ML20247E481
| ML20247E481 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1989 |
| From: | Galanis D, Meister J, Murskyj M SARGENT & LUNDY, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247A248 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8909150292 | |
| Download: ML20247E481 (23) | |
Text
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SARGENT & LUNDY
, -.: , ENGINEERS CH8CAGO i
Project No. 8484-35 ]
Connonwealth Edison Company Braidwood Station - Units 1 & 2 Supplement 1 to S&L Report Dated June 30, 1989 Response to NRC Concern f4o. 8-Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Control Circuits Terminated at flarathon 1600 NUC Terminal Blocks 1
Prepared by: J. R. fleister - PMED D. P. Galanis - EPED M. P. Murskyj - EPED Date: July 11, 1989 9909150292 890713 PDR ADOCK 05000456 O PDR
.S ARGENT. & LUNDY
'*J . ENGINEER 5' CHIC AGO v
Table of Contents Section Page 1.0. Background / Purpose............ .............................. 1 2.0' Sunnary of Additional Information Presented to the NRC i n t he Ju ly 6, 1989 fleet i ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3.0 New Analysis / Review Requested by the NRC for the Control Lircuits Subject to HELB Environment Outside Containment..... 2 3.1 Outside Containment Safe Shutdown Equipment and Cable Assessment........................................ 3 3.2 Functional Review of Affected Control ~ Circuits .... ...... 3 4.0 Conc 1usion................................................... 4
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h_ SARGENT & LUNDY
') L EN GlN E E R S CHIC ACO -
.i Commonwealth Edison Company l
Braidwood Station - Units 1 & 2 L
Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Control Circuits Terminated at Marathon 1600 !!UC Termnal Blocks 4
1.0 Background / Purpose On July' 6,1989, a meeting was held between the Nuclear Regulatory )
Commission (NRC), Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO), and Sargent & Lundy (S&L), to discuss S&L's analysis of the Class 1E control circuits terminated at Marathon 1600 NUC terminal blocks (reference S&L's report dated June 30,1989) and respond to any additional NRC concerns.
The purpose of this report is (a) to document the additional information presented to the NRC in the above meeting, and (b) to provide the results of the new analysis / review requested by the NRC for the control circuits outside containment that are subject to HELB environmental conditions.
2.0 Summary.of Additional Information Presented to the NRC in the July 6, 1989 Meeting The main NRC concern raised during the meeting was the degree to which the Wyle test specimen configuration simulates the actual installed conditions. Specifically, they questioned whether the cumulative water / chemical spray flow into the terminal box"., is om the various pull
- boxes in the conduit system could be greater than that experienced in the test. The NRC was petticularly interested in (a) the quantity of the affected control circuits that performed a truly safety-related (post LOCA or safe shutdown) function, (b) the specific installed configuration of the pull boxes and condue system associated with these control circuits, and (c) the dep ee of the available design margin (i.e., the magnitude of leakage currents in excess of the worst case leakage current test value of 290 mA these circuits could tolerate and still perform their intended safety function).
Attachment A includes diagrams presenting the above information requested by the NRC. The following can be seen from the diagrams:
A. The control circuits for 191 terminal boxes subject to LOCA/HELB environment were evaluated based on the worst case 290 mA leakage current test value and were found to be acceptable relative to both inadvertent device operation and circuit fuse rating. Sixty-five (65) of these terminal boxes were located within the containment while the remaining 126 terminal boxes were located in auxiliary building areas subject to HELB environment.
B. A total of 67 control circuits terminated within the 65 containment terminal boxes were further reviewed to identify the aveilable design margin and the nature of the safety function they performed. This additional review revealed the following:
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A SARGENT & LUNDY-E N GIN E E RG CHICAGO o For 37. control circuits, no potential (voltage) difference exists between adjacent terminal block points or to ground during a LOCA and, therefore, no leakage currents are possible. This is typically because an ESF actuation contact opens to deenergize the terminal box portion of the control circuit early in the LOCA and thus eliminate the possibility .of leakage currents between adjacent terminal block points and/or to ground. For example, the.
Pressurizer Relief Tank Primary Water Supply Isolation Valve 1RY8028 closes upon receipt of a containment isolation signal by deenergiling the control circuit solenoid.
o Twenty-two (22) control circuits do not perform a safety-related (post LOCA or safe shutdown) function. Examples of such circuits are the Loop Stop Valve control circuits (power locked out in modes 1, 2, and 3) and the Component Cooling Supply Valve to Penetration Cooling.
o The remaining eight (8) control circuits terminated at junction boxes 1/2JB202R and 1/2JB244R are those that perform a truly safety-related function. They are associated with the Containment Sump Isolation Valves and the RHR Heat Exchanger to Charging Pump Isolation Valves. However, it can be seen from Attachment "A" that their installed pull box and/or conduit system configuration is conservatively enveloped by the Wyle test configuration. In addition, there is substantial design margin available for these circuits in each potential leakage path. The minimum margin is 1451 raA/ path or 500% for inadvertent device operation and 571 mA/ path or 197% for fuse size.
3.0 New Analysis / Review Requested by the NRC for Control Circuits Subject to HELB Environment Outside Containment A. similar review (as that described in Section 2.B above for the containment) was not performed for the control circuits in the terminal boxes subject to HELB conditions outside containment, because of the conservatism involved in the analysis performed. Specifically, (a) the LOCA maximum leakage current test value of 290 mA was used to demonstrate acceptability of these circuits, (b) the 290 mA leakage current value was from teruinal block test specimens that were subjected to two LOCA exposures, and (c) the contrast in the LOCA leakage current (290 mA) used in the analysis as opposed to the Zion HELB test value (10 nA) implies a margin of 2800%.
However, another concern raised by the NRC during the meeting was the degree to which the LOCA test envelopes the environment resulting from a HELB outside containment. Specifically, the NRC questioned whether the cumulative water flow into the terminal boxes from the various pull boxes and the conduit system in the auxiliary building could be greater than that experienced in the LOCA test, due to condensation and direct water / steam impingement from a HELB outside containment. In addition, the NRC requested that we (a) identify the quantity of the control circuits that perform a truly safety-related function during the HELB, (b) review each specific installed configuration of these circuits to ensure it is enveloped by the Wyle test configuration, and (c) quantify the available design margin, as was done for the contrci circuits inside
! containment.
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SARGENT & LUNDY E N GIN EK R9 CHICAGO .
3.1. Outside Containment Safe Shutdown Equipment and Calle Assessment
.The evaluation of the terminal blocks in HELB areas outside containment takes into account the Outside Containment Safe Shutdown Equ'ipment and Cable Assessment. This assessment utilized a hazard zone approach to examine the HELB effects on safe shutdown equipnent and' cables. For many HELB zones, the evaluation assumes.
conservatively, that all safe shutdowr equipment, instrumentation, and cables located within the zone are incapacitated by the HELB and demonstrates the ability to safely shutdown the plant. Cont rol circuit terminal blocks located in these areas of the plant are eliminated from further consideration in this evaluation based on the HELB assessnent. In addition, the conduit system pull boxes for cables located in HELB areas where the conservative assumption addressed above does not apply, were evaluated for potential water / steam spray intrusion based on the zones of influence from the HELBs defined in the assessnent. Their associated junction boxes containing Class 1E terminal blocks outside the HELB zones of influence-were also eliminated from consideration.
Based on the results of'the above analysis /revicw, we identified a total of 53 terminal boxes that nust be further evaluated relative to their safety function. The results of that review are summarized below.
3.2 Functional Review of Affected Control Circuits Attachment B includes diagrans presenting the results of the additional review requested by the NRC for the terminai boxes identified based on the above HELB analysis / review. The following can be seen from the diagrans: ,
o A total of 88 control circuits, terminated within the 53 junction boxes subject to HELB environment, were evaluated relative to their safety function.
o For 70 control circuits, no potential (voltage) difference exists between adjacent terminal block points or to ground during a HELB .
l (for the same reason as that previously described for the !
containment circuits).
t l o Ten (10) control circuits do not perform a safety-related (post PELB or safe shutdown) function.
l-i o The remaining 8 contral circuits terminated at junction boxes IJB1735A, IJB1738A, IJB1849A,1/2JB099A,1/2JB1734A, 2JB057A, l
2JB100A, and 2JB105A are those required for safe shutdown. They are associated with the Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valves (1/2SD054B, D, E, H) and the Reactor Coolant Loop to Residual Heat Renoval Pump Isolation Valves (1/2RH8701B). However , it can be seen from Attachment B that their installed pull box and/or conduit system configuration is conservatively enveloped by the Wyle test configuration. In addition, there is substantial design l'
margin available for these circuits in each potential leakaae e _
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SARGENT & LUNDY E N G1W E E R S CHICAGO path, see Attachment C.- The mininun margin available for any of these circuits is (a) 116 nA/ path (or 812 nA total for the seven potential leakage paths) relative to fuse size fo the Stean Generator Blowdown Isolation Valves, and (b) the e are no potential leakage paths relative to inadvertent operation of a device.
The 812 cA nargin relative to the fuse size in the Stean Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve control circuits is further substantiated based on the systen design / function of these valves. The ,
temperature switch circuits are installed for the purpose of i identifying the high. energy line break and closing the associated i containment isolation valves. An evaluation of the HELB that activates the temperature switch revealed that the temperature switch setpoint is reached in approximately two seconds isolating the high energy line break. After the steam flow is isolated the environment will decay back to ambient. This transient is enveloped by the Wyle test.
4.0 Conclusion In view of the above, it has been demonstrated that the installed Braidwood Station Class IE control circuits, subject to LOCA/HELB environment, will perform their intended safety function with substantial nargin.
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SARGENT E LUNDY Attachment A Pege 1 of 5
, See Section 2.0 of July 11,1989 Report l
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65 containment junction 191 junction boxes 126 auxillary building !
boxes with terminal blocks + evaluated using 290 mA & Junction boxes with test value terminal blocks All circuits acceptable 1I 22 circults knctionally 65 junction boxes 37 circuits have no not required & (67 circuits)
+ potential for leakage in containment evalus'.ed current 1or margin and function lf 8 circuits have real 1/2JB244R safety function +
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1/2JB202R to tray-no pull boxes j 1/2JB244R lI 1JB202R 2 pull boxes 102 ft 2JB202R Bottom / side entry wasscot or so
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