ML17348A765
| ML17348A765 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/27/1990 |
| From: | FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17348A764 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9012060173 | |
| Download: ML17348A765 (40) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 AND 4 BORIC ACID CONCENTRATION REDUCTION PROJECT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS MARK-UP Attachment 2 NOVEMBER, 1990 9012060173 9'01127 PDR ADOCK 05000250 P PDC
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Technical S ecification Inserts Insert A:
..:EOL peak xenon conditions without letdown such that boration occurs only during the makeup provided for coolant contraction. This requirement can be met for a range of boric acid concentrations in the boric acid tank and the refueling water storage tank. The range of boric acid tanks requirements is defined by Technical Specification 3. 1.2.5.
Insert B: ...requirement of 55'F and corresponding surveillance intervals... Insert C: The temperature limit of
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55'F includes a 5'F margin over the 50'F solubility limit of 3.5 wt.% boric acid. Portable instrumentation may be used to measure the
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temperature of the rooms containing boric acid sources and flow paths. Insert D: ACTION times allow for an orderly sequential shutdown of both units when the inoperability of a component(s) affects both units with equal severity. When a single unit is affected, the time to be in HOT STANDBY is 6 hours. When an ACTION statement requires a dual unit shutdown, the time to be in HOT STANDBY is 12 hour s. Insert E: ...by verifying that the temperature of the rooms containing flow path components is greater than or equal to 55'F when a flow path from the boric acid tanks is used
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Insert f: Verifying that the temperature of .the boric acid tanks room is greater than or equal to 55'F, when it is the source of borated water.
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3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4. 1. 1 BORATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T GREATER THAN 200 F av LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to the applicable value shown in Figure 3.1-1. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, 3, and 4. ACTION: With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than the applicable value shown in Figure 3.1-1, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 14 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to boron or, equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored. e.o w%(szAs g~) SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS
- 4. l. l. l. 1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to the applicable value shown in Figure 3. 1-1:
- a. Within 1 hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable.
If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s);
- b. When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with Keffff greater than or equal to 1 at- is
, least once per 12 hours by verifying that control bank withdrawal within the limits of Specification 3. 1. 3. 6;
- c. When in MODE 2 with Keff less than 1, within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3. 1.3.6;
- d. Prior to initial operation above 5X RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of Speci fication
- 4. 1. 1. 1. le. below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3. 1.3.6; and "See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3. 10. 1.
TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8; 4 3/4 1-1 AMENDMENT NOS.l37 AND 132
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~ REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 200 F av LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1X Ak/k.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 5. ACTION: lb With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1X Dk/k, immediately initiate and continue boration at great than or equal to gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to boron or, equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restore . a.o w'/, (same 3 SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1X nk/k:
- a. Within 1 hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable.
If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s); and
- b. At least once per 24 hours by consideration of the following factors:
- 1) Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,
- 2) Control rod position,
- 3) Reactor Coolant System average temperature,
- 4) Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
- 5) 'enon concentration, and
- 6) Samarium concentration.
TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8: 4 3/4 1-4 AMENDMENT NOS.137AND 132
Bl.".~) 4)'d-A O.F H ~ REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4. 1. 2 BORATION SYSTEMS FLOW PATH - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source: a A flow path from the boric acid storage tanks via a boric acid
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transfer pump and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the boric acid storage tank in Specification 3. 1.2.4a. is OPERABLE, or
- b. The flow path from the refueling water storage tank via a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the refueling water storage tank in Specification 3. 1.2.4b. is OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6. ACTION: e With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS
- 4. 1.2. 1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At legs once er 7 da s by verifying that the temperature of the at trace por >on of t e flow path is greater than or equal to 145'F when a flow path from the boric acid tanks is use , and
- b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
MusEKf TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8: 4 3/4 1-8 AMENDMENT NOS. 137AND l32
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~ REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS
- OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1 2.2
~ The following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:
- a. The source path from a'oric acid storage tank via a boric acid transfer pump to the charging pump suction*, and
- b. At least one of the two source paths from the refueling water storage tank to the charging pump suction; and,
- c. The flow path from the charging pump discharge to the Reactor Coolant System via the regenerative heat exchanger.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION:
- a. With no boration source path from a boric acid storage tank OPERABLE, 1 ~ Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the second source path from the refueling water storage tank to the charging pump suction by verifying the flow path valve alignment; and
- 2. Restore the boration source path from a boric acid storage tank to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1X hk/k at 200'F within the next 6 hours; restore the boration source path from a boric acid storage tank to OPERABLE status within the next 72 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.
With only one bor'ation source path OPERABLE or the regenerative heat exchanger flow path to the RCS inoperable, restore the required flow paths to OPERABLE status'ithin 72 hours or be in at least HOT
. STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1X b,k/k at 200'F within the next 6 hours; restore at least two source paths to OPERABLE status within the next 72 hours or
'oration be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.
- c. With the boration source path from a boric acid storage tank and the charging pump discharge path via the regenera'tive heat exchanger inoperable, within one hour initiate boration to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to 1X Dk/k at 200'F and go to COLD SHUTDOWN as soon as, possible within the limitations of the boration and pressurizer level control functions of the CVCS.
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~The flow require in pec>fica >on 3.1.2.2.a above shall, be isolated from the other unit TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8 3/4 1-9 AMENDMENT NOS.137AND 132
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.1.2.2 The above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: 1
- a. At least once er 7 da s by
- b. At least once per 31 days by verifyihg that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, .is in its correct position;
- c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that the fl w path required by Specification 3. 1.2.2a. and c. delivers at least pm to the RCS.
0 TURKEY'OINT - UNITS 3 8: 4 3/4 1-10 AMENDMENT NOS.l37AND l32
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~ REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCE - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
- 3. 1.2.4 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:
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- a. A Boric Acid Storage System with:
- 1) A minimum indicated borated water volume of
- 2) 'A boron concentration between and 3)
- b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:
- 1) A minimum indicated borated water volume of 20,000 gallons,
- 2) A minimum boron concentration of 1950 ppm, and
- 3) A minimum solution temperature of 39~F.
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ACTION: tc.~$ eaaC ac o~ as With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS
- 4. 1.2.4 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per' days by:
- 1) '. Verifying the boron concentration of the water,
- 2) Verifying the indicated borated water volume, and 3)
TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 6: 4 3/4 1-12 AMENDMENT NOS.137AND 132
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- REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
- 3. 1.2.5 The following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:
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- a. A Boric Acid Storage System with:
- 1) A minimum indicated borated water volume
- 2) A boron concentration , 00-p and 0
- 3) 'cn accouJlanco
- b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with: co@ %%'uo~
- 1) A minimum indicated borated water volume of 320,000 gallons,
- 2) A minimum boron concentration of 1950 ppm,
- 3) A minimum solution temperature of 39 F, and e 4)
APPLICABILITY: A maximum MODES solution temperature of 100'F. 1, 2, 3, and 4. P c,Cncncncn tm)L oraaccc, ccCcacc'cL.'tanks acccccn O'JI ~ With the required Boric Acid Storage System inoperable verify that the RWST is OPERABLE; restore the system to OPERABLE status wigh'n 72 hours or be in at least MOT STANDBY within the next 6 hourWand borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least B Dkl/k at 200'F; restore the Boric Acid Storage System to OPERABLE status within the next 72 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.
- b. With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least MOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours, (pli4 I Loacc asia tanK. cnYcniacccf caccccn~~'Og
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Figure 3. 1.2.5 EIORIC ACID TANK MINIMUM VOLUME ('I) Modes 1,2,3 and 4 l. 15,000 15 Acceptable Tw'o Unit Operation U 13,200 C U 0 l 1,800:, Acce p table One Unit Operation (2) I 10,400 0 10 I- 9,500 Unacceptable 8 800
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E E 3.25 wt.% 3.5 wt.% >3.5 3, 0 wt.% WT.M (52 45ppm) (5682ppm) (6119pprn) BAT Inventory Concentration Minimum Acceptable Minimum Acceptable Two Unit Operation One Unit Operation Notes: (1) Combined volume of all available boric acid tanks assuming RWST boron concentration greater than or equal to 1950 p pm. (2) Includes 2900 gallons for shutdown unit. 3/4 1 14 a
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS e SURVEILLANCE RE UIRE51ENTS
- 4. l. 2. 5 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 7,days by:
- 1) Verifying the boron concentration in the water,
- 2) Verifying the indicated borated water volume of the water source, and 3)
- b. By verifying the R'4'ST temperature is within limits whenever the outside air temperature is less than 39'F or greater than 100'F at the following frequencies:
- 1) Mithin one hour upon the outside temperature exceeding its limit for 23 consecutive hours, and
- 2) At least once per 24 hours while the outside temperature exceeds its limits.
TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 6 4 3/4 1-15 AMENDMENT NOS. l37AND l32
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~ REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS HEAT TRACING. LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (0'. 1.2.6 At least two independent channels of heat tracing shall be OPERABLE for the boric acid storage tank and for the heat traced portions of the associated flow paths required by Specification 3. 1.2.2. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 h10DES 5 and 6 (when the boric acid storage tank is the borated water source per Specification 3. 1.2.4) ACTION: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 With only one channel of heat tr acing on either the boric acid storage tank or on the heat traced portion of an associated flow path OPERABLE, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided the tank and flow path temperatures are verified to be greater than or equal to 145'F at least once per 8 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. h10DES 5 and 6 e With only one channel of heat tracing on either the boric acid storage tank or on the heat traced portion of an associated flow path OPERABLE, operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions may continue*for up to 30 days provided the tank and flow path temperatures are verified to be greater than .or equal to 145'F at least once per 8 hours; otherwise, suspend all activities involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes. SURVEILLANCE RE UIRE11ENTS
- 4. 1.2.6 Each heat tracing channel for the boric acid stor g 'ank and associated. flow path required by Specification 3. 1.2.2 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At, least once per 31 days by energizing each heat tracing channel, and
- b. At least once per 7 days by verifying the tank and flow path temperatures to be greater than or equal to 145'F. The tank temperature shall be determined by measurement. The flow path
. temperature shall be determined by either measurement or recirculation flow unti l establishment of equilibrium temperatures within the tank.
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J t 3/4. 9 3/4.9. 1 REFUELING OPERATIONS BORON CONCENTRATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met; either:
- a. A K ff of eff 0.95 or less, or
- b. A boron concentration of greater than or equal to 1950 ppm.
A APPLICABILITY: MODE 6. ACTION: With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivit changes and initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal t gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to oron or i s equivalent until Keff ff is reduced to less than or eq a o .95 or the boron concentration is restored to greater than or equal to 1950 m whichever is the more restrictive. SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 8 OQIt."J.s (StAS ~) 4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to:
- a. Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and
- b. Withdrawal of any full-length control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor vessel.
4.9. 1.2 The boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours.
- 4. 9. 1. 3 Valves isolating unbor ated water sources"" shall be verified closed and secured in position by mechanical stops or by removal of air or electrical power- at least once per 31 days.
- 4. 9. 1.4 The spent fuel pit boron concentration sh'all be determined at least once per 31 days.
"The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed. **The primary water supply to the boric acid blender may be opened under administrative controls for makeup.
TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8 4 3/4 9-1 AMENDMENT NOS.137AND 132
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3/4. 10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4. 10. 1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of control rod worth and SHUTDOWN MARGIN provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated control rod worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE control rod(s). APPLICABILITY: MODE 2. ACTION: a0 With any full"length control rod not fully inserted and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal m of a solution containing greater than or equal to or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required
'oron by Specification 3. 1. 1. 1 is restored.
With all full-length control rods fully inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than, the above reactivity 'equivalent, immedi-tely initiate and continue boration at greater than or e ual to pm of a solution containing greater than or equal to oron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requir Specification 3. 1. 1.1 is restored. B.p bi% i~z4s H ~l SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.10.1.1 The position of each full"length control rod either partially or fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours.
- 4. 10. 1.2 Each full-length control rod not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50K withdrawn position within 24 hours prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of.
Specification 3.1.1.1. TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8L 4 3/4 10-1 AMENDMENT NOS 3.37 AND 132
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3/4. 1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4. 1. 1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that: (1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transients asso-ciated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition. SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T . The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T at no load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncon-trolled 'RCS cooldown. Figure 3. 1-1 shows the SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to . 1.77K bk/k at the end-of-core-life with respect to an uncontrolled cooldown. Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions. With T less than 200'.F, the reactivity transients resulting from an inadvertent cooldown of the RCS or an inadvertent dilution of RCS boron 'mal and a 3X hk/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN provides ade te protection. +,~ ~>, g~+p~) The boron rate requirement of gpm of boron or equivalent ensures the capability to restore the shutdown margin with one OPERABLE charging pump. 3/4. 1.1. 3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT The limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to ensure that the value of this coefficient remains within the limiting condition assumed in the FSAR accident and transient analyses. The MTC values of this specification are applicable to a specific set of plant conditions; accordingly, verification of MTC values at conditions other than those explicitly stated will require extrapolation to those conditions in order to permit an accurate comparison. The most negative MTC, value equivalent to the most positive moderator density coefficient (MDC), was obtained by incrementally correcting the MDC used in the FSAR analyses to nominal operating conditions. These corrections TURKEY'POINT " UNITS 3 8T 4 B 3/4 1-1 AMENDMENT NOS 137 AND 132
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued) involved subtracting the incremental change in the MDC associated with a core condition of all rods inserted (most positive MDC) to an all rods withdrawn condition and, a conversion for the rate of change of moderator density with temperature at RATED THERMAL POWER conditions. This value of the MDC was then transformed into the limiting MTC value -3. 5 x 10-4 b,k/k/'F. The MTC value of -3.0 x 10-4 hk/k/'F represents a conservative value (with corrections for burnup and soluble boron) at a core condition of 300 ppm equilibrium boron concentration and is obtained by making these corrections to the limiting MTC value of 3 5 x 10 4 >k/k/oF The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup. 3/4. 1. 1. 4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 541'F. This limitation is required to ensure: (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within it analyzed temperature range, (2) the trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum RTNDT. temperature. 3/4.-1. 2 BORATION SYSTEMS The Boron Injection System ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to erform this function include: (1) borated water sources 2 char ing u s, 3 separa e f ow pat s 4 boric acid transfer pumps With the RCS average temperature above 200'F, a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. One flow path from the charging pump discharge is acceptable since the flow path components subject to an active failure are upstream of the charging pumps. TURKEY'POINT - UNITS 3 5 4 B 3/4 1-2 AMENDMENT NOS.137 AND 132
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v REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued) The boration flow path specification allows the RWST and the boric acid storage tank to be the boron sources. Due to the lower boron concentration in the RWST, borating the RCS from this source is less effective than borating from the boric acid tank and additional time may be required to achie e the desired SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by ACTION statement restrictions. The ACTION statement restrictions for the boration flow paths allow continued operation in mode 1 for a limited time period with either boration source flow path or the normal flow path to the RCS (via the regenerative heat exchanger) inoperable. In this case, the plant capability to borate and charge into the RCS is limited and the potential operational impact of this limitation on mode 1 operation must be addressed. With both the flow path
.fr'om the boric acid tanks and the regenerative heat exchanger flow path inoperable, immediate initiation of action to go to COLD SHUTDOWN is required but no time is specified for the mode reduction due to the reduced plant capability with these flow paths inoperable.
Two charging pumps are required to be OPERABLE to ensure single unctional capabs 1 y sn t e event an assumed fail re e ders one of the pumps or power su plies inoper ble.
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Emergency Diesel transformer. enera or us sup o ac4, the ying the offsite grid pumps can be through ~ ed rom es her tartup the The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN in accordance with Figure 3.1-1 from expected operating conditions after xenon decay and cooldown to 200'F. The maximum expected bor tion capabilit re uirement occur s
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at es.a~ I%i~ mum~ A With the RCS temperature below 200'F, one boron injection source flow path is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single boron injection system source flow path becomes inoperable. The boron capability required below 200'F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1X hk/k after xenon ecay and cooldown from 200'F to 140'F. This condition requires eithe allons of from the boric acid storage tanks or , 0 gallons o 95 ppm borated water from the RWST. 4(get s o wt'f. g[(s)+) Lomtug+ot[[, ).[a. uv <t TURKEY POINT.-- UNITS 3 8[ 4 B 3/4 1"3 AMENDMENT NOS3.37 AND 132
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n REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued) The charging pumps are demonstrated to be OPERABLE by testing as required by Section XI of the ASME code or by specific surveillance requirements in the specification. These requirements are adequate to determine OPERABILITY, because no safety analysis assumption relating to the charging pump. performance is more restrictive than these acceptance criteria for the pumps. The boron concentration of the RWST in conjunction with manual addition of borax ensures that the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA will be basic. The basic solution minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The temperature requirements for the RWST are based on the containment integrity and large break LOCA analysis assumptions. The OPERABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in mdiv 8 The OPERABILITY associa e with the boric acid tank s e ensures t at the so ubility of the oron solution will be maintained. mQs~y Q (+)One channel of heat tracing is sufficient to maintain the specified temperature limit. Since one channel of heat tracing is sufficient to maintain the specified temperature> operation with one channel out-of-service is permitted for a period of 30 days provided additional temperature surveillance is performed.. 3/4. 1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that: (1) acceptable power distri-bution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTOOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to are'imited. determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits continue. OPERABLE condition for the analog rod position indicators is defined as being capable of indicating rod position to within 212 steps of the demand counter position. For the Shutdown Banks and Control Banks A and B, the Position Indication requirement is defined as the group demand counter indicated position between 0 and 30 steps withdrawn inclusive, and between 200 and 228 steps withdrawn inclusive. This permits the operator to verify that the control rods in these banks are either fully withdrawn or fully inserted, the normal operating modes for these banks. Knowledge of these bank positions in these two areas satisfies all accident analysis assumptions concerning their position. For Control Banks C and 0, the, Position Indication requirement is defined as the group demand counter indicated position between 0 and 228 steps withdrawn inclusive. (4 c it no lewis
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3/4. 9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9. 1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity condi tions during REFUELING ensure that: (1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses. Mith the required valves c]osed during refueling operations the possibility of uncontrolled boron dilution of the filled portion of the RCS is precluded. This action prevents flow to the RCS of unborated water by closing flo paths f sources of unborated water. The boration rate requirement of pm of boron or equivalent'nsures the capability to restore th SHU ARGIN with one OPERABLE charging pump. 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core. There are four source range'eutron flux channels, two primary and two backup. All four .channels have visual and alarm indication in the control room and interface with the containment evacuation alarm system. '-The"primary source range neutron flux channels can also generate reactor trip signals and provide audible'ndication of the count rate in the control room and containment. At least one primary source range neutron flux channel to provide the required audible indication, in addition to its other functions, and one of the three remaining source range channels shall be OPERABLE to satisfy the LCO. 3/4,9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. 3/4. 9. 4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive'material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential whi'le in the REFUELING MODE. 3/4. 9. 5 COMMUN I CATIONS The-requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core react'ivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS. TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8 4 B 3/4 9-1 AMENDMENT NOS.137 AND 132
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