05000286/FIN-2011008-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | lnappropriate Interim Compensatory Measure for Service Water Strainer Backwash Function |
| Description | The team identified a Green, Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3 Operating License Condition 2.H, in that Entergy did not establish an appropriate interim compensatory measure for several fire areas where 10 CFR 50 Appendix R paragraph lll.G.2 fire protection deficiencies associated with the fire protection of service water (SW) strainer motors and backwash valves existed. Specifically, Entergy in response to Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2006-10, Regulatory Expectations with Appendix R Paragraph lll.G.2 Operator Manual Actions, dated June 30, 2006, identified on September 5, 2006, that operator manual actions (OMAs) were being utilized in several fire areas instead of the fire protection options specified in paragraph lll.G.2 and without an exemption from the NRC staff. For fire areas that potentially impacted the electrical circuits to the SW strainers, Entergy continued to maintain the OMA to manually backwash SW strainers as an interim compensatory measure while seeking NRC staff approval through the exemption process. The team identified that the interim compensatory measure was inappropriate because it was too complex and beyond the limited scope of an OMA to achieve and maintain postfire hot shutdown. Entergy entered the Unit 3 SW strainer OMA issue into its corrective action program for long term resolution as condition report CR-IP3-2011- 02951 and promptly established an hourly fire watch in fire areas where SW strainer circuits may be affected. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the External Factors attribute (fire) of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected its objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the reliability of SW was not ensured for fire scenarios that damage circuits to the SW strainer motor or backwash valve. The team evaluated this issue using Phase 1 of IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process (SDP), and determined that the issue screened to Green because a low degradation factor was assigned. The team assigned a low degradation factor because although the manual actions were beyond the scope of an OMA and Entergy did not appropriately evaluate feasibility, the team determined several hours would likely exist to complete the action before strainer differential pressure (d/p) challenged SW flow to the emergency diesel generators and the OMA would be successful to maintain adequate SW flow. The team determined that this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution associated with the attribute of the corrective action program because Entergy personnel did not thoroughly evaluate necessary considerations associated with the Unit 3 SW strainer OMA. Specifically, Entergy walked down all OMAs on May 20, 2011, to evaluate feasibility but did not identify issues related to incomplete pre-staged tools, an OMA procedure with steps associated with normal maintenance conditions that would delay implementation, and control room annunciator circuits that may be affected by the fire. |
| Site: | Indian Point  |
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| Report | IR 05000286/2011008 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Metzger D Orr J Lilliendahl J Rady J Rogge R Fuhrmeister |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000286/2011008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2011Q2
Self-Identified List (Indian Point)
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