Information Notice 1992-13, Inadequate Control Over Vehicular Traffic at Nuclear Power Plant Sites

Inadequate Control Over Vehicular Traffic at Nuclear Power Plant Sites

ML031200669
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	02/18/1992
From:	Rossi C E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-92-013, NUDOCS 9202110001
Download: ML031200669 (9)

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 18, 1992 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE 92-13: INADEQUATE

CONTROL OVER VEHICULAR

TRAFFIC AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITES

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees

to continuing

problems resulting

from the failure of some licensees

to maintain adequate control over vehicular

traffic at their plants.These licensees

failed to follow established

administrative

procedures

related to the use of self-propelled

cranes. Their failures resulted in unnecessary

challenges

to safety systems and threatened

the health and safety of plant personnel.

It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description

of Circumstances

Diablo Canyon Unit 1: On March 7, 1991, during a refueling

outage, the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, experienced

a total loss of offsite power (LOOP). The event was caused when an electrical

flashover

occurred between a 500 kV transmission

line and the boom of a mobile crane. The boom was positioned

approximately

three feet from the transmission

line. At the time of the event, power to plant loads was being supplied from offsite by back-feeding

through the main output transformer

from the 500 kV switchyard.

Two standby startup transformers, the normal sources of offsite power to the plant, had been removed from service for scheduled

maintenance.

The flashover

caused protective

relaying to actuate to isolate the faulted line and, as a result, offsite power to plant loads was interrupted.

All three emergency

diesel generators

started and loaded successfully.

Operation of the residual heat removal system was restored within about 1 minute. The temperature

of the core did not increase.

No radiological

release resulted.The fault did not affect Diablo Canyon, Unit 2, which was operating

at full power.Palo Verde Unit 3: On November 15, 1991, while the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating

a ion , was shutdown in hot standby, the boom of a 35-ton truck-mounted

AAClec on 2/1 9 lJ-I CL-

..... I N 9 2 -1 3 February 18, 1992 crane made contact with one of two 13.8 kV offsite power feeder lines located in the plant's protected

area. The crane was being used to replace the "A" phase bushing on the main output transformer.

The original bushing had been damaged by lightning

a day earlier. Prior to final installation

and after high voltage testing had been completed, the bushing was returned to its shipping cask. The crane operator shut down the crane motor and engaged one of several braking devices on the crane boom. The crane operator then exited the crane cab to discuss replacement

procedures

with other maintenance

personnel.

A wind gust caused the boom of the crane to rotate and contact one of the phases of the 13.8 kY feeder. The feeder was transmitting

power from the startup trans-former to various vital and non-vital

loads in the "A" train. The electrical

fault current which was generated

was not of sufficient

magnitude

to cause protective

devices to actuate because the crane had not been grounded as required by plant procedure.

Therefore, the feeder remained energized

and the fault current initiated

small asphalt fires in the areas where the crane's front outrigger

pads made ground contact. The rear outrigger

pads were not extended.The maintenance

foreman (the foreman) contacted

the shift supervisor

and incorrectly

identified

the "B" train feeder as being faulted. The shift supervisor

opened the supply circuit breaker for the "B" train feeder before the foreman could correct his misstatement.

Electrical

power was interrupted

to non-vital

loads, including

two of four reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). Power to vital train "B" loads was momentarily

interrupted

but was reestablished

following-the

successful

start and Toa-din-g

of the train "B" emergency

diesel generator (EDG).The correct "A" feeder was subsequently

deenergized, resulting

in the start and loading of the "A" EDG and causing the loss of power to the remaining

two operating

RCPs. The reactor was cooled by natural circulation

for about 28 minutes until a reactor coolant pump was started. A notification

of an unusual event was made by the licensee based on a fire located in the protected

area lasting longer than 10 minutes. The event resulted in no personnel

injuries and no release of radioactive

material.Fermi Unit 2: On December 12, 1991, an event involving

a self-propelled

crane occurred at the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2. The Fermi Unit was in cold shutdown in preparation

for replacing

a main output transformer.

The crane, with its boom extended, attempted

to turn onto a roadway that is outside the protected

area but inside the owner controlled

area at the plant. While the crane spotter was directing

traffic, the crane operator proceeded

to turn onto the roadway. A lifting strap, which was dangling from the end of the crane boom made momentary

contact with one phase of a 120 kV transmission

line which was providing

offsite power to the plant. The circuit breaker for the line immediately

opened and reclosed, interrupting

and reestablishing

the power supply in a matter of cycles. No LOOP resulted.When the operator stopped the crane, the crane came to rest with the end of the boom extended above the transmission

line and with the transmission

line passing between the boom and lifting strap. The operator then backed up the crane. A second contact occurred between the transmission

line and the lifting

IN 92-13 February 18, 1992 strap. The circuit breaker again opened and reclosed rapidly so that no actual LOOP occurred.

The crane operator then informed his supervisor

of the event.No personnel

injuries or equipment

damage resulted.

No challenge

to plant safety systems occurred.Discussion

Information

Notice 90-25, Supplement

1, "Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent

Reactor Coolant System Heat-up," informed licensees

of problems that can occur when vehicular

traffic is not properly controlled

near safety systems or systems important

to safety. A significant

operating

event occurred at the Alvin W. Vogtle Generating

Plant (Vogtle) on March 20, 1990. An NRC incident investigation

team described

the circumstances

of the event in detail in NUREG-1410

titled, "Loss of Offsite AC Power and the Residual Heat Removal System During Mid-Loop Operations

at Vogtle Unit 1 on March 20, 1990." The Vogtle Unit 1 event was initiated

when a fuel and lubricants

truck, conducting

routine operations

in the switchyard, backed into a support column for a 230 kV feeder which was supplying

offsite power to the Unit. Ensuing events led to the total loss of vital ac power at the plant and operation

in natural circu-lation while the reactor coolant system was drained down to mid-loop.One of the lessons learned from the Vogtle incident was the need for licensees to develop appropriate

programs for controlling

vehicular

traffic at their sites. Although the events at the Diablo Canyon, Palo Verde, and Fermi plants were of less safety significance

than the Vogtle event, they demonstrate

that problems associated

with inadequate

control of vehicles continue to occur.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Direc Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: N. Fields, NRR (301) 504-1173 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices

r Q la 1-<C I , toW m c e I 2 C I-m:n~C)Z 0z Zoj 00 6 (n 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Date of Attachment

IN 92-13 February 18. 1992 Page I of I IInformation

tNotice No.92-12 92-11 92-10 92-09 92-08 92-07 92-06 92-05 Subject Effects of Cable Leakage Currents on Instrument

Settings and Indications

Soil and Water Contamina- tion at Fuel Cycle Facil-ities Brachytherapy

Incidents Involvihg

Iridium-192

Wire Used In Endobronchial

Treatments

Overloading

and Subsequent

Lock Out of Electrical

Buses During Accident Conditions

Revised Protective

Action Guidance for Nuclear Inci-dents Rapid Flow-Induced

Erosion/Corrosion

of Feedwater

Piping Reliability

of ATHS Mitiga-tion System and Other NRC Required Equipment

Not Controlled

by Plant Tech-nical Specifications

Potential

Coil Insulation

Breakdown

in ABB RXHH2 Relays Issuance Issued to 02/10/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.02/05/92 All uranium fuel fabrica-tion and conversion

facil-ities.'01/31/92 All Nuclear Regulatory

Com-mission (NRC) licensees authorized

to use iridiwu-192 for brachy-therapy; manufacturers

and distributors

of iridium-192 wire for use In brachy-therapy.01/30/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.01/23/92 All fuel cycle and materi-als licensees

authorized

to possess large quanti-ties of radioactive

materi-1al.01/09/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized

water reactors.01/15/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.01/08/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.0 a t ; 6 a OL -Operating

License CP I Construction

Permit

IN 92-13 February 18, 1992 strap. The circuit breaker again opened and reclosed rapidly so that no actual LOOP occurred.

The crane operator then informed his supervisor

of the event.No personnel

injuries or equipment

damage resulted.

No challenge

to plant safety systems occurred.Discussion

Information

Notice 90-25, Supplement

1, *Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent

Reactor Coolant System Heat-up," informed licensees

of problems that can occur when vehicular

traffic is not properly controlled

near safety systems or systems important

to safety. A significant

operating

event occurred at the Alvin W. Vogtle Generating

Plant (Vogtle) on March 20, 1990. An NRC incident investigation

team described

the circumstances

of the event in detail in NUREG-1410

titled, "Loss of Offsite AC Power and the Residual Heat Removal System During Mid-Loop Operations

at Vogtle Unit 1 on March 20, 1990." The Vogtle Unit 1 event was initiated

when a fuel and lubricants

truck, conducting

routine operations

in the switchyard, backed into a support column for a 230 kV feeder which was supplying

offsite power to the Unit. Ensuing events led to the total loss of vital ac power at the plant and operation

in natural circu-lation while the reactor coolant system was drained down to mid-loop.One of the lessons learned from the Vogtle incident was the need for licensees to develop appropriate

programs for controlling

vehicular

traffic at their sites. Although the events at the Diablo Canyon, Palo Verde, and Fermi plants were of less safety significance

than the Vogtle event, they demonstrate

that problems associated

with inadequate

control of vehicles continue to occur.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager., A harles E. Rossi, Directo Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: N. Fields, NRR (301) 504-1173 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFC : DOEA:OEAB

ADM:RPB : DRPW:PD5 : DRPW:PD5 :DRPW:PD3-1

SC:DOEA:OEAB:

-_- ___ ___ ___--_ __ ____ ------------

___ __ _____ ---------NAME : NFields* : JMain* : HRood* : CTrammell*

TColburn*

DFischer*

-_- _ ___ ________ ___ ________ ---------DATE : 01/22/92 : 01/14/92 : 01/23/92 : 01/22/92 :01/28/92

01/30/92

OFC :C:DOEA:OEAB

C:DOEA:OGCB

D:DOE :-NAME :AChaffee*

CBerlinger*

CRossi : DATE :01/31/92

02/10/92

02////9 DOCUMENT NAME: IN 92-13 IN 92-XX January xx, 1992 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: N. Fields, NRR (301) 504-1173 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFC : DOEA:OEAB

ADM:RPB : DRPW:PD5 : DRPW:PD5 :DRPW:PD3-1

SC:DOEA:OEAB:

NAME : NFields* : JMain* : HRood* : CTrammell*

TColburn*

DFischer*

DATE : 01/22/92 : 01/14/92 : 01/23/92 : 01/22/92 :01/28/92

01/30/92

OFC :C:DOEA:OEAB

C: 0 B :D:DOEA__--- _ _----- :--. ,-- ------------

.------------:------------:------------:---------

NAME :AChaffee*

CBe in er :CRossi : DATE :01/31/92

V/0/92 : / /92 : : : OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: IN/HF

IN 92-XX January xx, 1992 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: N. Fields, NRR (301) 504-1173 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFC : DOEA:OEAB

ADM:RPB : DRPW:PD5 : DRPW:PD5 :DRPW:PD3-1

SC:DOE :OEAB: NAME : NFields* : JMain* : HRood* : CTrammell*

TColburn*

DF cher : NAM N.els J*ain ..DATE : 01/22/92 : 01/14/92 : 01/23/92 : 01/22/92 :01/28/92

1/3q/92 : OFC :C:DOEA:OEAB

C:DOEA:OGCB

D:DOEA : :----- :-6Z&'--------:------------:------------

---

---

--------NAME :ACha fee :CBerlinger

CRossi : : : DATE : L/31/92 : / /92 : / /92 : : : OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: IN/NF

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office Of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: N. Fields, NRR (301) 504-1173 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFC : DOEA:OEAB

ADM:RPB : DRPW:PD5 : DRPW:PD5 :DRPW:PD3-1

SC:DOEA:OEAB:

_ _ ------ _ ____ _ ------------

_-__-___-____

NAME : NFields* : JMain* : HRood iTz : CTrammell*

TColburn

DFischer___ _ _ _ _ _____ _ -------------

DATE : 01/22/92 : 01/14/92 : \ /25/92 : 01/22/92 :' /ze/92 : / /92 OFC :C:DOEA:OEAB

C:DOEA:OGCB

D:DOEA : :____- _ ____ _____ ___ __ ------------

NAME :AChaffee

CBerlinger

CRossi : : DATE : / /92 :/ /92 :/ /92 : OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: IN/NF

IN 92-XX January xx, 1992 One of the lessons learned from the Vogtle incident was the need for licensees to develop appropriate

procedures

governing

vehicular

traffic in protected areas. Although the events at the Diablo Canyon and Palo Verde plants were of less safety significance

than the Vogtle event, they nevertheless

call into question the adequacy of the affected licensees'

programs for controlling

vehicular

traffic at their sites. The Diablo Canyon and Palo Verde events may prompt licensees

to reevaluate

the adequacy of their followup actions regarding the lessons learned from the Vogtle event.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office Of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: N. Fields, NRR (301) 504-1173 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices OFC : DOEA:PEAB

JAM:RPB : DRPW:PD5 : DRPS JD5 :SC:DOEA:OEAB:C:DOEA:OEAB

NAME : NFields HM1' HRood C ammell DFischer :AChaffee

-- ------- ------------

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------------

---

___ ___ _ _ _ __ _DATE: / /2.2/92 : /1,9/92 : / /92 : /y4P92 : / /92 : / /92 OFC :C:DOEA:OGCB

D:DOEA : : : : NAME :CBerlinger

CRossi : : DATE: / /92 : / /92 : : : : OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: IN/NF