.8549462.20.00.0100.0465.4426.20.00.0 128.6386393.50.00.0166.8383.53710.00.0 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-151Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-15 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 25.80.00.00.00.0 26.280.00.00.00.0 26.480.00.00.00.026.580.00.00.00.026.680.00.00.00.0 26.780.00.00.00.026.8530.1535.430.00.026.9635.9642.270.00.0 27.0619.3722.770.00.027.1620.9924.670.00.027.2627.8832.760.00.0 27.3635.1341.280.00.027.4639.3746.270.00.027.5643.651.240.00.0 27.6647.5655.90.00.027.7651.3160.310.00.027.8654.8864.50.00.0 27.9658.2968.510.00.028.0661.5672.360.00.028.1463.9375.150.00.0 28.1664.7176.060.00.028.2667.7479.640.00.028.3670.6883.090.00.028.4673.5386.440.00.028.5676.2989.690.00.0 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-152Rev. 3028.6678.9892.860.00.0 28.7681.695.930.00.028.8684.1598.940.00.0 29.86106.82125.630.00.030.86125.87148.070.00.031.87327.11386.433649.11497.55 32.64427.63506.394783.68687.1532.94429.64508.824801.21693.5833.94424.78503.024756.01690.71 34.94417.78494.644688.76683.3535.94410.47485.894617.08675.1236.94403.16477.154544.43666.6 37.34400.27473.74515.5663.1837.94395.99468.584472.41658.0638.94389.02460.264401.78649.61 39.94382.3452.224332.92641.3340.94375.81444.474266.03633.2641.94369.57437.024201.16625.42 42.94363.56429.854138.32617.843.54360.07425.684101.57613.3443.94357.78422.954077.47610.41 44.94352.23416.324018.55603.2545.99378.11447.184335.02625.746.99372.89440.964280.9619.347.99367.99435.14230.2613.0148.99363.26429.454181.01606.89TABLE 6.2-15 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-153Rev. 3049.99358.69423.994133.27600.95 50.49356.46421.334109.92598.0450.99256.59302.82649.97468.71 51.99396.99469.68315.95224.9252.99392.37464.19313.75222.0753.99382.67452.6309.34216 54.99373.23441.32305.07210.1155.99364430.3300.9204.3856.99355.32419.96296.99199.01 57.89348.24411.5293.8194.6357.99347.47410.59293.45194.1658.99339.97401.64290.09189.54 59.99332.79393.08286.87185.1460.99325.9384.88283.79180.9361.99319.3377.01280.85176.91 62.99312.96369.46278.03173.0663.99306.88362.23275.34169.3964.99301.05355.28272.76165.87 65.99295.45348.62270.29162.5166.99290.07342.23267.93159.2967.99284.91336.09265.67156.22 68.99279.96330.2263.5153.2769.99275.2324.54261.43150.4570.99270.63319.11259.44147.7571.99266.24313.9257.55145.1772.99262.03308.9255.73142.7TABLE 6.2-15 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-154Rev. 3073.99257.99304.1253.99140.33 74.99254.11299.49252.33138.0775.99250.39295.07250.74135.91 76.19249.66294.21250.43135.4976.99246.82290.83249.22133.8477.99243.39286.77247.76131.86 78.99240.11282.87246.37129.9679.99236.96279.13245.05128.1580.99233.93275.54243.77126.42 81.99231.03272.1242.56124.7682.99228.25268.8241.4123.1883.99225.59265.64240.29121.66 84.99223.04262.62239.24120.2285.99220.6259.73238.23118.8386.99218.27256.96237.27117.52 88.99213.9251.79235.49115.0690.99209.92247.06233.87112.8292.99206.29242.76232.41110.79 94.99202.99238.85231.09108.9596.99200235.3229.9107.2898.99197.29232.1228.83105.77100.29195.67230.17228.17104.87100.99194.95229.32227.86104.48102.99193.2227.25227.12103.53104.99191.63225.4226.45102.68106.99190.22223.73225.85101.91TABLE 6.2-15 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-155Rev. 30108.99188.96222.24225.31101.22 110.99187.83220.91224.83100.6112.99186.83219.72224.4100.06 114.99185.95218.68224.0299.57116.99185.17217.76223.6899.14118.99184.5216.97223.3998.77120.99183.92216.28223.1398.44122.99183.42215.7222.9198.16124.99183.01215.21222.7397.93 126.99182.67214.81222.5797.73128.79182.42214.51222.4597.58128.99182.39214.49222.4497.56 130.99182.19214.24222.3497.43132.99182.03214.06222.2697.33134.99181.94213.94222.297.26 136.99181.89213.89222.1697.21138.99181.88213.88222.1597.18140.99181.92213.93222.1497.18 142.99182214.02222.1697.2144.99182.11214.15222.1897.23146.99182.26214.32222.2297.28 148.99182.43214.53222.2897.35150.99182.62214.75222.3497.43152.99182.82214.99222.497.51154.99183.05215.26222.4897.6156.99183.29215.55222.5697.71TABLE 6.2-15 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-156Rev. 30158.99183.56215.86222.6597.83 159.99183.69216.02222.797.89160.99183.84216.19222.7597.95 162.99184.13216.54222.8598.08164.99184.45216.91222.9698.23166.99184.77217.29223.0898.37 168.99185.11217.69223.298.53170.99185.46218.11223.3398.69172.99185.82218.53223.4698.86 174.99186.19218.97223.699.03176.99187.18220.13224.299.54178.99188.21221.35225.4100.11 180.99189.37222.72227.17100.79182.99190.62224.2229.36101.54184.99191.9225.71231.85102.33 186.99193.14227.18234.52103.11189.99194.3228.56237.28103.86190.99195.37229.82240.09104.57 192.99196.32230.94242.9105.23193.09196.37230.99243.04105.26194.99197.16231.93245.7105.83 196.99197.88232.78248.48106.38198.99198.48233.49251.25106.88200.99198.95234.05254.02107.32202.99199.3234.46256.83107.71204.99199.54234.75259.66108.07TABLE 6.2-15 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-157Rev. 30(1) Mass and energy exiting the stea m generator side of the break.(2) Mass and energy exiting the pump side of the break.206.99199.7234.94262.49108.38 208.99199.78235.02265.35108.67210.99199.76235.01268.23108.94 212.99199.67234.9271.12109.17214.99199.5234.69274.04109.38216.99199.25234.4276.98109.57 218.99198.93234.02279.94109.74220.99198.54233.55282.91109.89222.99198.07233285.91110.03 224.99197.54232.37288.92110.15226.99196.94231.66291.94110.25228.59196.41231.04294.37110.32 228.600.00.00.00.0TABLE 6.2-15 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-158Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-16 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2)Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 25.80.00.00.00.026.280.00.00.00.0 26.480.00.00.00.026.580.00.00.00.026.680.00.00.00.0 26.780.00.00.00.026.8533.9339.850.00.026.963338.760.00.0 27.0618.7922.070.00.027.1620.824.430.00.027.2627.5732.380.00.0 27.3634.8540.930.00.027.463945.80.00.027.5643.1350.660.00.0 27.6647.0155.220.00.027.7650.6959.540.00.027.8654.1963.660.00.0 27.9657.5467.590.00.028.0660.7571.360.00.028.1663.84750.00.0 28.2666.8278.510.00.028.3669.7181.90.00.028.4672.5185.190.00.028.5675.2388.390.00.028.6677.8791.50.00.0 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-159Rev. 3028.7680.4594.530.00.028.8682.9697.480.00.029.86105.28123.750.00.0 30.86124.08145.890.00.031.87339.31400.863858.54526.7632.71425.55503.814827.67691.54 32.91426.34504.774834.56694.6433.91421.63499.154789.61691.8334.91414.77490.944722.31684.5 35.91407.57482.344650.39676.2836.91400.37473.724577.44667.7637.41396.81469.474541.11663.47 37.91393.3465.284505.05659.238.91386.44457.074434.04650.7439.91379.8449.144364.78642.45 40.91373.4441.54297.48634.3641.91367.24434.154232.19626.542.91361.32427.084168.91618.87 43.71356.74421.624119.73612.9343.91355.62420.284107.63611.4744.91350.14413.754048.27604.3 45.91425.67503.914934.17671.4246.91419.8496.914873.55665.3947.91415.02491.24825.53659.3448.91410.4485.674778.84653.4549.91405.92480.324733.44647.72TABLE 6.2-16 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2)Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-160Rev. 3050.31404.18478.234715.63645.4850.96340.59402.353997.02564.7852.01157.11184.771173.77232.11 53.01156.42183.961175.47231.9154.01155.74183.151177.3231.7455.01155.06182.351179.18231.59 56.01154.39181.561181.06231.4557.01153.72180.761182.92231.358.01153.05179.971184.76231.15 59.01152.38179.191186.5923160.01151.72178.41188.4230.8661.01151.06177.621190.2230.71 61.51150.69177.191190.33230.4862.01150.49176.941190.99230.4563.01150.21176.611192.07230.38 64.01149.93176.281193.15230.3165.01149.65175.951194.21230.2366.01149.38175.621195.27230.15 67.01149.11175.31196.32230.0868.01148.84174.981197.3723069.01148.57174.661198.4229.92 70.01148.3174.341199.44229.8471.01148.04174.031200.46229.7672.01147.78173.721201.49229.6873.01147.52173.411202.5229.674.01147.26173.11203.52229.52TABLE 6.2-16 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2)Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-161Rev. 3075.01147.01172.81204.53229.4376.01146.75172.51205.54229.3577.01146.5172.21206.54229.27 78.01146.25171.91207.53229.1979.01146171.611208.52229.180.01145.76171.311209.5229.01 81.01145.51171.021210.47228.9382.01145.27170.731211.44228.8483.01145.02170.441212.4228.75 84.01144.78170.151213.36228.6685.01144.54169.871214.31228.5686.01144.3169.581215.26228.47 87.01144.06169.31216.2228.3887.11144.04169.271216.29228.3789.01143.59168.741218.06228.18 91.01143.12168.181219.91227.9993.01142.66167.631221.74227.7995.01142.2167.081223.56227.6 97.01141.75166.541225.36227.3999.01141.3166.011227.14227.19101.01140.9165.541228.67226.99 103.01140.59165.181229.71226.81105.01140.29164.821230.75226.62107.01139.99164.461231.77226.44109.01139.69164.111232.79226.25111.01139.39163.761233.8226.06TABLE 6.2-16 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2)Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-162Rev. 30113.01139.1163.421234.8225.87115.01138.81163.071235.79225.68115.71138.71162.951236.13225.61 117.01138.52162.731236.77225.49119.01138.23162.391237.74225.29121.01137.95162.061238.71225.1 123.01137.66161.721239.67224.9125.01137.38161.391240.63224.7127.01137.1161.061241.58224.5 129.01136.82160.731242.52224.3131.01136.55160.411243.46224.09133.01136.27160.081244.39223.89 135.01136159.761245.32223.68137.01135.72159.441246.24223.48139.01135.45159.121247.16223.27 141.01135.18158.81248.07223.06143.01134.91158.481248.99222.85145.01134.65158.171249.89222.63 147.01134.38157.851250.79222.42147.11134.37157.841250.84222.41149.01134.12157.541251.69222.21 151.01133.85157.231252.59221.99153.01133.58156.911253.49221.77155.01133.31156.61254.38221.55157.01133.05156.291255.28221.33159.01132.78155.971256.17221.1TABLE 6.2-16 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2)Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-163Rev. 30161.01132.52155.661257.05220.88163.01132.26155.351257.94220.65165.01131.99155.041258.82220.43 167.01131.73154.731259.7220.2169.01131.47154.431260.58219.97171.01131.21154.121261.45219.74 173.01130.95153.811262.33219.51175.01130.69153.511263.2219.28177.01130.44153.211264.07219.05 179.01130.18152.911264.93218.81181.01129.93152.611265.8218.58/181.91129.81152.471266.19218.47 183.01129.67152.311266.66218.35185.01129.42152.011267.52218.11187.01129.17151.711268.38217.87 189.01128.92151.421269.24217.64191.01128.67151.121270.1217.4193.01128.42150.831270.95217.16 195.01128.17150.541271.8216.92197.01127.93150.251272.66216.69199.01127.68149.961273.51216.45 201.01127.43149.661274.4216.21203.01127.16149.351275.39215.96205.01126.89149.031276.37215.71207.01126.63148.721277.36215.47209.01126.37148.411278.34215.22TABLE 6.2-16 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2)Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-164Rev. 30211.01126.1148.11279.33214.97213.01125.84147.791280.31214.73215.01125.59147.491281.29214.48 217.01125.33147.181282.28214.23219.01125.07146.881283.26213.99221.01124.82146.581284.25213.74 221.21124.79146.551284.34213.72223.01124.57146.291285.23213.5225.01124.32145.991286.22213.25 227.01124.07145.71287.2213.01229.01123.82145.411288.19212.77231.01123.58145.121289.18212.53 233.01123.34144.831290.17212.28235.01123.1144.551291.16212.04237.01122.86144.271292.15211.81 239.01122.62143.991293.15211.57241.01122.39143.711294.14211.33243.01122.15143.441295.14211.1 245.01121.93143.171296.14210.86247.01121.7142.91297.15210.63249.01121.47142.631298.15210.4 251.01121.25142.371299.17210.18253.01121.03142.111300.18209.95255.01120.81141.851301.2209.73257.01120.6141.61302.23209.5259.01120.38141.351303.26209.29TABLE 6.2-16 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2)Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-165Rev. 30(1) Mass and energy exiting the stea m generator side of the break.(2) Mass and energy exiting the pump side of the break.261.01120.17141.11304.29209.07263.01119.97140.851305.33208.86265.01119.76140.611306.38208.65 267.01119.56140.371307.44208.44267.91119.47140.271307.91208.35267.920.00.00.00.0TABLE 6.2-16 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2)Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-166Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-17 DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 22.60.00.00.00.023.681689.98151.530.00.0 23.781685.26151.10.00.023.881680.56150.680.00.023.981675.89150.260.00.0 24.081671.25149.850.00.024.231662.03149.020.00.024.331659.41148.790.00.0 24.431655.18148.410.00.024.481650.641480.00.024.491646.12147.60.00.0 24.531641.62147.20.00.024.641637.76146.910.00.024.741633.89146.510.00.0 24.841629.45146.10.00.024.941625.03145.70.00.025.041619.01145.160.00.0 25.151615.48144.850.00.025.251611.85144.520.00.025.351609.14144.280.00.0 25.451605.55143.960.00.025.551601.98143.640.00.025.651598.44143.320.00.026.651569.37146.850.00.027.651563.2175.170.00.0 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-167Rev. 3027.751561.17176.180.00.028.651542.63183.840.00.029.651520.75189.70.00.0 30.651501.14197.041436.89206.3331.741488.5208.44074.37594.7332.741463.41206.274087.91600.51 33.741438.81203.514025.01594.4834.541419.89201.373973.1589.3134.741415.26200.853960.15588.01 35.741392.69198.33895.92581.536.741371.04195.863832.96575.0337.741350.24193.513771.59568.67 38.741330.24191.263711.95562.4339.741310.98189.093654.11556.3440.7465.49773598.06550.4 41.7465.1276.563543.78544.6142.7464.7676.133491.22538.9843.7464.4275.733440.32533.49 44.7479.2593.22240.78283.2345.0478.9492.86239.91282.1945.74217.8189.05183.49184.17 46.74216.9287.96187.1183.0547.74217.1388.17190.21183.4448.74217.3588.38193.35183.8449.74217.5588.57196.51184.2550.74217.7488.75199.67184.65TABLE 6.2-17 DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-168Rev. 3051.74217.9388.93202.8185.0452.74218.1189.1205.89185.4253.74218.2989.27208.93185.78 54.74218.4689.42211.91186.1155.74218.6389.57214.81186.4356.74218.7889.72217.63186.72 57.74218.9389.85220.36186.9858.74219.0889.97223187.2159.74219.2190.09225.55187.41 60.74219.3490.19227.99187.5961.74219.4690.29230.35187.7362.74219.5790.38232.6187.84 63.74219.6790.45234.75187.9364.74219.7790.52236.81187.9965.74219.8690.58238.77188.02 66.74219.9490.63240.64188.0267.74220.0190.67242.4318868.74220.0890.71244.13187.96 69.74220.1490.74245.75187.8970.74220.290.76247.29187.871.74220.2590.78248.76187.7 72.74220.390.79250.17187.5773.74220.3490.79251.51187.4374.74220.3890.79252.79187.2775.74220.4190.79254.01187.176.74220.4490.78255.19186.91TABLE 6.2-17 DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-169Rev. 3077.74220.4790.77256.31186.7178.74220.4990.75257.39186.5179.74220.5190.73258.43186.29 80.74220.5390.71259.43186.0681.74220.5590.68260.39185.8282.74220.5690.66261.32185.58 83.74220.5890.63262.22185.3385.74220.690.56263.95184.8186.84220.690.52264.85184.51 87.74220.6190.49265.57184.2789.74220.6290.41267.12183.7291.74220.6390.33268.61183.16 93.74220.6390.25270.04182.5995.74220.6390.16271.42182.0197.74220.6390.07272.76181.43 99.74220.6389.98274.07180.85101.74220.6189.91275.06180.37103.74220.5789.86275.9179.94 105.74220.5489.8276.72179.5107.74220.5189.75277.53179.07109.74220.4689.67278.34178.64111.74220.489.58279.14178.22113.74220.3489.5279.93177.8115.74220.2889.42280.71177.38117.74220.2389.33281.49176.96119.74220.1789.25282.25176.54TABLE 6.2-17 DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-170Rev. 30120.04220.1689.24282.36176.48121.74220.1189.17283176.13123.74220.0689.08283.75175.72 125.7422089284.49175.31127.74219.9588.92285.22174.9129.74219.8988.84285.95174.49 131.74219.8488.76286.67174.09133.74219.7888.67287.39173.68135.74219.7388.59288.1173.28 137.74219.6788.51288.81172.88139.74219.6288.43289.52172.48141.74219.5688.35290.21172.09 143.74219.588.26290.91171.69145.74219.4588.18291.6171.3147.74219.3988.1292.29170.91 149.74219.3488.02292.98170.52151.74219.2887.94293.67170.13153.74219.2287.85294.35169.74 155.74219.1787.77295.03169.35156.84219.1387.72295.41169.14157.74219.1187.68295.71168.97 159.74219.0587.6296.39168.58161.74218.9987.51297.07168.2163.74218.9387.42297.75167.81165.74218.8787.34298.42167.43167.74218.8187.25299.09167.05TABLE 6.2-17 DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-171Rev. 30169.74218.7587.16299.76166.67171.74218.6987.07300.43166.29173.74218.6386.99301.1165.91 175.74218.5786.9301.77165.53177.74218.5186.81302.44165.16179.74218.4486.72303.1164.78 181.74218.3886.62303.77164.41183.74218.3286.53304.44164.04185.74218.2586.44305.1163.66 187.74218.1986.35305.77163.29189.74218.1286.26306.43162.92191.74218.0686.16307.09162.56 193.74217.9986.07307.76162.19195.74217.9385.97308.42161.82197.74217.8685.88309.09161.46 198.04217.8585.86309.19161.4199.74217.7985.78309.75161.1201.74217.7285.69310.41160.73 203.74217.6585.59311.06160.37205.74217.5885.49311.72160.01207.74217.5185.39312.37159.65 209.74217.4485.3313.02159.3211.74217.3785.2313.67158.94213.74217.385.1314.32158.58215.74217.2385.01314.97158.23217.74217.1584.9315.63157.88TABLE 6.2-17 DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-172Rev. 30219.74217.0784.79316.29157.53221.74216.9984.68316.96157.18223.74216.9184.57317.62156.84 225.74216.8384.46318.29156.49227.74216.7584.35318.96156.15229.74216.6784.24319.62155.81 231.74216.5884.13320.29155.47233.74216.584.02320.96155.13235.74216.4283.91321.63154.8 237.74216.3383.79322.31154.46239.74216.2583.68322.98154.13241.74216.1783.57323.66153.8 243.74216.0883.46324.33153.47245.14216.0283.38324.81153.24245.7421683.34325.01153.15 247.74215.9283.23325.69152.82249.74215.8383.12326.37152.5251.74215.7583327.06152.18 253.74215.6682.89327.74151.86255.74215.5882.78328.43151.55257.74215.4982.66329.12151.24 259.74215.4182.55329.81150.93261.74215.3282.44330.51150.62263.74215.2482.32331.21150.31265.74215.1682.21331.91150.01267.74215.0782.1332.61149.71TABLE 6.2-17 DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-173Rev. 30269.74214.9981.98333.32149.42271.74214.981.87334.03149.12273.74214.8281.76334.74148.83 275.74214.7481.65335.46148.55277.74214.6581.53336.18148.26279.74214.5781.42336.91147.99 281.74214.4981.31337.64147.71283.74214.3981.18338.19147.38285.74214.2981.05338.57147.02 287.74214.1880.91338.96146.66289.74214.0580.74339.37146.31291.74213.9280.57339.78145.96 293.74213.7980.4340.19145.61295.74213.6580.22340.36145.19297.74213.580.04340.48144.78 299.74213.3679.86340.64144.37301.44213.2479.7340.81144.03301.74213.2279.68340.85143.97 303.74213.0879.5341.09143.58305.74212.9479.32341.36143.2307.74212.879.14341.66142.83 309.74212.6778.97342142.46311.74212.5378.79342.37142.1313.74212.3978.62342.77141.75315.74212.2678.45343.19141.41317.74212.1278.27343.64141.08TABLE 6.2-17 DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-174Rev. 30(1) Mass and energy exiting the br oken loop side of the break.(2) Mass and energy exiting the vessel side of the break.319.74211.9978.1344.12140.75321.74211.8677.93344.63140.43323.74211.7277.76345.16140.12 325.74211.5977.59345.72139.82327.74211.4677.43346.3139.52329.74211.3377.26346.9139.23 331.74211.277.09347.5138.95333.74211.0776.92348.13138.67335.74210.9476.76348.78138.4 337.74210.876.58349.31138.09339.74210.6676.4349.7137.75341.74210.5276.22350.08137.42 343.74210.3876.05350.47137.09345.74210.2475.87350.85136.76347.74210.175.69351.24136.43 349.74209.9575.5351.51136.07351.74209.875.31351.64135.68353.74209.6675.12351.81135.31 355.74209.5174.94352.01134.94357.74209.3674.75352.24134.58358.84209.2874.65352.38134.38 358.850.00.00.00.0TABLE 6.2-17 DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1 (1)Break Path Number 2 (2) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec)
Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-175Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-18 DELETED BY PACK AGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-176Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-19 3.0 FT 2 SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec)42.250.00.0 42.730.00.042.930.00.043.030.00.0 43.130.00.043.230.00.043.280.00.0 43.3851.2760.1843.4820.4523.9943.5817.4820.51 43.6821.8725.6643.7828.1833.0743.8834.6440.65 43.9838.5945.2944.0842.4849.8544.1846.1454.14 44.2849.6158.2244.3852.9162.1144.4856.0965.83 44.5859.1369.4144.6862.0772.8644.7363.5174.55 44.7864.9176.244.8867.6779.4444.9870.3482.5845.0872.9485.6345.1875.4788.6 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-177Rev. 3045.2877.9391.546.28250.89128.54 47.28271.18152.9448.284013.39850.7849.295518.791230.76 50.295492.991226.951.295432.21213.6952.295364.851198.78 53.295295.371183.2953.895253.551173.9554.295225.791167.75 55.295157.11152.4156.295089.821137.457.295024.231122.79 58.294960.431108.6159.294898.491094.8759.994856.231085.51 60.294838.391081.5761.294780.091068.6962.294723.561056.23 63.294668.731044.1664.294615.531032.4865.294563.911021.17 66.29648.4621.7166.99861.78929.5667.291119.351304.9868.291126.11315.05TABLE 6.2-19 3.0 FT 2 SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-178Rev. 3069.291052.871225.6670.311017.411182.61 70.561013.031177.3671.31981.941139.5372.31941.051085.68 73.31864.26952.6274.31799.78851.0275.31734.58748.63 76.31680.7673.9977.31643.37622.7578.31593.69554.33 79.31574.94529.1980.31563.65514.2881.31553.91501.48 82.31544.91489.6883.01538.97481.8983.31536.5478.67 84.31528.62468.3785.31521.23458.7386.31514.29449.68 87.31507.77441.1988.31501.62433.289.31495.83425.68 90.31490.37418.691.31485.23411.9492.31480.39405.6793.31475.81399.75TABLE 6.2-19 3.0 FT 2 SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-179Rev. 3094.31472.24395.1995.31469.35391.54 96.31466.57388.0497.31463.88384.6698.31461.28381.39 99.31458.77378.22100.31456.34375.16101.31454.09372.34 102.31451.94369.65103.31449.86367.05105.11446.31362.6 105.31445.93362.13107.31442.26357.54109.31438.85353.27111.31435.68349.31113.31432.75345.64115.31430.04342.25 117.31427.54339.15119.31425.23336.3121.31424.86335.81 123.31424.55335.4125.31424.23334.99127.31423.93334.59 129.31423.63334.2131.31423.33333.81131.91423.24333.7133.31423.04333.43TABLE 6.2-19 3.0 FT 2 SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-180Rev. 30135.31422.76333.06137.31422.48332.69 139.31422.2332.33141.31421.93331.97143.31421.66331.62 145.31421.4331.27147.31421.14330.93149.31420.89330.6 151.31420.71330.37153.31420.61330.24155.31420.51330.11 157.31420.41329.98159.31420.32329.86161.31420.23329.75 161.71420.21329.72163.31420.14329.63165.31420.06329.52 167.31419.98329.41169.31419.9329.31171.31419.82329.21 173.31419.75329.11175.31419.68329.02177.31419.61328.92 179.31419.54328.84181.31419.47328.75183.31419.41328.67185.31419.35328.59TABLE 6.2-19 3.0 FT 2 SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-181Rev. 30187.31419.29328.51189.31419.24328.43 191.31419.19328.36193.31419.14328.29194.21419.11328.26 195.31419.09328.23197.31419.04328.16199.31419328.1 201.31418.95328.04203.31418.91327.98205.31418.86327.92 207.31418.82327.86209.31418.78327.81211.31418.74327.76213.31418.71327.71215.31418.67327.66217.31418.64327.61 219.31418.61327.56221.31418.58327.52223.31418.55327.48 225.31418.53327.44227.31418.5327.41229.31418.49327.38 229.61418.48327.38229.71551.19144.67229.720.00.0TABLE 6.2-19 3.0 FT 2 SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Time (seconds)Break Path Number 1Flow (lbm/sec)Energy (thousands BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-182Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-20 DOUBLE ENDED HOT LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FL OWS REFLOOD PRIN CIPAL PARAMETERS Time (seconds)Flooding Carryover FractionCore Height (ft)Downcomer Height (ft)
Flow Fraction InjectionTemperature
(°F)Rate (in./sec)Total (ft 3/sec)Accumulator (ft 3/sec)SPIL (ft 3/sec)Enthalpy (BTU/lbm) 0288.2100000.2500089.66 0.24282.7256.60500.61-0.050.999122.4122.4094.920.32279.168.51301.03-0.390.887122.1122.1094.930.56274.94 3.9630.3631.5-0.390.865120.3120.3094.940.61274.86 3.8840.3751.51-0.240.865120.2120.2094.953.38267.5 7.3250.74726.880.91106.6106.6095.276.82254.1410.2080.8342.512.880.90890.390.3095.710.01241.5311.2990.8522.9516.120.90578.878.830.796.2310.36240.2711.2480.854316.120.90578.278.230.396.2914.18228.6810.7940.863.516.120.90672.272.226.396.95 18.25219.6310.3960.861416.120.907676722.797.6522.48212.6210.0120.8614.516.120.90870.362.327.787.2126.85206.74 9.6310.86516.120.90966.458.325.487.0327.01206.54 9.6180.865.0216.120.90966.358.225.387.0227.57205.86 9.5730.8595.0816.110.9098.10068.0431.84201.78 6.8060.8495.512.890.918.70068.0438.73198.82 4.1460.821610.170.99.10068.04 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-183Rev. 3048.25198.31 2.6230.7916.58.90.8829.30068.0460.36199.44 2.0520.77578.770.879.30098.0473.79200.99 1.9130.7717.59.150.8669.30068.0487.58202.29 1.8870.77189.650.8669.30068.04101.47203.15 1.8840.7718.510.180.8669.30068.04105.01203.29 1.8830.7718.6310.310.8669.30068.04115.39203.51 1.8840.771910.710.8669.30068.04129.3203.35 1.8850.7719.511.240.8669.30068.04143.21202.74 1.8850.7711011.760.8669.30068.04TABLE 6.2-20 DOUBLE ENDED HOT LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FL OWS REFLOOD PRIN CIPAL PARAMETERS Time (seconds)Flooding Carryover FractionCore Height (ft)Downcomer Height (ft)
Flow Fraction InjectionTemperature
(°F)Rate (in./sec)Total (ft 3/sec)Accumulator (ft 3/sec)SPIL (ft 3/sec)Enthalpy (BTU/lbm)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-184Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WI TH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD PRINCIPAL PARAMETERS Time (seconds)Flooding Carryover FractionCore Height (ft)Downcomer Height (ft)
Flow Fraction InjectionTemperature
(°F)Rate (in./sec)Total (ft 3/sec)Accumulator (ft 3/sec)SPIL (ft 3/secEnthalpy (BTU/lbm)25.8181.900000.2500089.6626.6179.422.59600.661.5107643.27643.2089.6626.8178.124.69201.051.4307595.97595.9089.66 28.1177.42.480.3081.55.210.3277263.97263.9089.6628.9177.52.4030.4011.67.450.3427118.57118.5089.6632.6178.34.4860.6372.0116.120.5845867.95867.9089.66 33.9178.54.2120.6742.1716.120.5835677.45677.4089.6637.3179.63.7850.7152.5116.120.5785305.25305.2089.6643.5182.53.3720.739316.120.5654779.24779.2089.66 44.9183.33.3030.7413.116.120.5624678.74678.7089.6646183.93.4550.7433.1816.120.57650344496.4087.3550.5186.63.2750.7493.516.120.5694763.84219.4087.19 51186.92.6940.7483.5316.120.4683157.12593.8085.852187.63.520.753.615.930.589531.60068.0457.9192.23.1090.7534.0114.790.582545.90068.04 67200.72.6410.7544.5413.630.569562.70068.0476.2210.12.3190.756512.990.557573.90068.04 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-185Rev. 3089221.62.0320.7595.5612.660.543583.90068.04100.3229.81.8810.763612.710.534589.60068.04115238.71.7960.7676.5313.040.528591.10068.04128.8245.91.7580.772713.450.526591.70068.04 145253.11.740.7797.5314.020.526591.80068.04160258.81.7370.785814.560.527591.60068.04177264.51.7440.7938.5215.190.53591.10068.04 193.1269.11.7790.8915.670.54589.70068.04197270.11.7820.8029.1215.750.542589.30068.04211273.51.7640.8089.5215.950.549588.90068.04228.6277.11.7010.8171016.080.553589.60068.04TABLE 6.2-21 DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WI TH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD PRINCIPAL PARAMETERS Time (seconds)Flooding Carryover FractionCore Height (ft)Downcomer Height (ft)
Flow Fraction InjectionTemperature
(°F)Rate (in./sec)Total (ft 3/sec)Accumulator (ft 3/sec)SPIL (ft 3/secEnthalpy (BTU/lbm)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-186Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21A DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM EC CS FLOWS REFLOOD PRINCIPAL PARAMETERS Time (seconds)Flooding Carryove r FractionCore Height (ft)Downco mer Height (ft)Flow Fraction InjectionTemperature (°F)Rate (in./
sec)Total (ft 3/sec)Accumula tor (ft 3/sec)SPIL (ft 3/sec)Enthalpy (BTU/lbm)25.8181.800000.2500089.6626.6179.322.68600.661.5207674.27674.2089.66 26.817824.76101.061.4407626.97626.9089.6628.2177.42.450.311.55.330.3287289.37289.3089.6628.9177.52.3770.3991.597.50.34371497149089.66 32.7178.44.4440.6392.0116.120.5855877.25877.2089.6633.9178.64.1840.6732.1616.120.5845706.75706.7089.6637.4179.83.7470.7152.516.120.5785323.25323.2089.66 43.71833.3350.739316.120.5664790.14790.1089.6644.9183.63.2780.7423.0916.120.5634703.94703.9089.6645.9184.23.7480.7443.1616.120.5985709.14341.3084.48 50.31873.5670.7493.516.120.5915444.54065.9084.19521882.0330.7423.616.120.4081492.50068.0461.5194.21.9550.746416.120.40414950068.04 742041.8880.7514.516.120.4061497.40068.0487.1214.31.8240.757516.120.40915000068.04 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-187Rev. 30101223.71.7610.7625.516.120.4111502.50068.04115.72321.7140.766616.120.4141502.50068.04131239.51.6660.7716.516.120.4161502.50068.04 147.1246.11.6190.775716.120.4191502.50068.04165252.31.5670.787.5316.120.4231502.40068.04181.9257.31.5180.785816.120.4261502.40068.04 201262.11.4650.7918.5116.120.431502.40068.04221.2266.31.4070.798916.120.4351503.10068.04245270.41.3390.8089.5416.120.4411503.90068.04 267.9273.71.2760.821016.120.4471504.60068.04TABLE 6.2-21A DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM EC CS FLOWS REFLOOD PRINCIPAL PARAMETERS Time (seconds)Flooding Carryove r FractionCore Height (ft)Downco mer Height (ft)Flow Fraction InjectionTemperature (°F)Rate (in./
sec)Total (ft 3/sec)Accumula tor (ft 3/sec)SPIL (ft 3/sec)Enthalpy (BTU/lbm)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-188Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21B DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD PRINCIPAL PARAMETERS Time (seconds)Flooding Carryove r FractionCore Height (ft)Downcomer Height (ft)Flow Fraction InjectionTemperature (°F)Rate (in./sec)Total (ft 3/sec)Accumulator (ft 3/sec)SPIL (ft 3/sec)Enthalpy (BTU/lbm)22.6163.9 00000.2500089.6624.2164.145.61600.194.0407106.57106.5089.66 24.3163.844.99700.563.5407094.67094.6089.6624.5163.638.63101.112.8207053.37053.3089.6625.4164-2.7880.1091.324.8206842.56842.5089.66 26.6164.62.4440.2681.467.480.0346643.56643.5089.6627.6165.22.150.3941.599.580.1496489.26489.2089.6629.6166.32.0290.5261.7713.770.1816212.76212.7089.66 30.6166.92.0760.5661.8515.720.1926080.56080.5089.6633.7168.71.9420.6322.0616.120.2185720.75720.7089.6642.7174.61.7030.6942.516.120.2143742.33742.3089.66 43.7175.31.6890.6972.5416.120.2143687.53687.5089.6644.71761.7850.7012.5915.990.248000055.7184.41.6230.7213.0315.980.226602.20068.04 69.7195.91.5630.7333.5316.090.2346040068.0483.7205.81.5070.741416.120.246060068.04 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-189Rev. 3099.7215.31.4470.7484.516.120.245608.30068.04111.7221.51.4160.7524.8616.120.248608.80068.04117.7224.31.4010.7545.0416.120.249608.90068.04135.7231.91.3590.7595.5416.120.253609.50068.04153.7238.31.3190.7646.0216.120.257610.10068.04 173.7244.31.2760.7696.5316.120.26610.70068.04 193.7249.51.2330.775716.120.264611.30068.04217.7254.61.1830.7827.5416.120.2696120068.04241.7258.91.1340.798.0316.120.273612.70068.04 267.7262.71.080.88.5316.120.277613.40068.04295.7264.41.030.8079.0116.120.28614.20068.04327.7263.90.9810.8079.5316.120.283615.20068.04 358.82640.9320.8091016.120.284616.10068.04TABLE 6.2-21B DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD PRINCIPAL PARAMETERS Time (seconds)Flooding Carryove r FractionCore Height (ft)Downcomer Height (ft)Flow Fraction InjectionTemperature (°F)Rate (in./sec)Total (ft 3/sec)Accumulator (ft 3/sec)SPIL (ft 3/sec)Enthalpy (BTU/lbm)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-190Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21C DELETED BY PA CKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-191Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21D 3.0 SQUARE FEET PUMP SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD PRINCIPAL PARAMETERS Time (seconds)Flooding Carryover FractionCore Height (ft)Downcomer Height (ft)Flow Fraction InjectionTemperature (°F)Rate (in./sec)Total (ft 3/sec)Accumulator (ft 3/secSPIL (ft 3/sec)Enthalpy (BTU/lbm)42.3226.600000.2500089.6643223.122.11800.641.4607438.47438.4089.6643.2221.224.1020 1.031.3807396.37396.3089.66 43.6220.12.6680.1081.311.990.23172987298089.6643.72202.730.1271.332.290.257283.47283.4089.6644.7219.62.3480.3151.55.450.3367069.37069.3089.6645.3219.52.2930.3841.577.10.3466967.66967.6089.6649.3218.24.5350.6412.0116.120.5976135.65614.6087.8350.3217.74.3040.672.1416.120.59760085486.1087.7853.9216.53.8490.7172.516.120.5935649.25119.7087.6360215.83.4570.74316.120.5855182.14640.3087.465.32163.2320.7483.3816.120.5774859.44308.9087.2166.3216.13.490.7393.4416.080.579522.50068.0467216.14.7630.7253.5115.830.606345.70068.0468.3216.26.1770.7143.6914.870.616126.30068.0470.6216.65.5180.718413.250.636127.60068.0475.3218.23.7710.7334.5210.80.661444.40068.04 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-192Rev. 3083222.42.5740.7559.640.686554.20068.0493.32292.1860.7565.59.060.71578.10068.04105.1235.52.0110.7668.880.734585.60068.04119.32421.8820.7656.558.980.755590.30068.04131.92471.8270.76979.190.768591.10068.04147.3252.31.770.7737.539.490.7825920068.04161.7256.61.7310.77789.810.792592.30068.04179.3261.11.6950.7838.5510.240.801592.60068.04194.2264.51.6720.788910.640.805592.80068.04213.3268.31.6530.7969.5511.20.805593.10068.04229.6271.11.6450.8031011.730.801593.30068.04TABLE 6.2-21D 3.0 SQUARE FEET PUMP SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD PRINCIPAL PARAMETERS Time (seconds)Flooding Carryover FractionCore Height (ft)Downcomer Height (ft)Flow Fraction InjectionTemperature (°F)Rate (in./sec)Total (ft 3/sec)Accumulator (ft 3/secSPIL (ft 3/sec)Enthalpy (BTU/lbm)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-193Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21E DOUBLE ENDED HOT LEG BREAK WI TH MINIMUM ECCS FL OWS MASS BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Mass Contributor (thousands lbm)Time 0.0 seconds 23.60 seconds 23.60 + (1) seconds 166.81 secondsInitial745.02745.02745.02745.02Added Mass Pumped Injection0.000.000.0076.19 Total Added0.000.000.0076.19Total Available745.02745.02745.02821.21TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Mass Contributor (thousands lbm)Time 0.0 seconds 23.60 seconds 23.60 + (1) seconds 166.81 secondsDistributionReactor Coolant517.42115.62115.62168.29Accumulator227.59130.10130.100.00Total Contents745.02245.72245.72168.29EffluentBreak Flow0.00499.27499.27622.51ECCS Spill0.000.000.0030.38Total Effluent0.00499.27499.27652.89Total Accountable745.02744.99744.99821.18 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-194Rev. 30 (1) The "+" is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs instantaneously after blowdown.
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-195Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21F DOUBLE ENDED HOT LEG BREAK WI TH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS ENERGY BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Energy Contributor (millions BTU)Time 0.0 seconds 23.60 seconds 23.60 + (1) seconds 166.81 secondsInitial Energy908.77908.77908.77908.77Added EnergyPumped Injection0.000.000.005.88Decay Heat0.008.398.3930.64Heat from Secondary0.00-3.60-3.60-3.60Total Added0.004.794.7932.92 Total Available908.77913.56913.56941.69 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-196Rev. 30(1) The "+" is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs inst antaneously after blowdown.TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Energy Contributor (millions BTU)Time 0.0 seconds 23.60 seconds 23.60 + (1) seconds 166.81 secondsDistributionReactor Coolant308.1922.1622.1630.96Accumulator20.4111.6711.670.00Core Stored24.759.619.614.44 Thin Metal 15.317.417.410.00Thick Metal141.38140.53140.53118.14Steam Generator398.74390.63390.63380.31 Total Contents908.77582.02582.02533.84EffluentBreak Flow0.00330.94330.94404.45ECCS Spill0.000.000.002.79 Total Effluent0.00330.94330.94407.24Total Accountable908.77912.96912.96941.08 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-197Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21G DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMU M ECCS FLOWS MASS BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Mass Contributor (thousands lbm)Time 0.0 seconds 25.80 seconds 25.80 + (1) seconds 228.59 secondsInitial745.02745.02745.02745.02Added Mass Pumped Injection0.000.000.00106.79 Total Added0.000.000.00106.79Total Available745.02745.02745.02851.81TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Mass Contributor (thousands lbm)Time 0.0 seconds 25.80 seconds 25.80 + (1) seconds 228.59 secondsDistributionReactor Coolant517.4252.9385.97147.00Accumulator227.59170.42137.380.00Total Contents745.02223.35223.35147.00EffluentBreak Flow0.00521.65521.65693.30ECCS Spill0.000.000.000.00Total Effluent0.00521.65521.65693.30Total Accountable745.02745.00745.00840.30 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-198Rev. 30(1) The "+" is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs inst antaneously after blowdown.
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-199Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21H DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS ENERGY BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Energy Contributor (millions BTU)Time 0.0 seconds 25.80 seconds 25.80 + (1) seconds 228.59 secondsInitial Energy: 908.77908.77908.77908.77Added Energy:Pumped Injection0.000.000.007.27Decay Heat0.008.558.5533.65Heat from Secondary0.009.489.489.48Total Added0.0018.0318.0350.40 Total Available908.77926.80926.80959.17 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-200Rev. 30(1) The "+" is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs inst antaneously after blowdown.TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Energy Contributor (millions BTU)Time 0.0 seconds 25.80 seconds 25.80 + (1) seconds 228.59 secondsDistribution:Reactor Coolant308.1912.1315.0937.42Accumulator20.4115.2812.32-0.00Core Stored24.7513.2413.244.68 Primary Metal 156.69149.41149.41130.62Secondary Metal102.48101.96101.9693.51Steam Generator296.26309.11309.11279.23 Total Contents908.77601.13601.13545.46EffluentBreak Flow0.00325.09325.09410.88ECCS Spill0.000.000.000.00 Total Effluent0.00325.09325.09410.88Total Accountable908.77926.22926.22956.34 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-201Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21I DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMU M ECCS FLOWS MASS BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Mass Contributor (thousands lbm)Time 0.00 seconds 25.80 seconds 25.80 + (1) seconds 267.91 secondsInitial 745.02745.02745.02745.02 Added massPumped Injection0.000.000.00333.27Total Added0.000.000.00333.27Total Available745.02745.02745.021078.29TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Mass Contributor (thousands lbm)Time 0.00 seconds 25.80 seconds 25.80 + (1) seconds 267.91 secondsDistribution:Reactor Coolant517.4252.9386.02148.85Accumulator227.59170.42137.33-0.00 Total Contents745.02223.35223.35148.85EffluentBreak Flow0.00521.65521.65917.94ECCS Spill0.000.000.000.00 Total Effluent0.00521.65521.65917.94Total Accountable745.02745.00745.001066.79 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-202Rev. 30(1) The "+" is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs inst antaneously after blowdown.
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-203Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21J DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS ENERGY BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Energy Contributor (million BTU)Time 0.00 seconds 25.80 seconds 25.80 + (1) seconds 267.91 secondsInitial Energy:908.77908.77908.77908.77 Added Energy:Pumped Injection0.000.000.0022.67Decay Heat0.008.558.5537.82Heat from Secondary0.009.489.489.48Total Added0.0018.0318.0369.97Total Available908.77926.80926.80978.75 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-204Rev. 30(1) The "+" is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs inst antaneously after blowdown.TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Energy Contributor (millions BTU)Time 0.00 seconds 25.80 seconds 25.80 + (1) seconds 267.91 secondsDistribution:Reactor Coolant308.1912.1315.0937.11Accumulator20.4115.2812.31-0.00Core Stored24.7513.2413.244.49Primary Metal156.69149.41149.41128.76 Secondary Metal102.48101.96101.9694.48Steam Generator296.26309.11309.11282.03Total Contents908.77601.13601.13546.87EffluentBreak Flow0.00325.09325.09429.02ECCS Spill0.000.000.000.00Total Effluent0.00325.09325.09429.02Total Accountable908.77926.22926.22975.89 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-205Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21K DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS MASS BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Mass Contributor (thousands lbm)Time 0.00 seconds 22.60 seconds 22.60 + (1) seconds 358.84 secondsInitial 745.02745.02745.02745.02 Added massPumped Injection0.000.000.00191.41Total Added0.000.000.00191.41Total Available745.02745.02745.02936.43TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Mass Contributor (thousands lbm))Time 0.00 seconds 22.60 seconds 22.60 + (1) seconds 358.84 secondsDistribution:Reactor Coolant517.4233.3071.45132.05Accumulator227.59159.70121.56-0.00 Total Contents745.02193.01193.01132.05EffluentBreak Flow0.00552.00552.00792.81ECCS Spill0.000.000.000.00 Total Effluent0.00552.00552.00792.81Total Accountable745.02745.01745.01924.86 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-206Rev. 30(1) The "+" is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs inst antaneously after blowdown.
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-207Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21L DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WI TH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS ENERGY BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Energy Contributor (million BTU)Time 0.00 seconds 22.60 seconds 22.60 + (1) seconds 358.84 secondsInitial Energy: 908.77908.77908.77908.77 Added Energy:Pumped Injection0.000.000.0013.02Decay Heat0.006.846.8445.87Heat from Secondary0.0010.3010.3010.30Total Added0.0017.1317.1369.19Total Available908.77925.91925.91977.96 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-208Rev. 30(1) The "+" is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs inst antaneously after blowdown. TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Energy Contributor (millions BTU)Time 0.00 seconds 22.60 seconds 22.60 + (1) seconds 358.84 secondsDistribution:Reactor Coolant308.198.0411.4631.83Accumulator20.4114.3210.90-0.00Core Stored24.7512.9012.904.30Primary Metal156.69150.13150.13135.84 Secondary Metal102.48102.69102.6997.39Steam Generator296.26311.93311.93291.94Total Contents908.77600.01600.01561.30EffluentBreak Flow0.00325.32325.32414.10ECCS Spill0.000.000.000.00Total Effluent0.00325.32325.32414.10Total Accountable908.77925.32925.32975.40 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-209Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21M DELETED BY P ACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-210Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21N DELETED BY PA CKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-211Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21O 3.0 FT 2 PUMP SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS MASS BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Mass Contributor (thousands lbm)Time 0.00 seconds 42.25 seconds 42.25 + (1) seconds 229.61 secondsInitial 745.02745.02745.02745.02Added massPumped Injection0.000.000.00103.27Total Added0.000.000.00103.27 Total Available745.02745.02745.02848.29TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Mass Contributor (thousands lbm)Time 0.00 seconds 42.25 seconds 42.25 + (1) seconds 229.61 secondsDistribution:Reactor Coolant517.4299.0399.08153.05Accumulator227.59127.88127.82-0.00Total Contents745.02226.91226.91153.05EffluentBreak Flow0.00518.10518.10684.23ECCS Spill0.000.000.000.00Total Effluent0.00518.10518.10648.23Total Accountable745.02745.01745.01837.27 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-212Rev. 30(1) The "+" is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs inst antaneously after blowdown.
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-213Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-21P 3.0 SQUARE FEET PUMP SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS ENERGY BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Energy Contributor (million BTU)Time 0.00 seconds 42.25 seconds 42.25 + (1) seconds 229.61 secondsInitial Energy908.77908.77908.77908.77 Added EnergyPumped Injection0.000.000.007.03Decay Heat0.0012.4612.4635.10Heat from Secondary0.0010.5610.5610.56Total Added0.0023.0223.0252.69Total Available908.77931.80931.80961.47TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Energy Contributor (million BTU)Time 0.00 seconds 42.25 seconds 42.25 + (1) seconds 229.61 secondsDistribution:Reactor Coolant308.1920.0020.0137.82Accumulator20.4111.4711.46-0.00Core Stored24.7513.0413.044.63 Primary Metal156.69148.51148.51129.65Secondary Metal102.48103.14103.1494.90 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-214Rev. 30(1) The "+" is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs inst antaneously after blowdown.Steam Generator296.26313.61313.61285.26Total Contents908.77609.77609.77552.26EffluentBreak Flow0.00321.44321.44406.28ECCS Spill0.000.000.000.00 Total Effluent0.00321.44321.44406.28Total Accountable908.77931.21931.21958.54TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Energy Contributor (million BTU)Time 0.00 seconds 42.25 seconds 42.25 + (1) seconds 229.61 seconds MPS3 UFSAR6.2-215Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-22 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-216Rev. 301.The pressurizer water volume does not reflect the pressurizer water level program of 64% at full power. However, the difference is not significant.TABLE 6.2-23 MAIN STEAM LINE BREA K MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES IN SIDE CONTAINMENT - INITIAL CONDITIONS ASSUMPTIONS Nominal NSSS Power, Mwt: 3666 Parameters Power Lever (%)10270300NSSS Power, Mwt37392566110037RCS Average Temperature (°F)594.5584.75571.75557.0 RCS Flowrate (gpm) (Thermal Design Flow)363,200363,200363,200363,200RCS Pressurizer Pressure (psia)2250225022502250Pressurizer Water Volume (% span)
(1) 60.049.535.525.0Feedwater Temperature, °F445.3407343100Steam Generator Pressure (psia)1019105911091102Steam Generator Level (% NRS)62.262.262.262.2 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-217Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-24 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-218Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-25 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-219Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-26 STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE PEAK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES FEEDWATER LINE BREAKVent PathsConnecting NodesPressure (psid)Time (Seconds)11 to 2-0.090.08822 to 30.060.04633 to 40.140.097 44 to 50.050.14955 to 6-0.10.10162 to 5-0.110.116 71 to 6-0.170.12881 to 7-0.150.03291 to 230.430.053102 to 8-0.160.075113 to 90.140.056123 to 230.410.057 134 to 10-0.130.039144 to 260.140.053155 to 11-0.130.037 165 to 260.150.053176 to 12-0.150.034186 to 260.140.049 197 to 8-0.140.073208 to 9-0.090.16219 to 10-0.110.119 2210 to 11-0.040.0322311 to 120.110.079248 to 11-0.10.122 257 to 120.170.083267 to 13-0.30.027278 to 14-0.240.027289 to 15-0.160.033 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-220Rev. 302914 to 230.440.0843010 to 16-0.170.0343111 to 17-0.140.0263212 to 18-0.20.025 3313 to 140.140.0353414 to 150.170.0253515 to 160.140.085 3616 to 17-0.140.0553717 to 18-0.130.0943814 to 17-0.20.058 3913 to 18-0.330.0584013 to 230.560.0334113 to 19-3.080.01 4214 to 230.440.0844314 to 19-3.080.014415 to 230.40.038 4517 to 19-3.130.014616 to 230.440.0684717 to 24-0.840.018 4817 to 230.410.0574918 to 25-0.950.0175019 to 20-3.180.018 5120 to 214.350.0075221 to 22-0.130.0125320 to 224.280.0075420 to 234.60.0095521 to 230.970.015 5622 to 231.080.0145719 to 242.990.01TABLE 6.2-26 STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE PEAK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES FEEDWATER LINE BREAKVent PathsConnecting NodesPressure (psid)Time (Seconds)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-221Rev. 305824 to 25-0.190.0165925 to 19-2.940.016024 to 210.530.0346125 to 22-0.550.012 6226 to 230.260.069TABLE 6.2-26 STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE PEAK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES FEEDWATER LINE BREAKVent PathsConnecting NodesPressure (psid)Time (Seconds)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-222Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-27 THREED INPUT FOR ANALYSIS AT PRESSURIZER CUBICLEVent Path Connecting Node Node No.Node Vol. (ft 3)Vent Path No.Vent Path Area (ft 2)FromTo Forward K-factor f L/DReverse K-factor f L/DInertia (ft
-1)12,6851143.01212.201.550.039 2639228.71212.311.760.292 3641322.11212.171.830.273 41,860411.4211.691.840.379 51,480556.2511.311.400.119 6789678.9411.301.320.088 72,222719.7310.841.120.454 82,9118108.7230.170.110.049 9919968.7250.300.290.116 1065910134.9450.230.220.063 112,5341197.1340.240.340.091 123,8901227.1260.430.510.383 138101391.8570.230.230.148 1436714116.6480.270.270.109 151,2041536.5390.280.290.347 161,8401655.1670.910.780.066 1741517135.5780.630.590.039 181,7641869.1890.680.870.058 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-223Rev. 30191,19119105.3690.410.400.0392089201.36101.631.644.371
21 2.3E6 (1)212.37111.651.652.258222.58121.421.402.8822320.58121.691.660.356 241.29131.691.704.434 2516.612213.012.940.017 2681.910110.720.590.055 27177.811120.550.500.038 28124.812130.460.590.043 2981.910130.430.440.055 3023.610140.720.680.493 3186.111150.670.650.134 32135.312160.640.630.088 3327.513170.720.690.409 3459.914150.280.280.115 3597.915160.280.270.089 3678.516170.280.270.093 3759.914170.090.070.097TABLE 6.2-27 THREED INPUT FOR ANALYSIS AT PRESSURIZER CUBICLEVent Path Connecting Node Node No.Node Vol. (ft 3)Vent Path No.Vent Path Area (ft 2)FromTo Forward K-factor f L/DReverse K-factor f L/DInertia (ft
-1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-224Rev. 30NOTE: 1. Node No. 21 = Remai nder of containment3840.314180.090.090.2213947.715180.390.360.145 4069.616180.390.470.095 4145.117180.090.090.198 42146.118190.470.380.068 4330.319211.801.040.397 4438.719211.630.810.396 4585.819211.060.530.049 466.32020.880.510.319 4710.02050.940.520.182 4811.32040.950.530.158 496.12030.880.510.332TABLE 6.2-27 THREED INPUT FOR ANALYSIS AT PRESSURIZER CUBICLEVent Path Connecting Node Node No.Node Vol. (ft 3)Vent Path No.Vent Path Area (ft 2)FromTo Forward K-factor f L/DReverse K-factor f L/DInertia (ft
-1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-225Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-28 THREED INPUT FOR ANALYSIS OF STEA M GENERATOR CUBICLE BVent Path Connecting NodeNode No.Node Vol. (ft 3)Vent Path No.Vent Path Area (ft 2)FromTo Forward K-factor f L/DInertia (ft
-1)13,461.11152.7120.360.0723,943.02146.4230.290.0631,090.0328.2340.900.21 42,116.84239.7450.130.0453,530.65180.7560.330.0562,155.3697.5250.720.08 71,692.07172.3160.100.1083,062.08275.1170.070.049609.4928.21231.700.62 101,024.810298.9280.130.04112,299.21184.8390.110.13121,412.61221.13232.180.16 134,351.21385.24100.530.06144,970.414102.04260.710.05151,030.015162.15110.790.04 161,437.016109.75260.740.04174,158.017128.46120.220.07182,465.01853.16261.050.05 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-226Rev. 3019337.51979.7780.670.09202,652.02077.7890.580.08 21515.02129.69100.630.2222437.022123.510110.260.05232,268,896.02365.811120.870.06 24170.82461.88110.860.1025142.12567.87120.570.12261,874.72678.87131.270.0527184.08140.830.04289.99151.630.152924.114233.410.80 3042.910161.000.1831164.911170.750.0532108.412180.690.09 33208.113140.340.0634134.114150.570.053547.615160.740.11 36215.616170.250.0337195.317180.440.03TABLE 6.2-28 THREED INPUT FOR ANALYSIS OF STEA M GENERATOR CUBICLE BVent Path Connecting NodeNode No.Node Vol. (ft 3)Vent Path No.Vent Path Area (ft 2)FromTo Forward K-factor f L/DInertia (ft
-1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-227Rev. 3038118.914170.800.063996.513180.700.07 4024.113232.320.144138.513190.470.094266.914232.250.09 4337.414190.490.084446.115231.760.19452.117191.430.09 462.816231.641.624739.517240.470.094810.417231.640.45 4932.818250.440.125060.519201.000.045110.920211.150.23 5210.921221.150.155310.920221.140.2354222.920231.040.01 5530.521231.040.065622.722231.040.08TABLE 6.2-28 THREED INPUT FOR ANALYSIS OF STEA M GENERATOR CUBICLE BVent Path Connecting NodeNode No.Node Vol. (ft 3)Vent Path No.Vent Path Area (ft 2)FromTo Forward K-factor f L/DInertia (ft
-1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-228Rev. 30579.719241.661.23589.724251.661.23 599.725191.661.236031.624210.720.116126.225220.770.12 62135.026231.310.01TABLE 6.2-28 THREED INPUT FOR ANALYSIS OF STEA M GENERATOR CUBICLE BVent Path Connecting NodeNode No.Node Vol. (ft 3)Vent Path No.Vent Path Area (ft 2)FromTo Forward K-factor f L/DInertia (ft
-1)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-229Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-29 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-230Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-30 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-231Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-31 MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE RATES FOR A SPRAY LINE DER IN THE PRESSURIZER CUBICLETime (seconds)Mass (lb/sec)Energy (Btu/sec)0.00.00.00.002515,552.02693,407,459.10.005025,756.66953,521,419.7 0.007515,692.30833,481,431.70.010025,615.64773,434,822.80.012515,582.04163,413,212.8 0.015025,605.90563,424,644.60.020036,046.92913,672,276.00.025056,094.26873,696,132.7 0.030046,377.22273,855,480.70.040026,514.35683,928,774.10.050056,255.17353,776,488.6 0.060036,324.98833,813,926.40.070066,345.50813,823,800.30.080036,287.21073,788,875.9 0.090016,040.91203,647,320.80.100026,273.57183,779,631.70.120096,432.57253,869,357.9 0.140106,098.83573,678,308.60.160116,193.97223,732,419.80.180086,019.79623,633,080.8 0.200106,057.08123,654,147.20.225046,074.99293,664,250.00.250096,018.48163,632,004.7 0.275066,082.11453,668,255.00.300045,925.24783,578,895.30.325055,865.64823,545,003.70.350275,801.42913,565,194.6 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-232Rev. 300.375125,838.49073,529,217.10.400025,902.62093,565,586.70.425105,873.38893,548,782.60.450055,788.40983,500,382.8 0.475145,794.99743,503,947.80.500115,760.36023,484,023.40.600045,749.20973,476,806.0 0.800055,685.67603,438,625.31.000055,671.77953,428,642.41.200055,642.66353,410,212.5 1.600105,570.31633,365,947.12.000005,535.83343,343,985.3TABLE 6.2-31 MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE RATES FOR A SPRAY LINE DER IN THE PRESSURIZER CUBICLETime (seconds)Mass (lb/sec)Energy (Btu/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-233Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-32 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-234Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-32A MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE RATES FOR A SURGE LINE DER IN THE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE Time (seconds)Mass (lbm/second)Energy (Btu/second)0.000000.0000.00.0025117553.57211425912.10.0050117422.25911340996.7 0.0075217572.43011432981.50.0100220028.95812977551.10.0125023244.63914998787.0 0.0150122780.36014701069.20.0200221536.20113910281.50.0250521788.97014067164.2 0.0300122096.82714258323.50.0400922163.79614296831.30.0500922168.79814297542.4 0.0600321954.86814161109.20.0700221486.33313865676.40.0800821559.65813911478.1 0.0900621177.33813670129.20.1001121246.03713713337.40.1200921458.63913844705.0 0.1400019982.68212915684.70.1600519494.77612609669.50.1800418528.59712003609.1 0.2000018050.37011704301.20.2251817998.64811671729.90.2500917696.52211481210.8 0.2750917106.07611111087.80.3000916635.33810816078.70.3250916555.41010765008.10.3502516519.04910741215.6 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-235Rev. 300.3750416482.63510717232.90.4000416457.39210700396.50.4250216449.95110694803.90.4501816448.88610693186.5 0.4750316430.15410680270.70.5002916372.01510662341.90.6001316348.31510623178.6 0.8002216274.59810566348.51.0082416153.70410479400.01.2006616042.29410398834.0 1.6000115843.66010253285.22.0002215596.98110076714.8100.0000015596.98110076714.8 100.010000.0000.0150.000000.0000.0TABLE 6.2-32A MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE RATES FOR A SURGE LINE DER IN THE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE Time (seconds)Mass (lbm/second)Energy (Btu/second)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-236Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-33 PRESSURIZER CUBICLE PEAK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURESVent Path Connecting NodesSpray Line Break in Node 15Surge Line Break in Node 5Surge Line Break in Node 20Vent Path (No.)FromToPressure (psid)Time (sec)Pressure (psid)Time (sec)Pressure (psid)Time (sec)11210.220.13215.410.18815.370.19221210.220.13215.410.18815370.192 31210.220.13215.410.18815.370.1924210.230.0728.450.0758.130.0855510.200.11014.610.0108.020.084 6410.220.0808.330.0817.970.0837310.220.0738.500.0828.080.085823-0.020.1634.270.0120.470.022 925-0.040.197-12.220.0081.970.01610450.100.161-13.050.008-0.400.0151134-0.070.160-2.970.0122.090.015 1226-0.250.1027.770.0168.970.0181357-0.300.10314.610.0107.650.0191448-0.230.0488.650.0197.400.019 1539-0.210.09911.160.0228.700.01716670.070.123-3.350.053-0.770.03717780.180.1043.260.0520.190.048 18890.140.086-1.390.034-0.680.02119690.060.105-2.370.033-0.170.03420610-4.370.05720.760.21620.830.227 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-237Rev. 3021711-4.400.05820.840.21020.850.22022812-3.900.07420.730.22220.800.22723812-3.900.07420.730.22220.800.227 24913-3.700.06320.760.21920.830.2322512214.370.0742.090.2162.060.136261011-0.950.020-0.110.054-0.330.081 2711121.570.0580.340.069-0.410.054281213-0.720.0600.310.0500.330.052291013-1.210.0410.220.0670.210.074 301014-3.830.0150.680.0650.600.066311115-5.910.0100.590.0650.440.068321216-3.000.0230.510.0530.560.055 331317-4.200.0220.530.1240.690.063341415-4.850.007-0.090.080-0.220.1403515165.800.009-0.250.098-0.310.100 3616171.680.0320.210.0990.200.101371417-3.010.0240.070.1240.130.1263814182.950.0130.360.1310.390.125 3915185.900.0100.410.1300.390.1154016181.690.0570.530.1000.560.102411718-1.850.0330.420.1310.370.102 4218192.510.0240.750.1440.700.1464319212.550.1071.250.1631.250.1654419212.550.1071.250.1631.250.1654519212.550.1071.250.1631.250.165462020.050.5203.200.007185.860.044TABLE 6.2-33 PRESSURIZER CUBICLE PEAK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURESVent Path Connecting NodesSpray Line Break in Node 15Surge Line Break in Node 5Surge Line Break in Node 20Vent Path (No.)FromToPressure (psid)Time (sec)Pressure (psid)Time (sec)Pressure (psid)Time (sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-238Rev. 30472050.050.520-10.87-0.013185.790.04748204-0.060.1593.910.008185.760.046492030.050.5205.010.009185.780.044TABLE 6.2-33 PRESSURIZER CUBICLE PEAK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURESVent Path Connecting NodesSpray Line Break in Node 15Surge Line Break in Node 5Surge Line Break in Node 20Vent Path (No.)FromToPressure (psid)Time (sec)Pressure (psid)Time (sec)Pressure (psid)Time (sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-239Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-33 PRESSURIZER CUBICLE PEAK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURESVent PathConnecting NodesSurge Line Break in Node 4Surge Line Break in Node 2Vent Path (No.)FromToPressure (psid)Time (sec)Pressure (psid)Time (sec)112115.460.18715.500.191212115.460.18715.500.191 312115.460.18715.500.1914218.450.08324.830.0085518.380.0838.610.081 64111.860.0108.230.0867318.410.07419.550.014823-4.400.01219.370.006 925-3.100.01223.320.007104510.480.008-3.840.0121134-9.730.00717.850.013 122611.310.02223.990.00713579.130.0207.160.016144812.160.0109.900.022 15397.190.01719.030.01316671.300.0343.430.05417783.410.0351.310.051 18893.210.0534.990.02119692.360.033-2.490.0212061020.970.22020.980.217 2171120.950.21720.760.2292281220.910.20720.720.2222381220.910.20720.720.2222491320.930.22120.990.2152512212.140.1272.050.139 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-240Rev. 30261011-0.330.0760.210.044271112-0.540.0470.280.083281213-0.450.0630.270.063 291013-0.330.047-0.200.0533010140.670.0570.410.0453111150.710.1120.360.132 3212160.720.0480.540.0603313170.730.0600.510.052341415-0.150.131-0.120.128 351516-0.320.086-0.290.1073616170.280.0810.190.105371417-0.150.086-0.240.111 3814180.380.1170.360.1033915180.400.1160.380.1224016180.560.0860.580.108 4117180.400.0900.520.1104218190.740.0920.680.0894319211.250.1541.240.164 4419211.250.1541.240.1644519211.250.1541.240.164462025.240.009-19.840.007 472053.970.0083.980.02648204-7.730.0135.170.010492033.160.008-13.390.013TABLE 6.2-33 PRESSURIZER CUBICLE PEAK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURESVent PathConnecting NodesSurge Line Break in Node 4Surge Line Break in Node 2Vent Path (No.)FromToPressure (psid)Time (sec)Pressure (psid)Time (sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-241Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-34 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-242Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-35 MASS AND ENER GY RELEASE RATES FOR A DOUBLE ENDED GUILLOTINE BREAK OF THE PRESS URIZER SURGE LINE (USED FOR A 196.6 SQUARE INCH HOT LEG LDR IN THE STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE)Time (seconds)Mass (lbm/sec)Energy (BTU/sec)0.000000.0000.00.0025117553.57211425912.1 0.0050117422.25911340996.70.0075217572.43011432981.50.0100220028.95812977551.1 0.0125023244.63914998787.00.0150122780.36014701069.20.0200221536.20113910281.5 0.0250521788.97014067164.20.0300122096.82714258323.50.0400922163.79614296831.3 0.0500922168.79814297542.40.0600321954.86814161109.20.0700221486.3313865676.4 0.0800821559.65813911478.10.0900621177.33813670129.20.1001121246.03713713337.4 0.1200921458.63913844705.00.1400019982.68212915684.70.1600519494.77612609669.5 0.1800418528.59712003609.10.2000018050.37011704301.20.2251817998.64811671729.9 0.2500917696.52211481210.80.2750917106.07611111087.80.3000916635.33810816078.70.3250916555.41010765008.1 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-243Rev. 300.3502516519.04910741215.60.3750416482.63510717232.90.4000416457.39210700396.5 0.4250216449.95110694803.90.4501816448.88610693186.50.4750316430.15410680270.7 0.5002916372.01510662341.90.6001316348.31510623178.60.8002216274.59810566348.5 1.0082416153.70410479400.01.2006616042.29410398834.01.6000115843.66010253285.2 2.0002215596.98110076714.8100.0000015596.98110076714.8100.010000.0000.0 150.000000.0000.0TABLE 6.2-35 MASS AND ENER GY RELEASE RATES FOR A DOUBLE ENDED GUILLOTINE BREAK OF THE PRESS URIZER SURGE LINE (USED FOR A 196.6 SQUARE INCH HOT LEG LDR IN THE STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE)Time (seconds)Mass (lbm/sec)Energy (BTU/sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-244Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-36 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-245Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-36A MASS AND ENERGY RELEA SE RATES FOR A FEEDWATER LINE SES IN THE STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLETime (sec)Mass Flow (lb/sec)Energy (Btu/lb)0.0124396.946 E62.0124346.946 E6 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-246Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-36B DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-247Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-37 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-248Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-37A DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-249Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-37B DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-250Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-38 STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE PEAK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES, PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE LDRVent Path (Number)Vent Path Connecting NodesPressure (psid)Time (seconds)FromTo1120.840.062231.170.049 334- 3.510.0244452.340.0275562.00.017 625- 2.60.018716- 2.760.0268171.520.038 91234.840.12110281.530.03411392.80.036123235.220.13913410-5 .470.015144262.50.024 15511- 7.580.008165262.320.018176123.210.029 186261.250.0561978- 1.110.0172089- 1.870.025 21910- 5.730.015221011- 6.490.0072311127.120.00824811- 7.950.00925712- 3.150.015 267131.680.053278141.890.054 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-251Rev. 30289152.460.052914234.550.1423010165.780.016 3111177.810.0083212182.980.0153313140.880.058 3414150.970.048351516- 2.970.0263616171.740.028 3717181.610.018381417- 2.250.021391318- 2.520.028 4013234.350.124113191.250.0554214234.550.142 4314190.890.0374415234.460.1574517192.580.021 4616234.910.094717241.30.0314817234.680.152 4918251.330.0275019203.30.146512021- 1.560.1675221220.30.022532022- 1.570.165 5420230.440.111TABLE 6.2-38 STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE PEAK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES, PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE LDRVent Path (Number)Vent Path Connecting NodesPressure (psid)Time (seconds)FromTo MPS3 UFSAR6.2-252Rev. 305521231.960.1685622231.970.163571924- 2.050.022 5824251.350.0215925191.660.0326024211.90.147 6125221.90.1546226234.250.155TABLE 6.2-38 STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE PEAK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES, PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE LDRVent Path (Number)Vent Path Connecting NodesPressure (psid)Time (seconds)FromTo MPS3 UFSAR6.2-253Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-39 STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE PEAK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL LINE LDR Vent Path (Number)Vent Path Connecting NodesPressure (psid)Time (seconds)FromTo112- 1.350.0212231.790.049 334- 5.120.02445- 5.340.0085565.540.009 625- 6.260.01716- 4.560.028170.890.036 91234.960.11110281.290.02111390.840.093123235.330.133134103.180.017144262.480.021 155115.580.009165265.290.008176123.280.018 186261.440.0219781.150.04620891.350.05 21910- 4.340.0242210113.40.0262311122.020.01624811- 2.810.01825712- 3.170.026 267132.050.04278141.850.033 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-254Rev. 30289152.680.0352914234.20.1513010165.110.025 3111172.950.0183212183.410.0263313140.440.049 3414150.840.053351516- 1.620.0833616170.720.085 3717180.50.079381417- 1.030.032391318- 1.150.033 4013234.340.1644113191.250.0514214234.20.151 4314190.860.0784415234.210.1254517191.610.037 4616234.830.0844717240.910.0474817234.440.146 4918251.060.0415019203.140.165512021- 1.520.082522122- 0.260.07532022- 1.460.142 5420230.470.051TABLE 6.2-39 STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE PEAK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL LINE LDR Vent Path (Number)Vent Path Connecting NodesPressure (psid)Time (seconds)FromTo MPS3 UFSAR6.2-255Rev. 305521231.890.1525622231.860.144571924- 0.880.039 5824250.380.0815925190.710.0356024211.810.142 6125221.870.1366226234.590.091TABLE 6.2-39 STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE PEAK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL LINE LDR Vent Path (Number)Vent Path Connecting NodesPressure (psid)Time (seconds)FromTo MPS3 UFSAR6.2-256Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-40 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-257Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-41 DELETED BY PK F FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-258Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-42 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-259Rev. 30NOTE:1. The controlling load combination for the refu eling cavity wall design is for the cavity filled with water during refueling, which results in a design pressure of 11.6 psid.2. The cold leg LDR break was eliminated due to the application of Leak Before Break (LBB) technology.3. Value based upon break from pressurizer surge line DER.4. Value based upon break from pr essurizer spray line DER. 5. Value based upon break from feedwater line SES.TABLE 6.2-43 SUBCOMPARTMENT DESI GN AND MAXIMUM CALCULATED DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES CompartmentDesign Pressure (psid, uniform)
Maximum Calculated Pressure (psid, local)
Refueling Cavity (1)11.6N/A - Note 2 Upper Reactor Cavity120.0N/A - Note 2 Lower Pressurizer Cubicle27.324.58 - Note 3 Upper Pressurizer Cubicle7.75.83 - Note 4Steam Generator Cubicle21.717.99 - Note 3Steam Generator Enclosure above Operating Floor9.24.6 - Note 5 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-260Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-44 OMITTED MPS3 UFSAR6.2-261Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-45 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-262Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-46 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-263Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-47 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-264Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-48 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-265Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-49 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-266Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-50 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-267Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-51 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-268Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-52 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-269Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-53 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-270Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-54 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-271Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-55 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-272Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-56 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-273Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-57 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-274Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-58 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-275Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-59 BALANCE OF PLANT PARAMETERS USED IN STEAM LINE BREAK MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE CALCULATION 1.Main Feedwater System
- a. Feedwater line volume between steam generator and feedwater isolati on valve (FWIV) (ft 3)438b. FWIV and FCV closure times (seconds) 7.0 2.Auxiliary Feedwater System
- a. Flow to broken loop SG, limite d by cavitating venturis (lbm/sec):
Double-ended ruptures and split rupture 39.0b. Assumed time of manual termination (min) 30 3.Main Steam System
- a. Total piping volume (ft
- 2) 10,111b. Volume between the break and the nearest MSIV For broken loop MSIV functioning (ft 3)947 For failure of broken loop MSIV (ft
- 3) 8,074c. Steam line minimum cr oss-sectional area (ft
- 2) 1.4 (1)d. MSIV closure time (sec) 12.0 (2)e. Instrument response and signal processing delay (sec) 1.81. For the Double Ended Rupture (DER) cases, th e forward-flow cross-sectional area from the faulted steam generator is limited by the integral flow restrictor of 1.4 ft 2, which is less than the actual area of 4.12 ft 2 for the main steam line piping inside containment.2. Includes instrument response and signal processing delay.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-276Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-60 PARAMETERS FOR ECCS CONTAINMENT BACKPRESSURE ANALYSIS Containment Net Free Volume 2,350,000 ft 3 Initial Conditions Minimum air initial containment partial pressure at full power operation 8.9 psia Minimum steam initial containment partial pressure at full pow er operation 0.00 psia Minimum initial containment temperature at full power operation 80
°F RWST temperature 40.0
°F Temperature outside containment -20
°F Initial spray temperature 40.0
°F Spray System Number of containment spray pumps operating 2 Post-accident containment spray system initiation delay 26.3 sec (1)Maximum spray system flow from all containment spray pumps 6500 gpm Fan Cooler Not modeled (2) Recirculation Spray Not modeled (3) Notes:1. Assumes off site power is available.2. The containment atmosphere recirculation fans A and B are stopped automatically on receipt of a CDA signal, even if the SIS or LOP signal has previously started the fans. Component cooling water is provided to the containment atmosphere recirculation cooling coils instead of chilled water on receipt of an LOP or CIA signal.3. The time at which the recirculation spray pumps are actuated is based on the low RWST level signal. The fasted time to low RWST level signal is 1962 seconds, which is past the PCT time calculated for the Best Estimate Large Break LOCA. Therefore, containment recirculation spray is not modeled in the Best Estimate Large Break LOCA.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-277Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-61 CONTAINMENT HEAT REMO VAL SYSTEMS COMPONENT DATA DataQuench Spray Pumps Number2TypeHorizontal centrifugalRated flow (gpm)4,000 Rated head (ft)291Horsepower (normal Bhp)386Material316 SS
Containment Recirculation Pumps Number4Rated flow (gpm)3,950 Rated head (ft)342Horsepower (normal Bhp)443Material304 SS Refueling Water Storage Tank Number1Volume (gal.) (see Figure 6.3-6)1,166,000 min 1,207,000 maxBoron concentration (ppm)2,700 min 2,900 maxDesign pressureHydraulic head Design temperature
(°F)150Operating pressure (psig)Hydraulic head
Operating temperature
(°F)40-75MaterialSA240-TP304Design codeASME III, Class 2 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-278Rev. 30Trisodium Phosphate Baskets Number12Minimum volume (to mark), each (cu. ft.)81.17Minimum density of TSP (lb/cu. ft.)54.0 Spray Headers CRS QSS Elevations (ft)145 ft. 3 in.141 ft. 9 in.168153 (operating floor elevatio n = 51 feet 4 inches)Azimuth coverage (degrees)360360360360 Diameter (ft)105107.54491Pipe diameter1212610No. of nozzles per header16016070192
Mass mean diameter of spray droplets (microns) at 40 psi1,0371,0371,0371,037 Maximum diameter that will pass through nozzles3/83/83/83/8 Sump screens mesh (in.)1/16
Containment Recirculation Coolers Number4TypeConventional shell and tube heat exchanger Shell sourceContainmen t recirculation waterTube sourceService waterTABLE 6.2-61 CONTAINMENT HEAT REMO VAL SYSTEMS COMPONENT DATA Data MPS3 UFSAR6.2-279Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-62 CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS CONSEQUENCES OF COMPONENTS MALFUNCTComponentsMalfunctionComments and ConsequencesQuench Spray PumpsPump Casing RupturesThe casing is designed for 150
°F temperature. Design pressure is 200 ps i maximum test pressure is 300 psi
- g. These conditions exceed those whi c would occur during operating conditions. The casings are made from st a steel (SA351-CF8M). This metal ha s corrosion-erosion resistance and produces sound castings. The pumps conform to Seismic Category I an d ASME Code Section III, Class 2 design requirements.
The pumps are enclosed in cubicles and protected from internally generated missiles. R u of the pump casing by a missile is not considered credible. Rupture of t h pump casing is therefore not considered credible.Quench Spray PumpsPump fails to startThe quench spra y system has two redundant parallel pumps. Sufficient capacity is provided by one pump in ca se of failure of the other pump.Quench Spray Pump Discharge Isolation ValveValve fails to openThe quench spray system has two redundant parallel pumps. Sufficient capacity is provided by one pump in ca se of failure of the other pump discharge isolation valve.Quench Spray Pump Discharge Isolation ValveRupture of valve bodyThe valve body is designed for 200 lb. The castings are made from stai n steel; this material has corrosion resistance and produces sound casting s Rupture of the valve body is not considered credible.Quench Spray Pump Check Valve Swing check valve in pump discharge line sticks closedValve is checked periodically. In addition, redundant parallel quench s p subsystem is operable, in case of failure of valve to open.Quench Spray PipingRupture of pipingThe piping is fabricated of Type 304 stainless steel; this metal has corr o erosion resistance. Pipi ng is designed for Seismi c Category I. Pipe rupt u not considered credible.
Containment Recirculation Spray PumpPump fails to startFour containment recircul ation pumps are provided. Only two out of fo must operate.
Containment Recirculation Spray CoolersTube or shell ruptureFour containment recirc ulation spray coolers ar e provided. The contain m recirculation spray coolers are designed to the AS ME Section III, Code 2/3, and Seismic Category I requirements. Rupture is considered unlikel yservice water discharge from each tr ain of the coolers is monitored for radiation; a high radiation level indicates a tube rupture in a train. In the of a rupture, motor-operated valves are provided to isolate the train an d prevent further leakage. Also, a re dundant containment recirculation sp r subsystem can be used.
Containment Recirculation PumpRupture of pump casingThe pump casing is fabricated of Type 304 stainless steel. This metal is corrosion resistant. The pump casings are missile-protected and set in concrete. Rupture of the pump casi ng is not considered credible.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-280Rev. 30 Containment Recirculation Spray PipingRupture of pipingPiping is fabricated of Type 304 stainless steel and designed to ASME I Code Class 2. Piping is also missil e-protected. Rupture of piping is not considered credible. However, in case of pipe rupture fo r pipe lines to a from containment recirculation pum ps, isolation valves are provided.
Containment Recirculation Spray Pump Discharge Isolation ValveRupture of valve bodyValve body is designed for 275 lb. The castings are made from stainles s This material has corrosion eros ion resistance and produces sound cast i The valves are missile-protected. R upture of valve body is not conside r credible.Motor-Operated Valves (where opening is required
for QSS)Loss of power to one valve due to failure of electric bus Redundant valves are provided where valves are required to open on a C signal. Electric power to these valv es is supplied from separate buses.
O valves are left open during normal pl ant operation to ensure against fai l open.Automatic Electric and Control Instrumentation Trains to Actuate Engineered Safety Features EquipmentFailure of one trainRedundant tr ain actuates redundant equipment.Spray NozzleSpray nozzles pluggedThree layers of screening are provide d in the suction of containment recirculation pumps. The strainers and the screen mesh are small enou g prevent passage of any material which could plug the spray nozzles.Containment Sump StrainerStrainer clogged or damaged The strainers have been evaluated for possible failure mechanisms. It w concluded that there are no reasonable postulated failures of the straine raccordance with Section 3.1.1.3, the strainer is considered especially qu afor service.TABLE 6.2-62 CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS CONSEQUENCES OF COMPONENTS MALFUNCTComponentsMalfunctionComments and Consequences MPS3 UFSAR6.2-281Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-63 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK CO LLECTION AND R ELEASE SYSTEM PRINCIPAL COMPONENT AND DESIGN PARAMETERSDesign Parameters Filtration Units Equipment Mark No.3HVR*FLT3A/3BQuantity2 Maximum capacity (cfm/unit)9,800HEPA FilterMaximum capacity9,800
Pressure drop, clean/change out (i n wg) at rated capacity of 1,500 cfm/element 1.30/1.75 Pressure drop at maximum capac ity flow rate of 1,633 cfm/
element 1.42 Charcoal Absorber Rated capacity for 5 cells at 2,000 (cfm) each10,000Pressure drop, clean (in wg)2.5 Filtration Fans Equipment Mark No.3HVR*FN12A, 12B Quantity2TypeCentrifugalCapacity (cfm)9,500 FluidAirOperating temperature (°F)120DriveDirect Static pressure (in wg)25.8Motor horsepower75 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-282Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-64 CONTAINMENT ENCLOSURE BUILDING DESIGN PARAMETERSContainment Enclosure BuildingDesign Parameters Free volume (ft 3)8.16 x 10 5 Pressure, in wg1. Normal operation0 (atmospheric pressure)
- 2. Post-accidentNegative pressure: To ensure a negative pressure in the containment Enclosure Building, negative pressure is measured at the Auxiliary Building 24 foot 6 inches elevation and maintained per
technical specificat ions at greater than or equal to 0.4 inches of water gauge.Leak Rate from Primary Containment to the Enclosure Building at Post-accident Pressure (%/day)See Table 15.6-9Inside Air Temperature (°F)140Outside Air Temperature (°F)86Thickness of Primary Containment Wall (in.)54Thickness of Enclosure Building Wall (in.)Inside panel 18 gage galvanized steel Outside panel 18 gage painted steelCoefficient of Linear Expans ion of Primary Containment Wall (in/in-
°F)6 x 10-6 Modulus of Elasticity of Primary Containment Wall (psi) 3 x 10 6 Thermal Conductivity of Primary Containment Wall (Btu/hr/ft 2/°F/ft)1.05Thermal conductivity of Enclosure Building Wall (Btu/hr/ft 2/°F/ft)26.2 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-283Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec)
(I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)Class A Penetratio ns Reactor coolant hot legs sampleNE12B13/4Liqui d9.3-2 A55NoI3SSR*CTV26 / Globe /
Solenoid 3SSR*CTV27 / Globe / Solenoi d Open Shut (3)ShutFCCIAA / BAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3SSR*V799 , 3SSR*V800Pressurizer vapor space sampleNE12A13/4Gas9.3-2 A55NoI3SSR*CTV20 /3SSR*CTV21 /Open Shut (3)ShutFCCIAA / BAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3SSR*V811 Globe / SolenoidGlobe / Solenoi d3SSR*V812Pressurizer relief tank (PRT) gas sampleNE12C13/4Gas9.3-2 A56NoI3SSR*CV8026 /3SSR*CV8025
/Open Shut (3)ShutFCCIAA / BAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3SSR*V788 Globe / SolenoidGlobe / Solenoi dReactor coolant cold legs
sampleNE13A13/4Liqui d9.3-2 A55NoI3SSR*CTV29 /3SSR*CTV30 /Open Shut (3)ShutFCCIAA / BAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3SSR*V787 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-284Rev. 30 Globe / SolenoidGlobe / Solenoi d3SSR*V795Safety injection accumulators sampleNE13D13/4Liqui d9.3-2 A55NoI3SSR*CTV32 /3SSR*CTV33
/Open Shut (3)ShutFCCIAA / BAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3SSR*V792 Globe / SolenoidGlobe / Solenoi d N 2 to safety injection accumulat orsNE1411Gas6.2-37 GG56NoII3SIL*CV8968 /3SIL*CV8880 /ShutShutShutFCCIAA / BAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 16Yes3SIL*V916 Globe / Air PilotGlobe / Air Pilot3SIL*V989Primary grade water to PRTNE1513Liqui d9.2-11 NN56NoII3PGS*CV8046 /3PGS*CV8028 /OpenOpenShutFCCIAA / BAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3PGS*V948 3PGS*V673 Globe / Air PilotGlobe / Air Pilot3/43PGS*RV77 / ShutShutShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Self-Actua tedN.A.N.A.N.A.TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-285Rev. 30 ReliefSeal water injection to reactor coolant pumpsE16, 17, 18, 1942Liqui d9.3-7 S55 (4) NoI3CHS*V394, 434, 467, 501 / 3CHS*MV8109A, B, C, D / Open Shut (3) / Open Shut / OpenN.A. / FAIN.A.N.A. / A, B, A, B Backf low / Remo te Manu alN.A. / ManualN.A. / NSR< 10No3CHS*V51 7Check / N.A.Globe / Motor3CHS*V80 83CHS*V45 1 3CHS*V82 03CHS*V41 43CHS*V82 7 3CHS*V48 43CHS*V81 4Seal water return from reactor coolant pumpsNE23 1 (5)2Liqui d9.3-8 T55NoI3CHS*MV8112
/ 3CHS*MV810 0 / OpenOpenShutFAICIAA / BAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3CHS*V54 7TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-286Rev. 30 Globe / MotorGlobe / Motor3CHS*V75 83/43CHS*RV8113 / ShutShutShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Self-Actua tedN.A.N.A.YesN.A.Relief / N.A.Reactor coolant letdownE24 (6)1 (5) (7)3Liqui d9.3-8 G55NoII3CHS*CV8160 / 3CHS*CV8152 / Open Shut (3) ShutFCCIAA / BAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3CHS*V99 5 Globe / Air PilotGlobe / Air Pilot2 1/23CHS*RV8117 / ShutShutShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Self-Actua tedN.A.N.A.YesN.A.Relief / N.A.Reactor coolant chargingE2613Liqui d9.3-8 H55NoI3CHS*V58 / 3CHS*MV810 5 / Open Shut (3)ShutN.A. / FAIN.A. / SISN.A. / A Backf low /
Auto maticN.A. / Remote ManualN.A. / 40 (8)< 10No3CHS*V38 5Check / N.A.Gate / Motor3CHS*V83 9TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-287Rev. 30PRT & Containm ent drains transfer pumps dischargeNE27 1 (5) 3Liqui d9.3-5 NN56NoII3DGS*CTV24 / 3DGS*CTV25
/ Shut (2)/ Open Shut (3) ShutFCCIAA / BAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3DGS*V82 4 Globe / Air PilotGlobe / Air Pilot3/43DGS*RV51 / ShutShutShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Self-Actua tedN.A.N.A.Relief Containm ent drains sump pump dischargeNE28 1 (5)2Liqui d9.3-6 NN56NoI3DAS*CTV24 / 3DAS*CTV25 / Shut (2) / Open Shut (3)ShutFCCIAA/BAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 14Yes3DAS*V92 4 Globe / Air PilotGlobe / Air Pilot3/43DAS*RV87 / ShutShutShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Self-Actua tedN.A.N.A.ReliefTABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-288Rev. 30PRT & containm ent drains transfer tank ventNE2913/4Gas9.3-5 NN56NoI3VRS*CTV20 / 3VRS*CTV21
/OpenOpenShutFCCIAA/BAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3VRS*V99 1Diaphragm / Air PilotDiaphragm / Air Pilot Containment vacuum pump suctionNE35, 3622Gas9.4-5 J256 (4)NoN.A. / INone3CVS*CTV20A, B; 21A, B Shut (3) Shut (3) Shut (3)N.A . / FCN.A. / CIAN.A. / A, A; B,B Auto maticRemote ManualN.A. / 60< 16YesN.A./ Globe / Air Pilot Chilled water supplyNE38, 72 2 (5)8Liqui d9.2-3 NN56NoI3CDS*CTV91A, B / 3CDS*CTV38A, B / Open Shut (3)ShutFCCIAB, B / A, A Auto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3CDS*V92 9Butterfly
/ Air Pilot Butterfly / Air Pilot3CDS*V93 63/43CDS*RV105A, B / ShutShutShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Self-Actua tedN.A.N.A.Relief Chilled water returnNE45, 116 2 (5)10Liqui d9.2-3 NN56NoI3CDS*CTV40A, B / 3CDS*CTV39A, B / Open Shut (3)ShutFCCIAB / AAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3CDS*V93 0TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-289Rev. 30Butterfly
/ Air Pilot Butterfly / Air Pilot3CDS*V93 43/43CDS*RV106 A, B /ShutShutShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Self-Actua tedN.A.N.A.ReliefInstrumen t airNE5412Gas9.3-1 B56NoII3IAS*M OV72 / 3IAS*P V15 / OpenOpenShutFAI /
FCCIAB / AAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3IAS*V998 Globe / MotorGlobe / Air PilotFire protectionNE56 1 (5)6Liqui d9.5-1 FF56NoI3FPW*CTV49 / 3FPW*CTV48
/ OpenOpenShutFCCIAB / AAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3FPW*V66 5Butterfly
/ Air Pilot Butterfly / Air Pilot3FPW*V64 1 3FPW*V661 / 3FPW*V666 / Shut (3) Shut (3)ShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Manu al (A.C.)N.A.N.A.< 10YesN.A.Globe / Handwh eelGlobe / Handwh eel3/43FPW*RV87 / ShutShutShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Self-Actua tedN.A.N.A.N.A.
ReliefTABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-290Rev. 30 Containment atmosphere monitor dischargeNE6311Gas6.2-53 B56NoI3CMS*MOV24
/ 3CMS*CTV23
/ OpenOpenShut (3)FAI / FCCIAB / AAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3CMS*V00 9 Globe / MotorGlobe / Air Pilot Containment atmosphere monitor suctionNE3211Gas6.2-53 J156 (4)NoN.A. / INone3CMS*CTV20, 21 / OpenOpen Shut (3)N.A. / FCN.A. / CIAN.A. / A, B Auto maticRemote ManualN.A. / 60< 10YesGlobe / Air PilotSafety injection test and accumulator fill lineNE99 1 (5)3/4Liqui d6.3-2 F56NoI3SIH*RV8870 /
Relief 3SIH*CV8964 / Globe / Air Pilot Shut (3) Shut (3)ShutFCCIABAuto maticRemote ManualN.A. / 60 < 10Yes3SIH*V937, 3SIH*V793, 3SIH*V984, 3SIH*V938, 3SIH*V9853SIH*CV8871 / 3SIH*CV8888 / Shut (3) Shut (3)ShutFCCIAA / BAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60N.A.Globe / Air PilotGlobe / Air PilotTABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-291Rev. 30Nitrogen supply headerNE12411Gas9.5-5 HH56NoII3GSN*CTV105 / 3GSN*CV8033
/ ShutShutShutFCCIAA / BAuto maticRemote Manual60 / 60< 10Yes3GSN*V97 0 Globe / Air PilotGlobe / Air PilotPost-accident sampleNE115 1 (5) 3/4Liqui d9.3-10 MM55NoI3SSP*CTV7 / 3SSP*V13 / Shut Shut Shut Shut Shut Shut FC N.A.CIA N.A.A N.A.Auto matic
/ Manu al A.C.Remote Manual
/ N.A.60 / N.A.< 10Yes3SSP*V021 Globe /SolenoidGlobe / Handwh eel 3SSP*V022 3SSP*V105 3SSP*V1063/43SSP*R V62 / ShutShutShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Self-Actua tedN.A.N.A.ReliefPost-accident sample returnNE120 1 (5)3/4Liqui d9.3-10 MM55NoI3SSP*CTV8 / 3SSP*V14 / Shut Shut Shut Shut Shut Shut FC N.A.CIA N.A.A N.A.Auto matic
/ Manu al A.C.Remote Manual
/ N.A.60 / N.A.< 10Yes3SSP*V023TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-292Rev. 30 Globe / SolenoidGlobe / Handwh eel 3SSP*V101 3SSP*V155 3SSP*V1563/43SSP*R V63 / ShutShutShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Self-Actua tedN.A.N.A.ReliefReactor plant compone nt cooling supply headersNE39, 40210Liqui d9.2-2 KK56NoI3CCP*V18, V60 /
3CCP*MOV45A, B / OpenOpenShutN.A./FAI NA / CIBA, BAuto maticRemote ManualN.A. / 60< 10No3CCP*V397CheckButterfl y / Motor3CCP*V437Reactor plant compone nt cooling return headersNE41, 42 2 (5)10Liqui d9.2-2 LL56NoI3CCP*MOV48A, B / 3CCP*MOV49A , B / OpenOpenShutFAICIBA, B / B, A Auto maticRemote Manual60 / 6010No3CCP*V398Butterfly
/ Motor Butterfl y / Motor3CCP*V436TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-293Rev. 303/43CCP*RV275 A, B / ShutShutShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Self-Actua tedN.A.N.A.N.A.
ReliefResidual heat removal pumps suction from hot legsE91, 92 2 (4) (7)12Liqui d6.2-37 DD55NoI3RHS*MV8701 A, 8702B /3RHS*MV8701B, 87002AShutOpen (3) ShutFAIN.A.A, B / B, A Remo te Manu al (A.C.)Manual (A.C.)NSR< 10No3RHS*V00 9 Gate / Motor/ Gate / Motor3RHS*V02 643RHS*RV8708A, B /ShutShutShut (3)Shut N.A.N.A.N.A.Self-Actua tedN.A.N.A.<10NoClass B Penetratio ns Relief /
N.A.Main steam linesE1, 2, 3, 4 4 (5) (7)30Gas10.3-1 M57NoN.A. (Typ)None (closed)3MSS*CTV27A, B, C, D / Open Shut (3)ShutFCSLIAB, AB, AB, AB Auto maticRemote Manual10 (Modes 1, 2 & 3)30NoN.A.Globe / Steam Pilot120 Mode 4) See Note 10TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-294Rev. 30N.A. (Typ)3MSS*HV28A, B, C, D / Shut (3)Shut (3)ShutFCSLIAB, AB, AB, AB Auto maticRemote Manual10< 39NoN.A.Globe / Air Pilot 3MSS*
RV22, 23, 24, 25, 26A, B, C, D / ShutShutShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Self-Actua tedN.A.N.A.< 17NoN.A.ReliefN.A. (Typ)3DTM*AOV29A, B, C, D / OpenShutShutFCSLIA,BAuto maticRemote Manual10< 34NoN.A.Globe / Air PilotN.A. (Typ)3MSS*PV20A, B, C, D / ShutShutShutFCSLIB,A, B,A Auto maticRemote Manual NSR< 37NoN.A.Globe / Air PilotTABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-295Rev. 30N.A. (Typ)3MSS*MOV74 A, B, C, D ShutShutShutFAIN.A.B,A, B,A Remo te Manu alManualNSR< 42NoN.A./ Globe / MotorMain feedwater linesNE5, 6, 7, 8 4 (7)20Liqui d10.4-6 N57NoN.A. (Typ)None (closed)3FWS*CTV41 A, B, C, D / Open Shut (3)ShutFCSIS, FWIBAuto maticRemote Manual510NoN.A.Gate / Hydr. PilotSteam generator blowdow n linesNE47, 48, 49 ,50 4 (7)4Liqui d10.3-1 E57NoN.A. (Typ)None (closed)3BDG*CTV22A, B, C, D / Open Shut (3)ShutFCNote 17 AB, AB, AB, AB Auto maticRemote Manual1010NoN.A.Globe / Air PilotSteam generator blowdow n sample linesNE122A, B ,C, D3/4Liqui d9.3-2 JJ57NoN.A.None (closed)3SSR*CTV19A, B, C, D /OpenOpenShutFCNote 18 B, B B, B Auto maticRemote Manual10< 10NoN.A.Class C Penetratio ns Globe /Solenoi dTABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-296Rev. 30High-pressure boron injection to cold legsE51 1 (5)3Liqui d6.3-2 Q55 (4)YesI3SIH*V 5 / 3SIH*MV880 1A, B ShutShutOpenN.A. / FAIN.A. / SIS, CLIP signalN.A. / A, B Backf low /
Auto maticN.A. / Remote ManualN.A. / 40 (8)10No3SIH-V883Check / N.A./ Gate / Motor3SIH-V990I3SIH*CV8843 / Shut (3)ShutShutFCCIAAAuto maticRemote Manual60 NoN.A.Globe / Air PilotResidual heat removal pumps discharge to cold legsE93, 94 2 (5) 10Liqui d6.2-37 U55 (4)YesI3SIL*V6, 7, 12, 13 / 3SIL*MV8809 A, B / Shut / Open Shut (3) OpenOpenN.A. / FAIN.A.N.A. / A, B Backf low /
Remo te Manu alN.A. / ManualN.A. / NSR10No3SIL-V877Check / N.A.Gate / Motor 3 SIL*V818, 3SIL-V928, 3SIL-V930, 3SIL-V931, 3SIL-V937, 3SIL-V938, 3SIL-V939TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-297Rev. 30I3SIL*CV8890A, B / Shut (3)ShutShutFCCIAAAuto maticRemote Manual60No Globe / Air PilotResidual heat removal pumps discharge to hot legsE95 1 (5)8Liqui d6.2-37 V55 (4)YesI3SIL*V26, 28 / 3SIL*MV8840 / ShutShutShutN.A. / FAIN.A.N.A. / B Backf low / Remo te Manu alN.A. / ManualN.A. / NSR10No3SIL*V879Check / N.A.Gate / Motor3SIL*V920, 3SIL*V921, 3SIL*V922I3SIL*CV8825 / Shut (3)ShutShutFCCIAAAuto maticRemote Manual60No Globe / Air PilotTABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-298Rev. 30Safety injection pumps discharge to hot legsE96, 97 2 (5)4Liqui d6.3-2 R55 (4)YesI3SIL*V27, 29, SIH*V110, 112 / Check /
N.A.3SIH*MV880 2A, B / Gate / MotorShutShutOpenN.A. / FAIN.A.N.A. / A, B Backf low /
Remo te Manu alN.A. / Manual N.A ./ NSR10No3SIH*V113, 3SIH*V114, 3SIH*V115, 3SIH*V116, 3SIH*V117, 3SIH*V118, 3SIH*V119, 3SIH*V120, 3SIH*V794, 3SIH*V795, 3SIH*V842, 3SIH*V843, 3SIH*V844, 3SIH*V845, 3SIH*V846, 3SIH*V915, 3SIH*V916, 3SIH*V917, 3SIH*V918, 3SIH*V919, 3SIH*V920, 3SIH*V921, 3SIH*V922, 3SIH*V969, 3SIH*V971TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-299Rev. 30I3SIH*CV8881, 8824 / Globe / Air Pilot Shut (3) ShutShutFCCIAAAuto maticRemote Manual60No3SIH*V842, 3SIH*V843Safety injection pumps discharge to cold legsE98 1 (5)4Liqui d6.3-2 Z55 (4)YesI3SIH*V22, 24, 26, 28 /
Check / N.A. 3SIH*MV8835 / Gate
/ MotorShut / OpenShut / OpenOpenN.A. / FAIN.AN.A. / A Backf low / Remo te Manu alN.A. / ManualN.A. / NSR10No3SIH*V1213SIH*V1223SIH*V1233SIH*V124 3SIH*V1253SIH*V1263SIH*V127 3SIH*V1283SIH*V8483SIH*V849 3SIH*V8503SIH*V8513SIH*V852 3SIH*V8533SIH*V8543SIH*V855 3SIH*V9073SIH*V9083SIH*V909TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-300Rev. 303SIH*V9103SIH*V911 3SIH*V9123SIH*V9133SIH*V914 3SIH*V967I3SIH*CV8823 / Shut (3)ShutShutFCCIAAAuto maticRemote Manual60No Globe / Air PilotQuench spray pumps dischargeE100, 101212Liqui d6.2-36 W56 (4)YesI3QSS*V4, 8 / 3QSS*MOV34A, B / ShutShutOpenN.A. / FAIN.A. / CDAN.A./ A, B Backf low / Auto maticN.A. / Remote ManualN.A. / 40< 12Yes3QSS*V948Check / N.A.Butterfl y / Motor 3QSS*V950 Containment recirculati on pump suctionE102,103, 104, 105412Liqui d6.2-37 AA56 (4)YesINone3RSS*MOV23A, B, C, D, / OpenOpenOpenFAICDAA, B, A, B Auto maticRemote Manual NSR< 10NoN.A.Butterfl y / Motor TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-301Rev. 30 Containment recirculation pump dischargeE107, 108, 109, 110410Liqui d6.2-37 X56 (4) YesI3RSS*V3, 6, 9, 12 / 3RSS*MOV20 A, B, C, D / Shut/Open Shut/OpenOpenN.A. / FAIN.A. / CDAN.A. / A, B, A, B Backf low /
Auto maticN.A. / Remote ManualN.A. / NSR< 10No3RSS*V950Check / N.A.Butterfl y / Motor 3RSS*V9513RSS*V9523RSS*V953Auxiliary feedwater linesE79, 80, 81, 8244Liqui d10.4-6 N57YesN.A. (Typ)None (closed)3FWA*MOV35 A, B, C, D / OpenOpenOpenFAIN.A.B, A, A, B Remo te Manu alManualNSR11No3FWA*V87 8Gate / Motor3FWA*V88 03FWA*V93 7 3FWA*V94 13FWA*V94 43FWA*V94 8N.A. (Typ)3FWA*HV36A, B, C, D,
/ OpenOpenOpen F0 (10)N.A.B, A A, B Remo te Manu alN.A.NSR< 10NoN.A.TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-302Rev. 30Globe / Solenoi dMain steam to auxiliary feedwater pump turbinesE74, 75, 76 (6)3 (7)3Gas10.3-1 M57YesN.A.None (closed)3MSS*MOV17 A, B, D / Shut Shut(3)OpenN.A./FAIN.A.B, A, A Backf low /
Remo te Manu alManualN.A. /
NSR< 26No3MSS*V90 0 Non return /
Motor 3MSS*V90 2 3MSS*V90 4N.A.None (closed)3MSS*V885ShutShutShutN.A.N.A.N.A.N.A. Manual N.A.< 26NoN.A.3MSS*V886 3MSS*V887 GlobeN.A. (Typ)3DTM*AOV63 A, B, D / OpenShutShutFCSLIAAuto maticRemote Manual1014No.N.A. Globe / Air PilotTABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-303Rev. 30Hydrogen recombin er suctionE111, 11222Gas6.2-36 CC56 (4)YesN.A. / INone3HCS*V2, 3, 9, 10 / ShutShut Shut(3)N.A.N.A.N.A.(A.C.) Manu alN.A.N.A.19YesN.A.Diaphragm /
Handwh eelHydrogen recombiner discharge113, 11422Gas6.2-36 C56YesI3HCS*V7, V14 / 3HCS*V6, V13 / ShutShut Shut(3)N.A.N.A.N.A.Backf low / Manu al (A.C.)N.A.N.A.12Yes3HCS*V01 8 Check / N.A.Diaphragm /
Handwh eel3HCS*V02 2 Containment leakage monitorin g open tapsE9A, 13C, 68, 33A43/4Gas11.5-2 KRG 1.11YesN.A.None3LMS*MOV40A, B, C, D / OpenOpenOpenFAIN.A.A, B, A, B Remo te Manu alManualNSR< 14NoN.A.Class D Penetratio ns Globe / MotorTABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-304Rev. 30 Containment vacuum ejector suctionNE3718Gas9.4-5 BB56NoI3CVS*A OV23 / 3CVS*V20 / Shut Shut (3)ShutFC / N.A.N.A.Non-Class IE / N.A.Remo te Manu al (A.C.)
/ Manu al (A.C.)N.A.NSR /
N.A.< 10Yes3CVS*V97 6Butterfly
/ Air Pilot Butterfl y /
Manual Operato rService air lineNE5212Gas9.3-1 D56NoI3SAS*V875 / 3SAS*V50 / Shut Shut (3)ShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Manu al (A.C.)N.A.N.A.< 10Yes3SAS*V882 Globe / Handwh eelGlobe / Handwh eelRefueling cavity purificati
on inletNE5913Liqui d9.1-6 D56NoI3SFC*V991 / 3SFC*V992 / Shut Shut (3)ShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Manu al (A.C.)N.A.N.A.< 10Yes3SFC*V864Gate / Handwh eelGate / Handwh eelTABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-305Rev. 30Refueling cavity purification outletNE6014Liqui d9.1-6 D56NoI3SFC*V990 / 3SFC*V989 / Shut Shut (3)ShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Manu al (A.C.)N.A.N.A.< 10Yes3SFC*V863Gate / Handwh eelGate / Handwh eelReactor coolant loop fillNE6212Liqui d9.3-8 EE55NoI3CHS*V372 / 3CHS*V371 / Shut Shut (3)ShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Backf low / Manu al (A.C.)N.A.N.A.< 10No3CHS*V38 9Check / N.A.Globe / Handwh eel3CHS*V83 73/43CHS*RV8351 / ShutShutShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Self-Actua tedN.A.N.A.Relief Containm ent purge air supplyNE86 1 (5)42Gas9.4-5 P56NoII3HVU*CTV33A / 3HVU*CTV32 A / ShutOpenShutFCRad.
Monitor Alarm B / AAuto maticRemote Manual (A.C.)N.A.< 13Yes3HVU*V96 3 Butterfly
/ Air Pilot Butterfly / Air PilotII3HVU*V5 / ShutOpenShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Manu al (A.C.)N.A.N.A.< 13YesTABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-306Rev. 30 Butterfl y /
Handwh eel Containm ent purge air exhaustNE85142Gas9.4-5 L56NoII3HVU*CTV33B / 3HVU*CTV32 B / ShutOpenShutFCRad.
Monitor Alarm (8)B / AAuto maticRemote Manual (A.C.)N.A.< 10Yes3HVU*V96 2 Butterfly
/ Air Pilot Butterfly / Air PilotDemineralized water supply inside containm ent NE7012Liqui d9.2-2 D56NoI3CCP*V886 / Gate /
Handwh eel 3CCP*V887 / Gate /
Handwh eelShutOpenShutN.A.N.A.N.A.Manu al (A.C.)N.A.N.A.< 10Yes3CCP*V882Steam generator chemical feed linesNE12343/4Liqui d10.3-3 N57NoN.A. (Typ)None (closed)3SGF*AOV24 A, B, C, D / Shut Shut (3)ShutFCN.A. /
FWIA, B / A, B Auto maticRemote ManualN.A. / 6010NoN.A.Globe / Air PilotTABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-307Rev. 30NOTES:1.Motor - Motor-operated valve, remote manua l operation from control room or operated by engineered safety features actuation signal with remote manual operation fr om control room provided as backup.Air Pilot - Air-operated va lve (solenoid activated).Automatic - Valve-operated by engineered sa fety features actuation signal with re mote manual operation from control room provided as backup.
Remote Manual - Remote, manual operation from control room.
Manual - Local manual operation only.
A.C. - Operation of valve subject to administrative control; locked closed.
Containment vacuum pump dischargeNE12112Gas9.4-5 Y56NoI3CVS*MOV25
/ 3CVS*V13 / ShutShutShut (3)FAI / N.A.N.A.Non-Class IE / N.A.Remo te Manu al (A.C.)
/ Manu al (A.C.)Manual (A.C.)NSR / N.A. <10Yes3CVS*V98 1 Globe / MotorDiaphragm /
Handwh eelTABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENE TRATION (CONTINUED) (12)Valve PositionValve Actuation (1) Service Essentia l Penetrat ionNo. of Penetrat ions Nominal Line Size (in.)FluidFSA R Figur e No.Isolation Arrangement Fig. No. 6.2-47 GD C ESF Syste m Yes/NoType C Leakage Test (I/II)Valve No. / Valve Type / Oper. Type (1)Valve No. / ValveT ype / Oper. Type (1)Norm alShutdo wnAccide ntPowe r Failur e (2)Actuat ion Signal(I/O)Powe r Source (I/O)Primary Mode (I/O)Second ary Mode(I/O)Closure Time (1) (Sec) (I/O)Length of Pipe from Contain ment Outside to Valve (ft)Bypass Leakage Penetration Yes/No Containment Penetration Vent, Drain, Test and Instrumentation Isolation Valves E/NENo.Inside (I) (1)Outside (0) (1)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-308Rev. 30Closed - Separated from containment atmosphere or reactor coolant system by membrane barrier.I - Test pressure is applied in the same direction as that existing when the valve is required to perform its safety function.II - Test pressure is applied between two isol ation valves such that the outermost valve is Type I tested and the innermost or inside c ontainment valve (Globe) is unseated by the test pressure, but seated by accident pressure.
Rad. - Radiation.NSR - No stroke time required. This applies to valves which open, go open, or are opened during an accident; or valves which are normally shut and stay shut during an accident. Valves which are normally shut and receive an accident closure signal are not considered NSR.N.A. - Not applicable, or closure time not applicable for the following reasons:
(1) there are no boundary valves applicable to this location, (2) boundary valves are either ma nual, relief, or check valves.
Solenoid - Solenoid-operated valve.2.FC - Fails Closed, FAI - Fails As Is, FO - Fails Open.3.Open during applicable system operation.4.Exception to criteria, see Section 6.2.4.2
.5.Branch lines are located between the main line containment is olation valves. See Figure 6.2-47 for details.6.E/NE based on NRC SRP Section 6.2.4, Item 11.5.h; pending issuance of Regulatory Guide 1.141, Rev. 1.7.Containment penetration is equipped with penetration cooler.8.The time listed includes the time required to detect the accident, (ECCS initiation, sensor and control system response time) and the affects of emergency power restoration delays (EDG start and sequencing delays). To determine maximum stroke time, these time delays must be subtracted from the times listed.9.Signal description found in Section 7.3
.10.In Mode 4, with the RCS temperat ure greater than or equal to 320
°F, the MSIVs are required to close within 120 seconds. In M ode 4, with the RCS temperature less than 320°F, the MSIVs are required to be closed and deactivated.11.Description in Section 9.4.7.3
.12.During movement of fuel within the cont ainment building, there is a 30 minute closure time requirement based on administrative controls, required per Technical Specification 3.9.4.13.14.15.16.17.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-309Rev. 3018.Sequenced Safeguard Signal (CDA, SIS, LOP), any steam generator 2/4 low-low level, AMSAC, Reactor Plant Sampling System Radiation High, Conde nser Air Removal Radiation High.19.Sequenced Safeguard Signal (CDA, SIS, LOP), any steam generator 2/4 low-low level, AMSAC.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-310Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-66 OMITTED MPS3 UFSAR6.2-311Rev. 30(1)S&W Spec. 2214.900-075 ADO No. 2, dated 1/23/74.(2)The incoming gas stream is preheated to 1,200°F.(3)Flow rates were tested, justif ied, and accepted (E&DCR N-ME-02591).TABLE 6.2-67 HYDROGEN RECOMBINER SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERDesign Parameters Positive Displacement Blowers (3HCS*C1A, B)
Horsepower5Electric Power (KW)3.73RPM3,600 Voltage460, 3-phase Design RequirementsPressure (psig)50 Temperature (°F)260Maximum continuous vacuum (in Hg)15Maximum continuous pressure (psi)15 Maximum intermittent pressure (psi)18Required flow 55 (SCFM at 12.9 psia cont ainment pressure at 140
°F) (1)Electric Heater Assembly (2) 3HCS*E1A, B Gas heater coil (304 SS)2 inch Schedule 40Number of heater elements15Power per element (kW)2.4 Sheath temperature (°F max.)1,600Voltage277 Gas Cooler Assembly 3HCS*CND 1A, B Fan typeCentrifugalGas cooler coil (304 SS)2 inch Schedule 40 Capacity (CFM)
(3)> 2,300 Cooling capacity (Btu/hr)
(4)63,000Gas outlet temperature (°F) (5)150 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-312Rev. 30(4)Approximate duty conf irmed by E&DCR N-ME-02591(5)The gas outlet temperature is the critical parameter for the gas cooler assembly. Cooling flow capacity (CFM), cooling capacity (Btu/h r), and process flow rate are acceptable variables as long as the return gas stream temperature is 150°F.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-313Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-68 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-314Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-69 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-315Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-70 SYSTEM ALIGNMENT FOR TYPE A TESTS Penetration Penetration NumberType Leakage Test PerformedComments on Alignment for Type A Test (Note 8)
Closed Systems (GDC 57)
The system piping inside the containment forms the pressure retaining boundary. The system is not exposed to the containment atmosphere for ILRT. However, per NRC letter dated February 25, 1991 ("Staff position regarding leakage out of containment" Docket Nos. STN 50-454, STN 40-455 and STN 50-456, STN 50-457), the possibilit y of containment leakage through steam generator secondary side exists during an ILRT. Therefore, during an ILRT, the secondary side of each steam generator for these systems is maintained at atmospheric pressure and the water level is maintained lower than the entrance to the st eam line (that is, the leak path out through the steam and past the MSIV should not be blocked wi th water). The leak path is further vented downstream to the atmosphere, as is normally done to systems during ILRTs, as follows: The MSIV may be left open, or, with the MSIV cl osed, a vent may be opened between the steam generator and the MSIV or from the steam gene rator secondary side itself. Correction of the Type A test result for the is olation valve leakage is not re quired for these penetrations.Main Steam1, 2, 3, 4Note 3Systems inside of containment aligned for normal full power
operation. No system venting to containment atmosphere or draining
required. Note 2.Feedwater5, 6, 7, 8Note 3Auxiliary Feedwater79, 80, 81, 82Note 3"Steam Generator Blowdown Samples122a, b, c, dNote 3" Steam Generator Blowdown47, 48, 49, 50Note 3"Main Steam to Auxiliary Feed Pumps74, 75, 76Note 3"Steam Generator Chemical Feed123Note 3" MPS3 UFSAR6.2-316Rev. 30 ESF or post-accident systems outside of containm ent that are exposed to containment pressure for the Type A test The isolation valves in these penetrations are maintained open for the Type A test to expose the system to containment pressure. No venting or dr aining of the system outside of containment is necessary. Correction of the Type A test results for the isolation valve leakage is not required. If the system is not exposed to containment for the Type A test, system or isolation valve leakage, as appropriate, will be added to the Type A results.Containment Leakage Monitoring9a, 13c, 33a, 68Note 5In addition to the normal full power system lineup, additional valves may
be opened outside of containment to allow for measuring of pressure for the Type A test. Note 4.Recirculation Spray Suction102, 103, 104, 105A, CSystems aligned for normal full power operation.Recirculation Spray Discharge107, 108, 109, 110A, CSystems aligned for normal full power operation.Hydrogen Recombiner111, 112, 113, 114A, CNote 7 ESF or post-accident systems that are norma lly filled with water and operating under post-accident conditions These systems need not be vented or drained for the Type A test in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J III.A.1(d). These penetrations will have water flowing into containment at a pressure higher than peak accident pressure or will ha ve pressure on the outside of the containment isolation valves higher than peak accident pressure and therefore are not a credible leakage path. Correction of the Type A test results for the is olation valve leakage is not required. Isolation valve leakage testing is required on the systems and the results of these Type C leakage tests reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J V.B.2.TABLE 6.2-70 SYSTEM ALIGNMENT FOR TYPE A TESTS Penetration Penetration NumberType Leakage Test PerformedComments on Alignment for Type A Test (Note 8)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-317Rev. 30Seal Water Injection (to Reactor Coolant Pump)16, 17, 18, 19CNote 1High-Pressure Safety Injection51CNote 1 Systems that are required to be vented and drained (if a liquid system) for the Type A test In general, venting means that the inboard isolation valve is exposed to containment pressure and downstream of the outboard valve is vented to atmosphere. In some systems, the system design provides this venting and no further actions ar e required. Draining means that water is not present on either side of an isolation valve so that the valve sealing surface is exposed to air.
Containment Atmospheric Monitoring32, 63A, C Nitrogen to Safety Injection Accumulator14A, CPrimary Grade Water15A, CSampling Connections12a, 12b, 13a, 13dA, CSampling Connection from PRT12cA, CSeal Water Return (from Reactor Coolant Pump)23A, CReactor Coolant Letdown24A, CReactor Coolant Charging26A, CGaseous Drains27A, CAerated Drains28A, C Gaseous Vents29A, CTABLE 6.2-70 SYSTEM ALIGNMENT FOR TYPE A TESTS Penetration Penetration NumberType Leakage Test PerformedComments on Alignment for Type A Test (Note 8)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-318Rev. 30Containment Purge Supply86A, CThe inboard isolation valve is blocked open for the type A test to allow pressurization and depressurization of the containment. This is more conservative than having both
isolation valves closed and no correction to the type A test results is necessary.Containment Purge Exhaust85A, CResidual Heat Removal (RHR)91, 92A, CThis system is normally in service unless the unit is defueled. If RHR is in service, correction to the Type A test results is required.
Residual Heat Removal Cold Legs93, 94A, CThis system is normally in service unless the unit is
defueled. If RHR is in service, correction to the Type A test results
is required.RHR to Hot Legs95A, CDemineralized Water Supply within Containment70A, CSafety Injection to Hot Legs96, 97A, CSafety Injection to Cold Legs98A, C Safety Injection Test99A, C Quench Spray100, 101A, CTABLE 6.2-70 SYSTEM ALIGNMENT FOR TYPE A TESTS Penetration Penetration NumberType Leakage Test PerformedComments on Alignment for Type A Test (Note 8)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-319Rev. 30NOTES: 1. Systems operating under normal operating or pos t-accident conditions which are usually filled with water, 10 CFR 50, Appendix J III.A.1(d).2. Not open directly to cont ainment atmosphere under post-accident conditions, 10 CFR 50, Appendix J III.A.1(d).3. Valves in main steam, feedwater, and blow down piping of pressuri zed water reactors do not require Type C testing per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.4. The containment leakage monitoring system must be in operation to perform Type A test5. Does not rupture as a result of loss-of-coolant accident. Instrument piping Class 2.6. Penetration may be aligned to perform Type A verification test as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J III.A.3(b). Therefore, the inside containment isolation valve may be open during the Type A test, which is more c onservative than with both valves closedContainment Vacuum Discharge121A, CContainment Vacuum Pump Suction35, 36A, CContainment Vacuum Ejector Suction37A, C Chilled Water Supply38, 72A, C Reactor Plant Component Cooling Supply39, 40A, C Reactor Plant Component Cooling Return41, 42A, CChilled Water Return45, 116A, CService Air52A, CNote 6Instrument Air54A, CFire Protection56A, C Fuel Pool Purification59, 60A, CLoop Fill62A, CNitrogen Supply124A, C Post-Accident Sample Supply115A, CPost-Accident Sample Return120A, CTABLE 6.2-70 SYSTEM ALIGNMENT FOR TYPE A TESTS Penetration Penetration NumberType Leakage Test PerformedComments on Alignment for Type A Test (Note 8)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-320Rev. 307. Either the containment isolation valves for this post-accident system will be opened for the Type A test to expose the recombiner and hydrogen analyzer system to the containment atmosphere or the system leakage will be added to the results of the Type A test.8. As required for system operability and to maintain the plant in a safe condition, some systems may be maintained in service and th e isolation valves not positioned, vented and/or drained for the Type A test. If the penetration is in an alignment different than required in this table, the Type A test results will be corrected for the local measured leakage for these isolation valves.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-321Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-71 PIPE INSULATION INSIDE CONTAINMENT (8 INCHES AND LARGER)Removable Encapsulated (1)System and Line No.
Thickness (inches)Pipe Size (inches)Linear Feet Removable Encapsulated (1)Main Feedwater System FWS016073023166 FWS016074023166FWS02001802320235FWS0200220232080 FWS0200260232080FWS02003002320235Main Steam System MSS03009202430174MSS0300930243082MSS0300940243082 MSS03009502430174Reactor Coolant System RCS008024013816 RCS008025013826RCS008029013816RCS008030013826 RCS008034013816RCS008035013826RCS008039013816 RCS008040013826RCS010122013107RCS010132013107RCS010138013107 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-322Rev. 30RCS010146013107RCS012103013.51213 RCS012123013.51213RCS014064013.51477RCS0290010142911 RCS0290020142912RCS0290060142911RCS0290070142912 RCS0290110142911RCS0290120142912RCS0290160142911 RCS0290170142912RCS0310030143128RCS0310080143128 RCS0310130143128RCS0310180143128RCS27500401427.59 RCS27500501427.517RCS27500901427.59RCS27501001427.517 RCS27501401427.59RCS27501501427.517RCS27501901427.59RCS27502001427.517RHS012033012.51265 RHS012035012.51278TABLE 6.2-71 PIPE INSULATION INSIDE CONTAINMENT (8 INCHES AND LARGER)Removable Encapsulated (1)System and Line No.
Thickness (inches)Pipe Size (inches)Linear Feet MPS3 UFSAR6.2-323Rev. 30NOTES:1.The density of the fiberglass within the removable encapsulated insulation is 2.4 lbm/ft
- 3. The fiberglass is Owens Corning TIW, Type 2.2.The density of the fiberglass used on th e chilled water system piping is 5.25 lbm/ft
- 3. The fiberglass is manufactured by the Certainteed Insulation Group.3.Foam plastic insulation is used in cases where close proximity of adjacent piping does not allow the use of fiberglass insulation.RHS012043022.51210RHS012044022.5126 Safety Injection System SIL010009022106SIL010012022109 SIL0100450121018SIL0100470121018SIL0100490121018 SIL0100510121018General Anti-Sweat (Fiberglass) (2)(3)Chilled Water System CDS010-45-41.510185CDS010-74-41.510185 CDS010-46-41.510185CDS010-75-41.510185CDS010-104-21.51010 CDS010-56-2 1.51010CDS008-44-21.585CDS008-105-21.585TABLE 6.2-71 PIPE INSULATION INSIDE CONTAINMENT (8 INCHES AND LARGER)Removable Encapsulated (1)System and Line No.
Thickness (inches)Pipe Size (inches)Linear Feet MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-324Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-72 DECLG MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES FOR THE LIMITING TRANSIENT Time (sec)Pump Side Mass Flow (lbm/sec)Pump Side Energy Flow (Btu/sec)Vessel Side Mass Flow (lbm/
sec)Vessel Side Energy Flow (Btu/
sec)0.01399428.85233414.7-9.10.01.013924975.113884340.349234.327158717.32.013920077.311697580.535634.219655078.6 3.013913463.78312730.027918.915470902.34.01399474.26647017.025923.814483669.05.01397174.95724096.023644.313375177.8 6.01396382.55322562.021413.712373656.97.01396033.45070637.619595.811535702.38.01395749.84793918.317873.910686310.2 9.01395699.44588957.916625.39934906.710.01395759.14433845.414723.38992346.611.01395545.14189442.912775.68043783.912.01395156.93880366.810460.86986302.613.01394581.13515523.78602.86075872.514.01393698.53022639.98532.25424972.3 15.01392627.32406842.98760.44810167.016.01391841.01877227.88714.64236789.417.01391383.51479599.78501.63667663.6 18.01391035.61164845.67837.33040266.7 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-325Rev. 3019.0139752.8889639.37330.32504096.520.0139595.3709840.96742.72032514.621.0139471.0566675.05942.41618401.622.0139372.3450378.15461.71443590.5 23.0139281.1342134.93879.4991049.024.0139201.5247344.53279.1790173.225.0139141.4175264.51966.2435124.2 26.0139111.6139880.57632.81500918.127.013984.9106984.42587.8419000.028.013962.779687.072.514919.8 29.013946.859746.7-15.10.030.013935.044970.9-87.60.040.013953.067275.62068.5296642.1 50.0139177.3220178.11932.5650434.060.013985.1107496.4695.6346312.170.014650.964934.2210.5141898.5 80.014654.669557.1171.3128123.690.014654.669506.3170.6121932.7100.013960.777015.8281.2163048.1 140.013968.085009.9358.8208799.0TABLE 6.2-72 DECLG MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES FOR THE LIMITING TRANSIENT Time (sec)Pump Side Mass Flow (lbm/sec)Pump Side Energy Flow (Btu/sec)Vessel Side Mass Flow (lbm/
sec)Vessel Side Energy Flow (Btu/
sec)
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-326Rev. 30180.014453.967958.7442.9156208.5220.014440.150685.3133.695040.3260.014840.851381.9122.794289.1300.014452.463727.4202.4124237.2 340.014651.363510.9410.8174517.9380.014553.664824.8489.2160469.9420.014549.559418.5439.8136175.0 460.014550.359422.3164.893141.9499.514737.045937.7468.2129010.3TABLE 6.2-72 DECLG MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES FOR THE LIMITING TRANSIENT Time (sec)Pump Side Mass Flow (lbm/sec)Pump Side Energy Flow (Btu/sec)Vessel Side Mass Flow (lbm/
sec)Vessel Side Energy Flow (Btu/
sec)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-327Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-73 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-328Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-74 DELETED BY CH ANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-329Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-75 DELETED BY FSARCR 02-MP3-017 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-330Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-76 DELETED BY FSARCR 02-MP3-017 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-331Rev. 30TABLE 6.2-77 PASSIVE HEAT SINK DATA FOR MINIMUM POST LOCA CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS (1) Case NumberDescriptionSlab Material (2) ThicknessExposed Area (ft 2)1Refueling Cavity Floor LinerS/S0.45 inches8661ARefueling Cavity FloorConcrete4.32 feet866 2Refueling Cavity Wall LinerS/S0.45 inches7,6742ARefueling Cavity WallsConcrete3.00 feet7,6743Interior Concrete (1 foot 6 inches thick)Concrete1.36 feet133,277 4Interior Concrete (2 feet 0 inches and 2 feet 3 inches thick)Concrete2.11 feet17,9265Interior Concreted (2 feet 6 inches and 3 feet 0 inches thick)Concrete3.0 feet6,5636Concrete Pedestals supporting Steam GeneratorsConcrete1.75 feet2,0077Exterior Containment FloorConcrete2.0 feet12,269C/S0.25 feetConcrete10 feet8Exterior Containment Shell below GroundC/S0.514 inches24,675Concrete4.5 feet9Exterior Containment Shell above GroundC/S0.514 inches38,493Concrete4.5 feet10Containment DomeC/S0.554 inches34,100Concrete2.56 feet MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.2-332Rev. 30 Notes:1) The minimum containment pressure analys is was performed utilizing the most up-to-dat e structural heat sink data for MPS-3 in accordance with Millstone Mass Tracking Program. Millstone Nuclear Power Station Common Engineering Procedure C EN 114 "Containment Mass Tracking" provides instru ctions for reporting and tracking the amount and type of the identified changes to materials inside containment as well as containment volume as a result of various design modifica tions. The impact of variation s in structural heat sink data on containment an alysis is routinely evaluated prior to ea ch design modification.
If required, the analyses of record are reanalyzed and th e associated documentation updated.2) S/S - Stainless Steel, C/S - Carbon Steel3) The installation of the AECL containment sump strainer resulted in a negligible ch ange in the overall metal mass and contain ment net free volume.11Stainless Steel ValvesS/S1.29 inches1,72212Carbon Steel ValvesC/S0.710 inches55213Stainless Steel Pipe, t < 0.4 inchesS/S0.240 inches13,230 14Stainless Steel Pipe, t > 0.4 inchesS/S0.658 inches2,06315Carbon Steel Pipe, t < 0.4 inchesC/S0.277 inches8,96616Carbon Steel Pipe, t > 0.4 inchesC/S0.990 inches1,282 17Structural Steel, Restraints and SupportsC/S0.218 inches514,27918Instrument Racks, Ducts and Miscellaneous Carbon Steel SinksC/S0.111 inches182,51719Stainless Steel EquipmentS/S0.365 inches11,03320Carbon Steel EquipmentC/S0.781 inches37,06821Allowance for GSI-191 Containment Sump StrainerS/S0.0119 feet21,000TABLE 6.2-77 PASSIVE HEAT SINK DATA FOR MINIMUM POST LOCA CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS (1) Case NumberDescriptionSlab Material (2) ThicknessExposed Area (ft
- 2)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-333Rev. 30 (1) Maximum spray flow predicted by analysis.TABLE 6.2-78 INPUT DATA FOR MINIMUM CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANALYSISMinimum initial total pressure10.4 psiaMinimum initial containment pressure120
°F Maximum initial relative humidity100 percentMinimum RWST water temperature40
°F Number of inadvertently activated quench spray pumps
+2 Maximum quench spray system flow (two pumps operating) 6,010 gpm (1)Outside air temperature0
°FSecondary containment temperature28
°FQuench spray thermal effectiveness100 percentHeat transfer coefficients on the heat sinks1.8 Btu/hr-ft 2-°F MPS3 UFSAR6.2-334Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE RESPONSE - DOUBLE ENDED LOCA (BREAK LOCATION)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-335Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE RESPONSE - PUMP SUCTION LOCA (BREAK SIZE)
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-336Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-3 CONTAINMENT VAPOR TEMPERATURE RESPONSE - LOCA MPS3 UFSAR6.2-337Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-4 CONTAINMENT LINER TEMPERATURE RESPONSE MPS3 UFSAR6.2-338Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-5 CONTAINMENT DEPRE SSURIZATION RESPONSE - LOCA MPS3 UFSAR6.2-339Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-6 CONTAINMENT SUMP TEMPERATURE RESPONSE MPS3 UFSAR6.2-340Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-7 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE FROM 1.4 SQUARE FOOT MSLB AT 0% POWER NO ENTRAINMENT - LIMITING PEAK PRESSURE CASE MPS3 UFSAR6.2-341Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-8 CONTAINMENT LINER TEMPERATURE FROM 1.4 SQUARE FOOT MSLB AT 100% POWER, NO ENTRAINMENT - LIMITING PEAK TEMPERATURE CASE MPS3 UFSAR6.2-342Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-9 CONTAINMENT LINER TEMPERATURE FROM 1.4 SQUARE FOOT AT 0% POWER, NO ENTRAINMENT - PEAK TEMPERATURE CASE MPS3 UFSAR6.2-343Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-10 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-344Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-11 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-345Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-12 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-346Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-13 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-347Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-14 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-348Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-15 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-349Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-16 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-350Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-17 PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION VIEW WITH NODAL ARRANGEMENT MPS3 UFSAR6.2-351Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-18 PLAN VIEW FOR THE PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 95.3 FEET MPS3 UFSAR6.2-352Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-18A PLAN VIEW FOR THE PRESSURIZER SU BCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 74.2 FEET MPS3 UFSAR6.2-353Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-18B PLAN VIEW FOR THE PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 51.3 FEET MPS3 UFSAR6.2-354Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-18C PLAN VIEW FOR THE PRESSURIZER SU BCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 25.7 FEET MPS3 UFSAR6.2-355Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-18D PLAN VIEW FOR THE PRESSURIZER SU BCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 12.75 FEET MPS3 UFSAR6.2-356Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-19 STEAM GENERATOR SU BCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION WITH NODAL ARRANGEMENT MPS3 UFSAR6.2-357Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-20 PLAN VIEW FOR THE STEAM GENERATOR SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 3 FEET 8 INCHES MPS3 UFSAR6.2-358Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-21 PLAN VIEW FOR THE STEAM GENERATOR SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 28 FEET 6 INCHES MPS3 UFSAR6.2-359Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-22 PLAN VIEW FOR THE STEAM GENERATOR SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 51 FEET 4 INCHES MPS3 UFSAR6.2-360Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-23 UPPER REACTOR CAVITY SUBCOMPARTMENT PLAN ELEVATION AND NODAL ARRANGEMENT MPS3 UFSAR6.2-361Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-24 PRESSURIZER SUBCOM PARTMENT NODALI ZATION DIAGRAM MPS3 UFSAR6.2-362Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-25 STEAM GENERATOR SUBCOMPARTMENT NODALIZATION DIAGRAM MPS3 UFSAR6.2-363Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-26 STAGGERED MESH APPROXIMATION FOR NODES AND INTERNAL JUNCTIONS MPS3 UFSAR6.2-364Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-27 GENERAL FL OW CHART FOR THREED MPS3 UFSAR6.2-365Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-28 PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE MPS3 UFSAR6.2-366Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-28A PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE MPS3 UFSAR6.2-367Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-29 PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE MPS3 UFSAR6.2-368Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-29A PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE MPS3 UFSAR6.2-369Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-29B PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE MPS3 UFSAR6.2-370Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-29C PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE MPS3 UFSAR6.2-371Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-29D PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE MPS3 UFSAR6.2-372Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-30 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-373Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-31 PRESSURE RESPONSE STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE MPS3 UFSAR6.2-374Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-32 PRESSURE RESPONSE STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE MPS3 UFSAR6.2-375Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-33 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-376Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-34 PRESSURE RESPONSE STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE MPS3 UFSAR6.2-377Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-34A DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-378Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-34B DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-379Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-34C DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-380Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-34D DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-381Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-35 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-382Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-36 P&ID QUENCH SPRAY AND HYDROGEN RECOMBINER The figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by Reference in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing number and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-383Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-37 (SHEETS 1-3) P&ID LOW PRESSURE SA FETY INJECTION/CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION The figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by Reference in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing number and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-384Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-38 TYPICAL CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE SUMP MPS3 UFSAR6.2-385Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-39 SPATIAL DROPLET SI ZE DISTRIBUTION OF SPRACO 1713A NOZZLE APPLYING SURFACE AREA CORRECTION AND SPRAYING WATER AT 40 PSIG UNDER LABORATORY CONDITIONS MPS3 UFSAR6.2-386Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-40 CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION PUMPS CHARACTERISTIC CURVES MPS3 UFSAR6.2-387Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-41 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-388Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-42 CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SPRA Y COVERAGE BEND LINE (ELEVATION 104 FEET), ELEVATED TEMPERATURE (275°F), SPRAY HEADER AT ELEVATION 141 FEET 9 INCHES MPS3 UFSAR6.2-389Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-43 CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SPRA Y COVERAGE BEND LINE (ELEVATION 104 FEET), ELEVATED TEMPERATURE (275°F), SPRAY HEADER AT ELEVATION 145 FEET 3 INCHES MPS3 UFSAR6.2-390Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-44 UNOBSTRUCTED QUENCH SPRAY COVERAG E AT THE BEND LINE (ELEVATION 104 FEET), ELEVATED TEMPERATURE (275°F), SPRAY HEADERS AT ELEVATIO N 153 FEET AND 168 FEET MPS3 UFSAR6.2-391Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-45 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-392Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-46 AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM AND SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COL LECTION & RE LEASE SYSTEM MPS3 UFSAR6.2-393Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-47 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM MPS3 UFSAR6.2-394Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-48 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-395Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-49 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-396Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-50 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-397Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-51 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-398Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-52 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-399Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-53 P&ID CONTAINM ENT MONITORING SYSTEM The figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by Reference in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing number and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
MPS3 UFSAR6.2-400Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-54 QUENCH SPRAY PUMPS CHARACTERISTIC CURVES MPS3 UFSAR6.2-401Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-55 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-402Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-56 CONTAINMENT INTERNAL STRUCTURE OPENINGS MPS3 UFSAR6.2-403Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-57 EXPECTED LONG-TERM CIRCULATION PATTERNS IN CONTAINMENT MPS3 UFSAR6.2-404Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-58 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MONITO RING SYSTEM MPS3 UFSAR6.2-405Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-59 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE LIMITING BREAK MPS3 UFSAR6.2-406Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-59A DELETED BY FSARCR 02-MP3-017 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-407Rev. 30FIGURE 6.2-60 CONDENSING WALL HEAT TRANSFER COEFFICIENT LIMITING BREAK MPS3 UFSAR6.2-408Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-61 DELETED BY PKG FSC 07-MP3-024 MPS3 UFSAR6.2-409Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.2-62 DELETED BY PKG FSC 07-MP3-024 MPS3 UFSAR6.3-1Rev. 30
6.3 EMERGENCY
CORE COOLING SYSTEM
6.3.1 DESIGN
BASESThe emergency core cooling system (ECCS) is designed to cool the reactor core and provide shutdown capability subsequent to the following accident conditions:1.Pipe breaks in the reactor coolant system (RCS) which cause a discharge larger than that which can be made up by the normal makeup system, up to and including the instantaneous circumferential rupture of the largest pipe in the RCS.2.Rupture of a control rod drive mechanis m causing a rod cluster control assembly ejection accident.3.Pipe breaks in the steam system, up to and including the instantaneous circumferential rupture of the largest pipe in the steam system.4.A steam generato r tube rupture.The primary function of the ECCS is to remove the stored and fission product decay heat from the reactor core during accident conditions.
The ECCS provides shutdown capability for the accidents above by means of boron injection. A single active failure in the short term or single active or passive failure in the long term is included in ECCS design. The system can meet its minimum required performance level with on site or off site electrical power c oncurrent with single active or passive failure.The ECCS consists of the centrifugal charging (C HS), safety injection (SI), and residual heat removal (RHS) pumps, accumulators, containm ent recirculation pumps (CR), containment recirculation coolers, RHS heat exchangers, and the refueling water storage tank (RWST), along with the associated piping, valves, inst rumentation, and othe r related equipment.
Section 1.3.1 compares the Millstone 3 EC CS with similar facility designs.
The design bases used for designing and selecti ng the functional requireme nts of the ECCS are derived from Appendix K limits as delineated in 10 CFR 50.46. The subsystem functional parameters are selected to integrate so that th e Appendix K requirements are met over the range of anticipated accidents and single failure assumptions.
Portions of the ECCS also operate in conjuncti on with the other system s of the cold shutdown design. The primary function of th e ECCS during a safety grade cold shutdown is to ensure a means for injecting and throt tling boration and makeup flow via the charging pumps. Certain initiating HELB events, postulated to occur in the operating CHS pump discharge piping, when combined with a single active failu re of the standby CHS pump to start, may lead to a loss of all charging. In addition, all charging may be lost as a result of certain postulated fire conditions (see FSAR Section 9.5.1 and the FPER for SIH system performance requirements). For these MPS3 UFSAR6.3-2Rev. 30 conditions, the SIH pumps will provide the require d RCS inventory and boration flow to achieve safe shutdown. Details of the cold shutdown design bases ar e discussed in Section 5.4.7.2.3.5.Reliability of the ECCS has been considered in selection of the functional requirements, selection of the components, and location of components and connected piping. Redundant components are provided where the loss of one component would impair reliability of the system. Valves are provided in series where isolation is desired and in para llel when alternate flow paths are to be established for assurance of ECCS performance. Redundant sources of the ECCS actuation signal are available so that the proper and timely ope ration of ECCS is not inhibited. Sufficient instrumentation is available so that a failure of an instrument does not impair readiness of the system. The active components of the ECCS are powered from separate safety related buses which are energized from off site power supplies.In addition, the emergency diesel generators assu re redundant sources of auxiliary on site power and have adequate capacity for all ECCS requireme nts. Each diesel is capable of driving all pumps, valves, and necessary instruments as sociated with one train of the ECCS.
Spurious movement of a motor operated valve due to the actuation of its positioning device coincident with a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) has been analyz ed and found to be a very low probability event.However, to comply with BTP-EICSB-18, power lo ckouts are provided in the control room for each valve whose spurious movement coul d result in degraded ECCS performance.The elevated temperature of the sump solution during recirculation is well within the design temperature of all ECCS compone nts. In addition, consideration has been given to the potential for corrosion of various types of metals exposed to the fluid conditions prevalent immediately after the accident or during long-term recirculation operations.
The piping and supports of the ECCS have been evaluated for system operation at the elevated temperatures associated with the spectrum of LOCAs and MSLBs. The limiting large break Design Basis Accident is the double ended ruptur e at the reactor cool ant pump (RCP) suction (PSDER). This is the most limiting accident due to the rapid increase to a high sustained containment saturation temperature. While th e containment will reach a higher saturation temperature for a break in the hot leg, both the containment pressure and temperature will be reduced more rapidly following the initial reactor coolant system (RCS) blowdown phase than for the RCP suction break since the hot leg break will not result in energy flow from the steam generators into containment. Analysis of a spectrum of small breaks indicates that the CDA setpoint, where the sprays are initiated, may not be reached. The limiting fluid temperature in the piping will, therefore, occur foll owing a small break LOCA. Furthermore, piping down stream of the CRS heat exchanger may be exposed to sump water temperatures if a service water pump fails to start. Pump heat is included in the determin ation of the pumped fluid (and piping) temperature.
Environmental testing of ECCS equipment, which is required to operate following a LOCA, is discussed in Section 3.11.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-3Rev. 30 Protection of the ECCS from missiles is discussed in Section 3.5.
Protection of the ECCS against dynamic effects associated with ruptures of pi ping is described in Section 3.6. Protection from flooding is also discussed in Section 3.4.
6.3.2 SYSTEM
DESIGN The ECCS components are designed such that a minimum of three accumulators, one charging pump, one safety injection pump, one RHR pump, one containment recirculation pump, and one containment recirculation cooler - together with their associat ed valves and piping - assure adequate core cooling in the event of a de sign basis LOCA. The redundant on site emergency generator assures adequate emergency power to a ll electrically operated components in the event that a loss of off site power occurs simultaneously with a LOCA, even assuming a single failure in the emergency power system such as th e failure of one diesel to start. The Emergency Core Cooling System contains suction and discharge connections that facilitate portable diesel driven BDB RCS FLEX Inject ion pump deployment. These connections are defense-in-depth design features that are available for coping with an extended loss of AC power (ELAP) event. The location of these BDB RCS FLEX suction and discharge connections are shown on Figure 6.3-2, Sheet 2.
6.3.2.1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams The process flow diagrams of the ECCS are shown on Figure 6.3-1. The piping and instrumentation diagrams asso ciated with the ECCS are s hown on Figures 6.2-37 and 6.3-2.
Pertinent design and operating parameters for the components of the ECCS are given in Table 6.3-1. The codes and standards to which the individual components of the ECCS are designed are listed in Table 3.2-1.The component interlocks used in different m odes of system operation are listed below: 1.The safety injection signal (SIS) is asso ciated with the following components and initiates the indicated action:a.Charging pumps start on SIS.b.RWST suction valves to charging pumps open on SIS.c.Charging pumps to RCS cold leg injection headers parallel isolation valves open on SIS coincident with a cold leg injection permissive [(P-19) -
pressurizer pressure low].d.Normal charging path valves close on SIS.e.Charging pump miniflow valves close on SIS.f.Alternate Charging Pump Mi niflow Lines open on SIS.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-4Rev. 30g.Safety injection pumps start on SIS.h.The RHR pumps start on SIS.i.Any closed accumulator isolation valves open. (See Section 6.3.2.2.6
.)j.Volume control tank (VCT) outle t isolation valves close on SIS.2.Switchover from injection mode to recirculation invol ves the following interlocks:a.The RHS pumps are stopped automati cally when one out of two level switches associated with each pump sense a low-low level in the RWST.b.Interlocks are provided to assure isolation of the RHS and proper alignment of the containment recirc ulation system for core cooling.c.The safety injection pump and charging pump recirc ulation suction isolation valves can be opened provided that the safety injection pump and the alternate charging pump minifl ow lines have been isolated.d.After approximately 3 to 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, cold leg recirculation is terminated and hot leg recirculation is initiated. The ECCS is realigned to supply water to the RCS hot legs in order to prevent boron precipitation in the reactor vessel should the break be in one of the cold legs.
6.3.2.2 Equipment and Component Descriptions The component design and operating conditions are specified as the most severe conditions to which each respective component is exposed during either normal plant operation or during operation of the ECCS. For each component, these conditions are considered in relation to the code to which it is designed. By designing the components in accordance with applicable codes, and with due consideration for the design and operating conditions, the fundamental assurance of structural integrity of the ECCS components is maintained. Components of the ECCS are designed to withstand the appropriate seismic loadings in accordance with their safety class as given in Table 3.2-1.
The major mechanical components of the ECCS follow. ECCS component parameters are provided in Table 6.3-1.
6.3.2.2.1 AccumulatorsThe accumulators are pressure vessels partially filled with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen gas. During normal opera tion each accumulator is isolat ed from the RCS by two check valves in series. Should the RCS pressure fall below the accumulator pressure, the check valves open and borated water is forced into the RCS. One accumulator is attached to each of the cold MPS3 UFSAR6.3-5Rev. 30 legs of the RCS. Mechanical operation of the swi ng-disc check valves is the only action required to open the injection path from the accu mulators to the core via the cold leg.
Connections are provided for remo tely adjusting the level and bor on concentration of the borated water in each accumulator during normal plant operation as required. The accumulator water level may be adjusted either by draining to the boron recovery system boron recovery tanks via the Reactor Plant Gaseous Drains system, or by pumping borated water from the RWST to the accumulator. Samples of the solution in the acc umulators are taken peri odically for checks of boron concentration (Section 9.3.2).
Accumulator pressure is provide d by a supply of nitrogen gas and can be adjusted as required during normal plant operation; however, the accumulators are normally isolated from this nitrogen supply. Gas relief valves on the accumulators protect them from pressures in excess of design pressure.The accumulators are located within the containment between the primary and crane walls for missile protection.
Accumulator gas pressure is monitored by indicato rs and alarms. The operator can take action as required to maintain plant operation within the requirements of the technical specification addressing accumulator operability.
6.3.2.2.2 TanksRefueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
The RWST is used to provide a sufficient supply of borated water to the safety injection, charging, and residual heat removal pumps during the in jection mode of ECCS operation. All valves between the RWST and the safety injection system are normally aligned and open, or immediately receive an SIS to effect proper position and alignment to assure an immediate supply of water to the safeguards equipment when required. Redundant level indicators and alarms are provided with readouts on the main control board to:1.Maintain the level within the minimu m and maximum technical specification range.2.Allow the operator to complete switchove r from the injection to recirculation phase.3.Indicate when the tank is empty.A further discussion of the RWST level indications is provided in Section 6.3.5.4.The RWST also supplies water to the quench spray pumps (Section 6.2.2) and provides borated water to fill the refueling cav ity for refueling operations.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-6Rev. 30 6.3.2.2.3 Pumps ECCS Pumps Pump characteristic curves are shown on Figures 6.2-40, 6.3-3, 6.3-4, and 6.3-5 with pump power requirements given in Table 6.3-1. The pump characteristic curves shown in Figures 6.2-40, 6.3-3, 6.3-4, and 6.3-5 are those used in the safety analys es. Since these curves represent the analyzed pump requirements, they will diff er from design and test curves.The safety intent of Regulatory Guide 1.1 is met by the design of the ECCS such that adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) is provided to syst em pumps. In addition to considering the static head and suction line pressure drop, the calculati on of available NPSH in the recirculation mode assumes that the vapor pressure of the liquid in the sump is eq ual to the containment pressure. This assures that the actual available net positi ve suction head is al ways greater than the calculated net positive suction head.
The minimum NPSH available to the ECCS pumps during the injection mode is conservatively calculated at a lower bound RWST level for pump operation. This level corresponds to the time period when switchover to cold leg recirculat ion is complete. Refer to Section 6.3.2.8 for a discussion of the assumptions us ed in determining this level.
Friction and minor losses in the suction piping are determined by detailed plant specific system analysis. The calculated system losses are ma ximized by basing them on full ECCS operation at the maximum flow conditions. The required NPSH is selected from the pump manufacturer's test curve at the maximum predicted flow rate, usi ng conservative assumptions. This combination of bounding assumptions is conservative for determ ining the available NPSH and the resulting margin over the required NPSH.
The expression used for determining the NPSH for the ECCS pumps is:Available NPSH = P t + Z - H f - P v where: P t = absolute pressure on the liquid in the RWST Z = elevation head of water at the pump suction H f = calculated friction and minor losses in the suction piping P v = vapor pressure of the pumped liquidRefer to Table 6.3-11 for the re sults of the NPSH analysis.The values given in Table 6.3-11 are limiting for the evaluation of NPSH for the ECCS pumps.
Following switchover to cold leg recirculation, adequate available NPSH is provided to the charging and safety injection pumps by the discharge head of the containment recirculation pumps. The RHS pumps do not operate after switchover.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-7Rev. 30Uncertainties such as NPSH variation betwee n similar pumps and test inaccuracies were considered but not included in the calculation due to the adequate margin between available and required NPSH and the conservati sm in calculated pipe loss.
Potential pumps runout due to su ction pressure boost during recirc ulation mode is precluded by the throttling of the ECCS branch line throttling valves.
Residual Heat Removal Pumps The (RHS) pumps are started automatically on receipt of an SIS signal. The pumps deliver water to the RCS from the RWST during the injecti on phase. Each pump is a single stage vertical position centrifugal pump.A minimum flow bypass line is provided down stream of the RHS heat exchangers for the pumps to recirculate and return the pump discharge fl uid to the pump suction should these pumps be started with their normal flow paths blocked. Once flow greater than approximately 1,542 gpm is established to the RCS, the bypass line is automatically closed. This line prevents dead heading of the pumps and permits pump te sting during normal operation.
The RHS pumps are discussed further in Sect ion 5.4.7. A pump performanc e curve is given on Figure 6.3-3. This pump performance curve is the one used in the Safety Analysis, therefore, the pump heads analyzed will differ from the actual design values given in Table 5.4-8.
The pumps have a self-contained mechanical seal which is nor mally cooled by the component cooling water system. However, after a LOCA, cooling water is not supplied or required, because the pumps are pumping water having a maximum temperature of 75
°F. The RHS pumps are not utilized in the recirculation phase.Centrifugal Charging Pumps In the event of an accident, the charging pumps are started automatically on receipt of an SIS and are automatically aligned to take suction from the RWST during injection. However, the charging pumps will not automatically inject into the reactor coolant cold legs unless there is also a cold leg injection permissive [(P-19) - pressurizer pressure low] signal present to open the charging pumps to RCS cold leg injection headers parallel is olation valves. During r ecirculation, suction is provided from the containment recirculation pump discharge.The charging pumps deliver flow to the RCS at the prevailing RCS pressure. Each centrifugal charging pump is a multistage centrifugal diffuser design (barrel type casing) with vertical suction and discharge nozzles. The pumps lubricating oil coolers are cooled by the charging pumps seal cooling subsystem (Section.2.2.4).A minimum flow bypass line is provided on each pump discharge to recirculate flow to the pump suction after cooling via the seal water h eat exchanger during nor mal plant operation. The minimum flow bypass line contains two valves in series which close on receipt of the SIS. Two alternate miniflow paths are provided for the two operable charging pumps when the normal MPS3 UFSAR6.3-8Rev. 30miniflow path is isolated. Two series redundant isolation valves are provi ded in each miniflow path; one is normally open and the other is nor mally closed. These valves are open when the normal path is closed. The normally closed isolation valve is on the same electrical power train as the pump it is protecting. The seri es redundant valve c onfiguration ensures that each miniflow path can be isolated prior to initiation of cold leg recirculation via the charging pumps. Electrical interlocks are provided preventing initiation of cold leg recirculation via the charging pumps if the miniflow isolation valves are open. The SI signal also closes the valves to isolate the normal charging line and volume control tank and opens the charging pump/refueling water storage tank suction valves to align the high head portion of the ECCS for inje ction. After cold leg injection permissive (P-19) is enabled, th e SI signal will align the cold leg injection valves to inject charging pump flow to the RCS. The charging pum ps may be tested during power operation via the minimum flow bypass line.
A pump performance curve for the centrifugal charging pump is presented on Figure 6.3-4.Safety Injection PumpsIn the event of an accident, the safety injecti on pumps are started automa tically on receipt of an SIS.The safety injection pumps deliver water to the RCS from the RWST during the injection phase and from the containment sump via the containmen t recirculation pumps dur ing the recirculation phase. Each high head safety injection pump is driven directly by an induction motor. The pump lubricating oil coolers are cooled by the sa fety injection pump seal cooling subsystem (Section 9.2.2.5).A minimum flow bypass line is provided on each pump discharge to recirculate flow to the RWST in the event that the pumps are started with the normal flow paths blocked.
This line also permits pump testing during normal plant operation. Two pa rallel valves in series with a third, downstream of a common header, are provided in this line. These valves are manually closed from the control room as part of the ECCS realignment from th e injection to the recirculation mode. A pump performance curve is shown on Figure 6.3-5.
Containment Recirculation Pumps The containment recirculation pumps (Section 6.2.2) are provide d for containment structure depressurization and later during the recirculat ion mode for core heat removal. The pumps provide safety injection via the charging and safety inject ion pumps during recirculation.
6.3.2.2.4 Containment Recirculation Coolers The containment recirculation c oolers (Section 6.2.2) are shell and tube type heat exchangers serving to cool recirculated water flowing through the shell side from the containment recirculation pumps. Service water acts as the cooling medium fl owing through the tube side of the cooler.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-9Rev. 30 6.3.2.2.5 Valves The design parameters for all ECCS valves are c onsistent with the design parameters of their respective systems as described in Table 6.3-1. Relief valve design parameters are listed in Table 6.3-2.The IEEE 323 Environmental Qualifi cation Program for all ECCS va lves was completed prior to initial criticality.The design features used to minimize valve leakage include:1.Valves which are normally open, except check valves and those which perform a control function, with backse ats to limit stem leakage.2.Normally closed globe valves installed with recirculation fl uid pressure under the seat to prevent stem leakage of recirc ulated (potentially radioactive) water.3.Enclosed relief valves with a closed bonnet.Motor Operated Gate Valves The seating design of selected motor operated gate valves is of the Crane flexible wedge design. This design releases the mechani cal holding force during the first in crement of travel so that the motor operator works only against the frictiona l component of the hydraulic imbalance on the disc and the packing box friction. The disc is gui ded throughout the full disc travel to prevent chattering and to provide ease of gate movement. The seating surfaces are hard faced to prevent galling and to reduce wear.
Where a gasket is employed for th e body-to-bonnet joint, it is eith er a fully trapped, controlled compression, spiral wound gasket or it is of the pressure seal design.The motor operator incorporates a hammer-blow feature that allows the motor to impact the discs away from the backseat upon cl osing or from the ma in seat upon opening of the valve. The hammer-blow feature not only impacts the disc but allows the motor to attain its operational speed prior to impact. Valves which must function agai nst system pressure are designed so that they function with a pressure drop equal to full system pressure across the valve disc.Manual Globe, Gate, and Check Valves Gate valves employ a wedge desi gn and are straight through. The wedge is either split or solid.
All gate valves have backseat a nd outside screw and yoke construction.
Globe valves, ("T" and "Y" style) ar e outside screw and yoke construction.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-10Rev. 30Check valves are either of the lift piston type, swing type or tilting disc type. Stainless steel check valves have no penetration welds other than th e inlet, outlet, and bonnet. The check hinge is serviced through the bonnet.
The gaskets of the stainless steel manual globe a nd gate valves are similar to those described above for motor operated valves. Carbon steel manual valves are employed to pass nonradioactive fluids only and, therefore, do not contain the double packing provision.Accumulator Check Valves (Swing-disc)
The accumulator check valve is designed with a low pressure drop configuration with all operating parts contained within the body.
Design considerations and analyses, which assure that leakage across the check valves located in each accumulator injection line does not impair accumulator availability, are as follows:1.During normal operation, the check valves are in the closed position with a nominal differential pressure across the disc of approximately 1,650 psi. Since the valves remain in this position except for testing or when called upon to open following an accident, and ar e, therefore, not subject to the abuse of flowing operation or impact loads caused by sudden flow reversal and seating, they do not experience significant wear of the moving parts, and are expected to function with minimal back-leakage. This back-leakage can be checked via the test connection as described in Section 6.3.4
.2.When the RCS is being pressurized dur ing the normal plant heatup operation, the check valves are tested for leakage. This test confirms the seat ing of the disc and whether or not there has been an increase in the leakage since the last test. When this test is completed, the accumulator-discharge-line motor operated isolation valves are opened and the RCS pressure increase is continued. There should be no significant increase in leakage from this point on, since increasing reactor coolant pressure increases the seating force.3.The experience derived from the check valve employed in the emergency injection systems indicate that the system is reliable and effective; check valve leakage has not been a problem. This is substantiate d by the satisfactory experience obtained from operation of plants where the use of check valves is identical to this application.4.The accumulators can accept some in-leakage from the RCS without affecting availability. Continuous in-l eakage would require, however, that the accumulator water column be adjusted accordingly with Technical Specification requirements.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-11Rev. 30Relief Valves Relief valves are installed in va rious sections of the ECCS to protect lines which have a lower design pressure than the RCS. Each relief valv e has a closed bonnet and screwed cap to contain any leakage of system fl uid that may occur along the valve spi ndle when the valve is lifting. This prevents release of system fluids to the building environment. Stainless steel materials are used for the valve body, disc, bonnet, spindle, spring assembly, and cap for compatibility with system fluids. Table 6.3-2 lists the systems relief va lves with their capacities and setpoints.Butterfly Valves Each main RHR line has an air-operated butterfly valve at the outlet of the RHS heat exchanger which is normally open and is designed to fail in the open position. The actuato r is arranged such that air pressure on the diaphragm overcomes the spring force, causing th e linkage to move the butterfly to the closed position. Upon loss of air pressure, the spring returns the butterfly to the open position. These valves are left in the full open position during normal operation to maximize flow from this system to the RCS during the injection mode of the ECCS operation. These valves are used during normal RHR system ope ration to control cooldown flowrate.
Modifications to the RHS system have been made to preclude overheating of the RHS heat exchanger (shell side) cooling water piping (CCP system) in the event of a loss of Instrument Air during a Normal or safety grade cold shut down (SGCS) cooldown. The RHS heat exchanger outlet butterfly valves have been provided with actuator throttle limiters that have been set to prevent full opening of the valves in the event of a loss of the (non-safety) Instrument Air. Upon a loss of air, the outlet valves will fail open to the preset open position to allow continued cooldown without adversely affecting CCP piping w ith an RCS temperature as high as 350
°F. The changes have no effect on the RHS injection flowpath when RHS is used during the SI phase following a LOCA. See FSAR Section 6.3.2.2.5.Each RHR heat exchanger bypass line has an air-operated butterfly valve which is normally open and is designed to fail open. These valves ar e used during normal cooldown to avoid thermal shock to the residual heat exchanger.
Modifications to the RHS system have been made to preclude overheating of the RHS heat exchanger (shell side) cooling water piping (CCP system) in the event of a loss of Instrument Air during a Normal or safety grade cold shut down (SGCS) cooldown. The RHS heat exchanger bypass butterfly valves have been modified to fail open in the event of a loss of Instrument Air. Upon a loss of air, the bypass valves will fail full open to allow continued cooldown without adversely affecting CCP piping with an RCS temperature as high as 350
°F. The changes have no effect on the RHS injection flowpath when RHS is used during the SI phase following a LOCA.
See FSAR Section 6.3.2.2.5.
Specific ECCS parameters are given in Table 6.3-1.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-12Rev. 30 6.3.2.2.6 Accumulator Motor Operated Valve Controls As part of the plant shutdown ad ministrative procedures, the oper ator is required to close these valves. This prevents a loss of accumulator water inventory to the RCS and is done after the RCS has been depressurized below the safety inject ion unblock setpoint and prior to the time RCS pressure reaches safety injecti on accumulator pressure. The redunda nt pressure a nd level alarms on each accumulator would remind the operator to close these valves, if any were inadvertently left open. Power is disconnected after the valves are closed.
During plant startup, the operator is instructed, via operating procedures, to energize and open these valves prior to the RCS pressure reachi ng the safety injection unblock setpoint. Monitor lights in conjunction with an audible alarm alert the operator should any of these valves be left inadvertently closed once the RCS pressure increases beyond the safety injection unblock setpoint. Power is disconnect ed after valves are opened.
The accumulator isolation valves are not require d to move during power operation or in a post-accident situation. For a di scussion of limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements of these valves, refer to Section 3/4.5.1 of the Technical Specifications.For further discussions of the instrumentation associated with these valves, refer to Sections 6.3.5, 7.3.1.1.2, and 7.6.4.
6.3.2.2.7 Motor Operated Valves and Controls Remotely operated valves for the injection mode which are under manual control (i.e., valves which normally are in their ready position and do not require an SIS) have their positions indicated by monitor lights on a common portion of the control board. If a component is out of its proper position, its monitor lights i ndicate this on the control panel. At any time during operation when one of these valves is not in the ready position for injection, this condition is shown visually on the board, and an audible alarm is sounded in the control room.
The ECCS delivery lag times are given in Chapte r 15. The accumulator inj ection time varies, as the size of the postulated break varies since the RCS pressure drop varies proportionately to the break size.
Inadvertent mis-positioning of a motor operate d valve due to a malfunction in the control circuitry, in conjunction with an accident, has been anal yzed and found to be a very low probability event. However, to comply with BTP-EICSB-18, power lockout s are provided in the control room for each valve whose spurious movement could result in degraded ECCS performance.Table 6.3-3 lists motor operated isolation valves in the ECCS showing interlocks, automatic features, and position indications.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-13Rev. 30 6.3.2.3 Applicable Codes and Classifications Applicable industry codes a nd classifications for ECCS are discussed in Section 3.9.3.
6.3.2.4 Material Specifications and CompatibilityTypical material specifications used for the ECCS components are listed in Table 6.3-4. Materials are selected to meet the applicable material requirements of the codes in Table 3.2-1 and the following additional requirements:1.All parts of components in contact with borated water are fabr icated of or clad with austenitic stainless steel or equivalent corr osion resistant material.2.All parts of components in contact (internal) with sump solution during recirculation are fabricated of austenitic stainless steel or equivalent corrosion resistant material.3.Valve seating surfaces are hard-faced with Stellite number 6 or equivalent to prevent galling and to reduce wear.4.Valve stem materials are selected fo r their corrosion resistance, high tensile properties, and resistance to surface scoring by the packing.
6.3.2.5 System Reliability Reliability of the ECCS is considered in all aspe cts of the system from initial design to periodic testing of the components during plant operatio
- n. The ECCS is a two-train, fully redundant standby safeguard feature. The system has been designed and proven by analysis to withstand any single credible active failure during injection or active or passive failure during recirculation and maintain the performance objectives desired in Section 6.3.1. Tw o trains of pumps, heat exchangers, and flow paths are provided for redundancy as only one train is required to satisfy the performance requirements. The in itiating signals for the ECCS are derived from independent sources as measured from process variables (e.g., low pressurizer pressu re) or environmental variables (e.g., containment pressu re). Redundant as well as f unctionally independent variables are measured to initiate the sa feguards signals. Each train is phys ically separated and protected where necessary so that a single event cannot in itiate a common failure. Power sources for the ECCS are divided into two independent trains supplied from the emergency buses from either on site or off site power. Sufficient emergency generating capacity is available to provide required on site power to each train. The emergency generators and their auxiliary systems are completely independent and each supplies power to one of the two ECCS trains.
The reliability program extends to the procur ement of the ECCS components such that only designs which have been proven by past use in similar applications are acceptable for use. The quality assurance program as described in Chapter 17 assures components have been manufactured and tested to the applicable codes and standards.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-14Rev. 30 The preoperational testing program assures that the systems as designed and constructed meets the functional requirements, as calculated in design.
The ECCS is designed with the ability for online testing of most component s so the availability and operational status can be readily determined.
In addition to the above, the integrity of the EC CS is assured through examination of critical components during the rout ine inservice inspection.1.Active Failure Criteria The ECCS is designed to accept a single active failure following the incident without loss of its protective function. The system design tolerates the failure of any single active component in the ECCS it self or in the necessary associated service systems at any t ime during the period of required system operations following the incident.
A single active failure analysis is presented in Table 6.3-5 and a failure mode and effects analysis is presented in Table 6.3-10. These demonstrate that the ECCS can sustain the failure of any single active co mponent in either the short or long term and still meet the level of performance for core cooling.
Since the operational status of the acti ve components of the ECCS following a steam line rupture is identical to that following a LOCA, the same analysis is applicable and the ECCS can sustain the failure of any single active component and still meet the level of performance for the addition of shutdown reactivity.Portions of the ECCS are also relied upon to provide boration and makeup during a safety grade cold shutdown as discussed in Section 9.3.4.2.6. The capability of the ECCS to sustain an active failure and still perform in conjunction with other systems of the cold shutdow n design is presented in Table 5.4 9 , RHS - Safety Grade Cold Shutdown Operations - FMEA.2.Passive Failure Criteria The structural failure of a static component that limits the component's effectiveness in carrying out its long term design function is considered a passive failure. Examples include cracks in pipes, sprung flanges, valve packing leaks or pump seal failures.
A single passive failure analysis is presented in Table 6.3-6. It demonstrates that the ECCS can sustain a single passive fail ure during the long term phase and still retain an intact flow path to the core to supply sufficient flow to maintain the core covered and effect the remova l of decay heat. The procedure followed to establish the alternate flow path also isol ates the component which failed.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-15Rev. 30 The following philosophy provides for n ecessary redundancy in component and system arrangement to meet the intent of the genera l design criteria on single failure as it specifically applies to failure to passi ve components in the ECCS. Thus, for the long term, the system design is based on accepting either a passive or an active failure.
Redundancy of Flow Paths and Components for Long Term Emergency Core Cooling In design of the ECCS, Westinghouse utilizes the following criteria:1.During the long term cooling period following a LOCA, the emergency core cooling flow paths are separa ble into two subsystems, ei ther of which can provide minimum core cooling functions and return spilled water from the floor of the containment back to the RCS.2.Either of the two subsystems can be is olated and removed from service in the event of a leak outside the containment.3.Adequate redundancy of check valves is provided to tolerate failure of a check valve during the long term as a passive component.4.Should one of the two subsystems be isol ated in this long term period, the other subsystem remains operable.5.Provisions are also made in the design to detect and collect leakage from components outside the containment.Thus, for the long-term emergency core cooling f unction, adequate core cooling capacity exits with one flow path removed from service.
Subsequent Leakage from Components in ECCS System With respect to piping and mechanical equipm ent outside the containm ent, considering the provisions for visual inspection (if access is availa ble) and leak detection, leaks will be detected before they propagate to major proportions. A revi ew of the equipment in the system indicates that the largest sudden leak potential would be the sudden failure of a pump shaft seal. Evaluation of leak rate assuming only the presence of a seal retention ring around the pump shaft showed flows less than 50 gpm would result. Piping leaks, valve packing leaks, or flange gasket leaks have been of a nature to build up slowly with time and are considered less severe than the pump seal failure.Larger leaks in the ECCS are prevented by the following:1.The piping is classified ANS Safety Cla ss 2 and, therefore, must comply with the corresponding quality assurance program associated with this safety class.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-16Rev. 302.The piping, equipment, and supports are designed to ANS Safety Class 2 seismic classification permitting no loss of func tion resulting from the design basis earthquake.3.The system piping is located within a controlled area on the plant site.4.The piping system receives periodic inservice inspection and pressure tests and is accessible for periodic visual inspection.5.The piping is austenitic stainless steel which is not susceptible to brittle fracture during operating conditions.Based on this review, the auxiliary and engineered safety features buildings and related equipment are designed to be capable of handling leak s up to a maximum of 50 gpm. Means are also provided to detect and isolate such leaks in the emergency core cooling equipment cubicles within approximately 30 minutes in the ESF building and within approximately one hour for leaks in the auxiliary building. In the pipe t unnel area of the fuel building and in the 4 foot 6 inches common area outside the RSS and RHS pump cubicles in the ESF building, detection and isolation for ECCS fluid leakage is not required because c onservative piping de sign precludes leakage postulation. All ECCS pipi ng within these areas meets the low stress limits required of MEB 3-1 for break exclusion areas for moderate energy piping.
In addition, the piping, valves, and components w ithin these areas are s ubjected to a periodic leakage test program in accordance with the TMI Task Action Plan Item III.D.1.1 (SER Confirmatory Item No. 66).
Potential Boron Precipitation Boron precipitation in the reactor vessel can be prevented by a back- flush of cooling water through the core to reduce the concentration of bor ic acid in the water remaining in the reactor vessel.Two flow paths are available for hot leg recirculation of sump water. Each safety injection pump can discharge to two hot legs with suction taken from the c ontainment recirculation pump discharge.
Loss of one pump or one flow path does not prevent hot leg recirculation, since two redundant flow paths are available for use.
Safety Grade Cold Shutdown Function During a safety grade cold shutdown, the ECCS high head injection header provides one of the two redundant flow paths for boration and make-up. The other redundant flow path is the charging bypass line which is part of the chemical and volume control system. Provisions are also included in the ECCS design to ensure that the acc umulators can be either isolated or vented so MPS3 UFSAR6.3-17Rev. 30 that RCS depressurization can be accomplish ed. Details of the cold shutdown design are discussed in Section 5.4.7.2.3.5.
6.3.2.6 Protection Provisions The provisions taken to protect the system from damage that might result from dynamic effects associated with postulated rupture of piping, are discussed in Section 3.6. The provisions taken to protect the system from missiles are discussed in Section 3.5. The provisions to protect the system from seismic damage are disc ussed in Sections 3.7, 3.9, and 3.10.
Thermal stresses on the RCS are discussed in Section 5.2.
6.3.2.7 Provisions for Performance TestingTest lines are provided for performance testing of the ECCS system as well as individual components. These test lines and instrumentat ion are shown on Figures 6.2-36, 6.2-37, 6.3-2, and 9.3-8. All pumps have miniflow li nes for use in testing operability. Additional information on testing can be found in Section 6.3.4.2.
6.3.2.8 Manual Actions No manual actions are required of the operato r for proper operation of the ECCS during the injection mode of operation, except to isolate within 90 minutes a potential charging pump alternate minimum flow line break between isolation valves 3CHS*MV8512 A/B and the RWST.
This action is credited to protect system hydraulic performance assume d in design analyses.
During the injection mode, the ECCS pumps (charging, safety injection, and residual heat removal) and quench spray pumps operate automatically, drawing water from the RWST and delivering it to the RCS and quench spray headers, respectively. The switchover to the recirculation mode is initiated automatically and completed manually by operator action from the main control room. The operator actions required for switchover are delineated in Table 6.3-7.
The residual heat removal pumps stop automatically upon receipt of an RWST low-low level signal coincident with the safety injection signa
- l. A one-out-of-two prot ection logic (see Figure 7.6-3) is used to trip each pump.RWST level indication is available to the opera tor to monitor the water level and prepare for switchover to the recirculation mode. The RWST level indication syst em (see Figure 7.6-3) consists of four level channels with each channel assigned to a separate process control protection set. Four RWST level transmitters provide level signals to four level indicators (through isolation devices) on the main control board. Two of these level channels ar e recorded on the main control board, and two of the channels provide indicat ion (through isolation devices) on the auxiliary shutdown panel, to indicate and record zero to 100 percent level in the RWST. The level indication logic is sepa rate from the pump trip logic described above.The RWST low-low level signal is also alarmed to inform the operator to initiate the manual actions required to realign the charging, safety injection, and containment recirculation pumps for the recirculation mode.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-18Rev. 30Minimum Injection Mode Time The minimum elapsed time from a LOCA to the receipt of the RWST low-low level signal has been calculated to be approximately 33 minut es. The analysis conservatively assumes the following:1.The ECCS and quench spray pumps are a ssumed to start coincident with the LOCA and to deliver at a constant ra te throughout the injection mode period.2.The containment and RCS pressures are as sumed to be 0 psig to maximize flow out of the RWST.3.The pump flow rates are the maximum ca lculated (system runout) flow rates, assuming two pumps of each type ar e operating. These flow rates are approximately:
Quench spray pump (2) - 6,500 gpm Charging pump (2) - 880 gpm
Safety injection pump (2) - 830 gpm
Residual heat removal pump (2) - 10,000 gpm The total flowrate out of the RWST du ring the injection mode of operation is conservatively assumed to be 18,400 gpm for analysis purposes.4.The RWST volume available during the inj ection mode is that contained between the Technical Specifications minimu m volume requirement of 1,166,000 gallons (modes 1 through 4) and the low-low level setpoint with allo wance for positive instrument error at the low-low level setpoint. An RWST volume of 1,166,000 gallons corresponds to a level approximately 3 inches below the RWST makeup alarm setpoint and permits a working allowance of approximately 5,100 gallons. Instrument uncertainty for the RWST makeup alarm has been accounted for to provide assurance that this alarm will be generated prior to the RWST level decreasing below 1,166,000 gallons. The volum e of water contained between the Technical Specifications requirement of 1,166,000 gallons and the low-low level setpoint (tank elevation = 25 feet 5 inches) is approximately 646,000 gallons.
When instrument error at this setpoint is considered, this volume of water is reduced to approximately 614,000 gallons.
The minimum time that would elapse from initiation of a LOCA to initiation of switchover to the recirculation mode is then 614,000 gallons divided by 18,400 gpm, or approximately 33 minutes. This is the minimum time available for the operator to prepare for switchover. Refer to Figure 6.3-6 for a presentation of RWST water levels and volumes.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-19Rev. 30Switchover Allowance Time Based on MNPS-3 simulator experience, a period of 25 minutes is considered conservative for operators to complete manual switchover to recirculation. This procedure (Table 6.3-7) is initiated promptly when the alarm signals automatic trip of a residual heat removal pump at the RWST low-low level setpoint.
The two residual heat removal pumps have indepe ndent instrumentation and are not expected to receive low-low trip signals at the same time. The second residual heat removal pump is conservatively assumed to draw 5500 gpm until it is manually tripped by procedure which is assumed to occur five minutes after the alarm. This action signifi cantly reduces the outflow from the RWST. The outflow is further reduced as each charging and safety in jection pump is aligned to the containment sump.
After termination of the residual heat removal pumps the outflow from the RWST is assumed to be constant at approximately 8300 gpm until switchover is complete. Thus, no credit is taken for reduction in outflow as each charging and safety injection pump is realigned to the containment sump.The amount of water drawn from the RWST during the 25 minutes after the low-low level alarm is approximately 234,000 gallons. A ssuming the low-low level alarm occurs at the lowest extreme of the instrument uncertainties, the minimum RWST water level will be approximately 12.4 feet.
above tank bottom. This level provides adequate NPSH for the charging and safety injection pumps when both power trains and all ECCS pumps operate.If one power train fails, the operating charging and safety injection pump each deliver higher flow and require higher NPSH than when both trains operate. This condition results in less NPSH margin than when both trains are powered. The minimum remaining RWST water level for this case is approximately 15.9 feet. above tank bot tom which provides adequate NPSH for the charging and safety injection pum ps when only one train operates.
Following the completion of the switchover sequenc e, two of the four c ontainment recirculation pumps would take suction from the containment sump and deliver borated water to the suction of the two charging pumps and the two safety injec tion pumps, which deliver directly to the RCS cold legs. As part of the switchover procedures, the suctions of the charging and safety injection pumps are cross-connected in the event of failure of either recirculation pump.
Section 7.5 lists the process inform ation available in the control r oom to assist the operator in performing the switchover actions.
6.3.3 PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION Chapter 15 Accidents That Result in ECCS Operation In conjunction with the following discussion, refer to Chapter 15.0.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-20Rev. 301.Increase in heat removed by the secondary system.a.Inadvertent opening of a steam ge nerator relief or safety valve.b.Steam system piping failure.2.Decrease in heat removal by the secondary system.a.Feedwater system pipe break.3.Decrease in reactor coolant system inventory.a.Steam generator tube rupture.b.Loss-of-coolant accident from a sp ectrum of postulated piping breaks within the system.c.Spectrum of rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) ejection accidents.4.Increase in reactor system (RCS) inventory.a.Inadvertent operation of the ECCS during power operation.
Safety injection system actuation ma y occur from any of the following:1.Low pressurizer pressure signal.2.Low steamline pressure signal.3.High containment pressure.4.Manual actuation.
SIS will rapidly close the feedwater control valves , close the feedwater isolation valves, and trip the main feedwater pumps.Further, the actuation signal will divert the suction of the charging pumps from the volume control tank to the refueling water storage tank.The va lves isolating the charging pumps from the injection header will then automatically open, if the cold leg injection permissive [(P-19) -
pressurizer pressure low] signal is present. When the injection header is olation valves open, the charging pumps pump 2700 ppm borated water from the RWST, through the header and injection line and into the cold legs of each loop. The safety injection pumps also start automatically, but provide no flow when the RCS is at normal pressure. The passive accumulator system and the low head system also provide no flow at normal RCS pressure.
Existing Criteria Used to Judge the Adequacy of the ECCS MPS3 UFSAR6.3-21Rev. 30 Criteria from 10 CFR 50.46 1.Peak clad temperature cal culated shall not exceed 2,200
°F.2.The calculated total oxidation of the clad shall nowhere exceed 0.17 times the total clad thickness before oxidation.3.The calculated total amount of hydrogen generated from the chemical reaction of the clad with water or steam shall not exceed 0.01 times th e hypothetical amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the clad cylinders surrounding the fuel, excluding the clad around the plenum volume, were to react.4.Calculated changes in core geometry shall be such that the core remains amenable to cooling.5.After any calculated successful initial ope ration of the ECCS, the calculated core temperature shall be maintained at an acceptable low value and decay heat shall be removed for the extended period of tim e required by long life radionuclides remaining in the core.An evaluation of single failures is provided in Section 6.3.2.5. A detailed description of the above accidents including methods of analysis assumptions, and results are provided in Chapter 15.
6.3.4 TESTS
AND INSPECTIONS 6.3.4.1 ECCS Performance TestsPreoperational Test Program at Ambient Conditions Preliminary operational testing of the ECCS sy stem was conducted during the hot-functional testing of the RCS following flushing and hydrostatic testing, with the system cold and the reactor vessel head removed. Provision was made for excess water to drain into the refueling canal. The ECCS was aligned for normal power operation. Simultaneously, the safety injection block switches reset and the breakers on the lines supplying off site power are tripped manually so that operation of the emergency diesels is tested in c onjunction with the safety injection system. This test provided information in cluding the following facets: 1.Satisfactory SIS gene ration and transmission.2.Proper operation of the emergency gene rators, including sequential load pickup.3.Valve operating times.4.Pump starting times.5.Pump delivery rates at runout conditi ons (one point on the operating curve).
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-22Rev. 30 A discussion of provision for testing the containm ent recirculation system is given in Section 6.2.2.Components 1.Pumps - Separate flow tests of the pum ps in the ECCS systems were conducted during the operational startup testing (with the reactor vessel head off) to check capability for sustained operation. The centrifugal charging, safety injection, residual heat removal, and containment recirculation pumps discharged into the reactor vessel through the injection lines, the overflow from the reactor vessel passing into the refueling canal. Each pump was tested separately with water drawn from the RWST. Data was taken to determine pump head and flow at this time. Pumps were then run on miniflow circuits and data taken to determine a second point on the head flow characteristic curve.2.Accumulators - Each accumulator is filled with water from the RWST and pressurized with the MOV on the discharge line closed. The valve is then opened and the accumulator allowed to discharge into the reactor vessel as part of the operational startup testing with the reactor cold and the vessel head off.
Also, see Chapter 14.0 for a descri ption of the testing program.
6.3.4.2 Reliability Tests and Inspections Periodic testing of the ECCS components and all necessary support systems is performed in accordance with applicable plant procedures. Va lves which operate afte r a LOCA are operated through a complete cycle, and pumps are operated individually in this test on their miniflow lines except the charging pumps which are tested by their normal charging func tion. If such testing indicates a need for corrective maintenance, the redundancy of equipment in these systems permits such maintenance to be performed wit hout shutting down or reducing load under certain conditions. These conditions include considera tions such as the period within which the component should be restored to service and the capability of the remaining equipment to provide the minimum required level of performance duri ng such a period. The operation of the remote stop valve and the check valve in each accumulator tank discharge line may be tested by opening the remote test line valves ju st downstream of the stop valve and check valve respectively. Flow through the test line can be observed on instrument s and the opening and closing of the discharge line stop valve can be sensed on this instrumentation.
Where series pairs of check valves from the hi gh-pressure to low- pres sure isolation barrier between the RCS and safety injection system pi ping outside the reactor containment, periodic testing of these check valves mu st be performed to provide as surance that certain postulated failure modes do not result in a lo ss of coolant from the low pressure system outside containment with a simultaneous loss of safety injection pumping capacity.The safety injection system test line subsystem provides the capability for determination of the integrity of the pressure boundary formed by series check valves. The tests performed verify that MPS3 UFSAR6.3-23Rev. 30each of the series check valves can independently sustain differential pressure across its disc, and also verify that the valve is in its closed position. The required pe riodic tests are to be performed after each refueling just pr ior to plant startup, after the RCS has been pressurized.Lines in which the series check valves are to be tested are the safety injection pump cold leg injection lines and the residual heat removal pump cold leg injection lines.To implement the periodic component testing requirements, Technical Specifications (Chapter 16) have been established. During periodic system test ing, a visual inspection of pump seals, valves packings, flanged connections, and relief valves is made to detect leakage. Inservice inspection provides further confirmation that no significant deterioration is occurring in the ECCS fluid boundary.Design measures have been taken to assure th at the following testi ng can be performed: 1.Active components may be tested pe riodically for opera bility (e.g., pumps on miniflow, certain valves, etc).2.An integrated system actuation test can be performed when the plant is cooled down and the residual heat removal system (RHRS) is in operation. The ECCS is arranged so that no flow is intr oduced into the RCS for this test.3.An initial flow test of the full operational sequence can be performed.
The design features which assure this test capability are specifically:1.Power sources are provided to permit individual actuation of each active component of the ECCS.2.The safety injection pumps can be tested periodically during plant operation using the minimum flow recirculation lines provided.3.The RHS pumps are used every time the RHS is put into operation. They can also be tested periodically when the plant is at power using the mi niflow recirculation lines.4.The centrifugal charging pumps are either normally in use for charging service or can be tested periodically on miniflow.5.Remote operated valves can be exerci sed during routine plant maintenance.6.Level and pressure instrumentation is provided for each accumulator tank for continuous monitoring during plant operation.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-24Rev. 307.Flow from each accumulator tank can be directed at any time through a test line to determine check valve leakage and to de monstrate operation of the accumulator motor operated valves.8.A flow indicator is provided in the safe ty injection pump header and in the RHR pump headers. Pressure instrumentati on is also provided in these lines.9.An integrated system test can be performed when the plant is cooled down and the RHRS is in operation. This test does not introduce flow into the RCS but does demonstrate the operation of the valves, pump circuit breakers, and automatic circuitry including diesel st arting and the automatic lo ading of ECCS components of the diesels (by simultaneously simulating a loss of off site power to the vital electrical buses).10.A test can be performed during plant mode 5 with the RHRS in operation, and with the ECCS pumps aligned to take sucti on from the RCS through the RHRS and to return the water through the safety inje ction branch lines. This arrangement permits a safety injection flow balanc ing test without introduction of any RCS inventory change.11.A special design feature is provided to prevent the injection lines throttling valves from being set at a position that may cause excessive w ear by erosion and/or from clogging by debris (passed by sump sc reen), during post-LOCA long term recirculation. This provision a dds resistance in the injection lines in a form of restriction orifices (ROs) and flow elemen t orifices. The added resistance reduces the amount of throttling required at each valve. Consequently the valves are set during the final balancing tests with flow path openings large enough to preclude both high fluid velocities that cause er osion and potential de bris entrapment.Chapter 16, Technical Specificati ons, gives the selection of test frequency, acceptability of testing, and measured parameters. A description of the inservice inspection program is also included in Chapter 16. ECCS components and systems are designed to meet the intent of ASME Code Section XI for inservice inspection.
6.3.5 INSTRUMENTATION
REQUIREMENTS Instrumentation and associated analog and logi c channels employed for initiation of ECCS operation is discussed in Section 7.3. This sect ion describes the instrumentation employed for monitoring ECCS components during normal plan t operation and also ECCS post-accident operation. All alarms are annunciated in the contro l room. The controls and instrumentation for the containment recirculation syst em are discussed in Section 7.3.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-25Rev. 30 6.3.5.1 Temperature Indication Cold Leg Injection/Normal RHR Return Line Temperature The fluid temperature of the coolant being returned to the RCS during safety injection and normal RHR operation is recorded in the control room.Refueling Water Storage Tank Temperature (RWST)
Fluid temperature in the RWST is recorded in the control room.
Containment Recirculation Coolers Outlet Temperature Temperature of the containment recirculation water at the outlet of the coolers is indicated in the control room.RHS Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature The fluid temperature at the inlet of each residual heat exchanger is recorded in the control room. There is also a locally mounted temperature at the outlet of each residual heat exchanger.
6.3.5.2 Pressure IndicationSafety Injection Header Pressure Safety injection pump discharge header pres sure is indicated in the control room.Accumulator Pressure Duplicate pressure channels are installed on each accumulator. Pr essure indication in the control room and high and low pressure al arms are provided by each channel.Test Line Pressure A local pressure indicator used to check for proper seating of the acc umulator check valves between the injection lines and the RCS is installed on the leakage test line.Residual Heat Removal Pump Discharge Pressure Residual heat removal discharge pressure for each pump is indicated in the control room. A high pressure alarm is act uated by each channel.Centrifugal Charging Pump Inlet/Discharge Pressure A local pressure indicator is located at the suction and discharge of each charging pump.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-26Rev. 30 Containment Recirculation Pump Pressure Discharge pressure indication is provided for each recirculation pump in the control room.
6.3.5.3 Flow IndicationCharging Pump Injection Header Flow Injection header flow to the reactor cold legs is indicated in the control room.
Safety Injection Pump Header Flow Flow through the safety injection pump head er is indicated in the control room.
Residual Heat Removal Pump Injection Flow Flow through each RHS injection header leading to the reactor cold or hot legs is indicated in the control room.Test Line Flow Local indication of the leakage te st line flow is provided to check for proper seating of the accumulator check valves between the injection lines and the RCS.
Safety Injection Pump Minimum Flow Flow indication for the safety injection pump minimum flow line is provided locally.
Residual Heat Removal Pump Minimum Flow A flowmeter installed in each RHS pump discharg e header provides control for the valve located in the pump minimum flow line.
6.3.5.4 Level IndicationRefueling Water Storage Tank Level The refueling water storage tank (RWST) instrumentation provides five distinct setpoints for level control. The high-high level setpoint provides an alarm to protect against possible overflow of the RWST. The low and high level setpoints provide an alarm to initiate and terminate manual make-up to assure that a sufficient volume of water is always available in the RWST in conformance with the Technical Specifications. The high-hig h, high, and low setpoints are not safety-related.
The safety-related low-low level setpoint stops the RHR pumps and starts the CRS pumps. This setpoint is alarmed to alert the operator to realign the ECCS from the injection to the recirculation mode following an accident. A safety-related ta nk empty setpoint stops the quench spray pumps.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-27Rev. 30 An alarm is provided to indicate pumps trip and that the usable volume of the RWST has been exhausted. All the above alarms annunciate in the control room.
In addition, four safety-related level indicator channels, which i ndicate in the control room, are provided for the RWST.Accumulator Water Level Duplicate water level channels are provided for each accumulator. Both channels provide indication in the control room and actuate High and Low water level alarms.Containment Structure Sump Water Level Two containment structure sump water level indicator channels are provided. Both indicate in the control room.
6.3.5.5 Valve Position IndicationValve positions which are indica ted on the control board are done so by a "off normal" system; i.e., should the valve not be in its proper position, a yellow light will be l it and thus give a highly visible indication to the operator.Accumulator Isolation Va lve Position Indication The accumulator motor operated valves are provide d with red (open) and green (closed) position indicating lights located at the control switch on the main control board and on the auxiliary shutdown panel for each valve. These lights are power ed from a source that is separate from the control power for the valve, and are actuated by valve motor-operated limit switches.A monitor light that is on when the valve is not fully open is provided in an array of monitor lights on the main control board that are all off when th eir respective valves are in proper position for performing safeguard operations. This light is energized from a separate monitor light supply and actuated by valve stem limit switches.
An alarm annunciator point is activated by both a valve motor operator limit switch and by a valve position limit switch activated by stem travel whenever an accumulator valve is not fully open for any reason with the system at pressure (the pressure at which the safety injection actuation signal is unblocked at the P-11 setpoint. A separate annunc iator point is used for each accumulator valve. This alarm wi ll be recycled at approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> intervals to remind the operator of the improper valve lineup.
6.3.6 REFERENCE
FOR SECTION 6.36.3-1WCAP-7907, 1972, Burnett, T.W.T. et al., "Loftran Code Description," Westinghouse Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-28Rev. 30TABLE 6.3-1 EMERGENCY CORE CO OLING SYSTEM COMPONENT PARAMETERSAccumulators Number 4Design Pressure (psig) 700Design Temperature (°F) 300Operating Temperature (°F) 70Nominal Operating Pressure (psig) 650Total Volume (ft
- 3) 1,350 eachNominal Water Volume (ft
- 3) 900 eachVolume N 2 Gas (ft 3) 450Boric Acid Concentration, maximum (ppm) 2,900Boric Acid Concentration, minimum (ppm) 2,600Relief Valve Setpoint (psig) 700Charging Pumps Number 3Design Pressure (psig) 2,800Design Temperature (°F) 300 Design Flow Rate (gpm) (1) 150Design Head (ft) 5,800 Maximum Runout Flow Rate (gpm) for "B" Pump 560for "A" and "C" Pumps 570Head at Maximum Flow Rate (ft) 1,400Discharge Head at Shutoff (ft) 6,000 Motor Rating (bhp)
(2) 600 Required NPSH (ECCS) Maximum Predicted Flowrate (ft)
(3)Available NPSH (3)
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-29Rev. 30Safety Injection Pumps Number 2Design Pressure (psig) 1,750Design Temperature (°F) 300Design Flow Rate (gpm) 425Design Head (ft) 2,850Maximum Flow Rate (gpm) 675Head at Maximum Flow Rate (ft) 1,480Discharge Head (ft) 3,545 Motor Rating (bhp)
(2) 450 Required NPSH (3)Available NPSH (3)Residual Heat Removal Pumps (See Section 5.4.7 for design parameters)
Required NPSH (3)Available NPSH (3)Residual Heat Exchangers (See Section 5.4.7 for design parameters)
Containment Recirculation Pumps Number 4Design Pressure (psig) Suction 60/30 inches Hg Discharge 295Design Temperature (°F) 260°FDesign Flow Rate (gpm) 3,950 gpmDesign Head (ft) 148 psi/342 ftMaximum Flow Rate (gpm) 3,000 gpm Containment Recirculation Coolers See Section 6.2.2 for design parametersRefueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
See Section 6.2.2 for design parametersNOTES:
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-30Rev. 30(1)Includes miniflow(2)1.15 Service factor not included(3)See Table 6.3-11 MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-31Rev. 30TABLE 6.3-2 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RELIEF VALVE DATADescriptionFluid Discharged Fluid Inlet Temperature, °F (normal) Process Set Pressure (psig) Back Pressure Constant psigRequired CapacityAccumulator N 2 Supply Nitrogen12070002,743 scfmHeader Relief to Atm.(Non-radioactive)(8857)(Non-radioactive)
SI Pump (Hot/Cold) Legs Relief to DGS (8853 A, B / 8851)
Dilute H 3 B0 3502235420 gpm RHR Pump (Hot/Cold) Legs Relief to DGS (884 / 8856 A, B)
Dilute H 3 B0 3506006 (8842, 8856A)20 gpm 5 (8856B)SI Pump Suction Relief to DGS (8858)Dilute H 3 B0 350220420 gpmSI Pump Suction Relief to DGS (8925A/B)Dilute H 3 B0 35022041 gpmAccumulator N 2 Relief to Containment (8855 A, B, C, D)Nitrogen12070001,500 scfmHydro Test Discharge Relief to Plant Drainage (DNF) (8885)
Dilute H 3 B0 31003325025 gpm MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-32Rev. 30TABLE 6.3-3 MOTOR OPERATED ISOLATION VALVES IN THE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMLOCATIONVALVE IDENTIFICATIONINTERLOCKSAUTOMATIC FEATURESPOSITION INDICATIONALARMSAccumulator Isolation valves8808 A, B, C, DOpens on SIS or high pressurizer
pressure with control switch in AUTO (Ref. Section 7.3.1.1.5)MCBYes, out position Safety injection pump suction from RWST 8806 and 8923 A & BNoneNoneMCBYes, out positionRHR suction from RWST8812 A & B 8812A or 8812B cannot be opened unless recirculation pumps discharge valves 8837A or 8837B are closed and valve 8804A or 8804B is fully closed.NoneMCBYes, out position Safety injection pumps suction from recirculation pump B8804BCannot be opened unless valve 8837B or 8838B is fully open, 8702A or 8702B or 8702C are fully
closed, SI pump miniflow valve 8813 or (8814 and 8920) is (are) fully closed, and valves (8511A and 8512A) or (8511B and 8512B) are fully closed.NoneMCBYes, out position Safety injection hot leg injection8802 A & BNoneNoneMCBYes, out positionRHR hot leg injection8840NoneNoneMCBYes, out position MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-33Rev. 30Centrifugal charging pumps suction from recirculation pump A8804ACannot be opened unless valve 8701A or 8701B or 8701C is fully closed, valve 8813 or valves (8814
and 8920) is (are) fully closed, valve 8837A or 8838B is fully open, and valves (8511A and 8512A) or (8511B and 8512B) are fully closed.NoneMCBYes, out position CVCS suction from RWSTLCV-112 D & EOpens on SIS or on low low VCT levelMCBCVCS normal suctionLCV-112 B & CCloses on SIS or low low VCT level
provided that the associated CVCS suction valve from the RWST is open (112D for 112B and 112E for 112C)MCBYes, out position Safety injection pump to cold leg8835NoneNoneMCBYes, out positionCVCS normal charging flow discharge line8105 and 8106NoneCloses on SISMCBNoneCharging pump miniflow8110, 8111 A,B & CNoneCloses on SISMCBYes, out positionCharging pump suction8468 A & BNoneNoneMCBYes, out positionTABLE 6.3-3 MOTOR OPERATED ISOLATION VALVES IN THE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMLOCATIONVALVE IDENTIFICATIONINTERLOCKSAUTOMATIC FEATURESPOSITION INDICATIONALARMS MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-34Rev. 30Charging pump discharge8438 A, B & CNoneNoneMCBYes, out positionCharging and safety injection pump header from RHR 8807 A & B and 8924NoneNoneMCBYes, out positionRHR to RCS cold legs8809 A & BNoneNoneMCBYes, out position Safety injection pump miniflow (8814 and 8920) or 8813NoneNoneMCBYes, out positionRHR cross connect8716 A & BNoneNoneMCBYes, out position Safety injection pump cross connect8821 A & BNoneNoneMCBYes, out position Recirculation pumps A&B discharge crossconnects to charging and SIH pumps8837 A & BValve 8837A cannot be opened unless RHR pump suction valves 8701A or 8701B or 8701C are fully closed and the RHR valve from the RWST 8812A is closed. Valve
8837B cannot be opened unless RHR pump suction valves 8702A or 8702B or 8702C are fully closed and the RHR valve from the RWST 8812B is closed.NoneMCBYes, out positionTABLE 6.3-3 MOTOR OPERATED ISOLATION VALVES IN THE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMLOCATIONVALVE IDENTIFICATIONINTERLOCKSAUTOMATIC FEATURESPOSITION INDICATIONALARMS MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-35Rev. 30NOTE: MCB - Main Control Board Recirculation pumps C&D discharge from the containment recirculation
sump8838 A & BRHR suction valves from RWST (8812A or 8812B) must be closed before recirculation pumps discharge valves may be operated.NoneMCBYes, out positionCharging pump discharge header to cold legs8801 A & BCold leg inj ection permissive (P-
- 19) must be enabled before an SI signal can automatically open the valves.Opens on SIS with P-19MCBYes, out positionTABLE 6.3-3 MOTOR OPERATED ISOLATION VALVES IN THE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMLOCATIONVALVE IDENTIFICATIONINTERLOCKSAUTOMATIC FEATURESPOSITION INDICATIONALARMS MPS3 UFSAR6.3-36Rev. 30TABLE 6.3-4 MATERIALS EMPLOYED FOR EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENTS COMPONENT
- MATERIALAccumulatorsCarbon steel, clad with austenitic stainless steelPumpsChargingAustenitic stainless steelSafety InjectionAustenitic stainless steelResidual Heat RemovalAustenitic stainless steel Residual Heat ExchangersShellCarbon steel Shell end capCarbon steelTubesAustenitic stainless steelChannelAustenitic stainless steel Channel coverAustenitic stainless steelTube sheetAustenitic stainless steelValves Motor-operated valves Containing radioactive fluidsPressure Containing partsAusteniti c stainless steel or equivalent Body-to-bonnet Bolting and nutsNot all bolting is low alloy - within S&W scopeSeating surfacesStellit e No. 6 or equivalentStemsAustenitic stainless steel or, 17-4 PH stainlessMotor-operated valves Containing nonradioactive Boron - free fluidsBody, bonnet and flangeCarbon steel StemsCorrosion resistant steelDiaphragm valvesAustenitic stainless steelAccumulator check valves Pa rts contacting borated waterClapper armAustenitic stainless steelShaft17-4 PH stainlessRelief valves MPS3 UFSAR6.3-37Rev. 30NOTE:*See Section 6.2.2 for materials in containment recirculation system.Stainless steel bodiesStainless steel Carbon steel bodies Carbon steel All nozzles, discs, spindles and guidesAustenitic stainless steel Bonnets for stainless steel valves without a balancing bellowsStainless steel or plated carbon steelAll other bonnetsCarbon steel Piping -All piping transporting borated waterAustenitic stainless steelTABLE 6.3-4 MATERIALS EMPLOYED FOR EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENTS COMPONENT
- MATERIAL MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-38Rev. 30TABLE 6.3-5 SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS FOR EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM COMPONENTSComponentMalfunctionComments Safety Injection Mode 1.Pumpsa. Centrifugal chargingFails to startTwo provided, evaluation based on operation of one.b. Safety injectionFails to startTwo pr ovided, evaluation based on operation of one.c. Residual heat removalFails to startTwo provided, evaluation based on operation of one.2.Automatically operated valvesa. Charging pump discharge to RCS cold leg injection headersFails to openTwo parallel; one valv e in either line required to open.
- b. Recirculation pumps A and B suction line to containment sumpFails to remain openTwo parallel lines; only one valv e in either line required to remain open.c. Charging pumps
- 1) Suction line from refueling water storage tankFails to openTwo parallel valves; only one valve required to open.2) Normal charging path to the RCSFails to closeT wo valves in series; only one valve required to close.3) Miniflow bypass lineFails to closeTwo valv es in series; only one valve required to close.4) Alternate miniflow bypass lineFails to openTwo valves in series (one normally closed, the other normally open) in redundant trains electrically tied to the
pump it is protecting; only one charging train required to operate.5) Suction from volume control tankFails to closeTwo valves in series; only one valve required to close.
Recirculation Mode1. Valves operated manually from the control room MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-39Rev. 30a. Residual heat removal pumps suction line from refueling water storage tankFails to closeCheck valve in series with one gate valve; operation of only one valve required.
- b. Safety injection pump suction line from refueling water storage tankFails to closeCheck valve in series with one gate valve; operation of only one valve required.c. Charging pump suctio n line from refueling water storage tankFails to closeCheck valve in series with two parallel gate valves; operation of either the check valve or both of the gate valves is required.
- d. Safety injection pump suction line at discharge residual heat exchangerFails to openSeparate and independent high head injection paths to safety injection pumps and chargi ng pumps taken suction from discharge of residual heat exchangers; operation of only one valve required.
- e. Residual heat removal cross connect lineFails to closeTwo valv es in series; operation of one required.f. Safety injection pump miniflow linesFails to closeT wo parallel valves provided in series with a third; operation of either both parallel valves or series valve
required.g. Safety injection/chargi ng cross connect line in suction header
- 1) Fails to open1) Two parallel valves provi ded; operation of either one required.2) Fails to remain open 2) Redundant and sepa rate cold leg inj ection paths assures adequate flow to the core.h. Safety injection hot leg isolation valvesFails to openTwo flow paths available; adequate flow to core is assured by any one.
- i. Safety injection/residual heat removal cold leg isolation valvesFails to closeRedundant train valves provided with suitable arrangements to preclude pump runout.TABLE 6.3-5 SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS FOR EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM COMPONENTSComponentMalfunctionComments MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-40Rev. 30j. Containment recirculation pump discharge valveFails to openTwo flow paths available; adequate flow to core provided by either path.
- k. Recirculation pumps A
& B suction lines from containment sumpFails to remain openTwo parallel lines; only one normally open valve in either line required to remain open.l. Charging alternate miniflow linesFails to closeTwo redundant trains with two valves in series powered with the opposite train valve; only one train required to close.TABLE 6.3-5 SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS FOR EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM COMPONENTSComponentMalfunctionComments MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-41Rev. 30NOTE:*Long term passive failure during recircula tion mode where hot leg recirculation ali gnment has previously been established.TABLE 6.3-6 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RECIRCULATION PIPING PASSIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS *FailureIndication of Loss of Flow PathAlternate Flow PathTrain "A" SIH piping, pump seal, or RHS piping in eith er Alpha SIH or Alpha RHS cubicle.
Main board alarm for the accumulation of water in the ESF building Alpha RHR cubicle. Loss of ECCS Train A. Hot leg recirculation via 3RSS*P1B and 3SIH*P1B. Cold leg recirculation via 3RSS*P1B through 3SIL*MV8809B. All recirculation pumps to sprays.Train "B" SIH piping, pump seal or RHS piping in eith er Bravo SIH or Bravo RHS cubicle.
Main board alarm for the accumulation of water in the ESF building Bravo RHR cubicle.Partial loss of ECCS Train B. Hot leg recirculation via 3RSS*P1A and 3SIH*P1A through suction cross-connect. Cold leg recirculation via 3RSS*P1A and any charging pump. All recirculation pumps to sprays.Train "A" RSS piping or pump seal in RSS Train "A" cubicle.
Main board alarm for the accumulation of water in the ESF building Alpha RSS cubicle.Loss of RSS Train "A". Ho t leg recirculation via RSS Train "B" and either SIH pump. Cold leg recirculation via RSS Train "B" and any charging pump through suction cro ss-connect line. RSS Train "B" pumps to sprays.Train "B" RSS piping or pump seal in RSS Train "B" cubicle.
Main board alarm for the accumulation of water in the ESF building Bravo RSS cubicle.Loss of RSS Train "B". Ho t leg recirculation via RSS Train "A" and either SIH pump. Cold leg recirculation via RSS Train "A" and any charging pump through suction cro ss-connect line. RSS Train "A" pumps to sprays.Common charging recirculation suction or discharge piping or charging pump seal in Auxiliary
Building.Main board alarm for the accumulation of water in the Auxiliary Building piping tunnel.
Loss of cold leg recirculation via charging pumps.
Hot leg recirculation via RSS Train "B" and both SIH pumps. Cold leg reci rculation via 3RSS*P1A through 3SIL*MV8809A. All recirculation pumps to sprays.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-42Rev. 30TABLE 6.3-7 SWITCHOVER PROCEDURE
- A. From Injection to Cold Leg Recirculation The following manual operator actions are required to terminate th e injection mode and establish the recirculation mode. It shoul d be noted that the RHR pumps have been stopped automatically on receipt of a RWST low-low level signal.Step 1 Place both RHR pumps in Pull-To-Lock.Step 2 Valve realignment prior to containment reci rculation pump switchove r from spray to cold leg recirculation.
- a. Close RHR pump cold leg inject ion valves (3SIL*MV8809A/B).
- c. Close the RHR pump cross-conne cting valves (3RHS*MV8716A/B).
- d. Verify recirculation spray pumps A and B running.
- e. Open containment recirculation pumps A and B discharge valves to the charging/
safety injection system (3RSS*MV8837A/B).
- f. Close the safety injec tion miniflow valves (3 SIH*MV8813, SIH*MV8814 and 3SIH*MV8920).
- g. Close charging pump miniflow isolation valves to the RWST (3CHS*MV8511A/B and 3CHS*MV8512A/B).Step 3 Align safety injection and charging pumps to the containment recirculation pump discharge.
- a. Open containment recirculation pump A to the charging pumps suction header valves (3SIL*MV8804A) and containment recirculation pump B discharge to the safety injection pumps su ction heater (3SIL*MV8804B)
- b. Open charging - safety injection suction cross connection valves (3SIH*MV8807A/B).Step 4 Verify at least one charging and one safety injection pump running.Step 5 Isolate the suction supply lines from the Refueling Water Storage Tank.
- a. Close safety injection pump suction RWST valve (3SIH*MV8806).
- b. Separate the gray boot connections for the VCT level input to 3CHS*LCV112D and 3CHS*LCV112E.
- c. Close charging pump suction RWST valves (3CHS*LCV112D/E).
B. From Cold Leg Recirculation to Hot Leg RecirculationStep 1 Align Safety Injection System for Hot Leg Recirculation.
- a. Stop safety injection pump A.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-43Rev. 30
- b. Close safety injection pump cross tie is olation valve for se paration of safety injection pumps (3SIH*MV8821A).
- c. Open hot leg isolation valve (3SIH*MV8802A).
- d. Start safety injection pump A.
- e. Stop safety injection pump B.
- f. Close the B safety injection pump cold leg injection valve (3SIH*MV8821B).
- g. Close the safety injection cold leg master isolation valve (3SIH*MV8835).
- h. Open the safety injection pump B hot leg injection valve (3SIH*MV8802B).
- i. Start safety injection pump B.
- j. Verify discharge flow for safety injection pumps A and B.NOTE;*Sequence of changeover operati ons from the inject ion phase to the recirculation phase with all pumps operating.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-44Rev. 30TABLE 6.3-8 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM SHARED FUNCTIONS EVALUATIONCOMPONENTNORMAL OPERATING ARRANGEMENTACCIDENT ARRANGEMENT Refueling water storage tank Lined up to suction of centrifugal charging, safety injection, residual
heat removal, and quench spray pumps.Lined up to suction of centrifugal charging, safety
injection, residual heat removal, and quench spray pumps.Charging pumpsLined up to suction of volume control tank for charging service Lined up to inlet-valves for realignment to meet single failure criteria.
Residual heat removal pumps Lined up to cold legs of reactor coolant piping Lined up to cold legs of reactor coolant piping during the injection phase.Residual heat exchangersLined up to cold legs of reactor coolant piping Lined up to cold legs of reactor coolant piping during the injection phase.
Containment recirc. pump and cont. recirculation coolers Lined up to containment recirculation headers Lined up to containment recirculation headers. After switchover, pumps and heat
exchangers are realigned to suction of charging/SI pumps and containment
recirculation heaters.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-45Rev. 30TABLE 6.3-9 NORMAL OPERATING STATUS OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENTS FOR CORE COOLING Number of Safety Injection Pumps Oerable 2Number of Charging Pumps Operable 2
- Number of Containment Recirculation Pumps (Available for recirculation modes) 4Number of Residual Heat Removal Pumps Operable 2 Number of Containment Recirculation Coolers (Available for recirculation modes) 2Refueling Water Storage Tank Volume, nominal (gal) 1.2 millionBoron Concentration in Refueling Water Storage Tanks, minimum (ppm) 2700Boron Concentration in Accumulator, minimum (ppm) 2600Number of Accumulators 4Nominal Accumulator Pressure (psia) 665Nominal Accumulator Water Volume (ft
- 3) 900System Valves, Interlocks, a nd Piping Required for the Above Components which are Operable AllNOTE:*Pump 3 available after manual insertion of breaker.
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-46Rev. 30TABLE 6.3-10 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM - ACTIVE COMPONENTS COMPONENTFAILURE MODE ECCS OPERATION PHASEEFFECT ON SYSTEM OPERATION *FAILURE DETECTION METHODREMARKS1.Motor operated gate valve LCV-112B (LCV-112C analogous)Fails to close on demandInjection-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing VCT discharge isolation. No effect on safety for system operation; isolation valve (LCV-112C) and check valve 8440 provides backup tank discharge isolation.Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB. Valve close position monitor light and alarm for group monitoring of components at CB.Valve is electrically interlocked with isolation valve LCV-112D. Valve closes on actuation by a SIS signal provided isolation valve LCV-112D is at a full open position. (Analogous train LCV-112C is electrically interlocked with LCV-112E.)2.Motor operated gate valve LCV-112D (LCV-112E analogous)Fails to open on demandInjection-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing fluid flow from RWST to suction of HHSI/CH pumps. No safety effect on system operation. Alternate isolation valve (LCV-112E) opens to provide backup flow path to suction of HHSI/CH pumps.Valve position indication (closed to open position change) at CB. Valve open position monitor light and alarm for group monitoring of components at CB.Valve is electrically interlocked with the instrumentation that monitors fluid level of the VCT. Valve opens upon actuation by a SIS signal or upon actuation by a "Low-Low-Level" VCT signal.3.Centrifugal charging pump 3CHS*P3A (3CHS*P3B and 3CHS*P3C analogous)
Fails to deliver working fluidInjection and recirculation cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing emergency coolant to the RCS at prevailing incident RCS pressure. Fluid flow from HHSI/CH Pump P3A will be lost. Minimum flow requirements at prevailing high RCS pressures will be met by HHSI/CH Pump P3B or Pump P3C delivery.HHSI/CH pump discharge header flow (FI-917) at CB.
Open pump switchgear circuit breaker close position monitor light for group monitoring of components at CB. Common breaker trip alarm at CB.One HHSI/CH pump is used for normal charging of RCS during plant operation. Pump circuit breaker aligned to close on actuation by SIS signal.
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-47Rev. 304. Motor operated globe valve 8110 (8111A, B, C analogous)Fails to close on demand Injection-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing isolation of HHSI/CH pump miniflow line. No effect on safety for system operation. Alternate isolation valve (8111 A,B&C) in miniflow line provides backup isolation.Same method of detection as that stated for Item 2.Valves are normally open and closed upon actuation by a
SIS.5.Motor operated gate valve 8105 (8106 analogous)Fails to close on demandInjection-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing isolation of HHSI/CH pump discharge to normal charging line of CVCS. No effect on safety for system operation. Alternate isolation valve (8106) provides backup normal CVCS charging line
isolation.Same method of detection as that stated for Item No. 1. Valves are normally open and closed upon actuation by a
SIS.TABLE 6.3-10 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM - ACTIVE COMPONENTS COMPONENTFAILURE MODE ECCS OPERATION PHASEEFFECT ON SYSTEM OPERATION *FAILURE DETECTION METHODREMARKS MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-48Rev. 306.Motor operated globe valve 8511A (8511B analogous)Fails to open on demandInjection-cold legs of RC loops Failure eliminates minimum flow protection of associated HHSI/CH train. Redundant HHSI/CH train minimum flow protected by separate minimum flow line (8511B).
Protection of a single HHSI/
CH is required to ensure availability of an ECCS train.Same method of detection as that stated for Item No. 1.Valves 8511A and 8511B are electrically interlocked with isolation valves (8804A and 8804B) and VCT suction isolation valves (LCV112B and LCV112C). Valve opens upon actuation by a SIS signal. Valve 8511A cannot be opened unless valves 8804A and 8804B are fully closed and LCV112B or LCV112C are 85% and fully closed, respectively. (Valve 8511B analogous.) Valves 8804A or 8804B cannot be opened unless valves 8511A and 8512A or 8511B and 8512B are fully closed and several other trained valves are in their respective positions.7.Motor operated gate valve 8801A (8801B analogous)Fails to open on demandInjection-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of fluid flow paths from HHSI/CH pumps to the RCS. No effect on safety for system operation.Same method of detection as that stated for item No. 2.Valves are normally closed and open upon actuation by a SIS in conjunction with a P-19 permissive. Note: The failure of a Train A P-19 signal is the same as the failure of valve 8801A.8.Item deleted 9.Item deletedTABLE 6.3-10 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM - ACTIVE COMPONENTS COMPONENTFAILURE MODE ECCS OPERATION PHASEEFFECT ON SYSTEM OPERATION *FAILURE DETECTION METHODREMARKS MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-49Rev. 3010.Motor operated globe valve FCV-610 (FCV-611 analogous)a.Fails to close on demandInjection cold legs of RC loopsa.Failure reduces working fluid delivered to RCS from RHR Pump PIA. Minimum flow requirements for LHSI will be met by LHSI/RHR
Pump PIB delivering working fluid to RCS.a.Valve position indication (open to closed position change) at CB. RHR pump return line to cold legs flow indication (FI-618) at CB.Valve is regulated by signal from flow indicator switch located at RHR pump discharge. The control valve opens on a minimum flow rate and closes on a maximum flow rate as stated in FSAR Section 5.4.7.2.1.b.Fails open on demandInjection-cold legs of RC loopsb.Failure results in an insufficient fluid flow through LHSI/RHR Pump PIA for a small LOCA or steam line break resulting in possible pump damage.
If pump becomes inoperative, minimum flow requirements for LHSI will be met by LHSI/RHR
Pump PIB delivering working fluid to RCS.b.Same as that stated above for failure mode "fails open" except closed to open position change indication
at CB.11.Residual heat removal Pump
3RHS*PIA (3RHS*PIB analogous)
Fails to deliver working fluidInjection-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing emergency coolant to the RCS from the RWST at low RCS pressure. Fluid from LHSI/RHR Pump PIA will be lost. Minimum flow requirements for LHSI will be
met by LHSI/RHR Pump PIB delivering working fluid.RHR pump return line to cold legs flow indication (FI-618) and low flow alarm at MCB.
RHR pump discharge pressure (PI-614) at CB. Open pump switchgear circuit breaker indication at CB. Circuit breaker close position monitor light for group monitoring of components at CB. Common breaker trip alarm at CB.The RHR pump is sized to deliver reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchanger to meet plant cooldown requirements and is used during plant cooldown and startup operations. The pump circuit breaker is aligned to close on actuation
by a SIS.TABLE 6.3-10 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM - ACTIVE COMPONENTS COMPONENTFAILURE MODE ECCS OPERATION PHASEEFFECT ON SYSTEM OPERATION *FAILURE DETECTION METHODREMARKS MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-50Rev. 3012.Safety injection Pump 3SIH*PIA (3SIH*PIB analogous)
Fails to deliver working fluidInjection-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing emergency coolant to the RCS from the RWST at high RCS pressure. Fluid flow from HHSI/SI Pump PIA will be lost. Minimum flow requirements for HHSI will be met by HHSI/SI pump PIB delivering working fluid.SI pumps discharge pressure (PI-919) at CB. SI pump discharge flow (FI-918) at CB.
Open pump switchgear circuit breaker indication at CB.
Circuit breaker close position monitor light for group monitoring of components at CB. Common breaker trip alarm at CB.Pump circuit breaker aligned to close on actuation by a
SIS.13.Motor operated gate valve 8837A (8837B analogous, 1-8838A analogous, 1-8838B analogous)Fails to open on demandRecirculation-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing fluid from the Containment Sump to the RCS during recirculation. Fluid flow from recirculation pump PIA will be lost. Minimum flow requirements at the prevailing RCS pressure will be met by recirculation pump PIB or C or D. Any one containment recirculation pump is sufficient to provide ECCS cooling. No effect on safety for system operation.Same method of detection as that stated for item No. 2.Refer to Table 6.3-3 for related information.TABLE 6.3-10 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM - ACTIVE COMPONENTS COMPONENTFAILURE MODE ECCS OPERATION PHASEEFFECT ON SYSTEM OPERATION *FAILURE DETECTION METHODREMARKS MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-51Rev. 3014.Motor operated gate valve 8812A (8812B analogous)Fails to close on demandRecirculation-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing dual train operation from the containment recirculation sump. Fluid flow utilizing train A will be lost.
Minimum flow requirements at the prevailing RCS pressure will be met by train B. No effect on safety for system operation.Same method of detection as that stated for Item No. 1.Refer to Table 6.3-3 for related information.15.Motor operated gate valve 8716A (8716B analogous)Fails to close on demandRecirculation-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing LHSI/Recirculation pump train separation pump train separation for recirculation of fluid to cold legs of RCS. No effect on safety for system operation.
Alternate isolation valve (8716B) provides backup isolation for LHSI/
Recirculation pump train separation.Same method of detection as that stated for Item No. 1.16.Motor operated gate valve 8813Fails to close on demandRecirculation-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing isolation of HHSI/SI pump's miniflow line isolation from RWST. No effect on safety for system operation.
Alternate isolation valve (8814 and 8920) in each pump's miniflow line provided backup
isolation.Same method of detection as that stated for Item No. 1.Valve is electrically interlocked with isolation valves 8804A and 8804B and may not be opened unless these valves are closed.TABLE 6.3-10 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM - ACTIVE COMPONENTS COMPONENTFAILURE MODE ECCS OPERATION PHASEEFFECT ON SYSTEM OPERATION *FAILURE DETECTION METHODREMARKS MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-52Rev. 3017.Motor operated globe valve 8814 (8920 analogous)Fails to close on demandRecirculation-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing isolation of HHSI/SI Pump miniflow isolation from RWST. No effect on safety for system operation. Alternate isolation valve (8813) in main miniflow line provides backup
isolation.Same method of detection as that stated for Item No. 1.Same remark as that stated for Item No. 16.18. Motor operated gate valve 8804AFails to open on demandRecirculation-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing NPSH to suction of HHSI/CH pumps from Containment/Recirculation pump. No effect on safety for system operation. Minimum
NPSH to HHSI/CH pump
suction will be met by flow from Containment/
Recirculation pump PIB via the cross tie line and opening of isolation valve 8807A or 8807B and isolation valve 8804B.Same method of detection as that stated for Item No. 2.Refer to Table 6.3-3 for related information.TABLE 6.3-10 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM - ACTIVE COMPONENTS COMPONENTFAILURE MODE ECCS OPERATION PHASEEFFECT ON SYSTEM OPERATION *FAILURE DETECTION METHODREMARKS MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-53Rev. 3019.Motor operated gate valve 8804BFails to open on demandRecirculation-cold leg of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing NPSH to suction of HHSI/SI pumps from LHSI/
Recirculation Pump. No effect on safety for system operation. Minimum NPSH to HHSI/SI pump suction will be met by flow from LHSI/RHR pump A via cross tie line and opening of isolation valve 8807A or 8807B and isolation valve 8804A.Same method of detection as that stated for Item No. 2.Refer to Table 6.3-3 for related information.20.Motor operated gate valve 8807A (8807B analogous)Fails to open on demandRecirculation-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing fluid flow through cross tie between suction of HHSI/CH pumps and HHSI/SI pumps. No effect on safety for system operation. Alternate isolation valve (8807B) opens to provide backup flow path through cross tie line.Same method of detection as stated for Item No. 2.21.Motor operated gate valve 8806Fails to close on demandRecirculation-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing flow isolation of HHSI/SI pump suction from RWST. No effect on safety for system operation. Alternate check isolation valve (8926) provides backup isolation.Same method of detection as that stated for item No. 1.TABLE 6.3-10 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM - ACTIVE COMPONENTS COMPONENTFAILURE MODE ECCS OPERATION PHASEEFFECT ON SYSTEM OPERATION *FAILURE DETECTION METHODREMARKS MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-54Rev. 3022.Motor gate valve LCV-112D (LCV-112E analogous)Fails to close on demandRecirculation-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing flow isolation of suction of HHSI/CH pumps from RWST. No effect on safety for system operation.
Alternate check isolation valve (8546) provides backup
isolation.Same method of detection as that stated previously for failure of item during injection phase of ECCS operation.23.Recirculation Pump A (Pump B analogous, Pump C analogous, Pump D analogous)
Fails to deliver working fluidRecirculation-cold or hot legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing recirculation of coolant to the RCS from the Containment Sump. Fluid flow from Containment/
Recirculation Pump A will be lost. Minimum recirculation will be met by Containment/
Recirculation Pump B, or Pump C, or Pump D delivering working fluid. Any one recirculation pump is sufficient to provide ECCS cooling.Recirculation pump discharge flow indication (FI-38A/FI-38B) is monitored at MB2. RSS pumps 1A/1B running status lights for group IV are available at MB2. Common RSS Pump Auto Trip/Overcurrent and Components Off Normal alarms are available at MB2.
Common Control Power Not Available alarm is available at
MB8.TABLE 6.3-10 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM - ACTIVE COMPONENTS COMPONENTFAILURE MODE ECCS OPERATION PHASEEFFECT ON SYSTEM OPERATION *FAILURE DETECTION METHODREMARKS MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-55Rev. 3024.Safety injection Pump No. 1 (Pump No. 2 analogous)
Fails to deliver working fluidRecirculation-cold or hot legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing recirculation of coolant to the RCS from the Containment Sump to cold legs of RC loops via HHSI/SI pumps. Fluid flow from HHSI/
SI Pump No. 1 will be lost.
Minimum recirculation flow requirements for HHSI flow will be met by HHSI/SI pump No. 2 delivering working fluid.Same method of detection as that stated previously for failure of item during injection phase of ECCS operation.TABLE 6.3-10 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM - ACTIVE COMPONENTS COMPONENTFAILURE MODE ECCS OPERATION PHASEEFFECT ON SYSTEM OPERATION *FAILURE DETECTION METHODREMARKS MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-56Rev. 3025.Motor operated gate valve 8809A (8809B analogous)Fails to close on demandRecirculation-cold or hot legs or RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing recirculation of coolant to the RCS from the Containment Sump to hot legs of RC loops. Fluid flow from Containment/Recirculation Pump PIA will continue to flow to cold legs of RC loops. Minimum recirculation flow requirements to hot legs of RC loops will be met by Containment/Recirculation Pump PIB recirculating fluid to RC hot legs directly and via HHSI/SI pumps. If valve fails to close the flow rate through the containment recirculation heat exchanger could exceed 4600 gpm. The maximum continuous flow allowed through the heat exchanger. Redundancy is provided and minimum recirculation flow required to the hot and cold legs will be met by Containment/Recirculation
Pump PIB.Same method of detection as that stated for Item No. 1.26.Item deletedTABLE 6.3-10 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM - ACTIVE COMPONENTS COMPONENTFAILURE MODE ECCS OPERATION PHASEEFFECT ON SYSTEM OPERATION *FAILURE DETECTION METHODREMARKS MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-57Rev. 3027.Motor operated globe valve 8511A (8511B analogous)Fails to close on demandRecirculation-cold legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing isolation of HHSI/CH train A alternate miniflow isolation from RWST. No effect on safety for system operation. Redundant in series alternate minimum flow isolation valve (8512B, 8512A analogous) provides backup
isolation.Same method of detection as that stated for Item No. 1.Valves 8511A and 8511B are electrically interlocked with isolation valves (8804A and 8804B) and VCT suction isolation valves (LCV112B and LCV112C). Valve 8511A cannot be opened unless valves 8804A and 8804B are fully closed and LCV112B or LCV112C are 85% and fully closed, respectively. (Valve 8511B analogous.) Valves 8804A or 8804B cannot be opened unless valves 8511A and 8512A or 8511B and 8512B are fully closed and several other trained valves are in their respective positions.28.Item deleted 29.Motor operated gate valve 8821A (8821B analogous)Fails to close on demandRecirculation-hot legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing flow isolation of HHSI/SI pump to cold legs of RC loops. No effect on safety for system operation.
Alternate isolation valve (8835) provides backup isolation against flow to cold legs of RC loops.Same method of detection as that stated for Item No. 1.TABLE 6.3-10 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM - ACTIVE COMPONENTS COMPONENTFAILURE MODE ECCS OPERATION PHASEEFFECT ON SYSTEM OPERATION *FAILURE DETECTION METHODREMARKS MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-58Rev. 30NOTE:*List of abbreviations and acronymsCH - ChargingHHSI - High Head Safety Injection30.Motor operated gate valve 8802A (8802B analogous)Fails to open on demandRecirculation-hot legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing recirculation of coolant to the hot legs of RCS from the Containment Sump via the "A&B" Safety Injection Pumps. Minimum core cooling sump recirculation flow requirements to the hot legs of RCS loops will be met via the "B" SI Pump recirculating fluid to the RCS hot leg loops 1 and 3, through the open isolation valve 8802B.Same method of detection as that stated for Item No. 2. In addition, SI pump discharge pressure (PI-919) and flow (FI-918) at CB.31.Motor operated gate valve 8835Fails to close on demandRecirculation-hot legs of RC loopsFailure reduces redundancy of providing flow isolation of HHSI/SI pump flow to cold legs of RC loops. No effect on safety for system operation.
Alternate isolation valve (8821A and 8821B) in cross tie between HHSI/SI pumps provides backup isolation against flow to cold legs of RC loops.Same method of detection as that stated for Item No. 1.TABLE 6.3-10 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - EMERGENCY CORE COOL ING SYSTEM - ACTIVE COMPONENTS COMPONENTFAILURE MODE ECCS OPERATION PHASEEFFECT ON SYSTEM OPERATION *FAILURE DETECTION METHODREMARKS MPS3 UFSAR6.3-59Rev. 30 LHSI - Low Head Safety Injection LOCA - Loss-of-Coolant Accident CB - Control Board NPSH - Net Positive Suction Head RC - Reactor Coolant RCS - Reactor Coolant System RHR - Residual Heat RemovalRWST - Refueling Water Storage TankSI - Safety InjectionVCT - Volume Control Tank MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.3-60Rev. 30TABLE 6.3-11 NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD FOR EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM PUMPSCharging (A/C) PumpsCharging (B Pump)SI RHS Elevation head (feet) (Z)9.19.113.136.7 Pipe losses (feet) (H f)4.84.63.218.5 P t - P v (feet)32.532.532.532.5Available NPSH (ft)36.837.042.450.8 Pump flow (gpm per pump); Maximum Predicted Flow5605506755500 Pump flow (gpm per pump); Maximum Predicted System Flow5005004155014 Required NPSH (feet) aa.The required NPSH is selected from the pump manufacturer's test curve at the maximum predicted flow rate, using conservative assumptions. This combination of bounding assumptions is conservative for determining the available NPSH and the resulting margin over the required NPSH.23.018.018.025.0Available minus required NPSH (feet) (NPSH margin)13.819.024.425.8 MPS3 UFSAR6.3-61Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.3-1 SAFETY INJECTION / RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM NOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-1 MPS3 UFSAR6.3-62Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.3-2 (SHEETS 1-2) P&ID HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION The figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by Reference in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing number and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
MPS3 UFSAR6.3-63Rev. 30FIGURE 6.3-3 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP PE RFORMANCE CURVE MPS3 UFSAR6.3-64Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.3-4 CHARGING PUMP CURV E ASSUMED FOR SAFETY ANALYSIS MPS3 UFSAR6.3-65Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.3-5 HIGH HEAD SI PUMP CURVE ASSUMED FOR SAFETY ANALYSIS MPS3 UFSAR6.3-66Rev. 30FIGURE 6.3-6 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK WATER LEVELS MPS3 UFSAR6.4-1Rev. 30
6.4 HABITABILITY
SYSTEMS The habitability systems for the control room e nvelope include radiation shielding, redundant air supply and filtration systems, redundant air conditioning systems, fire protection, personnel protective equipment, first aid, food, water storage, emergency lighting, a nd sanitary facilities.
Section 9.4.1 gives the design bases and descripti on of the control building heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system. This secti on describes the environment, supplies, and equipment criteria necessary to ensure control r oom habitability for the operation of Millstone 3 under normal conditions and to maintain it in a safe mode during and following a postulated design basis accident (DBA) or toxic gas release.
6.4.1 DESIGN
BASES The habitability system design is pr edicated on the following criteria.1.All spaces in the control building that require operator occupancy during an isolation or accident condition are loca ted within the cont rol room envelope.2.The control room is inhabited at all tim es. Food and potable water are provided in sufficient quantities to sustain 7 people fo r 5 days. Sanitary facilities and medical supplies are provided.3.General Design Criterion (GDC) 2 fo r protection against natural phenomena (Section 3.1.2.2
).4.GDC 3 for fire hazard (Section 3.1.2.3
).5.GDC 4 for protection against temperature, pressure, humidity, and accident conditions (Section 3.1.2.4
).6.GDC 19 and 10 CFR 50.67 for providing ad equate radiation protection under accident conditions (Section 3.1.2.19
).7.Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.52 for air filtration requirement (Section 1.8 and Section 6.5.1.2).8.RG 1.95 for protecting control room operato rs from a postulated chlorine release.9.RG 1.78 for assumptions for evaluating th e habitability of the control room following postulated chemical release.10.GDC 64 for monitoring radioactivity releases (Section 3.1.2.64
). 11.10 CFR 50.63 (Loss of all Alternative Cu rrent Power) for maintaining the control room temperature below 110
°F following a Station Blackout.
MPS3 UFSAR6.4-2Rev. 3012.Regulatory Guide 1.196 for assessing c ontrol room habitabi lity (CRH) with respect to radiological, hazardous chemical or smoke challenges; maintaining and monitoring CRH systems, including the co ntrol room envelope (CRE) boundary; and developing compensatory measures and mitigating actions to address degraded or nonconforming conditions in CRH systems.13.Regulatory Guide 1.197 for CRE integr ity testing, including test methods, acceptance criteria and periodicity, and compensatory actions in the event of excessive CRE unfiltered air inleakage.
6.4.2 SYSTEM
DESIGN 6.4.2.1 Control Room Envelope The control room envelope contai ns the control room area, shift manager's office, tagging office, viewing gallery and ramp, toilet, kitchenette, instrument rack and computer room, piping/duct chase, and the mechanical room. Within the c ontrol room envelope, all essential equipment necessary to operate the nuclear power plant and maintain a habitable environment during a postulated DBA is provided. Figure 6.4-1 shows the control room layout.
The mechanical room space in cludes the following equipment:1.Control Room Area Air Conditioning Units2.Instrument Rack and Comput er Room Air Conditioning Units3.Purge Supply and Exhaust Fans4.Control Room Emergency Ve ntilation Filters and Fans5.Control Building Isolation Valves (CBIV)6.Control Room Pressurization Air Storage Tanks7.Control Room Toilet and Kitchenette Exhaust Fans The instrument rack room incl udes the following equipment:1.Main Control Board Termination Cabinets2.Auxiliary Relay Rack3.Stop Valve Logic Cabinet4.Test Cabinets MPS3 UFSAR6.4-3Rev. 305.Emergency Generator Load Sequencer Panels6.Protection Set Panels7.Auxiliary Relay Cabinet8.Solid State Protection Cabinet9.Computer - Demultiplexer10.Computer Termination Cabinet11.Balance of plant (BOP) Instrument Panels12.Control Board Demultiplexer13.Control Set Panels14.Annunciator Logic15.Loose Parts Monitoring The control room area includes the following equipment:1.Main Control Board2.Computer Communication Console3.Emergency Operator Console4.Operator's Console5.Primary Relay Panel6.Turbine Supervisory Instrument Cabinet7.Seismic and Main Fire Protection Panels8.Main Ventilation and Air Conditioning Panel9.Radiation Monitor Panel10.Nuclear Instruments Panels11.Digital Fault Recorder MPS3 UFSAR6.4-4Rev. 30 6.4.2.2 Ventilation System DesignTwo redundant systems provide ventilation to the control room envelope. The system configuration and component s are shown on Figure 9.4-1. The main control room ventilation and air conditioning system automatically maintains the design temperature within the main control room. Com ponent failures in one system automatically actuate the redundant system.
Power to all electric motors and controls associ ated with the safety-related air conditioning and pressurization systems is supplied from Class 1E power sources. Essential lighting in the control room also receives power from these sources. In addition, DC batteries (Section 8.3.2) provide power for emergency lighting in the control room.A list of major components serving the habitabili ty system including their design capacities and parameters are shown in Table 6.4-1.The emergency ventilation filters, air conditioning units , chilled water piping, ducts, controls, and building isolation valves are designe d to Safety Class 3 requirements.The emergency air bottle pressurization system is seismically supported and designed to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) B and PV Code Section VIII, Division 1 and American National Standards In stitute (ANSI) B31.1 standards.
Figure 6.4-1 shows the control room layout includi ng doors, corridors, stairwells, shielded walls, and location of equipment. The control room architectural features include an acoustic ceiling and carpet floor covering.
The locations of potential radiol ogical and toxic gas releases rela tive to the control building and the control room envelope air intake are shown on Figure 6.4-2.Each control room emergency vent ilating filtration assembly consists of moisture separator, electric heater, prefilter, upstream high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, charcoal adsorber, and downstream HEPA filter.
The moisture separator is designed and tested in accordance with USAEC Report MSAR-71-45.An electric heating coil is provided to reduce the relative humidity of the inlet air stream from 100 percent to less than 70 percent. The element is protected with integral automatic (primary) and manual (secondary) reset thermal cut out sw itches for over temperature protection.
The prefilter is a Group III, extended dry media type and rigid frame in accordance with ORNL-NSIC-65.
MPS3 UFSAR6.4-5Rev. 30The HEPA filters are designed, constructed, test ed, and qualified in accordance with USAEC Bulletin Number 306, MIL-F-51068D, MIL-F-51079B, MIL-STD-282, and UL-586. They are capable of removing 99.97 percent of the 0.3 micron or larger particles which impinge on them.The charcoal adsorbers are high efficiency gasketless type filters. The charcoal is stored in 4 inch layers in vertical modules, a nd each module is refillable wit hout being removed from the unit frame. The filter unit is designed for a nominal fa ce velocity of 40 fpm a nd a residence time of 0.50 second. Each ventilation filt ration assembly contains 405 pounds of commercially pure virgin coconut shell activated impregnated char coal in accordance with American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) D3803.
The design testing and maintenance of the control room envelope filtration unit is in accordance with RG 1.52 (Section 6.5.1.2).
Monitors and alarms are provide d for the detection of smoke.
Adjacent to the control room, within the control r oom area, are a kitchenette and toilet facility.
The kitchenette has an electric range, refrigerator, sink, 12 feet of shelf space, and approximately 16 cubic feet of storage area. Emergency food, water, and a medical kit are stored in the kitchen area in sufficient quantities to sustain 7 people for 5 da ys. The potable water storage capacity is 1 gallon per day per person. The capacity is base d on data obtained from Shelter Design and Analysis (OCD 1969) at a temperature of 75
°F. The actual daily wa ter requirement is approximately 2.8 quart s to avoid dehydration.
Additional design features included in the control room envelope la yout to ensure habitability by minimizing fire hazards are as follows:1.The control building is of fire re sistant construction using noncombustible building materials.2.Jackets of power and control cables are of flame retardant material, and fillers are flame retardant and nonwicking.3.Furniture used in the control room is of metal construction.4.Combustible supplies, such as logs, reco rds, procedures, and manuals, are limited to the amounts required for operation.5.All areas of the control room are r eadily accessible in case of a fire.6.Carbon dioxide and dry chemical portable extinguishers are provided.7.Acoustic ceiling tiles and floor carpet are selected to meet National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) fire retardancy requirements. Ceiling tiles are specified for maximum flame spread 25, sm oke developed 50 and fuel contribution 20 ratings MPS3 UFSAR6.4-6Rev. 30 when tested in accordance with ASTM E84.
Carpet is specified as anti-static and meets Class I Interior Floor Finish Rating.
6.4.2.3 Leaktightness The leak paths from the control room envelope consist of leakage thro ugh concrete walls and construction joints, duct penetrati ons, doors, isolation valves, elect rical sleeves, and exfiltration through negative pressure ducts located in the mechanical room serving other areas in the control building outside the envelope. Control room leakage assumptions used in habitability calculations are presented in Chapter 15.
All duct penetrations through the c ontrol room envelope are sealed.
Pipe penetrations are cast in the concrete or cast in fire and pressure seals designed for leaktightness and do not constitute a leak path at the pressure differential noted.The electrical sleeves are cast in the concrete and are not considered a leak path source. The cables which pass through the sleeves are sealed. An allowance has been made to account for any crevices that may result in leakage paths.
6.4.2.4 Interaction with Other Zones an d Pressure-Containing Equipment The control room envelope is served by the control room area air conditioning units and instrument rack and computer room air conditioning units.
The duct and pipe penetrations and electrical sl eeves at the envelope boundaries are sealed as described in Section 6.4.2.3.Drain lines located in the mechanical room are trapped with a loop seal. To maintain seal integrity, a domestic water line provides a c ontinuous trickle flow to each drain.
The service water lines enter th e control building through the foundation floor. The lines from the point of entry in the control building to the machinery equipment room floor are encased within a 48 inch diameter, welded joint carbon steel pipe.
The enclosure pipe forms part of the control room envelope boundary. The enclosur e pipe is sealed at all levels but is left open above floor elevation 64 feet 6 inches. Thus, the enclosure pipe also serves as a temporary reservoir for water spills.The cable penetrations located in the control room floor are designed to withstand 0.5 psig.The control room envelope air intake and exhaust outlets are located approximately 70 feet above ground level.
The air conditioning units use chil led water to cool and dehumidif y the air in the control room envelope. The water is chille d by two 100 percent capacity centrifugal type chillers. The centrifugal chillers are not located within the control room envelope.
MPS3 UFSAR6.4-7Rev. 30With the exception of the portable fire extingui shers, service water piping, chilled water piping, potable water piping, and instrument air lines, ther e are no other pressurized pipes or tanks in the control room envelope. The halon fire protection piping located in the underfloor of the computer and instrument rack room is not pressurized. The halon bottles are located in the turbine building storage area on the top of the control building. The halon pipe lines are se ismically supported only within the instrument rack room. There are no carbon dioxide supply pipes in the control room envelope. The air bottle pressurization syst em relief valves vent to atmosphere.
6.4.2.5 Shielding Design The design of the control room envelope includes adequate shielding to maintain acceptable radiation levels in the contro l room under accident conditions as discussed in Section 12.3.1.3.1.In accordance with GDC 19 and 10 CFR 50.67 (Section 3.1.2.19), personnel exposure is limited to 5 rem TEDE for the duration of any accident postulated in Chapter 15.The postulated accident radioactivity sources affecting the control room envelope are stated in Chapter 15.The limiting Millstone 3 accident to evaluate control room shielding for doses to the control room personnel is the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The effects of the LOCA as described in Section 15.6.5 are evaluated to determine the dos es which the control room personnel might receive.For purposes of analysis, it is assumed that the accident occurs with loss of off site power. Additionally, for Millstone 3, a seismic event is also assumed.
6.4.3 SYSTEM
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES The control room, the instrument rack room, and the computer room air conditioning systems are capable of maintaining the ambient air temperat ure in their respective areas under normal and accident conditions at 75
+/- 2°F and less than 60 percent relative humidity, except for the mechanical room. The ambient ai r temperature in the mechani cal room is maintained under normal and accident conditions below 104
°F in the summer and above 54
°F in the winter. Control room temperature will remain below a 110
°F habitability limit for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> following a Station Blackout event and concurrent loss of all air conditioning.
The air conditioning system for each area has two 100 percent cap acity redundant trains except for the air distribution ductwork wi thin each area which is common to both trains. In the event of a single component failure on an operating tr ain, the standby train au tomatically starts.Outdoor air is supplied to the control room envelope at a constant rate of 1,450 cfm during normal plant operation. Mechanical exhaust is provided from the control room toilet and kitchenette exhaust fan at a rate of 595 cfm. Thus, a positiv e pressure is maintained during normal operation.
MPS3 UFSAR6.4-8Rev. 30When the control room emergency ventilation sy stem initiates on a LOCA or a high radiation condition at the intake monitors, the air intake valves receive a signal to open and the control room emergency ventilation system starts in th e pressurized filtration mode. The air conditioning units serving the control room envelope conti nue operating to maintain required humidity and temperature. The control room pressure envelope maintains a positive pressure relative to surrounding area.
The calculated ventilati on filter flow rate is 1,225 cfm (cl ean) and 1,000 cfm (dirty). The actual flow rate is in accordance with performance test ing requirements which ensures that filter flow rates are maintained within an acceptable tolerance of design flow. The recirculation air rate from the control room to either filter retu rn can be varied between 0 to 915 cfm.
Redundant Seismic Category I radiat ion monitors are located at the outdoor air intake. If high radiation is detected in the intake air stream, the air intake valves receive a signal to open and the control room emergency ventilation system star ts in the pressurized filtration mode. A smoke detector is also provided at the air intake and, if smoke is detected, the alarm is annunciated in the control room for operator action. The radiation mo nitor high alarm setting is discussed in the Technical Specifications.
6.4.4 DESIGN
EVALUATION The control room air conditioning system main tains a suitable environment for personnel and equipment during normal and emergency conditions. Components of the air conditioning and chilled water systems are designed to Category I cr iteria and are enclosed in a Category I control building with the exception of the air conditi oning unit electric heat ers which are Seismic Category II. Electric heat is not required during design basis events.All intake and exhaust openings are tornado missile protected. Outdoor air is filtered by one of the emergency ventilation filter assemblies.
6.4.4.1 Radiological Protection The positive pressure in the control room envelope provides a continuous purge of the control room atmosphere and protects against infiltration of smoke or airborne radiation from the surrounding areas. Cables and pipe s entering the control room envelope are sealed to aid the pressurization of the control room.
The capability is provided to isolate the cont rol room from the outsi de atmosphere for high containment pressure conditions or when the air borne radiation level of the outside atmosphere exceeds a predetermined value. Other control bui lding isolation (CBI) signals are described in Section 9.4.1. An emergency ventilating subsystem is started upon the CBI signal. This subsystem introduces air into the control room after the air has been filtered by a prefilter, carbon adsorber, and HEPA filters.
The control building, exterior wall s and roof are constructed of 24 inch thick reinforced concrete to protect personnel within the building from exterior radioactivity.
Section 12.3.1.3 describes the MPS3 UFSAR6.4-9Rev. 30 shielding for the control room. Section 2.2.3 discus ses possible site related accidents. There is some exposure of control room personnel from all postulated accidents as discussed in Chapter
- 15. Radiation doses have been calculated for direct radiation from the cont ainment, the external cloud and the halogen build-up on the control room filters. Dose calcul ations also include contributions from inleakage to the control room from containment and engineered safety features (ESF) system leakage. The control room dose is less than the limit specified in 10 CFR 50.67. The control room area is thus continuously habitable under any condition of operation.
6.4.4.2 Toxic Gas Protection There are no analyzed chemical spills that could affect the control room habitability. The effects of spills of chemicals along transportation routes are evalua ted in Section 2.2.3.2. For Control Room habitability, Figure 6.4-2 s hows the Control Room intake a nd hazardous material storage locations. The evaluation of control room habitability is performed using Regulatory Guides 1.78 and 1.95 (Section 1.8). At the discretion of the operator, the control room can be isolated in the case of chemical spills in the vicinity of the plant.As shown in Section 2.2, no off site storage or tr ansport of chlorine is close enough or frequent enough to be considered a hazard. There is no on si te chlorine that is co nsidered a hazard under Regulatory Guide 1.78. A sodium hypochlorite biocide system is used, thus eliminating an on site chlorine hazard. Therefore, special provisions for protection against chlorine gas are not provided in the control room habitability design.
6.4.5 TESTING
AND INSPECTION The pressurization system was pneum atically tested for tightness of installation. It is not credited in radiological accident analyses.A simulated CBI signal closes all control building automatic isolati on butterfly valves located in the ductwork to the atmosphere and the control room emergency ventilation system starts in the pressurized filtration mode. Al l doors serving the control room envelope must be closed.
The following inspections are performed for control room habitability.1.Check bottled water supply monthly and refill as necessary.2.Check food and medical supplies monthly and replace as necessary.3.The Control Room Habitability Program requires assessment of CRE habitability and measurement of the unfiltered air inleakage into the CRE at the frequencies stated by Regulatory Guide 1.197. The pe riodic CRE habitabi lity assessment includes a review of maintenance, in spections and testing of systems and components affecting control room habitability, including the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System and CR E boundary components. CRE integrated inleakage testing is performed periodically to provide measurement of unfiltered air inleakage into the CRE.
MPS3 UFSAR6.4-10Rev. 30
- Section 9.4.1.4 describes the testing and inspection of the emergency ventilation filters and the control room air conditioning system.
6.4.6 INSTRUMENTATION
REQUIREMENTS Controls, alarms, and indicators are provided to allow manual operation. Temperature, pressure and flow monitors, equipment ON-OFF status lights, and damper and valve position status lights are also provided to assist the operator.
Instrumentation is provided to monitor the cont rol room air for particulate and gas radiation.
Indicators are provided on the ra diation monitoring panel in the control room. High radiation is annunciated on the radi ation monitoring panel.
Outside supply air is monitored by redundant in struments for radiation. High radiation is annunciated on the radi ation monitoring panel.The control room emergency ventilation system is automatically started in the pressurized filtration mode when high radiati on is detected in the outside air supply, or with a containment pressure Hi-1 signal. The control room emergency ventilation system can be started manually on the main control board or at the main ventilat ion and air conditioning panel. The control room emergency ventilation system is also started in the pressurized filtration mode at the main control board or at the main ventilation and air conditi oning panel when safety injection is initiated manually.The outside supply air is also monitored by a smoke detector that annunciates on the fire protection panel and the main boa rd when smoke is detected.
Design details and logic of the above inst rumentation are discussed in Section 7.3.
6.
4.7 REFERENCES
FOR SECTION 6.46.4-1Conventional Building for Reactor Containment. 1965 NAA-SR-10100. Atomics International, Washington, D.C.6.4-2Office of Civil Defense.
1969. Shelter Design and Analysis. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., TR-20-(Vol.
3), Chapter IX, Figure 9.1.TABLE 6.4-1 CONTROL ROOM COMPONENT PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS FOR HABITABILITY SYSTEMS ComponentsDesign CapacityDesign Parameters Control Room Area Air-Conditioning Unit21,725 cfm at 5.95 in. wg s.p.
(1)
MPS3 UFSAR6.4-11Rev. 30NOTES:Cooling Coil551,000 Btu/hrASME III, Class 3Heating Coil70 kWUL 1096Filter90-95% EFF DOPARI 430 & 850 Instrument Rack and Computer Room Air-Conditioning Unit 32,300 cfmat 11.23 in. wg s.p.Cooling Coil662,500 Btu/hrASME III, Class 3Heating Coil50 kWUL 1096 Filter90-95% EFF DOPARI 430 & 850 Control Room Pressurizing SystemAir Storage Tank23.27 cu ft (liq)ASME VIII, Div 1 Piping2,450/250 psigANSI B31.1Valve2,450/250 psigANSI B31.1Control Room Emergency Ventilation Filter Unit 1,000 cfm to 1,225 cfm at -15 in. wg s.p.Moisture Separator99% EFF (at 10 to 100 micron)
MSAR-71-45HEPA99.97% EFF DOPMIL-STD-282 Charcoal (2)99% EFF (Iodine Adsorption)
ANSI N509/
ASTM D3803Prefilter80% EFF NBSASHRAE 52-68Heater9.4 kWControl Room Emergency Ventilation Filter Fan 1,070 cfm at 12.6 in. wg s.p.AMCA Std 210Control Building Isolation Valves (3)Supply4,250 cfmASME III, Class 3Exhaust4,000 cfmASME III, Class 3Exhaust595 cfmASME III, Class 3Control Building Chilled Water Pump450 gpm at70 ftASME III, Class 3Control Building Water Chiller250 tonsASME III, Class 3TABLE 6.4-1 CONTROL ROOM COMPONENT PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS FOR HABITABILITY SYSTEMS ComponentsDesign CapacityDesign Parameters MPS3 UFSAR6.4-12Rev. 30(1)S.P. refers to static pressure.(2)Testing of used charcoal, post Generic Le tter 98-02 (Ref. Ame ndment 184) uses ASTM D3803-89 testing standards assuring charcoal efficiency of 97.5% or greater.(3)Closure time for all except the control buildi ng inlet valves is 3 seconds. The leakage rate in the closed condition at 0.125 in. wg is insignificant.
MPS3 UFSAR6.4-13Rev. 30FIGURE 6.4-1 CONTROL ROOM AREA MPS3 UFSAR6.4-14Rev. 30FIGURE 6.4-2 CONTROL ROOM IN TAKE AND HAZ ARDOUS MATERIAL STORAGE LOCATIONS MPS3 UFSAR6.5-1Rev. 30
6.5 FISSION
PRODUCT REMOVA L AND CONTROL SYSTEMS Fission product removal and contro l systems are required to miti gate the release of fission products into the atmosphere. The systems are cl assified as nuclear safety related and are comprised of the following:1.engineered safety features filter systems;2.containment spray systems; and3.fission product control systems.
6.5.1 ENGINEERED
SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) FILTER SYSTEMSThe ventilation filter systems identified below are classified as ESF filter systems:1.control room emergency vent ilation system described in Section 9.4.1
- 2.charging pump, component cooling wate r pump, and heat exchanger exhaust ventilation system described in Section 9.4.3; and3.supplementary leak collection and re lease system (SLCRS) described in Section 6.2.3.6.5.1.1 Design Bases The ESF filter systems are designed in accordance with the following criteria.1.General Design Criterion 19, for providi ng adequate protection to permit access and occupancy of the control room under accident conditions, except as stated in Section 3.1.2.19
.2.10 CFR 50.67, as related to releases to the environment of ai rborne radioactive material following accidents.3.General Design Criterion 61 , for providing appropriate fi ltering systems for fuel storage and handling areas to provide adequate safety under normal and postulated accident conditions, except as stated in Section 3.1.2.61
.4.Regulatory Guide 1.26, for the quality group classification of systems and components, except as stated in Section 3.2.2
.5.Regulatory Guide 1.29, for the seismi c design classification of system components, except as stated in Section 3.2.1
.
MPS3 UFSAR6.5-2Rev. 306.Regulatory Guide 1.52, for design, testing, and maintenance of ESF filter systems, except as stated in Table 6.5-1
.Other design bases are described in:
1.Section 6.2.3 for the supplementary leak collection and release system; 2.Section 9.4.1 for the control room emergency ventilation system; 3.Section 9.4.3 for the charging pump, component cooling pump, and heat exchanger exhaust ventilation system.
The conditions that establish the need fo r each of the ESF filter systems are:
6.5.1.2 System DescriptionTable 6.5-1 provides a comparison between the design features and fission product removal capability of each ESF filter system with the positions detailed in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2.The control room emergency ventila tion system is designated to maintain the control room at a positive pressure during acci dent conditions to prevent fission product infiltration.The charging pump, component cooling pump, and heat exchanger ventilation system is designed to produce an airflow direction fr om the auxiliary building genera l areas into component cooling pump and heat exchangers areas dur ing a LOCA to prevent areas of low radiation to be affected by areas of high radiation.
The SLCRS system operated in conjunction with the charging pump, component cooling pump, and heat exchanger exhaust ventilation system in cluding auxiliary building fi lters, is designed to maintain a negative pressure in the containm ent enclosure building a nd associated contiguous structures (auxiliary building, ESF building (partially), main steam valve building (partially), and hydrogen recombiner building (par tially)) during LOCA. This is accomplished by exhausting air from these areas and passing it th rough a charcoal filter assembly before releasing to atmosphere.
Filtration System Operating Conditions
- 1. Control room emerge ncy ventilation systemAll accidents in Table 15.0-8 that evaluate control room dose2. Charging pump, component cooling pump, and heat exchanger exha ust ventilation system (auxiliary building filters are used in conjunction)Loss-of-coolant accident3. SLCRSLoss-of-coolant accident MPS3 UFSAR6.5-3Rev. 30 Redundant filtration units ar e provided for each of th ese ESF filter systems.The combined flow rates for the fuel buildi ng exhaust and auxiliary building exhaust are monitored by flow instrumentation located in th e plant ventilation vent (see Section 9.4.3). The SLCRS flow is monitored by flow instrumentation located in the common discharge ducting downstream of the system filtration units (see Section 6.2.3.3). Monitoring of the ventilation flow rates is via the RMS computer workstations located in the contro l room. Recording of these flow rates is also performed by the RMS computer system.
Flow rates for the control room pressurization filtration units are measured during surveillance testing.6.5.1.3 Safety Evaluation The ESF filter systems conform to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2 as shown in Table 6.5-1. All necessary equipment a nd surrounding structures are Seismic Category I. Emergency power is provided from Class 1E power supplies. Redundancy of equipment and power supplies enable the systems to sustain a single active failure without loss of function during all postulated accident conditions.
ESF filter systems are evaluate d in Sections 15.6 and 15.7 to dem onstrate adequate removal of radioactive airborne material unde r the postulated accident conditions.
6.5.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Inspections and testing of ESF filter systems ar e consistent with the requirements outlined in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2.Test programs consist of predelivery shop and qualification tests, initial in-place acceptance tests, and post-operation surveillance testing.Filter housing leak tests, performed in accordance with ANSI-N510, are conducted at the shop and during in-place acceptance testing. These te sts demonstrate leakage rates of less than 0.1 percent of rated design flow at design pressure.Each HEPA filter is factory tested to demonstrate a minimum efficiency of 99.97 percent when tested with a 0.3 micron DOP aerosol at 100 percent and 20 percent of rated flow. After delivery and installation each HEPA bank is tested with DOP in accordance with ANSI N510 to confirm a penetration of less than 0.05 percent at rated flow.
Carbon media qualification and batch tests for the charcoal filters are performed prior to shipment to demonstrate compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2 requirements. After the adsorber cells are charged with the qualified carbon, the adsorber section is leak tested with freon in accordance with ANSI N510. This test is performed to confirm that bypass leakage through the adsorber section is less than 0.05 percent.
MPS3 UFSAR6.5-4Rev. 30An airflow distribution test was performed on the upstream HEPA bank. Flow distribution across each HEPA filter was demonstrated to be within 20 percent of the average air flow.Test canisters are provided to allow periodic re moval of carbon samples fo r laboratory testing to be sure that adequate capacity exis ts for the collection of radioiodines.
The fans were operationally te sted following installation.System availability is assured by the surveilla nce requirements imposed by the applicable plant Technical Specifications.
6.5.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements Each ESF filter system is provided with in strumentation as described in this section.A local pressure differential indicating switch is installed across each filter element including the heater. A pressure drop in excess of the setpoi nt of this switch re sults in control room annunciation for the respective filter element. Each filter s ection is monitored by the plant computer for high differential pressure.
Relative humidity of the air entering the charcoal adsorbers is indicated locally.
Each electric heater is prot ected from over temperature by a temperature switch having an automatic reset and a local manual reset. Each heater is interlocked with a fan running signal. The filter fan must be running for the heater to operate. Low airflo w in a running filter bank starts the standby filter bank. Status lights on the main heat ing and ventilation panel in the control room indicate when a heater is ON or OFF.The discharge of all carbon adsorb er sections is equipped with a continuous thermistor sensor. Control room fire detection annunciation and local indication result when air temperatures exceed the predetermined setpoint.
The high and high-high temperat ure alarm setpoints are 190
°F and 270°F for the SLCRS and fuel building ESF filters, 240
°F and 270°F for the auxiliary building ESF filters, and 225
°F and 250°F for the control room ESF filter
- s. This temperature monitoring system is provided with supervisory circuits.Flow indicators and recorders are not necessary, but Technical Specifications for these systems require periodic flow verification. Flow veri fication for the control room, SLCRS and the auxiliary building filters is on a monthly basis.
6.5.1.6 MaterialsThe engineered safety feature filter system s are composed of the following materials:1.Ductwork - galvanized sheet metal;2.Filter housings - carbon steel; MPS3 UFSAR6.5-5Rev. 303.Moisture separator - stainless steel;4.HEPA Filter Element Frame - Type 409 stainless steel;5.Charcoal cell - stainless steel; and6.Housing and components of the control room emerge ncy ventilation system -
carbon steel and galvanized sheet metal.
6.5.2 CONTAINMENT
SPRAYS AS A FISSION PRODUCT CLEANUP SYSTEMThe quench spray system (QSS) a nd the containment recirculation spray system (CRS), discussed in detail in Section 6.2.2, are safety-related systems that provide chemically treated water spray to the containment during the unlikely event of a LOCA to depressurize the containment and to minimize the release of radioactiv e iodine to the environment. Th is section describes the iodine removal capability of the sprays. The analysis of the radiological consequences of the LOCA is given in Section 15.6.
6.5.2.1 Design Bases The following are the design bases of the QSS and the CRS for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere: 1.General Design Criterion 41, as it relates to the desi gn which permits containment atmosphere cleanup. 2.General Design Criterion 42, as it relates to the design which permits inspection of containment atmosphere cleanup systems. 3.General Design Criterion 43, as it relate s to the design which permits testing of containment atmosphere cleanup systems. 4.The system is capable of functioning effectively with the single failure of an active component in the spray system, any of its subsystems, or any of its support systems. 5.The amount of radioactive iodine in the containment following a design basis accident (DBA) is reduced so that the outleakage will result in a TEDE below the limits of 10 CFR 50.67 as suppl emented by Regulatory Guide 1.183.6.The spray systems are designed to obtain adequate coverage of the containment volume in order to limit the site boundary dose following a DBA to a value less than that established in 10 CFR 50.67 as supplemented by Regulatory Guide 1.183.
MPS3 UFSAR6.5-6Rev. 307.The spray nozzles are designed to mini mize the possibility of clogging while producing droplet sizes effect ive for iodine absorption. 8.The QSS and CRS remove elemental and particulate iodine from the containment atmosphere. 9.The quench spray contains a solution of bo ric acid with a pH as low as 4.15. The containment recirculation spray contains neutralized boric acid and trisodium phosphate with a pH between 7.0 and 10.5 at all times. 10.The final pH of the sump water after the addition of all the re fueling water storage tank (RWST) water is above 7.0. 11.Baskets are provided in th e containment on the (-)24 foot 6 inches elevation for the long-term storage of trisodium phosphate crystals in a st ate of continual readiness to be dissolved in rising water after spray actuation.12.The QSS and CRS are designed to init iate automatically by an appropriate accident signal. The QSS is capable of continuous operation until the refueling water storage tank is emptied while the CRS is capable of continuous operation for long-term cooling (Section 6.2.2
). 6.5.2.2 System Design The QSS consists of two parallel flow paths.
Each flow path consists of one spray pump and associated piping valves. Both flow paths provide quench spray to opposite sides of the two spray headers. The QSS design is discus sed in detail in Section 6.2.2, and component data are given in Table 6.2-61.
The CRS consists of two 360 degree spray headers shared by two 100 percent redundant subsystems. Each subsystem consists of two pumps that take suction from the containment sump, and pump the water through a containment recirculation cooler into both spray headers. The CRS design is detailed in Section 6.2.2.
The quench spray and recirculation spray noz zles are manufactured by Spray Engineering Company (SPRACO) and are Model 1713A. Section 6.2.2 discusses the quench and recirculation spray header designs and the regions of the containment that are sprayed. The mass mean droplet diameter used in the iodine removal analysis is 1,037 microns at 40 psi for the Model 1713A nozzle. Figure 6.2-39 (Section 6.2.2) shows a histogram of droplet size distribution.
The QSS is capable of operating continuously until the RWST is emptied. The system meets the redundancy requirements of an ESF and will satisfy the system performa nce requirements despite the most limiting single-active failure in the shor t term or the most li miting single-active or passive failure in the long term.
MPS3 UFSAR6.5-7Rev. 30 The chronology of events for system operation is discussed in Section 6.2.2.
The technical specificat ions for the QSS are discussed in Chapter 16.
The CRS is capable of operating continuously for long-term cooling. The system meets the redundancy requirements of an ESF and will satisfy the system performa nce requirements despite the most limiting single-active failure in the shor t term or the most li miting single-active or passive failure in the long term. The chronology of operation of QSS and CRS is discussed in Section 6.2.2. The surveillance testing of the CRS is discussed in Section 6.2.2.
6.5.2.3 Design Evaluation 6.5.2.3.1 Iodine Removal Coefficients The calculated iodine removal coef ficients are given in Chapter 15.6.
6.5.2.3.2 Range of Spray pHIn order to ensure adequate iodine removal effe ctiveness and compatibility of the spray solution with the safety-related materials inside the cont ainment, the pH of the containment recirculation spray is maintained between 7.0 and 8.0 at all times.
The conditions utilized in calculating the mini mum expected CRS spray pH for the system are given in Table 6.1-2. The spray pH will remain in the range given in the table for all operating modes of the system after all the RWST water was admitted into the containment. The values of the parameters used in calculat ing the limiting pHs are those technical specification limits which tend to minimize or maximize pH as appropriate.
6.5.2.3.3 Ultimate Sump pH The minimum expected ultimate sump pH is given in Table 6.1-2 along with the boric acid and trisodium phosphate sources considered in the analysis. The values of the parameters listed in this table are consistent with the a ppropriate technical specification limits which minimize the pH. A time history of the sump solution pH following a LOCA is presented on Figure 6.5-1.
6.5.2.4 Inspection and Testing RequirementsThe inspection and testing of the quench and containment recirculation spray systems is described in Section 6.2.2.4.
6.5.2.5 MaterialsThe boric acid solution show little change at high temperatures (130
°C) with or without radiation (Eggleton 1967; Fittel and Row 1971; Greiss and Bacarella 1969). The boric acid and TSP solution is not susceptible to significant radiol ytic or pyrolytic deco mposition under conditions found in nuclear power plant containments.
MPS3 UFSAR6.5-8Rev. 30
6.5.3 FISSION
PRODUCT CONTROL SYSTEMS Fission product control systems ar e considered to be those syst ems whose performance controls the release of fission products following a desi gn basis accident (DBA). These systems are exclusive of the containment isolation system and any fission product re moval systems, although they may operate in conjunction with them.
6.5.3.1 Primary Containment Additional information for the para meters used in determining th e radiological consequences of accidents is shown in Table 15.6-9.
The primary containment is equipped with a QSS. Th is spray system is designed to remove heat generated within the primary containment follow ing a design basis accident (DBA). In addition, the spray system serves as a fission product control system and is described in detail in Section 6.5.2. 6.5.3.2 Secondary Containment The secondary containment at Mill stone 3 consists of a containm ent enclosure structure (Section 3.8.4) and the contiguous buildings. Following a DBA, these areas are maintained under negative pressure with the use of the SLCRS described in Section 6.2.3. The SLCRS exhausts the air from these areas, filtering a nd removing particulate and gaseous iodine from the air, before discharging to the atmosphere via the Millstone stack. Detail of the filtration system is given in Section 6.5.1.
6.
5.4 REFERENCES
FOR SECTION 6.5 6.5-1ANSI/ANS Standard 56.5. 1979. "PWR and BWR Containment Spray System Design Criteria." 6.5-2DiNunno, J. J.; Anderson, F. D.; Baker, R. E; and Waterfield, R. L. 1962. "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites." U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) Document TID-14844. 6.5-3Eggleton, A. E. J. 1967. "A Theoretical Examination of Iodine-Water Partition Coefficients." UKAEA, AERE-R4887. 6.5-4Fittel, H. E. and Row, T. H. 1971. "Radiation and Thermal Stability of Spray Solutions." Nuclear Technology, p. 442. 6.5-5Griess, J. C., and Bacarella, A. A. 1969. "Design Considerations of Reactor Containment Spray System - Part III, The Corrosio n of Materials in Spray Solutions." ORNL-TM-2412, Part III, p. 15.
MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.5-9Rev. 30TABLE 6.5-1 COMPARISON OF ESF FILTER SYSTEMS WITH RESPECT TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, REV. 2 POSITIONSCriteriaControl Room Emergency Ventilation System Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Exchanger Exhaust System Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System Regulatory Position 1:
Environmental Design Criteriaa.System design based on conditions resulting from postulated DBAIn complianceIn complianceIn complianceb.Shielding of adsorber section from other ESF systemsIn complianceIn complianceIn compliancec.Adsorber design based on iodine concentrationsIn complianceIn complianceIn complianced.Compatibility with other ESF systemsIn complianceIn complianceIn compliance The atmosphere cleanup systems will be compatible with other engineered safety features. However, there is no need for them to be compatible with the containment spray systems as they are not located within the
containment structure.e.Component design for maximum and minimum predicted temperaturesIn complianceIn complianceIn compliance MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.5-10Rev. 30 Regulatory Position 2: System Design Criteriaa.Redundancy of systems and used sequence of filter elementsIn complianceIn complianceIn compliance (Demisters in lieu of prefilters)b.Physical separation of redundant systemsIn compliance Redundant systems are separated by 10 feet distance In compliance Redundant systems are separated by 12 inch concrete slab.In compliance Redundant systems are separated by 12 inch concrete slab.c.Seismic category of system components In essential compliance. All components seismically qualified.
In essential compliance.
All components seismically qualified.
In essential compliance.
All components seismically qualified.d.Pressure surge protectionNot applicable. Units are located in control building, therefore not subject to any pressure surges from any postulated accidents.
Not applicable. Units located in auxiliary
building, therefore not subject to surges in reactor containment due to LOCA.Not applicable. Units located in auxiliary
building, therefore not subject to to pressure surges in reactor
containment due to LOCA. e.System construction material compatibility with radiationIn complianceIn complianceIn complianceTABLE 6.5-1 COMPARISON OF ESF FILTER SYSTEMS WITH RESPECT TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, REV. 2 POSITIONSCriteriaControl Room Emergency Ventilation System Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Exchanger Exhaust System Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.5-11Rev. 30f.Maximum flow rate and HEPA filter arrayIn compliance 1,225 cfm filter train with single HEPA.In compliance 30,000 cfm filter train. Three high by seven wide HEPA array.
In compliance 9,800 cfm filter train.Three high by two wide HEPA array.g.InstrumentationPartial compliance. See Section 6.5.1.5.Partial compliance. See Section 6.5.1.5
.Partial compliance. See
Section 6.5.1.5
.h.Design of power supply and instrumentation Partial compliance. See Section 1.8 for exceptions Partial compliance. See Section 1.8 for
exceptions Partial compliance. See Section 1.8 fo r exceptionsi.Automatic actuation of systemNoncompliance. Manual actuation from control room at 1 hr. after c ontrol building isolation signalIn complianceIn compliancej.Radiation exposure ALARAIn complian ce with clarification. See Section 1.8 In compliance with clarification. See Section 1.8 In compliance with clarification. See Section 1.8 k.Minimization of atmospheric effects on system performanceIn complianceIn complianceIn compliancel.Leak testing of filter housings and ductworkIn compliance with exception. See Section 1.8 In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8 In compliance with exception. See Section
1.8 TABLE
6.5-1 COMPARISON OF ESF FILTER SYSTEMS WITH RESPECT TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, REV. 2 POSITIONSCriteriaControl Room Emergency Ventilation System Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Exchanger Exhaust System Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.5-12Rev. 30 Regulatory Position 3: Component Design Criteria and Qualification Testinga.Demister design, construction, and testingIn complianceIn complianceIn complianceb.Air heater design, construction, and testingIn complianceIn complianceIn compliancec.Prefilter design, construction, and testingIn complianceIn compliance(See Sect. C.2.a)d.HEPA filter design, construction, and testing In compliance with clarification. See Section 1.8 In compliance with clarification. See Section 1.8 In compliance with clarification. See Section 1.8 e.Filter and adsorber mounting frame design and construction In compliance with clarification. See Section 1.8 In compliance with clarification. See Section
1.8 In compliance with clarification. See Section
1.8 f.Filter and adsorber bank arrangementIn complianceIn complianceIn complianceTABLE 6.5-1 COMPARISON OF ESF FILTER SYSTEMS WITH RESPECT TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, REV. 2 POSITIONSCriteriaControl Room Emergency Ventilation System Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Exchanger Exhaust System Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.5-13Rev. 30g.Filter housing designPartial compli ance. In accordance with ANSI 509 except access is not provided with hinged doors or inspection windows. Access is via 20
inch x 40 inch bolted panels. No internal lighting. Minimum access to units required due to the locations and f unction. See Section 1.8.
Millstone 3 complies with ANSI N509-1980 paragraph 4.6.2.2 with respect to designing inlet units and components which can be
isolated from the fan to withstand a peak negative pressure by ensuring that such isolation is precluded vi a the design control logic between the fans and the In compliance Millstone 3 complies with ANSI N509-1980 paragraph
4.6.2.2 with respect to designing inlet units and components which can
be isolated from the fan to withstand a peak negative pressure by
ensuring that such isolation is precluded via the design control logic
between the fans and the inlet dampers.
Compliance with
designing inlet units and components, as noted in paragraph with respect to
the plugging of such components, is demonstrated via routine surveillance and subsequent filter replacement as necessary.In compliance Millstone 3 complies with ANSI N509-1980 paragraph
4.6.2.2 with respect to designing inlet units designing inlet units and
components which can be isolated from the fan to withstand a peak negative
pressure by ensuring that such isolation is precluded via the design control logic between the fans and the inlet dampers. Compliance
with designing inlet units and components, as noted in the same paragraph
with respect to the plugging of such components, is
demonstrated via routine surveillance and subsequent filter replacement as necessary.TABLE 6.5-1 COMPARISON OF ESF FILTER SYSTEMS WITH RESPECT TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, REV. 2 POSITIONSCriteriaControl Room Emergency Ventilation System Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Exchanger Exhaust System Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.5-14Rev. 30inlet dampers. Compliance with designing inlet units and components as noted in the same paragraph with respect to the plugging of such
components, is demonstrated via routine surveillance and subsequent filter replacement as necessary. Even though doors are not
available to access both sides of each bank of components, Millstone 3 complies with the intent of the requirements of Paragraph 5.6 of
ANSI 509-1976 to provide access to each side of each component of the ESF ventilation filtration systems fi lter housings for maintenance and testing.
Even though doors are not available to access both sides of each bank
of components, Millstone 3 complies with the intent of the
requirements of Paragraph 5.6 of ANSI N509-1976 to provide
access to each side of each component of the ESF ventilation filtration
systems filter housings for maintenance and testing.Even though doors are not available to access both sides of each bank of
components, Millstone 3 complies with the intent of the requirements of
Paragraph 5.6 of ANSI N509-1976 to provide access to each side of
each component of the ESF ventilation filtration systems filter housings
for maintenance and testing.h.Water drain designIn compliance with exception. See Section 1.8 In compliance with exception.
See Section 1.8 In compliance with exception.
See Section 1.8 i.Adsorber mediumIn complianceIn compliance with exception.
See Section 1.8 In compliancej.Adsorber cell designIn complianceIn complianceIn complianceTABLE 6.5-1 COMPARISON OF ESF FILTER SYSTEMS WITH RESPECT TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, REV. 2 POSITIONSCriteriaControl Room Emergency Ventilation System Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Exchanger Exhaust System Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.5-15Rev. 30k.Iodine desorption and adsorbent auto-ignitionPartial compliance. Cons ervative calculations show that maximum decay heat generation is insufficient to produce iodine desorption. Units
provided with control room annunciation if adsorber temperature exceeds a specified temperature See Section 1.8 Partial compliance. Same features as control room emergency
ventilation system. See Section 1.8Partial compliance. Same features as control room emergency ventilation
system. See Section 1.8l.System fan flow and pressure capability In compliance with exceptions. See Section 1.8In compliance with exceptions.
See Section 1.8 In compliance with exceptions.
See Section 1.8m.Capability of fan to operate under postulated environmental
conditionsIn complianceIn complianceIn compliancen.Ductwork design, construction, and testing Partial compliance. Duct welding will be performed in accordance with AWS D9.1-80 See Section 1.8 Partial compliance.
Same as control room units. See Section 1.8Partial compliance. Same as control room units. See Section 1.8o.Ductwork layoutIn complianceIn complianceIn compliance p.Damper design, construction, and testingIn compliance with exceptions. See Section 1.8In compliance with exceptions. See Section 1.8 In compliance with exceptions. See Section
1.8 Regulatory
Position 4:
MaintenanceTABLE 6.5-1 COMPARISON OF ESF FILTER SYSTEMS WITH RESPECT TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, REV. 2 POSITIONSCriteriaControl Room Emergency Ventilation System Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Exchanger Exhaust System Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.5-16Rev. 30a.Component accessibilityPart ial compliance. See Section 1.8Partial compliance.
Service area outside housing of 2 feet- 6 inch is adequate. See Section
1.8 Partial
compliance. See Section 1.8b.Filter spacingNoncompliance. See Section 1.8Noncompliance. See Section 1.8 Noncompliance. See Section 1.8c.Test portsIn complianceIn complianceIn compliance d.Monthly operation of filter trains with heaters energized In compliance with clarification. See Section 1.8 In compliance with clarification. See Section 1.8 In compliance with clarification. See Section 1.8e.Installation of final filter devices after active constructionIn complianceIn complianceIn compliance Regulatory Position 5: In Place Testinga.Visual inspection before in place testing in accordance with ANSI N510 - 1975In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8In compliance with exception.
See Section 1.8 In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8b.Air flow distribution HEPA and adsorberIn compliance with exception.See Section 1.8In compliance with exception.
See Section 1.8 In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8TABLE 6.5-1 COMPARISON OF ESF FILTER SYSTEMS WITH RESPECT TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, REV. 2 POSITIONSCriteriaControl Room Emergency Ventilation System Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Exchanger Exhaust System Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System MPS3 UFSARMPS3 UFSAR6.5-17Rev. 30c.HEPA filter DOP testing in accordance with ANSI N510In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8In compliance with exception.
See Section 1.8 In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8d.Charcoal adsorber leak testing with refrigerant in accordance with ANSI N510In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8In compliance with exception.
See Section 1.8 In compliance with exception. See Section
1.8 Regulatory
Position 6: Laboratory Testing Criteria for Activated
Carbona.Regulatory requirements for carbonIn compliance with exception. See Section 1.8In compliance with exception.
See Section 1.8 In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8b.Laboratory efficiency testing of carbonIn compliance with exception. See Section 1.8In compliance with exception.
See Section 1.8 In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8TABLE 6.5-1 COMPARISON OF ESF FILTER SYSTEMS WITH RESPECT TO REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, REV. 2 POSITIONSCriteriaControl Room Emergency Ventilation System Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Exchanger Exhaust System Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System MPS3 UFSAR6.5-18Rev. 30 FIGURE 6.5-1 POST DBA MI NIMUM CONTAINMENT SUMP PH MPS3 UFSAR6.6-1Rev. 30
6.6 INSERVICE
INSPECTION OF CLASS 2 AND 3 COMPONENTS
6.6.1 INSERVICE
INSPECTION PROGRAMIn accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g), ASME S ection XI and Regulator y Guide 1.26, Millstone Unit 3's Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program outlines requirements for performing inservice examinations of ASME Code Class 2 and 3 co mponents (and their supports) containing water, steam or radioactive materi al other than radioactive waste management systems.The ISI Program for the first ten year interval was approved in Safety Evaluation Report dated February 8, 1991. Subsequent updates of the ISI Program are submitted for NRC review and approval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g).
The ISI Program addresses the following subjects:
Components Subject to Examination Examination Categories and Methods Inspection Interval Dates Evaluation of Examination ResultsSystem Pressure Tests Augmented ISI to Protect Agai nst Postulated Piping Failure Relief RequestsA list of the Class 2 and Class 3 systems that are required to be included in the Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program are listed in Table 6.6-1. Ot her systems considered to be safety related per Section 3.2 but which do not meet the require ments for testing per Regulatory Guide 1.26 are tested, commensurate with their safe ty function, outside the ISI Program.
6.6.2 ACCESSIBILITY
Access to Class 2 and 3 components has been pr ovided for so that Code examinations of applicable components can be performed, to the extent practicable. If certain examinations cannot be fully accomplished inservice, then suitable alternate examinations and inspections are made to supplement the Code examinations. Accessibil ity was demonstrated during the Class 2 and 3 preservice inspections, and departures from C ode or Regulatory requirements were formally documented in the inservice inspect ion program implementing documents.
6.6.3 AUGMENTED
INSERVICE INSPECTION TO PROTECT AGAINST POSTULATED PIPING FAILURES Millstone 3 has been designed to ensure that the containment vessel and all essential equipment within or outside the containment have been adequately protected against the effects of blowdown jet and reactive forces includi ng pipe whip which may result from postulated ruptures of high-energy piping systems. Section 3.6 discusses the effects of pi ping system rupture in greater detail.
MPS3 UFSAR6.6-2Rev. 30 Circumferential and longitudinal we lds in portions of certain essential and/or high energy fluid system piping as described in Section 3.6.2.1.2.2(f) will receive supplementary examinations. During each inspection interval, augmented examinat ions will be performed on welds in the pipe break exclusion area in accorda nce with the risk-informed me thodology established in WCAP-14572, Revision 1-N-A, Addendum 1.
Surface and volumetric inspecti ons will be performed on piping greater than 4 inches nominal pipe size a nd surface only examinations will be performed on piping less than or equal to 4 inches nominal pipe size. These inspections will be performed in accordance with the weld area and volume require ments specified in the edition of the ASME Code,Section XI, which is in effect for the inspection period in whic h the examination is performed.
MPS3 UFSAR6.6-3Rev. 30TABLE 6.6-1 INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM CLASS 2 & 3 SYSTEMS CLASS 2 SYSTEMS Chemical Volume Control (CVC)
Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Feedwater (FWS) Main Steam (STG)
Quence Spray (QSS)
Containment Recirculation Spray (CRS)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPI) Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPI) Steam Generator Blowdown (BDG) CLASS 3 SYSTEMS Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Control Building Chilled Water (CBW)
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (SFC) Service Water (SWS) Charging Pump Cooling (CCE)
Safety Injection Pump Cooling (CCI)
Reactor Plant Compone nt Cooling (CCR) Chemical Volume Control (Boric Acid) (CVC) 10....f U (00..(_RHU'ELI><C W4UR CH£w.cAL AOOIT ION T ANI('lIM>4lIIMf\,l(\.'" W,,'(II (;:('J()I.(II wU[R STORACETA NJI\,.1 OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE I I I I 2-360°CONU lt/IIENT RECIRCULATION SPR4Y
_____INS IDE CONT h lNMENT S1 RUC1UR_E'--
......'--'---:..::'--2.360°llU:NCHSPRAY\lEADERS
'__0'1*l l..l'4:FIGURE 6.0-1 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 3 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CADFILE: 601.dgn/601,crt i+/-RE S'O UAl 1<[AT , A(" O VAL P U,"",S I-
,@0 I"-ISP nAs.tlS(I,PICAl10
.121 COHTAI""'CNT STRUCTURE Su,",P SCREE NS$hfETy INJECTION ACCUMULATORI*IT yP IC ALI'.,.__--'*_._..)--.:.--L
--.J R es l[G5-::J_________J IlCS COLD l E G S1 I::
I I...,,\,,"(f!u:.:'o-"""'A__--!0<)'1"L", CQ'I"rtl.'1QoI5 ANO l'IUw" TH61 O"'(IIUtf......'Ill"""1:..,(;1" 1[-'0 ,arllfSOll....
""l M>'SOlO"!!lJ(H COHi"l(CI.()N'
"""-L I(....., ClfU..(O ()oII".......C;1 or1"K!.....fOU..l
!>u8\<w')T(IIII' OC TOBER 1997 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE RESPONSE - DOUBLE ENDED LOCA (BREAK LOCATION)Rev. 27.2
MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-5 CONTAINMENT DEPRES SURIZATION RESPONSE - LOCARev. 21.3
MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-7 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE FROM 1.4 FT 2 MLSB AT 0% POWER, NO ENTRAINMENT, - LIMITING PEAK PRESSURE CASERev. 21.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-8 CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE FROM 1.4 FT 2 MSLB AT 102
% POWER, NO ENTRAINMENT - LIMITING PEAK TEMPERATURE CASERev. 21.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-9 CONTAINMENT LINER TEMPERATURE FROM 1.4 SQUARE FEET AT 0% POWER, NO ENTRAINMENT - PEAK TEMPERATURE CASERev. 22.1 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-10 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038Rev. 21.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-11 DELETED BY PKG FSC 07-MP3-039Rev. 21.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-12 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038Rev. 21.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-13 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038Rev. 21.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-14 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038Rev. 21.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-15 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038Rev. 21.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-16 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038Rev. 21.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-17 PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION VIEW WITH NODAL ARRANGEMENTAmendment 11 November 1984 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 18 PLAN VIEW FOR THE PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT, ELEVATION 95.3 FEETAmendment 11 November 1984 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 18A PLAN VIEW FOR THE PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT, ELEVATION 74.2 FEETAmendment 11 November 1984 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 18B PLAN VIEW FOR THE PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT, ELEVATION 51.3 FEETAmendment 11 November 1984 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 18C PLAN VIEW FOR THE PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT, ELEVATION 25.7 FEETAmendment 11 November 1984 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 18D PLAN VIEW FOR THE PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT, ELEVATION 12.75 FEETAmendment 11 November 1984 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-19 STEAM GENERATOR SUBC OMPARTMENT EL EVATION WITH NODAL ARRANGEMENTRev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-20 PLAN VIEW FOR THE STEAM GENERATOR SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 3 FEET 8 INCHES NODE 4 NODE 5 NODE 6 NODE 3 NODE 1 NODE 2 Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-21 PLAN VIEW FOR THE STEAM GENERATOR SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 28 FEET 6 INCHESNODE 12 NODE 11 NODE 10 NODE 9 NODE 7 NODE 8 NOTENodes 13 through 18 are located directly above nodes 7 through 12 respectively.Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-22 PLAN VIEW FOR THE STEAM GENERATOR SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 51 FEET 4 INCHESNODE 21(24)
NODE 22(25)
NODE 20(19)
NOTENodes (19), (24), and (25) ar e at elevation 47 feet 0 inches below nodes 20 through 22.Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 23 UPPER REACTOR CAVITY SUBCOMPA RTMENT PLAN ELEVATION AND NODAL ARRANGEMENTDecember 1997 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 24 PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT NODALIZATION DIAGRAMAmendment 11 November 1984 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-25 STEAM GENERATOR SU BCOMPARTMENT NODALIZATION DIAGRAMNOTES: 1. Node 23, remainder of containment.
Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 26 STAGGERED MESH APPR OXIMATION FOR NO DES AND INTERNAL JUNCTIONSDecember 1997 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 27 GENERAL FLOW CHART FOR THREEDRev. 20.3 MPS-3FSAR FIGURE 6.2-28 PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE 20 ,....----------.,------------,-------------r----------,"--NODE 21 (CONTAINMENT)
<t Ci5 a...,.....15 C\J a z<t lO r-CJ)W 0 0 Z 10 Z W 0:::J en CJ)w 0:: a...w 5 (!)<t a:: w><<
1 5.83 PSI MAX.l1P ACROSS UPPER PRESSURIZER CUBICLE WALLS=t_10-1 TIME AFTER BREAK (SEC)o__---a._....._.
........._.................
....r......
__"""----L-----I-............a.---'-
...............__
............
._L.._I""",I,..I
_____&._....r..........._.._L.._
..........10-3 NOTE: SPRAY LINE BREAK IN NODE 15 Amendment 11 November 1984 Rev.20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-28A PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLENOTE: SPRAY LINE BREAK IN NODE 15 Rev. 20.3Amendment 11 November 1984 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-29 PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLENOTE: Surge line break in node 5.
Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-29A PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLENOTE: Pressurizer uplift and differential pressure acrosss skirt (surge line break, node 20).
Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-29B PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLENOTE: SURGE LINE BREAK IN NODE 2.Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-29C PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLENOTE:Peak load across pressurizer (surge line break node 5).
Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-29D PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLENOTE: Peak load across pressurizer (surge line break node 4).
Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-30 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-31 PRESSURE RESPONSE STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLENOTES:Pressurizer surge line break in node 11.
MaximumP = 8.09 psi across steam generator (nodes 11 - 7).Maximum P = 8.11 psi across steam generator cubicle wall (nodes 11 - 23, containment).Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-32 PRESSURE RESPONSE STEAM GENE RATOR CUBICLENOTES:Residual heat removal line break in node 5.
Maximum P = 6.42 psi across steam generator (nodes 5 - 1).Maximum P = 6.45 psi across steam ge nerator cubicle wall (nodes 5 - 23, containment).Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-33 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006Rev.22 Section 508
Description:
MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-34 PRESSURE RESPONSE STEAM GENE RATOR CUBICLENOTES:Feedwater line split break in node 19.Maximum DP = 2.60 psi across stea m generator (nodes 19 - 21).Maximum DP = 3.15 psi acro ss steam generator cubicl e wall (nodes 19 - 23).Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-34A DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-34B DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-34C DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-34D DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 Rev. 22 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-35 DELETED BY PKG FSC 07-MP3-038Rev. 21.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-38 TYPICAL CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE SUMPRev. 21.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 39 SPATIAL DROPLET SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF SPRACO 1713A NOZZLE APPLYING SURFACE AREA CORRECTION AND SPRAYING WATER AT 40 PSIG UNDER LABORATORY CONDITIONSRev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 40 CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION PUMPS CHARACTERISTIC CURVESRev. 20.3 April 1998 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-41 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038Rev. 21.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 42 CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SPRAY COVERAGE BEND LINE (ELEVATION 104 FEET) ELEVATED TEMPERATURE (275
°F), SPRAY HEADER AT 141 FEET 9 INCESRev. 20.3 April 1998 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-43 CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SPRAY COVERAGE BEND LINE (ELEVATION 104 FEET) ELEVATED TEMPERATURE (275
°F), SPRAY HEADER AT145 FEET 3 INCESRev. 20.3 April 1998 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 44 UNOBSTRUCTED QUENCH SPRAY COVERAGE BEND LINE (E LEVATION 104 F EET) ELEVATED TEMPERATURE (275
°F), SPRAY HEADERS AT ELEVATION 153 FEET AND 168 FEETRev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-45 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038Rev. 21.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 46 AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM AND SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEMMay 1994 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSAR FIGURE 6.2-47 (SHEET 1 OF 14)CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM A.INSIDE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT CONTAlN"'ENT STRUCTURE (ICS)STRUCTURE COCS)e.COWTAlNhlENT ATMOSPHERE WONITORIHG DISCHA.-GE AND IWSTRU WEHT 1.1.-I I f.C.LJ T f.C*NOTE: I.SAFETY CLASSES (SC)SHOWN ow FLUID SYSTEM fiGURES 2.FOR VALVE POSITION AND ACTUATION SIGNAL-SEe TABl..E 6.2-65 3.PENETRATIONS 12D AND 138 HAVE 1 VALVE AND A PIPE CAP OR PLUG C*DBA HYDROGEN RECQMBINER DISCHARGE NOTE: 1.SAFETY CLASSES SHOWN ON APPl..leABLE FLUID SYSTEM FIGURES 2.,.OR VALVE POSJTION seE TABLE E.2-65 D.ICS OCS I CS oes A.C.LMC NOTE: SAFETY CLASSES SHOWN ON APPl..lCABLE FLUID SYSTEM FIGURESo: TEST CONNECTION September 1997 A.C.NOTES: 1.THE ISOLA lION VALVES ARE GLOBE VALVES FOR PENETRATION 2-52.2.Lt.fC VALVES FOR REFUELING CAVITY PURIFlCA TICt-J ARE PLUG VALVES.Rev.22.3 MPS-3 FSAR FIGURE 6.2-47 (SHEET 2 OF 14)CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM E.F.SAFETY INJECTION TEST AND Aceu MUL.ATOR FILl..ICS OCS LMC ICS OCS NOTE: t.SAFETY CL.ASSES SHOWN ON APPL.JCABL.E FLUID SYSTEM FIGURES 2.FOR ACTUATION SIGNAL.seE TABLE e.2-65 CLOSEDJ:--------..
x.-......---1..F.e.ocs ICS H.REACTOR COOL.ANT CHARGING ocs G.REACTOR COOL-ANT L.ETDOWN{E}-""1 S AIR Rev.22.3 MPS-3 FSAR FIGURE 6.2-47 (SHEET 3 OF 14)CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM F.e.J2.CONTAINMENT VACUUM PUMP SUCTION 1 NOTES-__---_...---.-.41-.....1,2£3 T Foe.lUCU'CsIOCS F.C.Jt.CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE MONITORING SUCTION rTT.*NOTES 1.LINE OPEN TO CONTAINMENT AT-..OSPHERE.
2.SAFETY CLASSES SHOWN ON APPL1CASLE FLUIO SYSTEM FIGURES.3.AUGMENTEO ICE INSPECT ION (A 1 SI)IS PERFORMED ON THE SECT ION OF PIPING OUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE BETWEEN THE PENETRATION AND THE FIRST ISOLAT ION VALVE.K.CONTAINMENT MONITOR-OPEN TAPS (TY PICAL OF FOUR PENETRATIONS)
L.CONTAINMENT PURGE AIR EXHAUSTF.C.}F.O.lCS oes ICS OCS NOTE: LINE OPEN TO CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE THESYSTEM CONFIGURA nON OUTSIDE OF THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VARIES BETWEEN THE FOUR PENETRATIONS.
September 1997 Rev.22.3 MPS-3 FSAR FIGURE 6.2-47 (SHEET 4 OF 14)CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM PILOT OPERATED ATMOS.-r-NNS (TYP)F.Cl:-SC2 sc z---I.--NNS DETAIL 2 AIR TYP F.C.AIR P PT SEE OETAIL 2 SC2 SC3 T(, STEAM GEN.AUX.FEEOWATER l.F.O.PUMP TURBINE SUPPLY[TYP OF 3)SC2.ICS OCS SEE DETAIL 1 DETAIL\F.C.N.MAIN STEAM (TYPICAL.OF FOUR PENETRATIONS)
CLCJSECt{--....
.........-....
..TO TUR SINE PL.ANT MISC DRAINS (TYP)September 1997 Rev.22.3 MPS-3 FSAR FIGURE 6.2-47 (SHEET 5 OF 14)CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM H.FEEOWATE R (TYP OF 4)-........----....__-A.C.I CS OCS F.C. I
- I Po CONTAINMENT PUIitGE SUPPLY AIR}AUX.FEED}SIS/FW II I___J F.e.MAIN FEEDI SC 2+NNS{Tl'P OF'2}T'CSIOCS:.r:.: CHEMICAL..........FEED F.C'I sc t--T'-NNS CLOSEO PI PT September 1997 Rev.22.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-47 (SHEET 6 OF 14)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEMNOTES 1. Figure shows penetration Z-96. Penetrati on Z-97 has one LMC valve and a pipe cap.
- 2. Figure shows penetration Z-96. These LMC valves do not exist on penetration Z-97.
- 3. Differential Pressure tap for flow measurement.
Rev. 22.3 MPS-3 FSAR FIGURE 6.2-47 (SHEET 7 OF 14)CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM S.REACTOR PUMPS SEAL WATER INJECTION T.REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS SE AL WATER RETURN les ces ICS oes LMC LJ LMC LMC n SC2 VENT SC2 SC2 U.RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL.PUMP DISCHARGE TO L.EGS (T't'P ICAL.OF TWO PENETRAT IONS)1.Penetration Z-94 has two LMC valves installed as shown.Penetration Z-93 has one LMC valve and a pipe cap or plug.Rev.22.3 MPS-3 FSAR FIGURE 6.2-47 (SHEET 8 OF 14)CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM V.RESIOUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMPS DISCHA RGE TO HOT L E6S UAC NNS§}.fil1.-....--._c:-...-......-...AI RFoO.les OCS SC2 W.QUENCH SPRAY PUMP OISCHARGE (TYPICAL OF TWO PENETRATIONS)
X.CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION PUMP OISCHARGE (TYPICAL OF FOUR PENETRATIONS)
ICS OCS 1 NOTE LOOP SEAL tuiTI SC2 NOTE: Motor operated valve opens on CDA signal, closes on low RWST level.September 1997 Rev.22.3 MPS-3 FSAR FIGURE 6.2-47 (SHEET 9 OF 14)CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Y.CONTAINMENT VACUU" PUW..OlSCHAftG[.loc.T A.C.SC2+tmS NOTE: OPEN TO CONTAIMNENT ATMOSPHERE Z.SAfETY INJECTION PU"-PS DISCHARGE TO COL 0\..EGS lMC lUC LUC Note 1.Differential pressure taps for flow measurement.
January 1998 ICS OCS SC2.Rev.22.3 MPS-3 FSAR FIGURE 6.2-47 (SHEET 10 OF 14)CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM E NCAPSULATI ON NOTE: OPEN TO CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE tCS oes SC2 L.C.WA.C.NHS 5C2 e e.CONTAINMENT VACUUM EJECTOR S UCT IONAIA....I..-__..
SC2 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE SUMP AA.CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION PUMP(TYPICAL OF FOUR PENETIUTIONS) ce.DBA H 2 RECOlllBINER SUCTION (TYPICAL OF TWO PENETRATIONS) 00.RESIDUAL HEAT REMOYAL PUMP SUCTIONHOT LEGS (TYPICAL OF TWO PENETRATIONS)
L.C.L.C.SC2 SC2 NOTE---_----........NOTE: OPEN TO CONTAINMENT Rev.20.1 MPS-3 FSAR FIGURE 6.2-47 (SHEET 11 OF 14)CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM££. COOLANT LOOP fiLL lWC F F.FIRE PROTECTION ,L.C.NNS---4.-SC 2 L:J LUC ICS OC$January 1998 F.C.LoC., SC2---4.--
NNS Rev.22.3 MPS-3 FSAR FIGURE 6.2-47 (SHEET 12 OF 14)CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM QG*.,2 TO SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATORS ICS oct F.O.I-t: T Foe.HNS scz SC 2 UIC HH.lIS AIR+uT+-NSS SC Z sc Z NNS LLtC.J J.STOM GtN£RATOR BLOWDOWH SAMPLE LI NES'IS CLOSED{
T r---t NOTE 1 Foe.NOTE: CLOSES ON WOTOR.DRIVEN AUX FEEDWAT£A PUMP START January 1998 Rev.22.3 MPS-3 FSAR FIGURE 6.2-47 (SHEET 13 OF 14)CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM KIC.CONPONENT COOUNG WATER SUPPLY SC2.+SC3 SC3-+SCZ ICrotS!_-t-L T LL.
COOLING WATER RETURNI SC3+SCZ ACt--T'-NNS T..M.POST ACCIDENT SAMPLE L RETURN lUC n LJ lYe NOTE: PENETRA.nON z-ns DOES NOT HAVE CAPS ON TtE.LUC CONNEC TIONS.January 1998 Rev.22.3 MPS-3 FSAR FIGURE 6.2-47 (SHEET 14 OF 14)CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEMNN AIR LMC'IS AIR n-+T+HSS SC 2 SC 2 N NS NOTES:1-RELIEF IS NOT REQUIRED/INSTALLED ON PENETRATION Z-292-THIS SKETCH DEPICTS MANY PENETRATIONS.
THE VALVE TYPE AND POSITION SHOWN ARE NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT A TIVE September 1997 Rev.22.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-48 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010Rev. 18.4 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-49 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010Rev. 18.4 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-50 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010Rev. 18.4 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-51 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010Rev. 18.4 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-52 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010Rev. 18.4 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 54 QUENCH SPRAY PUMPS CHARACTERISTIC CURVESAmendment 15 September 1985 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-55 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010Rev. 18.4 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 56 CONTAINMENT INTERNAL STRUCTURE OPENINGSNOTES:Refueling cavity and pressurizer shed and steam generator shield walls above operating floor not shown for clarity.Openings are shown schematically and do not indicate exact sizes and shapes.Rev. 20.3 Amendment 8 May 1984 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 57 EXPECTED LONG-TERM CIRCULATION PATTERNS IN CONTAINMENTNOTES:Refueling cavity and pressurizer sh ed and steam generator shield wa lls above operating floor not shown for clarity.Openings are shown schematically and do not indicate exact sizes and shapes.Rev. 20.3 Amendment 8 May 1984 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 58 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MONITO RING SYSTEM.Rev. 20.3 Amendment 8 May 1984 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-59 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE LIMITING BREAKRev. 21.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-59A DELETED BY FSARCR 02-MP3-017Rev. 17.2 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2-60 CONDENSING WALL HEAT TRANSFER COEFFICIENT LIMITING BREAK Rev. 21.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2 - 61 DELETED BY PKG FSC 07-MP3-024Rev. 20.2 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.2--62 DELETED BY PKG FSC 07-MP3-024Rev. 20.2 RCS COLD LEG LOOP 2 TANK RCS HOT LEG LOOP 2 ACCUM SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 2 SIS CHG PUMPS SIS CHG PUMPS QENCH SPRAY PUMPS REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK IRC ORC RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 2 RCS HOT LEG LOOP 4 ORC IRC RCS COLD LEG LOOP 1 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1 SIS CHG PUMPS IRC ORC FOR DETAILS OF THE PIPING, VALVES, INTRUMENTATION, ETC. REFER TO THE PIPING AND INSTRUMENTATION DIAGRAM. REFER TO PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM TABLES FOR THE CONDITION AT EACH NUMBERED POINT.
NOTE: RCS HOT LEG LOOP 1 ORC IRC MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.3-1 ((SHEET 1 OF 2)
SAFETY INJECTION / RESI DUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM PROCE SS FLOW DIAGRAMRCS COLD LEG LOOP 4 RCS COLD LEG LOOP 3 TANK TANK TANK RCS HOT LEG LOOP 4 RCS HOT LEG LOOP 1 RCS HOT LEG LOOP 3 ACCUM ACCUM ACCUM SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1 THIS DIAGRAM IS A SIMPLIFICATION OF THE SYSTEM INTENDED TO FACILITATE THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROCESS.
CCW CCW RHR HEAT EXCHANGER 2 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER 1 September 1997 Rev. 20.3 RCS COLD LEG LOOP 4 IRC ORC CHARGING PUMP 2 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.3 - 1 (SHEET 2 OF 2) SAF ETY INJECTION / RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAMIRC ORC RCS COLD LEG LOOP 1 RCS COLD LEG LOOP 2 RCS COLD LEG LOOP 3 CHARGING PUMP CVCS VCT SIS RWST SH. 1 LOC. C CVCS SEAL WT HX CVCS NOR CHG CVCS SEAL WT INJ SIS SI PUMPS SH. 1 LOC. B SIS RHR HX 1 SH. 1 LOC. A NOTE: This diagram is a simplification of the system intended to facilitate the understa nding of the process. For details of the p iping, valves, instrumentation.
etc. refer to the piping and
- 1. instrumentation diagram. Refer to process flow di agram tables for the condi tion at each numbered point.
September 1997 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSAR NOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-1 Modes of Operation ECCS process flow diagrams ar e provided for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to represent the flow rates used in various accident analyses; such fl ow rates are provided in Chapter 15, where appropriate. The process flow diagrams ar e developed to provide representative system performance data. This data consists of process fl ow data (i.e., pressure, temperature, and flow) and valve alignments for three pr incipal modes of ECCS operation. The following general assumptions were utilized to develop the process flow data for the principal modes of ECCS operation.
1.The system operating conditions presente d for the injection and recirculation modes are based on the assumption that reactor coolant system is fully depressurized and is in equilibrium with the containment at zero psig.
2.The accumulator delivery is considered as an independent mode of operation and
the process conditions presented are based on the assumption that the accumulators are fully discharged and de pressurized to zero psig. Containment atmosphere may be higher than zero psig, however, the results are the same. Mode A - Injection This mode presents the proces s conditions for the case of maxi mum safeguards, i.e. all pumps operating, following accumulator delivery. Two re sidual heat removal (R HR) pumps, two safety injection (SI) pumps, and two centrifugal charging (CC) pumps ope rate, taking suction from the refueling water storage tank and delivering to the reactor through the cold leg connections. Note that the flow from each pump is less than its maximum runout since the pump discharge piping is shared by the two pumps of each s ubsystem. Note also that the SI pump branch connections to the residual heat removal lines are located close to their discharge into the accumulator lines, thereby minimizing head loss in RHR branch line due to the combined flows of the RHR and SI pumps.
The RHR line resistance was assumed to be th e minimum of allowable band presented in the limiting pressure drop and elevat ion head design requirements, allowing maximum RHR injection flow. Mode B - Cold Leg Recirculation This mode presents the proces s conditions for the case of cold leg recirculation assuming containment recirculati on (CR) pump A or B operating, safety injection pumps A or B operating, and centrifugal charging (CC) pumps A or B operating.
In this mode the safeguards pumps operate in series, with only the CR pump capable of taking suction from the containment sum
- p. The recirculated coolant is th en delivered by the CR pump to both of the SI pumps whic h deliver to the reactor through their cold leg c onnections and to both of 1 of 13Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARNOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-1the CC pumps which deliver to the reactor through their cold leg connections. The following data is based, however, on one CC pump and one SI pump in operation.
Mode C - Hot Leg Recirculation This mode presents the pro cess conditions for the case of hot leg recirculation, assuming containment recirculation pump A operating, centrifugal charging (CC) pump A operating, and safety injection (SI) pumps A and B operating.
In this mode, the safeguards pumps again operate in series with only th e CR pump taking suction from the containment sump. The r ecirculated coolant is then de livered by the CR pump to both of the CC pumps which continue to deliver to the reactor through their cold leg connections and to both of the SI pumps which deliver to the react or through their hot leg connections. The following data is based, however, on one CC pu mp and two SI pumps in operation.
2 of 13 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARNOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-1VALVE ALIGNMENT CHART OPERATIONAL MODESValve No.
A B C 1 O C C 2 O C C 3 O C C 4 O C C 5 O C C 6 O O C 7 O O O 8 C C O 9 C C C 10 C C C 11 C C C 14 C C C 15 C C C 16 O O O 17 O O O 18 O O O 19 O O O 20 C O O 21 C O O 22 O C C 23 O C C 24 O C C 25 C C C 26 O C C 27 C C C 28 O C C 29 C O O 30 C C C 3 of 13 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARNOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-1VALVE ALIGNMENT CHART OPERATIONAL MODESValve No.
A B C 31 C C C 32 O O O 33 O O C 34 O O O 35 O O O O = Open C = Closed 4 of 13 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARNOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-1MODE A - INJECTION PHASE (MAXIMUM SYSTEM FLOW CONDITIONS FOLLOWING ACCUMULATOR DELIVERY)Flow Location Fluid Pressure (psia) Temperature (°F) (Gpm) (1) (lb/sec) Volume (gal) 1 Refueling Water ATM Tank 40 --2 Refueling Water 27 40 10,452 1,453 -3 Refueling Water 34 40 9,619 1,337 -4 Refueling Water 34 40 9,619 1,337 -5 Refueling Water
-40 8,856 1,222 -6 Refueling Water 26 40 834 116 -8 Refueling Water
> 30 40 763 106 -9 Refueling Water
> 22 40 417 58 -10 Refueling Water 22 40 417 58 -11 Refueling Water 1,312 40 417 58 -12 Refueling Water
< 15 40 24 3 -13 Refueling Water 22 40 417 58 -14 Refueling Water 1,312 40 417 58 -15 Refueling Water
< 15 40 14 2 -16 Refueling Water 15 40 38* 5.2 -17 Refueling Water 1,280 40 796 110 -18 Refueling Water 48.5 40 199 27 -19 Refueling Water 15 40 2,413 335 -20 Refueling Water
-40 2,413 333 -21 Nitrogen 0 50 0 0 -22 Nitrogen 0 50 0 0 850
- 23 Nitrogen 0 50 0 0 500 24 Reactor Coolant
-50 0 0 -25 Refueling Water 0 40 4,428 611 -26 Refueling Water 138 40 4,428 611 -27 Refueling Water
-40 975 135 -5 of 13 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARNOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-1MODE A - INJECTION PHASE (MAXIMUM SYSTEM FLOW CONDITIONS FOLLOWING ACCUMULATOR DELIVERY)Flow Location Fluid Pressure (psia) Temperature (°F) (Gpm) (1) (lb/sec) Volume (gal) 28 Refueling Water 47 40 4,428 611 -29 Refueling Water 86 40 3,453 476 -30 Refueling Water 101 40 0 0 -31 Refueling Water
-40 975 135 -32 Refueling Water 86 40 4,428 611 -33 Refueling Water 86 40 0 0 -34 Reactor Coolant
-40 0 0 -35 Refueling Water 0 40 4,428 611 -36 Refueling Water 138 40 4,428 611 -37 Refueling Water
-40 975 135 -38 Refueling Water 47 40 4,428 611 -39 Refueling Water 86 40 3,453 476 -40 Refueling Water 101 40 0 0 -41 Refueling Water
-40 975 135 -42 Refueling Water 86 40 4,428 611 -44 Refueling Water 101 40 0 0 -45 Refueling Water 101 40 0 0 -46 Refueling Water Low 40 0 0 -47 Refueling Water Low 40 0 0 -48 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -49 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -50 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -51 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -52 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -53 Refueling Water
> 29 40 763 106 -54 Refueling Water 26 40 0 0 -55 Refueling Water 1,747 40 381 53 -6 of 13 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARNOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-1MODE A - INJECTION PHASE (MAXIMUM SYSTEM FLOW CONDITIONS FOLLOWING ACCUMULATOR DELIVERY)Flow Location Fluid Pressure (psia) Temperature (°F) (Gpm) (1) (lb/sec) Volume (gal) 56 Refueling Water 26 40 0 0 -57 Refueling Water 19 40 381 53 -58 Refueling Water 19 40 382 53 -59 Refueling Water 1,746 40 382 53 -60 Refueling Water 1,740 40 122 17 -61 Refueling Water 1,740 40 122 17 -62 Refueling Water 1,694 40 641 89 -64 Refueling Water 1,662 40 641 89 -65 Refueling Water 1,324 40 160 22 -66 Refueling Water 15 40 160 22 -1. At reference conditions 40
°F and 0 psig
- Minimum allowable volume at normal operating conditions 7 of 13 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARNOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-1MODE B - COLD LEG RECIRCULATION (A-TRAIN OPERATING)Flow Location Fluid Pressure (psia) Temperature (°F) (Gpm) (1) (lb/sec) Volume (gal) 1 Refueling Water ATM Tank 40 --< 5,000 2 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -3 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -4 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -5 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -6 Recirc Coolant 15 149 0 0 -8 Refueling Water 15 40 0 --9 Recirc Coolant 102 149 0 0 -10 Recirc Coolant 104 149 654 89 -11 Recirc Coolant 903 149 654 89 -12 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -13 Refueling Water 104 40 0 0 -14 Refueling Water 104 40 0 0 -15 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -16 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -17 Recirc Coolant 853 149 654 89 -18 Recirc Coolant 39 149 164 22 -19 Recirc Coolant 15 149 164 22 -20 Recirc Coolant 15 149 169 22 -21 Nitrogen 0 Ambient 0 0 -22 Nitrogen 0 Ambient 0 0 -23 Nitrogen 0 Ambient 0 0 -24 Recirc Coolant
-212 0 0 -25 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -26 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -27 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -28 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -8 of 13 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARNOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-1MODE B - COLD LEG RECIRCULATION (A-TRAIN OPERATING)Flow Location Fluid Pressure (psia) Temperature (°F) (Gpm) (1) (lb/sec) Volume (gal) 29 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -30 Refueling Water 28 149 0 0 -31 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -32 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -33 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -34 Reactor Coolant
-212 0 0 -35 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -36 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -37 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -38 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -39 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -40 Recirc Coolant 112 149 1,200 164 -41 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -42 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -44 Refueling Water 107 149 0 0 -45 Recirc Coolant 109 149 1,200 164 -46 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -47 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -48 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -49 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -50 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -51 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -52 Recirc Coolant
-149 0 0 -53 Recirc Coolant 109 149 0 0 -54 Recirc Coolant 109 149 1,200 164 -55 Recirc Coolant 895 149 545 74 -56 Recirc Coolant 109 149 654 89 -57 Recirc Coolant 101 149 545 74 -9 of 13 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARNOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-1MODE B - COLD LEG RECIRCULATION (A-TRAIN OPERATING)Flow Location Fluid Pressure (psia) Temperature (°F) (Gpm) (1) (lb/sec) Volume (gal) 58 Refueling Water 101 149 0 0 -59 Refueling Water 101 149 0 0 -60 Recirc Coolant 876 149 87 12 -61 Recirc Coolant 876 149 87 12 -62 Recirc Coolant 857 149 458 62 -64 Recirc Coolant 841 149 458 62 -65 Recirc Coolant 673 149 114 16 -66 Recirc Coolant 15 149 114 16 -1. At reference conditions 149
°F and 0 psig
- Minimum allowable volume at normal operating conditions 10 of 13 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARNOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-1MODE C - HOT LEG RECIRCULATION (1 CR, 1CC AND 2SI PUMPS OPERATING)Flow Location Fluid Pressure (psia) Temperature (°F) (Gpm) (1) (lb/sec) Volume (gal) 1 Refueling Water ATM Tank 40 --< 5,000 2 Refueling Water 55 40 0 0 -3 Refueling Water 61 40 0 0 -4 Refueling Water 61 40 0 0 -5 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -6 Recirc Coolant 50 149 0 0 -8 Refueling Water 56 40 0 0 -9 Recirc Coolant 46 149 643 88 -10 Recirc Coolant 46 149 643 88 -11 Recirc Coolant 867 149 643 88 -12 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -13 Recirc Coolant 47 149 643 88 -14 Recirc Coolant 869 149 643 88 -15 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -16 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -17 Recirc Coolant 15 149 0 0 -18 Recirc Coolant 17 149 0 0 -19 Recirc Coolant 15 149 0 0 -20 Recirc Coolant 15 149 0 0 -21 Nitrogen -Ambient 0 0 -22 Nitrogen 0 Ambient 0 0 -23 Nitrogen 0 Ambient 0 0 -24 Recirc Coolant
-212 0 0 -25 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -26 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -27 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -28 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 - 11 of 13 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARNOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-1MODE C - HOT LEG RECIRCULATION (1 CR, 1CC AND 2SI PUMPS OPERATING)Flow Location Fluid Pressure (psia) Temperature (°F) (Gpm) (1) (lb/sec) Volume (gal) 29 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -30 Recirc Coolant 52 149 0 0 -31 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -32 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -33 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -34 Refueling Water
-212 0 0 -35 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -36 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -37 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -38 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -39 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -40 Recirc Coolant 59 149 1,826 249 -41 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -42 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -44 Recirc Coolant 50 149 0 0 -45 Recirc Coolant 56 149 1,826 249 -46 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -47 Refueling Water
-40 0 0 -48 Recirc Coolant 824 149 643 88 -49 Recirc Coolant 15 149 322 44 -50 Recirc Coolant 828 149 643 88 -51 Recirc Coolant 15 149 322 44 -52 Recirc Coolant
-149 0 0 -53 Recirc Coolant 56 149 0 0 -54 Recirc Coolant 54 149 1,826 249 -55 Recirc Coolant 874 149 540 74 -56 Recirc Coolant 54 149 1,287 175 -57 Recirc Coolant 46 149 540 74 -12 of 13 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARNOTES TO FIGURE 6.3-1MODE C - HOT LEG RECIRCULATION (1 CR, 1CC AND 2SI PUMPS OPERATING)Flow Location Fluid Pressure (psia) Temperature (°F) (Gpm) (1) (lb/sec) Volume (gal) 58 Refueling Water 46 149 0 0 -59 Refueling Water 46 149 0 0 -60 Recirc Coolant 858 149 86 12 -61 Recirc Coolant 858 149 86 12 -62 Recirc Coolant 840 149 453 62 -64 Recirc Coolant 824 149 453 62 -65 Recirc Coolant 660 149 113 15 -66 Recirc Coolant 15 149 113 15 -1. At reference conditions 149
°F and 0 psig
- Minimum allowable volume at normal operating conditions 13 of 13 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.3 - 3 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP PERFORMANCE CURVEDecember 2001 (01-43)
Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.3 - 4 CHARGING PUMP CURVE ASSUMED FOR SA FETY ANALYSIS (PER CALC. SE/FSE-C-NEU-0154, TABLE 1)May 1998 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.3 - 5 HIGH HEAD SI PUMP C URVE ASSUMED FOR SAFETY ANALYSIS (PER CALC. SE/FSE-C-NEU-0148, PAGE 6 ASSUMPTION 5)May 1998 Rev. 20.3 MPS-3 FSAR FIGURE 6.3-6 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK WATER LEVELS Rev. 24.3 SECURITY-RELATED-INFORMATION-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 MPS-3 FSAR FIGURE 6.4-1 CONTROL ROOM AREA Withheld under 10 CFR 2.390 (d)(1)
Rev. 20.1 Rev. 23.1 SECURITY-RELATED-INFORMATION-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 MPS-3 FSAR Withheld under 10 CFR 2.390 (d)(1)
FIGURE 6.4-2 CONTROL ROOM INTAKE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIAL STORAGE LOCATIONS MPS-3 FSARFIGURE 6.5-1 POST DBA MINIMUM CONTAINMENT SUMP PH Rev. 21.3