ML072690112

From kanterella
Revision as of 10:08, 22 October 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
R. E. Ginna Final Examinations Outlines (Folder 3)
ML072690112
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/11/2007
From: Reid J
Constellation Energy Group
To: Caruso J G
NRC Region 1
Sykes, Marvin D.
Shared Package
ML063560007 List:
References
ES-401-2 IR-07-301
Download: ML072690112 (20)


Text

\ f%Lf#[ 0LK4AIc ----- -- ES-401 Form ES-401-2 RO WA Category Points SRO-Only Points Systems 2 20111110111 10 011 2 3 Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable WA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e.. except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, Note: I l' I the "Tier Totals" in each WA cateaorv shall not be less than two). Tier , Totals 5 2 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 38 3 5 8 I 6. I Select SRO toDics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded svstems and WA cateaories 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories The generic (G) WAS in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the KIA Catalog, but 17' I the toDics must be relevant to the aDDliCable evolution or svstem. 1 2 3 14 10 1234, 2 2 2 4 2212 2. 3. 4. 5. NUREG-I021 The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by

+I from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.

The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points. Systemslevolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regarding elimination of inappropriate WA statements.

Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution. Absent a plant specific priority, only those KAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratinas for the RO and SRO-onlv oortions.

resDectivelv.

1 8. 9. On the following pages, enter the WA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G' on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #I does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the WA Catalog, and enter the WA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals

(#)on Form ES-401-3.

Limit SRO selections to WAS that are linked to 10CFR55.43 ES-401 Ginna Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 1 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name Safety Function I G I K1 1 K2 I K3 I AI I A2 I Number I KIA Topic@) I Imp. I Q# 009 /Small Break LOCA / 3 Ill 022 I Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup / 2 X 027 i Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction 029 I Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) I 1 038 /Steam Generator Tube Rupture

/ 3 E12 I Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators i 4 008 / Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident

/ 3 015 / 17 /Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions

/ 4 022 / Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup

/ 2 Ill 025 / Loss of Residual Heat Removal System / 4 1x1 I 026 / Loss of Component Cooling Water I8 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA Actions to be taken if PTS limits are violated Emergency Procedures

/ Plan Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system mponents and controls.

Equipment Control Knowledge of bases in technical and safety limits. Emergency Procedures

/ Plan Knowledge of which events related to system operationslstatus should be reDorted to outside aqencies.

4.4 4.0 specifications for limiting conditions for operations 3.7 3.6 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a SGTR RCP restart criteria Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Uncontrolled Depressurizalion of procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

Knowledge of the interrelations between the followino: Sensors and detectors.

4.4 a11 Steam Generators)

Adherence to appropriate

3.3 Pressurizer

Vapor Space Accident and the 3.8 <noMeoge of the reasons for Ine foilofflng responses as tney apply to tne Reactor Coolant Pmp Ma fdnclons ,-ass of RC Flow) Polenl a 25 damage from high mna ng analor beanng temoeratwres AO ty 10 operate an0 I or monllor he follomng as tney apply 10 tne -05s of Reactor Cooant MakeJp RCP sea Row. IemperatJres. pressJres. and nbral ons Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Shifl to alternate flowpath Conduct of Operations: Ability to locate and operate wmponents.

including local wntrols. NUREG-I021 2

ES-401 Ginna Form ES-40 1-2 Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions -Tier 1 Group 1 I MA Topic(s) 1 Imp. 1 Q# E/APE #I Name Safety Function I G I K1 I K2 I K3 I AI I A2 I Number I AK1 ,ol 2.4.31 AA2.15 Knodedge of the Operational implications of the following wncepts as they apply to Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): MFW line break depressurizes the S/G (similar to a steam line break) Emergency Procedures

/ Plan Knowledge of anniinciators alarms and indications, and use of lhe response instructions.

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument BUS: That a loss of ac has occurred Knowleoge of tne .nlerrelal ons between tne fo own9 Conlro ers and PosiLoners A6203 I Pressdnzer Pressdre Conlro MalLnclons an0 tne 058 / Loss of DC Power / 6 062 / Loss of Nuclear Service. Water

/ 4 065 / Loss of Instrument Air

/ 8 E04 / LOCA Outside Containment

/ 3 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of system status and its ootential wnseouences X X X X Anowledge of me operational implicat ons of the fo onnng wncepls as lney app y to Sleam L ne Rdpldre ConseaLences of PTS AK1 01 AK3.02 responsCs as mey apply to tne -ass of DE Power. Act ons wnla ned in EOP for loss of dc power I Knowledoe of the reasons for the followina AA2.03 AA1.03 EK1.2 Ability to determine and interpret the follwjlng as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: The valve lineups necessary to restart the CCWS while bypassing the portion of the System causing the abnormal condition Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of instrument Air: Restoration of Systems served by instrument air when pressure is regained Knowledge of the operational implications of the following wncepts as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containmentl Normal. abnormal and emergency operat ng proced-res assocared vntn (LOCA Oulsloe Conlalnmenl) 2.6 2.5 - 4.5 4.1 4.1 - 3.3 3.8 4.0 - 2.6 - 2.9 - 3.5 ES-401 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following: Components and functions of control and safety systems. including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

3.7 Ginna

Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions -Tier 1 Group 1 55 Form ES-40 1-2 AO ty to operate ana I or mon lor me followng as tney apply 10 the (Loss of Emergency Coo ant Rec rcLlatdon)

Desireo operating re%

Is omng abnormal ana emeraencv s ualons 3 7 I WA Topic(s) 1 Imp. I Q# E/APE # / Name Safety Function I G I K1 I K2 I K3 I AI I A2 I Number I 56 E05 I Loss of Secondaw Heat Sink I4 ---I El 1 / Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation

/ 4 EK2.1 7- EA1.3 6 i Grouo PointTotal:

i 1 24 I NUREG-1021 4

ES-401 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Expected change In source range count rate when rods are moved Emergency Procedures I Plan Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a inadequate Core Cooling: The effect of turbine bypass valve operation on RCS temperature and pressure Conduct of Operations: Knowiedge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation.

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal:

Proper actions to be taken if automatic safety functions have not taken place Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Startup termination on source-range loss Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Manual restoration of Dower 3.9 4.3 4,6 4.0 4.5 3.2 3.0 Ginna Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions -Tier 1 Group 2 82 83 84 85 57 58 59 Form ES-401-2 Instrumentation I 7 059 I Accidental Liquid RadWaste Release I9 060 /Accidental Gaseous RadWaste Release/ 9 E02 I SI Termination 13 RAPE #/ Name Safety Function I G I K1 1 K2 I K3 I AI I A2 I Number I KIA Topic(s) 1 Imp. I Q# X X X X Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization)

Components. capacity, and function of emergency systems.

3.4 63 AA2.02 2.4.4 E03 / LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization I4 EA2.08 X 2.1.2 AA2.03 AK3.01 AA1.03 AK2.01 EA206 2.1.23 EK1.l Knodedge of the interrelations between the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release and the following: Radioactive-liquid monitors Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Accidental Gaswus Radwaste:

Valve lineup for release of radioactive gases Conduct of Operations:

Ability to perform speciflc system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of Dlant ooeration.

NUREG-I021 5

ES-401 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Natural Circulation Operations) and the following: Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant. emergency coolant.

the decay heat removal systems. and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Degraded Core Cooling)Normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures associated with Degraded Core Cooling. EK2.Z EK12 Ginna Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions -Tier 1 Group 2 3.6 64 3.5 65 Form ES-401-2 Group Point Total: */APE # / Name Safety Function I G I K1 I K2 I K3 I AI I A2 I Number I WA Topic(s) I Imp. I Q# 13 EO9 / Natural Circulation Operations I4 E06 / Degraded Core Cooling / 4 I WA Cateaow Point Total: NUREG-I021 6

ES-401 Ginna Written Examination Outline Plant Systems -Tier 2 Grow 1 Form ES-401-2 1 Imp. I Q# KIA Topics System #/Name 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal 006 Emergerrcy Core Cooling 013 Engineered Safety Features Acluation 064 Emergency Diesel Generator 003 Reactor Coolant Pump 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal 005 Residual Heat Removal 006 Emergency Core Cooling 007 Pressurizer RelieflCluench Tank X X X X X AO 'If 10 (a, pie0 CI IIIC inipacis of tile fo oMng ma f.nci ons or oi)eralions on me CVCS. mc (D. base0 011 Inose prco clions. .dse proceoJreS 10 wrrecl ~oniio. of ni t gale !ne wnseq-elices of iiiosc maifJiici wis or opera! LI s -ow L CT ores.Lre ~ AD ,rY 10 ra, DI~UICI Ihe rnpacls of me 10 lonmg ma'fLnCtions Lr operatioils on rne RhRS. anc 10, oasPd on [nose prw,;ions me procedwcs io co(rcct coiilroi or m t caw tne conseq-enccs of tn05e rila lLnc1.ons or opera1.onS RhR vaw malfuxlion Eq-.pmeni Comrol &rio.vleage of oaseb II lecnn mi specifiahons for I miiinq r.ond8i ons for operations and safelb ,.m 1s Condd d Operx om AD, ty io apply tecnnca spec 'Ical oris for a sysiem Conaai of Opera1 ons An illy IO recogn 2e inb cat ons for s/siem opera! ng pardmerefs An ci are emry eve1 ~3~0.1 ons *rJr !xnr ?? soec.fcai ons ~ Knowledge of the physical connections andlor cause-effect relationships between the RCPS and the following svstems:

RCP seal system Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS: Flow paths for emergency boration Knowledge of RHRS design feature(s) andlor inteiiock(s) which provlde or the following: Lineup for low head recirculation mode (external and internal)

Emergency Procedures I Plan Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls.

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the ECCS: Core flood tanks (accumulators)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to PRTS: Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR NUREG-I021 7

ES-401 Ginna Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 Form ES-401-2 I Imp. I Q# KIA Topics System #/Name I G I K1 I K2 I K3 I K4 I K5 I K6 I AI I A2 I A3 I A4 I Number I Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions. use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Highllow surge tank level. AT02 008 Component Cooling Water Ao ty to preacl analor monitor changes in parametem (to prevent excee0,ng desgn m ts) assocatea wln operating the PZR PCS controls mlLo nq S~rav nozzle OT 8 AI .08 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control 2.1.2 - K5.01 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant Knowledge of the operational implications of the followino conCeDts as the amlv to the RPS: ONB 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control 012 Reactor Protection K6.01 - A1.09 - K4.03 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the ESFAS: Sensors and detectors Ability to predict andlor monitor changes in parameters (lo Prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ESFAS controls including: T-hot Knowledge of CCS design feature@)

andlor interlock(s) which provide for the following:

2.8 13 Automatic Containment Isolation.

2.7 11 3,4 ,2 013 Engineered Safely Features Actuation 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 022 Containment Cooling 2.2.22 - K3.04 3.4 14 EqJlpment Control KnoMeage 01 llmlung wna ltons for operations ana safety limits.

026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MRSS will have on the following:

MFW Knowledge of the physical connections andlor causeeffect relationships between the MRSS and the followinq systems: SIG pumps I lx 039 Main and Reheat Steam K1.01 I lx Knowledge of the physical connections andlor cause-effect relationships between the MFW and the following systems: SIGS water level control system Ability to predict andlor monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the AFW controls including: AFW flowlmotor amps 3.4 17 3.6 18 059 Main Feedwater K1.04 A1.05 061 AuxillaryIEmergency Feedwater NUREG-1 021 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 Ginna Written Examination Outline Plant Systems -Tier 2 Group 1 System #/Name I G I K1 I K2 I K3 I K4 I K5 I K6 I A1 I A2 I A3 I A4 I Number I KIA Topics I Imp. I Q# 161 AuxillarylEmergency

eedwater 162 AC Electrical Distribution 162 AC Electrical Distribution 163 OC Electrical Distribution )64 Emergency Diesel Generator )73 Process Radiation Monitoring 176 Service Water 178 Instrument Air 103 Containment 103 Containment UA Category Point Totals: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the AFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct. control.

or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Total loss of feedwater.(no Value Listed in KA CAT) Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

Major system loads Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Synchronizing and paralleling of different ac supplies Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the control room: Banery discharge rate Knowledge of bus power supplies to the foliowing:

Control oower knowleage of the effect tnat a loss or malfunnlon of me PRM Syslem WI have on the following Rao oac1:ve emLent releases AD ty to mon.tor aLtomal c operat on of tnc SWS. nclLd.ng. Emergency heat oads AD.. ty lo manually operate andlor monitor In tne control room' PressLre gaJges Ability IO (a) predict the impacls 01 Ihe lo omng ma fJnct ons or operahons on tne containment system-ana (bj base0 on tnose preo cl ons. Jse proceoures to correct. contro.. or miugate tne cOnseqJences of !hose malfdncuons or Operations Phase A ana B 150 allon Ability to monitor automatic operation of the containment system. including:

Containment isolation iintTotal:

I + 3.0 22 7 3.1 26 I -- NUREG-I021 9

r 0 P v) W X cn N r- 9 5 X N o 2 N 9 2 X 0 R Y - X k m VI z o VI 9 2 X 0 r ES-401 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the NIS : DiScriminatOr/COmDenSation circuits K6.02 t Svstem #/Name I G IKlIK2 2.6 068 Liquid Radwaste Ill 079 Station Air Ill Ginna Form ES-401-2 Written Examination Outline Plant Systems -Tier 2 Group 2 NUREG-I 021 11 Number I K/A Tnnics I Imn~ linowedge 01 SAS oes gn featJre(s) andlor wnneclwlh AS K4.01 mlenocn(s)

Wicri pruvioe fur [ne followng Cross- 2 9 Grow Point Total: I Ability to perform specific system and integrated operation.

plant procedures during all modes of plant Facility:

I ~~~ 3.9 Ginna 22'10 I Dateof Exam: I 81: Knowledge of the process for determining if the margin of safety, as defined in the basis of any technical specification is reduced by a uroposed Categoly 2.2.12 1. Conduct of Operations Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

2. Equipment Control 2 3 10 3. Radiation Control Ao.lity 10 perform procedbres to rcobce excessive levels of radiatron and auard aaainst 2 9 4. Emergency Procedures I Plan Knowledge of fire in the plant procedure.

KIA # 3.0 2.1.25 2.1.5 2.1.22 2.1.23 Topic I, I Ability to obtain and interpret station reference I materials such as araohs. monoaraohs.

and I -. . ~., ~~ ~.~ ~ lables wnicn conlain performance data. Ability In locate and use procedures ano I directives related to shift staffing and activities.

I Abilitv to determine Mode of ODeration.

I 2.8 Subtotal I I change, test or expennient

_. .,,, I Knowlcdae Gf ne* and saenl fuel movement L.L.LU I proceduGs.

2.6 3.0 - I cI ~ I Knowledge of the Drocess for uerformina a I porsonnei exposure.

2'3'1 1 radiation control reqLirements - - 2.6 Knowledge of 10 CFR: 20 and related facility Subtotal I 2.4.6 2.4.34 - 2.4.27 2.4.3 - 2.4.17 2.4.29 Knowledge of symptom based EOP mitigation strategies.

Knowledge of RO tasks periormed outside the main control room during emergency operations including system geography and system implications.

Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation.

I 3.5 Knowledae of EOP terms and definitions.

1 3.1 ~~~~ Knowledge of the ememencv Dlan. I 2.6 Tier 3 Point Total I Subtotal I 2007 66 67 - 2 68 69 2 _. _. 70 71 2 72 73 74 75 - _. 4 10 - - SR( IR - 3.1 3.4 - - 3.3 3.5 _. 3.4 4.0 - 3.6 _. _. 94 95 2 _. 96 97 2 98 - 1 99 _. 100 2 7 NUREG-1021 12 rier I Randomly ;roup 212 1 I1 212 314 313 212 211 212 212 21 1 211 112 Selected~WP 075 G2.2.25 008 AK2.03 035 K5.01 G2.4.44 G2.3.2 068 G2.1.27 013 G2.1.28 068 K6.10 011 K2.02 022 K4.04 008 A2.08 E14 EK1.3 Reason for Rejection No LCOs and Safety Limits associated with Circulating Water System. Randomly reselected G2.1.32 Removed due to excessive overlap with 027 AK2.03. Since 027 had only 1 KA >2.5 in that category and 008 had 3 topics, removed the 008 topic and randomly reselected AK2.02 Overlap with 045 AI .05, so removed 035 topic since it had a lower KA importance value. Manually added K5.03 because it was the only other K5 in the 035 topic area. (Same as random) Excessive overlap with Admin Task on Operating exam. Randomly reselected G2.4.6 Too difficult to develop an SRO question from selected KA. Randomly reselected G2.3.9 Selected topic had no tie to IOCFR55.43(b) and only yielded information at the ROIAO level. Randomly reselected G2.1.23 Selected toDic had no tie to IOCFR55.43(b) and onlv vielded information at the ~~ ~ ,I RO/AO level. Randomly reselected G2.i.12 Excessive overlaD with information In auestion 24. No olher K6 tooics ~~8- ~ ~ - ~~~~ ~~~ ~ ~~ available in 068, iandomly reselected irom available topics, replaced with 015 K6.02. Topic would not yield a discriminating question without excessive effort. Other K2 topics similar. Randomly reselected 01 1 K1.04 Topic would not yield a discriminating question without excessive effort. Randomly reselected 022 K4.03 Topic would not yield a discriminating question without excessive effort. Randomly reselected 008 A2.02 Operating Exam modifications resulted in excessive overlap with JPM. Randomly reselected E06 EKI .2 NUREG-1021 13 ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Rev Final Facility:

Ginna Date of Examination:

a127107 Examination Level (circle one). RO/SRO Operating Test Number: N07-1-1 Administrative Topic Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations I- ' Describe activity to be performed 2.1.7 (4.4) Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interDretation JPM: Calculate QPTR and take action as necessarv 2.1.25 (3.1) Ability to obtain and interpret station reference materials such as graphs, monographs, and tables which contain Derformance data JPM: Verify Required Service Water to Emergency Diesel Generators 2.2.26 (3.7)

Knowledge of Refueling Administrative Requirements JPM: Determine if the Electrical System is aligned for Mode 6 ODeration 2.3.10 (3.3) Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and guard against personnel exposure JPM: 2.4.44 (4.1) Respond to a contaminated injured person Knowledge of Emergency Plan Protective Action Recommendations JPM: Make Protective Action Recommendations during a General Emergency NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required. - - - *Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; 5 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (N)ew or (M)odified from bank (2 1) (P)revious 2 exams (s 1; randomly selected) (S)imulator NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 ES-301 ~ A1 a Alb A2 A3 A4 Rev Final SRO Admin JPM Summary The operator will be required to calculate QPTR using 0-6.4. The initial conditions will be off normal in that one NIS PR Detector will be out of service and reactor power will be at 65%. QPTR will be high requiring the operator to take action in accordance with TS 3.2-4. This JPM will be accomplished on the Simulator. (Similar JPM exists in Facility Bank - JR015.001)

The operator, as part of the Daily Surveillance (0-6.13) will be directed to verify sufficient Service Water flow to the Emergency Diesel Generators. The Controlotron flow instrumentation will be unavailable requiring the operator to use Attachment 12, and Lake Temperature will be 69OF requiring that the candidate identify that the use of Attachment 14 is inappropriate. The operator should determine that the SW flow to the EDG is insufficient and declare the EDG inoperable in accordance with TS 3.8.1, and that both EDG coolers sets must be flushed. While in Mode 5, the operator will be directed to verify that the electrical system will support operation in Mode 6. The operator a copy of 0-15.1 (Step 6.1.6) marked up by the Outage Control Center.

The operator will determine that one full Electrical Distribution train is not operable in accordance with TS 3.8.10, and determine that the system must be made operable before Core Alterations can occur. This JPM will be accomplished on the Simulator. While operating at power, the operator will receive a report of an employee who received serious steam burns while performing RCS sampling activities.

The sampling system will be reported as stabilized and no radioactive releases are in progress. The operator will be expected to respond in accordance with A-7, and address the issue that the individual being transported to an off-site medical facility is contaminated. The operator will need to place an emergency response organization in place and determine which off site notifications must be made.

This JPM will be accomplished on the Simulator. The operator will be placed in a post-accident condition with a Large Break LOCA in Containment with a release from the Containment. The Emergency Plan is being implemented.

The operator will be given an emergency classification of General Emergency, the wind direction, and then asked to determine the PAR at Time = 0 (Le. Initial PAR) in a Time Critical setting of 15 minutes. Following the initial recommendation, two updates will be required (T=30 and T=60) where wind direction and projected dose assessments will change. (Similar JPMs exist in Facility Bank - JS340.003, 013, 015) NUREG-1021.

Revision 9 ES-301 Control RoomAn-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Final acilitv: Ginna Date of Examination:

8/27/07 ixam Level (circle one): SRO(I) / SRO (U) Operating Test No.: N07-1-1 :ontrol Room Systems" (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF) System / JPM Title I. 004 Chemical & Volume Control All Rods Not Fully Inserted

), 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Depressurize RCS Using Pzr Porvs on Nitrogen 005 Residual Heat Removal System Start Up the RHR System :. 1. 062 A.C. Electrical Distribution Transfer Instrument Bus B ?. 041 Steam Dump System Use Atmospheric Dump Valves to Cooldown in a SGTR :. 008 Component Cooling Water System Restore CCW to RHR 3. 026 Containment Spray System Manually Actuate Containment Spray

~ In-Plant Systems" (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U) Type Code* Safety 1 Function S, N, A 1 S, M, A 3 S, D, L c h. 004 Chemical &Volume Control Take Local Manual Control of Charging Pump i. 039 Main and Reheat Steam System Locally Operate the ARVs M, A, E 4s j. EPE 038 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Respond to SGTR Outside Control Room N, R. E 3 All RO and SRO-, conlroi room land in-plant) systems mLst be different and serve oillcrent safety fAcl ons all 5 SRO-U systems m4st SCNe d.llerent Safety fdnctions, in-planf SJStemS and fJnctlons may overlap those teste0 in the control room ~~ ~ NUREG-1021.

Revision 9 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D Facility:

GlNNA Scenario NO.: 1 Op Test No.: N07-1-1 1 I Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at approximately 48% power (BOL), with both A and B MFW Pumps operating.

Load was reduced due lo 'A MFW pump vibration.

Pump repairs have anticipated. been made, the pump has been tested and restarted, 1 and a Load Ascension is T..rnover.

The follow ng eqJ pmenl s O4l-Of-Service A EDG (Expected bacd in 4 ho~rs]. ana Conla nment Pressure cnannel PT-945 (The cnannel has Deen delealea per ER- lhST 1) ~ Event No. 1 Malf. No. Event 1 Type' 0 2% 1 .O (60 sec ramp) CVCIOA to I - RO, 0% SRO EDS04B (TS)- N - SRO, ROD02-J4 C - RO. RODOZ-JIO C-fl EDSO6 RPS07M C- and N N/A N/A Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm occurs 71 VCT Level Transminer (LT-112) Fails Low An Electrical Ground Fault occurs on Safeguards Bus 16 Load Decrease at l%/Minute.

Dropped Rod Second Dropped~ Contro! Rod occur during load decrease A Total Loss of On-Site Power occurs Steam Admission Valves on TDAFW Pump Fail to Open , .. ' Del& RO. SRO 1 The A EDG is restored to Automatically

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent. (M)ajor - - 1 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 :acility:

GINNA Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N07-1-2 Ixaminers:

Operators:

iitial Conditions:

The Plant is at 100% power Steady-State (BOL), and been for the last 9 days following Refueling Outage.

urnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

A MDAFW Pump (Expected back in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />), Steam Flow channel FT-475 (The channel has been defeated per ER- INST.1) and MCB Annunciator J-8 has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (I&C is investigating).

Type* RMS02B (TS) - SRO (TS) - SRO I E;;; I 3 I NIA I R-RO lM 6 SlSOl I (0-A) 7 1 RPSOSNB C-RO, I BOP 8 I FDWllA I C-BOP NB Event Description R-12 fails hiqh. A Small SG Tube Leak

(.4 gpm) develops on B SG Rapid Down Power. Uncontrolled Automatic Rod motion occurs Pzr level Fails High. Inadvertent Safety Injection.

ATWS - AutomaticlManual Pushbutton Reactor Trip blocked - Manual Trip Received.

B MDAFW Pump fails to auto start and then trips shortly after manual start. TDAFW Pump trips on overspeed.

SAW Flow Transmitters are isolated resulting in pump run out of SAFW Pump. (Pumps trips c 60 seconds after start).

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

-1.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ~ Event Type* Event Description C (TS)-SRO N2 Leak on E Accumulator

acility: Ginna Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.:

N07-1-4 fxaminers: Operators:

I-SRO 1 I-BOP C-BOP 1 C-SRO 1" Stage Pressure Transmitter Fails Low "A" FRV Controller fails causing valve to Close nitial Conditions:

1 R-RO Rapid Downpower LBOP N - SRO, C-RO Misaligned Rod rurnover: , C(TS) - SRO M C-RO Loss of Instrument Bus C (causing SI) AI6 SI Pumps fail to Auto Start SIS43 I 4 1 TUR05H 4 ROD03 7 1 EDS07C RPS07 RCSl9D The Plant is at 100% power Steady-State (BOL), and has been for the last 9 days following Refueling Outage. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

A MDAFW Pump (Expected back in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />), Containment Pressure channel PT-945 (The channel has been defeated pel ER-INST.l) and MCB Annunciator J-8 has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (I&C is investigating).

C-BOP I Hiah Vibrations on Main Turbine NA I Check Valve CV-8538 fails causing intersystem LOCA iorin Laruso - wnna txam From: John Caruso To: mdsl Date: 08/30/2007 3:44:17 PM

Subject:

Ginna Exam Marvin, Two things I wanted to share with you and the Branch regarding our Ginna exam administration this week 1) When we were administering our 3rd scenario, the operator was a little slow at controlling a FRV controller failure and the plant tripped prematurely. This resulted in skipping over 3 planned malfunctions (i.e., the SRO applicant was short one TS and one malfunction as a result). We continued to run the scenario to the end since the malfunctions had no direct affect on the major transient and remainder of the sceanrio.

Gil made a very good suggestion for recovery to just go back and start the scenario over again with the same set-up and we just ran the 3 previously missed malfunctions.

In essence, we ran the same scenario in two parts.

There was no need to run the spare scenario.

2) Since we didn't use the spare scenario, I asked Fred Guenther if it would be appropriate to withhold it from the exam record in ADAMS, so that the licensee could re-use this on a future exam. Fred suggested it would be okay, if I put a note to file explaining the circumstances that the spare scenario was not used and the licensee wishes to use it for afuture qxam. It had no bearing the exam outcome and it saves the licensee future resources.
  1. 25 /$ J- cc: bchl; dms3; gxj; jcs5; jmd; pap3; rrm2; sxg; thf