ML15034A474

Written Communication as Specified by 10 CFR 50.4(b)(1) Regarding the Response to the University of Missouri at Columbia - Request for Additional Information Regarding the Renewal of Facility Operating License No. R-103 for the University o

ML15034A474
Person / Time
Site:	University of Missouri-Columbia
Issue date:	01/28/2015
From:	Butler R A, Fruits J L Univ of Missouri - Columbia
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ML15034A472	List: ML15034A473 ML15034A474
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TAC ME1580
Download: ML15034A474 (602)

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{{#Wiki_filter:UNIVERSITY of MISSOURI RESEARCH REACTOR CENTER January 28, 2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-37 Washington, DC 20555-0001

REFERENCE:

Docket 50-186 University of Missouri-Columbia Research Reactor Amended Facility License R-103

SUBJECT:

Written communication as specified by 10 CFR 50.4(b)(1) regarding the response to the "University of Missouri at Columbia -Request for Additional Information Regarding the Renewal of Facility Operating License No. R-103 for the University of Missouri at Columbia Research Reactor (TAC No. ME1580)," dated December 3, 2014; Two attachments (22 and 23) should be withheld from public disclosure per 10 CFR 2.390 On August 31, 2006, the University of Missouri-Columbia Research Reactor (MURR) submitted a request to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to renew Amended Facility Operating License No. R- 103.On December 3, 2014, as part of the NRC staff s review of the renewal request, the NRC requested additional information in the form of two (2) questions. Those questions, and MURR's responses to those questions, are attached. Additionally, we request that you withhold Attachments 22 and 23, Project RL-76, "Production of 1-131 Radiochemical Sodium Iodide Solution," and 50.59 Screen No. 12-07,"Iodine-131 Processing Laboratory," respectively, from public disclosure per 10 CFR 2.390. Attached is the affidavit, dated January 27, 2015, which explains the reasoning for this request. The Attachments are clearly labeled "Withhold from Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390." If there are questions regarding this response, please contact me at (573) 882-5319 or FruitsJ@missouri.edu. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.ENDORSEMENT: Sincerely, Reviewed and Approved, John L. Fruits Ralph A. Butler, P.E. DONNA RATHKE Notary Public -Notary Seal Reactor Manager Director State of Missouri Commissioned for Boone County My Commission Expires: August 15, 2017 Commission Number: 13515190 1513 Research Park Drive Columbia, MO 65211 Phone: 573-882-4211 Fax: 573-882-6360 Web: www.murr.missouri.edu Fighting Cancer with Tomorrow's Technology Enclosed: Attachment 1: Attachment 2: Attachment 3: Attachment 4: Attachment 5: Attachment 6: Attachment 7: Attachment 8: Attachment 9: Attachment 10: Attachment 11: Attachment 12: Attachment 13: Attachment 14: Attachment 15: Attachment 16: Attachment 17: Attachment 18: Modification Record 05-08; "Replacement of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B" Modification Record 05-08, Addendum 1; "Replacement of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B -Instrumentation Portion" Modification Record 05-08, Addendum 2; "Replacement of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B -Heat Exchanger and Piping Portion" Modification Record 94-04, Addendum 1; "Replacement of Pool Coolant System Heat Exchanger HX52 1" Modification Record 05-06; "Replace Pool Pump Piping" Modification Record 09-01; "Interfacing MURR Systems with the Shipping and Receiving Building" Modification Record 11-02, "Replace Cooling Tower" Modification Record 14-01; "Interfacing MURR System Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion" Modification 14-01, Addendum 1; "Construction of Usable Laboratory Spaces within the Expanded MURR Industrial Building" Modification Record 88-07, Addendum 3; "Exhaust Ventilation in MIB Eastward Expansion" Modification Record 90-01, Addendum 3; "Evacuation System Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion" Modification Record 0 1-02, Addendum 11; "Intercom and Paging System Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion" Modification Record 01-09, Addendum 5; "Emergency Electrical in MIB Eastward Expansion" Modification Record 03-03, Addendum 5; "Fire Protection System Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion" Modification Record 03-03, Addendum 6; "Fire Protection System Changes in Support of the MIB Eastward Expansion Fit-out" Modification Record 04-03, Addendum 2; "Liquid Radioactive Waste in MIB Eastward Expansion" Modification Record 14-02; "Normal Electrical Distribution in MIB Eastward Expansion" Modification Record 14-04; "Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor" Attachment 19: Attachment 20: Attachment 21: Attachment 22: Attachment 23: Attachment 24: Attachment 25: Modification Record 75-16, Addendum 4; "Reactor Safety System Monitoring Circuit ("White Rat') Panel -Revision to Panel Overlays in Support of Flux-Trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST)" Modification Record 06-03, Addendum 2; "Replace Flux Trap Holder Wear Ring" Modification Record 11-01; "Flux-trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST)Instrument Channels" Project RL-76; "Production of 1-131 Radiochemical Sodium Iodide Solution" (Proprietary version -withhold from public disclosure per 10 CFR 2.390)50.59 Screen No. 12-07; "Iodine-131 Processing Laboratory" (Proprietary version -withhold from public disclosure per 10 CFR 2.390)Project RL-76; "Production of 1-131 Radiochemical Sodium Iodide Solution" (Redacted version -maybe released to the public)50.59 Screen No. 12-07; "Iodine-131 Processing Laboratory" (Redacted version -maybe released to the public)xc: Reactor Advisory Committee, w/o attachments Reactor Safety Subcommittee, w/o attachments Dr. Kenneth Dean, Interim Provost, w/o attachments Dr. Robert Hall, Associate Vice Chancellor for Research, w/o attachments Mr. Alexander Adams, U.S. NRC, w/o attachments Mr. Geoffrey A. Wertz, U.S. NRC, w/o attachments Mr. Johnny Eads, U.S. NRC, w/o attachments The MURR license renewal application (LRA,) SAR was submitted August 31, 2006. Changes to the facility since that time have been summarized in the MURR Annual Reports, but detailed information, including any relevant safety analyses, updated SAR sections, or results of any reviews of those changes performed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, have not been provided NUREG-1537, Section 1.8, "Facility Modifications and History, "provides guidance that significant modifications to the facility should be provided in the LRA.a. Provide a list of the significant changes to the MURR facility since the submittal of the LRA in August 2006.The following are all of the facility modifications that were implemented at MURR in accordance with administrative procedure AP-RO- 115, "Modification Records," since the license renewal application (LRA) was submitted. The modifications are listed by the year that they were completed. Additionally, proposed changes to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) based on these modifications are also listed as well as whether the modification was performed under a License Amendment or 10 CFR 50.59.Furthermore, at the end of this section is revised wording to Sections 1.7.3 and 1.7.4 of the LRA SAR. These facility changes would be considered "significant modifications" as per NUREG-1537, Section 1.8, and Modification Records and 50.59 Screens which document implementation of these changes are included as attachments. Facility changes performed under a License Amendment are also documented under a Modification Record, such as License Amendment No.35 which was implemented under Modification Records 75-16, Addendum 4; 06-03, Addendum 2;and 11-01 (Attachments 19, 20 and 21). License Amendment No. 34 did not require any changes to the LRA SAR but the most recent version of the relicensing Technical Specifications (January 27, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14030AI32) does incorporate this change (TS 3.6.o). License Amendment No. 36 revised the Safety Limits. Section 2.1 of the most recent version of the relicensing Technical Specifications does incorporate this change. Sections 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 of the LRA SAR will be replaced by Attachment 11 (Appendix F) of the August 24, 2011 submittal in support of License Amendment No. 36.Page 4 of 40 FACILITY MODIFICATIONS -YEAR 2006: 1. Modification 94-04, Addendum 1; "Replacement of Pool Coolant System Heat Exchanger HX 521" a) This addendum to Modification Record 94-04, "The Replacement of the Pool Tube and Shell Heat Exchangers with a Plate Type," documents the replacement of the current plate-type pool coolant heat exchanger with the exact same model that was initially installed in 1995 (with 151 plates). Since installation in 1995, the pressure drop across the heat exchanger had steadily increased, which resulted in a decrease in total pool coolant system flow rate. An evaluation of the pool coolant heat exchanger was performed in February 2005 by the Engineering Firm Black & Veatch (B&V), Kansas City, Missouri. In the evaluation B&V states that due to the tight clearances between the plates, the heat exchanger will act like a filter and collect impurities in the water. Additionally, the maker of the heat exchanger (Graham Corporation) had previously inspected plates that had what appeared to be a thin layer of surface contaminants. Both of these factors are sufficient to cause an increase in the pressure drop across the heat exchanger. Installation of the new heat exchanger returned total pool coolant system flow rate to design values.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.2. Modification 05-08; "Replacement of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B" a) This Modification Record was used as the initiating document in a coordinated set of addenda whose purpose was to replace the existing primary coolant system heat exchangers, modify and upgrade existing flow detectors and associated instrumentation, replace affected primary coolant system piping, and replace and re-plumb affected secondary coolant system piping. Each major system modification (i.e. -instrumentation, and primary and secondary coolant system hydraulics) was documented as a separate addendum to this Modification Record.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.3. Modification 05-08, Addendum 1; "Replacement of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B -Instrumentation Portion" a) This addendum to Modification Record 05-08, "Replacement of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B," documents the instrumentation changes that were necessary to support the replacement of the old shell and tube-type primary coolant heat exchangers with new plate-type heat exchangers. b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 5 of 40 Page 7-12 through 7-15, Table 7-3, Instrument Panel Instrumentation: Delete: Replace with: Delete: Replace with: Delete: Replace with: Delete: Replace with: Delete: Replace with: Delete: Replace with: Delete: Replace with: Delete: Replace with: Delete: Replace with: Add: Add: "26 Primary Coolant HX503A Outlet Temperature Meter -TE 980A""26"27"27"43"43"46"46"89"89"90"90"91"91"100"100"101"101"133"134 Primary & Pool Coolant Demineralizer Flow Recorder -2 Pen" Primary Coolant HX503A Outlet Temperature Meter -TE 980B" Dual Alarm Unit (EP 920E/F) Primary Low Flow Scram" Square Root Transmitter (EP 919E) -Primary Flow "B" Loop" Square Root Transmitter (EP 919E) -Primary Flow "A" Loop" Alarm Unit -Pressurizer Water Level" Square Root Transmitter (EP 919G) -Primary Flow "B" Loop" Primary Coolant System Flow Recorder -2 Pen" Primary Coolant System "A" Loop Flow Recorder -2 Pen" Pool Coolant System Flow Recorder -2 Pen" Primary Coolant System "B" Loop Flow Recorder -2 Pen" Primary & Pool Coolant Demineralizer Flow Recorder -2 Pen" Pool Coolant System Flow Recorder -2 Pen" Primary Coolant HX503A Differential Pressure Meter -DPS 928A" Primary Coolant HX503A Outlet Temperature Meter -TE 980A" Primary Coolant HX503B Differential Pressure Meter -DPS 928B" Primary Coolant HX503B Outlet Temperature Meter -TE 980B" Dual Alarm Unit (EP 920G/H) Primary Low Flow Scram" Square Root Transmitter (EP 919H) -Primary Flow "B" Loop" Page 7-46 and 47, Section 7.6.4.1, Primary Coolant System: Delete: "Primary coolant system flow is measured at the following locations with the indicated Flow Transmitters (FTs) and Differential Pressure Sensors (DPSs);(a) Downstream of Primary Coolant Heat Exchanger (HX503A) -FT 912A;(b) Downstream of Primary Coolant Heat Exchanger (HX503B) -FT 912E;(c) Differential Pressure across HX503A -DPS 928A;(d) Differential Pressure across HX503B -DPS 928B; and (e) Differential Pressure across the Reactor Core -DPS 929.Primary coolant system flow is recorded on a strip-chart, two-pen recorder mounted on the instrument panel. Differential pressure across orifice Page 6 of 40 plates (Flow Element 913A and 913B) located downstream of HX503A and HX503B is measured by FT 912A and FT 912E, respectively. The output signal (10 to 50 mA) generated by each flow transmitter is directed to a Square Root Converter which provides a linear output signal for the two-pen recorder and a Dual Alarm Unit. In addition to providing flow indication, the recorder will initiate a "Reactor Loop Lo Flow" annunciator alarm if primary coolant flow downstream of either heat exchanger decreases to 95% of the normal operating value. If primary coolant flow decreases to 90% of the normal value, a reactor scram and a "Reactor Loop Lo Flow Scram" annunciator alarm are initiated. The Dual Alarm Unit for FT 912A opens a contact (K30-2) in the process input string to E4A of the Reactor Safety System NCLUs, thereby interrupting power to the control blade electromagnets. The Dual Alarm Unit for FT 912E opens a contact (K38-2) in the process input string to E3B of the NCLUs.A primary coolant system low flow scram may also be initiated by a low differential pressure across the primary coolant heat exchangers. Differential pressure across HX503A and HX503B, which provides an indication of flow, is measured by DPS 928A and DPS 928B, respectively. The output signal (4 to 20 mA) produced by each differential pressure sensor is directed to an Alarm Unit.If primary coolant flow decreases to 90% of the normal operating value, a reactor scram is initiated. The Alarm Unit for DPS 928A opens a contact in the process input string to E3B of the Reactor Safety System NCLUs, thereby interrupting power to the control blade electromagnets. The Alarm Unit for DPS 928B opens a contact in the process input string to E4A of the NCLUs. The Alarm Units will also de-energize relays 2K24 and 2K26, which will cause the following actions to occur: 1. "Low Primary HX AP Scram" annunciator alarm is initiated; and 2. In-Pool Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves V546A and V546B open.The output signals produced by DPS 928A and DPS 928B also power meters on the instrument panel, thus providing the reactor operator with an indication of primary coolant heat exchanger differential pressure." Replace with: "Primary coolant system flow is measured at the following locations with the indicated Flow Transmitters (FTs) and Differential Pressure Sensors (DPSs);(a) Downstream of Primary Coolant Heat Exchanger (HX503A) -FT 912A and FT 912E;(b) Downstream of Primary Coolant Heat Exchanger (HX503B) -FT 912G and FT 912H; and (c) Differential Pressure across the Reactor Core -DPS 929.Page 7 of 40 Primary coolant system flow measurement system includes two orifice plates, one in each of the two heat exchanger legs. Flow as measured by two transmitters connected to each orifice plate is recorded on two, two-pen recorders mounted on the instrument panel. Differential pressure across orifice plates (Flow Element 913A and 913B) located downstream of HX503A and HX503B is measured by FT 912A and FT 912E, and FT 912G and FT 912H, respectively. The output signal (10 to 50 mA) generated by each flow transmitter is directed to a Square Root Converter which provides a linear output signal for the corresponding two-pen recorder and a Dual Alarm Unit. In addition to providing flow indication, the recorder will initiate a "Reactor Loop Lo Flow" annunciator alarm if primary coolant flow downstream of either heat exchanger decreases to 95% of the normal operating value. If primary coolant flow decreases to 90% of the normal value, a reactor scram and a corresponding "Reactor Loop A Lo Flow Scram" or "Reactor Loop B Lo Flow Scram" annunciator alarm is initiated. The Dual Alarm Unit for FT 912A opens a contact (K30-2) in the process input string to E4A of the Reactor Safety System NCLUs, thereby interrupting power to the control blade electromagnets. The Dual Alarm Unit for FT 912E opens a contact (K38-2) in the process input string to E3B of the NCLUs. The Dual Alarm Unit for FT 912G opens a contact in the process input string to E3B of the Reactor Safety System NCLUs, thereby interrupting power to the control blade electromagnets. The Alarm Unit for FT 912H opens a contact in the process input string to E4A of the NCLUs. Alarm Unit EP No. 920 A/B and EP No. 920 G/H will also de-energize relays 2K24 and 2K26 respectively, which will cause the following actions to occur: 1. Corresponding "Reactor Loop A Lo Flow Scram" or "Reactor Loop B Lo Flow Scram" annunciator alarm is initiated; and 2. In-Pool Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves V546A and V546B open." Page 51, Table 7-8, Reactor Scrams: Delete: "15. Low Primary HX Diff. Pressure" 4. Modification 05-08, Addendum 2; "Replacement of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B -Heat Exchanger and Piping Portion" a) This addendum to Modification Record 05-08, "Replacement of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B," documents the primary and secondary coolant system changes that were necessary to support the replacement of the old shell and tube-type primary coolant heat exchangers with new plate-type heat exchangers. This addendum primarily documents the hydraulic modifications. b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 8 of 40 Page 5-2, Section 5.2.4, Heat Exchangers: Delete: "The primary coolant heat exchangers are tube type, water-to-water shell, with removable tube bundles. The tubes, and all materials in contact with the primary coolant, are made of stainless steel. The primary coolant flow makes two passes through the tube side of the heat exchanger with a velocity of no greater than 7 ft/sec (2.1 m/sec). At a maximum of 1,600 gpm (6,057 lpm) of secondary water flow and an inlet water temperature at 87 OF (31 0 C), one heat exchanger is capable of removing 17 x 106 BTU/h of heat from 1,800 gpm (6,814 1pm) of primary coolant water and returning it at 140 OF (60 'C)." Replace with: "The primary coolant heat exchangers are plate-type with all surfaces in contact with the reactor coolant constructed of stainless steel. At a maximum of 1,600 gpm (6,057 1pm) of secondary coolant flow at 87 OF (31 'C), one heat exchanger is capable of removing 16.9 x 106 BTU/hr of heat from 1800 gpm (6,814 1pm) of coolant and returning it at approximately 140 °F (60 'C)." Page 5-9, Section 5.4.3, Heat Exchangers: Delete: "The secondary water flow makes a single pass on the shell side of the primary coolant system heat exchangers and on the opposite plate side of the pool coolant in the pool coolant system heat exchanger." Replace with: "The secondary coolant flows on the opposite plate side of both the primary coolant system heat exchangers and the pool coolant system heat exchanger. In both the primary and pool coolant heat exchangers, the secondary coolant water flows in a cross-flow configurations to the process water being cooled." 5. Modification 05-10; "Replace Pressure Vessel Tie-Rod Clevis Pins with Instrumented Load-Cell Clevis Pins" a) This Modification Record documents the replacement of the reactor pressure vessel tie-rod clevis pins with instrumented load-cell clevis pins. The clevis pins are constructed with an internal strain gauge, as well as the full bridge circuit necessary to correlate strain to tension; thus, allowing a more accurate method of determining the load applied to the tie-rods.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.6. Modification 06-01; "Removal of Pressurizer Low Liquid Level Alarm Unit EP-932 and Signal Resistor Unit EP-931" a) This Modification Record documents the removal of alarm unit EP-932 and its associated signal resistor unit EP-93 1. EP-932 is a Bailey Type 745 Single Alarm Unit; whereas, EP-931 is a Bailey Type 766 Signal Resistor Unit. Elimination of these components allowed for the removal of the Bailey Type 761 Instrument Rack, which was located below the other process instrumentation racks, allowing for the installation of a 4 th General Electric Page 9 of 40 Measurement and Control (GE/MAC) rack to support the additional instrumentation that was necessary for the primary coolant system heat exchanger project.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 7-13, Table 7-3, Instrument Panel Instrumentation: Delete: "46 Signal Resistor Unit -Pressurizer Water Level" Page 10 of 40 FACILITY MODIFICATIONS -YEAR 2007: 1. Modification 90-01, Addendum 1; "Evacuation System Changes in Support of the New North Office Addition" a) This addendum to Modification Record 90-01, "Evac Horn," documents changes to the facility Evacuation System in support of the facility's new North Office Addition (NOA).The manual actuation switch was relocated and additional horns and lights were added to the facility Evacuation System in order to safely occupy the new building addition.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 3-31, Section 3.5.5, Containment System: Delete: "(Room 202)" Replace with: "(Room 210)" Page 7-59, Section 7.8.2.2, Manual Initiation: Delete: "A second facility evacuation switch is located at the reception desk in the facility lobby (Room 202)." Replace with: "A second facility evacuation switch is located at the reception desk in the facility lobby (Room 210)." 2. Modification 01-02, Addendum 2; "Intercommunication and Paging System Changes in Support of the New North Office Addition" a) This addendum to Modification Record 01-02, "Installation of a New Reactor Facility Intercommunication and Paging System," documents changes to the facility intercommunication and paging system that are in support of the facility's new North Office Addition (NOA). Additional intercom staff stations and paging speakers were added in order to safely occupy the new building addition.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 9-11, Table 9-1, Intercommunication System Master and Staff Station Locations: Add: The following to Table 9-1 under Staff Stations: "Corridor C2002 Cyclotron Suite Corridor C2000 Exit to Lobby Room 2041 Laboratory Area" 3. Modification 0 1-14, Addendum 1; "120/2081V Electrical Distribution System Upgrade" a) This addendum to Modification Record 01-14, "Installation of a 300-kVA Transformer," documents the upgrade of the facility's 120/208V electrical distribution system.Modification Record 01-14 documented the installation of a new 300-kVA transformer to help increase the facility's overall 120/208V load capacity while reducing the load on the Page 11 of 40 current 120/208V distribution center. This upgrade included installation of a new 300-kVA transformer to eventually replace the existing 120/208V distribution center transformer, and to power both 300-kVA transformers via a new 480/277V high voltage panel which is fed from the laboratory building 2,000-kVA transformer. b) Modification perfonned under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.4. Modification 04-01, Addendum 1; "Replace the 943 LFE Meter Relay Unit (EP-942) with a Beede Meter Relay Unit" a) This addendum to Modification Record 04-01, "Replace the General Electric Type 551 Reactor Pressure Transmitter PT-943 with a Rosemount Model 1151," documents the replacement of the LFE Model 195 meter relay unit for primary coolant system pressure transmitter PT-943 with a Beede Model MR4 meter relay unit. Replacement of the LFE meter relay unit was necessary because the instrument could no longer satisfactorily pass calibration, and this particular make and model was no longer commercially available. b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.5. Modification 05-01, Addendum 1; "Upgrade Pneumatic Tube System Photo Sensor Collar and Counting Circuit" a) This addendum to Modification Record 05-01, "Pneumatic Tube System Photo Sensor Collar Upgrade," documents the replacement of the pneumatic tube system photo sensor collars with a new, standardized version that supports the new fiber optic connections. This Modification Record also documents the replacement of the photo sensor relays with fiber optic photo relays.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.6. Modification 05-06; "Replace Pool Pump Piping" a) This Modification Record documents the replacement of certain sections of pool coolant system piping in order to reduce operational system head losses and therefore increase available system flow. This modification, in conjunction with the replacement of pool coolant heat exchanger HX521 (performed under Modification Record 94-04, Addendum 1), returned pool coolant system flow rate to design values.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.7. Modification 06-03; "Replace Flux Trap Holder Wear Ring" a) This Modification Record documents the replacement of the center test hole experimental sample holder wear ring with an improved design which helps to further ensure that the Page 12 of 40 experimental contents of the sample holder remain secured during reactor operation. This improved design was a corrective action for Licensee Event Report No. 05-02.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.8. Modification 07-01; "Installation of the Five and Six Inch Sample Diameter Irradiation Facility" a) This Modification Record documents the replacement of the bulk pool sample irradiation facility with a new three-position irradiation facility of improved design and capacity. The new design incorporates an increased number of self-powered detectors, an underwater rotating mechanism, and stabilizing legs for additional support.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.9. Modification 07-02; "Installation of Circuitry to Indicate a Loss of the Main Annunciator" a) This Modification Record documents the installation of circuitry that provides a visual and audible alarm to the control room operator in the event of a loss of power or any other abnormal condition in the main annunciator panel.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 7-11, Section 7.3.1, Annunciator: Add: "To ensure the annunciator panel remains operable, an out of normal or loss of power condition is indicated on the auxiliary annunciator." 10. Modification 07-03; "Replace Cooling Tower Fan Vibration Switches" a) This Modification Record documents the replacement of the cooling tower fan vibration switches with an improved design. The new switches offer the following three improvements: (1) the existing switches were originally mounted near the fan gearbox and then relocated to the motor baseplate where fan vibration levels are significantly damped while the set point was not changed, (2) an ongoing effort is being made throughout the facility, where possible, to replace switches that contain mercury, and (3) the old enclosures no longer provided adequate weather protection to prevent corrosion of the internal electrical connections. b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.11. Modification 07-04; "Interfacing MURR Systems with the North Office Addition" a) This Modification Record was used as the initiating document to ensure that all systems related to emergency response have been identified and modified prior to safely occupying the facility's new North Office Addition (NOA). Actual modifications to these systems -Page 13 of 40 facility evacuation, fire protection, intercommunication and paging, and emergency electrical power -were performed under addendums to previously approved Modification Records.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following changes to the SAR are required: Page 1-6, Figure 1.2, Grade Level Plan: Replace with: Updated Figure 1.2, Grade Level Plan (MURR Dwg No. 1145, Sheet 2 of 5)Page 1-10, Figure 1.6, North and East Elevation: Replace with: Updated Figure 1.6, North and East Elevation Page 6-8, Figure 6.2, Grade Level Floor Plan: Replace with: Updated Figure 1.2, Grade Level Plan (MURR Dwg No. 1145, Sheet 2 of 5)12. Modification 07-05; "Beamport 'E' Changes to Replace Collimator Liner in Support of Boron-Neutron Capture Therapy (BNCT) Project" a) This Modification Record documents the replacement of Beamport 'E' removable collimator liner with a new design, and the associated piping changes necessary for its utilization. The replacement collimator liner is a combined liner and filter cavity which utilizes as much of the 8-inch diameter portion of the collimator liner in order to accommodate as much neutron and gamma filter material as possible. Due to this larger diameter filter material, no provisions can be made in the collimator liner for the helium and water connections, or concrete shielding annulus.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.Page 14 of 40 FACILITY MODIFICATIONS -YEAR 2008: 1. Modification 75-01, Addendum 2; "Addition of Jumpers to Electronic Circuit Jumper Panel" a) This addendum to Modification Record 75-01, "Electronic Circuits Jumper Panel," documents the addition of three jumper circuits to support the surveillance requirements of new flow detector instrument channels that were installed during the recent upgrade to the primary coolant system. The electronic circuit jumper panel provides a positive means of (1) inserting and removing circuit jumpers for maintenance, surveillance, and troubleshooting, and (2) verifying that the jumpers are removed.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.2. Modification 01-02, Addendum 3; "Removal and Relocation of Unused Staff Intercommunication Stations" a) This addendum to Modification Record 01-02, "Installation of a New Reactor Facility Intercommunication and Paging System," documents the removal and relocation of two intercom staff stations in the Intercommunication and Paging System. One staff station, which was previously located in the laboratory building outer corridor, was relocated near the outer airlock door to aid in communication when entering the containment building.The staff station located in Room 271 was removed since it was no longer required at this location.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 9-11, Table 9-1, Intercommunication System Master and Staff Station Locations: Delete: The following to Table 9-1 under Staff Station: "Room 210 Laboratory Building Outer Corridor Room 271 Machinery Shop Corridor C2000 Exit to Lobby" Add: The following to Table 9-1 under Staff Stations: "Room 287 Central Corridor" 3. Modification 05-01, Addendum 2; "Replace Pneumatic Tube System Irradiation Counter" a) This addendum to Modification Record 05-01, "Pneumatic Tube System Photo Sensor Collar Upgrade," documents the installation of two new-style photo sensor collars to the pneumatic tube system which allow the light source and sensor to be removed or realigned without having to relax reactor containment integrity. b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.Page 15 of 40

4. Modification 06-03, Addendum 1; "hIstall Temporary Flux Trap Holder Wear Ring" a) This addendum to Modification Record 06-03, "Replace Flux Trap Holder Wear Ring," documents the replacement of the center test hole canister wear ring with a temporary test design which allows the wear ring to engage a device consisting of two position sensing switches.

This temporary installation is being performed in conjunction with Modification Record 08-05, "Install Temporary Prototype of the Flux-trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST) Device," which documents the temporary installation of a prototype switch device which senses the position of the center test hole canister.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.5. Modification 08-02; "Addition of Service Catwalk to 15-ton Overhead Crane" a) This Modification Record documents the installation of a service catwalk to the containment building 15-ton overhead rectilinear crane. The crane requires periodic maintenance, inspection and repair to safely perform its intended functions. Prior to the catwalk, the ability to perform these items had been severely limited by the lack of a physical access to the north-south drivetrain. The catwalk consists of two separate steel installations: (1) a fixed catwalk assembled and bolted as an auxiliary platform, and (2) a moving catwalk welded to the north box girder of the crane. The moving catwalk is designed to allow access to the north-south drive and electrical panels without limiting the north travel of the crane platform.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.6. Modification 08-03; "Replacement of Graphite Reflector Elements 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9" a) This Modification Record documents the replacement of eight graphite reflector elements.From April, 2005, until October, 2007, all but one of the twelve graphite reflector elements were replaced during various maintenance evolutions. Three of these reflector elements were documented specifically in previous Modification Records. The remaining eight reflector elements were documented in this Modification Record in order to provide consistency in documentation. b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.7. Modification 08-04; "Replacement of Demineralized Water Storage Tanks T-300 and T-301" a) This Modification Record documents the replacement of demineralized water storage tanks T-300 and T-301. Due to degradation of their phenolic liner, the original two carbon steel water storage tanks were replaced with 3 16L stainless steel tanks of almost identical design and capacity.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 16 of 40 Page 9-21, Section 9.12.3, Reactor Plant Make-Up Water Storage Tanks: Delete: "lined carbon steel" Replace with: "stainless steel" 8. Modification 08-05; "Install Temporary Prototype of the Flux-trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST) Device" a) This Modification Record documents the temporary installation of a prototype switch device intended to positively indicate the position of the center test hole canister when it is in its secured and latched position. The current method of calculating the total experiment reactivity worth in the center test hole includes the reactivity contribution of the center test hole canister (sample holder) itself. This is a conservative approach that severely limits the total available reactivity of samples loaded into the canister. The MURR is considering an alternative methodology in which the reactivity contribution of the center test hole canister is not included, and only the reactivity contribution of the experiment samples is included in the calculation. This temporary installation is being performed in conjunction with Modification Record 06-03, Addendum 1; "Install Temporary Flux Trap Holder Wear Ring," which documents the temporary installation of a test design wear ring on the center test hole canister.b) Modification perfonned under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.Page 17 of 40 FACILITY MODIFICATIONS -YEAR 2009: 1. Modification 90-01, Addendum 2; "Evacuation System Changes in Support of the Shipping and Receiving Building" a) This addendum to Modification Record 90-01, "Evac Horn," documents changes to the facility Evacuation System that were necessary in order to safely occupy the new shipping and receiving building (SaRB). To ensure a prompt and effective response from facility staff to an emergency or abnormal condition, the facility Evacuation System was extended into the SaRB. One (1) horn was installed in the open space of this building.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.2. Modification 96-0 1, Addendum 2; "Removal of the Nuclepore Experiment Equipment" a) This addendum to Modification Record 96-01, "Removal of Nuclepore Gas Lines, Isolation Valves, and Valve Control Wiring," documents the removal of the remaining utility connections and abandoned components associated with the nuclepore facility not removed under Modification Record 96-01 and Modification Record 96-01, Addendum 1. The nuclepore facility was installed in 1977 to provide a means of producing finely controlled porosity in an irradiated plastic film. To accommodate the required equipment a redesigned thermal column door was installed. Within this door, a removable set of uranium-bearing 'fission plates' was exposed to thermal neutron flux in the thermal column facility. As the target film slid across these fission plates, the fission products released penetrated the film, thus producing finely distributed perforations, which were later acid-etched to produce the desired porosity. After the nuclepore facility was decommissioned and abandoned in place in 1993, Modification Record 96-01 documented the removal of gas lines, isolation valves and valve controls. The irradiator case (that part of the experiment that was moved into and out of the neutron flux) was removed using reactor test procedure RTP- 166D. Addendum I to Modification Record 96-01 documented the removal and disposal of the shield box ventilation exhaust filter housing and associated duct work.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.3. Modification 01-02, Addendum 4; "Intercommunication and Paging System Changes in Support of the Shipping and Receiving Building" a) This addendum to Modification Record 01-02, "Installation of a New Reactor Facility Intercommunication and Paging System," documents changes to the facility intercommunication and paging system that were necessary in order to safely occupy the new Shipping and Receiving Building (SaRB). To ensure a prompt and effective response from facility staff to an emergency or abnormal condition, the intercommunication and paging system was extended into the SaRB. Two (2) paging speakers were installed in this building.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.Page 18 of 40 c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.4. Modification 01-09, Addendum 3; "Emergency Electrical System in the Shipping and Receiving Building" a) This addendum to Modification Record 01-09, "Installation of Emergency Lighting Panel No. 1," documents the addition of loads to the emergency electrical power system in the new Shipping and Receiving Building (SaRB). This addition provides two (2) 120V emergency power circuits to the SaRB for key systems such as fire protection and building access control.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.5. Modification 06-03, Addendum 2; "Replace Flux Trap Holder Wear Ring" a) This addendum to Modification Record 06-03, "Replace Flux Trap Holder Wear Ring," documents the replacement of the center test hole canister temporary wear ring with a different design. The new ring covers a larger circumference of the flux trap holder; thus, ensuring rotation will not disengage the position sensing switches of the flux-trap irradiations reactivity safety trip (FIRST) instrument channel. This installation was done in support of preliminary long form Modification Record, "Flux-Trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST) Instrument Channel." The prototype FIRST rig was installed under Modification Record 08-05, and subsequent details of the FIRST device and its function are provided in this Modification Record.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.6. Modification 09-01; "Interfacing MURR Systems with the Shipping and Receiving Building" a) This Modification Record was used as the initiating document to ensure all systems related to emergency response and routine operation have been identified and modified prior to safely occupying the facility's new shipping and receiving building. Actual modifications to these systems -facility evacuation, fire protection, intercommunication and paging, and normal and emergency electrical power -were performed under addendums to previously approved Modification Records.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following changes to the SAR are required: Page 1-9, Figure 1.5, Fifth Level Plan: Replace with: Updated Figure 1.5, Fifth Floor, Cooling Tower and SaRB (MURR Dwg No.1145, Sheet 5 of 5)7. Modification 09-02; "Airlock Door Control" a) This Modification Record documents the replacement of the existing pedestrian entry (airlock) door analog control system with a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)-driven Page 19 of 40 system. In addition, the control scheme was modified to maintain both airlock doors closed and sealed when in an idle condition. All existing interlocks and protective functions were preserved, with the addition of controls necessary to open and close both doors. This Modification Record is classified as "Safeguards Information" due to the inclusion of security-sensitive information. b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 6-15, Section 6.2.6, Description of Operations: Delete: "During normal operation of the reactor, the following conditions exist: one pedestrian entry door is closed and sealed," Replace with: "During normal operation of the reactor, the following conditions exist: at least one pedestrian entry door is closed and sealed," Page 20 of 40 FACILITY MODIFICATIONS -YEAR 2010: 1. Modification 01-09, Addendum 2; "Emergency Electrical System in North Office Addition" a) This addendum to Modification Record 0 1-09, "Installation of Emergency Lighting Panel No. 1," documents the extension of the Emergency Electrical Power System to the North Office Addition (NOA). This system extension provides 120/208V electrical power to key NOA systems such as facility access and security, fire protection, computing servers, stack monitor, and Cyclotron processing and pharmacy.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.2. Modification 10-01; "Addition of Junction Box and Terminal Board for Control Rod Drive 'D'Drive Cable" a) This Modification Record documents the addition of a junction box and terminal board to the drive cable for control rod 'D' drive mechanism. The more frequent handling of control rod 'D' drive mechanism drive cable increases the likelihood of damage to the cable.Previous efforts at providing strain relief at significant flexure points have been less effective than desired. This Modification Record documents the addition of a junction box and terminal board near the drive mechanism. This addition reduces the magnitude of flexure and should extend the service life of the drive cable. The addition has the added advantage that when drive cable replacement is necessary; this work can be accomplished with a much shorter length of cable and can be performed entirely from the upper bridge.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.Page 21 of 40

FACILITY MODIFICATIONS -YEAR 2011: 1. Modification 01-02, Addendum 5; "Intercommunication and Paging System Changes in Support of the North Office Addition Lab Space" a) This addendum to Modification Record 01-02, "Installation of a New Reactor Facility Intercommunication and Paging System," documents changes to the facility intercommunication and paging system that were necessary in order to safely occupy the new laboratory space in the North Office Addition (NOA). To ensure a prompt and effective response from facility staff to an emergency or abnormal condition, the intercommunication and paging system was extended into the NOA laboratory space.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.2. Modification 0 1-2, Addendum 6; "Intercommunication and Paging System Changes in Support of the North Office Addition Classroom Space, Laboratory Break Room and Laboratory Basement" a) This addendum to Modification Record 01-02, "Installation of a New Reactor Facility Intercommunication and Paging System," documents changes to the facility intercommunication and paging system that were necessary in order to safely occupy the new classroom space in the North Office Addition (NOA) and provide additional coverage within NOA. To ensure a prompt and effective response from facility staff to an emergency or abnormal condition, the intercommunication and paging system was extended into the NOA classroom space, NOA break room and NOA basement.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.3. Modification 09-04; "Cooling Tower Temporary Cooling" a) This Modification Record documents the changes to the Secondary Coolant and Normal Electrical Power Systems to allow connection of temporary cooling to the existing system.The existing cooling towers cells were approaching the end of their operational lifetime due to the degrading integrity of wooden structure members, as well as steel fan support members. The planned replacement of these cells required several weeks to complete. To ensure continued reactor operation at 10 MW for the duration of the maintenance, rental cooling towers were connected to provide a means of cooling the Secondary Coolant System.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.Page 22 of 40 FACILITY MODIFICATIONS -YEAR 2012: 1. Modification 75-16, Addendum 4; "Reactor Safety System Monitoring Circuit (White Rat)Panel -Revision to Panel Overlays in Support of FIRST Device" a) This addendum to Modification Record 75-16, "Portable White Rat for Safety System," documents a revision to the Reactor Safety System Monitoring Circuit ("White Rat")Panel. New overlays reflect the addition of a series of contacts in both the "green leg" and"yellow leg" of the Reactor Safety System. The new contacts provide a SCRAM function from the Flux-Trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST) instrument channel. This modification did not change the function of the "White Rat" Panel itself.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.2. Modification 98-02, Addendum 1; "Sulfuric Acid System Changes in Support of Cooling Tower Replacement" a) This addendum to Modification Record 98-02, "Overhaul the Secondary System Pump/Motors (SP-1, SP-2, SP-3) and Replacement of Bulk Sulfuric Acid System," documents the reconfiguration of the existing Sulfuric Acid System due to replacement of the Cooling Tower cells. The replacement of the Cooling Tower removed the original open sump, resulting in a need to convert the Sulfuric Acid System from a gravity drip system to an injection system. The reconfiguration consisted of demolition of the existing gravity day tank along with the associated transfer equipment and controls, installation of an injection metering pump and piping injector, and installation of supporting piping, electrical power and controls.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.3. Modification 01-02, Addendum 8; "Intercommunication and Paging System Changes in Support of the Sterility Suite Rooms 2045A and 2045B" a) This addendum to Modification Record 01-02, "Installation of a New Reactor Facility Intercommunication and Paging System," documents changes to the facility intercommunication and paging system that were necessary in order to safely occupy the new sterility suite in the North Office Addition (NOA) to ensure a prompt and effective response from facility staff to an emergency or abnormal condition. b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.4. Modification 0 1-09, Addendum 4; "Emergency Electrical Power System in Room 231" a) This addendum to Modification Record 01-09, "Installation of Emergency Lighting Panel No. 1," documents the transfer of loads on the Emergency Electrical Power System in Room 231. The change consisted of transferring the one remaining load from Emergency Page 23 of 40 Lighting Panel No. IA (ELP-IA) to the Diesel Generator Room Distribution Panel which allowed the removal of ELP- IA.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.5. Modification 03-03, Addendum 3; "Fire Protection System Changes in Support of Cooling Tower Replacement" a) This addendum to Modification Record 03-03, "Installation of a Facility Fire Detection/Suppression System," documents the removal of the Deluge System in the Cooling Tower due to the replacement of the Cooling Tower cells. Replacement of the Cooling Tower cells, as documented in Modification Record 11-02, provided an all-stainless steel structure and significant reduction of potential fire loading, resulting in a Factory Mutual (FM) rating for the new Cooling Tower cells. This removed the need for the existing non-freezing deluge system.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 9-8, Section 9.3, Fire Protection Systems and Programs: Delete: ", and a deluge, non-freezing system used in the cooling tower" Page 9.9, Section 9.3, Fire Protection Systems and Programs: Delete: "a deluge system used in the cooling tower," 6. Modification 05-01, Addendum 3; "Pneumatic Tube System Changes in Lab 227" a) This addendum to Modification Record 05-01, "Pneumatic Tube System Photo Sensor Collar Upgrade," documents the removal of the Pneumatic Tube (P-Tube) System from Lab 227. The master control station for Labs 218 and 227 were removed from Lab 227. A new simplified control station is now located in Lab 218. Also, the existing transfer valve for Labs 218 and 227 were replaced with a section of tubing that directs Row 2 to Lab 218.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 10-14, Section 10.3.4.2,

Description:

Delete: "three sending-receiving stations" Replace with: "two sending-receiving stations" 7. Modification 09-03; "Lab Jmpex Stack Monitoring System" a) This Modification Record documents the installation of a Lab Inpex Stack Monitoring System which provides off-gas radiation monitoring capability as required by the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda. This system replaced a Nuclear Measurements Corporation (NMC) RAK Stack Monitoring System, including the function of release integration, which had reached the end of its operational lifetime.Page 24 of 40 b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.8. Modification 09-03, Addendum 1; "Update to Lab Impex Stack Monitoring System" a) This addendum to Modification Record 09-03, "Lab Impex Stack Monitoring System," documents an update to the installation of a Lab Impex Stack Monitoring System which provides off-gas radiation monitoring capability as required by the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda. This system was previously installed to replace the existing Nuclear Measurements Corporation (NMC) RAK Stack Monitoring System, including the function of release integration. This addendum contains additional information and documents changes performed since initial installation. Completion of these changes allows the Lab Impex Stack Monitor to be commissioned as a licensed system, subject to surveillance requirements of the Technical Specifications, and relied upon for use in both emergency response and effluent reporting roles.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.9. Modification 10-02; "Addition of MURR Systems to Lab 251" a) This Modification Record documents the conversion of Room 251 to a laboratory (lab)space outfitted for the safe disposal of acids. Room 251 was not originally fitted as a lab space. Therefore all major lab utilities, save Natural Gas and Vacuum, were routed to this space. These include Facility Air, Deionized Water, Domestic Cold Water, Domestic Hot Water, Normal Electrical Power, Exhaust Ventilation, and Radioactive Liquid Waste.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.10. Modification 11-02; "Replace Cooling Tower" a) This Modification Record documents the replacement of the existing Cooling Tower. The replacement of the Cooling Tower consisted of the demolition of the existing wood structure, removal of an asbestos containing basin liner, conversion of the existing basin to a structural slab, installation of a steel elevating structure, installation of three (3) current generation stainless steel modular towers, installation of associated piping and electrical components and supporting instrumentation, as well as repairs to the existing mechanical building.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 5-9, Section 5.4.6, Instrumentation: Delete: Entire paragraph under Section 5.4.6 Replace with: "The secondary water inlet and outlet temperatures to the primary and pool coolant heat exchangers, the coolant flow to the pool Page 25 of 40 coolant heat exchanger and the total flow in the secondary coolant system, are displayed and recorded in the reactor control room." Page 5-9, Section 5.4.7, Cooling Tower: Delete: Replace with: Entire paragraph under Section 5.4.7"The cooling tower is a stainless steel, induced-draft, cross-flow type, with three cells and two-speed fan assemblies for each cell. The tower is designed to cool 5,400 gallons (20,440 I) of water per minute to a temperature of 85 'F (29.4 'C) from an initial temperature of 115 'F (46.1 'C) at a maximum wet bulb temperature of 80 'F (26.7 'C).Vibration and low oil cutout switches are mounted on each fan assembly to secure the associated fan motor to prevent damage to the fan or cooling tower structure should an imbalance or low oil level condition develop. The number of fans and fan speed is configured as required to provide sufficient cooling for 10-MW operation." 11. Modification 11-01; "Flux-Trap hIradiation Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST) Instrument Channels" a) This Modification Record documents the addition of the FIRST device to the Reactor Safety System that ensures that the Center Test Hole Canister and its contents remain in place during reactor operation. The change is authorized by issuance of License Amendment No. 35 to Amended Facility License No. R-103. Installation of the FIRST device allows a change in the methodology that was previously used to calculate the reactivity contribution of samples loaded in the flux trap region.b) Modification performed under License Amendment No. 35 (issued February 9, 2012).c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 7-9, Table 7-1, Reactor Control Console Display Instruments: Add: "61 FIRST 62 FIRST Off-Bypass Off-Bypass 2 Pos. Key Lock 2 Pos. Key Lock" Page 7-51, Table 7-8, Reactor Scrams: Add: "15. Flux-Trap Irradiation Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST)" Page 7-51, Section 7.6.6, Surveillance: Replace with: "7.6.7 Surveillance" Page 7-51, New Section 7.6.6, Flux-Trap Irradiation Reactivity Safety Trip: Add: "The Flux-Trap Irradiation Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST) device consists of two instrument channels, including sensors, components and modules, which detect the position of the Center Test Hole Canister and converts that position into a logic input to the Reactor Safety System. The FIRST device is comprised of the following components: Center Test Hole Canister Wear Ring, Page 26 of 40 Sensor Switches, Support Rig, Relays and Power Supply, Safety System Interface, and FIRST Bypass Switches.The FIRST device provides protection against an excessive reactivity step insertion in the Flux Trap region. This is achieved by two independent position sensing switches mounted on a removable support rig at the top of the pressure vessel head. In the event the Center Test Hole Canister leaves its secured and latched position, a reactor scram and "PLI or FIRST Scram" annunciator are initiated by either or both of these sensing switches, which actuate auxiliary relays K61 and K62, which in turn interrupt logic unit inputs to E4A and E3B of the NCLU." Page 27 of 40 FACILITY MODIFICATIONS -YEAR 2013: 1. Modification 75-01, Addendum 3; "Rod Run-In Electronic Circuit Jumper Panel" a) This addendum to Modification Record 75-01, "Electronic Circuits Jumper Panel," documents the installation of a jumper panel dedicated to the rod run-in system. This jumper panel supports the use of the rod run-in system monitoring circuit installed under Modification Record 13-04.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 7-12/15, Table 7-3, Instrument Panel Instrumentation: Add: "138 Rod Run-In System Monitoring Circuit" 2. Modification 01-02, Addendum 9; "Intercommunication and Paging System Changes in Support of MURR Industrial Building (Room 299) Renovations" a) This addendum to Modification Record 01-02, "Installation of a New Reactor Facility Intercommunication and Paging System," documents changes to the facility Intercommunication and Paging System that will enhance communications in Rooms 299M, N and 0.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.3. Modification 01-02, Addendum 10; "Intercommunication and Paging System Changes in Support of MURR Industrial Building (Room 299), Room 243, Room 246 and Room 271 Renovations" a) This addendum to Modification Record 01-02, "Installation of a New Reactor Facility Intercommunication and Paging System," documents changes to the facility Intercommunication and Paging System that will enhance communications in MURR Industrial Building (Room 299), Room 243, Room 246 and Room 271B. It also documents the relocation of the Health Physics Office staff station from Room 288 to Room 271B.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.4. Modification 04-03, Addendum 1; "Liquid Radioactive Waste System In MURR Industrial Building" a) This addendum to Modification Record 04-03, "Liquid Radioactive Waste Modification," documents the changes required to incorporate the MURR Industrial Building (MIB)Liquid Radioactive Waste (LRW) system into the existing facility LRW system.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.Page 28 of 40

5. Modification 04-05, Addendum 8; "Cooling Tower Electrical Arc Flash Danger Mitigation" a) This addendum to Modification Record 04-05, "Cooling Tower Electrical Upgrade Project," documents the changes to Motor Control Center 1 in order to provide for improved arc flash protection and subsequent classification reduction of the cooling tower motor control center.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 8-2, Section 8.1.2, Description of System (1 st paragraph, last sentence):

Delete: "Substation A houses two main feeder breakers, one feeder breakers provides electrical power to a Motor Control Center (MCC) also located in the electrical equipment room, while the other breaker is an installed spare." Replace with: "Substation A houses a fused main feeder breaker and an in-line disconnect. These provide electrical power to a Motor Control Center (MCC) also located in the electrical equipment room." 6. Modification 11-03, Addendum 1; "Addition of Blow-Down Meter to the Data Acquisition Monitoring Systemn" a) This addendum to Modification Record 11-03, "Data Acquisition and Monitoring System for Secondary Coolant System," documents the installation of an additional component to the Data Acquisition and Monitoring System for the Secondary Coolant System. A secondary coolant blow-down transmitter and associated indication were installed to assist in monitoring the amount of secondary coolant that is required to be discharged to the sanitary sewer in order to maintain appropriate Secondary Coolant System chemistry control.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.7. Modification 12-01; "Replace PT-944A/B with Rosemount Transmitters" a) This Modification Record documents the replacement of two pressure transmitters, PT-944A and PT-944B, which measures reactor core outlet pressure in the primary coolant system. The previous pressure transmitters could not be directly replaced due to obsolescence of both the transmitters and repair parts. The replacement pressure transmitters meet or exceed the performance specifications of the previous transmitters. b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.8. Modification 12-02; "Control Blade Fabrication Alternative Using Laser Welding" a) This Modification Record documents a fabrication alternative for construction of the control blades. An assembly method using laser welding on the edge channels required a Page 29 of 40 change in the edge channel alloy. A more streamlined connection between the top mounting plate and the BORAL absorber plate was also documented. b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.9. Modification 13-01; "Replacement of TE-980A and TE-980B Power Supply 2PS5" a) This Modification Record documents replacement of the power supplies for the temperature instrument channels on Primary Coolant Heat Exchanger outlet temperatures, TE-980A and TE-980B. The previous power supply, 2PS5, was obsolete and unavailable for purchase. The replacement power supply EP-9 11 C meets or exceeds the performance specifications of the previous power supplies, and was relocated from behind the Instrument Cabinet to the former General Electric Measurement and Control (GE/MAC)rack on the Instrument Cabinet face.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following wording changes to the SAR are required: Page 7-12/15, Table 7-3, Instrument Panel Instrumentation: Add: "137 Isolated Power Supply (EP 911 C) -TE-980 A/B" 10. Modification 13-02; "Replacement of Secondary Chemistry Controllers" a) This Modification Record documents the replacement of the Secondary Coolant System pH and conductivity controllers. The previous model controllers had become obsolete and repair parts, were no longer available. The replacement controllers meet or exceed the performance specifications of the existing controllers. b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.11. Modification 13-03; "Replacement of the GH and IJ Wedge with a Single 60-Degree Wedge" a) This Modification Record documents the redesign and replacement of the 30-degree "GH" and "IJ" graphite reflector elements with a single 60-degree graphite reflector element (GHIJ). The new reflector element accommodates a 6-inch irradiation position as well as a 3-inch, two 2-inch and two 1-inch irradiation positions designated G-6, B-3, B-2 and R-2, G-1 and H-i, respectively. The 6-inch irradiation position is designed such that a sleeve insert with nickels bands may be installed to allow for manipulation of the flux profile.This insert is bolted securely to the element cover plate, and is inserted and/or removed only when the reactor is shutdown. The reflector element is constructed of aluminum 606 1-T6 with graphite in the void area.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.Page 30 of 40

12. Modification 13-04; "Rod Run-In Monitoring System" a) This Modification Record documents the implementation of a passive monitoring circuit on the rod run-in system to improve troubleshooting capabilities for rod run-in signals that are too short in duration to detect with the annunciator system. The monitoring circuit works in conjunction with a new jumper panel dedicated to the rod run-in system, and provides additional unused monitoring capacity for future troubleshooting expansion.

The monitoring circuit was constructed in a manner similar to the reactor scram system monitoring circuit.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.13. Modification 13-05; "T-300 & T-301 Level Sensing System" a) This modification to the Reactor Plant Make-Up Water Storage Tank System documents the replacement of the previous level sensing and annunciating instrument channels with current loop transmitters that also display the tank levels in the Control Room.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.14. Modification 13-06; "Modifications -to MURR Industrial Building (Room 299) in Support of the NS-99 Project" a) This Modification Record documents the remodeling of portions of the MURR Industrial Building (Room 299) to provide the necessary space needs and services required to support the dispensing system for the NS-99 Project.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.Page 31 of 40 FACILITY MODIFICATIONS -YEAR 2014: 1. Modification 86-01, Addendum 4; "Replacement of Graphite Reflector Element '51' -Reflector Tank Position 5A/Irradiation Position L6" a) This addendum to Modification Record 86-01, "Reflector Element 5A and 5B Replacement," documents the replacement of reflector element 51; the graphite element that accommodates irradiation position L6. Addenda I and 3 documented the replacement of the same element, which occurred in March 2000 and 2006, respectively. This reflector element was replaced with an element of similar design and this Modification Record was used as documentation for the replacement time, sequence, and pre- and post-maintenance tests. Replacement was due to demonstrated signs of binding between the irradiation sample holder and irradiation position inner wall.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.2. Modification 88-07, Addendum 3; "Exhaust Ventilation in MIB Eastward Expansion" a) This addendum to Modification Record 88-07, "Exhaust Ventilation Upgrade," documents the installation of radioactive exhaust ventilation in the newly expanded MURR Industrial Building (MIB). The system consists of charcoal and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter banks, constant volume control valves (CVCVs), hot cell ventilation exhaust fans, flow and pressure measurement devices, and associated ducting and dampers. The modification to the exhaust system in the MH3 eastward expansion is designed to maintain Rooms 299T, 299U and 299V at a slight negative pressure with respect to the surrounding areas; maintain hot cells HC-1 1A, HC- I B and HC-I IC at a negative pressure; provide the necessary charcoal and HEPA filtration to ensure radioactive airborne being released to the environment are kept at minimum concentrations; and provide continuous monitoring of all radioactive airborne releases discharged through the MIB Eastward Expansion exhaust ventilation system.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required 3. Modification 90-01, Addendum 3; "Evacuation System Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion" a) This addendum to Modification Record 90-01, "Evacuation Horns," documents changes to the facility Evacuation System that are necessary in order to safely occupy the MURR Industrial Building (MIB) Eastward Expansion. This modification adds three evacuations horns to the areas in the MIB Eastward Expansion. b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.Page 32 of 40

4. Modification 01-02, Addendum 11; "Intercom and Paging System Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion" a) This addendum to Modification Record 01-02, "Installation of a New Reactor Facility Intercommunication and Paging System," documents changes to the MURR Intercommunication and Paging System that will enhance communications in the MURR Industrial Building (MIB) Eastward Expansion through the addition of six paging speakers.The installation of an additional amplifier will reduce loading on existing paging speaker amplifiers throughout the facility, and provide capacity for future system growth facility-wide. It also documents the addition of a speaker in the Laboratory Building, as well as correcting minor discrepancies found during a speaker location audit.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.5. Modification 01-09, Addendum 5; "Emergency Electrical in MIB Eastward Expansion" a) This addendum to Modification Record 01-09, "Installation of Emergency Lighting Panel No. 1," documents the addition of loads to the Emergency Electrical Power System in the MURR Industrial Building (MIB) Eastward Expansion.

The addition will provide a single 120V circuit, supplied by the Diesel Room Distribution Panel, to the MIB Eastward Expansion for supplying emergency lighting.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.6. Modification 03-03, Addendum 1; "Fire Protection in North Office Addition" a) This addendum to Modification Record 03-03, "Installation of a Facility Fire Detection/Suppression System," documents the installation of an additional Fire Protection System in the North Office Addition (NOA) to the existing MURR Fire Detection/Suppression System. The new NOA system provides two functions: a detection system compromised of heat, smoke and remote manual devices, and a suppression system that incorporates a traditional sprinkler system with a pre-action system used in areas with sensitive electrical equipment. These systems are integrated with the remainder of the MURR Fire Detection/Suppression System at the new central control panel located in the Main Lobby. The control station continuously monitors each system component and will annunciate if any component is not in its normal condition. The sprinkler system is supplied by the MURR Fire Main Loop.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.7. Modification 03-03, Addendum 4; "Fire Protection System in the Shipping and Receiving Building" a) This addendum to Modification Record 03-03, "Installation of a Facility Fire Detection/Suppression System," documents the installation of an additional Fire Protection System in the new Shipping and Receiving Building (SaRB) to the existing MURR Fire Page 33 of 40 Detection/Suppression System. The SaRB system provides two functions: a detection system compromised of heat, smoke and remote manual devices, and a suppression system that incorporates a traditional sprinkler system. The sprinkler system is supplied directly from the University water distribution system and is separate from the MURR Fire Main Loop. The detection system is connected to the facility control station in the Main Lobby and will also annunciate if any component is not in its normal condition. b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.8. Modification 03-03, Addendum 5; "Fire Protection System Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion" a) This addendum to Modification Record 03-03, "Installation of a Facility Fire Detection/Suppression System," documents the installation of a Fire Protection System in the new MURR Industrial Building (MIB) Eastward Expansion. This phase of the modification only provides the addition of a traditional sprinkler system for the MIB Eastward Expansion stairwell and mezzanine areas. The sprinkler system will be connected to the existing MIB sprinkler header.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.9. Modification 03-03, Addendum 6; "Fire Protection System Changes in Support of the MiIB Eastward Expansion Fit-out" a) This addendum to Modification Record 03-03, "Installation of a Facility Fire Detection/Suppression System," documents the installation of additional Fire Protection System equipment in the newly constructed MURR Industrial Building (MIB) Eastward Expansion. The MIB Eastward Expansion system provides two functions: a detection system compromised of heat, smoke and remote manual devices, and a suppression system that incorporates a traditional sprinkler system. The sprinkler system is supplied from the MURR Fire Main Loop via the MIB sprinkler header. All of these systems and devices combine to form a complete Fire Detection/Suppression System and are integrated with the remainder of the MURR Fire Detection/Suppression System at the central control panel in the Main Lobby.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.10. Modification 04-03, Addendum 2; "Liquid Radioactive Waste in MIB Eastward Expansion" a) This addendum to Modification Record 04-03, "Liquid Radioactive Waste Modification," documents the changes required to extend facility Liquid Radioactive Waste (LRW) system to the eastward expansion of the MURR Industrial Building (MIB). This modification documents the installation of two lift stations and an elevator sump with associated connections to the existing MIB LRW header. Drainage from a small sink and eyewash station on the grade level is connected to a small lift station which in turn discharges to a Page 34 of 40 larger duplex lift station located in the MIB Eastward Expansion basement. The basement lift station also receives condensate from the air handling units, cooling coils of the air conditioning system and a sink in the grade level laboratory (Room 299V). The elevator sump discharges directly to the MIB LRW header.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.11. Modification 14-01; "hIterfacing MURR System Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion" a) This Modification Record was used to document the basic construction of the MURR Industrial Building (MIB) Eastward Expansion and as the initiating document to ensure that all systems related to emergency response have been identified and modified prior to safely occupying the facilities MIB Eastward Expansion. Actual modifications to these systems -facility evacuation, fire protection, intercommunication and paging, and emergency electrical power -were performed under addendums to previously approved Modification Records.The MIB Eastward Expansion provides approximately 2,880 ft 2 of usable space to the MURR facility. The building is construction Type II-B with a grade level floor of poured concrete designed for a heavy load rated. The basement flooring is also rated for heavy loads. The steel and concrete structure rests on pilings driven to bedrock. The east wall of the building has a masonry shield wall in part of the structure to reduce possible dose to the public. The building is equipped with standard heating ventilation and air conditioning. b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following changes to the SAR are required: Page 1-6, Figure 1.2, Grade Level Plan: Replace with: Updated Figure 1.2, Grade Level Plan (MURR Dwg No. 1145 Sheet 2 of 5)Page 1-10, Figure 1.7, South and West Elevation: Replace with: Updated Figure 1.6, South and West Elevation Page 6-8, Figure 6.2, Grade Level Floor Plan: Replace with: Updated Figure 1.2, Grade Level Plan (MURR Dwg No. 1145 Sheet 2 of 5)12. Modification 14-01, Addendum 1; "Construction of Usable Laboratory Spaces Within the Expanded MURR Industrial Building" a) This addendum to Modification Record 14-01, "Interfacing MURR System Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion," documents the construction of the usable laboratory spaces within, and extension of MURR systems to, the dedicated laboratory facility in the new eastward expansion to the MURR Industrial Building (MIB). The laboratory contains three adjoined and inter-connected hot cells located on the grade level. Each hot cell is heavily shielded with lead. The area to the rear of the cells, the cask loading area, is where the cell support facilities and equipment are Page 35 of 40 located and where cells inputs and outputs occur. The area in front of the cells, the operator area, is where the cell windows, manipulators, glove boxed and controls are located. There is an additional laboratory on the grade level and a full basement beneath the expansion. The extension of existing systems such as Fire Protection, Liquid Radioactive Waste, Radioactive Exhaust Ventilation and Electrical modifications were covered by addendums to existing Modifications Records.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) The following changes to the SAR are required: Page 1-6, Figure 1.2, Grade Level Plan: Replace with: Updated Figure 1.2, Grade Level Plan (MURR Dwg No. 1145 Sheet 2 of 5)Page 6-8, Figure 6.2, Grade Level Floor Plan: Replace with: Updated Figure 1.2, Grade Level Plan (MURR Dwg No. 1145 Sheet 2 of 5)13. Modification 14-02; "Normnal Electrical Distribution in MIB Eastward Expansion" a) This Modification Record documents the expansion of the Normal Electrical Power System for the eastward expansion to the MURR Industrial Building (MIfi). Electrical power will be supplied from the facility 2000-kVA transformer through high voltage panel HVP-3 and the 120/208V Distribution Center 1 to a newly installed high voltage panel HVP-3A and two new low voltage panels designated LP-46 and HC-1 1 Electrical Power Panel. All electrical components have sufficient capacity to provide the necessary loads and remain below an 80% overall panel loading.b) Modification performed under 10 CFR 50.59.c) No wording changes to the SAR are required.Page 36 of 40 In addition to the above mentioned changes to the SAR, the following changes are also required: Page 1-30, add the following to the end of Section 1.7.3: "Amendment 34 -Date of Issuance: October 10, 2008 Amendment 34 authorized the MURR to revise the requirements for the conduct of fueled experiments. This amendment allowed Technical Specification 3.6.o to be changed such that fueled experiments, with inventories of iodine-131 through -135 greater than 1.5 curies or strontium-90 greater than 5 millicuries, could be placed in irradiation containers that satisfy the requirements of Specification 3.6.i.Amendment 35 -Date of Issuance: February 9, 2012 Amendment 35 authorized the MURR to implement a flux-trap irradiations safety device to the reactor protective system. This amendment allowed an increase in irradiation capacity in the center test hole by removing the reactivity contribution of the sample holder while also allowing the use of the 6-barrel sample holder for movable samples.Amendment 36 -Date of Issuance: July 8, 2013 Amendment 36 changed Section 2.1, "Reactor Core Safety Limit," of the Technical Specifications. The Safety Limits were revised to correct an error caused by misinterpreting the definition of "diameter of heated surface" (Di) in the Bernath correlation as. "heated diameter" (Dh). Additionally, updated peaking factors were used based on modem analyses." Page 1-33, add the following to the end of Section 1.7.4: "December 2006 -Replacement of the Two Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers The two existing primary coolant system shell and tube-type heat exchangers (HX 503A and HX 503B) were replaced by heat exchangers of plate-type design. This replacement was necessitated by the degradation of the heat transfer capability of the heat exchangers since they were approaching the end of their design operational lifetime.December 2006 -Replacement of the Pool Coolant System Heat Exchanger The current plate-type pool coolant heat exchanger was replaced with the exact same model that was initially installed in 1995 (with 151 plates). Since installation in 1995, the pressure drop across the heat exchanger had steadily increased, which resulted in a decrease in total pool coolant system flow rate. An evaluation of the pool coolant heat exchanger was performed in February 2005 by the Engineering Firm Black & Veatch (B&V), Kansas City, Missouri. In the evaluation B&V states that due to the tight clearances between the plates, the heat exchanger will act like a filter and collect impurities in the water. Additionally, the maker of the heat exchanger (Graham Corporation) had previously inspected plates that had what appeared to be a thin layer of surface contaminants. Both of these are sufficient to cause an increase in the pressure drop across the heat exchanger. Installation of the new heat exchanger returned total pool coolant system flow rate to design values. Furthermore, replacement of certain sections of pool coolant system piping in order to reduce operational system head losses and therefore increase available system flow were also performed in conjunction with the replacement of pool coolant heat exchanger HX-52 1.Page 37 of 40 June 2014 -Construction of the Shipping and Receiving Building A Shipping and Receiving Building (SaRB) was constructed on-site to enhance the security at MURR by creating a location external to the main facility where packages are received, opened and examined prior to being transported into the facility.January_ 2012 -Replacement of the Cooling Tower The old cooling tower, which was a wood-framed, induced-draft, cross-flow type, with three cells and two-speed fan assemblies per cell, was replaced with a stainless steel, induced-draft, cross-flow type, with three cells and two-speed fan assemblies per cell. The new tower is designed to cool 5,400 gallons (20,440 1) of water per minute to a temperature of 85 IF (29.4'C) from an initial temperature of 115 IF (46.1 °C) at a maximum wet bulb temperature of 80°F (26.7 °C).June 2014 -Construction of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion An eastward expansion to the MURR Industrial Building (MIB) was constructed in order to provide additional laboratory space at MURR -1,440 ft 2 and 1,432 ft 2 of net usable space on the grade and the below grade levels, respectively. The grade level floor is poured concrete designed for a 125 lb/ft 2 live load with additional steel and concrete framing to support four (4)100,000 lb hot cells positioned next to each other anywhere along the North-South direction. The steel and concrete structure rests on pilings driven to bedrock. The below grade floor is also poured concrete designed to handle a 125 lb/ft 2 live load. Additionally, the floor can handle a 10,000 lb load on a 6 ft x 6 ft base plate." Modification Records, including the 50.59 Screens which supported these changes, are included as Attachments I through 9 and 19 through 21.Page 38 of 40

b. Provide a description of the review/approval process for the implementation of the significant facility changes (i.e., 50.59, License Amendment, etc.).As stated in Section a. above, each facility change was performed either under a License Amendment or 10 CFR 50.59. The method of review and approval is listed above.c. Provide a copy of the safety analysis, 50.59 review checklist/evaluation, and/or any updated SAR information for the significant facility changes. If not applicable, state the basis for the determination.

Safety analyses and 50.59 Screens are included as attachments. Any changes to the SAR are also described in Section a. above.d. Provide the relevant infornmation (50.59 review, safety analyses, updated SAR information) for the iodine facility.In addition to the Project Authorization (RL-76) and its 50.59 Screen, which describes the processing of iodine and its safety evaluation, the following eleven (11) facility modifications were performed in support the iodine facility: 1. Modification 14-01; "Interfacing MURR System Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion" (Attachment 8)2. Modification 14-01, Addendum 1; "Construction of Usable Laboratory Spaces Within the Expanded MURR Industrial Building" (Attachment 9)3. Modification Record 88-07, Addendum 3; "Exhaust Ventilation in MIB Eastward Expansion" (Attachment 10)4. Modification Record 90-0 1, Addendum 3; "Evacuation System Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion" (Attachment 11)5. Modification Record 0 1-02, Addendum 11; "Intercom and Paging System Changes in Support of the MURIR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion" (Attachment 12)6. Modification Record 01-09, Addendum 5; "Emergency Electrical in MIB Eastward Expansion" (Attachment 13)7. Modification Record 03-03, Addendum 5; "Fire Protection System Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion" (Attachment 14)8. Modification Record 03-03, Addendum 6; "Fire Protection System Changes in Support of the MIB Eastward Expansion Fit-out" (Attachment 15)9. Modification Record 04-03, Addendum 2; "Liquid Radioactive Waste in MIB Eastward Expansion" (Attachment 16)10. Modification Record 14-02; "Normal Electrical Distribution in MIB Eastward Expansion" (Attachment 17)Page 39 of 40

11. Modification Record 14-04; "Lab Inpex Iodine Duct Monitor" (Attachment 18)Project RL-76; "Production of 1-131 Radiochemical Sodium Iodide Solution," and 50.59 Screen No. 12-07; "Iodine-131 Processing Laboratory," are Attachments 22 and 23,' respectively.

Changes to the SAR in support of the iodine facility are described in Section a. above under the Modification Records.2. The proposed MURR Technical Specifications (TS) (see letter dated January 27, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14030A132), TS 5.2, "Reactor Coolant Systems, Exceptions" Specifications a and b, do not have supporting information in the SAR necessary to justify the TS Bases for each.Provide support information to explain the basis for TS 5.2, Exception a and b, or justify why no change is necessary. The bases for Technical Specification 5.2, Exceptions a and b, are implied in the bases for Specifications 5.2.a and 5.2.e.The basis for 5.2.a states: "Specification 5.2.a as excepted, permits reactor operation at 50% of full power in the event of a major component failure in which repairs cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time. The reactor was designed and has extensive safe operating history for operation at 50% of 10 MW cooling capacity. In this event, the shutdown system shall be secured in a manner such as to assure system integrity." The word "excepted" in the basis allows, for instance, a component, such as the primary coolant heat exchanger in the shutdown system (one of two parallel legs) to be removed for repairs while still allowing 5 MW operation with the operating system while not being in violation of Specification 5.2.a. Specification 5.2.c allows for Mode II operation with just one system, or leg.The basis for 5.2.a states: "Specification 5.2.e assures strength and corrosion resistance of the coolant system components and excepts some components in the instrumentation of the system which are not commercially available in the materials specified. The size of these components is such that a failure would not result in a hazard to safe operation of the reactor." The word "excepted" in the basis allows "...some components in the instrumentation of the system which are not commercially available in the materials specified. The size of these components is such that a failure would not result in a hazard to safe operation of the reactor." This exception allows for materials other than those stated in Specification 5.2.e.Page 40 of 40 ATTACHMENT 1 A AP-RO-l 15 Revision 2 MODIFICATION RECORD: LONG FORM Modification Number: 05-8 Modification Title: Replacement of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B Page No.1 2 3 4 5a-c 6 7 8 9 Page Title Modification Record: Long Form Modification Description Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Operator Review and Evaluation Operating Procedure Evaluation CP and PM Evaluation Parts Requirements Spare Parts and Technical Manual Requirements Required Date Yes No Completed_ 12 0-5K-(I12 -Z- 015"/I e-6 a"ro/-, .- i By (Initials) 50.59 Screen or Evaluation Completed: _(Asst. Reactor Manager -E gneering)Modification Approved: ( ReactorMan er)Modification Completed: ,4 (Reactor Mag Date: /2--- --g Date: /2- -e--O Date: /2-Z'-oc REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION Item No.1 2 3 4 Page Title Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review Reactor Advisory Committee Review U.S. NRC Review MURR Prints Updated Required Yes No Date Completed.)-?-o7 A,,/1, -Documented by (Initials) ,,d/Z.4 I Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

1 ORIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 2 I Modification Number: 05-8 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)The primary coolant system consists of the reactor pressure vessels, two main circulating pumps, two heat exchangers, two automatic isolation valves, a pressurizer, a closed in-pool convective cooling system (decay heat removal system), an in-pool invert loop and anti-siphon system, a fuel element failure monitoring system, a bypass loop for water clean-up, and associated piping and valves. Instrumentation is installed to monitor the system's operation, pressures, water temperatures, and flows.The primary coolant heat exchangers, designated as HX503A and HX503B, are tube-type, water-to-water shell, with removable tube bundles. The primary coolant flow makes two passes through the tube side of the heat exchanger with a velocity of no greater than 7 ft/sec. At a maximum of 1,600 gpm of secondary water flow and an inlet water temperature at 87 OF (31 OC), one heat exchanger is capable of removing 17E6 BTU/hr of heat from 1,800 gpm of primary coolant and returning it at 140 OF (60 OC). Two heat exchangers are installed for design power operation. This Modification Record will be used as the initiating document in a coordinated set of Addendums whose purpose is to replace the existing primary coolant heat exchangers, modify and upgrade existing flow detectors and associated instrumentation, replace affected primary coolant system piping, and replace and replumb affected secondary coolant system piping. Each major system modification (i.e. -Instrumentation, primary and secondary coolant system hydraulics) will be documented as a separate Addendum to this Modification Record. Each Addendum will include all of the information that a Long Form Modification Record contains: Modification Description, Hazards Summary Report Evaluation (including 50.59 Screening or Evaluation, if applicable), Reactor Safety Evaluation, Spare Parts Requirements, and any Operating or Compliance Procedure, Print, and/or PM revision required. Additionally, a formal crew evaluation, and subsequent review and approval by the Reactor Manager will be performed for each Addendum. The following two Addendums are proposed as the initial scope of work for this Modification Record.Modification Record 05-8, Addendum 1 will detail the instrumentation changes required to implement replacement of the primary coolant heat exchangers. This addendum primarily documents the changes associated with relocating two existing reactor safety system flow measurement instruments to new detectors, and associated changes to the control room Instrument Cabinet.Modification Description continued on Page 2a.2 Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

1 ORIGINAL AP-RO- 115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)Addendum 2 will detail the primary coolant system changes required to implement replacement of the primary coolant heat exchangers. This Addendum primarily documents the following five modifications: (1) the choice of the replacement heat exchangers; (2) the geometry of the primary coolant piping required to backfit the replacement heat exchangers; (3) replacement of the existing flow orifice flanges to provide additional independent flow detection output; (4) the geometry of the secondary coolant piping required to backfit the replacement heat exchangers; and (5) installation of additional secondary coolant piping and valves required to provide backflush capability for the new heat exchangers. The addendums described above are planned to be implemented during one week-long outage in December of 2006. Additional work coinciding with that outage includes: Replacement of the Pool Coolant System Heat Exchanger (Modification Record 94-4; Addendum I); Replacement of Pool Coolant System Piping (Modification Record 05-6); Updating the "White Rat" Overlays (Modification Record 75-16; Addendum 3); and Replacement of Graphite Reflector Elements 6, 7 and 8.2a Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

1 ORIGINAL AP-RO-I 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report'?Yes: ___No: Signature: Date: I___-_ _'-If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does involve a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda.Due to the extensive nature of and multiple systems affected by this modification, an HSR analysis will be performed for each Addendum and the suggested revisions to the HSR and its addenda, as required, will be documented in that Addendum. No specific references or suggestions will be stated here.3 Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

1 ORIGINAN AP-RO- 115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8 REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a safety hazard as described in 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Yes: No: __Signature: Z4*Date: /z-& -If YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. A 50.59 Screen (06-32) is attached which shows that the proposed activity may be implemented without further evaluation or license amendment. Specific impacts related to reactor safety are analysed in each of the planned Addendums to this Modification Record. An additional 50.59 Screen will be performed for each of those Addendums as well.Deliberate planning has been done to ensure the following reactor safety elements: 1. No significant impact to the thermal-hydraulic characteristics of the Primary Coolant System;2. No new mechanism for initiating a loss of coolant or loss of flow accident;3. No deviation from the Safety System Instrumentation requirements of the Technical Specifications;

4. No new or unreviewed mode of failure for the new plate-type heat exchangers or instrumentation components; and 5. No deviation from the single failure criteria of IEEE-279.4 Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

1 ORIGINAL AP-RO-l 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8 OPERATOR REVIEW AND EVALUATION Operators are asked to comment on any safety and/or operational concerns relating to the proposed change. Pleas indicate any additions, questions, or changes regarding the Hazards Summary Report and Reactor Safety evaluations. Name Comments_____.___,, _____,PJO't" 5a Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

1 ORIGINAL AP-RO- 115 Revision 2 I Modification Number: 05-8 OPERATOR REVIEW AND EVALUATION (CONT.)Name Comments 5b Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

1 ORIGINAI AP-RO-115 Revision 2 I Modification Number: 05-8 OPERATOR REVIEW AND EVALUATION (CONT.)Name Comments 5c Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

1 ORIGINAL AP-RO-I 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8 OPERATING PROCEDURE AND PRINT EVALUATION If a revision to, or a new Operating Procedure and/or Print are required in order to implement the change, note the Procedure or Print Number, Title, and Section and attach a copy of the proposed new or revised procedure or print.OPERATING PROCEDURES Number N/A Title Section Required revisions to any Operating Procedure will be specified in the applicable Addendum to this Modification Record.PRINTS Number N/A Title Required revisions to any Print will be specified in the applicable Addendum to this Modification Record.6 Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

1 ORIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8 COMPLIANCE AND PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE EVALUATION If a revision to, or a new Compliance and/or Preventative Maintenance Procedure are required in order to implement the change, note the Procedure Number, Title, and Frequency and attach a copy of the proposed new or revised procedure. COMPLIANCF PROCEDI IRES Title Number NIA Frequency Required revisions to any Compliance Procedure will be specified in the applicable Addendum to this Modification Record.Number N/A PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES Title Required revisions to any Preventative Maintenance Procedure will be specified in the applicable Addendum to this ModificationRecord. Frequency 7 Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

1 nRIGINAL AP-RO-115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8 PARTS REQUIREMENTS List all parts that are required in order to implement the change, noting Part Number, Description, and Quantity.Part Number None Part Description Required Parts will be specified in the applicable Addendum to this Modification Record.PO No.: Ordered From: Date: PO No.: Ordered From: Date: PO No.: Date: Ordered From: PO No.: Date: Ordered From: 8 Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

1 nRIGINAL AP-RO-l 15 Revision 2 I Modification Number: 05-8 SPARE PARTS and TECHNICAL MANUAL REQUIREMENTS List all spare parts and technical manuals that are required in order to implement the change, noting Part Number, Description, and Quantity, and Manual Title and where ordered from.Part Number N/A SPARE PARTS Part Description Reauired Spare Parts will be specified in the applicable Addendum to this Modification Record.PO No.: Date: PO No.: Date: Ordered From: Ordered From: PO No.: Date: PO No.: Date: Ordered From: Ordered From: TECHNICAL MANUALS Manual Title Ordered From Required Technical Manuals will be specified in the applicable Addendum to this Modification Record.9 Ree0Fr Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

1 AP-RR-003 Revision 4 50.59 SCREEN Activity Screening Number: 06-32 Page I of 2 Title: "Modification Record 05-8, Replacement of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B" Description of Activity (what is being changed and why): This Modification Record is the umbrella record for replacing the Primary System Heat Exchangers. Each addendum will also be separately screened based on the specific modifications described within them.Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safefiiciliity (i.e., x MURR) operations? YES NO If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design.Junction X described in the HSR? YES NO 2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a pIrocedurt that adversely affects how HSP X described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested? YES NO 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology X that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safet, analyses? YES NO 4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or exvpeirimeut not described in the HSR, where an SSC is X utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or YES NO is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? X YES NO It" all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approvcdfitclit procedure(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.If Screcen Question 5 is answered YES, then rcqttest and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question I, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation totto.( Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (-ISR, Technical Specitications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use page 2 of this foi-m to document your statements. Print Name Sign Name Date Preparer: Carl A. Herbold /2-7-0o-Reviewer: Reactor Manager: Les P. Foyto /c Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

1 AP-RR-003 Revision 4 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Activity Screening Number: 06-32 Page 2 of 2 Title: "Modification Record 05-8, Replacement of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B" If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessamy. ]I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designfwrction describcd in the HSR?No. The proposed activity does not involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR. The replacement heat exchangers and piping arrangement are chosen such that thermal and hydraulic performance will remain essentially unchanged. This ensures that the design function of the heat exchangers remains unchanged.

2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to aprocedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested'?No. The proposed activity does not involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects the performance, control or testing of HSR described SSC design functions.

The procedural changes required primarily reflect addition and relocation of instrumentation valving and nomenclature. One new procedure SM-RO-105 will provide detailed steps to perform the replacement. That procedure will also be separately screened for impacts to Reactor Safety.3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSI? described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safrty analyses?No. The proposed activity does not involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses. The heat exchangers were deliberately chosen such that assumptions and conclusions of the safety and accident analyses remain unchanged.

4. Does the proposed activity involve a lest or exyperinient not described in the UISR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a ranner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. The proposed activity does not involve a test or experiment not described, outside the reference bounds, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR.Instrumentation testing will be performed using approved post-maintenance and surveillance procedures, and the thermal and hydraulic performance testing will be performed using the approved new procedure SM-RO-105 described above. All testing will be performed within SSC reference bounds described in the HSR.List the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]HSR Section 5.2, 5.4, Figure 5.1, Addendum 3 Section 2.1, Figure 2.2, Addendum 4 Figure A.2, Appendix D, and Appendix E.Black and Veatch -Rep~lacement of Primary Coolant Evaluation Report (Proiect No. 400031)Technical Specifications 3.3, 3.9, 4.4, 5.2, 5.4, and Modification Record 05-8 Attachment 9.1 ATTA~f p~AP-RO- 115 Revision 2 MODIFICATION RECORD: LONG FORM Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 1 Modification Title: Replacement of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchan-qers HX 503A and HX 503B-Instrumentation Portion Page No.1 3 4 5a-c 6 7 8 9 Page Title Modification Record: Long Form Modification Description Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Operator Review and Evaluation Operating Procedure Evaluation CP and PM Evaluation Parts Requirements Spare Parts and Technical Manual Requirements Required Date Yes No Completed 7" /2--2-o,____ _____-a-J oc/- __ (2..- By (initials) 50.59 Screen or Evaluation Completed: (Asst. Reactor Manager -Engineering)

Modification Approved: -4Mant er (Reactor Man er)Modification Completed: (Reactor nager)Date: 1/2--/0-06" Date: /2-/16-o" Date: /2-C-oC REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION Item No.1 2 3 4 Page Title Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review Reactor Advisory Committee Review U.S. NRC Review MURR Prints Updated Required Yes No/7 Date Completed 3-9e?-07 A.. Documented by (Initias I Attachment

8.2 ORIGINAL

Aýtd 2 AP-RO-115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 1 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)Primary coolant system flow rate is currently measured at the following locations with the stated Flow Transmitters (FT) and Differential Pressure Sensors (DPS): (a) Downstream of Primary Coolant Heat Exchanger HX 503A -FT-912A;(b) Downstream of Primary Coolant Heat Exchanger HX 503B -FT-912E;(c) Differential pressure across Primary Coolant Heat Exchanger HX 503A -DPS-928A;(d) Differential pressure across Primary Coolant Heat Exchanger HX 503B -DPS-928B; and (e) Differential pressure across the reactor core -DPS-929.Primary coolant flow rate is recorded on a strip-chart, two-pen recorder mounted on the control room Instrument Panel. Differential pressure across orifice plates (FE-913A and FE-9138) located downstream of HX 503A and HX 503B is measured by FT-912A and FT-912E, respectively. The output signal generated by each flow transmitter is directed to a square root converter which provides a linear output signal to the recorder and a dual alarm unit. In addition to providing flow indication, the recorder will initiate a "Reactor Loop Lo Flow" annunciator alarm if primary coolant flow downstream of either heat exchanger decreases to 95% of the normal operating value. If primary coolant flow decreases to 90% of the normal value, a reactor scram and a "Reactor Loop Lo Flow Scram" annunciator alarm are initiated. The dual alarm unit for FT-912A opens a contact (K30-2) in the process input string to E4A of the reactor safety system non-coincidence logic units (NCLU), thereby interrupting power to the control blade electromagnets. The dual alarm unit for FT-912E opens a contact (K38-2) in the process input string to E3B of the NCLUs.A primary coolant low flow scram may also be initiated by a low differential pressure across the primary coolant heat exchangers. Differential pressure across HX 503A and HX 5038, which provides an indication of flow, is measured by DPS-928A and DPS-928B, respectively. The output signal produced by each differential pressure sensor is directed to an alarm unit. If primary coolant flow decreases to 90% of the normal operating value, a reactor scram is initiated. The alarm unit for DPS-928A opens a contact in the process input string to E3B of the safety system NCLUs, thereby interrupting power to the control blade electromagnets. The alarm unit for DPS-928B opens a contact in the process input string to E4A of the NCLUs. The alarm units will also de-energize relays 2K24 and 2K26, which will cause the following actions to occur: 1. "Low Primary HX Delta-P Scram" annunciator alarm is initiated; and 2. In-Pool Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves V546A and V546B open.As discussed in Modification Record 05-8, this addendum documents the instrumentation changes that are necessary to support the replacement of the current shell and tube-type primary coolant heat exchangers with new plate-type heat exchangers. Addendum 2 documents changes to the hydraulics of the primary and secondary coolant systems, namely the new heat exchangers and associated piping changes.Modification Description continued on Page 2a.2 Attachment 8.2 0 RIGINAL ,IIGJW E2AP-ROIl15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8. Addendum I MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)The following instrumentation changes will be performed in support of replacing the primary coolant heat exchangers: I. Removal of differential pressure sensors DPS-928A and DPS-928B, and their associated alarm units and electronic meters.2. Installation of new flow transmitters FT-912G and FT-912H, and their associated Square Root Converters, Alarm Units, and Flow Recorder. These new flow transmitters will perform all of the safety functions, including the opening of In-Pool Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves V546A and V546B, which DPS-928A and DPS-928B provided.3. Relocation of the Meter Relay Units for TE-980A and TE-980B to the vacated areas from which the electronic meters for DPS-928A and DPS-928B were removed.4. Relocation of the Primary and Pool Coolant Demineralizer Flow Recorder to the vacated area from which the Meter Relay Units for TE-98OAand TE-980B were removed.5. Installation of a new Primary Coolant Flow Recorder, which will support new flow transmitters FT-912G and FT-912H, in the location from which the Demineralizer Flow Recorder was removed.Replacement of the heat exchangers affords the opportunity to replace the current single set of sensor taps on the flanges for flow elements (orifices) FE-913A and FE-9131B. The new flanges will have two sets of taps, thus allowing two flow transmitters to be connected to a single flow orifice. This type of arrangement was first used at MURR when the pool coolant system heat exchangers were replaced in 1995. Although the MURR Technical Specifications allow the use of either a flow orifice or heat exchanger differential pressure to determine flow (TS 3.3.a, Note 1), the use of a calibrated flow orifice is much more desirable than using differential pressure across a heat exchanger. Installation of the new flanges will allow DPS-928A and DPS-928B, and all of their associated instrumentation, to be removed. The safety analysis to support the use of two flow transmitters on a single flow orifice, specifically conformance with IEEE-279, is discussed in detail in the Reactor Safety Evaluation section of this Modification Record.As shown on the Simplified Primarj, Flow Instrumentation Block Diagram found in Attachment 5, flow transmitter FT-912E, which is currently connected to FE-913B (Primary 'B' Loop), will be connected to the second set of sensor taps on flow element FE-913A (Primary 'A' Loop).Two new flow transmitters, FT-912G and FT-912H, will be installed and connected to FE-913B (Primary 'B' Loop). Two new square root converters (designated EP No. 919G and EP No.919H), two new dual alarm units (designated EP No. 920E/F and EP No. 920G/H), and a new flow recorder (designated EP No. 915G/H) will be installed and connected to the flow transmitters. Dual alarm unit EP No. 920A/B ("Yellow Leg") will actuate relay 2K26, which cause the In-Pool Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves V546A and V546B to open on a primary coolant low flow reactor scram, while dual alarm unit EP No. 920G/H ("Green Leg") will actuate relay 2K24 which will cause the same valves to open on the same type of scram.Modification Description continued on Page 2b.2a NRIGINAL Attachment 8.1 ATTýM"[2 AP-RO- 115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 1 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)The new flow transmitters will be of the same style that are currently installed; Rosemount Model 1 151 Differential Pressure Transmitter (0 to 750 inches of water). Rosemount Model 1151 's have been used at MURR since 1976 with no abnormal or significant failures.The new square root converters will be Moore Industries Square Root Transmitters, the same model that replaced the old General Electric Measurement and Control (GE/MAC) square root converters for the primary, pool and demineralizer flow transmitters under Addendums 4, 6 and 7 to Modification Record 01-4.The new dual alarm units will be Absolute Process Instruments, Inc. Model I0OOG, the same model that was installed for the primary and pool flow transmitters under Addendums 10 and 12 to Modification Record 01-4.The new flow recorder will be the same model that is currently installed to display and record primary coolant flow; a Honeywell Model DPR I OOC installed under Modification Record 99-I.Design specifications and any additional technical information regarding the instrumentation that will be added to the reactor systems by this proposed change are contained in the previously mentioned Modification Records and are not duplicated here. Additionally, all models are currently installed at MURR and have some degree of operational history with no abnormal or significant failures.Relocation of the meters and recorders to their new locations will ensure that all related process parameters are displayed in a logical order on the control room Instrument Panel.The following Attachments are included in this Modification Record: 1. Electronic Shop Review of Instrumentation Changes.2. Index of Changes.3. Instrumentation Changes Procedures.

4. MURR Instrumentation Drawings -Pre-Modification.

5. MURR Instrumentation Drawings -Post-Modification.

6. New Instrumentation Bench Calibration Data.7. Compliance and Operating Procedures Draft Changes.2b IGINf, Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

2 S2I GINA L AP-RO-! 115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 1 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: 7 No: Signatur .--..-' Date: /2-.7-OC If YES, make an analysis below and o .,e the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.Yes, this modification does involve a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda.Proposed instrumentation changes that are documented by this Modification Record are described or depicted in the following sections and prints of the HSR and its addenda: 1. Original HSR: a. Figure 5.1 (MURR Print No. 156, Sheet 1 of 1)b. Table 9.2 c. Figure 9.3 (MURR Print No. 74, Sheet 12 of 12)d. Figure 9.4 (MURR Print No. 139, Sheet 1 of 1)e. Section 9.8.2.1 2. Addendum 3: a. Section 2.1.3.1 b. Section 2.5.3.2 c. Section 2.5.3.5 d. Section 2.5.3.6 3. Addendum 4: a. Section A.3.3.5 b. Section A.3.16 c. Figure A.1 (MURR Print No. 139, Sheet 1 of 1)d. Figure A.2 (MURR Print No. 156, Sheet 1 of 1)e. Figure A.3 (MURR Print No. 41, Sheet 3 of 4)f. Figure A.4.a (MURR Print No. 42, Sheet 1 of 2)g. Figure A.5 (MURR Print No. 41, Sheet 1 of 4)h. Figure A.6 (MURR Print No. 41, Sheet 2 of 4)i. Figure A.6 (MURR Print No. 138, Sheet 1 of 2)Hazards Summary Report Evaluation continued on Page 3a.3 Attachment

8.2 ORIGINAL

ATTAN E T2 Li IAP-RO-1 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum I HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION (con't)The following sections and prints of the HSR and its addenda will be revised as follows: 1. Original HSR: a. Figure 5.1 (MURR Print No. 156, Sheet I of 1) will be revised as per the attached draft print.b. Table 9.2 will be revised as follows: Change: "26 Primary Coolant HX503A Outlet Temperature Meter -TE 980A" to"26 Primary & Pool Coolant Demineralizer Flow Recorder -2 Pen" Change: "27 Primary Coolant HX503A Outlet Temperature Meter -TE 980B" to"27 Dual Alarm Unit (EP 920E/F) Primary Low Flow Scram" Change: "43 Square Root Transmitter (EP 919E) -Primary Flow "B" Loop" to"43 Square Root Transmitter (EP 919E) -Primary Flow "A" Loop" Change: "46 Alarm Unit -Pressurizer Water Level" to"46 Square Root Transmitter (EP 919G) -Primary Flow "B" Loop" Change: "89 Primary Coolant System Flow Recorder -2 Pen" to"89 Primary Coolant System "A" Loop Flow Recorder -2 Pen" Change: "190 Pool Coolant System Flow Recorder -2 Pen" to"90 Primary Coolant System "B" Loop Flow Recorder -2 Pen" Change: "91 Primary & Pool Coolant Demineralizer Flow Recorder -2 Pen" to"91 Pool Coolant System Flow Recorder -2 Pen" Change: "100 Primary Coolant HX503A Differential Pressure Meter -DPS 928A" to"100 Primary Coolant HX503A Outlet Temperature Meter -TE 980A" Hazards Summary Report Evaluation continued on Page 3b.3a ORIGIN!'Attachment 8.1 ATTA,.-, 1 NT. 2 KA L AP-RO-1 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum I HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION (con't)Change: "101 Primary Coolant HX503B Differential Pressure Meter -DPS 928B" to"101 Primary Coolant HX503B Outlet Temperature Meter -TE 980B" Add: "133 Dual Alarm Unit (EP 920G/H) Primary Low Flow Scram" Add: "134 Square Root Transmitter (EP 919H) -Primary Flow "B" Loop" c. Figure 9.3 (MURR Print No. 74, Sheet 12 of 12) will be revised as per the attached draft print.d. Figure 9.4 (MURR Print No. 139, Sheet I of I) will be revised as per the attached draft print.e. Section 9.8.2.1 will be revised as follows: "The reactor loop flow measurement system includes two orifice plates, one in each of the two heat exchanger legs. Flow, as measured by two transmitters connected to each orifice plate, is recorded on two, two-pen recorders mounted on the control room Instrument Panel. The orifice plate flow measuring channels will alarm at approximately 95% of normal flow. At approximately 90% of normal flow the core isolation valves, reactor convective loop valves, and the siphon break valves operate as the reactor scrams." 2. Addendum 3 a. Section 2.1.3.1 will be revised by adding the following paragraph at the end of the section: "In December 2006, DPS 928A and DPS 928B were removed as part of the primary coolant heat exchanger replacement project which consisted of replacing the tube and shell-type heat exchangers with plate-type heat exchangers. New dual tap flanges were installed for flow orifices 913A and 913B, which allowed an additional flow transmitter to be connected to each heat exchanger leg, thus eliminating the need for DPS 928A and DPS 928B." b. Section 2.5.3.2 will be revised by adding the following paragraph at the end of the section: "In December 2006, DPS 928A and DPS 928B were removed as part of the primary coolant heat exchanger replacement project which consisted of replacing the tube and shell-type heat exchangers with plate-type heat exchangers. New dual tap flanges were installed for flow orifices 913A and 913B, which allowed an additional flow transmitter to be connected to each heat exchanger leg, thus eliminating the need for DPS 928A and DPS 928B." c. Section 2.5.3.3 will be revised by adding the following paragraph at the end of the section: "In December 2006, DPS 928A and DPS 928B were removed as part of the primary coolant heat exchanger replacement project which consisted of replacing the tube and shell-type heat exchangers with plate-type heat exchangers." Hazards Summary Report Evaluation continued on Page 3c.3b Attachment

8.1 RIGINAL

ATTA6I 1 T~p4 2 AP-RO- 115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum I HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION (con't)d. Section 2.5.3.5 will be revised as follows: Add the following three paragraphs after the second paragraph: "In December 2006, as part of the primary coolant heat exchanger replacement project, which consisted of replacing the tube and shell-type heat exchangers with plate-type heat exchangers, new dual tap flanges were installed for flow orifices 913A and 913B. This allowed an additional flow transmitter to be connected to each heat exchanger leg. The following paragraphs describe how flow through the heat exchangers is now monitored. Flow of heat exchanger 503A is monitored by flow element 913A, flow transmitters 912A and 912E, square root transmitters 919A and 919E, electronic alarms 920A and 920C, and recorder 915A/B.Flow of heat exchanger 503B is monitored by flow element 913B, flow transmitters 912G and 912H, square root transmitters 919G and 919H, electronic alarms 920E and 920G, and recorder 915G/H." Revise the third paragraph as follows: "Output logic of the dual electronic alarm units EP 920A, EP 920C, EP 920E, and EP 920G determine the scram functions, alarms and control circuitry for 5 and 10 MW operation." e. Section 2.5.5.1 will be revised by adding the following paragraph at the end of the section: "In December 2006, DPS 928A and DPS 928B were removed as part of the primary coolant heat exchanger replacement project, which consisted of replacing the tube and shell-type heat exchangers with plate-type heat exchangers." 3. Addendum 4 a. Section A.3.3.5, the second paragraph will be revised as follows: "Reactor flow is the sum of flows through two heat exchangers for 10 MW operation. Flow scram signals are developed by measuring the pressure drop across orifice plates with multiple taps and generating a trip from any one of the following Alarm Units: 920A, 920C, 920E or 920G. Auxiliary or internal relays from these alarm units open inputs E4A and E3B to the noncoincidence logic units (Figure A.])." b. Section A.3.16 will be revised by adding the following paragraph at the end of the section: "In December 2006, DPS 928A and DPS 928B were removed as part of the primary coolant heat exchanger replacement project; therefore, heat exchanger differential pressure is no longer used." c. Figure A. I (MURR Print No. 139, Sheet I of 1) will be revised as per the attached draft print.d. Figure A.2 (MURR Print No. 156, Sheet I of 1) will be revised as per the attached draft print.e. Figure A.3 (MURR Print No. 41, Sheet 3 of 4) will be revised as per the attached draft print.Hazards Summary Report Evaluation continued on Page 3d.3c Attachment 8.1? ,IGINAL A T T APN"A41 2 AP-RO- 115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum I HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION (con't)f. Figure A.4.a (MURR Print No. 42, Sheet 1 of 2) will be revised as per the attached draft print.g. Figure A.5 (MURR Print No. 41, Sheet I of 4) will be revised as per the attached draft print.h. Figure A.6 (MURR Print No. 41, Sheet 2 of 4) will be revised as per the attached draft print.i. Figure A.7 (MURR Print No. 138, Sheet I of 2) will be revised as per the attached draft print.NOTE: Addendum 3 was submitted to the Atomic Energy Agency in support of MURR's application for an Amendment to reactor license R-l103 to allow operation at the full design power of 10 MWs. Much of the information contained in Addendum 3 was of the proposed upgrade design, not the current as-built. Addendum 4 documented the final design; therefore information that is contained in Addendum 3 that does not depict the current design is corrected in Addendum 4.3d Attachment 8.1 KIGINAhl, ATTAQJ14 T2 AP-RO-l115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 1 REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a safety hazard as described in 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: 1. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Yes: No: v/ Signature: .,a-,---..Date: /s--(If YES, the change must be performed sý g a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. A 50.59 Screen (06-33) is attached which shows that the proposed activity may be implemented without further evaluation or license amendment. Technical Specification 3.3.a states that four (4) instrument channels are required to provide a primary coolant low flow scram in Mode 1 (10 MW) operation and two (2) are required for Mode 11 (5 MW) operation. Note (1)of this Specification states: "Flow orifice or heat exchanger delta-P (psi) in each operating heat exchanger leg corresponding to the flow value in the table." The proposed modification will still satisfy the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.a.Primary coolant loss of flow and coolant accidents are analyzed in Appendix D and E of Addendum 4 to the Hazards Summary Report, respectively. This modification does not change the assumptions or alter the results or conclusions of either accident.The proposed modification of connecting two flow transmitters to a single flow orifice must also be evaluated to ensure the single failure criteria of IEEE-279, "Criterion for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," are still met.Reactor Safety Evaluation continued on Page 4a.4 Attachment 8.2 ,GINAL ATTA~tiAP-RO-1 115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8. Addendum I REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION (con't)Appendix A of Addendum 4 describes how the reactor protective system was redesigned for the 10 MW upgrade such that the system met all the applicable criteria of IEEE-279. This Appendix was reviewed in detail to ensure that the proposed instrumentation modification still meets all the applicable criteria of IEEE-279. The primary coolant low flow scram instrument channels satisfy the definition of Channel Independence in IEEE-279 and would continue to satisfy the single failure criteria of the same document. Furthermore, IEEE-279 states, regarding the derivation of system inputs, that "To the extent feasible and practical, protection system inputs shall be derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables." Use of a flow orifice instead of heat exchanger differential pressure to determine system flow rate more closely satisfies this criterion. Additionally, the following regulatory documents were also reviewed to ensure that the proposed modification did not involve a question pursuant to 50.59.The sensing lines for the two transmitters will be located on opposite sides of the flow orifice flange. Each flow transmitter will be connected to the primary coolant flow scram instrument channels as described in this Modification Record. The two flow transmitters will not share any common sensing lines. This is consistent with the guidance in NRC Regulatory Guide I. 151, Instrument Sensing Lines.The channel independence of the sensing lines connected to the single flow orifice meet the guidance in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.75, Physical Independence of Electrical Systems. This Regulatory Guide references and incorporates Draft IEEE Standard, "Criteria for Separation of Class IE Equipment and Circuits," dated July 20, 1973. Section 5.8.2 of this draft Standard, under the heading Sensor to Process Connections, states: "...redundant pressure taps located on opposite sides of a large pipe may be considered to be separated by the pipe, but the lines leaving the taps must be protected against damage from a credible common cause unless other redundant or diverse instrumentation is provided." In MURR's case, the sensing lines from each orifice plate to the flow transmitters will be brought out of opposite sides of the flange and routed so that a credible failure could not disable both sets of sensing lines on each flow orifice. The backup scrams from core differential pressure and the primary coolant isolation valves V507A and V507B provide additional redundancy. 4a Attachment 8.1 ATTACJ"Ft2 AP-RO-I 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 1 OPERATOR REVIEW AND EVALUATION Operators are asked to comment on any safety and/or operational concerns relating to the proposed change. Pleas indicate any additions, questions, or changes regarding the Hazards Summary Report and Reactor Safety evaluations. Name Comments 5a Attachment 8.2 2 G1N/t ATTACHENT 2 AP-RO-i 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 1 OPERATOR REVIEW AND EVALUATION (CONT.)Name Comments 5b Attachment

8.2 qGINAL

ATTACHME 2 AP-RO-115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 1 OPERATOR REVIEW AND EVALUATION (CONT.)Name Comments 5c Attachment

8.2 ATTAC1NT

2 AP-RO-I115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 1 OPERATING PROCEDURE AND PRINT EVALUATION If a revision to, or a new Operating Procedure and/or Print are required in order to implement the change, note the Procedure or Print Number, Title, and Section and attach a copy of the proposed new or revised procedure or print.OPERATING PROCEDURES Number AP-RO-110 FM-43 Title"Conduct of Operations""Nuclear and Process Data Sheet" Section Table 10.2 PRINTS Number 41 (Sheet 1 of 4)41 (Sheet 2 of 4)41 (Sheet 3 of 4)42 (Sheet 1 of 2)74 (Sheet 12 of 12)79 (Sheet 1 of 1)138 (Sheet 1 of 2)139 (Sheet 1 of 1)156 (Sheet 1 of 1)1137 (Sheet 1 of 2)1137 (Sheet 2 of 2)1386 (9 Sheets)Title"Process Instrumentation Control & interlock""10 MW Process Instrumentation Control & interlock (Temperature Inst.)""Process Instrumentation Control & interlock""Reactor Control System""Instrument Cabinet""10 MW Annunciator""Annunciator Control 10 MW.""Safety System""Piping & Instrument Diagram""Jumper Board Connections Panel Layout""Jumper Board Connections Jumper Functions""Relay Schedule" 6 Attachment 8.2:" INAL ATTACHMENT 2.N AL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 1 COMPLIANCE AND PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE EVALUATION If a revision to, or a new Compliance and/or Preventative Maintenance Procedure are required in order to implement the change, note the Procedure Number, Title, and Frequency and attach a copy of the proposed new or revised procedure. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES Number CP-23 CP-4A CP-4B CP-4C CP-4D Title"DPS 928A, DPS 928B and DPS 929""Primary Flow Transmitter 912A and Calibration and Scram Point Check of Flow Alarm 920A""Primary Flow Transmitter 912E and Calibration and Scram Point Check of Flow Alarm 920C""Primary Flow Transmitter 912G and Calibration and Scram Point Check of Flow Alarm 920E""Primary Flow Transmitter 912H and Calibration and Scram Point Check of Flow Alarm 920G" Frequency Semi-Annual Semi-Annual Semi-Annual Semi-Annual Semi-Annual PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES Title N umber No Changes Frequency 7 Attachment 8.2 d INAL ATTACHMENT 2.NAL AP-RO- 115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 1 PARTS REQUIREMENTS List all parts that are required in order to implement the change, noting Part Number, and Quantity.Description, Part Number SRT/1 0-50ma/1 17ac(AB)API 1000 G -Option L DPR 100C Model 1151 (0-750" H20)Part Description Moore Industries Square Root Transmitter Absolute Process Instruments, Inc. DC Input Alarm Trip Honeywell Chart Recorder Rosemount Differential Pressure Transmitter Qty.2 2 2 PO No.: C0000032558 Date: N/A Ordered From: Emerson Process Management Rosemount, Inc.8200 Market Blvd ChanhasChanhassen, MN 55317 PO No.: N/A Date: 3/20/06 Ordered From: Mod-Tronic 1 Delta Park Blvd No. 12 Brampton, ON L6T 5G1 PO No.: C0000025655 Date: N/A Ordered From: Gateway Controls Inc.1302 West Lark Industrial Park Fenton, MO 63026 PO No.: Ordered From: Date: 8 Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

2-iit~AP-RO-1 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 1 SPARE PARTS and TECHNICAL MANUAL REQUIREMENTS List all spare parts and technical manuals that are required in order to implement the change, noting Part Number, Description, and Quantity, and Manual Title and where ordered from.SPARE PARTS Part Description Qty.Part Number SRT/1 0-50ma/1 17ac(AB)API 1000 G -Option L DPR 100C Model 1151 (0-750" H201 Moore Industries Square Root Transmitter Absolute Process Instruments, Inc. DC Input Alarm Trip Honeywell Chart Recorder Rosemount Differential Pressure Transmitter 1-I-NOTE: All of the items listed above are Dart of an overall soare parts inventory. All four components are also used in other instrumentation systems which support the reactor.PO No.: C0000032558 Date: N/A Ordered From: Emersnn Process Rosemount-Inc, 8200 Market Blvd PO No.: N/A Date: 3/20/06 Ordered From: Mod-Trnnin 1 Delta Park Blvd No- 12 Bramoton. ON L6T 5G1 PO No.: C0000025655 Date: N/A Ordered From: Gateway -nntrnls Inc 1302 West Lark Industrial Park Fenton, MO 63026 PO No.: Ordered From: Date: Ordered From TECHNICAL MANUALS Manual Title Ordered From DPR 100C Product & Operating Manual API 1000/1020 G Installation and Setup Instructions SRT/1 0-50ma11 17ac(AB) Installation and Setup Instructions Model 1151 Installation and Setup Instructions Honeywell Provided with Alarm Unit Provided with Square Root Transmitter Provided with Differential Pressure Transmitter 9 UAL Attachment 8.2 0 A A(EVT 2 AP-RR-003 Revision 4 50.59 SCREEN Activity Screening Number: 06-33 Page 1 of 2 Title: Modification Record 05-8, Addendum 1; "Replacement of Primary Coolant Heat Exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B -Instrumentation Portion" Description of Activity (what is being changed and why): This Modification Record documents the instrumentation changes associated with replacing the primary coolant system heat exchangers. The major change is replacing DPS-928A and DPS-928B with FT-912G and FT-912H.Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safe facility (i.e., _'_MURR) operations? YES NO If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function ___ __.described in the HSR? YES NO 2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR '1' !__described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested? YES NO 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology -__that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses? YES NO 4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is _ IX utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or YES NO is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? X YES NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approved facility procedure(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use page 2 of this form to document your statements. Print Name Sizý ame Date Preparer: Brian Jacobi _ a:: I" /I*Reviewer: Carl Herbold Reactor Manager: Les P. Foyto =Z ,1,1 /,-/C-oc Attachment 9.1 'CH-M T 2 AP-RR-003 Revision 4 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Activity Screening Number: 06-33 Page 2 of 2 Title: Modification Record 05-8, Addendum 1; "Replacement of Primary Coolant Heat Exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B -Instrumentation Portion" If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessary. ]1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR?No, the proposed activity involves a change to an SSC that does not adversely affect any HSR described design function. The replacement of DPS-928A and DPS-928B, heat exchanger differential pressure sensors, with FT-912G and FT-912H, flow orifice-type detectors and associated instrumentation, provides for an equal or better flow indication within the bounds of the HSR.2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No, the proposed activity does not affect the performance, control or testing of HSR-described SSC design functions. All procedure changes made via Modification Record 05-8, Addendum 1, merely reflect the listed changes to instrumentation.

3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?No, the proposed activity does not involve any evaluation methodology used to establish the design bases or used in the safety analyses.

The instrumentation changes provides for an equal or better flow indication and response within the bounds of the HSR.4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No, the proposed activity involves no test or experiment outside the reference bounds of the HSR. Instrumentation testing will be performed using approved post-maintenance and surveillance procedures. List the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]Technical Specifications 3.3.a, 4.4.d, and 5.4; HSR: Figures 5.1, 9.3, and 9.4, Table 9.2, and Section 9.8.2.1; Addendum 3: Sections 2.1.3.1, 2.5.3.2, 2.5.3.5, and 2.5.3.6; Addendum 4: Sections A.3.3.5 and A.3.16, and Figures A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4.a, A.5, A.6, and A.7; Modification Record 05-8, Addenda 1 and 2 Attachment

9. 1 ATTACHMENT 3 ORIGINAL MODIFICATION RECORD: LONG FORM AP-RO- 115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 Modification Title: Replacement of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B-Heat Exchanger and Piping Portion Page No.1 2 3 4 5a-c 6 7 8 9 Page Title Modification Record: Long Form Modification Description Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Operator Review and Evaluation Operating Procedure Evaluation CP and PM Evaluation Parts Requirements Spare Parts and Technical Manual Requirements Required Yes No Date Completed/-y'--o0/ -F-0 C" J- r- o5/2- t-06" ,Z-d-O&"/2- d"-o O" ,z.- 6-05 By (Initials) 50.59 Screen or Evaluation Completed:

Modification Approved: Modification Completed: (Asst. Reactor Manager -Engineering)(Reactor M ager)\EV(Reactor F-anager)REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION Date: /Z o IL Date: 1. -&---o£Date: /2-z2A. -oL Item No.1 2 3 4 Page Title Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review Reactor Advisory Committee Review U.S. NRC Review MURR Prints Updated Required Date Yes No Completed 3 ---'I -,-I/~ ~ I Documented by (Initials) ORIGINAL Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

3 ORIGINAL AP-RO- 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)This Addendum to Modification Record 05-8 will detail the primary and secondary coolant system changes required to implement replacement of primary coolant heat exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B as initially discussed in Modification Record 05-8. Addendum 1 documents the instrumentation changes desired and required by the heat exchanger replacement. This Addendum will primarily document the following five hydraulic modifications:

a. The choice of the replacement heat exchangers;

b. The geometry of the primary coolant piping required to backfit the replacement heat exchangers;

c. Replacement of the existing flow orifice flanges to provide additional independent flow detection;

d. The geometry of the secondary piping required to backfit the replacement heat exchangers; and e. Installation of additional secondary coolant piping and valves required to provide backflush capability for the replacement heat exchangers.

The current primary coolant heat exchangers are water-to-water shell and tube-type with removable tube bundles. The tubes, and all materials in contact with reactor coolant water, are of stainless steel. The reactor coolant flows on the tube side of the exchanger with a velocity not in excess of 7 ft/sec. One heat exchanger is capable of removing 17E6 Btu/hr from 1800 gpm of coolant water and returning it at 140 IF, using a maximum of 1600 gpm of secondary water flow with its inlet water temperature at 87 OF. Two such heat exchangers are installed for design power operation at 10 MW.Differential pressure across HX 503A and HX 503B, which provides an indication of flow, is currently measured by DPS-928A and DPS-928B, respectively. These differential pressure sensors provide a flow signal which can initiate a reactor scram, annunciate the "Low Primary HX Delta-P Scram," and open In-Pool Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves V546A and V546B.The secondary coolant system provides a flow of cooling water to transfer heat from the primary and pool coolant system by means of heat exchangers HX 503A, HX 503B, and HX 521, respectively. Secondary coolant is throttled automatically by automatic temperature control Valve S-1. This valve bypasses secondary coolant around HX 503A and HX 503B to maintain primary coolant return temperature as measured by temperature element TE-901A at its desired set point.The shell sides of HX 503A and HX 503B, which are in contact with the secondary coolant, are constructed of carbon steel. These shells have required multiple repairs due to leaks, and are approaching the end of their operational lifetime due to the degrading integrity of the carbon steel shells. It is proposed to replace these heat exchangers with two 50% capacity plate and frame-type heat exchangers. Modification Description continued on Page 2a.2 ORIGINAL Attachment 8.2 rfttwA~LT 3 AP-RO-I 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)An evaluation (Attachment I) of the replacement of the primary coolant heat exchangers was performed in December, 2004 by the Engineering Firm Black & Veatch (B&V), Kansas City, Missouri. That report concluded that the existing shell and tube-type heat exchangers may be replaced by two plate and frame-type heat exchangers with equivalent cooling capacity and with minimal piping modifications. Additionally, modeling was performed to verify that the following three major operational objectives were accomplished by the proposed design change.1. The existing Primary and Secondary Coolant Pumps are adequate to provide the required cooling flow for their respective systems (Attachment 1, pg I-I).2. When operating at 10 MW, the primary coolant heat exchangers maintain primary coolant Tc at 120 'F with a secondary coolant system that is also maintaining pool coolant Tc at 100 *F using a heat exchanger with 151 plates, and temperature control valves S-I and S-2 in the middle of their flow bands (50%), and outside dew-point at the highest possible (Attachment i, pg 2-2).3. Heat exchangers chosen such that flow rate versus pressure drop across the primary coolant side remains essentially unchanged from the existing configuration. This ensures that no deviation from the existing Safety Analysis and Accident Analyses occurs. The replacement heat exchangers will therefore function as a component replacement from the perspective of thernmo-hydraulic performance (Attachment 1, pg 3-4).The Graham Corporation plate and frame-type heat exchangers recommended by B&V are GPE-60 Model heat exchangers with 1200 square feet of heat transfer surface area using 201 plates (Attachment 2). The replacement heat exchangers will occupy roughly the same locations in Mechanical Equipment Room 114 as the existing heat exchangers with the exception that they are physically far smaller. They will retain the existing designations of HX 503A and HX 503B.MURR has a 10 year operational performance history using plate and frame-type heat exchangers since installation of the existing pool coolant heat exchanger HX 521 in 1995 (See Modification Record 94-4).Due to the geometry of the replacement heat exchangers and their piping connections, it is necessary to replace certain sections of the primary coolant system piping. Detailed specifications for this piping geometry are provided by B&V and included as Attachment 3.Existing system design requirements were met or exceeded in material specification, fabrication, and integrity evaluation. Detailed documentation for material, fabrication and integrity of the replacement piping components is included as Attachment

5. Procurement and fabrication of the replacement piping components was accomplished by MURR. Installation of the piping components will be accomplished by an outside contractor.

Replacement of the heat exchangers affords the opportunity to replace the current single set of sensor taps on the flanges for flow elements (orifices) FE-913A and FE-913B. The new flanges have two sets of taps, thus allowing two flow transmitters to be connected to single flow orifice.Sensing lines will have high point vent valves installed to facilitate system venting.Modification Description continued on Page 2b.2a ORIGINAL Attachment 8.1 AP-RO- 115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)This results in the addition of the following eight 1/22-inch stainless steel ball valves (shown on revised MURR Print No. 156): 599AM, 599AN, 599AO, 599AP, 599AQ, 599AR, 599AS, and 599AT. The two new flow transmitters FT-912G and FT-912H will have test fitting isolation valves that were not present with DPS-928A and DPS-928B. This results in the addition of the following four 1/-inch stainless steel ball valves (also shown on revised MURR Print No. 156): 599AU, 599AV, 599AW, and 599AX.This type of arrangement is currently in use in measuring pool coolant system flow, and has been shown to provide superior flow measurement and input to the reactor safety system than the use of differential pressure across a heat exchanger. Installation of the new flanges will allow DPS-928A and DPS-928B to be removed. Detailed explanation and analysis of the instrumentation changes is available in Modification Record 05-8, Addendum 1.Again, due to the geometry of the replacement heat exchangers and their piping connections, it is necessary to replace certain sections of the secondary coolant system piping. Detailed specifications for this piping geometry are provided by B&V and included as Attachment 4.Existing system design requirements were met or exceeded in material specification, fabrication, and integrity evaluation. Procurement, fabrication and installation of the secondary coolant system piping components will be accomplished by an outside contractor. One notable exception to the replacement piping is the relocation of the existing piping arrangement for temperature control valve S-I to the North wall of Mechanical Equipment Room 114. Each heat exchanger will be equipped with a secondary side relief valve to provide overpressure protection when the heat exchanger is isolated. These two relief valves (S-70 and S-71) will be set to 125 psig, as are the other secondary coolant system relief valves Due to the tight plate-to-plate clearances in these heat exchangers, the secondary side acts as a strainer and collects impurities over time. To mitigate this strainer effect and maintain optimal operational flexibility, B&V has provided the piping and valves required to back-flush the replacement heat exchangers. Back-flushing will be accomplished as required using procedural steps specified in the attached draft revision to OP-RO-480, "Secondary Coolant System." The modifications described above are planned to be implemented during one week-long outage in December of 2006. Additional work coinciding with that outage includes: Replacement of the Pool Coolant System Heat Exchanger (Modification Record 94-4; Addendum I); Replacement of Pool System Piping (Modification Record 05-6); Revision of "White Rat" Overlays (Modification Record 75-16, Addendum3); and replacement of the north side graphite reflector elements (6, 7, and 8).Modification Description continued on Page 2c.ORI&INAL Attachment 8.1 f ýTAý H.C I U AP-RO-1 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8. Addendum 2 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)Attachments: I. Project No. 40003 1, Replacement of Primary Coolant System Evaluation Report, Black & Veatch, December 21, 2004.2. Technical Data -Plate-Type Heat Exchanger (201 plates).3. Project No. 40003 1, Replace Primary Coolant Piping, (Approved for Construction Drawings), Black & Veatch, July 25, 2005.4. Project No. 400031, Replace Secondary Coolant Piping, (Approved for Construction Drawings), Black & Veatch, July 25, 2005.5. Quality Assurance Report, Replace Primary Coolant Piping, MURR, December, 2006.6. Hardware and Parts List, MURR, November, 2006 2c ORIGINAL Attachment 8.1 O 4 TAThMELN 3 1 ^AP-RO-1 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: ___ No: __ Signature: Date: /Z- J-O0 If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.Yes, this modification does involve a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda.Proposed heat exchanger, piping and valve changes that are documented by this Modification Record are described or depicted in the following sections and figures of the HSR and its addenda: 1. Original HSR a. Section 5.2.3 b. Section 5.4.2 c. Section 5.4.7 d. Figure 5.1 (MURR Print No. 156, Sheet 1 of 1)2. Addendum 3 a. Section 2.1.2.2 b. Section 2.1.2.5 c. Section 2.1.2.12 d. Section 2.1.2.14 e. Figure 2.2 (MURR Print No. 502, Sheet 1 of 1)3. Addendum 4 a. Figure A.2 (MURR Print No. 156)b. Appendix D c. Appendix E Hazards Summary Report Evaluation continued on page 3a.3 Attachment

8.2 ORIGINAL

7 1'LN) AP-RO-1 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION (con't)The following sections and figures of the HSR and its addenda will be revised as follows: I. Original HSR: a. Section 5.2.3 will be revised as follows: "The heat exchangers are plate-type with all surfaces in contact with reactor coolant water being constructed of stainless steel. One heat exchanger is capable of removing 16.9 x 106 BTU/hr of heat from 1800 gpm of coolant water and returning it at approximately 140 OF, using a maximum of 1600 gpm of secondary water flow at 87 OF.Two such heat exchangers are installed for design power operation." b. Section 5.4.2 will be revised as follows: "The secondary water flows on the opposite plate side of the primary coolant in the primary coolant heat exchangers and on the opposite plate side of the pool coolant in the pool coolant heat exchanger. In both the primary and pool coolant heat exchangers, the secondary water flows in a cross-flow configuration to the process water being cooled." c. Figure 5.1 (MURR Print No. 156, Sheet I of 1) will be revised as per the attached draft print.2. Addendum 3 a. Section 2.1.2.2 will be revised by adding the following paragraph at the end of the section: "In December 2006, HX 503B was replaced with a Graham Model GPE-60 plate-type heat exchanger with 201 plates and 1200 square feet of surface area. This heat exchanger is a duplicate of HX 503A, which was also replaced in December, 2006." b. Section 2.1.2.5 will be revised by adding the following paragraph at the end of the section: "In December 2006, the flow orifice flanges for 913B were replaced with dual-tap flanges to allow for additional flow monitoring sensing points. These flow orifice flanges are identical to those used for 913A, which were also replaced in December, 2006." c. Section 2.1.2.12 will be revised by adding the following paragraph at the end of the section: "As of December 2006, the valves numbered 595C, 595D, 595E, and 595F are the isolation valves for normally installed but isolated pressure gauges used for long-term trending of heat exchanger differential pressure." d. Section 2.1.2.14 will be revised by adding the following paragraph at the end of the section: "As of December 2006, FE 913B is instrumented with valve manifolds 5681 and 568J." e. Figure 2.2 (MURR Print No. 502, Sheet I of I) will be revised as per the attached draft print.3. Addendum 4 a. Figure A.2 (MURR Print No. 156, Sheet I of I) will be revised as per the attached draft print.Hazards Summary Report Evaluation continued on Page 3b.3a ORIGINAL Attachment 8.1 AýTTAIýjNET 3 AP-RO- 115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION (con't)NOTE: Addendum 3 was submitted to the Atomic Energy Agency in support of MURR's application for an Amendment to reactor license R-103 to allow operation at the full design power of 10 M Ws. Much of the information contained in Addendum 3 was of the proposed upgrade design, not the current as-built. Addendum 4 documented the final design; therefore information that is contained in Addendum 3 that does not depict the current design is corrected only in Addendum 4.3b 0P I G INA I Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

3 0 A L AP-RO-] 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a safety hazard as described in 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Yes: No: Signature: Date: /- --06" If YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. A 50.59 Screen (06-34) is attached which shows that the proposed activity may be implemented without further evaluation or license amendment. Technical Specification 4.4.a. states: "The reactor coolant system shall consist of not less than a reactor pressure vessel, two primary system pumps, primary pressurizer, two primary heat exchangers, two pool system pumps, one 100% capacity or two 50% capacity pool system heat exchanger(s), and one pool system hold-up tank plus all associated piping and valves." Additionally, Technical Specification 4.4.e. states: "All coolant system major components in contact with pool or primary water shall be constructed principally of aluminum alloys or stainless steel." The proposed modification will still satisfy the requirements of these Specifications. Primary coolant loss of flow and loss of coolant accidents are discussed in HSR Addendum 4, Appendices D and E, respectively. By request and by design, the replacement heat exchangers duplicate the thermal-hydraulic performance of the existing heat exchangers and therefore do not change the initial assumptions nor the results or conclusions of those analyses.Reactor Safety Evaluation continued on Page 4a.4 Attachment

8.2 ORIGINAL

ATTAC,ýM'TNT 3'Dp ~ v~09 L AP-RO-115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION (con't)The likelihood of the primary to secondary coolant system leak scenario is significantly reduced or even eliminated due to the construction of the plate-type heat exchanger. Plate-type heat exchangers use alternating plate channels separated by gasket material to retain both primary coolant and secondary water. In this design primary coolant leakage to the secondary coolant system is not likely unless one of the stainless steel plates is defective. Any primary coolant leakage would immediately be detected by the secondary coolant monitor.Primary coolant leakage to atmosphere is a more likely scenario than leakage to the secondary coolant system, in which case the leakage would be evident and directed to the radioactive liquid waste retention system. The gasketing material of the heat exchangers is EPDM (ethylene propylene diene monomer) and identical to the material used in the primary coolant isolation valves V507A and V507B which experience much higher gamma radiation levels. Additionally, the same material is used in the pool coolant heat exchanger, which has been in service since 1995 with no leakage occurring. The complete or partial failure of a gasket in a plate-type heat exchanger would be no worse than a complete or partial failure of an end plate gasket on a tube and shell-type heat exchanger. Both are isolatable from the rest of the system and any leakage would be contained in Mechanical Equipment Room 114 or directed to the radioactive liquid waste retention system. Any leakage from the new plate-type heat exchangers, or from the existing tube and shell-type for that matter, would be an operational issue and not a reactor safety concern.Safety analyses relating to the relocation of flow instruments and ensuring the single failure criteria of IEEE-279 are still met by connecting two flow transmitters to a single flow orifice are performed in 50.59 Screen No. 06-33, and are associated with Modification Record 05-8;Addendum I.4a ORIGINAL Attachment 8.1 AP-RO-1 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 OPERATOR REVIEW AND EVALUATION Operators are asked to comment on any safety and/or operational concerns relating to the proposed change. Pleas indicate any additions, questions, or changes regarding the Hazards Summary Report and Reactor Safety evaluations. Name Comments 5a Attachment

8.2 ORIGINAL

4%TTACHMENT 3 AP-RO-1 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 OPERATOR REVIEW AND EVALUATION (CONT.)Name Comments 5b Attachment 8.2 OR!GINAL SATTAG1HMENT 3 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 OPERATOR REVIEW AND EVALUATION (CONT.)AP-RO-1 15 Revision 2 Name Comments 5c Attachment 8.2 ORI( iINAL ATTACHMENT 3 AP-RO-1 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 OPERATING PROCEDURE AND PRINT EVALUATION If a revision to, or a new Operating Procedure and/or Print are required in order to implement the change, note the Procedure or Print Number, Title, and Section and attach a copy of the proposed new or revised procedure or print.OPERATING PROCEDURES Number SM-RO-105 SM-RO-100 AP-RO-1 10 OP-RO-410 OP-RO-480 Title"REPLACE PRIMARY AND POOL COOLANT SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGERS AND PIPING""DRAINING AND FILLING THE PRIMARY SYSTEM SIDE OF PRIMARY HEAT EXCHANGERS""CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS""PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM""SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM" Section New Procedure Section 5 Table 10.2 Attachment 9.1 New Section 5.6 PRINTS N umber 156 (Sheet 1 of 1)502 (Sheet 1 of 1)Title"Piping and Instrument Diagram""Secondary Coolinq System" 6 Attachment

8.2 ORIGINAL

ATTACHMENT 3 AP-RO-I115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 COMPLIANCE AND PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE EVALUATION If a revision to, or a new Compliance and/or Preventative Maintenance Procedure are required in order to implement the change, note the Procedure Number, Title, and Frequency and attach a copy of the proposed new or revised procedure. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES Number No Changes Title Frequency PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES Title Number P3-Q1"MEASURE PRIMARY HEAT EXCHANGER DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE" -New Procedure Frequency Quarterly 7 0 ,% U Ri L Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

3 LB AP-RO-! 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 PARTS REQUIREMENTS List all parts that are required in order to implement the change, noting Part Number, Description, and Quantity.Part Number M4503A through M4505B M4520 through M4527 various HX-503A and HX 503B Part Description Fabricated primary piping as specified in Attachment 3 Fabricated secondary pipe and valves as specified in Attachment 4 Hardware and Parts as specified in Attachment 6 (includes gaskets. nuts, bolts, fittings, etc...)Plate and frame heat exchanger (See Attachment 2 and PO below)Qty.10 multiple multiple 2 PO No.: Bid C283-5-1 Date: 5-24-05 Ordered From: Graham Corp. (Beth Asbury/MU) P.O Box 719 Batavia, NY 14021-0719 585-343-2216 www.graham-mfg.com PO No.: Ordered From: Date: PO No.: Ordered From: Date: PO No.: Ordered From: Date: 8 Attachment

8.2 ORIGINAL

ATTACHMENT 3 AP-RO- 115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 05-8, Addendum 2 SPARE PARTS and TECHNICAL MANUAL REQUIREMENTS List all spare parts and technical manuals that are required in order to implement the change, noting Part Number, Description, and Quantity, and Manual Title and where ordered from.Part Number None Required SPARE PARTS Part Description Required .askets. hardware, etc. currently maintained in adequate numbers in spare Parts system N/A PO No.: Ordered From: Date: PO No.: Ordered From: Date: PO No.: Date: PO No.: Date: Ordered From: Ordered From: TECHNICAL MANUALS Manual Title Ordered From 9 ORi A L Reset Fbrhi-A Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

3 kY)LP AP-RR-003 Revision 4 50.59 SCREEN Activity Screening Number: 06-34 Page 1 of 2 Title: "Modification Record 05-8; Addendum 2 -Replacement of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers HX 503A and HX 503B -Mechanical Portion" Description of Activity (what is being changed and why): This Modification Record documents the mechanical changes associated with replacing the Primary System heat exchangers. The major changes are replacing HX 503A and HX 503B, associated Primary and Secondary piping changes, and relocation of Safety System flow detector.Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safefacility (i.e., MURR) operations? If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR?2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? YES NO F-YES YES r-[7 YE-S NO NO NO NO NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approved facility procedure(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use page 2 of this form to document your statements. Print Name Sign Name Date Preparer: L. Alex Saale , Reviewer: Reactor Manager: Les P. Foyto (Attachment 9.1 k~AYj2[j~-' Vj ATbQHMEN 3 AP-RR-003 Revision 4 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Activity Screening Number: 06-34 Page 2 of 2 Title: "Modification Record 05-8: Addendum 2 -Replacement of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers IIHX 503A and HX 503B -Mechanical Portion" If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages asc neces.'sai.

1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in tile HSR?Nn The propnrr-cd activitv invnlxie n rchnnae tn 'qi that not ndeel' affprt :nay desion fiunctinn The replacement heat exchansyerq and piping rranuriement are chosen such th-t thermnl and hydraulic performance will remain essentially unchanged This ensu'es that the desoon finction of the heat exchangers remains unchanged The modification to the Primnau flow detectors and changes to the Secondary System piping arrangement continue to serve their HSR described design function in the same manner.2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No The proposed activity does not affect the perforp'rnce, control or testing of HSPqd.s-rtbhd SSC design filnrtions The procedural channres required primarilV reflect afddition nd relocatinn nf initr*n1lent.altioll ,alvino and nomenclature The new prncedure lu- RflM-W-Il5 which prnvideq detailed _qep- to perfnrm the replacement will also he separately screened for imparts to Reactor Safety 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the s /ery anah.'ses?

No The proposed activity does liot involve any evalntionn rnethl'dology Uzed w O ertin hlivh the rleoic'n nor iibed in the safetx, analyses The heat eychanoers were delihernteh, chinen giich rham anumptionn and conclusions of'the afety adaident analses renlain unchanged From the thermal and hydraulic perspective, the replacement heat exchangers are simply component replacements. Relocation of the Primary flow detectors is considered in detail in Modification Record 05-8: Addendum 1. and in 50.59 Screen 06-33.4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. The proposed activity involves no test or experiment. Material verification, and piping and piping joint integritv testing will ensure that existing system design specifications are met or exceeded. The thermal and hydraulic performance testing will be performed using the approved new procedure SM-RO-105 described above. All testing will be performed within SSC reference bounds described in the HSR.List the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]HSR Section 5.2.3 5.4.2. Figure 5.1, Addendum 3 Section 2.1.2. Figure 2.2. Addendum 4 Figure A.2 Technical Specifications 4.4.a, b. c. and e.

• 9..5- Zfj~~ , ,, ,-.zV~.~ A ~ ~ Z Attachment I Reset Form Ree Form Attahmen J=

ATTACHMENT 4 ORIGINAL AP-RO-l115 Revision 2 MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM FOR: I) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.NOTE: Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 94-4, Addendum 1 Modification Title: Replacement of Pool Coolant System Heat Exchanger HX 521 Requi Page No.I 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation OP, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Yes K K K K X red Date No Completed______ /Z-I -c',/2--2 -C'_ /2-2 -G.c-K- 1 -___-__._By (Initials) -.z-Lt 50.59 Screen Completed: ,,,-, , (Asst. Reactor Manager -Engineering) Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review:_ f__ _ _ __ _ _ _ _(Asst. Reactor Mianager -n~gineering) Modification Approved: _C(a e C p Leted ' Manager)Modification Completed: (P actor Manager)Date: 12 -d" Date:3 -" O Date: /2-- 7-O Date:_ __-2__-__I Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

4 ORIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 2 ]Modification Number: 94-4, Addendum 1 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)The pool coolant system consists of two main circulating pumps, a heat exchanger, an automatic isolation valve, a reflector plenum natural convection valve, a hold-up tank, a return diffuser, a bypass loop for water clean-up, and associated valves and piping. The pool coolant heat exchanger, designated as HX 521, is a water-to-water plate-type with all surfaces in contact with pool water constructed of stainless steel. This heat exchanger is designed to remove 3.6E6 BTU/h of heat from 1,200 gpm of pool coolant and return it at 99 OF (37 1C) with a secondary coolant flow rate and inlet temperature of 500 gpm and 87 °F (31 1C), respectively. In 1995, Modification Record 94-4 documented the replacement of the two original, tube and shell-type pool coolant heat exchangers with a single plate-type consisting of 151 plates. The new heat exchanger was sized to reject the pool coolant system portion (-10%) of the 30 MW heat load that would be generated in a potential future reactor upgrade. A short time after installation, 50 of the 151 plates were removed because thermal equilibrium with the primary coolant system could not be maintained even with automatic temperature control valve S-2 in the fully open position -essentially the heat exchanger was removing more heat from the pool coolant system than was desired.Since installation in 1995, the pressure drop across the heat exchanger has steadily increased, which has resulted in a decrease in total pool coolant system flow rate. An evaluation (Attachment

1) of the pool coolant heat exchanger was performed in February 2005 by the Engineering Firm Black & Veatch (B&V), Kansas City, Missouri.

In the evaluation B&V states that due to the tight clearances between the plates, the heat exchanger will act like a filter and collect impurities in the water. Additionally, the maker of the heat exchanger (Graham Corporation) had previously inspected plates that had what appeared to be a thin layer of surface contaminants. Both of these are sufficient to cause an increase in the pressure drop across the heat exchanger. Modification Description continued on Page 2a.Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page 1, with justification) The short form of the Modification Record is appropriate because (a) this is an Addendum to an existing, previously reviewed and approved Modification Record (94-4), and (b) this is a modification to a non-safety system that requires documentation and review only.2 Attachment

8. 1 ATTACHMENT 4 ORIGINAL AP-RO-I 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 94-4: Addendum I MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)Based on these findings and the discussions with the Graham Corporation, B&V recommended the following two corrective options: 1. Disassembly and inspection of the heat exchanger, and any damaged plates replaced -this should return the heat exchanger to a like new condition, or 2. Installation of a new heat exchanger, which may be performed as part of the reconfiguration of the primary coolant system. Essentially, the new pool coolant heat exchanger would be designed to be thermally balanced with the new primary coolant heat exchangers.

Relevant pages (Attachment

2) from the evaluation report (Project No. 40003 1, Replacement of Primary Coolant System Evaluation Report) for system upgrades to the primary and pool coolant systems, mainly replacement of the system heat exchangers are attached.

On page 2-2, an operational issue was identified by MURR in which it was desired to maintain primary and pool coolant temperatures at normal operating values with the highest outside dew-point. Basically, when operating at 10 MW, the primary coolant heat exchangers would maintain primary coolant Tc at 120 'F with a secondary coolant system that is also maintaining pool coolant Tc at 100 'F using a heat exchanger with 151 plates, and temperature control valves S-I and S-2 in the middle of their flow bands. By increasing the number of plates, which will decrease the pressure drop across the heat exchanger, coupled with piping improvements to the pool coolant system (See Modification Record 05-6), this should allow operation at 10 MW with only one pool coolant pump, if so desired. This was the case prior to the removal of the 50 plates from the current heat exchanger. Therefore, this addendum to Modification Record 94-4 documents the replacement of the current plate-type pool coolant heat exchanger with the exact same model (Attachment

3) that was initially installed in 1995 (with 151 plates). Installation of the new heat exchanger should return total pool coolant system flow rate to design values.Attachments:

I. Pool Heat Exchanger Evaluation, MURR -Replace Primary Cooling System, Project No 400031, Black & Veatch, February 18, 2005.2. Selected pages from Project No. 40003 1, Replacement of Primary Coolant System Evaluation Report, Black & Veatch, December 21, 2004.3. Technical Data -Plate-Type Heat Exchanger (151 plates).2a Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

4 ORIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 2 Modification Number: 94-4, Addendum 1 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: _ No: _ ' Signature: Date: 1/-0C If YES, make an analysis below and pr vide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda. The new plate-type heat exchanger is the exact same model as the one that is currently installed -the number of plates is not discussed. 3 Attachment 8.1I ATTACHMENT 4 ORIGINAL AP-RO- 115 Revision 2 Modification Number: 94-4, Addendum 1 REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a safety hazard as described in 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: 1. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Yes: No: /Signature: ,.L..4/,,( ýDate: /22- 2-C-4 If YES, the change must be performed ting a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.The proposed modification may be considered a maintenance activity as defined in the "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation," NEI 96-07, Revision 1, November 2000, prepared by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). Maintenance activities are activities that restore SSCs to their as-designed condition, including activities that implement approved design changes. These activities include troubleshooting, calibration, refurbishment, maintenance-related testing, identical replacements, housekeeping and similar activities that do not permanently alter the design, performance requirements, operation or control of SSCs. A 50.59 Screen (06-35) is attached which shows that the proposed activity may be implemented without further evaluation or license amendment. Additionally, as part of the safety analysis for Modification Record 94-4, the facility submitted a request to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to change the MURR Technical Specifications to support the replacement of the two original 50% capacity tube and shell-type pool coolant heat exchangers with one 100% capacity plate-type heat exchanger. The NRC reviewed the request and the associated safety analysis and issued Amendment No. 27 to Amended Facility License No. R-103 authorizing the modification. The safety analysis for this Modification Record falls within the envelope of the safety analysis performed for Modification Record 94-4.4 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

4 ORIGINAL AP-RO-I115 Revision 2 I Modification Number: 94-4, Addendum 1 OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, AND COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE, AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?Yes: No: 1' Signature: If YES, provide the suggested revision(Date: /2-2-OC OPERATING PROCEDURES:-No revision is required for this modification. PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES:

• No revision is required for this modification.

COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES:-No revision is required for this modification. PRINTS:-No revision is required for this modification. 5 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

4 OF AP R(Modification Number: 94-4, Addendum 1 SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory'? Yes: No: 7 Signature: Date: /2-2-6(If YES, provide a list of the spare parts.IlGINAM-RO-1 15 evision 2 C SPARE PARTS:-No spare parts are required for this modification. 6 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

4nI)y AP-RR-003 Revision 4 50.59 SCREEN Activity Screening Number: 06-35 Page 1 of 2 Title: Modification Record 94-4, Addendum 1, "Replacement of Pool Coolant System Heat Exchanger HX 521" Description of Activity (what is being changed and why): The current plate-type heat exchanger is being replaced with the exact same model. This is being done due to an increasing pressure drop across the plates, which is occurring due to the tight plate clearances acting as a filter and the possibility of surface contaminants. Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safe facility (i.e., [ [x MURR) operations? YES NO If this question is answered yes, do =o continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function C []described in the HSR? YES NO 2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR C M]described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested? YES NO 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology EC M]that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses? YES NO 4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is [- C utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or YES NO is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? YES NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approved facility procedure(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is 01 required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use page 2 of this form to document your statements. Print Name Sign Name Date Preparer: Stephen L. Sample ,=-i Reviewer: " _____/ _Reactor Manager: Les P. Foyto /, .7-6, Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

4PY AP-RR-003 Revision 4 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Activity Screening Number: 06-35 Page 2 of 2 Title: Modification Record 94-4, Addendum 1, "Replacement of Pool Coolant System Heat Exchanger HX 521" If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessary. ]I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR?No. The proposed activity does not involve a change to any SSC described in the Hazards Summary Report. This modification does not alter the function of the Safety System or create new modes of failure.2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No. The proposed activity does not affect any procedure. ,,k'.1 &acte.we 5M -.-o-t90oy ,0 r. ., o-', , C. gl 3rJC '4:J r, 44,,.1/ ,, .3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?No. The proposed activity does not affect any of the design bases or safety analyses described in the Hazards Summary Report.4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. The proposed activity does not involve any test or experiment. List the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]Mod. Record 94-4; Mod. Record 94-4 Add. 1; Tech. Spec. 3.3; T.S. 4.4; HSR 5.3; HSR 5.3.5;HSR Add. 3, 2.2.2.2; HSR Add. 4, Fig. A.2..,, -, -X0 -/o6S Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

4 BLACK & VEATCH J building a world of difference-' ENERGY .WATER

• INFORMATION

.GOVERNMENT University of Missouri -Columbia B&V Project: 138814 MURR -Replace Primary Cooling System B&V File 41.0000 Project No. 400031 Project Record No.: BV-MURR-2005-0035 February 18, 2005 University of Missouri System 6 Clark Hall Columbia, Missouri 65211

Subject:

Pool Heat Exchanger Evaluation

References:

1. None Attention:

Beth Asbury UM Project Manager As part of the ongoing work at the MURR facility, B&V has reviewed available performance information on the existing Pool Heat Exchanger. The following table shows a comparison of the pressure drop data recorded December 19, 1995 to the data recorded January 19, 2004.December 19, 1995 January 19, 2004 Measurement P-508A P-508B Two Pump P-508A P-508B Two Pump Pool Flow' 1,027 1,063 1,191 955 947 1,153 HX 521 Inlet' 36 37.5 55 39.5 39 51.5 HX 521 Outlet" 28 29 44 28 28 36 Difference' 8 8.5 11 11.5 11 15,5 Notes: 1) Average flow rates in gallons per minute 2) Pressures in psig.It can not be determined from the data if the secondary pumps were running when the pool coolant readings were recorded in 1995. Therefore, the January 19, 2004 data selected for comparison are from the cases where no secondary coolant pumps running. The recorded pressure drops from 2004 are higher when secondary pumps are running.Since the measured flow rates are lower and the corresponding pressure drops across the heat exchanger are higher in 2004 than in 1995 it is apparent that pressure drop on the pool side has increased over time.B&V has contacted Gary Trumpfheller, Sales Manager, Graham Corporation to discuss heat exchanger performance. Due to the tight clearance between the plates, the heat exchanger will act like a filter and collect impurities in the water. Contaminants can enter the system through the open reactor pool or with test samples. In the past, Graham Corporation has inspected plates that have what appears to be a thin layer of contaminants on the surface.This thin layer has been enough to increase the pressure drop across the heat exchanger. Based upon the discussion with the Mr. Trumpfheller, B&V recommends that the pool heat exchanger be disassembled and the plates inspected. Any damaged plates should be replaced. This should return the heat exchanger to a like new condition. If MURR purchases and installs a replacement pool heat exchanger, this inspection may be performed as part of the reconfiguration of this heat exchanger for the primary coolant service.building a world of difference". ATTACHMENT 4 Page 2 University of Missouri -Columbia B&V Project 138814 Beth Asbury February 18, 2005 In addition. Mr. Trumpfheller stated that the plates are indeed extremely flexible. Therefore, as the pressure increases on one side of the plate, the flow area decreases on the other side of the plate, resulting in an increase in the pressure drop. This phenomenon has been demonstrated for the pool heat exchanger by the increase in pressure drop observed on the pool side when the secondary side is operated. Since the flow rate and corresponding pressure drop are by design greater on the pool side of the heat exchanger, some increase in pool water flow can be achieved by decreasing the pressure in the heat exchanger on the secondary side.From discussions with the MURR staff, secondary coolant valve S-223 is used to throttle flow in Room 114. Since this valve is downstream of the pool heat exchanger, throttling it increases the pressure on the secondary side of the pool heat exchange. Moving the valve to upstream of the heat exchanger will reduce the pressure on the secondary side of the pool heat exchanger. This may result in a slight decrease in the pressure drop across the heat exchanger. Please contact Bill Luelf at 913-458-7878 or myself at 913-458-4605 should you have any questions. Very truly yours, BLACK & VEATCH Carl A. Rainey Project Manager

Enclosures:

1. None WCL:mrk cc: Doug Spellman Charlie McKibben Bob Fraser A (T-7-:, A C E ATTACHMENT 4 University of Missouri -Columbia Research Reactor Project No. 400031 Replacement of Primary Coolant System Evaluation Report December 21, 2004 122004-1 B&V Project 138814 RAR-0002 BLACK & VEATCH ATTACHMENT 4 MURR Introduction reactor was able to operate at 10 MW with a single pool pump in operation.

Since plate and frame heat exchangers have multiple parallel flow paths, decreasing the number of plates proportionally decreased the number of flow paths. Therefore, the pressure drop across the heat exchanger increased as a result of decreasing the number of plates (and decreasing flow area). This pressure drop increase caused the unit to require both pool pumps to be running in order to operate the reactor at 10 MW.Another operational issue identified during discussions with MURR was spurious SCRAMS of the reactor due to changes in differential pressure across the Pool Loop Heat Exchanger when the secondary cooling system pumps are started. This has been attributed to the heat exchanger plates being too flexible, and is to be considered in the design of Primary Coolant System Heat Exchangers. A related issue identified by MURR was that the existing piping arrangement results in a static pressure of approximately 0 psig at the pool pumps suction during pool loop testing. MURR expressed interest in modifications to the piping that would improve the net positive suction head (NPSH) available for these pumps.A final operational issue identified by MURR was the desire to maintain targeted Pool and Primary temperatures with the highest outside dew-point possible. Therefore when operating at 10 MW, MURR is interested in having primary heat exchangers that will maintain the Primary Coolant Tc at 120 F with a secondary that has maintained the Pool Coolant Tc at 100 F using the Pool Heat Exchanger with 151 plates, and S-1 and S-2 in the middle of their flow bands.The Primary Coolant Heat Exchangers are not required during a beryllium change outage. Therefore, the heat exchanger replacement is planned for the beryllium change outage scheduled for January 2006. This outage is expected to be 6 days but the heat exchanger replacement should be performed as quickly as possible. The Pool Coolant System is required during the beryllium outage. Therefore, a separate outage is required for the Pool Coolant System modifications. This outage is tentatively scheduled for the end of 2006. The outage should be as short as practical. Finally, a walkdown inspection of Room 114 and immediate vicinity revealed that access to Room 114 is limited by the opening in an existing fence gate. The clear opening of the gate is 5 feet 7 inches wide by 7 feet 0 inch high. Although the entire gate may be removed to allow better access to the adjacent hallway, the existence of conduit and piping in the hallway makes the gate dimensions a practical limit [or any item brought to or removed from Room 114. As part of this walkdown, and subsequent discussions, it is clear that welding on current Primary and Pool piping in Room 114 should be minimized or eliminated to minimize the outage.122004-1 2-2 122004-1 2-2 ATTACHMENT 4 MURR Analysis Moving the tank into place as a single unit will result in more of the existing piping being temporarily removed.To speed up final assembly, tank turning rolls would be used to keep the tank in an optimum position for welding. By continuously or semi-continuously rolling the tank, the welder will be able to constantly perform a horizontal weld, which is typically the easiest and fastest weld to make. The use of tank turning rolls when performing circumferential welded joints should allow the fabrication of a welded tank to be competitive with a bolted joint.Based on AWWA C207 72 inch diameter flanges, the bolted tank will have approximately 60 bolts per connection. Each nut and bolt or stud and bolt assembly could weigh between 5 and 10 pounds. Therefore, the bolting of each flange will take time and effort, especially with the bolts on the bottom and on the backside of the tank.Additional discussion will be provided in the Preliminary Cost and Schedule Report.3.2.5 Demolition Considerations The demolition of the existing tank is expected to be on the critical path of the outage. Therefore, any reduction or elimination of work to be performed during the outage will have a direct impact on outage duration.Discussion with John O'Neil of Chase Environmental has revealed that the existing tank may be cut apart in about 36 hours. The tank would be cut into sections for removal from Room 114. The sections would be shipped offsite for decontamination and disposal. In addition to the time required to cut the tank apart, additional time in Room 114 will be necessary to set up and take down radiological controls and for removal of tank sections. Additional discussion will be provided in the Preliminary Cost and Schedule Report.3.3 Pool Coolant System Pressure Drop Recovery In Deccmber 1995, 50 plates were removed from the Pool Coolant Heat Exchanger. Prior to the removal of the 50 plates. the reactor could be operated at 10 MW with only a single pool pump in service. After the removal of the plates, due to the increased differential pressure that resulted from the reduced flow area in the heat exchanger, a single pool pump was not sufficient to supply the coolant flow.3.3.1 Heat Exchanger Pressure Drop Evaluation Predicted differential pressure across the Pool Loop Heat Exchanger was requested from the original equipment manufacturer, Graham Corporation., for the cases 122004-1 3-10 ATTACHMENT 4 MURR Analysis of 950 gpm, 1,200 gpm, and 1,600 gpm for the current configuration of 101 plates. The submitted data sheets from Graham are included in Appendix A.The predicted data was compared to the measured data provided by MURR in support of this study (Appendix B) and the values are given in Table 3-5. The value given for the measured pressure drop is based upon the average values recorded for single pool pump operation with two secondary cooling pumps operating and are corrected to reflect the apparent calibration error of the pressure indicators. Table 3-5 Primary Side Pressure Drop for the Pool Loop Heat Exchanger Measured Number of Plates Predicted (2004)151 Plates at 1,100 gpm 4.8 psi Unknown 101 Plates at 1,100 gpm 9.9 psi 20.0 psi It was discovered during the preparation of the preliminary isometric drawings that the piping was connected in reverse of that shown on Graham drawings. The actual primary side inlet piping was connected to what Graham shows as the secondary side outlet and the actual secondary side inlet piping was connected to the primary side inlet.MURR confirmed that on the final heat exchanger drawings submitted by Graham, this was an approved alternate configuration. MURR provided perfbrmance data for the 101 plate configuration dated December 19, 1995 (see Appendix B). The data sheet is annotated with a note reading: "HX differential press is" lower than what Graham predicted They said 11. 7psi and we have 11 psi." The value attributed to Graham (11.7 psi at 1200 gpm) is the same as the predicted performance from Graham for the 101 plate configuration at the same flow rate (see Appendix A). Therefore, reversing the direction of flow through the heat exchanger had limited impact on the pressure drop.Comparing the test data recorded in 1995 to that recorded in 2004 indicates that the measured pressure drop has increased. This may be due to fouling or foreign matter collecting in the heat exchanger and reducing the flow area. It is recommended that this be investigated further as part of Phase II design activities. It is assumed that with the reinstallation of 50 plates that any issues with fouling or foreign matter will be resolved and the heat exchanger will be restored to its original condition. This will allow the reactor to operate at full power on a single pool pump.However, if the degradation of heat exchanger performance as reflected in pressure drop was the result of fouling, or foreign matter collecting within the heat exchanger. then over 122004-1 3-11 ATTACHMENT 4 MURR Analysis time performance may again degrade to the point where two pool pumps are required to provide sufficient pool cooling flow. This may be alleviated in part by increasing the size of some of the pool system piping to offset the change in differential pressure across the heat exchanger. Performance data is not available to determine the actual pressure drop with the original installation of 151 plates. Since the reported pressure drop for 101 plates in 1995 was slightly less than the pressure drop predicted by the manufacturer, it is assumed that actual pressure drop with 151 plates was also slightly less than manufacturer predicted values. Therefore, the original as installed pressure drop for the 151 plate installation will be estimated to be 4.8 psi at a flow rate of 1100 gpm.Review of the available data for 101 plate configuration reveals that the pressure drop across the pool heat exchanger has increased by a little more than double over the last nine years (from 9.9 psi to 20 psi at a flow rate of 1100 gpm). The design criteria for modifying the piping is to increase size as necessary to reduce the friction loss in piping and mechanical devices by 5 psi at a flow rate of 1075 gpm.3.3.2 System Analysis AFT Fathom software program was again used for the modeling. The basis for the Pool Coolant System piping model is as described for the Primary Reactor Coolant System piping in Subsection 3.1.3.The base scenario for each piping system analyzed reflects the piping as currently installed and operating. Test data provided by MURR (Appendix B) was used to estimate pressure drop for various components, create boundary and flow conditions, and to reconcile the model with actual system performance. Because the primary concern of the analysis is to identify piping and in-line devices to be replaced to reduce system pressure drop, modeling simplifications and techniques discussed in Subsection 3.1.3 were used.The calculated properties from AFT Fathom for the pumps for all cases discussed are given in Appendix C. Calculation files showing the spectrum of results are included on the enclosed CD-ROM. The results of the baseline analysis of the Primary Coolant System using AFT Fathom are generally consistent with the as-measured valves provided by MURR. It was previously noted that the data provided by MURR exhibits some scatter. For example, under the no pump case, the pressure indicators on the suction and discharge of the pool pumps range from 9 psig to 10.5 psig. These instruments are all measuring the same condition in this case (static head) and should indicate the same value. However. since this scatter does not affect conclusions of this study, further investigation is not required at this time.122004-1 3-12 CD cm z w I 0 H-H-NOZZLE SCHEDULE SIZE: 8" TYPE: 1501 STUDDED N OESCRIPTION e 3HS OUTLET B- _CSINET" R- C OUTLET S(.3) 3/4"0 HOLES CUSTOMER: UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI -I CUST ORDER NO.: C0000028494 (2) RELIEF VALVES SUPPLIED (SHIPPEO LOOSE. PIPED BY OTHERS)GRAHAM JOB NO.: 05-52152PE CIRCLE SEAL CONTROLS MODEL HP559B-2M-150 (SET POINT 150 PSIG)DESIGN / CONSTRUCTION: ASME SECT VII,. OIV 1. 2004 ED.. AO4 PLATE HEAT EXCHANGER MATERIAL LIST INSPECTION. CUSTOMER G ASHE , .. PART NAME MATERIAL SPEC. NO.STAMPING: ASME / FIXED COVER CARBON STEEL SA-516-70 SURFACE PREPARATION: GRI TBLAST PER SSPC-SP6 MOVABLE COVER CARBON STEEL SA-516-70 PAINT (EXT CARBON STL/: IC 8837 GRAHAM BLUE CARRYING BAR CARBON STEEL SA-35 TAG:.' PROJECT 1400043. PO C00000284,94 GUIDE BAR STAINLESS STEEL SA-479-304 NO. OF PLATES: J51 (173 MAX.)NO TES: 1. OVER PRESSURE PROTECTION MUST BE PROVIDED PRIOR TO PLACING VESSEL IN SERVICE.2. PULSATING PUMPS MUS T HAVE ADEQUATE PULSATION DAMPENERS PROVIDEO.3. BOLT HOLES STRADDLE CENTERLINES. I 4. MARK ALL CONNECTIONS WITH FLOW LABELS. CERTIFIED CORAEC T 5. ALL CONN. ARE 1501 ASHE sTD DRILLING. GRAHAM CORPORATION

6. ALUMINUM SHROUD SUPPLIED.HS L1INEH ZIVU 5 TiAJNLb..S STIEEL SA-24U-316 CS LINERS/NOZ STAINLESS STEEL SA-240-316 PLATES STA INLESS STEEL SA-240-316 GASKETS EPOM ----BOL TINS ALLOY STEEL SA-193-87, SA-194-2H GRAHAM CORPORA U.ON 20 FLORENCE AVE. BATAVIA. NEW YORK M.A.W.. P TEMPERATURE HYDRO (P.S.I.G.)

MONT/OESIGN TEST I IIJGaF) IPgR 1f)t NUMBER OF PARAFS EST'O WGTS. SURFACE (LBS) AREA (SO F T)GPE-60 PLATE HEAT EXCHANGER HOT SIDE 150 0/150 .25 1 EMPTY 3330 SL E DATE OWG. NO. REV COLD SIDE 150 0/150 225 1 FLOOHED 4090 N-1-05 A-5BO1S-1 5, 00101105 > K:lA'f~205 J5161 . CD C z w I 0 Hi H/-,CODE SrMSOL LOCA TION GRAHAM CORPORATION PLATE HEAT EXCHANGER MODEL NO. GPE-60 _ SURFACE 898 SO. FT.SERIAL NO. 05-52152-I DATE BUILT 1 2005 IAG NO. I.2 J CODE I ASME SECT VIJI. DIV I M.A.W.P. 150 PSIG PRoxE-CAT 00043 TEST PRESS. 225 PSIG PC ,COOOOo8494 DESIGN TEl. 150 F SERVICE DEMIN. WA TER /-WA TER XWF .D4 V.S. 4.PLATE HEAT EXCHANGER NAME PL PER DG." S-3946/1/,r 5-; /CERTIFIED BY HTI GRAHAM CORPORATION HOTSIDE MAWP 150 PSIG AT 150 "F COLDSIDE MAWP 150 PSIG AT 150 F MIN DESIGN METAL TEMP AT MAWP: HOTSIDE 0 *F COLOSIDE 0 *F S/N 05-62152-i YEAR 2005 ASKE NAME PL FOR PL HEAT EXCHANGERS PER 0WG: S-2054-3ýOTE: 01 CONI&CY O.C. F04R N&710ý. 8oio4P N&OEQ.05-62155 PC GRAHAM CORPORATION 20 FLORENCE AVE. BATAVIA. NEW YOPX NAMEPLA TE STAMPING DORIGINAL ISSUE SCALE MADE CHKO DATre DWG. NO. REV.REV ,ESCRIPTION MADE CHKD DATE FULL ICOG EPK B-1-05I B-58015-,3 1 0 Oal.a/O5) A. 1 9 t- 1f2OfSlSfl O5 I3.CAD FIXED END z w IJ 0 H H F-<-%, b Lc UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI CUST. P.O. COOOOO8494 JOB # 05-62152 PE MODEL 6PE-60 PASSES HO(SIDE I PASSES COLOSIOE I rAe,. i" 5.-I PLA TE SEQUENCE K, S, L, R.. .C GRAHAM CORPORA TION 20 FLORENCE AVE. BA TA VIA, NEW YORK PLA TE HEAT EXCHANGER FLOW DIAGRAM 0 ORIGINAL ISSUE ---.. ... SCALE MADE CHKD DATE DWG. NO. ýEV.REV.DESCRIPTION MADE I CHKO DA TE NONE I SCG EPK 08/01/05 A-58015-21 0 SCG 08/01/05 > K. \AcrrvE\2o05\62y52%5a0jS_2JCAD ATTACHMENT 5 ORIGINAL AP-RO-i 15 Revision I MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM FOR: 1) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.NOTE: Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 05-6 Modification Title: Replace Pool Pump Piping Page No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation OP, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Required Yes No X.___ _Date Completed 2 -aoC 7-za -Ogr 7-zo6-de By (Initials) 50.59 Screen Completed: -4¢9 ,z 25ý,,a #</-" (Asst. Reactor Manager -Engineering) Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review: I,'A? (Asst. Reactor Managero 1.ngineering) Modification Approved: -IN (" / \ , (Reactp~f"Manager) Modification Completed: (Reacto/Manager) Date: _-7_-_-0 Date: /'-/03-6/Date: 7-2./-04 Date: __-_o-_o_I Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

5 ORIGINAL AP-RO-! 15 Revision I Modification Number: 05-6 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)Summary This Modification Record replaces certain existing Pool System piping with larger diameter piping. This modification will reduce operational head loss and therefore increase available system flow. A future change, Modification Record 94-4, Addendum 1, will replace the existing pool heat exchanger to better balance the heat transfer capacity of the Pool System and Secondary System, and help to minimize an existing dynamic effect of Secondary flow on Pool flow.Background The Pool Coolant System includes the following: The reflector plenum natural convection valve, an automatic isolation valve, a hold-up tank, main circulating pumps, a plate type heat exchanger, a pool return diffuser and associated piping and valves.The basic design conditions for the pool loop cooling system are that it will transfer 3.6 x 10A6 BTU/hr (roughly 1 MW) at a flow rate of 1200 gpm.It is desired to increase all four-inch pipe diameters to six-inch pipe diameters for the following reasons: 1. Current Pool System flow is typically less than 1100 gpm and due to various factors occasionally reduces to the chosen low flow alarm value of 1060 gpm.2. The Hazards Summary Report states that pool loop coolant flow rates are adjustable to provide optimum cooling rates for various possible experimental arrangements in the reflector. This statement is only true in part, as no increase in flow is available through throttling.

3. While flow assumptions in the reflector are very conservative and no such limits are currently being approached, future experiment configurations may require additional cooling capacity.(Modification Description continued on Page 2a)Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page 1, with justification)

The short form of the Modification Record is appropriate because this is a modification to a non-safety system that requires documentation and review only (Reason No.4).2 Attachment

8. 1 ATTACHMENT 5 ORIGINAL AP-RO- 115 Revision I Modification Number: 05-6 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)4. Current pump suction pressure is typically at or slightly below atmospheric pressure.Increased pipe diameters at the pump suctions can help to increase the NPSH and reduce cavitation, resulting in longer pump service life and increased pumping efficiency.

5. Reduced head loss in the system may allow single-pump operation of the pool coolant system, providing greater maintenance and repair flexibility.

Scope of Work The modification will consist of fabrication, testing, and installation of various sections of Pool System piping, followed by verification of the overall system performance. Black and Veatch Engineering was contracted to analyze and design this piping configuration as part of a larger upgrade to the Pool and Primary systems. MU Project 400031 Mechanical Construction Specifications and Pool and Primary Coolant Piping Drawings contain detailed design data and analysis supporting the piping being fabricated and installed in this modification. Six-inch diameter aluminum piping will replace four-inch diameter aluminum piping, and where appropriate, six-inch isolation and check valves will replace four-inch isolation and check valves in the Mechanical Equipment Room 114. System function and flowpath will remain as existing, though specific pipe routing and pipe hanger locations will change to some degree. Other system components such as the automatic valve, hold-up tank, circulating pumps, heat exchanger and interfacing system connections will remain as existing and unchanged by this modification. The predicted increase in flow capacity will allow throttling of Pool System Valve 600A to control system flow rather than by physical limitations of the Pool System itself.Pool pump suction and discharge piping that is now four-inch diameter piping will be replaced with six-inch diameter piping. The pump isolation and check valves will be replaced with six-inch stainless steel gate-type isolation and swing-check valves. Inlet piping to the pump suctions will be fabricated with two-inch drain lines and equipped with diaphragm-type isolation valves.Existing pump bypass piping configurations will be eliminated. The current HX-521 Inlet Valves 522A and 522D are parallel four-inch paths, which will be replaced with a single six-inch path and a single stainless steel gate-type isolation valve. Connections to piping and pump flanges and valve flanges will be made consistent with respect to raised-face vs. flat-faced flanges. A pipe tee will be installed and blanked off at the common pump suction to facilitate a possible future emergency recirculation system.Specific Tasks-Fabricate piping sections per Black and Veatch (UM Project 400031) drawings M-4501A through M-4502H (see attached)-Perform and document all required non-destructive testing including radiography and hydrostatic pressure tests-Measure and record pool system performance prior to performing modifications -During a scheduled outage, replace piping sections per approved work sequence-Measure and record pool system performance following modifications -Control Pool System flow by throttling HX-521 Outlet Valve 600A This work is being performed under MU Project No. 40003 1, Replace Primary Cooling System.2a Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

5 ORIGINAL AP-RO- 1!5 Revision I Modification Number: 05-6 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: L/No: Signature: e"e.- g.. Date: "7-2_o-0(C If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggestedrevision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification involves a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR)and its addenda. The following is a list of Sections and Figures in the HSR and its addenda where the Pool System is described or discussed: Original HSR 1. Figure 5.1 -MURR Print No. 156 2. Section 5.3 -Pool Loop Cooling System 3. Section 13 -Accident Analysis Addendum 3 1. Section 2.2 -Pool Coolant System Addendum 4 1. Figure A.2 -MURR Print No. 156 The following Sections and Figures are affected by this modification and will be revised as follows: Hazards Summary Report 1. Figure 5.1 -MURR Print No. 156 Revise to reflect new piping size and configuration Addendum 4 1. Figure A.2 -MURR Print No. 156 Revise to reflect new piping size and configuration All other sections within the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda will remain unchanged. The accident analysis in Chapter 13 deals with boiling within the flux trap and reflector regions, and analyzes a pool loop rupture scenario. Both analyses make no specific assumptions about the process side of the pool system, only the effects on the reactivity, cooling, and shielding of the core. The 10 MW upgrade description in Addendum 3 discusses specific valves that are affected by this modification, but will remain intact to preserve the detailed examination involved in doubling the cooling capacity of the Pool System at that time.No change of that magnitude is being performed by this modification. 3 Attachment 8.1I ATTACHMENT 5 ORIGINAL AP-RO- 115 Revision I Modification Number: 05-6 REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a safety hazard as described in 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Yes: No: ___-_Signature: -.Z J-./4f Date: .7-2z-6o" If YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Mod-ification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or an unreviewed safety hazard as described in 10 CFR 50.59. A 50.59 Screen (06-019) is attached to show that the proposed activity may be implemented without further evaluation or license amendment. The proposed modification functionally replaces existing piping with minor configuration changes, and presents no new failure modes.4 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

5 ORIGINAL AP-RO- 115 Revision I Modification Number: 05-6 OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, AND COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE, AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?Yes: --<No: Signature: _ ,,_______ Date: 2-zo -If YES, provide the suggested revision(s). OPERATING PROCEDURES: OP-RO-460 Attachment

9.1 Valve

Line-up Revision -See Attached OP-RO-461 Procedure Revision and Attachment

9.1 Revision

as above -See Attached OP-RO-466 Procedure Revision -See Attached PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES: No PM revisions are required for this modification COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES: No CP revisions are required for this modification PRINTS: MURR Print No. 156 -Piping and Instrument Diagram Revise to reflect new piping size and configuration -See attached 5 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

5 OR AP-R Revi Modification Number: 05-6 SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory? Yes: _"ý No: Signature: ,o¢,x Date: 7-za-o" If YES, provide a list of the spare parts.6-inch Flexitallic Gasket, Stainless Steel, 1501b Class -maintain a minimum of two 6-inch Silicone Gasket, high temperature, mesh reinforced (Red Rubber) -maintain a minimum of two 6 IGINAL 0-115 ision I Attachment

8.1 ORIGINAL

ATTACHMENT 5 rL UJlt iAA[OP-RO-460 Revision,6V I I Date: POOL COOLANT SYSTEM VALVE LINE-UP This checksheet will be completed when required by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO). The operators performing the check will independently verify the position of each valve and indicate the verification by initialing the checksheet. Where appropriate, the positions of throttled valves are shown on a permanent tag secured to the valve. Note the throttled valve's position on the checksheet. Under the direction of the LSRO, a valve may be positioned other than listed on this checksheet. If this is required, the operators must ensure that the valve is in the desired position and indicate this position on this checksheet. If this change of position is not covered by a procedure in use, for example an RTP, SMP, or Work Package, which would return the valve to the normal operating position, then the LSRO will issue and place a Danger Tag on the valve for the duration of time the valve is in the out-of-normal position.LOCATION: ROOM 114 VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER HP/LP open;568F FT-912C Valve Manifold Equalizer closed 599AE FT-912C QDF Isolation Closed 599AD FT-912C QDF Isolation Closed 515AY Conductivity Cell 932B Isolation Open 515AZ Conductivity Cell 932D Isolation Open-4 -P-508B Suction Open-Z5 P-508B Discharge Open 51T8AC P-508B-Bypass-- Poain Open 518AC P-508B Gauge Isolation Open 51l8AD P-508B Gauge Isolation Open 595J Pool Cleanup Effluent to Sample Station Open 515X P-513B Bypass Closed 515N P-513B Discharge Open 518G P-513B Gauge Isolation Open 518H P-513B Gauge Isolation Open 595K Vent (Cleanup Influent) Closed 595G Pool Influent to Sample Station Open Page I of 3 Attachment

9.1 ORIGINAL

ATTACHMENT 5 i~ Li: /k~k L OP-RO-460 Revision6,1~ I VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER--%k- P-508A Suction Open S_:SP-508A.Discharge .-Open 5181 --50-8 Gauge Iso-laton Open-518J P-508A Gauge Isolation Open 522C Pool Drain/Fill Closed 522B Pool Drain Closed 515M Cleanup Suction from Pool Closed 515P Cleanup Return to Pool Open 515Q Cleanup Return to Loop Closed 515T Cleanup Suction from Loop Open 599J PS-947 Isolation Open 518V Vent (Common Pump Discharge Line) Closed 518W Vent (Downstream Y-Strainer) Closed 599AA Vent (Common Pump Discharge Line) Closed 518AG Y-Strainer Drain Closed HP/LP open;568C FT-912D Valve Manifold Equalizer closed 599N FT-912D QDF Isolation (Downstream Y- Closed Strainer)599Q FT-912D QDF Isolation (LP) Closed 599P FT-912D QDF Vent (LP) Closed 599R FT-912D QDF Vent (HP) Closed HP/LP open;568D FT-912F Valve Manifold Equalizer closed 599S FT-912F QDF Isolation (HP) Closed 599T FT-912F QDF Isolation (LP) Closed 599U FT-912F QDF Vent (LP) Closed 599X FT-912F QDF Vent (HP) Closed I Page 2 of 3 Attachment

9.1 ORIGINAL

ATTACHMENT 5~'e'. /~~9 L P-R-460 J Revision,~ I VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER 518U TH Vent Closed 518N HUT Vent Isolation Open 518K HUT Vent Closed 515R HUT Drain Locked Closed 514B Hut Outlet Open-. 522-A HX--52-1-Inlet -.. ... .... ... .. ... Open .. .HX-521 Inlet Open 515Z HX-521 Drain Closed 518AJ HX-521 Vent Closed 600A HX-521 Outlet Throttled 518AL PI-927 Isolation Open 518AK Vent (Capped) Closed 518Q Loop Drain (Tunnel) Closed 518R Loop Drain (Tunnel) Closed 514A V-509 Isolation Open 5680 PT-917 Isolation Open 599Z PT-917 Vent Closed 515AC Spool-piece to WT System (DI Room) Closed I Page 3 of 3 Attachment

9.1 ORIGINAL

PO'ATTACHMENT 5[ OP-RO-461 MURR OPERATING PROCEDURE OP-RO-461 OL COOLANT SYSTEM -ONE PUMP OPERATION RESPONSIBLE GROUP: Reactor Operations PROCEDURE OWNER: Richard Smith MASTER COPY ISSUED MAY -2 2006 APPROVED BY: Les Foyto Date: 9,-/,-OC This procedure contains the following: Pages Attachments Tables Figures Appendices Check-Off Lists 1 1 None None None None through through through through through through 7 1 ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT 5 &i'q .t," Re'vision 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS /Section Page Number 1.0 PURPOSE ......................................................................................................................... 3 2.0 SCOPE ............................................................................................................................. 3 3.0 PRECAUTION S AND LIM ITATIONS .................................................................... 3 4.0 PREREQUISITES AND IN ITIAL CONDITIONS .................................................. 3 5.0 PROCEDURE (STARTUP) ................................................................................... 4 5.1 PREPA RE SYSTEM FOR STARTUP ........................................................... 4 5.2 SYSTEM STARTUP .................................................................................... 5 6.0 PROCEDURE (SH UTDO W N) ............................................................................... 6 6.] SYSTEM SH UTDOW N ........................................................................... 6

7.0 REFERENCES

.......................................................................................................... 6 8.0 RECORDS ....................................................................................................................... 7 9.0 ATTACHM ENTS ....................................................................................................... 7 2 OR IGINAL ATTACHMENT 5 OP-RO-461I ~ ~~ !]/s Revision5', POOL COOLANT SYSTEM -ONE PUMP OPERATION /1 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 Instructions for starting up and shutting down the Pool Coolant System in a one pump operating mode.2.0 SCOPE 2.1 Pool Coolant System startup and shutdown using detailed valve and switch positioning.

3.0 PRECAUTIONS

AND LIMITATIONS

3.1 Failure

to perform an Area Radiation and Contamination Survey of Room 114 prior to entry could result in a worker receiving an unanticipated radiation exposure or becoming contaminated. (ALARA) (HSR 10.3)3.2 The pumps of the pool system shall be instrumented and connected so as to permit safe operation at five or ten megawatts on either pump or both pumps operating simultaneously. (TS 4.4.d)4.0 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS

4.1 Obtain

the Reactor Manager's permission for one Pool Coolant Pump operation. 4.2 No Pool Coolant System maintenance has been performed since the last shutdown of the pool system, or 4.1.1 If maintenance has been performed on the system, ensure that all affected components are in their normal positions (Attachment

9. 1 ).4.1.2 The Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO) must determine if a valve line-up checksheet needs to be completed (Attachment 9.1 ).4.3 A Room 114 Area Radiation and Contamination Survey has been completed, or 4.2.1 Perform a Room 114 Unscheduled Entry procedure (Reference 7.6).4.4 The following systems are in the proper line-up:* Valve Operation Air System (Reference 7.5)* Drain Collection System (Reference 7.4)a Reactor Demineralizer System (Reference 7.3)3 nwnirwai ATTACHMENT 5'.,I II U I ,~ :-, ~.."-OP-RO-461 Revisioq5/

4.0 PREREQUISITES

AND INITIAL CONDITIONS (CONT.)4.5 Power available to Pool Coolant Pump P-508A or P-508B, and Pool Demineralizer Pump P-5 !3B.4.6 Pool level is 29'-4" to 29'-10". The Pool Coolant System may be operated with pool level lowered to below the refuel bridge to perform RTP-2 1.4.7 When the reactor is operating, the Flux Trap Sample Holder or Flux Trap Strainer must be installed. When the reactor is shutdown, this requirement is at the discretion of the LSRO.4.8 Pool Coolant Temperature Controller S-2 temperature demand SET at 100 OF.4.9 S-2 electro-hydraulic motor power local switch is on.5.0 PROCEDURE (STARTUP)5.1 PREPARE SYSTEM FOR STARTUP: 5.1.1 IF Pool Coolant System is running in two pump operation, THEN shutdown Pool Coolant System (Reference 7.7).5.1.2 Secure a Pool Coolant Pump:* Tag open breaker for non-operating Pool Coolant Pump P-508A or P-508B.a Depress, AND lock out non-operating Pool Coolant Pump P-508A or P-508B "Stop" button.* CLOSE, AND Tag-Out non-operating pump Suction Valve-539A (P-508A) or 539G (P-508B).5-/ V Y71e 0 CLOSE, AND Tag-Out non-operating pump Discharge Valve -5.2-2F (P-508A) or-52-2.E (P-508B).5.1.3 ENSURE operating pump Suction Valve 39A (P-508A) or -539C (P-508B) is open.5.1.4 ENSURE operating pump Discharge Valve-5-2-F (P-508A) or 52-2E (P-508B) is open.5.1.5 OPEN Pool HX-521 Outlet Valve 600A.5.1.6 ENSURE Pool Coolant Flow Recorder is on.I I 4 ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT 5 f7/") OP-RO-461 jd ,/~ ".Revision/5" I 5.0 PROCEDURE (STARTUP) (CONT.) , 5.1.7 ENSURE Pool Coolant Temperature Recorder is on.5.1.8 ENSURE Primary & Pool Coolant Demineralizer Flow Recorder is on.5.1.9 ENSURE Pool Coolant Flow Bypass Switch 2S40 in 10 MW position.5. 1. 10 Place Master Control Switch IS I to Test.5.2 SYSTEM STARTUP: 5.2.1 Place Pool Coolant Isolation Valve 509 switches to Manual/Open.

5.2.2 START

Pool Coolant Pump P-508A or P-508B.5.2.3 ENSURE flow is between LIO00 gpm and 1,300 gpm.IF flow adjustment is required, THEN adjust flow using Valve 600A.5.2.4 START Pool Demineralizer Pump P-513B, AND ENSURE flow greater than 42.5 gpm.5.2.5 ENSURE all applicable valve position indication lights are lit.5.2.6 Place Valve 509 switches to Auto/Close.

5.2.7 Place

Master Control Switch IS I to On.NOTE: Calculation and potentiometer adjustment should be made after secondary system is placed in operation.

5.2.8 Calculate

the pool system input potentiometer setting using the formula (pool flow / 1400), AND adjust as necessary.

5.2.9 RECORD

Single Pool Coolant Pump operation in Console Log Book.5 ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT 5 I ,'OP-RO461" t' L Revisi9,'I

6.0 PROCEDURE

(SHUTDOWN) "I 6.1 SYSTEM SHUTDOWN: CAUTION: The Pool Coolant System must be operated for greater than 5 minutes following a reactor shutdown from full power to allow for removal of decay heat.6.1.1 Place Master Control Switch I S I to Test.6.1.2 STOP Pool Coolant Pump P-508A or P-508B.6.1.3 VERIFY Pool Coolant Isolation Valve 509 closes.6.1.4 VERIFY Pool Demineralizer Pump P-513B shuts off.6.1.5 Place Valve 509 switches to Manual/Close.

6.1.6 Place

Pump 513B switch' to OFF.6.1.7 ENSURE all applicable valve position indication lights are lit.6.1.8 Place Master Control Switch ISI to Off.

7.0 REFERENCES

7.1 MURR Dwg. 156, "Piping & Instrument Diagram" 7.2 MURR Dwg. 41, Sh. 1 of 3, "Process Instrumentation Control and Interlock" 7.3 RM-RO-405, "Reactor Demineralizer System" 7.4 OP-RO-532, "Drain Collection System" 7.5 OP-RO-516, "Valve Operation Air System" 7.6 RP-HP-135, "Room 114 Entry -Self Monitored" 7.7 OP-RO-460, "Pool Coolant System -Two Pump Operation," Step 6.1, System Shutdown 6 ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT 5-, -.,'/OP-RO-461I Revision.5' I 8.0 RECORDS 8.1 Reactor Startup Checksheet -Full Power Operation 9.0 ATTACHMENTS 9.1 Pool Coolant System -One Pump Operation Valve Line-up Checksheet 7 ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT 5/1 lb I.-!I, OP-RO-466 Revision.,41 I~MURR OPERATING PROCEDUREMATRCP OP-RO-466 ISSUED MAR 1 3 2006 POOL LEVEL CONTROL -POOL COOLANT SYSTEM RESPONSIBLE GROUP: Reactor Operations PROCEDURE OWNER: Richard Smith APPROVED BY: Les Foyto Date 2-y-oc I This procedure contains the following: Pages Attachments Tables Figures Appendices Check-Off Lists I None None None None None through through through through through through 8 ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT 5 Li'. ~q " .OP-RO-466 iJ Revision 4'I TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1.0 P U R P O S E ............................................................................................................................ 3 2 .0 SC O P E ................................................................................................................................. 3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ........................................................................ 3 4.0 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS ...................................................... 3 5.0 PROCEDURE (LOWERING) ..................................................................................... 4 5.1 PREPARATION FOR LOWERING POOL LEVEL ........................................ 4 5.2 POOL LOWERING ........................................................................................... 4 6.0 PROCEDURE (RAISING) .......................................................................................... 6 6.1 FROM TANK T-301 ......................................................................................... 6 6.2 FROM TANK T-300 AND TANK T-301 ........................................................ 7

7.0 REFERENCES

.......................................................................................................... 8 8.0 R E C O R D S ........................................................................................................................... 8 2 ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT 5/lj fL) 7i OP-RO-466.j ,, " ,Reevisio°,4' I tf /1 POOL LEVEL CONTROL -POOL COOLANT SYSTEM 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 Instructions for raising and lowering the pool level.2.0 SCOPE 2.1 Procedural steps and precautions required to raise and lower the pool level using the Pool Coolant System.3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

3.1 Failure

to perform an Area Radiation and Contamination Survey of Room 114 prior to entry, could result in a worker receiving an unanticipated radiation exposure or contamination. (ALARA) (HSR 10.3)3.2 Health Physics must monitor radiation levels at the Reactor Bridge during the lowering operation. (HSR 10.2)3.3 If the pool level will be lowered to less than 29 feet, a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) must be obtained.3.4 The reactor shall not be operated unless the reactor makeup water system is operable and connected to a source of at least 2,000 gallons of primary grade water. (TS 3.10.b)4.0 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS 4.1 The Reactor is shutdown.4.2 When operating the Pool Coolant System, the Flux Trap Sample Holder or Flux Trap Strainer must be installed. This condition is not required when temporarily swapping the Flux Trap Sample Holder and Flux Trap Strainer.4.3 Health Physics is stationed at the Reactor Bridge to monitor radiation levels as the pool is being pumped down. (HSR 10.2)4.4 If lowering the pool level to less than 29 feet, a RWP has been obtained.4.5 If the pool level will be lowered greater than 2 feet below the Reactor Refuel Bridge, obtain permission from the Reactor Manager.4.6 The Lead Senior Reactor Operator has approved lowering the pool level.3 ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT 5 OP-RO-466 Revision,41 1 4.0 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS (CONT.)4.7 The Lead Senior Reactor Operator has approved raising the pool level.4.8 Ensure a Room 114 Area Radiation and Contamination Survey has been completed. (HSR 10.3)4.9 The Pool Coolant System is ready for operation (Reference 7.1).4.10 Verify Skimmer Pump P-532 is off.5.0 PROCEDURE (LOWERING)

5.1 PREPARATION

FOR LOWERING POOL LEVEL 5.1.1 IF tank T-301 does not have sufficient room to receive pump down volume as determined by Lead Senior Reactor Operator, THEN 5.1.1.1 Fully open Tank T-300 Isolation Valve 539E AND 5.1.1.2 place one person with a radio and flashlight at top of Tank T-301 in the South Tower to observe rising water level and report to Control Room during pump down.5.1.2 Place one person in Room 114.5.1.3 ESTABLISH communications between Control Room and Room 114 and, if required, with person at the top ofT-301.5.2 POOL LOWERING CAUTION: If Control Room stop the Pool Coolant Pump at any time during this procedure, immediately close Pool Drain/Fill Valve 522C and notify Control Room that Valve 522C is closed.-5-2i-14-R-1om-t-l-4-otSlE-Poot-eoo1at-Heat-Exchanger-Inlet-Vaive-5224-5.2 21 Room 114 -CLOSE Pool Coolant Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve-5--2Dto approximately 50%.5.2e-3 Control Room -VERIFY Pool Coolant Flow Recorder is operating. 5.2,4' Control Room -Place Master Control Switch IS I to Test.4 ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT 5 OP-RO-466 Revision,4

5.0 PROCEDURE

(LOWERING) (CONT.)5.2.6' Control Room -Place Pool Coolant Isolation Valve 509 switches to Manual/Open. 5.2.6" Control Room -START Pool Coolant Pump P-508A OR P-508B.5.2.7" Room 114 -OPEN Pool Drain/Fill Valve 522C.NOTE: The normal method of having someone stop at a specific point, is by announcing a "Mark" command.NOTE: Throttling the pool coolant flow increases the flow rate to Tank T-301. Water will flow to Tank T-301 without throttling, but throttling the pool coolant flow will : triple the flow rate to Tank T-301. Pool Coolant System flow is normally throttled to 200 to 300 gpm as indicated on the pool flow recorder.5.2.8- Control Room -Direct person in Room 114 to THROTTLE down flow using Valve 2-2-9 until receiving a "Mark."-5-.2-,9f--Room H14-- CLOSE Valve 52-2D until flow-constriction-noise-is-hear4. L14 /4 ý ;l'./ q6.5.2.1.0" Room H14 -CONTINUE slowly throttling until Control Room gives a"Mark." --7 5.2.,11 Tank Level Observer -IF tank level observer was placed in the South Tower, THEN notify Control Room when water level is 5 feet from top of Tank T-301.5.2. 1,2 Control Room -MONITOR flow AND pool level until pool is at desired level.5.2.13 Room 114 -WHEN Control Room notifies that pool level is 1 foot from desired level, THEN stand by Valve 522C.5.2.14 Control Room -WHEN pool is at desired level, THEN STOP running Pool Coolant Pump.5.2.1-5 Control Room -Place Pool Coolant Isolation Valve 509 switches to Manual/Close. 5 ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT 5 OP-RO-466 Revision,4/I

5.0 PROCEDURE

(LOWERING) (CONT.)5.2.,16 Room 114 -Immediately CLOSE Valve 522C AND notify Control Room that Valve 522C is CLOSED.-29?la--Room.-144---Fully.-OREN-V-alve-522A. 5.2.,1-8 Room 114 -Fully OPEN Valve 22: 5.2.I,9 Tank Level Observer -IF tank level observer was placed in South Tower, THEN CLOSE Valve 539E.5.2.20 Control Room -Place Master Control Switch IS I to Off)5.2:21 Control Room -RECORD pool level in Console Log Book.6.0 PROCEDURE (RAISING)6.1 FROM TANK T-301 6.1.1 IF tools were used on and around the Refuel Bridge, THEN INSPECT area for tools, parts, and uninstalled components. 6.1.2 IF Refuel Bridge Ladder was installed, THEN remove Refuel Bridge Ladder.6.1.3 ENSURE Tank T-300 Isolation Valve 539E is closed.6.1.4 Place one person in Room 114 AND ESTABLISH communication with the Control Room.6.1.5 Control Room -Direct person in Room 114 to open Pool Drain/Fill Valve 522C.6.1.6 Room 114 -OPEN Valve 522C.6.1.7 Control Room -WHEN pool level is z1 foot from desired level, THEN inform person in Room 114.6.1.8 Control Room -WHEN pool level is at desired level, THEN direct person in Room 114 to CLOSE Valve 522C.6.1.9 Room 114 -CLOSE Valve 522C.6.1.10 Control Room -RECORD pool level in Console Log Book.6 ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT 5 OP-RO-466 Revision/4'I

6.0 PROCEDURE

(RAISING) (CONT.)6.2 FROM TANK T-300 AND TANK T-301 6.2.1 IF tools were used on and around the Refuel Bridge, THEN INSPECT area for tools, parts, and uninstalled components. 6.2.2 IF Refuel Bridge Ladder was installed, THEN remove Refuel Bridge Ladder.6.2.3 Place one person in Room 114 AND ESTABLISH communication with the Control Room.6.2.4 Place one person to observe Tank T-300/301 gauges AND ESTABLISH communication with the Control Room.6.2.5 Tank T-300/301 Gauge Observer -OPEN Tank T-300 Isolation Valve 539E.6.2.6 Control Room -Direct person in Room 114 to OPEN Pool Drain/Fill Valve 522C.6.2.7 Room 114 -OPEN Valve 522C.6.2.8 Tank T-300/301 Gauge Observer -WHEN Tank T-300 level indicates 3,000 gallons, THEN CLOSE Valve 539E.6.2.9 Control Room -WHEN pool level is 1 foot from desired level, THEN inform person in Room 114.6.2.10 Control Room -WHEN pool level is at desired level, THEN direct person in Room 114 to CLOSE Valve 522C.6.2.11 Room 114 -CLOSE Valve 522C.6.2.12 Control Room -RECORD pool level in Console Log Book.6.2.13 ENSURE Tank T-300 level is greater than 2,100 gallons.7 ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT 5 OP-RO-466 Revisio/4" I

7.0 REFERENCES

7.1 OP-RO-460, "Pool Coolant System -Two Pump Operation" 7.2 MURR Dwg. 911, "Deionized Water System" 8.0 RECORDS 8.1 Reactor Console Log Book 8 ATTACHMENT 5 C no Py AP-RR-003 Revision I 50.59 SCREEN Activity Screening Number: 06-019 Page 1 of 2 Title: "Modification Record 05-6; Replace Pool Pump Piping" Description of Activity (what is being changed and why): Six inch piping will replace four inch piping in selected portions of the Pool Coolant System to reduce operational head loss and increase available system flow.Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safe facility (i.e., MURR) operations? YES If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR?2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how I-ISR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?V NO V/NO NO NO YES 4. Does the proposed activity involve a lest or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or YES is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approved facilit' procedure(s). Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.NO A License If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment

2. )NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination.

In addition, list the documents (IHSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis docutnents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section /page numbers. Use page 2 of this form to document your statements. Print Name Sign Name Date Preparer: Carl Herbold _____Reviewer: .S0, , / Q.. Reactor Manager: Les Foyto 7-2/-On/Attachment 1 ATTACHMENT 5 o AP-RR-003 Revision I 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Activity Screening Number: 06-019 Page 2 of 2 Title: "Modification Record 05-6; Replace Pool Pump Piping" If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessali. ]1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designfiunction described in the HSR?Nn Thi prnpoitid nttilvity clndo not involpve q rhann tn an qSC that ad;vercely affpeta qn --PR delcrihed desisn finction The repl.ernent piping s functionally eguivalent to the existing piping and the syutern flowpath will remain unchanged 2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No The Proposed Actility does not inizolve a cha.rge to a procedure that aduersely affects the perfo.mance, control or testing of HSR descrihel d esign Procedrural revisions, include referencec to ,a vev only 2nd pregent nn knorwn ndverie affects 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safet, analyses?Nn Thle proponvp"l activity does nnt invol revien- or rcnlyino 2n T--c'P dlecrihed evnhution mnthndlogy that is used in eqtnhlihing the design hase, nr in the i.afety annlyicNi Performrncee rnnnitoring and balancing will he completed following the modification to ensure proper flow and cooling through the flux trap and reflector region 4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. The proposed activity does not involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR. No experiment is associated with this modification. List the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]MURR Technical Specifications -3.3.a, 4.4.a, 4.4.d, 4.4.e HSR -Fig. 5.1. Section 5.3 and Chapter 13 Addendum 3 -Section 2.2 Modification Record 05-6: MURR Print No. 156 Attachment 1 Reset Form -, L. 51 BAH 51BAH 1/2,-51WA I A 600 A DR FT 5w5i CS 2"-515P TO SOLENOID VALVE 11-t 529C (H-12)AMPLIFIER CONDUC70 C:TY INDICATOR"588" -VALVE BLOCK NUMBER'599' -1/4' NEEDLE VALVE VOP -VALVE OPERATING SYSTEM SEE REF. DWG. MURRf172 I FOR PNEUMATIC CONTROL DIAC.------ C.E. 237E£95 2 ELECTRICAL CONTROL DIAG. ---------- G.E. 237E586 3 MAIN PARTS LIST--------------- -G.E. 19IX603 4.) PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL & INTERLOCK DRAFT R -51ýý 'rRel "; /,0 7-A4.1& V.ý7-4e4^76,V7-I I I InI= U ~ it i L -. fr M N A I rK 0 ry=Mr. " .T-M da2kgr abo, 0 DRAFT I: TMWC 1 i~Iii, ~* I~I4 U~D~!S¶aAv -1 N I I I I U~> F< >r 9IPIPING & INSTRUMENT 1 DIAGRAM FACILITIES OPERATIONS I IIliorch reoctor tocllty DRAFT ATTACHMENI Review ed By: 19'-C6 Assist. Rx Mgr-Engin'eering r5 ORIGINAL Reviewed Bt 7-/-0c (3 Reactor h)ager Modification Record 05-6 Replacement of Pool Suction Piping Sequence Initial Conditions:

1. Reactor Secured 2. Pool water level between 29'4" and 29' 8".Primary Coolant System secured lAW OP-RO-410 4. Dummy load test connectors installed 5. No other Pool Coolant System maintenance in progress 6. All necessary valves, gaskets and pipe supports on hand 7. All new piping sections hydrostatically tested and welding documentation verified complete 8. New piping spacer on hand 9. RWP initiated Maintenance Sequence: 1. Place the Pool Coolant System in operation IAW OP-RO-460.2. Place the Secondary Coolant System in operation LAW OP-RO-480 A.,-13. Pool flow with two Pool Pumps and Secondary flow with two Secondary Pumps in operation

-Record pump combination: 2/3 4. Fully CLOSE valve S-I 5. Fully CLOSE valve S-2 6. Establish 70% load on each of the operating Secondary Coolant Pumps X- 7. Record the following data: S-2 Fully Closed Pool Tc Pool Flow 1 Pool Demin Flow P-508A suction pressure PI 927 A P-508B suction pressure PI 927 F Pool HX inlet pressure PI 927 PL Total Secondary Flow g9,q/09 1 ~<0 0 174~Pool Th tog.*y Pool Flow 2 10q (PT-917 31-K P-508A discharge pressure PI 927 B 63 P-508B discharge pressure PI 927 E 6(7 Pool HX outlet pressure PI 927 PO L1 Secondary Flow thru Pool HX '333" 7 --8.x, 9.Establish 80% load on each of the operating Secondary Coolant Pumps Record the following data: S-2 Fully Closed Pool Tc Pool Flow I Pool Demin Flow P-508A suction pressure P1 927 A P-508B suction pressure PI 927 F Pool HX inlet pressure PI 927 PL Total Secondary Flow 0 q5-11,08 Pool Th Pool Flow 2 PT-917 P-508A discharge pressure PI 927 B P-508B discharge pressure PI 927 E Pool HX outlet pressure PI 927 PO Secondary Flow thru Pool HX ,,V27..Z 107C 6. 7~3-":170D Page I of 5 ATTACHMENT 5 ORIGINAL Z?#' 10. Establish 90% load on each of the operating Secondary Coolant Pumps , 11. Record the following data: S-2 Fully Closed Pool Tc Pool Flow 1 Pool Demin Flow P-508A suction pressure PI 927 A P-508B suction pressure PI 927 F Pool HX inlet pressure PI 927 PL Total Secondary Flow qW.q./-05-7<0 0 Pool Th MI1. t Pool Flow 2 / 67.PT-917 P-508A discharge pressure PI 927 B , P-508B discharge pressure PI 927 E (7 Pool HX outlet pressure PI 927 PO R-Secondary Flow thru Pool HX 371?~-12. Establish FULL load on each of the operating Secondary Coolant Pumps 14 0 We .-o*0 Record load: P/90 17 k, 13. Record the following data: S-2 Fully Closed Pool Tc Pool Flow 1 Pool Demin Flow P-508A suction pressure PI 927 A P-508B suction pressure PI 927 F Pool HX inlet pressure PI 927 PL Total Secondary Flow Pool Th Pool Flow 2 PT-917 P-508A discharge pressure PI 927 B P-508B discharge pressure PI 927 E Pool HX outlet pressure PI 927 PO Secondary Flow thru Pool HX 14. Secure the Secondary Coolant System IAW OP-RO-480 J 15. Pool flow with two Pool Pumps and Secondary Coolant System secured Pool Tc Pool Flow 1 Pool Demin Flow P-508A suction pressure PI 927 A P-508B suction pressure PI 927 F Pool HX inlet pressure PI 927 PL (0 0 Pool Th Pool Flom PT-917 P-508A d P-508B d Pool HX 7%- 16. Secure the Pool Coolant System TAW OP-RO-460_-P 17. Danger Tag the following:

a. Pool Coolant Pump P-508A Breaker b. Pool Coolant Pump P-508 B Breaker c. Pool Demin Pump P-513B Breaker d. Valve 514B (Hold-Up Tank Outlet)e. Valve 522B (Pool Drain)f. Valve 539A (P-508A Suction)g. Valve 522E (P-508B Discharge)

h. Valve 515Q (Cleanup Return to Loop)i. Valve 509 (Pool Hot Leg Isolation) s2 ischarge pressure PI 927 B ischarge pressure PI 927 E outlet pressure PI 927 PO OFF/OPEN OFF/OPEN OFF/OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED MANUAL/ CLOSE 1603 6 &Page 2 of 5 ATTACHMENT 5 ORIGINAL AP 18. Connect tygon tubing and funnel from P-508B drain to DCT funnel ,z4j 19. Slowly remove the pump drain plug from P-508B_ 20. Remove plug from PI 927 E (P-508 Discharge Pressure Gauge) to vent the system during draining CAUTION: When removing sections of piping, take extra care to collect any residual water that may have remained in the pipe after draining./1 21.t22.S23.-24.S25." 26.S27.S28.29.' 30.A.. 31._ .c---32.Once the system is drained, remove valve 538C (P-508B Bypass)Install blank flange in place of valve 538C (pump discharge side)Disconnect piping from header to valve 518AD (P-508B Gauge Isolation

-Suction Pressure)Remove piping sections between P-508B and valve 539C (P-508B Suction)Remove piping section between valve 539C and combined pool pump suction header Tag and discard piping pieces as directed by Health Physics*Install new spacer piece to existing suction piping header Install new piping portions between P-508A and combined Pool Pump suction CLOSE/CHECK CLOSED valve 515AI (newly installed P-508B Drain)Reconnect piping from header to valve 518AD (P-508B Gauge Isolation) Reinstall P-508B drain plug with new Teflon tape Connect a tygon tube from the plug at PI 927 E (P-508B Discharge Pressure Gauge) to the DCT funnel NOTE: The system will vent through valve 518AC and the open pipe from PI 927 E removal during the filling process. Monitor the air/water flow from the pipe during the filling operation.

33. CLOSE valve 518AC (P-508B Gauge Isolation

-Discharge Pressure)__.34. (PMT) Visually verify Pool Coolant System integrity from valve 514B (Hold-Up Tank Outlet) to valve 522E (P-508B Discharge) itt) 35. Clear the Danger Tag on valve 514B in the CLOSED position 3 6. Clear the Danger Tag on valve 509 in the MANUAL/CLOSE position L_ 37. OPEN valve 509 38. Refill the pool system piping by slowly OPENING valve 514B 39. Vent the piping by THROTTLING OPEN valve 518AC 40. (PMT) When a solid stream of water issues from valve 518AC, CLOSE valve 518AC and check system for leakage 41. Remove tygon tubing and reinstall plug at PI 927 E (P-508 Discharge Gauge)<--2. OPEN valve 51 8AC W 3. CLOSE valve 509.~*0 .4/.// &-/. /aq t,9 h O ,ft / c,,/ Page 3 of 5 ATTACHMENT 5 ORIGINAL 44. Clear the following Danger Tags: a. Pool Coolant Pump P-508A Breaker b. Pool Coolant Pump P-508B Breaker c. P-513B Breaker d. Valve 522B (Pool Drain)e. Valve 539A (P-508A Suction)f. Valve 522E (P-508B Discharge)

g. Valve 515Q (Cleanup Return to Loop)ON/SHUT ON/SHUT ON/SHUT CLOSED OPEN OPEN CLOSED N Post Maintenance Testing:.4 _(fý45. Vent Pool Flow transmitters FT-912D and FT-912 F as follows: a. For transmitter FT-912D: 1. OPEN valve 568C-EQ;Z 2. Crack OPEN valves 599R and 599P until a steady stream of water issues then CLOSE valves 599R and 599P 3. CLOSE valve 568C-EQ b. For transmitter FT-912F: 1. OPEN valve 568D-EQ 2. Crack OPEN valves 599U and 599X until a steady stream of water issues then CLOSE valves 599U and 599X" 6. 3. CLOSE valve 568D-EQ 46. Perform a post maintenance valve line-up ,-- -, 47. Place the Pool Coolant System in operation lAW OP-RO-460 6---48. Record the following data: Pool Tc Pool Flow I Pool Demin Flow P-508A suction pressure PI 927 A P-508B suction pressure PI 927 F Pool HX inlet pressure PI 927 PL-7ZL Pool Th /b7. 5-Pool Flow 2 A_3 /PT-917 "3.7 P-508A discharge pressure PI 927 B K3 P-508B discharge pressure PI 927 E ,57 Pool HX outlet pressure PI 927 PO 36-' 49.,- 50.5 51.--52.C=53.c 54.Inspect the Pool Coolant System for leakage Place the Secondary Coolant System in operation IAW OP-RO-480 with the pump combination recorded in Step 3 -/3 Fully CLOSE valve S-I Fully CLOSE valve S-2 Establish 70% load on each operating Secondary Coolant Pump Record the following data: S-2 Fully Closed Pool Tc Pool Flow 1 /_9 _Pool Demin Flow P-508A suction pressure PI 927 A _. 0 P-508A discharge pressure PI 927 B e'V Pool HX inlet pressure PI 927 PL 5-57-Total Secondary Flow /7. 1ýc Pool Th Pool Flow 2 PT-917 P-508B suction pressure PI 927 F P-508B discharge pressure PI 927 E Pool HX outlet pressure PI 927 PO Secondary Flow thru Pool HX 0J3 Page 4 of 5 ATTACHMENT 5_ 55. Establish 80% load on each operating Secondary Coolant Pump56. Record the following data: ORIGINAL S-2 Fully Closed Pool Tc Pool Flow I Pool Demin Flow P-508A suction pressure PI 927 A P-508A discharge pressure PI 927 B Pool HX inlet pressure PI 927 PL Total Secondary Flow/ 0 ". X.Pool Th Pool Flow 2 PT-917 P-508B suction pressure PI 927 F P-508B discharge pressure PI 927 E Pool HX outlet pressure PI 927 PO Secondary Flow thru Pool HX.33'c 4- 57. Establish 90% load on each operating Secondary Coolant Pump< 58. Record the following data: S-2 Fully Closed Pool Tc Pool Flow I IA I Pool Demin Flow P-508A suction pressure PI 927 A C)P-508A discharge pressure PI 927 B gS-Pool HX inlet pressure PI 927 PL -S Total Secondary Flow /,. e Pool Th Pool Flow 2 PT-917 P-508B suction pressure PI 927 F P-508B discharge pressure PI 927 E Pool HX outlet pressure PI 927 PO Secondary Flow thru Pool HX 3.3 0-%S" 103-59. Establish FULL load on each operating Secondary Coolant Pump Record load: 90. -.-60. Record the following data: S-2 Fully Closed Pool Tc Pool Flow 1 Pool Demin Flow P-508A suction pressure P1 927 A P-508A discharge pressure PI 927 Pool HX inlet pressure PI 927 PL Total Secondary Flow B Cj-/9'. 1ýPool Th Pool Flow 2 PT-917 P-508B suction pressure PI 927 F P-508B discharge pressure PI 927 E Pool HX outlet pressure PI 927 PO Secondary Flow thru Pool HX 0.5'-/ -61. Verify flow data for new piping against data taken prior to replacement C.=, 62. Operate the Secondary Coolant System as required-6""3. Remove dummy load test connectors

-Make the reactor ready for operation, reset TAAs and monitor pressures and flows for at least 30 minutes prior to starting up the reactor Page 5 of 5 ATTACHMENT 5 ORIGINAL Post Maintenance Valve Line-up Checksheet Modification Record 05-6 Replacement of Pool Suction Piping Date Performed: VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER 514B Holdup Tank Outlet OPEN 4-522B Pool Drain CLOSED I 515Q Cleanup Return to Loop CLOSED J 515AI P-508B Drain CLOSED 518AD P-508B Gauge Isolation OPEN 518AC P-508B Gauge Isolation OPEN PLUG PI-927E; P-508B Discharge Gauge INSTALLED 539C P-508B Suction OPEN 522E P-508B Discharge OPEN 568C FT-912D Valve Manifold HP/LP OPEN; A EQ CLOSED 599N FT-912D QDF Isolation (HP) CLOSED 599Q FT-912D QDF Isolation (LP) CLOSED 599P FT-912D QDF Vent (LP) CLOSED 599R FT-912D QDF Vent (HP) CLOSED 568D FT-912F Valve Manifold HP/LP OPEN; c EQ CLOSED 599S FT-912F QDF Isolation (HP) CLOSED 599T FT-912F QDF Isolation (LP) CLOSED 599U FT-912F QDF Vent (LP) CLOSED 599X FT-912F QDF Vent (HP) CLOSED ATTACHMENT 5 Date: September 6, 2007 To: File -Modification Record 06-6, Replace Pool Pump Piping From: Carl Herbold, Assistant Reactor Manager -Engineering

Subject:

Installation of 8" Strainer in Pool Piping During the December, 2006 Primary and Pool Heat Exchanger Replacement project, the Pool Heat Exchanger (HX-521) was found to have foreign materials including small solid objects and fibrous matter in the Pool side inlet plenum. The fibrous material was identified as nylon, possibly the remains of a segment of the nylon rope commonly used in the bulk pool to store and handle various objects.Due to the nature of the plate-type heat exchanger, the new HX-521 could again accumulate such materials over time, resulting in an eventual degradation of flow capacity. The current Pool Coolant System strainer, 597B, is installed downstream of HX-52 1, and so provides no protection to the heat exchanger against accumulation of foreign materials. To ensure the long-term performance of HX-52 1, an additional strainer will be installed in the Pool System piping upstream of HX-521. The strainer, 597D, will be a Mueller Wye Strainer, of cast stainless steel construction, 8" raised-face flanges, 150 psi class, with a 0.062" opening wire mesh tack-welded to the rigid basket insert. It will be installed in the overhead piping in the pump discharge header to the heat exchanger. Piping fabrication drawings were modified and approved for the following Black and Veatch prints: 138814-IPCS-M4502C, and 138814-1 PCS-M4502D. These new drawings (attached) supersede the previously approved drawings of the same designation. The MURR P&ID Print 156 (also attached) now reflects the installation of Strainer 597D, as well as the associated '/2" flush/drain, Valve 518Z.The additional head loss introduced by installing this 8" strainer with 0.062" opening mesh is predicted to be on the order of 1.0 -1.5 psid over the full range of flows, and expected to be near 1.2 psid when operating at the current target flowrate of 1200 gpm. This additional loss is expected to be small, and a net gain is still expected following installation of the new Pool Coolant System piping.The existing Pool Coolant System strainer is not specifically described in the Original Hazards Summary. Addendum 3, while making specific mention of the existing strainer, is traditionally not revised in order to preserve knowledge of the 10 MW upgrade. Therefore, the only revision required to the Hazards Summary Report will be the revised MURR P&ID Print 156, reflecting the addition of the strainer.CAl Herbold, Xssistant R oL-rr L oyto, React Manager Manager -Engineering ORIGINAL r--I 4 a BILL OFl MATERIAL 4 1 I I I S PIPE, 5/STO SKLS. ASIM 7 41 (S51-T6f) ( 01-Il" W J" ELL- W- LN SIlT' , V'" 0:61 MW %P E5 I 3 111 6 FLG. RFVN 15I.B S/ST BURE, Asrm 1247 I 4 4 1 3/4' KS) STUD BOLTS V/ NUTS, ASIO E93/194 M 1 3 3/4I (\I J1' ipd "url 420 W-Sý. 13 T. 830091 KM 3 IP 7 (2 1. ML N(ls ý row *= .M,.3. m- u tact" to e C WXn a n usc m nui Go.4. 0 +/- A Or~m G /eS. -c C N Aý = la Aý,0 0 '7-,-T- 07 -ýý mEs: me~oaS APPROVED FOR CONSTRUCTION H 0 I z H ffAM -u-' .ACK &VEATCH INm uSliTy or O COUIT 4 -1.gao~ela, MUR.EIPLAct FwAw cooWsna ITIDI 138aI4-1PCS-M4;a2D 10 MEII III I I I 1¶1.'Z .. =1j~OO~ NW? ~A *1630563 02514*12 pI~l* -wswfii W---i 40oo3i L_J ORI1NAL ORIGINAL F--I Sau Si S Si i 1 Vir. 0 Ocn MI "1 X S -mi. ugSa WK 4-.* , -A.-o7 if-.".WltP55 0635 51,@ slf MMM "al B c RY5 O712 7 w* AGEML n 0:I m z ci" APPROVED FOR CONSTRUCTION L..J ORIGINAL U foi oi liii!~ MA~~CJ.f'.u CD '-sjK FI Ir IU F1~sg

• I~h~B II ii' I vi 1 4 I'o I I'~~I' 4 J II p&L +F1I" I F I oU P I A RFPIN G & IN S T R U M E N T ! I E S O a a p11 ~ DIAGRAM FAIILTE O' RATO]

AO;NA6T 6 AP-RO-l 15 Revision 3 MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM FOR: 1) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.NOTE: Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 09-1 Modification Title: Interfacinq MURR Systems with the Shipping and Receiving Building Page No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation OP, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Required Date Yes No Completed XC E__ /-o K K _____-K-__-K-By (Initials) 50.59 Screen Completed: (Asst. Reactor ager -Engineering) Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review: w:_. _(Asst. Reactor Manager t'fngineering) Modification Approved:; Modfiatodeactor Manager)Modification Completed: ,._i Date: e%- 4-9c Date:12-3 -07 Date: _ __-2-__-- 0_Date: /0 "Zd6- 0-- T r (Reactor Mknager)I Attachment

8.1 ORIGINAL

QR04&NT 6 AP-RO-I 15 Revision 3 I Modification Number: 09-1 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)This Modification Record documents the addition of the new Shipping and Receiving Building to the MURR facility.Several systems within the MURR facility are in place to ensure a prompt and effective response from MURR staff to an emergency or abnormal condition. These systems will also be required to be in place in order to safely occupy the Shipping and Receiving Building, which will tentatively be occupied in late summer 2009.Since multiple systems are involved, this Modification Record will be used as the initiating document to ensure all systems related to emergency response have been identified. These systems include: Evacuation Horns, Fire Protection, Intercom System, Emergency Electrical Power, and Normal Electrical Power. The following addendums to previously approved Modification Records will be used to document changes to each of these systems: Modification Record 90-1; Addendum 2 -Evacuation Horns in Shipping and Receiving Building Modification Record 03-1; Addendum 2 -Fire Protection in Shipping and Receiving Building Modification Record 01-2; Addendum 3 -Intercom System in Shipping and Receiving Building Modification Record 01-9; Addendum 3 -Emergency Electrical Power in Shipping and Receiving Building Modification Record 04-5; Addendum 7 -Normal Electrical Power in Shipping and Receiving Building It should be noted that the functions of the existing Mail Trailer will be integrated into the new Shipping and Receiving Building. The installation of this trailer was documented in Modification Record 01-12. A letter to Modification Record 01-12 will be drafted to state that the trailer will be removed following the transfer of its functions to the new building.This Modification Record will NOT provide suggested revisions to the Emergency Procedures. Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page 1, with justification) The short form of the Modification Record is appropriate because this is a modification to a non-safety system that requires documentation and review only (Reason No. 4).2 Attachment

8.1 ORIGINAL

j~fjWE N T 6 AP-RO- 115 Revision 3 Modification Number: 09-1 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: No: Signature: AýDate: -,/-_If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggested (evision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This Modification Record does not involve a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda. An HSR analysis will be performed and revisions suggested for each of the Modification Record Addenda listed on page 2.3 Attachment

8.1 ORIGINAL

QRIShAINT 6 AP-RO-1 15 Revision 3 Modification Number: 09-1 REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a safety hazard as described in 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if.(i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Yes: No: i1(Signature:~< eý W/0-Date: 2--7/-02 If YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or create a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.A 50.59 screen (09-14) is attached to document that these specific existing MURR systems may be safely extended to the Shipping and Receiving Building without further review under 10 CFR 50.59.4 Attachment

8.1 ORIGINAL

Ofi~lfL M E N T 6 AP-RO-1 15 Revision 3 Modification Number: 09-1 OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, AND COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE, AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?Yes: No: x Signature: -Date: ,_F_-__/_-- If YES, provide the suggested revision(s). OPERATING PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. Revisions to the Emergency Procedures will be performed independently of this Modification Record and will also be independently reviewed under 10 CFR 50.59.PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. PRINTS: No revision is required for this modification. 5 Attachment

8.1 ORIGINAL

dftfdftflEN T 6 AP-RO-l 15 Revision 3 Modification Number: 09-1 SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory? Yes: No: Signature: c "1, 4' 47 Date: F--/-09 If YES, provide a list of the spare parts.SPARE PARTS: No spare parts are required for this modification. 6 Attachment

8.1 ORIGINAL

AP-RR-003 Revision 4 50.59 SCREEN Activity Screening Number: 09-14 Page 1 of 2 Title: Modification Record 09-1; Interfacing MURR Systems with Shipping and Receiving Building Description of Activity (what is being changed and why): This Modification Record documents the addition of the new Shipping and Receiving Building to the MURR facility.Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safe facility (i.e., F 2_-MURR) operations? YES NO If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions:

1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function L described in the HSR? YES NO 2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR F-1 FXJ described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested? YES NO 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology F1K that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?

YES NO 4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is F F-utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside .the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or YES NO is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? F7 r YES NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approved facility procedure(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. 1 NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use page 2 of this form to document your statements. Print Name Sign Name Date Preparer: C. Herbold 7" _____Reviewer: Reactor Manager: Les'P. Foyto Lý j-7-- TF-1 ______L- fAttachment

9.1 600T6

AP-RR-003 Revision 4 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Activity Screening Number: 09-14 Page 2of 2 Title: Modification Record 09-1; Interfacing MURR Systems with Shipping and Receiving Building If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessary. ]1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR?No. The proposed activity does not involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects any HSR-described design function.2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to aprocedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No. The Shipping and Receiving Building has no procedure that affects the performance, control or testing of HSR-described SSC design functions.

3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?No. The proposed activity does not involve any evaluation methodology used to establish the design bases or used in the safety analyses.4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. The proposed activity involves no test or experiment.

List the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers.]Modification Record 09-1 Attachment 9.1 QO[PV ATTACHMENT 7 ORIGINAL AP-RO- 115 Revision 6 MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM FOR: 1) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 11-2 Modification Title: Replace Cooling Tower WAFNumber: 10- I-5SY-)Page No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Fonn is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Procedure, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Required Date Yes No Completed SV _ /- _Zor- //_ /_ /-/--/--I-1_ ,'_ 2 1'2-7 d-,,0 By (Initials) 50.59 Screen Completed: A d<(Asst. Reactor Managt- Engineering) Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review. ,_Z ' ,/Weactor I3anager)Modification Approved: A K' .- ager)Modification Completed:- K < eac or Ytnager)Modification Closed: ./Yeactor Manager)Date: -r4--Date: _3 _ /___Date: k4-Ai-,.Date: _- 2 _-Y _-Date: 1O I s I Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

7 ORIGINAL AP-RO-l 15 Revision 6 Modification Number: 11-2 REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION Item No.I 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review Operating Procedures Updated Preventive Maintenance Procedures Updated Compliance Procedures Updated MURR Prints Updated Spare Parts System Updated Req Yes___x'u ired Date Documented by No Completed (Initials) ._ -z-r- z., 5/ ,V /4C -r// 47-C '-) o.4 6J 15-P/ // 7-5-5-02 5H- -/ ,?e / D/-1 Z /5- 0 5, C 67>2-t 41,fDA6)~-2 5 4 7 ý )? /1 0/j 7-d6D 2 C.-1/,z -,/66 -/A1r / ?C -DA04-D 04 7E 2/S- Z5-'/ 2 F- /7-3 -~'/r'la Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

7 ORIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 11-2 Revision 6l Modification Number: 11-2_Revision_6 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)This Modification Record documents the replacement of the existing Cooling Tower. The replacement of the Cooling Tower will consist of demolition of the existing wood structure, removal of an asbestos containing basin liner, conversion of the existing basin to a structural slab, installation of a steel elevating structure, installation of three (3)current generation stainless steel modular towers, installation of associated piping and electrical components and supporting instrumentation, as well as repairs to the existing mechanical building.The existing Cooling Tower is a wood-framed, induced-draft, cross-flow type with three cells and two-speed fan assemblies for each cell. The tower is designed to cool 4,632 gallons of water per minute to a temperature of 87 degrees-F from an initial temperature of 104 degrees-F at a maximum wet bulb temperature of 77 degrees F. This tower structure was last renewed in 1998, along with several repair and preservation efforts since, and is approaching the end of its service life. When the detennination was made to fund the replacement tower, a design engineer was contracted through Campus to evaluate and recommend the proper approach and end result, based on the current and projected cooling needs of MURR. The results of the design engineer's conclusions are best shown in the attached set of drawings, and further detailed in the project specifications (not attached). To support this work, Modification Record 09-4; Cooling Tower Temporary Cooling has been implemented, providing temporary cooling to the Secondary Coolant System. This allows continued operation of the Reactor on a normal schedule during the performance of this replacement work.Since multiple systems are involved, this Modification Record will be used as the initiating document to ensure all changes to supporting systems or subsystems are documented. This Modification Record will primarily document the Structural, Mechanical and Electrical changes associated with this change.The following Modification Records and addendums to previously approved Modification Records will be used to document changes to each of these systems: Modification Record 98-2; Addendum I -Sulfuric Acid System Changes in Support of Cooling Tower Replacement Modification Record 03-3; Addendum 3 -Fire Protection System Changes in Support of Cooling Tower Replacement Modification Record 11-3; Data Acquisition and Monitoring System for Secondary Coolant System (Modification Description continued on page 2a.)Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page 1, with justification) The short form of the Modification Record is appropriate because this is a modification to a non-safety system that requires documentation and review only (Reason 4).2 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

7 ORIGINAL AP-RO- 115 Revision 6 Modification Number: 11-2 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)Scope of Work DEMOLITION Demolition will be performed in accordance with the 'D' series sheets of the attached drawings. It will consist first of connecting and ensuring operable the Temporary Cooling Towers. Then piping, instrument and electrical services will be disconnected, along with the Fire Protection Deluge System. The Bulk Acid Tank will be emptied and temporarily relocated. Removal of the existing tower structure will proceed from the west end. When the major structure has been removed, an existing asbestos-containing liner will be removed from the concrete basin and properly disposed of.The concrete basin walls will be cut down to form a flat slab from the basin. Additional demolition work will include removal of the Acid Day Tank and associated piping and removal of the asbestos-containing transite panel wall that currently forms the north wall of the Cooling Tower building mechanical room.STRUCTURAL Structural work will be performed in accordance with the 'S' series sheets of the attached drawings.It will consist first of anchoring a prefabricated, galvanized steel structural box frame on the footprint of the basin converted to slab. This steel structure will be primarily bolted members of I-beams sitting on steel columns with welded angle braces. The steel structure will provide a 7-foot elevation for the new tower modules to sit on.The tower modules will consist of three SPX Marley towers. These towers are Model NC8414, are primarily stainless steel construction with PVC integral fill sheets, and are constructed to have all piping connections be made from underneath the towers. They will remain as induced-draft, cross-flow type with three cells and two-speed fan assemblies for each cell. The fill sheets integrate the inlet louver, fill drip surface area and drift eliminator inner section on one stamped sheet. These towers will have fan motors mounted inside the airstream with a fan access platform for inspection and maintenance of the fan drivetrain. The towers will be shipped as a lower and upper module, and will be installed by stacking and bolting the two modules for each of the three cells on the steel support frame.Other supporting structures will be installed following installation of the tower modules such as access platforms and ladders as well as handrail restraints at the top of the tower modules. The west wall of the Cooling Tower building will be evaluated for necessary repairs and finish options, once exposed. Currently, the north and center access doors are expected to be blocked, leaving one access door on the south as an egress route from the electrical room. A concrete block wall will be installed at the north wall of the Cooling Tower building mechanical room.MECHANICAL Mechanical work will be performed in accordance with the 'M' series sheets of the attached drawings. It will consist of installing piping and valves to connect the three tower cells to the existing piping connections.(Modification Description continued on page 2b.)2a Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

7 ORIGINAl 'AP-RO-1 15 Revision 6 Modification Number: 11-2 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)Several new mechanical features are described as follows: 1) The existing six flow distribution valves will be replaced with three current generation flow distribution valves, one for each tower inlet.2) Since the three tower cells will have three independent basins, additional equalizing piping and valves will be provided to ensure basin levels remain roughly equal.3) The existing makeup water distribution tree will be modified to provide independent isolation and bypass features for both the Auto-makeup Valve and the makeup flowmeter.

4) The existing makeup flowmeter will be replaced with a larger capacity Badger flowmeter, but remain compatible with the existing pulse cycle instrumentation output.5) Makeup water will no longer be fed to a common sump; therefore each of the three basins will have independent makeup float valves and independent level sensing systems.6) Each basin will be provided with independent overflow and drain piping.7) The existing acid addition drip system will be replaced with an integral injection quill in the common cold water header.8) Several temperature and pressure sensing field devices will be installed as described in the attached drawings.

Except where noted here, this instrumentation will be used for monitoring purposes only and will be described in another Modification Record.ELECTRICAL Electrical work will be performed in accordance with the 'E' series sheets of the attached drawings.It will consist of installing new 200-amp disconnects adjacent to each tower cell, and feeding fan power from the existing fan controllers in MCC-1. Control of the fans will remain as two-speed manual control from the Control Room, with reversing control at each motor controller. Several new electrical features are described as follows: 1) A space heater powered from LP-41 installed in each fan motor will be energized any time that fan motor is secured.2) An additional fan logic interlock will utilize a capacitive sensor to prevent a fan from running if its gearbox oil level is not high enough.3) The existing low sump cutout float will be replaced with a low header discharge pressure switch.4) The existing steam heat for basin freeze protection will be replaced with 30-kw electrical heaters placed in each basin, and controlled by independent thermostats. These heaters will be powered from an existing spare breaker in MCC-1 as shown on the 'E' series drawings attached.5) Six lamp posts will be mounted on top of the new tower structure to provide lighting.6) A lightning protection system will be installed on the lamp posts described above, and will have a Surge Protector Device installed in MCC-] as shown on the 'E' series drawings attached.This work is being performed under Campus Project number: CPI 10731.2b Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

7 )RIGINAI AP-RO-I 15 11-2 Revision 6 [Modification Number: 11-2 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: __ No: _ Signature: --..- -Date: /2k<//If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does involve a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda.Proposed system changes documented by this Modification Record are described or depicted in the following sections and figures of the HSR and its addenda: I. Original HSR a. Section 5.4 2. Addendum 3 a. Figure 2.2 -MURR Print No. 502, Sheet I of I b. Figures 2.3.a and 2.3.d -MURR Print No. 522; Sheets I and 4 of 5 3. Addendum 5 a. Figure 2. .a and 2. .d -MURR Print No. 522; Sheets 1 and 4 of 5 The following Sections and Figures of the HSR and its addenda will be revised as follows: I. Original HSR a. Section 5.4.3 Replace entire section with the following: "The cooling tower is a stainless steel, induced-draft, cross-flow type, with three cells and two-speed fan assemblies for each cell. The tower is designed to cool 5,400 gallons (20,440 liters) of water per minute to a temperature of 85 degrecs-F (29.4 C) from an initial temperature of 115 degrees-F (46.1 C) at a maximum wet bulb temperature of 80 degrees F (26.7 C). Vibration and low oil cutout switches are mounted on each fan assembly to secure the associated fan motor to prevent damage to the fan or cooling tower structure should an imbalance or low oil level condition develop. The number of fans and fan speed is configured as required to provide sufficient cooling for 10-MW operation." 2. Addendum 3 a. Figure 2.2 MURR Print No. 502, Sheet I of I -revise per attached draft as Figures 2.2.a,b MURR Print No. 502, Sheets 1-2 of 2.b. Figures 2.3.a and 2.3.d -MURR Print No. 522; Sheets I and 4 of 5 -revise per attached draft.3. Addendum 5 a. Figures 2. .a and 2. I.d -MURR Print No. 522; Sheets I and 4 of 5 -revise per attached draft.All other Sections and Figures of the HSR and its addenda are considered correct and will remain the same.3 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

7 ORIGINAL AP-RO- 1 15 Revision 6 11-2 Modification Number:_________ REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a safety hazard as described in 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Yes:__No: AC Signature: Date: /.?- Z4-//If YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to Technical Specifications or create a question pursuant to IOCFR 50.59.A 50.59 Screen (1 I- 18) is attached to show that the change may be implemented without further review.4 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

7 ORIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 11-2 Revision 6 [i Modification Number: 11-2 OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?Yes: A- No: _ Signature: -Date: /Z-2L#'//If YES, provide the suggested revision(s). OPERATING PROCEDURES:

1. OP-RO-480, "Secondary Coolant System" -revise per attached draft.PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES:

I. S I -A3, Change Oil and Inspect Internals of Gear Reducers and Vibration Switches -replace with attached draft SI-Ol.2. SI -S2, Grease Motor Bearings on Cooling Tower Fans I and 2 -revise per attached draft.3. S I-S4, Clean Cooling Tower Basin and Sump -revise per attached draft.4. SI-S6, Tighten and Torque Check bolts and Nuts on CooLing Tower Fans and Drives -revise per attached draft.5. S I-S7, Grease Valve Mechanism -INACTIVATE. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES: No Compliance Procedure revisions are required to implement this change.PRINTS: 1. MURR Print No. 502, Sheet I of I, "Secondary Coolant System" -revise per attached draft containing Sheets I and 2 of 2.I. MURR Print No. 522, Sheet I of 5, "Electrical Distribution" -revise per attached draft.3. MURR Print No. 522, Sheet 4 of 5, "Electrical Distribution" -revise per attached draft.5. MURR Print No. 1091, Sheet I of 2, "Domestic Cold Water" -revise per attached draft.5 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

7 ORIGINAL AP-RO-l 15 11-2 Revision 6 I Modification Number: 11-2 SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory? Yes: No: Signature: Date: 12-4t-/&If YES, provide a list of the spare parts SPARE PARTS I. Gear Reducer -Marley Model 2400 with ISO 150 Synthetic Oil 2. Gear Reducer Lubrication Line -field fabricate from existing 3. Vibration Switch -Marley M-5 set to 2.5 G 4. Oil Level Switch -Capacitive Probe RobertShaw Model 741B 5. Motor -Leeson 40 HP, 2 speed (1200/600 rpm) on 365T frame 6. Coupling -Marley Model MC09 7. Heater -Marley standard electric heater package 8. Heater sensor -Marley standard RTD 9. Float Valve -Marley NC-72-92 10. Float -Marley 7" copper on 20" x 3/8" SS rod IL. Level Sensor Assembly 6 Attachment 8.1 ATTA HAE, AP-R.R-003 Revision 7 50.59 SCREEN Number: 11-18 Page I of 2 Title: Modification Record 11-02; "Replace Cooling Tower" Description of Activity (what is being changed and why): The Cooling Tower Cells will be replaced with three stainless steel modular units and associated piping and valves, Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safefacility (i.e., F__j MURR) operations? YES NO If this question is answered ycs, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designfimction El. M/1 described in the HSR? YES NO 2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR III described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested? YES NO 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology FI i that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safely analyses? YES NO 4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is Fi M utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds ofthe design for that SSC or YES NO is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? 111 11 YES NO If all screening questions arc answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approvcd facililj'procedure(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1, 2. 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use Page 2 ofthis form to document your statements. Print Name Sign Name Date Preparer: C. Herbold /27-LA-/I Reviewer: Reactor Manager: J.Fus_________ Submit copy of screen to HSR / SAR file(crl n? eT N Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

7 AP-RR-003 Revision 7 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Number: 11-18 Page 2 of 2 Title: Modification Record 1 1-02: "Replace Cooling Tower" If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessary.] I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designjfunction described in the HSR?No The propnied activity doie- nnt involve a change to an .SC' that adversely afferts a design finclion descrihed in ihe H 'R The new conling lower power requirements are ghnwn in he well within the load limils of the affected load centers- The existing function and failure modes of the new Cooling Tower have not changed more than minimally, and no new failure modes are introduced.

2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No The proposed activity does not involve a cha;io ton pinrncedhrer thal adversely affects the performance.

control or tesing of HSqR described SSC design functions None of the affected procednres revised resulted in a review having adverse effects on the operation of the Secondary Coolant System 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the sqfety analyses?No. The proposed activity does not involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses. The proposed electrical load changes will utilize lighting panels and loads that are not significant to safcty. The proposed cooling capacity of the new cooling tower will be well in excess of the one being replaced.4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. The proposed activity does not involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR. No test or experiment is associated with this change.List the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]Technical Specification 4.4.b HSR Section 5.4: Add. 3. Section 2.3 Modification Record 11-02 MURR Prints 502, 522 (and HSR equivalents) and 1091 Attachment

9. 1 ATTACHMENT 7 COOLING; 1'ýCHNOLOGlI._S ORIGINAL Midwest Machinery Company 17814 Edison Ave CHESTERFIELD, MO 63005-1262 636 537.1919/email: vormimldweslnmadh.com Proposal to: .Project: Engineer: Mr. Kevin Summers UMC -MURR Mr. Chris Barth P.E.University of Missouri Procurement Services COLUMBIA, MO Rogers-Schmidt Engineering 113 Heinkel Building Columbia, MO 65211 Opportunity I Quote No. (Var): 100422_142231331 1 TROY GLADSTONE1IO405_165443484 (1)April 5, 2011 Marley NC8400 Tower TOWER MODEL PERFORMANCE MOTOR DATA TOWER DIMENSIONS WEIGHTS CONDITIONS Quantity of (1) Marley NC Per 3-cell tower. NEMA 40 HP 2 speed / Each cell: (without options) Per cell: Class Diamond Series 6,4Q0 an 1 wind Length 13'- 10 314" Shipping:

25.965 lb model NC8414TLS 106.0 IF Hot Water 3 phase 160 Hz 1460v Width 2Z -5" Operating: 54,163 lb factory assembled 3-Cell 85.0 "F Cold Water 1.15sf/ITEFC Height 27r -1 1/8" crossflow cooling tower 80.0 "F Entering WB 1200/600 RPM Per 3.cell tower.or ,120 volt space heater Per 3-cell tower: (with options) Shipping: 77,894 lb 113.0 "F Hot Water Length 50' -7 3/4" Operating: 162,488 lb 86.0 "F Cold Water Width 26'- 5" 80.0 'F Entering WB Height 27'- 1 1/8. Heaviest Uft 13,946 lb or 115.0 °F Hot Water 86.0 IF Cold Water 80.0 IF Entering WB Quantities shown below are per tower.Base Tower Construction/Equipment: Stainless Steel casing.Stainless Steel structure. Stainless Steel collection basin.Stainless Steel distribution basin.All stainless steel is series 300.Anchorage design selected to meet customer specified design requirements for wind load of 30.0 psf.Quiet fan with aluminum blades.Marley designed Geareducer with 5-year warranty.15 mil PVC film fill with Integral louvers and drift eliminators designed and manufactured by Marley., Drift rate guaranteed to be no greater than .005% of the design flow rate.CTI certification per STD-201.Factory Mutual Approval For multi-cell towers Purchaser must ensure that the number of cells includes consideration of cell outage due to fire damage, mechanical failure and preventive maintenance such that sufficient cooling capacity Is available to enable normal business and manufacturing operations to continue throughout the year.Fiberglass fan stack.Collection Basin Connections and Accessories: All flanges are to Class 125 ANSI B16.1 standard.All threads are to American Standard Pipe Taper Thread.(3) 10 In (254 mm) diameter depressed side sump outlet(s) with trash screen(s) and anti-vortex plate(s).12 In (305 mm) diameter hole and bolt circle(s) for equalization, One per Cell 4 in (102 mm) diameter combination drain and overflow In each cell (3) 1 in (25.4 mm) water make-up float valve(s)Probe type electronic water level sensor with the following events: make-up, low-alarm, high-alarm, low-cutoff, high-cutoff 24 kW per cell 480/3 volt/phase electric Immersion heater for freeze protection of the collection basin during cold weather system shutdown Includes heater elements, water temperature sensor probe and control box Heater system disconnect switch Heater system fuse block with fuses Distribution Basin Inlet and Accessories: (1) self-balancing 12 in (305 mm) diameter PVC bottom inlet connection per cell.All internal piping is PVC. External piping is PVC.Page 1 of?. ATTACHMENT 7 ORIGINAL Midwest Machinery company 17814 Edison Ave CHESTERFIELD, MO 63005-1262 ,O LI NG TLC H NOt.OGI.S 636537.19191 emall: troyc@nidwesltachmmorn Variable flow nozzles.Maintenance & Maintenance Access Features: Tower is designed in accordance with OSHA safety standards. This quotation includes features that will allow safe access on the fan deck while the fan is still operating. External tube line with dipstick Low oil level switch Full face horizontally mounted air Inlet screens for easy access to collection basin Convenient access to the collection basin and plenum area Is provided via a large access door located on each endwall (2) Access door platforms Stainless Steel plenum walkway In each cell Internal mechanical equipment access platform In each cell Fan deck extension Easy fitting perimeter guardrail, kneera9 & toeboard (1) Cased face ladder Ladder(s) extended 60 In below base of tower Easy fitting ladder safety cage(s)Self closing safety gate(s) Included at the top of the access ladder(s)Control Systems: Mariey M-5 121-110 DPDT Elec & Manua( Reset vibration cutoff switch Field Installed Equipment: The field installed portion of the equipment will require approximately 140-190 man-hours of installation time after the tower arrives at the jobsite (based on USA experienced crew). The price to install these components is NOT included in the total price.Total Sell Price ...................................................................................................................... (US Dollar) $ 287,440.00 (Freight Included. Installation labor not included. Taxes not included.) OPTIONAL ADDS Midwest Machinery (will require separate PO to Midwest Mahcinery) supplied startup and Installation $ 19,230.00 supervision including required spare parts in base bid (Geareducer and Motor) (US Dollar)Commercial / Technical Clarifications

1. In general, many of the "boiler plate' documents in the RFQ refer to 'Contractor".

We are NOT acting as a contractor on this project: merely an equipment vendor. Much of the language does not pertain to a simple material order.2. "General Terms & Conditions" Page 3, Item 3 -We do not Include any taxes in this proposal 3. "General Terms & Conditions' Page 5, Item 12 -As this is a "Materials Only" proposal, this insurance requirement does not apply.4. 'General Terms & Conditions" Page 5, Item 13 -As this is a "Materials Only" proposal, we have not included a performance bond.5. "Cooling Towers" Specification 15640-6, Paragraph I -We do not include ANY factory wiring of electrical devises.Payment Terms: NET 30 days from date of shipment (subject to credit approval)Freight Terms: F.O.B. SPX plant(s) Olathe, Kansas, USA with freight prepaid Shipment Lead-Time After Drawing Approval: 45 business days The following options are offered for your consideration: The SPX Cooling Technologies Certification of Limited Warranty ("Warranty $ 29,386.09 Certificate") shall include a 5 year labor warranty. All other terms of the Warranty Certificate remain unchanged and in effect.The SPX Cooling Technologies Certification of Limited Warranty ("Warranty $ 11,801.96 Certificate") shall include a 2year labor warranty. All other terms of the Warranty Certificate remain unchanged and in effect.Page 2 ofR ATTACHMENT 7 ORIGINAL University of Missouri-Columbia Research Reactor Intra-Department Correspondence Date: October 21, 2011 To: Carl Herbold From: Ron Dobey

Subject:

Cooling Tower Replacement Project In preparation for and during the cooling tower replacement project MURR Health Physics analyzed four separate putential radioactive waste streams prior to demolition. These were: 1. Cooling tower sump sludge 2. Cooling tower sump liner material 3. Underground secondary suction header soil sample 4. Underground secondary suction header tritium analysis from soil sample.Items 1-3 above were analyzed for gamma identification using the HP germanium counting system in lab 213 while item 4 was analyzed for H-3 due to leakage from the secondary system header using the Packard 2300 LSC system. In all cases radioactive materials evidence was negative, as there were no isotopezs identified above background levels. Should you require more or additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me.Cc: John Fruits L4W ME"f 7 OP-RO-480 Revision 14 MURR OPERATING OP-RO-480 SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM MASTER COPY ISSUED JUL 1 1 2811 RESPONSIBLE GROUP: Reactor Operations PROCEDURE OWNER: Eric Hood APPROVED BY: John Fruits_______________ Date I This procedure contains the following: Pages Attachments Tables Figures Appendices Check-Off Lists 1 1 None None None None through through through through through through 13 3 IF ATTACHMENT 7 DRAFT OP-RO-480 Revision 14 I TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1.0 P U R P O S E ........................................................................................................................... 3 2 .0 S C O P E ................................................................................................................................ 3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ........................................................................ 3 4.0 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS ..................................................... 3 5.0 PROCEDURE -COOLANT SYSTEM: NORMAL OPERATION ...................... 4 5 .1 S ta rtu p ...................................................................................................................... 4 5.2 Tem perature C ontrol ......................................................................................... 5 5.3 Shutdow n ....................................................................................................... 7 5.4 O peration of SP-4 ............................................................................................. 8 6.0 PROCEDURE -COOLANT SYSTEM: SHUTDOWN OPERATION .................. 8 6.1 Back-Flush Pool Heat Exchanger 521 ................................................................ 8 6.2 Back-Flush Primary Heat Exchangers 503A and 503B ................................... 10 7.0 PROCEDURE -COLD WEATHER OPERATION ..................................................... II 7.1 Cold Weather Operation of Pump SP-4 ............................................................ 11 7 .2 D e ic in g ................................................................................................................... 12 7.3 Shutdown Operations Greater Than 24 Hours ................................................. 12 8.0 R E F E R E N C E S .................................................................................................................. 13 9 .0 R E C O R D S ......................................................................................................................... 13 10.0 A T T A C H M E N T S .............................................................................................................. 13 2 ATTACHMENT 7 DRAFT OP-RO-480 Revision 14 I SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 Instructions for the startup, normal operation and shutdown of the Secondary Coolant System.2.0 SCOPE 2.1 Procedural steps, precautions and prerequisites necessary to startup and shutdown the Secondary Coolant System.2.2 Procedural steps, precautions and prerequisites necessary to operate the Secondary Coolant Pumps.2.3 Procedural steps, precautions and prerequisites necessary to perform a back-flush of the Pool Heat Exchanger and Primary Heat Exchangers.

2.4 Procedural

steps, precautions and prerequisites necessary to operate the Cooling Tower (CT) Fans.3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 3.1 With the exception of SP-4, no more than two Secondary Coolant Pumps can be run at the same time.3.2 In cold weather operations, ice must not be allowed to form on the Cooling Tower plastic fill material or the fan blades.3. If the rca tor is shut o an t ut-s-J mpera, re is expect-ed to re"in less.Coo tPum P-4 distri ion should be rer uted if the 'I iknin Zlctric-. onditi ing SyS is i perat io , 4.0 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL COND IONS 4.1 No Secondary Coolant System maintenance has been performed since the last shutdown of the secondary coolant system, OR 4.1.1 If maintenance has been performed on the system, ensure that all affected components are in their normal positions (Attachment

10. 1).4.1.2 The Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO) must determine if a valve line-up checksheet needs to be completed (Attachment

10. I).3 ATTACHMENT 7 DRAFT OP-RO-480 Revision 14 4.0 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS (CONT.)4.2 Power available to Secondary Coolant Pumps.4.3 Before starting pumps, CT basin water level is greater than inches.4.4 The following Secondary support systems are in the proper line-up:* Acid and pH control" Conductivity control" Chemical treatment system 4.5 Prior to starting CT fans in cold weather operation, the fan blades must be clear of ice build-up.4.6"-- 4-thei building electric air conditioning system inngT , ,' Se";dary.Codiant ",7,-cýtrol switch shall be-lced in the"g'n' postoi 40 securing-condafy Coolant Pumps SP-SI,"P-2 and SP-3.5.0 PROCEDURE

-COOLANT SYSTEM: NORMAL OPERATION 5.1 STARTUP: NOTE: Secondary Coolant Pumps (SP-l, SP-2, SP-3) should be operated alternately to equalize operation time.5.1. I ENSURE Secondary Temperature/Flow Recorder is ON.NOTE: Starting of Secondary Coolant Pumps should be monitored using the intercom system.5.1.2 START one Secondary Coolant Pump as specified by the LSRO.5.1.3 VERIFY flow has increased on the Secondary Flow Display.5.1.4 WHEN the first Secondary Coolant Pump has run for greater than five minutes, THEN start a second Secondary Coolant Pump, if required.5.1.5 VERIFY flow has increased on the Secondary Flow Display.5.1.6 Balance Secondary Coolant Pumps by matching the % Load on the running pumps.4 ATTACHMENT 7 DRAFT OP-RO-480 Revision 14 5.0 PROCEDURE -COOLANT SYSTEM: NORMAL OPERATION (CONT.)5.2 TEMPERATURE CONTROL NOTE: When possible, S-I should be maintained between its alarm set points and S-2 should be maintained between its low and high limits. Small changes in cooling can be accomplished by adjusting Secondary Coolant Pump speeds. Large changes in cooling can be accomplished by changing CT Fan configuration. NOTE: At least one CT Fan must be operating in at least slow speed at all times.NOTE: Secondary Coolant Pump speeds should be maintained high enough to prevent any out of specification conditions.

5.2.1 Secondary

Coolant Pump Operation: NOTE: Secondary Coolant Pumps (SP-I, SP-2, SP-3) should be balanced according to % Load.5.2.1.1 IF changing pump speed, THEN push the raise or lower buttons of both running pumps so that percent load of both pumps remain within approximately 1% of each other.5.2.1.2 Inform LSRO that pump speed has been changed.5.2.1.3 VERIFY change in pump speed by OBSERVING a change in Primary and Secondary Coolant temperatures. 5 ATTACHMENT 7 DRAFT OP-RO-480 Revision 14 I 5.0 PROCEDURE -COOLANT SYSTEM: NORMAL OPERATION (CONT.)5.2.2 Cooling Tower Fan Operation: NOTE: The CT Fan controllers incorporate a fast speed to slow speed coast down delay timer to allow the fans to coast down to a slow speed before the slow speed relays energize (- 20 seconds).5.2.2.1 Fan Operation -Startup a) Obtain permission from the LSRO to start a CT Fan.b) START CT Fan 1, 2 or 3 in slow or fast speed.c) ENSURE CT Fan I, 2 or 3 slow or fast speed indication is lit.d) VERIFY fan(s) running by OBSERVING a change in Primary and Secondary Coolant temperatures. 5.2.2.2 Fan Operation -Shifting Speed a) Obtain permission from the LSRO to shift a CT Fan to fast or slow speed.b) IF shifting from slow to fast speed, THEN place switch to'Fast.'c) IF shifting from fast to slow speed, THEN: " Place switch to 'Off.'* After greater than 20 seconds, place switch to 'Slow.'d) ENSURE CT Fan 1, 2 or 3 slow or fast speed indication light is lit.6 ATTACHMENT 7 DRAFT OP-RO-480 Revision 14 5.0 PROCEDURE -COOLANT SYSTEM: NORMAL OPERATION (CONT.)5.2.3 Primary and Pool Coolant Temperature Controllers S-I and S-2: I 5NOTE: Normal control of S-1 and S-2 is in the automatic mode.I 5.2.3.1 Manual Control of S- I or S-2: CAUTION: A substantial reactivity change can occur when adjusting Primary Coolant Temperature Controller S-I position.a) Depress controller "A/M" button AND VERIFY hand icon is lit.b) Adjust S- I or S-2 to desired position using the "<" or ">" buttons.c) Depress controller "A/M" button AND VERIFY circle icon is lit.5.2.3.2 Adjusting Primary or Pool Coolant Temperature Controller set point: CAUTION: A substantial reactivity change can occur when adjusting Primary Coolant Temperature Controller S-I set point.a) Obtain permission from LSRO to change Coolant Temperature Controller set points b) Adjust Coolant Temperature Controller set point using the"V" or "A" buttons.5.3 SHUTDOWN: '~tcbu i'h ectiarndi, oing ystemn running, T""E"NSU"R-EPumpP is runnin. "K 5.3.2 IF CT fan operation is not required, THEN STOP fan(s).5.3.3 IF Secondary Coolant Pumps are not required, THEN STOP Secondary Coolant Pumps.7 ATTACHMENT 7 DRAFT OP-RO-480 Revision 14 I 5.0 PROCEDURE -COOLANT SYSTEM (CONT.)5.. ~ TUP 5.4. .1 OPEN A/C #2 Inlet Valve S-53.5.4.1.2 HECK OPEN A/C #2 Outlet Valve S-57.5.4.1.3 STA Secondary Coolant Pump SP4.5.4.2 SHUTDOWN 5.4.2.1 ENSURE A/C #2 1 ot in operation. 5.4.2.2 STOP Secondary Coolan ump SP-4.5.4.2.3 CLOSE A/C #2 Inlet Valve S- .6.0 PROCEDURE -COOLANT SYSTEM: SHUTDOWN OPERATION 6.1 BACK-FLUSH POOL HEAT EXCHANGER 52 1: 6.1 ,,F n ~ runn~i" ,' HEN 6.1.2 STOP Pumps SP-1, SP-2 and SP-3.6,1.3 Place Primary Coolant Temperature Controller S-I in 'Manual' control.6.1.4 SET Primary Coolant Temperature Controller S-I to 'Full Closed.'6.1.5 Place Pool Coolant Temperature Controller S-2 in 'Manual' control.6.1.6 SET Pool Coolant Temperature Controller S-2 to 'Full Open.'6.1.7 CLOSE Hx-521 Inlet Valve S-210.6.1.8 CLOSE Hx-521 Outlet Valve S-21 1.6.1.9 OPEN FT912R Equalizer Valve S-228.6.1.10 CLOSE FT912R HP Isolation Valve S-227.6.1.11 CLOSE FT912R LP Isolation Valve S-226.8 ATTACHMENT 7 OP-RO-480 Revision 14 I 6.0 PROCEDURE -COOLANT SYSTEM: SHUTDOWN OPERATION (CONT.)6.1.12 CLOSE Hx-503B Inlet Valve S-24.6.1.13 CLOSE Hx-503A Inlet Valve S-23.6.1.14 OPEN S-I Bypass Valve S-27.6.1.16 RECORD throttle position of Hx52l Inlet Valve S-232 6.1.17 OPEN Valve S-232.6.1.18 START Pump SP-l, SP-2 or SP-3.6.1.19 WHEN back-flushed for greater than 1 hour, THEN STOP Pump SP-I, SP-2 or SP-3.6.1.20 OPEN Valve S-2 10.6.1.21 OPEN Valve S-211.6.1.22 OPEN Valve S-226.6.1.23 OPEN Valve S-227.6.1.24 OPEN Valve S-24.6.1.25 OPEN Valve S-23.6.1.26 CLOSE Valve S-27.6. 1.28 Throttle Valve S-232 to position noted in Step 6.1 .16.6.1.29 Vent FT912R through quick disconnect fittings.6.1.30 CLOSE Valve S-228.6.1.31 Place Primary Coolant Temperature Controller S- I in 'Automatic' control.6.1.32 Place Pool Coolant Temperature Controller S-2 in 'Automatic' control.6.1.33 Perform valve line-up using Attachment 10.2.9 ATTACHMENT 7 OP-RO-480 Revision 14 I 6.0 PROCEDURE -COOLANT SYSTEM: SHUTDOWN OPERATION (CONT.)6.2 BACK-FLUSH PRIMARY HEAT EXCHANGERS 503A AND 503B: 6.2.1 IF the building electric air conditioning system is running, THEN ENSURE Pump SP-4 is running.6.2.2 STOP Pumps SP-l, SP-2 and SP-3.6.2.3 Place Primary Coolant Temperature Controller S-I in 'Manual' control.6.2.4 Set Primary Coolant Temperature Controller S-I to 'Full Open.'52 6.2.6 CLOSE HX-503A and 503B Inlet Valve S-223.6.2.7 CLOSE Back-Flush Isolation Valve S-38.6.2.8 OPEN Back-Flush Supply Valve S-40.6.2.9 OPEN S-I Bypass Valve S-27.6.2.10 IF HX-503A is being back-flushed, THEN CLOSE HX-503B Outlet Valve S-41.6.2.11 IF HX-503B is being back-flushed, THEN CLOSE HX-503A Outlet Valve S-39.6.2.12 START Pump SP-1, SP-2 or SP-3.6.2.13 When back-flushed for greater than one hour, STOP Pump SP- I, SP-2 or SP-3.6.2.14 IF HX-503B was back-flushed, THEN OPEN HX-503A Outlet Valve S-39.6.2.15 IF HX-503A was back-flushed, THEN OPEN HX-503B Outlet Valve S-41.6.2.16 CLOSE S-I Bypass Valve S-27.6.2.17 CLOSE Back-Flush Supply Valve S-40.6.2.18 OPEN Back-Flush Isolation Valve S-38.10 ATTACHMENT 7 OP-RO-480 Revision 14 6.0 PROCEDURE -COOLANT SYSTEM: SHUTDOWN OPERATION (CONT.)6.2.19 OPEN HX-503A and 503B Inlet Valve S-223.6.2.2h -j 6.2.21 Place Primary Coolant Temperature Controller S-I in 'Automatic' control.6.2.22 Perform valve line-up using Attachment 10.3.7.0 PROCEDURE -COLD WEATHER OPERATION"--7."- "-'"-D'W-EA-AE'R-OPERA'rION..O~iFUM.P, SP."'I N.TE: IF the reactor is shutdown and the outside temperature is expected to remain less than 40 'F, THEN Pump SP-4 flow distribution should me rerouted to prevent ice build-up of the Cooling Tower if the b ding electric air conditioning system is running.7.1.1 OPEN -P,4 Return to Cell #1 Valve S-47A.7.1.2 CLOSE SP-4 Rbtum To CT Distribution Valve 8-47B.K 7.1.3 WHEN reactor is operýtipng, THEN restore normal flow distribution line-up as follows: 7.1.3.1 OPEN Valve S-47B. 7.1.3.2 CLOSE Valve S-47A.7.1.3.3 ENSiJE SP-4 Return Drain Line VaAye S-196 is cracked 11 ATTACHMENT 7 -T OP-RO-480 Revision 14 I 7.0 PROCEDURE -COLD WEATHER OPERATION (CONT.)7.2 DEICING: NOTE: Ice formation can be controlled and minimized by one or more of the following operations:

• Run one fan only* Run fans in slow speed" Rotate fan operation on an hourly basis NOTE: Reverse operation of Cooling Tower fans should only be used to eliminate ice, not prevent it.NOTE: Reverse operation of the fans may be in fast or slow speed, however, fast speed is recommended.

Reverse fan operation should not exceed 20 minutes.7.2.1 Obtain permission from LSRO to deice CT Cell 1, 2 or 3.7.2.2 STOP fan for CT Cell to be deiced.7.2.3 WHEN fan has coasted to a stop, THEN place local controller switch in'Reverse.'

7.2.4 START

fan in 'Fast.'7.2.5 WHEN cell is clear of ice OR 20 minutes has elapsed, THEN STOP fan.7.2.6 WHEN fan has coasted to a stop, THEN place local controller switch to'Forward.'

7.2.7 RECORD

"Deiced Cooling Tower Cell "in Console Log Book.7.3 SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS GREATER THAN 24 HOURS: 7.3.1 ENSURE SP-1, SP-2, SP-3 AND CT Fans are 'Off.'7.3.2 STOP building air conditioners. 12 ATTACHMENT 7 OP-RO-480 Revision 14 7.0 PROCEDURE -COLD WEATHER OPERATION (CONT.)NOTE: -Swam to the Cooling Tower Basin to prevent freezing is'controlled by,,a thermostats. 7.3.pply .. 3TM-30 ;- OPEN.7.3.4 ENSURE CT Basin d, Supply V ilvc.. STM-3, ;1 7.3.5 Prop OPEN CT Sump Makeup Float ValvwQ9gW-2.O to drain makeup lineS 7.3.6 ENSURE heat tape is attached to CT Sump Makeup line.7.3.7 Energize heat tapes.

8.0 REFERENCES

8.1 MURR Dwg. 502, "Secondary Cooling System" 8.3 MURR Dwg. 1091, Sh. I of 2, "Domestic Cold Water" 8.4 MURR Dwg 2521, "Sulfuric Acid System" 8.5 RM-RO-470, "Sulfuric Acid System" 9.0 RECORDS 9.1 Console Log Book 10.0 ATTACHMENTS

10. I Secondary Coolant System Valve Line-Up Checksheet 10.2 Post HX-521 Backflush Valve Line-Up Checkshect 10.3 Post HX-503A/B Backflush Valve Line-Up Checksheet 13 ATTACHMENT 7 OP-RO-480 Revision 14 I Date: SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM VALVE LINE-UP CHECKSHEET This checksheet will be completed when required by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO). The operators performing the check will independently verify the position of each valve and indicate the verification by initialing the chccksheet.

Where appropriate, the position of throttled valves are shown on a permanent tag secured to the valve. Note the throttled valve's position on the checksheet. Under the direction of the LSRO, a valve may be positioned other than listed on this checksheet. If this is required, the operators must ensure that the valve is in the desired position and indicate this position on this checkshect. If this change of position is not covered by a procedure in use, for example an RTP, SMP, or Work Package, which would return the valve to the normal operating position, then the LSRO will issue and place a Danger Tag on the valve for the duration of time the valve is in the out-of-normal position.COOLING TOWER VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER S-17 Cooling Tower Distribution (Cell i) Open S-18 Cooling Tower Distribution (Cell 1) Open S-19 Cooling Tower Distribution (Cell 2) Open S-20 Cooling Tower Distribution (Cell 2) Open S-21 Cooling Tower Distribution (Cell 3) Open S-22 Cooling Tower Distribution (Cell 3) Open S-176 Air Connection Isolation Upstream of S-46 Closed S-196 SP4 Return to Cell #1 Drain Throttled S-47A SP-4 Return to Cell #1 Closed S-47B SP4 Return to CT Distribution Valves Open S-128 Cooling Tower Distribution Line Drain Closed S-129 Drain line Open S-233 Drain line Closed S-197 pH Sampling Line Isolation Open S-198 pH Sampling Line Isolation Open S-155 Condensate return to secondary Closed Page I of 7 Attachment

10. i ATTACHMENT 7 OP-RO-480 Revision 14 SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM VALVE LINE-UP CHECKSHEET (CONT.)COOLING TOWER VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERWIER S-192 Cooling Tower Sump Drain Closed S-11 SP-4 Suction Open S-105 SP-4 Strainer Suction Gauge Isolation Open S-106 SP4 Strainer Discharge Gauge Isolation Open S-207 SP4 Casing Vent Closed S-117 SPA Discharge Gauge Isolation Open S-12 SP4 Discharge Open S-121 SP4 Line Vent Closed S-8 SP-1 Suction Locked Open S-107 SP-1 Strainer Suction Gauge Isolation Open S-108 SP-i Strainer Discharge Gauge Isolation Open S-114 SP-I Suction Gauge Isolation Open S-118 SP-I Discharge Gauge Isolation Open S-204 SP-I Casing Vent Closed S-5 SP-I Discharge Locked Open S-123 SP-I, 2 & 3 Header Vent Closed S-9 SP-2 Suction Locked Open S-109 SP-2 Strainer Suction Gauge Isolation Open S-110 SP-2 Strainer Discharge Gauge Isolation Open S-115 SP-2 Suction Gauge Isolation Open S-119 SP-2 Discharge Gauge Isolation Open S-205 SP-2 Casing Vent Closed S-6 SP-2 Discharge Locked Open S-I0 SP-3 Suction Locked Open S-I 11 SP-3 Strainer Suction Gauge Isolation Open S-112 SP-3 Strainer Discharge Gauge Isolation Open Page 2 of 7 Attachment 10.1 ATTACHMENT 7 flu r OP-RO-480 Revision 14 I SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM VALVE LINE-UP CHECKSHEET (CONT.)VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER S-1 16 SP-3 Suction Gauge Isolation Open S-120 SP-3 Discharge Gauge Isolation Open S-206 SP-3 Casing Vent Closed S-7 SP-3 Discharge Locked Open S-163 Reliefs S-122 & S-124 Drain Open S-102 SP-4 Return Line Drain Closed S-127 SP-4 Line Drain Closed S-113 Secondary Supply Drain (I") Closed S-125 Secondary Supply Drain (2") Closed S-101 Secondary Return Drain (2") Closed S-126 Secondary Return Drain (I") Closed ROOM 114 PASSAGEWAY VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER DCWR-7 DCW From Room I I I Closed AX-5 Secondary Return Isolation Open S-195 Return From Waste Heat System Closed S-202 Corrosion Rack Inlet Isolation Open S-203 Corrosion Rack Outlet Isolation Open AX-I Secondary Supply Isolation Open S-104 Drain Closed S-103 Drain Closed S-151 Drain Closed S-231 SP-4 Check Valve Isolation S-199 Blowdown Isolation Open S-170 Blowdown Throttle Throttled i Page 3 of 7 Attachment

10. 1 ATTACHMENT 7 F~fl~ ~ ~'OP-RO-480 Revision 14 SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM VALVE LINE-UP CHECKSHEET (CONT.)ROOM 114 VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER S-161 AP Transmitters HP Isolation Open S-162 AP Transmitters LP Isolation Open S-182 FT912Q LP Isolation Open S-183 FT912Q HP Isolation Open S-184 FT912Q Equalizer Closed S-185 FT912Q HP Test Connection Closed S-186 FT912Q LP Test Connection Closed S-140 FT912Q LP Flush Closed S-145 FT912Q HP Flush Closed S-130 FT9I2P HP Isolation Open S-131 FT912P LP Isolation Open S-134 FT912P Equalizer Closed S-132 FT912P HP Test Connection Closed S-180 FT912P LP Test Connection Closed S-133 FT912P LP Flush Closed S-139 FT912P HP Flush Closed S-135 Hx 503A Vent Closed S-141 Return Header Vent Closed S-39 Hx 503A Outlet Locked Open S-31 S-I Outlet Open S-136 S-I Drain Closed S-30 S-I Inlet Open S-177 S-I Drain Closed S-27 S-1 Bypass Closed S-138 Hx 503A Drain Closed S-23 Hx 503A Inlet Locked Open Page 4 of 7 Attachment 10.1 ATTACHMENT 7 OP-RO-480 Revision 14 I SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM VALVE LINE-UP CHECKSHEET (CONT.)ROOM 114 VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER S-38 Back-Flush Isolation Locked Open S-40 Back-Flush Supply Locked Closed S-142 Hx 503B Vent Closed S-191 Hx 503B Drain Closed S-41 Hx 503B Outlet Locked Open S-24 Hx 503B Inlet Locked Open S-221 Hx 521 Outlet Vent Closed S-223 Hx 503A &503B Inlet Throttled S-222 Hx 521 Outlet Drain Closed S-211 Hx 521 Outlet Locked Open S-212 Hx 521 Bypass Open S-34 S-2 Inlet Open S-215 FT912R LP Flush Closed S-216 FT912R HP Flush Closed S-226 FT912R LP Isolation Open S-227 FT912R HP Isolation Open S-228 FT912R Equalizer Closed S-214 Hx 521 Outlet Pressure Indication Open S-210 Hx 521 Inlet Locked Open S-218 Hx 521 Outlet Drain Closed S-220 Hx 521 Inlet Drain Closed S-217 Flush (Air Connection)

Closed S-213 Hx 521 Inlet Pressure Indication Open S-232 Hx 521 Inlet Throttled S-219 Hx 521 Inlet Vent Closed Page 5 of 7 Attachment 10.1 ATTACHMENT 7 OP-RO-480 Revision 14 I SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM VALVE LINE-UP CHECKSHEET (CONT.)ROOM 114 VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER S-229 FT912R LP Clean Out Closed S-230 FT912R HP Clean Out Closed WASTE TANK ROOM VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER S-169 Waste Tank Isolation Closed S-42 Blowdown Solenoid Isolation Open S-43 Blowdown Solenoid Isolation Open S-144 Blowdown Drain Closed S-50 Isolation to Sanitary Sewer (West) Open S-49 Isolation to Sanitary Sewer (East) Closed ROOM 278 VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER S-58 A/C Unit #1 Outlet Closed S-60 Drain Closed S-54 Vent Closed S-57 A/C Unit #2 Outlet Open S-200 Flow Sensor Isolation Open S-201 Flow Sensor Isolation Open S-61 Drain Closed S-53 A/C Unit #2 Inlet Closed S-56 A/C Unit #1 Inlet Closed S-62 Drain Closed S-234 Facility Air Compressor Return Closed S-146 Vent (By DI-300) Closed S-149 Vent (By DI-300) Closed Page 6 of 7 Attachment

10. I ATTACHMENT7 7 -, OP-RO-480 Revision 14 I SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM VALVE LINE-UP CHECKSHEET (CONT.)COMMENTS: Page 7 of 7 Attachment

10. 1 ATTACHMENT 7ý > A- , OP-RO-480 Revision 14 POST HX-521 BACKFLUSH VALVE LINE-UP CHECKSHEET This checksheet will be completed when required by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO). The operators performing the check will independently verify the position of each valve and indicate the verification by initialing the checksheet.

Where appropriate, the positions of throttled valves are shown on a permanent tag secured to the valve. Note throttled valve's position on the checksheet. Date Performed: VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER S-210 Hx 521 Inlet Locked Open S-211 Hx 521 Outlet Locked Open S-228 FT912R Equalizer Closed S-227 FT912R HP Isolation Open S-226 FT912R LP Isolation Open S-24 Hx 503B Inlet Open S-23 Hx 503A Inlet Open S-27 S-1 Bypass Closed S-232 Hx 521 Inlet Throttled I P COMMENTS: Page 1 of I Attachment 10.2 ATTACHMENT 7 POST HX-503A/B BACKFLUSH VALVE LINE-UP CHECKSHEET r /OP-RO-480 Revision 14 t This checksheet will be completed when required by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO). The operators performing the check will independently verify the position of each valve and indicate the verification by initialing the checksheet. Where appropriate, the positions of throttled valves are shown on a permanent tag secured to the valve. Note throttled valve's position on the checksheet. Date Performed: VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER S-223 Hx 503A & 503B Inlet Throttled S-38 Back Flush Isolation Locked Open S-40 Back Flush Supply Locked Closed S-39 Hx 503A Outlet Locked I_ Open S-41 Hx 503B Outlet Locked Open S-27 S-I Bypass Closed j COMMENTS: Page I of I Attachment 10.3 I ATTACHMENT 7 I? ~T 7 L u ic-PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE NUMBER: PAGE: REVISION: S1-A3 1 OF 1 5/14/09 Preventive Maintenance: PM System: Secondary Change Oil and Inspect Internals of Gear Reducers and Vibration Switches PM Components: Cooling Tower Fan Gear Plant Conditions: Frequency: -Annually-5 ,/./,Ef Reactor Shutdown Number of Men Needed: 2 Estimated Time 2 hours Test Equipment, Tools and Materials 1. Safety Harness 5. 9 gallons of Mobil DTE Extra Heavy Oil 9. Pliers 2. 314-inch Breaker Bar 6. 4 oz. Sample Bottle 10. Ladder 3. Flashlight

7. 9/16-inch Deep Well Socket 11. Magnet 4. 12-inch Crescent Wrench 8. 1/2-inch Socket Drive 12. Bucket References N/A Procedure 1. Danger Tag the following:

___ a. Cooling Tower fan #1 breaker in the 'Of position.___ b. Cooling Tower fan #2 breaker in the 'O.f position.c. Cooling Tower fan #3 breaker in the 'Of' position.2. Drain oil AND INSPECT each gear reducer as follows: a. Place collection container under gear reducer drain.b. OPEN drain valve and drain oil to container.

c. WHEN all oil is drained from the gear reducer, THEN CLOSE the drain valve.d. INSPECT old oil for metal filings by immersing a magnet in oil.e. INSPECT for suspended particles that attach to magnet.f. Collect a four ounce oil sample for analysis.g. Remove inspection plug AND VISUALLY INSPECT gear teeth for wear.h. INSPECT for unusual wear or markings.i. Install the inspection plug.NOTE: Use MobiW'T'E-E-treaHeav'y Oil.

S =,4_-C,-,0?D

• ,, -rPc Jo /5,21 3. Add three gallons of new oil to dipstick housing to each gear reducer.4. Repeat Steps 2 and 3 for each fan.5. VERIFY control room switches for CT fan #1, CT fan #2, and CT fan #3 are in the 'Off position.6. Clear the following Danger Tags: a. Cooling Tower fan #1 breaker in the 'O.n' position.b. Cooling Tower fan #2 breaker in the 'On' position.c. Cooling Tower fan #3 breaker in the 'On' position.7. Test run each fan and listen for any anomalies.

8. Log PM completed in the console log book and maintenance day book.Date Completed:

LSRO Signature: APPROVED: Assistant Reactor Manager ATTACHMENT 7 DPA~PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE NUMBER: PAGE: REVISION: Sl-$2 1 OF 1 5/20/09 1 Preventive Maintenance: PM System: Secondary Grease Motor Bearings on Cooling Tower Fans 1 and-2 c,(.J PM Components: Cooling Tower Fan Drive Motors Plant Conditions: Frequency: Semi-Annually Reactor Shutdown Number of Men Needed: 1 Estimated Time 1 hour Test Equipment, Tools and Materials 1. -1/2-inch-Deep Socket-and-Drive-4.-Gfeseent-WfVeh-

2. Lithium Based Grease 5.-F-Fat-Screwd-iver-

3. Grease Gun 6. Rags References N/A Procedure ii Ii 1. Danger Tag the following:

_ a. Cooling tower fan #1 breaker OFF.b. Cooling tower fan #2 breaker OFF.2. Grease CT fan #1 motor bearings as follows: a--Remove-motor-bearing-drain-plug. b; --Remove-any-hardened-grease -from drain-plug-opening. __ c. Clean the zirc fitting. _, d. Add grease to zirc fitting on bearing housing until-new-grease-is-forced-out-the-drain-hole and-wipe-off-zirc-fitting.... 4 e. VERIFY control room switch for CT fan #1 in the'Off position.f. Clear Danger Tag on CT fan #1 in the 'On' position.g. Run CT fan #1 fer-thirty-(-30-)-minutes , /--h,--Replace-the-drain-plug [-== C.eai ep..piles -of-excess-grease., 3G~rease CT fan #2 motor o owws:a. Remove motor bearing drain plug.__. -Remrove any hardened grease from drain plug ___ c. Clean'the-zirQ fitting.__d. Add grease to zirc fiftihg-on-bearing-housing until new grease is forced out the drain hole and wipe off zirc fitting.-- ---e. VERIFYgontrol room switch for CT fan #2inWe- Off.. position.___ f. -ClearDanger Tag on CT fan #2 in the 'On' position. --Run CT fanr#2fo~rthirity(0) minutevs/-- h. ý-Replace-the-drainplug. i.'-elean-up-piles-of-excess~greae.

---

4. nsole log book and maintenance day book.Date Completed:

LSRO Signature: ,/APPROVED: Assistant Reactor Manager ATTACHMENT 7 NUMBER: S-1:S4 PAGE: 1 OF4 REVISION :4.09/9/111 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE I Preventive Maintenance: PM System: Secondary Clean Cooling Tower Basin and Sump PM Components: Cooling Tower Plant Conditions: Frequency: Semi-Annually Reactor Shutdown Secondary Coolant System Shutdown Number of Men Needed: 3 Estimated Time: 8 hours Test Equipment, Tools and Materials 1. 8-inch Pipe Wrench 6. Cooling Tower Cleaning Visual Inspection Forms 2. 24-inch Pipe Wrench 7. Extension Ladder 3. Bucket 8. Shovel 4. Rope 9. Squeegee 5. Fire Hose References OP-RO-480, "Secondary Coolant System" OP-RO-555, "Fire Protection System" Procedure 1. ENSURE Reactor Health Physics has analyzed sludge. i',/cvr.__2.--4F-eler~tr~ic-air-conditioner-is -on-ser-vioe4-HEN-secure air-conditioner--and-chill -water-pumps-ý

3. IF pumping sludge, THEN CHECK with Reactor Health Physics regarding disposal and whether to dry prior to disposal._4.-Isolate and drain Cooling Tower- deluge system per- OP-RG-555-"Fire-Protection-System-'I-

5. Danger Tag the following in the indicated position: b.C.d.SP-1 Main Circuit Breaker in 'Open' position.SP-2 Main Circuit Breaker in 'Open' position.SP-3 Main Circuit Breaker in 'Open' position.f. SP-1 Suction Valve S-8 in 'Closed' position.g. SP-2 Suction Valve S-9 in 'Closed' position.h. SP-3 Suction Valve S-10 in 'Closed' position.-.e4d4-- &&4, j.k.I Auto Makeup Valve Inlet Isolation Valve DCW-16 in 'Closed' position.Auto Makeup Valve Bypass Valve DCW-19 in 'Closed' position.Aut -akeu A av Byas Valv 1-_DCW--1ýA

ý4ý_1- -n -Cosd poiin 1.m.n.0.P.q.r.Acid Day-Tank. Isolation Valve SAS-.12 in 'Closed' position.Blowdown Switch in 'Off position. /0 Acid Addition Switch in 'Off position.Chemical Addition Pump-1 in 'Unplugged' position.Chemical Addition Pump-2 in 'Unolugaed' position.Air Compressor Drain Valve DCW-152 in 'Open' position.Facility Air Compressor Return S-234 in 'Closed' position.6.7.8.-- vil I ý..L4J 1 Iy Vu w %WV1' ýJI IýGIII %.-I fv-ývI RL~ib conductivity and pH probes from ENSURE Cooling Tower sump pumps are operable.OPEN Cooling Tower Setup Drain Valve S-4--2 " (_&ý--- .. 2 s- 7, C C=/..tf ----r. PPROVED: Assistant Reactor Manager ATTACHMENT 7 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE NUMBER: S1-S4 PAGE: 2 OF 4 REVISION:-1.8W999/9/11 I ATTACHMENT 7 NUMBER: PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE PAGE: 3 OF 4 REVISlON:9I481O99/9/11

9. W)EN-sump-isufficently-drained,-T.HE-N4emeve-standpipe-CAUTION: Do not damage Cooling Tower deluge system sprinkler heads or pilot air header activation heads.10. Remove outside box covers.11 CAUTION: Do not spray fire hose directly on fill.11. Thoroughly clean Cooling Tower with fire hose. Do not damage floor or fill.12. Using inspection forms, INSPECT Cooling Tower.13. CLOSE S-92.'fY, 27)l, .,J'2..14. 4astall.standpipe-and re-install box covers.-ean-basement-ler-dain-and-if-necessar'---lean-dr-ir+-vtve-

16. Clear Danger Tag and place DCW-16 in 'Open' position.17. Place Auto Make-Up Valve in 'Open' position.18. Re-fill sump.19. Examine and test operation of float valve. /7 rne J /, 2- ,,,'3 20. CHECK float rod set screwstight. 1.-INSP-E-GT-alI-Cooling-Tower-.deluge-systern-pilot-air-header-actuating-heads,-

---22..-ENSURE-,al-actuating-heads.are-intact-and-undamaged. 3-Clear-Danger-Tag-on-F-P--464n-theCIosed'position. .-Return -Cooling.-Tewer-deluge-syste -te-ser.viee-per-OP-RO-555.-Fire-Pfetection-System---Section-64.---

25. Clear Danger Tags for the following:

a. SP-1 Main Circuit Breaker in 'Closed' position.b. SP-2 Main Circuit Breaker in 'Closed' position.c. SP-3 Main Circuit Breaker in 'Closed' position.Sd-SP-,4-Main-OirAuit-Br-eakser.-i4r-A jdr,4,, f , ,E4,A&e. S-8 in 'Open' position.f. S-9 in 'Open' position.-g. S-10 in 'Open' position.i. DCW-19 in 'Closed' position.j. GAS1 i

-j. SAS-,2 in 'Open' position.k. Blowdown Switch in 'Auto' position.I. Acid Addition Switch in 'Auto' position.m. Chemical Addition Pump-1 in 'Plugged' position.n. Chemical Addition Pump-2 in 'Plugged' position.o. DCW-152 in 'Open' position.-p. S-234 in 'Closed' position.q. STM 0 -:e._Erpesitien-

26. Return conductivity and pH probes to basi.-_.,'#'(-4

27. Vent secondary system at high points, using SP-1, SP-2 and SP-3 Header Vent Valve S-1 23.enf-SP-ALnt-Vatve-S-1-24.

28. Jog SP-1 and vent SP-1 by opening SP-1 Casing Vent Valve S-204.29. Jog SP-2 and vent SP-2 by opening SP-2 Casing Vent Valve S-205.30. Jog SP-3 and vent SP-3 by opening SP-3 Casing Vent Valve S-206. b-epening-SP-4-Gasing-Vent-Valve-S--20:-

32. Run pumps for a period of time to allow strainers to remove suspended debris.33. Backflush pool heat exchanger per OP-RO-480, "Secondary Coolant System."

ATTACHMENT 7 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE NUMBER: PAGE: 40F14 R EVI SION:Oil-8W099/9/1 1 34. Individually backflush primary heat exchangers per OP-RO-480, "Secondary Coolant System." 35. Schedule strainer to be cleaned. or ,4W.36. Perform post maintenance valve line-up checksheet. -37.-ENSURE-fire-suppression-valve4ine-up cooling deluge-system-has-been-completed-per

• GP-RO-555---Fire-Proteetien-System-" 38. Log PM completed in the Console Log Book and Maintenance Day Book.Date Completed:

LSRO Signature: ATTACHMENT 7 NUMBER: PAGE: REVISION: 1 of 1 9/9/11 S1-$4 Cooling Tower Visual Inspection Form Cell No.Date Inspected By.Inform the Assistant Reactor Manager-Engineering for any items which are categorized as "other".OK Other OK Other I. -End-Easing-

3. Distribution System a.---SteefPiping

b. Flow Valves 4. Distribution Boxes a. Fan Deck Floor Condition b. Fan Deck Floor Supports-0. Sun-Goverm--

d. Distribution Nozzles 5. Fan Units a. General Steel Components_

_b--Shroud--

c. Vibration Switch Mounts d. Support Beams e. Framing 6. Motor and Gear Reducer Mounting 9. ,Wooden-Structural Members 10. Basin a;-- oncrete-.b.---T.ar-Sealer-c.-Steam-Line-

d. Over flow Line II. Fan Blades a. Blade Integrity b. Tip Clearance c. Smooth Running (slow)d. Smooth Running (fast)12. Gear Reducer a. Runs smooth and quiet b. Oil Seal Condition c. Vent d. Pinion Shaft Play e. Fan Shaft End Play 13. Driveshafi, couplers-etc.Following Secondary System Startup: Balance cell flow distribution

7. Water Distribution Boxes 8. Plastic Tower Fill General Comments Approved:

_Assistaht Reactor Manager ATTACHMENT 7 NUMBER: 51-5 PAGE: 1 of I REVISION: DRAF-9/9/11 S1-S4 Cooling Tower Visual Inspection Form Cell No.Date Inspected By.Inform the Assistant Reactor Manager-Engineering for any items which are categorized as "other".OK Other OK Other I. End Casing 2. Louvers 3. Distribution System a. Steel Piping b. Flow Valves 4. Distribution Boxes a. Fan Deck Floor Condition b. Fan Deck Floor Supports c. Sun Covers d. Distribution Nozzles 5. Fan Units a. General Steel Components_

b. Shroud c. Vibration Switch Mounts d. Support Beams e. Framing 6. Motor and Gear Reducer Mounting 9.Wooden Structural Members 10. Basin a. Concrete b. Tar Sealer c. Steam Line d. Over flow Line II. Fan Blades a. Blade Integrity b. Tip Clearance c. Smooth Running (slow)d. Smooth Running (fast)12. Gear Reducer a. Runs smooth and quiet b. Oil Seal Condition c. Vent d. Pinion Shaft Play e. Fan Shaft End Play 13. Driveshaft, couplers, etc.Following Secondary System Startup: Balance cell flow distribution 7.8.Water Distribution Boxes Plastic Tower Fill General Comments Approved: Assistant Reactor Manager ATTACHMENT 7 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE NUMBER: PAGE: REVISION: 1 OF3 9/9/11 Preventive Maintenance:

PM System: Secondary Clean Cooling Tower Basin and Sump PM Components: Cooling Tower Plant Conditions: Frequency: Semi-Annually Reactor Shutdown Secondary Coolant System Shutdown Number of Men Needed: 3 Estimated Time: 8 hours Test Equipment, Tools and Materials 1. 8-inch Pipe Wrench 6. Cooling Tower Cleaning Visual Inspection Forms 2. 24-inch Pipe Wrench 7. Extension Ladder 3. Bucket 8. Shovel 4. Rope 9. Squeegee 5. Fire Hose References OP-RO-480, "Secondary Coolant System" OP-RO-555, "Fire Protection System" Procedure 1. ENSURE Reactor Health Physics has analyzed sludge.2. IF electric air conditioner is on service, THEN secure air conditioner and chill water pumps._3. IF pumping sludge, THEN CHECK with Reactor Health Physics regarding disposal and whether to dry prior to disposal.4. Isolate and drain Cooling Tower deluge system per OP-RO-555, "Fire Protection System," Section 6.2.4.5. Danger Tag the following in the indicated position:-a. CT Deluge Water Control Valve FP-16 in 'Closed' position.b. SP-1 Main Circuit Breaker in 'Open' position.c. SP-2 Main Circuit Breaker in 'Open' position.d. SP-3 Main Circuit Breaker in 'Oven' position.e. SP-4 Main Circuit Breaker in 'Ooen' position.f. SP-1 Suction Valve S-8 in 'Closed' positionf-g. SP-2 Suction Valve S-9 in 'Closed' position.h. SP-3 Suction Valve S-10 in 'Closed' position.i. SP-4 Suction Valve S-11 in 'Closed' position.-j. Auto Makeup Valve Inlet Isolation Valve DCW-16 in 'Closed' position.k. Auto Makeup Valve Bypass Valve DCW-19 in 'Closed' position.I. Acid Day Tank Isolation Valve SAS-12 in 'Closed' position.m. Blowdown Switch in 'Off position.n. Acid Addition Switch in 'Off' position.o. Chemical Addition Pump-1 in 'Unolugged' position.-p. Chemical Addition Pump-2 in 'Unpluaaed' position.-q. Air Compressor Drain Valve DCW-152 in 'Open' position.r. Facility Air Compressor Return S-234 in 'Closed' position.s. Steam Supply Valve to CT Basin STM-30 in 'Closed' position.6. Remove conductivity and pH probes from basin and store in a bucket of water, 7. ENSURE Cooling Tower sump pumps are operable.8. OPEN Cooling Tower Sump Drain Valve S-192.I APPROVED:___5 .__ _ __ _Asslirant ReaFctor Manager ATTACHMENT 7 NUMBER: SI-$4 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE PAGE: 2 OF 3 REVISION: 9(9/11 9. WHEN sump is sufficiently drained, THEN remove standpipe. I CAUTION: Do not damage Cooling Tower deluge system sprinkler heads or pilot air header activation heads.10. Remove outside box covers.CAUTION: Do not spray fire hose directly on fill.11. Thoroughly clean Cooling Tower with fire hose. Do not damage floor or fill.12. Using inspection forms, INSPECT Cooling Tower.13. CLOSE S-192.14. Install standpipe and re-install box covers.15. Clean basement floor drain and if necessary, clean drain valve.16. Clear Danger Tag and place DCW-16 in 'Open' position.17. Place Auto Make-Up Valve in 'Ooen' position.18. Re-fill sump.19. Examine and test operation of float valve.20. CHECK float rod set screw tight.21. INSPECT all Cooling Tower deluge system pilot air header actuating heads.22. ENSURE all actuating heads are intact and undamaged.

23. Clear Danger Tag on FP-16 in the 'Closed' position.24. Return Cooling Tower deluge system to service per OP-RO-555, "Fire Protection System," Section 6.1.5.25. Clear Danger Tags for the following:

a. SP-1 Main Circuit Breaker in 'Closed' position.b. SP-2 Main Circuit Breaker in 'Closed' position.c. SP-3 Main Circuit Breaker in 'Closed' position.d. SP-4 Main Circuit Breaker In 'Closed' position.e. S-8 in '9Oen' position.f. S-9 in '.OQ ' position.g. S-10 in 'Open' position.h. S-11 in 'Oven' position.i. DCW-19 in 'Closed' position.-j. SAS-12 in 'Ope.' position.k. Blowdown Switch in 'Auto' position.I. Acid Addition Switch in 'Auto' position.m. Chemical Addition Pump-1 in 'Plugged' position.n. Chemical Addition Pump-2 in 'Plugged' position.o. DCW-152 in 'Oren' position.-p. S-234 in 'Closed' position.2 q. STM-30 in 'Open' position.26. Return conductivity and pH probes to basin.27. Vent secondary system at high points, using SP-1, SP-2 and SP-3 Header Vent Valve S-123 and SP-4 Vent Valve S-121.28. Jog SP-1 and vent SP-1 by opening SP-1 Casing Vent Valve S-204.29. Jog SP-2 and vent SP-2 by opening SP-2 Casing Vent Valve S-205.30. Jog SP-3 and vent SP-3 by opening SP-3 Casing Vent Valve S-206.31. Jog SP-4 and vent SP-4 by opening SP-4 Casing Vent Valve S-207.32. Run pumps for a period of time to allow strainers to remove suspended debris.33. Backflush pool heat exchanger per OP-RO-480, "Secondary Coolant System."

ATTACHMENT 7 NUMBER: 81-84 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE PAGE: 3 OF 3 REVISION: 9/9/11 34. Individually backflush primary heat exchangers per OP-RO-480, "Secondary Coolant System." 35. Schedule strainer to be cleaned.36. Perform post maintenance valve line-up checksheet.

37. ENSURE fire suppression valve line-up cooling deluge system has been completed per OP-RO-555, "Fire Protection System." 38. Log PM completed in the Console Log Book and Maintenance Day Book.Date Completed:

LSRO Signature: ATTACHMENT 7 NUMBER: PAGE: REVISION: S1-S4 I of 1 9/9111 I SI-S4 Post Maintenance Valve Line-Up Checksheet Date: Valve Description Position Performer Verifier S-8 SP-1 Suction Open S-9 SP-2 Suction Open S-10 SP-3 Suction Open-S-1 ---SP-4-Suction- ...... ....---- Open--. .....-DCW-17 Auto Make-up Valve Open DCW-19 Auto Make-up Bypass Closed DCW-152 Main Air Compressor Floor Open Drain S-234 Facility Air Compressor Return Closed S4 Cooling Tower .'mew 6 rain Closed SAS-4-2 Acid Day-T-ank Isolation Open S-123 SP-1, SP-2 and SP-3 Header Closed Vent----8--1-24-- -SP-4-L-ine-Vent .---Ctosed-S-204 SP-1 Casing Vent Closed S-205 SP-2 Casing Vent Closed S-206 SP-3 Casing Vent Closed-S-207-- -SP-4-Gasing-Vent-- -.-.- -- -. -Gsed--ST-M-30-.--.SteamS.upply-to-Basin--- -. --Open-DCW-16 Auto Make-Up Isolation Open Approved:2~~ Assista' t Reactor Manager ATTACHMENT 7 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE*~;NUMBER: PAGE: REVISION: S1-$6 1 OF 1 8/4/09 Preventive Maintenance: PM System: Secondary Tighten and Torque Check Bolts and Nuts on Cooling Tower Fans and Drives PM Components: Cooling Tower Fans Plant Conditions: Frequency: Semi-Annually Reactor Shutdown Number of Men Needed: 2 Estimated Time 2 hours Test Equipment, Tools and Materials 1. Torque Wrench 4. 1-1/2 inch Socket 2. Ratchet and Short Extension

5. 9/16-inch Socket and Box 3. 15/16-inch Socket and Box 6. 3/4-inch Open End and Socket References N/A Procedure 1. Danger Tag the following:

a. CT Fan No. 1 breaker in 'Open' position.b. CT Fan No. 2 breaker in 'Open' position.c. CT Fan No. 3 breaker in 'Open' position."UsUa-9/46-inch-so ,nemeve-hub-cever-

3. Using 15116-inch socket, torque CHECK blade clamp bolts between 45-50 ft. lbs.4.-Using-9-6-inch-seGcket,.terque-&Gup Koobob.-bseol-25-ft1bs--(six-bolts-per-hub}.

.5. Using 1-1/2 inch sockeL&IECK-tight-hub bolt. ,- z'--e' 4,,4/1.6. Using 9/16-inch socket and box, torque CHECK shaft seal bolts between 15-20 ft. lbs.7. Using 15/16-inch socket and box, CHECK tight motor hold down bolts and gear reducer hold down bolts.8. IF any blade clamp bolts were loose, THEN perform PM S1-S6.1.Q P----e- eb4-e ,ef--41 10.11.Clear the following Danger Tags: a. CT Fan No. 1 breaker in 'Closed' position.b. CT Fan No. 2 breaker in 'Closed' position.c. CT Fan No. 3 breaker in 'Closed' position.Log PM completed in the console log book and maintenance day book.Date Completed:__________ LSRO Signature: APPROVED: Assistant Reactor Manager ATTACHMENT 7 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 4 NUMBER: PAGE: REVISION: S1-S7 1 OF 1 8/4/09 Preventive Maintenance: PM System: Secondary G'ase Valve Mechanism PM Components: Cooling Tower Flow Control Valves\ /Plant Conditions: Frequency: Semi-Annually Reactor Shutdown /Number of Men Needed: /1 Estimated Time 30 minutes Test Equipment, Tools and Materials 1. Grease Gun 2. Lithium Based Grease \3. Rags References N/A Procedure I/1. Clean grease fitting first and IF clogged>,THEN unclog or replace fitting.2. Insert two (2) strokes of grease through (ease fitting into the following valves: a. S-17 (Cooling Tower Distribution Vaalve'Cell No. 1)b. S-18 (Cooling Tower DistributiopValve Cell No. 1)c. S-19 (Cooling Tower Distribution Valve Cell\No. 2)d. S-20 (Cooling Tower Distribution Valve Cell No. 2)e. S-21 (Cooling Tower Distribution Valve Cell N. \3)f. S-22 (Cooling Tower Distribution Valve Cell No. 3)3. RECORD the number of turns for each valve to the FOLLY CLOSED position: a. S-17:____,__

b. S-18:__., c. S-19: d. S-20: ./ '.e. S-21: L" f. S-22:.4. Cycle each val,'e to the FULLY CLOSED and OPEN positions AND, return each valve to the original valve/position.

5. Clean exce~s grease.6. Balance flpW to cells.7. Log PM completed in the console log book and maintenance day book.Date Completed:

LSRO Signature: APPROVED: Assistant Reactor Manager ATTACHMENT 7.4.4*21L.~..c-IT.LTq ~ 0.4 -i ,,Z 5 AIR L I-tt-t 16- o R n `C S TO I 9 42 *4 44-44410w (0 S-S.T-4*00 -W0044T ar 1 UT -*0*0* I x K"- C-P S-TOo S-43 r. ---444*C-22 w H 53 S-445,4 T 9*5* sP *s1 s TO SISO *44..0*5003-SR4 0-045 0-1 Tj~S-~JE T4-4-s A-4"'5 0*( 4 T 4 2 0' -STE'S *00 A,1TOT T 75T 00*0 (*04) 04 P1 0*4 2 040 S'zi 0*10 BY4,5 0TIP*02007 0 a-*0 z 0 0 0 U 5021 I~*2 TEA 40*7 cOOT.,.*0 ~ ~ *0400 _O 44*ST 22 **. CHT0 a0 IPPAC, AM54 4/24/W4 25 cOICHDR 00.00 MIDI40044*.0 24 M 1- .+/-. !20 REMOVED N0* 500*2 o, " -! O* *0470 oh,.RIN" CAM404C.SO 01 ST SZ- SYS-0*41 10 104. *40T402T W* .-104*44, LEGENQ-0-p- Coo, 0440W 110--000 44-*4- '4-10+/- mom0 10) *44*441* A/C 0*7*.*04 7-0 Z. S,46-rr I ATTACHMENT 7 SEEI ".~n TITG w:4ETE-21 P?S-9J 3'sc S-e.CELL UV s-p;'-in S--9 S-19 S-9J FRLSS ACID SYSTIS'CSEE MUPQ O5 0I'521 S-2AI S-217 5-3 S-PT-IPI" I~?TS-TIC -5 S-OI H,9 5-1 S-PI-IT S-M'-9 30-' HG-TS PSI) 0-100 PUGC T' T I? -S-nI5 3'e-T s-us1 --T S-6 S-PT-"S-PT-TI2 30' IT5-15 PSI6 C-100 PSIG-19 S-20 6' 1 T'S '2 5;m S-T"1 5- P-IC S-TI?RE V [Z INS Z.T DESnC :TIIflTS U~IMP~I~ T t V SCITTPo Ia -S~ j I1MWI 1E1,9'" N' DATE M641 1-81OW7- Agg 4 A l,~,'lS~ Ad..,./ ... ---- S--31.39~3-43'-AO ICAT S-SI S-31 F20L~ KA1 S"P 5el!CC 6A6 D.C OWC~3IE Io A,ýD 70 n U4LL ATTACHMENT 7 fRT5) Mo/\ rE-Tp Ufll U u 1ý 1 11 11 1L~~F-'A IV0 40.~~A~1 (ýipz-------------

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2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 14-01 WAF Number: 14-11838 Modification Title: Interfacing MURR Systems with the MIB Eastward Expansion Page No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Procedure, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Required Yes No__zEl 111C~Date Completed 0611612leya 06//btZ, 'I 001001Y/06116noy/(initials~ 3"~50.59 Screen Completed: /10L fRtSmsst. Reactor Manager- Engineering) Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review: " "*- " xk.Modification Approved: Modification Completed:. Modification Closed: (Jieactor Ma .ger)(ReActor Manager)/-(Rector Manager)/- X(ff~eactor Manager)Date: 06.71YVY Date: G-I _-_4 Date:_,_'__-___-_- 14 Date: i_-_-_i__Date: : -. '-4.O)RIGINAL Attachment

8. 1 ATTACHMENT 8 ALRIGINAI AP-RO-1 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 14-01 REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION Item No.I 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review Operating Procedures Updated Preventive Maintenance Procedures Updated Compliance Procedures Updated MURR Prints Updated Spare Parts System Updated Required Date Yes No Completed v7 ___ CU /dV Documented by (Initials)

'I-s,____ V____ /V ____V 0m f2'If'4"6~full I thIM& /I W4 W5t/ 114/I I a DR IG IN A'Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

8 O- I)RICINAL AP-RO-115 Modification Number: 14-01_Revision_8 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)Several systems within the facility are in place to ensure a prompt and effective response from MURR staff to an emergency or abnormal condition. These systems will also be required to be in place in order to safely occupy the Eastward Expansion of the MURR Industrial Building (MIB).Since multiple systems are involved, Modification Record 14-01 will be used as the initiating document to ensure all systems related to emergency response have been identified. The following Modification Records will be used to document changes to the individual systems: " Modification Record 90-01; Addendum-62"- Evacuation Horns in MIB Eastward Expansion" Modification Record 03-03; Addendum 05 -Fire Protection in MIB Eastward Expansion* Modification Record 01-02; Addendum 11 -Intercom System in MIB Eastward Expansion* Modification Record 14-02 -Normal Electrical Distribution in MIB Eastward Expansion It should be noted that the functions of the existing MIB will not be changed. The Eastward expansion of MIB will serve to house additional space for projects and storage. A future modification record will document further changes to construct usable laboratory spaces within the expansion. This Modification Record will NOT provide suggested revisions to the Emergency Procedures. Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page 1, with justification) The short form of the Modification Record is appropriate because this is a modification to a non-safety system that requires documentation and review only (Reason No. 4).2 (MRIGINAI Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

8 SRIGINAM AP-RO-I 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 14-01 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: No: Signature: Y__Date:_______ Date: If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.Yes the facility as described in the HSR is changed in the following sections: Original HSR: Figure 2.3 -Site Plan Figure 3.1 -Basement Level Figure 3.2 -Grade Level Plan Figure 3.3a -Third Level Plan Figure 3.3b -Fourth Level Plan Figure 3.3c -Fifth Level Plan Figure 3.4 -North and East Elevations Figure 3.5 -South and West Elevations Figure 3.6 -Building Sections A and B Figure 3.7 -Building Sections C, D, E, F, G, and H (Change as attached)(No change)(Change as attached)(No change)(No change)(No change)(Change as attached)(No change)(No change)(No change)All other Sections and Figures of the HSR and its addenda are correct and will remain the same.3-Attachment

8.1 ORIGINAL

(DI3'DEV ATTACHMENT 8/RESEARCH REACTOR FACIUTY Ppt~L: 2-Hi 6iTeF PLA A w I31EJ1U Ip BmfIIipv~7 a -a----- --- -in -m i~~mmu E DO WIFU~C 5 SO O~'JFP 1,VEL [D 013 & p If ATTACHMENT 8 FIE 7-11 t ¶L.V 4 71 U'Di: f[(DIkI~ti PA6-rr $-It ATTACHMENT 8 AP-RO-l 15 Revision 8 14-01 Modification Number: REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Yes: No: " Signature: ___Date: 061//14" I 1--*If YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or create a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.A 50.59 screen (14-17) is attached to document that these specific existing MURR systems may be safely extended to the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion without further review under 10 CFR 50.59.4 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

8 AP-RR-003 En COPYRevision 8 50.59 SCREEN Number: 14-17 Page I of 2 Title: Madifiration R.rnrd 14-01 Intrfac.inq Ml IRR Syv.t.m, With thF. MIR Fasvtward FxIpan-nicnn Description of Activity (i,'.;- I. ',:;,; , .! and why): Addition of MIB Eastward Expansion. The addition will have Evacuation horns, Fire Protection, Intercom and Paging, and Electrical Distribution systems extended from MURR to provide prompt and effective communication and response in the event of an emergency. Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safe faci/io' (i.e., D MURR) operations? YES NO If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designfinction described in the HSR? YES NO 2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR III described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested? YES NO 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an IISR described evaluation methodology P that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses? YES NO 4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the !/SR, where an S.SC is D W_1 utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or YES NO is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the I1SR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? L YES NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approved facility procedure(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use Page 2 of this form to document your statements. Print Name Sign Name Date Preparer: Sean Schaefer I _,,, _____,.__..,___ 5/18/14 Reviewer: ,d .Reactor Manager: John Fruits I Submit copy of screen to HSR /SAR file (circle one. Yes Z o)[I COPY Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

8 AP-RR-003 co py 50.59 SCREEN (Cot.)Number: 14-17 Page 2 of 2 Title: Modification Record 14-01; Interfacing MURR Systems with the MIB Eastward Expansion. If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessarY]

1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designfinction described in the HSR?.N__I the proposed activity does not involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR. This modification does not change We design function of the affected sysems nor the manner in which they are performed. , ,1,kk,"n:idxhC0 i-- "\,!-r+V d- CA---ex cr -AA-e- Je '-ire &agcx 2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?Nn, thp. prnon-.po d arMivity doe-, not involve a change to a pronp.diire that advypr.s.ly affpckt- how HI-IR dscrihed qSC desin functienn-are performed.

ronntrnllpd or testedl FIch system will h. indivkiduly-cr eenpd for consequences using a -50 5Q screen for Pa-h of those- -"yqtem-% 0- &i ; -3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?Non the propose-d activity does not involve revising or replacing qn HSR describehd evaluntion methodology that is in establishing the dersign hbse.s, or usqepd in the safety analyses The de..dign bases and s.afety do not rely on the affected .sy.tepmq in their evaluation methodology

4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. the proposed activity does not involve any test or experiment.

Each of the affected systems (Evacuation Horns, Fire Protection, Intercom and Paging, and Electrical Systems) will be screened individually for conse uences.List the documents (HSR, Technical Specificdtiuns, andi t,,;,.i Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]FP-RO-13 FIcility Fvacuation: FP-Rt"l-14 FP7 and I;itp Area FIvrc.ations Mopdifirtation Rec.rd 14-01 HSR-7 24. 7 2 9, 71 4 CO PY Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

8 C-Y)R I G I NAt AP-RO-I 15 Modification Number: 1401 ev 3 on OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?No: Signature: Date: 061//1412.W/ If YES, provide the suggested revision(s__ OPERATING PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. Revisions to the Emergency Procedures will be performed independently of this Modification Record and will also be independently reviewed under 10 CFR 50.59.PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. PRINTS: MURR Print 2269 Sheet 2 of 5 Update according to attached draft MURR Print 1145 Sheet 2 of 5 Update according to attached draft' O)RIGINAL Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

8 AP-RO-I 15 14-01Revision 8 Modification Number: 14-01 SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory? Yes: No: _ Signature: _ Date: e A y If YES, provide a list of the spare parts No spare parts are required for this modification. 6 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

8 Date: October 28, 2014 To: File -Modification Record 14-01 From: John Fruits, Reactor Manager

Subject:

Construction Details Modification Record 14-01 documented the construction of the MURR Industrial Building (MIB) Eastward Expansion. This letter documents the construction methods and details.The expansion is not directly mentioned in the Hazards Summary Report. The MIB is a part of the Laboratory Building. The extent of inclusion in the Hazards Summary Report is to show the expansion on the building floor plan drawings.The grade level floor is poured concrete designed for a 125 lb./ft 2 live load with additional steel and concrete framing to support four (4), 100,000 lb. hot cells positioned next to each other anywhere along the North-South direction. The steel and concrete structure rests on pilings driven to bedrock. The below grade floor is also poured concrete designed to handle a 125 lb./ft.2 live load, additionally, the floor can handle a 10,000 lb. load on a 6 ft. x 6 ft. base plate.The East outer wall of the building has a masonry shield wall in part of the building as shown on the attached print. This is in place to reduce possible dose to the public from the cask loading taking place in the cask loading side of the hot cells. This wall is concrete block with all voids filled with grout.This expansion will provide an additional 1440 ft 2 and 1432 ft 2 of net usable space on the grade, and the below grade levels respectively. The building is construction type II-B. This type of construction utilizes non-combustible materials that do not provide a burn rating. There is an external drain tile sump with visual alarm indication of sump high level. This building also has heating ventilation and air conditioning, domestic cold water, domestic hot water, vacuum, and compressed air. For more information on the individual non-license related systems refer to University of Missouri Project Numbers CP122371 and CP141431.Jo ru-ts Reactor Manager jls Page 1 of 2 ATTACHMENT 8 0 1 25 0 Page 2 of 2 ATTACHMENT 9 ORIGINAL AP-RO-l 15 Revision 8 MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM FOR: 1) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 14-01 Add. 1 WAF Number: 13-11838 Modification Title: Construction of Usable Laboratory Spaces Within The Expanded MURR Industrial Building Page No.i 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Procedure, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Required Yes No MT n z1 z1~_ x _ _Date By Completed (Initials) I Dae-ll4LU/ZW 11/2.1H IId _ -___Date:___________ 50.59 Screen Completed: (A4sfeactor Manager -Engineering) Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review: (Reactor Manager)hp§Modification Approved: Modification Completed: / ,(Reactor Manager)(Reactor Manager)Date: Date:__-_ý_14 Date: 1ýrA_- l Date: Modification Closed: (Reactor Manager)I Attachment

8. I ATTACHMENT 9 ORIGINAL AP-RO-! 15 Revision 8 I Modification Number: 14-01 Addendum 1 REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION Item No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review Operating Procedures Updated Preventive Maintenance Procedures Updated Compliance Procedures Updated MURR Prints Updated Spare Parts System Updated Required Yes No-xi Date Completed 12,105/I" 4 Documented by (Initials)

_____ I I2/a~5,:S 4____ X Z ,2fayU/Ll 3 ,.2 L- S.la Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

9 0 fA 1 L 14-01 Add. 1 Revision 8 I Modification Number:_________ MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)This modification record serves to document the construction of the usable laboratory spaces within, and extension of MURR systems to, the dedicated laboratory facility in the new eastward expansion to the MURR Industrial Building (MIB).This laboratory contains three adjoined and inter-connected hot cells located on the grade level (HC-11A, HC-11B, and HC-11C). HC-11A and HC-11B have 200mm (7.9 in) of vertical lead shielding while HC-11C has 100mm (3.9 in) of vertical lead shielding. The area to the rear of the cells, the cask loading area (Room 299U), is where the cell support facilities and equipment are located and where cell inputs and outputs occur. The area in front of the hot cells, the operator area (Room 299T), is where the cell windows, manipulators, glove boxes and controls are located. There is an additional laboratory (Room 299V) on grade level and a full basement under the expansion (Room 199).The following Modification Records will be used to document the individual systems: " Modification Record 90-01; Addendum 03 -Evacuation Horns in MIB Eastward Expansion" Modification Record 01-02; Addendum 11 -Intercom System in MIB Eastward Expansion" Modification Record 03-03; Addendum 06 -Fire Protection in MIB Eastward Expansion* Modification Record 04-03; Addendum 02 -Liquid Radioactive Waste in MIB Eastward Expansion" Modification Record 01-09; Addendum 05 -Emergency Electrical in MIB Eastward Expansion" Modification Record 88-07; Addendum 03 -Exhaust Ventilation in MIB Eastward Expansion This Modification Record will NOT provide suggested revisions to the Emergency Procedures. Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page 1, with justification) The short form of the Modification Record is appropriate because this is a modification to a non-safety system that requires documentation and review only (Reason No. 4).2 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

9 ORIGINAk AP-RO-I 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 14-01 Addendum 1 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes:X... No: Signature:o_ 'vllvlz) v' Date: iIUi/iiidZ t4 If YES, make an analysis below and pro e' the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.Yes the facility as described in the HSR is changed in the following sections: Original HSR: Figure 2.3 -Site Plan Figure 3.1 -Basement Level Figure 3.2 -Grade Level Plan Figure 3.3a -Third Level Plan Figure 3.3b -Fourth Level Plan Figure 3.3c -Fifth Level Plan Figure 3.4 -North and East Elevations Figure 3.5 -South and West Elevations Figure 3.6 -Building Sections A and B Figure 3.7 -Building Sections C, D, E, F, G, and H (No change)(Change as attached)(No change)(No change)(No change)(No change)(No change)(No change)(No change)(No change)All other Sections and Figures of the HSR and its addenda are correct and will remain the same.3 Attachment 8.1 CIT r I rr 199 HASDIEWJ OF WE E&T M]nnI1M-n a-I n"r~: We I S : ! N.T.&..I uIIIerslllly Uo mI oUrI -- COUlU a~l buidtfng: mURR No.RESEARCH REACTOR dote.7/23/2014 level: BASEMENT LEVEL sheet 1 OF 5 ATTACHMENT 9 ORIGINAL.AP-RO-i 15 14-01 Addendum 1 Revision 8 Modification Number: REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.I Yes: No: .Signature: WO/W_51 Date: I I/Z1l2ev'4 If YES, the change must be performed us ng a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or create a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.A 50.59 screen (14-41) is attached to document that these specific existing MURR systems may be extended to the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion without further review under 10 CFR 50.59.4 Attachment

8.1 ATTXAin'

1h A r-hT 0 COPY Revision 9 50.59 SCREEN Number: 14-41 Page 1 of Title: Construction of Usable Laboratory Spaces within thie Expanded MURR Industrial Building Description of Activity (what is being changed and why): Con-truntinn of thA iH.qhltA Iharatnry within, and of MiJRR to. thA dP-di.Ad t.d I hnratnry fainility in the new to tht- MLJRR Indistrial Ruildinp(MIR) Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safe facility (i.e., MURR) operations? YES NO If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: 1__I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design Junction YES NO described in the HSR?2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR j F71 described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested? YES NO 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology L._.W that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses? YES NO 4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is El I1 utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or YES NO is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?.5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? D IZI YES NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approvedfacilityproceiur:(s), .iccvlse Amer, emt or a .50.59 Evaluation is not required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question I, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use Page 2 of this form to document your statements. Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

9 COPY Revision 8 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Number: 14-41 Page 2 of 2 Title: Construction of Usable Laboratory Spaces within the Expanded MURR Industrial Building If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessary. ]1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR?No. The construction of the usable lab in the eastward expansion of the MURR Industrial Building does not involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects the design function described in the HSR. The construction of the usable lab space in the MURR Industrial Building is within the scope of the ILab building as described in the HSR.2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No Thp prnposed artivity does nnt invply, a change to , ,nrndi ire that advyersel affp.cts how HSR dcri deshin fitnrftionn performed, rontmnIle.l The cnnnstni.tinn of the isbhle lab dnoe not havE a nr'.ediir_ anth. ndy.bte.m q will he evaluated on separate 50 '_Q Scren -3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?No- The proposed activity daes not involve revising or r.placing an HSR .valhation mJthodology that io used in .tabhlishing the de.ign hae.s nr used in the safety The.de.sign hapse dn not use thp lbhnorton .panp.re of the yval11tinn mrthndology for the derign hbases. and safety analysVs.!z., the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or coatrolled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. The proposed activity does not involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where the SSC is utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or is inconsistent with analyses or descriDtions in the HSR. The construction of usable lab spaces is not an experiment. List the d,,-:iments (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) rcvk, wed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]HSR t-tionn_ 9 3 -gd 7 HSRI Addendilm I Sertinn 1 99 Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

9 ORIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 14-01 Add. 1 OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?Yes: L No: Signature: 1,71 , Date: 11/2LI/aVY If YES, provide the suggested revision(s). OPERATING PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. Revisions to the Emergency Procedures will be performed independently of this Modification Record and will also be independently reviewed under 10 CFR 50.59.PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. PRINTS: MURR Print 2269 Sheet 1 of 5 MURR Print 2269 Sheet 2 of 5 MURR Print 1145 Sheet 1 of 5 MURR Print 1145 Sheet 2 of 5 Update according to attached draft Update according to attached draft Update according to attached draft Update according to attached draft 5 Attachment

8. I LEGEND.0 FIRE EXTINGUIS"ER

-C02 A FIRE EDX1NGUISHER -DRY CHEMICAL FIRE EXTINGUISHER -HALON IC> EVACUATION ALARM*- INTERCOM SPEAKER EMERGENCY UGHT [A 0 03 E)GT UGHT AFIRE MAIN OUTLET" E'YE WASH STATION 0("h 4 FLASHING EVACUA71ON IGHT c ID,.FIRE BLANKET D 0 S MO KE114 101 (D FIRST AID KIT -GENERAL USE* FIRST AID KIT EMERGENCY USE ONLY 100 low>110 , FIRE ALARM BELLO m 121(0 II~~~2DIX1 11710 112AI 10 0 AD=E NID EAST RASEMET jD.GN.UPOA1TI PER WAY 11-2373 JDCII.REOWHOSE CA.:ET I ~D." Pl ACEMENT OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT 11 8/24/05 CKANGE FIRST AID XiT TO 01IGCY USE ONLY DCAI north: 10 6/13/06 O FS AID I- DCII BASEMENT Of MmB EAST ADITM 9 C HkE A/O~ aMC LARM 70 HORN IN LA III DCII.-Columbia .T.S..MUR No.1145 RESEARCH REACTOR de: HVDI1ORIM EVAC / HOMNS AMD UMM1 T 0CM DEMIPn0N BASEMENT LEVEL sheet: 1 oF 5 0 Fit 07=90 -00 nooy e A FE EXIGU~ -Of ONEAI. Mr. MR RAminau pWK WUNWn -HALON OCTAamAU BM ENT Lfl4 01 £VAC"WALI"um IIFl% MAIN AO131 oPulm om~om.Td WE4 ri I T1j4 RAM"e 9V~A1UAT LTf so Wcmol e mu E VAOIA1M / KAC"-O KAMSW MA AMTWD-OT-NL UM AED* WT AI 10T 011"US OLY 0-I 0 C)m z"-(ra0 a..ft I PLACEMENT OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT RESEARCH REACTOR 1145 dote& 5/12/14 a0310 2D 40 r1 GRADE LEVEL A 2eet 2 of 5 Nit "T 0 199 BASElWEJT OF 119 EAST AMMOlN

---

m ---- -m m--m -mm--- m -m r m z (.0 I 0'1-I a 5m Z ~FE ATTACHMENT 9 0RIGINAL AP-RO-I 15 Modification Number: 14-01 Addendum 1 Revision 8 SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory?

Yes: No: )C Signature: Date: i1/21/0/If YES, provide a list of the spare parts No spare parts are required for this modification. 6 Attachment 8.1 M IATONRCO 10 MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM AP-RO-l 15 Revision 8 FOR: I) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 88-07; Add. 3 WAF Number: IAq" qi Modification Title: Exhaust Ventilation in M11B Eastward Expansion Required Page No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Procedure, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Required Yes N FA +/-Date Completed I V/C 26a14 I 2 i 91 LI 10¢(0%/ Uhql U By (Initials)-ts 50.59 Screen Completed: Manager -Engineering) Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review:-" '&'ae (Keacyt g-iiaer)Modification Approved:_(tactor Manage Modification Completed: 7 7K > (eorMng)Date: 10/&12 t Date: I-' --Date: At -Date:_ __Date: Attachment 8.1 (Reaqjor Manager)Modification Closed: (Reactor Manager)O)RIGINAL ATTACHMENT 10 Modification Number: 88-07; Add. 3 O)RIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 8 I REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION Item No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review Operating Procedures Updated Preventive Maintenance Procedures Updated Compliance Procedures Updated MURR Prints Updated Spare Parts System Updated Required Yes No X.x K __Date Completed I Z /(2! Otj AtIA".u/A Documented by (Initials) tIV/,4 MIA, Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

10 OiRIGINAL AP-RO-I 15 88-0; Ad. 3Revision 8 I Modification Number: 88-07; Add. 3 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)This modification record documents the installation of radioactive exhaust ventilation in the newly expanded MURR Industrial Building (MIB). The system consists of charcoal and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter banks, constant volume control valves (CVCVs), hot cell ventilation exhaust fans, flow and pressure measurement devices, and associated ducting and dampers.Exhaust air from the containment and laboratory buildings are discharged to atmosphere through the exhaust stack by either exhaust fan EF-13 or EF-14 in the west tower. Either one or the other (EF-13 or EF-14) exhaust fan is on at all times. The other fan is a standby.Failure of the in service fan automatically activates the standby and also activates a warning light in the control room. A failure of both fans activates an alarm in the control room. Static pressures are limited by a pressure sensitive relief damper that begins to open at 8" H20 and is full open at 10" H20.The ventilation system, which will support the MIB Expansion, is designed to perform the following radiological control functions: Maintain Rooms 299T, 299U, and 299V at a slightly negative pressure with respect to the surrounding areas to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination; Maintain hot cells HC-11A, HC-11B, and HC-1 1C at a negative pressure to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination; Provide the necessary charcoal and HEPA filtration to ensure radioactive airborne being released to the environment are kept at minimum concentrations; and (Continued on page 2a)Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page I, with justification) The short form of the Modification Record is appropriate because this is an Addendum to an existing, previously approved Modification Record (Reason 1) and this is a modification to a non-safety system that requires documentation and review only (Reason 4).2 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

10 qlpjp3 5AL Revision 8 Modification Number: 88-07; Addendum 3 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (cont.)provide continuous monitoring of all radioactive airborne releases discharged through the MIB Expansion ventilation exhaust system. Air exiting the MIB Expansion through the exhaust ventilation system is continuously monitored for airborne activity by a radiation monitoring system downstream of all of the hot cell and room filtration systems.The ventilation system will be utilized in multiple areas of the MIB Expansion as follows: Room 299T The air will be exhausted through a CVCV, HEPA filter and a (selected) parallel charcoal filter (one filter on service -one in standby) into the facility main ventilation exhaust system at a rate of approximately 250 cfm.Room 299U The air will be exhausted through a CVCV and the same HEPA and parallel charcoal filter system which also supports Room 299T and then into the facility main ventilation exhaust system at a rate of approximately 100 cfm.Room 299V The air will be exhausted from the room through a fume hood, a CVCV, HEPA filter and a (selected) parallel charcoal filter (one filter on service -one in standby), and then into the facility main ventilation exhaust system at a rate of approximately 450 cfm.Hot Cells HC-II A, HC-I IB, and HC-11 C The exhaust ventilation for hot cells HC-I IA, HC-i lB and HC-I 1C will consist of an intricate combination of HEPA and charcoal filtration systems, two (2)exhaust fans, and flow measurement and control devices.The exhaust systems for each cell will combine to form a common header; each hot cell will have its own independent filtration system. Air will be exhausted from each hot cell through an internal parallel set of charcoal filters, then through a (selected) external parallel charcoal and HEPA filtration bank (one bank on service -one in standby), a CVCV, a second (selected) parallel charcoal filter (one filter on service -one in standby), and then through a (selected) parallel exhaust fan into the facility main ventilation exhaust system at a rate of approximately 60 cfm (one fan operating -one in standby).(Continued on page 2b)2a Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

10 AP4. 'IiGI\ t Revision 8 Modification Number: 88-07, Addendum 3 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (cont.)The exhaust fans will be 3 HP centrifugal models, each controlled by an Adjustable Speed Drive (ASD) that will maintain a constant flow rate through the system based on a control signal from a pressure transmitter located between the CVCV and the second set of charcoal filters. The fans will be powered from lighting panel LP-46 and will be designated HC-1 I Exhaust Fans No. I and 2 (HC- I I EF-I and HC-l I EF-2). A loss of electrical power to HC- 11 EFI and 2 will not cause an immediate unsafe condition because the facility ventilation exhaust system will continue to operate and maintain a negative cell pressure.There are two glove boxes mounted to the hot cells; one on the north end of HC-I IA and one on the south end of HC-I IC. Air will be exhausted from each glove box through a charcoal filter and then a HEPA filter. The exhaust ducting for each glove box will connect to the hot cell common exhaust header downstream of the hot cell filtration systems.Room 199 Exhaust ventilation will be available in the basement to support future addition of loads within room 199.Filtration and room differential pressures will be monitored by a combination of Magnehelic& gauges, pressure transmitters, and flow stations. The Magnehelic gauges are used to measure differential pressure across the filtration systems as well as measure differential pressure in Rooms 299T, 299U and 299V. Two of the pressure transmitters will be used to control HC-1 I EF-1 and HC-1 I EF-2 fan speed.2b Attachment 8.1 I I NUNEX0JS YSE"IFDEOU~U61111WSI /I'11-11PIT i Al Rm 299V NOMALLYCLOSE P4 HEPA FLTER W CK~tCOAt FILTER EP~cACWA.&A FITE~R CCPWTMTVOtIAE CONTROL ftv CDNTRWIM Fm 0 PRE~URE TRWINTER SAC DRAFT U.R 1.-I WAMSY PRESSLIP IRMANIM~R METASYS FLOW S,.l all 3 tES.GNtpQTE I Pj Q9W11'9[ 2 SftUPDATE owI .0 NtkA REVOUU Lip2 O4r7)I4 RE OESC$PPT104 B, .3 DMRAF 1 ATTACHMENT 10 ORIGINAL AP-RO-! 15 Modification Number: 88-07; Add. 3 Revision 8 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: >' No: Signature: Date: 10/103/22vL/ If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does involve a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda.The Laboratory and Containment Building Exhaust Ventilation System is described or discussed in the following Sections and Figures of the HSR and its addenda and are not changed: Original HSR-Section 3.2.7-Section 7.2.7 Addendum 1-Question 3.20-Question 3.22-Figure 3.22.1 Addendum 2-Question 11+ This question is no longer relevant due to facility Modification Record 88-7. This question is discussed in Section 5.3.3 of Addendum 3.Addendum 3-Section 3.7-Section 5.3.3 The following sections of the HSR will be revised as shown: ORIGINAL HSR Figure 3.22.1 (MURR Print No. 2420 Sheet 1 of 1) will be revised to show the modification performed to the ventilation system. All other Sections and Figures of the HSR and its addenda are correct and will remain the same.3 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

10 OR)IJGINAL AP-RO-I 15 Revision 8 88-07: Add. 3 Modification Number: .REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Yes:___ No: ).' Signature: Date: .If YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or create a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.A 50.59 screen (14-36) is attached to document that the MURR exhaust ventilation system may be safely extended to the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion without further review.4 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

10 50.59 SCREEN AP-RR-003 Revision 9 Number: 14-36 Page 1 of 2 Title: Modification Record 88-07, Addendum 03: Exhaust Ventilation in MIB Eastward Expansion Deseriptior of Activity (what is being changed and why): In.ttllntinn of rndingwftiy. PxhatLcqt vyntilntinn in thp MHIRR Ruiilding I:Ftw:rd FIxpansninn (MIR Fast)Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safefacility (i.e., MURR) operations? YES If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.NO 50.59 Screening Questions:

1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designf!]nction described in the HSR?2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications?

NO NO NO NO NO E]YES If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approvedfacilityprocedure(s). A License Amendment or a .50."9 Evaluc:ton is not required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use Page 2 of this form to document your statements. Print Name A SignName Date Preparer:

\rlc Luebbering

/_)_____I/ Reviewer: Rob Hudson Reactor Manager John Fruits Submit copy of screen to HSR / SAR file (circle o/e)? Yes No Attachment

9. I ATTACHMENT 10 CO AP-RR-003 Revision 9 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Number: 14-36 Page 2 of 2 Title: Modification Record 88-07, Addendum 03; Exhaust Ventilation in MIB Eastward Expansion If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination:

[ Use and attach additional pages as necessary. ]1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR?No- The connection of MIR East to the MURR Fxhaijst Ventilation system will not involve changes to an SSC that could adverselv affect edlsion function dascribed in the HSR Fynluations hbv the Ml IRR Fanility Enginppr show that exhaust ventilation flow will remain well within thep design rApacity nf the M1JRR Facility Fxhaumt System 2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No. The connection of MIB East to the MURR Exhaust Ventilation system will not directly involve any procedure changes related to HSR described SSC design functions. The radioactive exhaust design in MIB East is consistent with the design function of the MURR Exhaust Ventilation system. The processing in MIB East itself was evaluated under 50.59 Screen 12-07 "Iodine-1 31 Processing Laboratory" 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?No. The connection of MIB East to the MURR Exhaust Ventilation system will not involve any HSR described evaluation methodoloav used for establishing design bases or used in safety analyses. The connection will contain HEPA and charcoal filters to contain any possible particulates from the processes occurring within MIB East. Due to the additional HEPA and charcoal filtration, additional exhaust stack effluent is not anticipated.

4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No, The connection of MIB East to the MURR Exhaust Ventilation system will not directly involve any tests or experiments not described in the HSR. MIB East will not be exposed to significant radiation from the reactor, nor will it be used to measure or monitor reactor characteristics.

MIB East will be used in accordance with Reactor License R-1 03, Section 2.B(3) for post-irradiation processing of experiment byproduct material as evaluated in 50.59 Screen 12-07.List the documents (HS??. Tedcnical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers.]HRR Section 7-2-7 7-3-1 10.4; HSR Addendum 3 Section 3-7 Technical Specifications 1.5. 3.7. 6.1 -REP 24 50.59 Screen 12-07 J £--o7, MURR Print #1125 (Sheets 1-4 and proposed Sheet 5)Attachment 9.1 Saddler, Jeffrey L.From: McCracken, Charles B.Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2014 3:02 PM To: Saddler, Jeffrey L.Cc: Fruits, John L; Allison, Jennifer K.; Saale, Lawrence A.; McCracken, Charles B.

Subject:

Bob Addition Exhaust To the File, My analysis of adding the "Fit-Out of the Industrial Building East Addition" CP141431 exhaust modification to the MURR Exhaust System indicates that the exhaust loading is within the capacity of the MURR Exhaust System.Brad McCracken I ATTACHMENT 10 ORIIN I AP-RO-I 15 88-07;Add. 3Revision 8 Modification Number: 88-07; Add. 3 OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?Yes: j~No:_ Signature____ Date: J~ff1;1Z-Z If YES, provide the suggested revision(s). OPERATING PROCEDURES: No revisions required for this modification. PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES: No revisions required for this modification. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES: No revisions required for this modification. PRINTS: The following prints will be revised per the attached draft revisions: MURR Print No. 1125 Sheet 1, "SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF LABORATORY AND CONTAINMENT BUILDINGS VENTILATION SYSTEM" MURR Print No. 1125 Sheet 2, "MURR SUPPLY AIR SCHEMATIC" MURR Print No. 1125 Sheet 3, "MURR EXHAUST VENTILATION LOADS" MURR Print No. 1125 Sheet 4, "SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF LABORATORY AND CONTAINMENT BUILDINGS VENTILATION SYSTEM STACK MONITORS MURR Print No. 2420 (1 of 1), "DIAGRAM OF LABORATORY AND CONTAINMENT BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM" The following print will be added per the attached draft: MURR Print No. 1125 Sheet 5, "MIB EAST ADDITION EXHAUST SCHEMATIC" 5 Attachment 8.I A I IurIIVII-INI IU r .--I C "- -- l a I -'I [OLTa-: j o r I --------:7>-///....£t i i r- II+R TA ru 4 Taralt I ARRITAICi. NLAC V fl , I -' tP tI I I. i A Ali I I-,a " "---A- .-,--- -I- F --------IO , F{"T O7AIT II.IAA1PA# II.. 1 zO llc'4'Mar--- ------------

---

---------I II, , I'Il4 IT I ' ',.I L 4 I -ii L --- L A Wlc.o 7 2 _15 27 To 19 ell 23 I LVDA20 ON COD WDA'BTtD PER CiC lt UPDATED PECC COTA-f Rn REII0C COTPM-TCCT AtDDvED vOvt M --awk.© nMrDAITt 2/&TCACI.SCOT PADDE PlaC OCOCT-LIPDALIE iE 1VDETECTORS ATEVO ADl' S12PTES CRl K-7111 041Al 1.. 24 AVIIO*AMC fA6 Ml?A.DDED 2AaVE "Mt ODWOD .aFTOA PA ~l -GESýEaca ACTC Wfl TC.E T25 COANT-DAJACE 0-AMPER LO TIPED AlOFF haT U7/ad TO ALTO, 0-C 12ADm. IC-IT3. C IC-4M.a ANDP tM DICT APPD K-117 TO COCýT L3( SK -Ct m. ICMm.CCIC-AttA AW IAMDNA-TlaRD,, Ca DA OR DCTOOP-i;et7F 6111-197 6/4129/IA/4t/1M 97,13/1W 12/05/5 IAjL 3/C/dll/H'2 T..... -------- --- ---- --I t AA CPA ACa..a.CA a TA ACS ACA AC l .LR LA IS1/It/1l 7/a7/MAP LIT'CCR 011110101 PAKA, z H Lii Z I--2: IlJ I>-L, -0. <I-H 0-4C<L0j UCD LLd 0 _j.. m 1125----I -------- J -----IlA t I 0 I ~ l I 5I I-----------------------

L ----' + + Ct..1T , ---- / LH ,§VA1/ DAM-PER IS>lQ. DUCT MSMKE DETECTOR&AUTO -DIKt DAMPtER/WI/TH CONTROL SIGNAL MIB@Plff EXHAUST TRUNK LINE AIR FLOW tMEASuREHEI.ý7, : -t tF 13 lFAsi PEED Er14 (F-AST SPEEDDI HOT CELL (1e' IDCT) 328 1076 SIOUITH (30' DUCT) 11125 13026 NORTH (124' 7,0T 7352 ROOM 114 (16' DUCT 2M07 7209 COIJTOIIIOIl4I (16- DUCl) 7550 2591 ITOAL 21341 20558 UFA1S, CUSI[ 6E[ I / 411NUTE r 00150C KIDT PACIIIOT 8S -7 [OWDIT HOWIff DESCRIPTION 7--" mIT SBI GL-1.J~'-UEHI) UEH0 r~Ei m L~J LZ2~i m L~~0R~I 1281NW QUA~lDRANlT 12813 109-1 ac-0 NE QUADRANT 299D -04S 299 G8-021 HC--S8 G -O 0, 1 GS-12.299J GB:-13. 1 29 G8--2 HC-07 CB-22 HC-A9 GB-2'GB-28 299M"O9N...299P -SW QUADRANT HC-10 G--9 'A-2 242 244.. ........ýq V D,-0.-2LLI HEAT-O- VAC. SEI- 4 H C.-\ c _ __SE QUADRANT FT]I E OO Vol~3&lT LE-K NoT all ATTACHMENT 10 n~scrnPTlr~J IREV. WI DESCRIPTION DR. BY I DATC I w 1 1-24-Vio AL-\s' 71140cZ cef'.-JC Roof Line RE- Li ui 4Z 0 0~Z F 0-~ u AI4x xi Ut Iw 0 1125 t(JIi31l ATTACHMENT 10 DDIBIOU+0 j? ocy aZ-5 mmlu\~I SYROU~R<ROME MUIM EXHAUST SYSTEM&6ee ot.,& I1 is SHERT I/I/WIB@9M1T Rm 299V LEGLND NORMALLY CLOSED b NORMALLY OPEN >C HEPA FILTER CHARCOAL FILTER HEPAECHARCOAL FILTER E CONSTANT VOLUME CONTROL VALVE CENTRIFICAL FAN (3 PRESSURE TRANSMIT`TER BACR DRAF r DAMPER MAGNRHELIC GAUGC METASYS PRESSURE TRANSMLIITER M,1ETASYS r LOW STATON [1 Ir I lrrjIn OKVI.Id m I llllI FI IVI F-- I IU MDhifli1v FROM LAB rI -iZ'REACTOR CONTAINMENT BLDG.4 (2) PREFILTERS 4HEPA FILTERS QUADRANT FROM"R LAB FRLTER i HOODS SUPPLY OF REACTOR AIR CONDITIONED AIR SUPPLY FAN PLI TO REACTOR PLENUM SL DG. ' M OTORIZED RETURN OF -tAIR CONDIllONED AIR -RETUR APN FROM REACTOR BLOG.F -Af~O1 MutX~-rlA I I 16B 16A SEE-EAST TOWER DWG.DATE:4/25/15 RE'MTSON NIUiSZR F5oIEVS DATV z 0 a- .go-05 0 ()4)1<ZJ F- _ -<2 -]D >~Mz 0 V FROM MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM 114 B FROM LAB HOODS FIG. 3.22.1 MURR NUMBER: 5 REMOVED NUCLEPORE JRL 2/I5/10 2420 4 ADDED PSD ON BEAMPORT D CHJ SI.FF1 CH -1 " Q -1E REV.DESCRIPTION IINIT. IDATE lof 1 DENRo~O I NT.I AT ATTACHMENT 10 ORRIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 2,,,b ;-, I Modification Number: 88-07; Add. 3 SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory? Yes: " No: Signature: _4 Date: 10)/0.3/2c-YL If YES, provide a list of the spare parts Spare filters for the various locations will be maintained by Health Physics and Facility Engineering. iv I 6 Attachment 8.1 6 ECO 11 MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM AP-RO-! 15 Revision 8 FOR: 1) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.NOTE: Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 90-1; Addendum 3 WAF Number: 14-1276 Modification Title: Evacuation system Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Buildiing Eastward Expansion Page No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Procedure, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Required Yes No_-___ h Date Completed a*tt/wwq~06/1 vIILCILI 8stgyI40Mt By (Initials) 3A, 3 L-.s ,TL t.50.59 Screen Completed: (Ass actor Manager -En ineering)Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review:_ _ _ _ _ _ _r(leact r Manager)Modification Approved: e __ _ _/Reactor Manager)Modification Completed:__ _ __ _ _/ (l'eactor Manager)Date: Date: _________Date: Date: 4-Date: Modification Closed: (Reactor Manager)1-I ORIGINAL*Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

11 kRI G INAL AP-RO-I 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 90-1; Addendum 3 REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION Item No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review Operating Procedures Updated Preventive Maintenance Procedures Updated Compliance Procedures Updated MURR Prints Updated Spare Parts System Updated Required Yes No X?" Date Completed GA /Q ? I I Y1¢(Sbl, / IV 10123/1111 02ie fg fw Documented by (Initials) 3t1'3LS la.Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

11 viR IGINAL AP-RO-I 15 Modification Number: 90-1; Addendum 3 Revision 8 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)This Modification Record documents changes to the facility Evacuation System that are necessary in order to safely occupy the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion (MIB East). This is part of an effort to ensure all systems relating to emergency response are extended to MIB East. The initiating document for installation/extension of those systems is Modification Record 14-01, Interfacing MURR Systems with the MIB/BOB Eastward Expansion. Modification Record 90-1, "Evacuation Horns" provided for additional evacuation horns and lights as part of a major reconfiguration of the system in 1990.The MURR Evacuation System serves to actuate the MURR Containment Isolation System, and to provide an audible and visible indication via horns and lights to evacuate the facility via the nearest exit. The system can be manually actuated from either the control room (Room 302) or the facility lobby (Room 210). There is no automatic means to actuate the Evacuation System. The existing Evacuation System horns and lights are powered from the Emergency Lighting Panel in the Laboratory building and the North Office Addition Emergency Lighting Panel in NOA.Previous Modification Record 90-1; Addendum 1 stated that horns and lights may be added to the Evacuation System with Reactor Manager's approval, and without a separate Modification Record. This allows for reconfiguring as needs change within the facility. This Modification Record is being used to document a larger addition to the system as a result of the construction of the new structure. To ensure a prompt and effective response from MURR staff to an emergency or abnormal condition, the MURR Evacuation System will be extended to MIB East. This will require the addition of three (3) evacuation horns (see attached drawing).Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page 1, with justification) The short form of the Modification Record is appropriate because this is an addendum to a previously reviewed and approved Modification Record (Reason No. 1).2 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

11 O))RIGINAL Basement 199 I. north: Ul BOB/MIB Expansion Evacuation Horns ATTACHMENT 11 API GI NAI AP-RO-1 15 Modification Number: 90-1; Addendum 3 %IV,, a I HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: No: X" Signature: , Date: G7/11&/1 L-1 If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This Modification Record does not involve a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda.The following sections and figures of the HSR and its addenda discuss the Evacuation System HSR Addendum 1, Section 3.18 and Figure 3.20.1.All Sections and Figures of the HSR and its Addenda are considered correct and will remain the same.I 3 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

11 (IRIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 8 I Modification Number: 90-1; Addendum 3 REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Signature: Yes: No: X Date: /q12c,'4j If YES, the change must be performed usIng a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or create a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.A 50.59 screen (14-29) is attached to document that the MURR Evacuation System may be extended to the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion without a revision to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.4 Attachment 8.1 ATTAG.HMENT 11.a1Aftok h1ma rn Cpy U LUI'Y 61W lw a AP-RR-003 Revision 8 50.59 SCREEN Number: 14-29 Page I of 2 Title: Modification Record 90-01, Addendum 3 ; Evacuation System Changes in Support of the MIB/BOB Eastward Expansion De ..i *, * -" Actd; Sky (what is beig changed and why,): Addition of Evacuationi Horns to MIB/BOB Expansion Grad~e and Basement Levels Additiýn of Evacuation Horns to IB/B B Expansion Grade and Basement Levels Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safc.facility (i.e.MURR) operations? 0 YES NO If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designfinction described in the 11SR?2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how IJSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an 11SR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safet: analyses?4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the IISR, where an SSC is utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the IISR?.5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? Li YES Fl.YES YES El YES YES NO NO NO NO NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approved facility procedure(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.If Screen Question 5 is answered I EZ), men ,Q.uest and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (11SR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use Page 2 of this form to document your statements. Print Name Sit-n Name Date Preparer: Jason Carroll 08/01/14 Reviewer: ~/ 4 / .& //Reactor M~anager:-Spl Submit copy' of screen to HSR /SAR file (circle re1 Ys Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

11 AP-RR-003 Revision 8 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Number: 14-29 Page 2 of -Title: Modification Record 90-01, Addendum 3 ; Evacuation System Changes in Support of the MIB/BOB Eastward Expansion If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessary. ]1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR?.N~o. The proposed activity does not involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR. The modificationVAdoes not change the design function of the Evacuation System. This modification will enhance system functio by providing coverage IQ the East Expansion of the MIB/BOB building.2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how SSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No The. Dronpns, d activity does nnt invnlvp, q change to a prncedli re, that advyersely affect.s how HSR dpscrihcd ..SC design finpfionn arre performed cnontrolle.d r tested Prrnoedilrl hanges will reflnt the new horn !ocation. x .. r-, 't Lb- , \oLt\u 04%1'-t4 niri k z:6n.tcJk Vt- .-. o _.3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?No. The proposed nrtivity does not involve revising or replacing an HSR descrihed evaluation methndpologythat is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses-The additinn of more horns doeos not rhange the evahltition methodology u.sed to estiblish the design hasps and .snfety analyses 4. Does the propostu tutivit' iiv.j ie a test or experiment noi described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. The proposed activity does not involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where the SSC is utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR. The proposed activity is not a test or experiment. It is the addition of three horns to the Evacuation System.List the documents (KSR ;*a, X 1 pxcifications, wid otlici- L ecss-ig Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]HSR A dderndium I ._ection 3 18 and Fig 3 20 1 Mnd reprnrd QO-1 Addendurm 1,2 and 3 CP-.0 Attachment

9. I ATTACHMENT 11[J COPY Basement 195or north: BOB/MIB Expansion Evacuation Horns O~RIGINAL ATTACHMENT 11 AP-RO-I 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 90-1; Addendum 3 OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?Yes: X No: If YES, provide t Signature:

he suggested revision(s). 1'Date: OPERATING PROCEDURES: Operator Aid OA-20, "Emergency Equipment" will be revised to reflect the addition of the horns to the Evacuation System. A draft revision is attached.Revisions to the Emergency Procedures will be performed independently of this Modification Record and will also be independently reviewed under 10 CFR 50.59.PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES: CP-30 will be revised to update the list of evacuation horns and lights.A draft revision is attached.PRINTS: MURR Print No. 1145, "Placement of Emergency Equipment" will be revised to reflect the addition of the horns to the Evacuation System. A draft revision is identical to the print used for OA-20 above.MURR Print No. 524, Evacuation/Isolation System, will be revised to reflect the addition of horns to the Evacuation System. A draft is NOT included with this Modification Record as Print No. 524 is controlled as SAFEGUARDS information. 5 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

11 DR AFT Revision 17 1 MASTER COPY ISSUED JUL 1 4 2014 MURR OPERATOR AID OA-20 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT RESPONSIBLE GROUP: Reactor Operations I PROCEDURE OWNER: Reactor Manager APPROVED BY: John Fruits__________ Date: (P [M A Posted at the following locations: Control Room, Lobby Associated with procedure: Emergency Procedures This Operator Aid contains the following: Pages 1 through 6 I-, I LL, Az-O/C z w I;0 C)z[,T,, w,~o Is.,.. 040IC I~dI .flb 1.00.1.0 .1* nan c,*-n Ii.o oxjIi US f-I I.0~ I ~I.J Il 'VW .0.qS~ I..0* IA/I S....a..II..Iba. II .InI a 'Oh. C C O-.I .0 00.Ira 14 -- *..*C aOl.~ Ill_ '.ACErIE\T 0-- ED/,ERGENC ' EOUIPMEZNT ....e h " ri II i wsy Gi msoul.~S~ -:o.ýb-a/ bsdc..;. ouR ý; ft n/ RESEARC-i REAC F , ,Ar.F EVEL T0--- -; L3 fL 11 i Ii p Liz I-I-I]n 1-nz mwmim -W02£FmE DaflhGS -of cml-incy LMNT Z. aInuaa it m 0 b 0.Off urn FM m Urnr M~ %W SrATM mN W-SMNA IDM~E Fm SANCET 9W AD O KX CSSAV MAL-nm Oq~x U, i n I PLACEMENT OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT ire Ivuntvr of mWsgaw -columbia sot LT~RESEARCH REACTOR -f)

• FCLRIN FLOOR t*4W53 0 510 w 40Fr.

ATTACHMENT 11 CP-30 COMPLIANCE CHECK PROCEDURE PAGE: 1 OF 6 REVISION: 1/10/14 Compliance Check: Frequency: Monthly ARMS and 16-Inch Valve Cabinet and Associated Horns and Lights Plant Conditions: Number of Men Needed: 4 Reactor Shutdown Estimated Time: 1 Hour Test Equipment, Tools and Materials 1. Setpoint Toggle Switch Tool 4. Shorted Relays and Jumpers 2. Screwdriver

5. Dummy Load Test Connectors

3. 16-inch Valve Cabinet Key (Key No. 45) 6. Bypass Keys References Technical Specification 3.4.a and 5.4.b Prints 203 and 1145 FM-21, "ARMS Trip Set Points" Procedure 1. install Dummy Load Test Connectors.

2. Install jumper G-5 (Power Level Interlock).

3. Install jumper G-9 (Rx loop low pressure PT-943).4. Install jumper G-10 (Rx loop low pressure PT-944B).5. Install jumper G-1 1 (Rx loop low flow HX-503B alarm 920G).6. Install jumper G-27 (reflectorAP PT-917).7. Install jumper Y-2 (Rx loop low flow HX-503B alarm 920E).8. Install jumper Y-3 (Valve 509 off open position).

9. Install jumper Y-4 (Rx loop low pressure PT-944A).10. Install jumper Y-5 (Power Level Interlock).

11. Install jumper Y-1 7 (pool below refuel level LS-966).12. Remove relay K-25 (pressurizer low pressure PS-938) and install shorted relay in K-25 position.13. Remove relay K-26 (pressurizer high pressure PS-939) and install shorted relay in K-26 position.14. Remove relay K-28 (pressurizer low level LC-935) and install shorted relay in K-28 position.15. Remove relay K-30 (Rx loop low flow HX-503A alarm 920A) and install shorted relay in K-30 position.16. Remove relay K-31 (pool loop low flow HX-521 alarm 920B) and install shorted relay in K-31 position.17. Remove relay K-37 (pool loop low flow HX-521 alarm 920D) and install shorted relay in K-37 position.18. Remove relay K-38 (Rx loop low flow HX-503A alarm 920C) and install shorted relay in K-38 position.19. Place FIRST Bypass Key Switch 1 S28 to 'BYPASS' position.20. Place FIRST Bypass Key Switch 1S29 to 'BYPASS' position.21. Place Master Control Switch IS1 to 'ON' position.22. Place Magnet Current Switch 1S14 to 'ON' position.23. Reset scram TAAs.24. Announce to the facility that a test of the reactor isolation system will occur.25. Flip down 'Test in Progress' sign by isolation light outside aidock door.NOTE: Check alarm indications in Control Room for all channels, and check buzzers on bridge for bridge and bridge ALARA channels.26. Push test source push button (green light) on air plenum 1 until alarm is received.APPROVEDacto4aneger 7/ Rea'ctorhanager DoER3LipTP ATTACHMENT 11 Ri M I If NUMBER: CP-30 COMPLIANCE CHECK PROCEDURE PAGE: 2 OF 6 REVISION:

1/10/14 27. VERIFY a reactor isolation has occurred..28. Complete Reactor Isolation Horns and Light Checklist.

29. Place 16-inch valve cutout switch to 'CUTOUT' position.30. Place reactor isolation horns cutout switch to 'CUTOUT' position.31. Place backup doors cutout switch to 'CUTOUT' position.-32. VERIFY scram TAAs and magnet current zero.33. Reset air plenum 1 ARMS alarm.34. Reset scram TAAs.35. Push test source push button (green light) on air plenum 2 until alarm is received.36. VERIFY scram TAAs and magnet current zero.37. Reset air plenum 2 ARMS alarm.38. Place bridge upscale switch in 'NORMAL' (down scale) position.39. Reset scram TAAs.40. Push test source push button (green light) on bridge to ENSURE meter responds.41. Use screwdriver to lower set point until unit trips.42. VERIFY scram TAAs and magnet current zero.43. Use screwdriver and set point toggle tool to reset alarm to set point.44. Reset bridge ARMS alarm.45. Place bridge upscale switch in 'UPSCALE' position.46. Reset scram TAAs.47. Push test source push button (green light) on bridge ALARA to ENSURE meter responds.48. Use screwdriver to lower set point until unit trips.49. VERIFY scram TAAs and magnet current zero.50. Use screwdriver and set point toggle tool to reset alarm to set point.51. Reset bridge ALARA ARMS alarm.52. NOTIFY MU Police Department (MUPD) of 16-inch valve cabinet alarm test.53. Reset scram TAAs.54. Using Key No. 45, OPEN 16-inch valve cabinet door.55. VERIFY scram TAAs and magnet current zero.56. CLOSE and lock 16-inch valve cabinet door.57. Reset scram TAAs.I NOTE: Certain areas may be verified by coordinating with personnel who have day-to-NOE day access in those areas.58. Station operators in the facility to check operation of evacuation horns and lights.(Stations 1, 2, 5, 25, 27 and 28 can be checked remotely)59. Announce to the facility that a test of the facility evacuation system will occur.60. Turn facility evacuation switch 1S16 to 'ON' position.61. Complete the checklist "Evacuation Horns and Lights."_.62. VERIFY scram TAAs and magnet current zero.63. Turn facility evacuation switch 1S16 to 'OFF' position.64. Place 16-inch valves cutout switch to 'NORMAL' position.65. Place reactor isolation horns cutout switch to 'NORMAL' position.66. Place backup doors cutout switch to 'NORMAL' position.67. OPEN Doors 504 and 505.68. VERIFY ventilation fans, Door 504, Door 505 and backup doors in correct configuration.

69. Reset 16-inch valve cabinet alarm at keypad.70. NOTIFY MUPD that testing is complete AND VERIFY that their alarm has cleared.71. Place Magnet Current Switch 1S14 to 'OFF' position.72. Place Master Control Switch iS1 to 'OFF' position.73. Place FIRST Bypass Key Switch 1S29 to 'OFF' position and remove key.74. Place FIRST Bypass Key Switch 1S28 to 'OFF' position and remove key.75. Remove jumper Y-17.m LL1 WLii) r-ATTACHMENT 11 COMPLIANCE CHECK PROCEDURE NUMBER: PAGE: REVISION: CP-30 3 OF 6 1110114 76. Remove jumper Y-5.77. Remove jumper Y-4.78. Remove jumper Y-3.79. Remove jumper Y-2.80. Remove jumper G-27.81. Remove jumper G-1 1.82. Remove jumper G-10.83. Remove jumper G-9.84. Remove jumper G-5.85. Remove shorted relay from K-38 position and install relay K-38.86. Remove shorted relay from K-37 position and install relay K-37.87. Remove shorted relay from K-31 position and install relay K-31.88. Remove shorted relay from K-30 position and install relay K-30.89. Remove shorted relay from K-28 position and install relay K-28.90. Remove shorted relay from K-26 position and install relay K-26.91. Remove shorted relay from K-25 position and install relay K-25.92. Remove Dummy Load Test Connectors.

93. ENSURE all jumpers, shorted relays and Dummy Load Test Connectors are removed.94. Connect control rod drive mechanism cables.94. CHECK air plenum 1, air plenum 2, bridge, and bridge ALARA alarm set points per FM-21,"ARMS Trip Set Points." 95. Flip up and lock 'Test in Progress' sign.96. Announce to the facility that reactor isolation and facility evacuation test is complete.97. Log CP complete in Console Log Book and Maintenance Day Book.Date Completed:

LSRO Signature: r~r~um~LPJLJflL~1r ATTACHMENT 11 NUMBER: CP-30 COMPLIANCE CHECK PROCEDURE PAGE: 4 OF 6 REVISION: 1/10/14 List of Reactor Isolation Horns and Liaht 1. Room 101 (CoStar Tower on East Wall Across from Horn Thermal Column B/P Floor)2. Room 285 (Containment Building Lobby-East Wall) Horn 3. Room 301 (3rd Level Stairway) Horn 4. Room 401 (4th Level Stairway) Horn 5. Room 287 (Outside Airlock Door) Light List of Facility Evacuation Horns and Lights Reactor Laboratory Building 1. Room 287 (Outside Airlock Door) Horn 2. Room 210 (Northeast Corner of Laboratory Building) Horn 3. Room 215A Light 4. Room 211 (Northwest Corner of Laboratory) Horn 5. TOB No. 1 Horn 6. TOB No. 2 Horn 7. TOB No. 4 Horn 8. TOB No. 5 Horn 9. Room 2328 Light 10. Room 277 Horn 11. Room 278 Horn 12. Room 238 Hom 13. Room 231B Horn 14. Room 231E (DG Room) Horn 15. Room 231E (DG Room) Light 16. Corridor C299A (Industrial Building) Horn* 17. Room 299D (Industrial Building) Horn 18. Room 2990 (Industrial Building) Horn* Can be checked remotely* Coordinate with Lab Responsible 7A Ii .ATTACHMENT 11 NUMBER: CP-30 COMPLIANCE CHECK PROCEDURE PAGE: 5 OF 6 REVISION: 1/10114 List of Facility Evacuation Horns and Lights Reactor Laboratory Building* 19. Corridor C299C (Industrial Building) Horn-_

• 2 oom 242A Horn_____2'1V oom 249 (Southwest Corner of Laboratory Building)

Horn___ 2,-Aoom 249 (Immediately Outside Room 246) Horn_____2"3"OB No. 3 Horn 24t Room 254 (Southeast Corner of Laboratory Building) Horn 26 25. Room 105 (Laboratory Basement East Wall) Horn 26: Room 111 Horn* _ '7. Room 114 Gate Horn 31* 28, Cooling Tower Basement Horn List of Facility Evacuation Horns and Lights North Office Addition 32 29. Room 2009A (Cyclotron Vault) Light_30. Corridor C2002 (Cyclotron Suite Corridor) Horn__34.3Lorridor C2000 (North End) Horn 3-2.Corndor C2000 (South End) Horn 3.3Noom 2008B (South End) Horn 34. Room 2041 (East End) Horn 32 36. Room 2046 (East End) Horn 36.Noom 2015 (North End) Horn 37, Room 2015 (West End) Horn L41 38. Room 2015 (South End) Horn______.39.oom 3000 (West Wall) Horn* Can be checked remotely* Coordinate with Lab Responsible ,QD. C9QqCA (I=oc.-RIxAL e 2jcjLA (ZA.)0(.kT1-PA-L G"L0.FrAf1,) 1CI1 1'17, ýATTACHMENT 11 COMPLIANCE CHECK PROCEDURE NUMBER: PAGE: REVISION.CP-30 6OF6 1110114 List of Facility Evacuation Horns and Lights Shipping and Receiving Building C3 0 West Wall Horn Comments: rrr~ FDf7~ Ffl T T DRAFT* gm,3 H K 0 m z HT ARM tI W A iS J3-tt- S -S-a a.I PLACEMENT OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT11' univlersity of missouri -columbia XTJ&RESEARCH REACTOR date 5/1145 E .*. GRADE LEVEL ' 2.15 use. a n DRAFT LEGED.,h 0 FIRE EiNOJISl4ER -O A FIRE ExTi~ol94ER -DRY O4DicAL i FIRE EXTINGUISHER -HALON 1> EVACUATION ALARM 0- INTECOM PAE= MEGNCY LIGHT CEO DT LICHT FIRE MAIN CUTLET SEY~E WASH STAMMO M FASKING EVACUATION LIGHT FIRE BLANKCET o0 uoc S OKE1E (0 FIRST AID KIT -GENERAL USE 0 FIST AID KIT EMERGENCY USE ONFLY ALARM IIU NIO.ER SUPPLY AL.AIN H z 0 m z 1 1 1 A4 I -C Ml EAMT mASMiT III m" 13!l,/titl LIMAMl I' uwA 11-2mr Mo.m..12 7 /m/_8_mom_"on _ _ PLACEMENT OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT 11 e/14/08 CKANS IlWN AD WrOT CE SCY UKE GWY 0." 10 S/13/01 RS E? DBT mO 1, 7/18/W 1 fiNaMW EiAC / H=4 AM UWIS j a" nOF~: Wm. univ,.rsit-of mnisor -Columb,,ia N.T.S.bucdlng: MURR No.RESEARCH REACTOR dft1 Wq I NYE By BASEMENT LEVEL idst IOF t5 SEW DAIS By BASEMENT LEVEL ATTACHMENT 11 ORIGINAL AP-RO-115 D : :. I Modification Number: 90-1; Addendum 3 Iv, o n SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory? Yes: No: X Signature: Date: @0?-1/1&12c. If YES, provide a list of the spare parts The additional horns are the same as the existing system components for which spares are already maintained, therefore additional spares will not be necessary. I 6 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

12 AP-RO-1 15 Revision 8 I..MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM FOR: I) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 01-02; Addendum 11 WAF Number: 14-1277 Modification Title: Intercom and Paging System Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion Page No.2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Procedure, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Required Yes No-in-i Date Completed 07-12/212,0.14 '77 /? 2 / 24.% y 07-4 1 /L/20sW 0L7*1?-24/ By (Initials) 5LC, 0&'-s 50.59 Screen Completed: eact[G or Manager -Engineering) Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review: Modification Al Modification C(Date: A-4 Date: J 4-Date: Date: I, l-I Date: Modification Closed: (Reactor Manager)I Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

12 AP-RO- I15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 01-02; Addendum REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION Item No.I 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review Operating Procedures Updated Preventive Maintenance Procedures Updated Compliance Procedures Updated MURR Prints Updated Spare Parts System Updated Required Yes No v"7_-V" Date CompletedZ/J1f Documented by (Initials)"I t.-C I -t--.y,--5 V / V__ 1G 1('L4______ 1 f07~af 0-Ila Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

12 AP-RO-1 15 Modification Number: 01-02; Addendum Revision 8 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)This Modification Record documents changes to the MURR Intercommunication and Paging System that will enhance communications in the MURR Industrial Building (MIB)expansion through the addition of paging speakers. The installation of an additional amplifier will reduce loading on existing paging speaker amplifiers, and provide capacity for future system growth facility-wide. It also documents the addition of a speaker in the Laboratory Building, as well as correcting minor discrepancies found during a speaker location audit.Modification Record 01-02 documented installation of the current MURR Intercommunication and Paging System. Addenda 1-10 documented modifications and additions to that system.The MURR facility utilizes two principal communication systems: a computerized telephone system, which allows several different telephones to originate a page, and an intercommunication system that allows two-way communication between a master station in the Control Room (Room 302) and any of several staff stations.To ensure a prompt and effective response from MURR staff to an emergency or abnormal condition, the MURR Intercommunication and Paging System will be extended to the Rooms 199T, C299U, 299U, 299T, and 299V. This will require the addition of six (6)paging speakers as described in the attached revision to the Hazards Summary Report, Table 7.2.(Modification Description continued on Page 2a)Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page I, with justification) The short form of the Modification Record is appropriate because (a) this is an addendum to an existing, previously reviewed and approved Modification Record (Reason No. 1), and (b) this is a modification to a non-safety system that requires documentation and review only (Reason No. 4).2 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

12 AP-RO-1 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 01-02: Addendum I I MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (cont.)The existing Laboratory Building and MIB portions of the paging system are supported by a single BOGEN model TPU-250 watt amplifier. This amplifier is currently supplying power to 72 paging speakers totaling 204.39 watts, approximately 81.76% of rated amplifier capacity. The existing North Office Addition (NOA) portion of the paging system is supported by a BOGEN model TPU-60 watt amplifier. This amplifier is currently supplying power to 38 paging speakers totaling 49 watts, approximately 81.6%of rated amplifier capacity.With the proposed modifications, the BOGEN TPU-60 amplifier currently installed in NOA will be replaced by a BOGEN TPU-250 (the same model as the Laboratory Building amplifier). This change will reduce the percent load on the NOA amplifier to approximately 19.67% rated amplifier capacity with the same 49 watt loading.The Laboratory Building amplifier (BOGEN TPU-250) will not be replaced; however existing speaker loads for the MIB will be removed from the Laboratory Building amplifier. This will reduce the loading on the Laboratory Building amplifier to 63 speakers totaling 172.39 watts, approximately 68.96% of rated amplifier capacity.The BOGEN TPU-60 watt amplifier removed from NOA will be installed in the MIB.This amplifier will power the eight MIB loads transferred from the Lab Building amplifier as well as six additional speakers required for the eastward expansion of the MIB. This amplifier will have the load from these 14 speakers totaling 27 watts, approximately 45% of rated amplifier capacity.In addition to the MIB expansion area speakers and amplifier installation, this modification record will also document the installation of one (1) additional speaker in room 213 powered by the Laboratory Building amplifier. While creating the documentation for this modification record, a speaker location audit was performed, and minor discrepancies were noted. These discrepancies are being documented as follows: Speaker Location HSR Table 71. Corrective Action Room 246 Not Listed Installation has been verified and documented here Room 225 Not Listed Installation has been verified and documented here Corridor C299A Room 299 Room designation verified and documented here With this modification, all paging system amplifier loadings will be below the recommended 80% maximum loading thereby making each amplifier more reliable, and providing capability for future system expansion needs. Along with the reduced loading of individual amplifiers, the addition of a third amplifier reduces the impact of a failure of a single amplifier. 2a Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

12 AP-RO-l 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 01-02: Addendum 11 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (cont.)The following tables indicate each amplifier loading and their respective speaker loading and locations. PROPOSED MURR Paging Speaker Inventory Location Updated 7114114 General Location 1OGE4N TPU-280W Armoifier Specific location 2 2!0J Q2 2 7545,%2 2 2iW0X2 2 o.2 rJ South Outer Passeae Outside Rm 244 & 258 Weast Outer Passage Outside Rm 228 & 241 South Iner Passage South West & South East West Inner Passage Center of Weal Passage 1 sub total Lab&/Offices Room 202 old lobby 1 Room 212 1 Room 213 1 Room 215A 1 Room216 1 Room 218 1 Room 224 Room 225 Room 227 1 Room 232B 1 Room 238 1 Room 231 1 Room 231A 1 Room 231C I Room 241 1 Room 242 1 Room 243 1 Room 244 1 Room 245 Room 246 Room 247 1 Room 251 1 Room 255 Room 257 1 Room 258 1 Room 259 1 Room 260 1 Room 269 1 Room 271 B 1 Room 288 1 sub total Basement Room 114 Gate Entrance tol14 1 Room 110 BEaesment Pillar HC-01 area I Room 111 1 Room 103 Acros from door 101¶sub total Cooloing Tower Grade Level 1 sub total Containment Building Room 275A 1 Grade Level Containment Lobl1 Third Level Top of Stairs5 Fourth Level Top of Stairs 1 Beamport Floor Door 101 1 Beamport Floor BP-C 1 Beamport Ftoor Room 101B 1 sub total 14 wvzls 0.44 0.4.1 0.44 0.44 0 22 4 4Via 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0.5 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 30 5 44 1.253 4 1 2 0.2?0.2?7 2b Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

12 Modification Number: 01-02: Addendum I I MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (cont.)PROPOSED MURR Paging Speaker Inventory Location Updated 7/14/14 Temporary Office Buddkiga AP-RO-I115 Revision 8 TOB-2 T08-4 1 Tce-5 sub total Slipping & Receiving BL&4ng (SaRS)Room ? East Open Bay 1 Room ? West Open Bay 1 4s 6 sub total 2 Total Tota Watt.BOGEN TPU-250W amplifier 83 172.38 BOGE0 TPU-OW amplifier A&lOBU., Room C299A outside room 299B 1 4 Room 299D 1 25 Room 299F 1 25 Room 299N speaker sersrces rooms M & N 1 5 Room 2990 1 2 Room 299P 1 2 Room C2990 HC-7 & HC-9 Area 1 2 Room 2990 NS-99 Dispensing Bay Area 1 1 Room 299T Holoell Ops Area Grade level 1 1 Room 299U Cask Loading Grade level 1 Room C299U Haway Grade level Room 299V U.C. Lab 1 Room 199T Basemerd 2 2 Total Spcak,-s ThW411.BOGEN TPU.40W awiotflter 14 27 BOGEN TPU-250W Amplifier North Ofice Addfitn (IVOA)Room 210 Room 82006 Room C2000 NONMURR Lobby 1 Room C2002 2 Room 2005 1 Room 2006 1 Room 2007 1 Room 2008 1 Room 2008A 1 Room 2008C 1 Room 2009 1 Room 2009A 1 Room 2010 1 Room 2011 1 Room 2015 17 1W7 x 1d7 17 24 Room 2041 1 Room 2045A Room 2045B Room 2046 Room 2047-Al Room 2048 4-1 1 Total Spe.kerS Tatl WMrit FCIGI. Tr-L i.a)hCI nW om4r 3s 82 Total # of Installed Paging Speakers Total 116 2c Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

12 AP-RO-I 15 Modification Number: 01-02; Addendum Revision 8 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: X No: Signature: d Date: "--i 4 If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This Modification Record involves a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda.The following sections and figures of the HSR and its addenda discuss the Intercommunication and Paging System: HSR Section 7.2.9, Table 7.1 and Table 7.2, "Intercommunication and Paging System" HSR Addendum 5, Section 2.0, "Analysis of a Loss of Electrical Power to the MURR" The following sections and figures of the HSR and its addenda will be revised as described below: Table 7.2, PAGING SYSTEM SPEAKER LOCATIONS, will be revised per the attached draft to reflect the addition of seven paging speakers to the system and correct location terminology inconsistencies. The remaining Sections and Figures of the HSR and its addenda are considered correct and will remain unchanged. 3 Attachment

8. 1 ATTACHMENT 12 AP-RO-1 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 01-02; Addendum REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59?NQTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Yes: No: K(Signature:

Date: 0,/11./2.&Cl -f1- -if YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.A 50.59 screen (14-11) is attached to document that the MURR Intercommunication and Paging System may be safely extended to the MURR Industrial Building expansion, and that an additional amplifier and speakers may be safely added to the system as indicated. 4 Attachment 8.1 ATTT AP-RR-003 Revision 9 50.59 SCREEN Number: 14-11 Page I of 2 Title: Modification Record 01-02: Addendum 11; Intercom and Paging System Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion De-cription of Activity (wha! I'S being' and why): The addition of paging speakers in support of the eastward expansion to the MURR Industrial Building (MIB). an additional paging speaker to improve coverage within the Laboratory Building, and an update to the Hazards Summary Report paging speaker locations table.Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safefacility (i.e., 0 " MURR) operations? YES NO If this quIestion is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: [-7 I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function YES NO described in the HSR?2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR [---]described SSC design functions are perfoined, controlled, or tested? YES NO 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an ItSR described evaluation methodology F] Z that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses? YES NO 4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is D utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or YES NO is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the [HSR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? EII YES NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approvedfacility procedure(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If (he conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use Page 2 ofthis form to document your statements. Print Name SSian Name Date Preparer: Jeffrey Saddler 07/23/2014 Reviewer: Carl Herbold ".- _ -/__Reactor Manager: John Fruits )-34-IL-Submit copy of screen to HSR / SAR file (circle on' ? Yes / ýNo_.)A\ttachmenit

9.1 ATTACHMENT

12 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)AP-RR-003 Revision 9 Page 2 of 2 I Number: 14-11 Title: Modification Record 01-02: Addendum 11; Intercom and Paging System Changes in Support of the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessary ]I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR?No. The proposed activity does involve a change to an SSC. The addition of a third amplifier will allow all paqinq speaker amplifiers to be maintained below 80% loadinq to improve reliability and provide room for future growth. The addition of speakers in the Laboratory Building will improve coverage. The extension of the paging system to the MIB expansion will further increase system coverage by allowing pages to be heard in this new section ot the building. I hese changes will improve overall system coverage and reliability, 2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No. The Droposed activity does not involve a chanae to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR desion functions are performed, controlled, or tested. The only channe would he to an adminiktratiw. desion functions are performed controlled or tested The onlv channe would be to an administrative orocedure, and the chanoe is administrative in nature as it only updates pagina speaker locations. I 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?No The activity dones- not involve thp W-IR descrihed evaluatinn methodology.

4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment aut described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. The proposed activity does not involve any tests or experiments.

List the documents (HSR, Technical Specif`-,-Pti,,,w. snd other Licensing Basis docurnents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page ntuibers. ]Original HSR Section 72 2q MIJRR Print #1145 Original HRR Table 7 2 OA-90 Modificafinon Reconrd 01-09 and it.- addPnda Work Pac-kagep

1. 14-1277 Altachnint

9.1 ATTACHMENT

12 AP-RO-1 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 01-02; Addendum OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?Yes:X No: Signature: &V_______Date: d'7/2 2/2mIq If YES, provide the suggested revision(s). OPERATING PROCEDURES:

1. OPERATOR AID OA-20 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

-attached draft reflects revision of MURR Print No. 1145 below.PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. PRINTS: 1. MURR Print No. 1145, Sheet 2; Placement of Emergency Equipment -attached draft reflects addition of seven paging speakers.5 Attachment 8.1 ATTACH..ENT 12 A i Ott --mlm 4 ca-.m va o un Dsa-mac nansm* lnPas m mc ~ w ucýol mxxn o waME m* SCaw- o a LI WaSclOT 4 l~tCcalaoam fla e n OG atZ

• ycus.'aassiT 14* PUIa-5554 B* I at01 mc amso n- n-I, -I--l so -m ,ua M a.a aS.Otlln niesiyo aiszoa --coumi o ae NTS 4.L~:MUR rsigJm 0 Wii 2D a Fr ad a ~sheet I ~-I--- I UGRADE Lt/LL 2 of5 ATTACHMENT 12 AP-RO-1 15 Modification Number: 01-02; Addendum Revision 8 SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory?

Yes: No: X" Signature: ____,__-__..---_ Date: L If YES, provide a list of the spare parts The additional paging speakers are equivalent and interchangeable with the existing paging speakers.6 Attachment

8. i Ab~qtffA4 AP-RO-1 15 Revision 8 MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM FOR: I) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 01-09; Add. 5 WA Modification Title: Emergency Electrical in MIB Eastward Expansion F Number: 14-8008 Page No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Procedure, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Required Yes No__ r_z %z~Date Completed ctA/q /'20AIL V ~f/2-0 qf By (Initials)11"tS 50.59 Screen Completed: lvyd&_4;ý,(,st'. Reactor Manager -En ineering)Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review: ( 'eactorM ger)Modification Approved: 7- (-actor Manager)M odification C om pleted: -T_._-V (Pl'eactor Manager)Modification Close d: (Wa~ctor Manager)Date: WVHLZ24V Date: Date: Date: -ej(Date: 1_3_____Attachment

8. I O)RI G INALC 6)-TO9MNY 14 AP-RO-I115 Revision 8 Modification Number: 01-09; Add. 5 REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION Item No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review Operating Procedures Updated Preventive Maintenance Procedures Updated Compliance Procedures Updated MURR Prints Updated Spare Parts System Updated Required Date Yes No Completed 7 ___0C12iM,1i4

_ _ 1 0fUat/ ILI__ 12.14 flu Documented by (in itialIs)t-S 0r%3 Ia Attachment 8.1 (MR IG INAL -'7 ATfiýq-14 AP-RO-! 15 01-0; Ad. 5Revision 8 Modification Number: 01-09; Add. 5 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)This Modification Record documents the addition of loads to the Emergency Electrical Power System in the MURR Industrial Building (MIB) Eastward Expansion. The addition will provide one 120 volt circuits to the MIB Eastward Expansion for emergency power to emergency lighting.Modification Record 01-9, and its addenda document various changes to the Emergency Electrical System.The Emergency Electrical Power System is designed to provide emergency electrical power to key essential reactor components in order to monitor systems and assure personnel safety should the facility experience a loss of normal electrical power. The system includes an Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), an Auto-transfer bus system, the Emergency Distribution Center (EDC), its various loads, panels, and low voltage sub-panels. The Emergency Electrical Power System currently provides power to facility loads such as Exhaust Fans EF-13 and EF-14, the EDG Distribution Panel, exit and stairway lighting, Intercommunication System, Off-Gas Stack Monitor, specific reactor related loads through an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS), and others as described in the Hazards Summary Report and its addenda.This modification consists of adding one 120 V circuit to breaker 15 of the 120/208 panel"Diesel Room Distribution Panel" located in room 231 E. The circuit will be used to provide emergency lighting for the various rooms within the MIB Eastward Expansion. Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page I, with justification) The short form Modification Record is appropriate because this is an Addendum to an existing Modification Record (Reason 1) and this is a modification to a non-safety system and requires documentation and review only (Reason 4).2 Attachment 8.1 (DRIGINAL ATdtfiýKKJU AP-RO-I 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 01-09; Add. 5 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: )C No: Signature:e:__ Date: eA41/J/24114 If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does involve a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report and its addenda. The Emergency Electrical Power System is discussed in the following Sections and Figures of the Hazards Summary Report and its addenda: Original Hazards Summary Report: Section 7.1.4 Addendum 1: Figure 3.8.1 Addendum 3: Figures 2.3.a and 2.3.d Addendum 5: Section 2.4.1 and Figure 2.1 The following sections and figures of the HSR and its addenda will be revised as described below: Addendum 1: Section 3.8 Change to read-"3) Diesel Room Distribution Panel which provides power for the EG controls, emergency lighting, and selected receptacles." Addendum 3: Figures 2.3.a and 2.3.d-Revise Figure 2.3.d (MURR Print No. 522, Sheet 4 of 5) per the attached draft.All other sections, tables and figures of the HSR and its addenda are considered correct and will remain unchanged. 3 SR1IGINAL-' Attachment 8.1 fTyfilf, "r 14 AP-RO-I 15 Revision 8 01-09; Add. 5 Modification Number: REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Yes: No: Signature: _ Date: &?/Oq/ 12&L/If YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.The Emergency Electrical Power System is discussed in MURR Technical Specifications 3.10.a, 4.5, 5.6b, and 5.6c. This modification will not change these Technical Specifications. A 50.59 screen (14-34) is attached and shows that the proposed activity can be implemented without further evaluation or a license amendment 4 D)RIGINAi' Attachment

8. I ATTACHMENT 14[I coPy AP-RR-003 Revision 8 50.59 SCREEN Number: 14-34 Page I of 2 Title: MIVndifiratinn 01-A.q fi: Fmp-rqpnrV FIArin.ral In MIR .F;tward FIpqn-ninn Description of Activity (what is beinj .... .:--- -):_____Connect Emergency Electrical power connections for the MIB/BOB eastward expansion to the existing MURR Emergency Electrical Distribution System.Safety Determination:

Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safe facility (i.e., MURR) operations? D2 YES NO If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the IISR?2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the !ISR, where an SSC is utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?.5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? D1 YES LI YES YES YES D YES NO NO NO NO NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approved facility procedure(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a Licensc ,tim,,,,.,ijivi pr',ror to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use Page 2 of this form to document your statements. Print Name S Date Preparer: Aric Luebbering ___9__J___V Reactor Manager: John Fruits ___ _ ___Submit copy of screen to HSR/ SAR file (circle o 6 e)? Yes/ / No 0 coPY Attachment 9.1I ATTACHMENT 14 AP-RR-003 Revision 8 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.) r%Number: 14-34 Page2 of 2 Title: Modification Record 01-09, Addendum 5; Emergency Electrical In MIB Eastward Expansion If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessary. ]I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR?No. The connection of these new circuits to the electrical system will not involve changes to an SSC that could adversely affect a design function described in the HSR. The addition and utilization of these new circuits in the MIB Eastward Expansion is within the design function of the Emergency Electrical Distribution System and will not result in any electrical panel loading exceeding the 80% loading requirement. These types of loads are specifically specified in the HSR for this system.2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No- The connection of thepse new circuit to the Emergency Electrical Systerm will not involve any procedure changes related to HSR described SSC design functions. These new circuits do affect any SSC design functions, and are wholly within the design function of that system. Reactor Emergency Procedures (REPs) related to electrical power loss and the Emergency ElectricalA ystem are unaffected by this change.3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?No. The connection of these new circuits to the Emergency Electrical System will not involve any HSR described evaluation methodology used for establishing design bases or used in safety analyses. The safety analysis assumes a total loss of electrical power: an additional load to the system will not change this methodology. These new circuits are not related to any design bases or safety analyses, and are within the design function of the Emergency Electrical System.4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not descrioea in die ji6R. where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. The connection of these new circuits to the Emergency Electrical System will not involve any tests or experiments not described in the HSR. The scope of this Modification Record Addendum is only the connection of Emergency Electrical Power to the MIB Eastward Expansion and does not involve any tests or experiments. List the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other LOi,, b 1,4s u 6,.ents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]HSR Section 7.1 HSR Addendum I- Section 3.87 HSR Addendum 3, Section 2.4;HSR Addendum 5. Section 2.4 Technical Specifications 3.10, 4.5, 5.6 REP 9,10, 11 MURR Print #522 (Sheet 1 of 5 and Sheet 4 of 5)(f 1 I Cc .Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

14'ý1MIIB Expansion Emergency Lighting Load 10I rn"ý..8/1/14/2006 WP# 14-8008 MIB Expansion Ernergenc" !.iohiflo Conunection to spare DG panel single pole 20A breaker # 15 Based on the attached proposed MIB Expansion Emergency lighting load data and historical data for the DG emergency power panel, the activity described in WP#14-8008 is within the design specification of the DG panel and the electrical distribution system.WorkConrolate Manager Work Control Manager Grade Level -F32T8 Bulbs (3) three bulb fixtures @ .80 amps each totaling (3) four bulb fixtures @ 1.1 amps each totaling (1) two bulb fixtures @ .53 amps each totaling Grade level total lighting load Stairwell-F32T8 Bulbs (3) two bulb fixtures @ .53 amps each totaling Stairwell total lighting load Material Lift Shaft-F32T8 Bulbs (1) two bulb fixtures @ .53 amps each totaling Material Lift total lighting load Basement -F25T5 Bulbs (3) four bulb fixtures @ .83 amps each totaling Basement total lighting load (4) Exit Lights @ .031 amps each totaling Exit lights total loading Total Emergency Lighting Load 2.40 amps 3.3amps.53 amps 6.23 amps 1.59 amps 1.59 amp.53 amps.53 amps 2.49 amps 2.49 amps.U93 amps.093 amps 10.93 amps~~*% !%\f ATTACHMENT 14~<'~c)& rig.e k (6~i Fj 5po 7'V IjI~&PY! C, hao Page I of I Chart A 33-32-31.3O 29 28 27 2 25 24 23 22 21 20 1 18 17 1 15 14 13 12'11.1'8 7 6" 4 Phase A H K C)m ZI H-0>12/9/2003 12:00:00 Am 12/10/2003 12:00:00 AM 12/11/2003 3.2:00:00 Am 32/12/2003 122:00:00 AN' 2/13/2003 '12:00:60 AM 12/14*/2003 112:00:00 Am' 12/15/20031 12:O0:0 R4s Currelt -ICA Inf 5 eo ? Sa 0ý , I Start: 12/8/2003 8:57:25 AM End: 12/15/2003 2:56:55 AM Chart.Page 1 of I A 0 1111111.111 1 1 ..m z Phase C~inmi,~iii

• inm~m~'Y'fl'~fl
• ~min*1*12/9/2003 12:00:00 Am 12/10/2003 12:00:00 m 1I Start: 12/8/2003 8:57:25 AM End: 12/15f2003 2:56:55 AM AM 12112/2003 12:00:00 AM-RMS Current --4-( A x 0-':00:00 AM 1Zfl41/205 11:00:00 AM ]L/151, L:O Ii MTMN~t3T 14 AP-RO-! 15 01-09; Add. 5 Revision 8 Modification Number: OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?Yes: X) No: Signature:

Date: Q?10QZ2&r(4 If YES, provide the suggested revision(s). OPERATING PROCEDURES: No revisions required for this modification. PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES: No revisions required for this modification. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES: No revisions required for this modification. PRINTS: The following print will be revised per the attached draft revisions: MURR Print No. 522 (4 of 5), "Electrical Distribution Reactor/Laboratory Panels -2" 5 O)RIGINAL Attachment 8.1 m[P-328 RU 105 IHoWIaN LP-41 COOLING TO(MER K UPS-3 RM 302A týweld I.1w-l I 1ý,-.I .wl'JTl Wa217,SEI.7M 7 C ,.LC(T.O~, ~4V 172 A7R2CC ~.C 9 Pa. ft.~.lfl.lk. 7.., (CI' *n0 I DRAFT I-t 086861-op sy REV AP.Modification Number: 01-09; Add 5 SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory? Yes: No: _ Signature: Date: a If YES, provide a list of the spare parts There are no spare parts required for this modification.-RO-1 15-vision 8ýW'-/6 Attachment 8.1-I ORIGINAL MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM AP-RO-l115 Revision 8 FOR: I) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 03-03; Addendum 5 WAF Number: ILI-12.1A Modification Title: Fire Protection System Changes in Support of the MIB Eastward Expansion Page No.I 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Procedure, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Required Yes No_iL D FiEz+/-1Yii Date Completed Mf341W2FL4 e)/130 I-0 a6/30 1 2dW"6180124:fq 0613ol~ag By (Initials) 3," ,.7-W 3141 ,Ted 50.59 Screen Completed: ___ __/I~sst.. Reactor Manager -En ineering)Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review: (Reactor Manag )Modification Approved: o ved:_ _Modification Comnleted: `e , r Date: Date: -4 Date: (oi 4 Date: l -4 Date: -9_4 Modification Closed:/ (Reaftor Manager)o-(Re-tor Manager)W)RIGINAL Attachment

8.1 A1TdKj

14 AP-RO-1 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 03-03; Addendum!REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION Item No.!2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review Operating Procedures Updated Preventive Maintenance Procedures Updated Compliance Procedures Updated MURR Prints Updated Spare Parts System Updated Required Yes No-7____ // __/__Date Completed off4/dW/4 06V1N 00/af~q/u (OT 42111I Documented by (Initials) It_5'3 14T31 It-.%Ia Attachment

8.1 WiRIGINAL

A T T f T~l~AP-RO-1 15 Modification Number: 03-03; Addendum: Revision 8 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)This Modification Record documents the installation of a Fire Protection System in the new MURR Industrial Building (MIB) eastward expansion. It is part of an effort to ensure all systems relating to emergency response are extended to the MIB expansion. The initiating document for installation/extension of those systems is Modification Record 14-01, Interfacing MURR Systems with the MIB Eastward Expansion. The facility's Fire Protection System is briefly described in Section 7.2.4 of the HSR. The system is designed to protect the facility and staff, and to mitigate any property loss in the event of a fire. It consists of a combination of several subsystems: (1) a Detection System including multiple sensors, pull stations, and monitoring panels, and (2) a Suppression System including a pre-action system, a dry fire main system, a traditional flooded sprinkler system, and a ventilation damper system.The new system in MIB Expansion will likewise provide both functions as well. This phase of construction, as documented in Modification Record 14-01, will only provide fire suppression to the stairwell and mezzanine areas of the MIB eastward expansion. Fire suppression for the remainder of the building will be installed with the next phase of construction and will be documented with the construction of laboratory spaces within the expanded MIB. The fire detection system for the entire MIB expansion will be provided at that time as well.The expansion will utilize a traditional sprinkler system. The system is pressurized with water and will sprinkle the area when a sprinkler head opens due to high heat. The system is to be supplied from the 3" Fire Main in the existing MIB structure.(Modification Description continued on Page 2b)Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page 1, with justification) The Short Form of the Modification Record is appropriate because this is and Addendum to a previously reviewed and approved Modification Record (Reason No. 1), and is a modification to a non-safety system that requires documentation and review only (Reason No. 4).2 Attachment

8.1 WJRIGINAL

A T T AWfkhJIJ1L AP-RO-I 15 Revision 6 Modification Number: MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)See attached drawing on page 2b Additional design information and stamped engineering drawings can be obtained by University of Missouri -Columbia construction project number CP122371.(Modification Description continued on Page 2b)2a Attachment 8.2 MW I IGINAL DRAFT I-.-BUILDING SECTION A-A UPPR TM UMIM DRAFT flU PIWIIC'flON CINERAL NONE.44541 dIal S inflh,,sr. Ken,. 554fln54,5 s44I44p vIa, 04401,5 154K 54 .1*40 Sd It KIN (NJ MINK 5454 LInIaNS 4$444(& *4 40544450,541.45 t~54'5I 4,4 at 4(51St 44444 4044fl 14 540.. flA 54,450(4(54411 K~1N NI SON 4 54 nt45 *54 54*4 K 1s., SOPS 444 (115401. 0400 K 045.l *5454)1 000 tn54 544 OIC(* 4(5404545444414 400W 144'I KIWI 54 444..-~ IS 144 4 00444041, 154540 1440 444 4154.1 444 4(pfl0O 14(0. 414(1, 4054541 #444.541/4 051.4 41544.4545441 Ia44 5444(5 44(0 4.44411 4' 541 54401.5454/fl 040 KILN 54444 00 1541071,4.454401 450 44' 55.41.445.40045554 445',14 11 ,44 1545.54 .54545454~0144.4 455444410005441. 45 4 444*44~.4 -44 .55Il~4455lW54 45154,554 45545 II .1410 4l 444 .154551." 154744415 ('K PS 54 505441.4144 ('44441. ATMIJ FJL1 4 AP-RO-I 15 Modification Number: 03-03; Addendum! Revision 8 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: No: X Signature: _____-- ___ Date: 0613014 If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.No, this change does involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report.The Fire Protection System is described or depicted in the following sections and prints of the HSR and its addenda: 1. Original HSR, Section 7.2.4 2. Addendum 5, Section 2.4.1(15)The remaining sections of the HSR and its addenda are correct and will remain the same.3 ORIGINA~L Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

14 O)R IG INAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 8 03-03; Addendum!Modification Number: REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Sitanature: Yes: No: X Date: "6'A0120sLI 'V'If YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or create a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 A 50.59 screen (14-19) is attached to document that the MURR Fire Protection System may be safely extended to the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion. 4 Attachment 8.1 O)RIGINAL ATTACHMENT 14 PYAP-RR-003 Revision 7 50.59 SCREEN Number: 14-19 Page I of 2 Title: Modification Record 03-03. Addendum 5; Fire Protection System changes in support of the MIB Eastward Expansion. Description of Activity (hit'iat is being chang., ',..The existing fire protection system is being extended into the MIB Eastward Expansion. Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely aflect nuclear safety or safe ftciliit (i.e., NIURR) operations? YES NO Ifthis question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: I. Does the proposed activity, involve a change to -an SSC that adversely affects a desigtn foiclion L_21 described in the U.S!? YES NO 2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedvre that adversely affects how lHSR I W described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested? YES NO 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology F] that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safeO, analyses? YES NO 4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or e.vperiment not described in the HSIR, where -in SSC is utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or YES NO is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? L YES NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approvedfiocili', procedure(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES. then request and receive a License Amendment prior to tnF:tementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1,2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: I fthe conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents ([ISR?. Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use Page 2 ol'this form to document your statements. Print Name Sign Name Date Preparer: G etec Reviewer: R. iudso" " Reactor Manager: J. Lruits Submit copy ofscree,, to I ISR / S..R file (cir ,I. oi In COPY Attachment

9. I AP-RR-003 Revision 7 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Number: 14-19 Page 2 of 2 Title: Modification Record 03-03. Addendum 5: Fire Protection System changes in support of the MIB Eastward Expansion..

.... ...If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evalu/ation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessary. ]I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a desig, function described in the HSR?No the propoged -activitv done nnt involve n ch;nae in an qS, fh..l :.cverselv ifl'euts an I-qR descrihed desgi)n functiooThe. dLactiviyt is an expansion of'the existing fire protection system which will involve no_changeto an SSC 2. Does the proposed activity innvolve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No, the proposed activi ly d'oes nnt involve crhanne in " pronedure that adversely mffectis ihe performance. control, or testing of'an IISR described SSC desion function-The proposed activity is an extens ion of the current fire protection system into the MIB Eastward Expansion which does not involve a change to any procedures and thereflore does not adversely affect the performance. control. or testing of any HSR described SSC design function.3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?No. the proposed activity does not involve revising or replacing an I-ISR described evaluation methodolog YjhI.L is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety system. The proposed activity is an addition to the existing fire protection system and will not revise or replace the evaluation methodoloit', used in establishing design bases or safety analysis.4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or expmeriment not describea in the nti., where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC. or is inconsistent wvith analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No- the proposed activity does not involve any tet or experiment where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for thai SSC. or is inconsistent with analysis or descriptions presented in the HSR. The proposed activity is an addition to the existing facility fire protection system and does not involve a test or experiment. List the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other L i3.,., reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]1 WP# 14-1280 HSR 7.2.4 Fire Protection System EP-RO-004 Fire MJIRR Print 11090 (sheet 5 of12)OP-RO-555 Fire Protection System GS-RA-008 MURR Firemain Impairment Guidelines Addendum 5. Section 2.4.1(15) Fire Protection System 11f, Attachment 9.1"J '40I %fm ATTt¶W~T4r i AP-RO-l 15 03-03; Addendum! tRevision 8 Modification Number: OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?Yes: X. No: Signature: .Date: D If YES, provide the suggested revision(s). OPERATING PROCEDURES: NONE PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES: NONE COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES: No Compliance Procedure revisions are required for this modification. PRINTS: MURR Print No. 1090, "Fire Protection System" This print will be revised to include the interconnections between systems.a. Sheet 5 of 12, "Fire Protection System (Wet Fire Suppression -TOB's 1, 2, 4, 5 & MIB)Draft attached 5 Attachment

8.1 ORIGINAL

ATRIOW-WAL1 4 AP-RO-l115 Modification Number: 03-03; Addendum! Revision 8 SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory? Yes:_ No: X Signature: tu_ Date: 06A' ,7,y If YES. provide a list of the spare parts SPARE PARTS:-Spare parts will be determined by Campus Maintenance and maintained either at MURR or on campus.6 Attachment

8. I ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT 14 DRAFT BUJILDING BKCTION A-A Ii m~m~FIRE PROTECTION PIPING PLAN DR A FT-NUMCOKM A .

GLOF E VALVE<3 LL.44 GATE VALVE E><BALL VALVE I 0 AERNLE VALVE ANGLE VALVE LEGEND NORMALLY CLOSED VALVE PRESSURE REGULATOR -7 W/ ,ITERNAL SEISING NORMALLY OPEN VALVEP UE1 LOCKED OPEN VALVE 40 psig) as read on pressure gauge FP-PI-10 before proceeding. 6.1.4.12 PARTIALLY OPEN Valve FP-29 until full flow develops from FP-244.6.1.4.13 CLOSE Valves FP-244 and FP-243.6.1.4.14 OPEN Valve FP-29.6.1.4.15 DEPRESS the plunger of manually actuated check Valve FP-317. No water should flow from FP-317 when the plunger is pushed.6.1.4.16 COMPLETE the "Fire Suppression Valve Line-up, Preaction System" (Attachment 8.4).6.1.4.17 ACKNOWLEDGE and CLEAR all applicable alarms.7 ATTACHMENT 15 DRAFT OP-RO-555 Revision 11 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.1.4.18 NOTIFY MURR Safety Associate that the Preaction Sprinkler System is operational.

6.1.5 Sprinkler

System for the North Office Addition 6.1.5.1 CLOSE or CHECK CLOSED NOA Sprinkler System Supply Valve FP-8 1.6.1.5.2 POSITION all valves except FP-81 to their normal operational position as identified on the "Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up, NOA Preaction and Sprinkler System" (Attachment 8.7).6.1.5.3 OPEN or CHECK OPEN NOA Sprinkler System Drain Valve FP-275.6.1.5.4 Refill the system by SLOWLY OPENING Valve FP-81.6.1.5.5 WHEN a solid stream of water comes from Valve FP-275, THEN CLOSE Valve FP-275.6.1.5.6 COMPLETE the "Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up, NOA Preaction and Sprinkler System" (Attachment 8.7).6.1.5.7 ACKNOWLEDGE and CLEAR all applicable alarms.6.1.5.8 NOTIFY MURR Safety Associate that the sprinkler system for the NOA is operational.

6.1.6 Sprinkler

System For The Shipping And Receiving Building 6.1.6.1 CLOSE or CHECK CLOSED SaRB Main Supply Header Isolation Valve FP- 15.6.1.6.2 POSITION all the valves except FP-15 to their normal operational position as identified on the "Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up, SaRB Sprinkler System" (Attachment 8.8).6.1.6.3 OPEN or CHECK OPEN SaRB West Wall External Drain Valve FP-226.6.1.6.4 CLOSE or CHECK CLOSED SaRB South Wall Drain Valve FP-225.8 ATTACHMENT 15 DRAFT OP-RO-555 Revision I I 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.1.6.5 Refill the system by SLOWLY OPENING Valve FP-15.6.1.6.6 WHEN a solid stream of water comes from Valve FP-226, THEN CLOSE Valve FP-226.6.1.6.7 COMPLETE the "Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up, SaRB Sprinkler System" (Attachment 8.8).6.1.6.8 ACKNOWLEDGE and CLEAR all applicable alarms.6.1.6.9 NOTIFY MURR Safety Associate that the sprinkler system for the SaRB is operational.

6.2 SYSTEM

SHUTDOWN 6.2.1 Sprinkler System for TOBs 1, 2. 4. & 5 NOTE: No Fire Detection System Fire Alarms should occur unless draining the system.6.2.1.1 CLOSE Valve FP-64.6.2.1.2 NOTIFY MURR Safety Associate that the sprinkler system for TOBs 1, 2, 4, & 5 is out of service.6.2.2 Sprinkler System for Room 299, MIB NOTE: No Fire Detection System Fire Alarms should occur unless draining the system.6.2.2.1 CLOSE Valve FP-73.6.2.2.2 NOTIFY MURR Safety Associate that the sprinkler system for Room 299, MIB is out of service.9 ATTACHMENT 15 DR A F7T OP-RO-555 Revision 11 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.2.3 Preaction System NOTE: Closing Valve FP-29 will trigger a Fire Detection System Supervisory Alarm for the tamper switch.6.2.3.1 CLOSE Valve FP-29.6.2.3.2 OPEN Valves FP-243 and FP-244.NOTE: Closing Valve FP-38 may trigger a Fire Detection System Fire Alarm for pressure switch FP-PS-l. This alarm triggers due to low air pressure in the Preaction System.6.2.3.3 CLOSE Valves FP-31 and FP-38.6.2.3.4 OPEN ValveFP-18. 6.2.3.5 NOTIFY MURR Safety Associate that the Preaction System is out of service.6.2.4 Sprinkler System for the Laboratory Building 6.2.4.1 ENSURE the Preaction System is shutdown by completing Section 6.2.3.NOTE: Closing Valves FP-I or FP-14 will trigger a Fire Detection System Supervisory Alarm for the tamper switch.6.2.4.2 CLOSE Valves FP-I and FP-14.6.2.4.3 NOTIFY MURR Safety Associate that the sprinkler system for the Laboratory Building is out of service.6.2.5 Sprinkler System for the North Office Addition 6.2.5.1 CLOSE NOA Sprinkler System Supply Valve FP-8 1.6.2.5.2 NOTIFY MURR Safety Associate that the NOA Sprinkler System is out of service.10 ATTACHMENT 15 A OP-RO-555 Revision 11 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.2.6 Sprinkler System for the Shipping and Receiving Building 6.2.6.1 CLOSE SaRB Main Supply Header Isolation Valve FP-15.6.2.6.2 NOTIFY MURR Safety Associate that the SaRB Sprinkler System is out of service.6.3 SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS rT 6.3.1 Isolate Wet Fire Main NOTE: Isolation of the Wet Fire Main prohibits Fire Water from being supplied to the Wet Fire Suppression -Grade Level, Preaction Fire Suppression -Grade Level, Room I 10 Sprinklers, Room Ill Sprinklers, Room Ill Loft Sprinklers and Dry Fire Main. Isolation also restricts the quantity of water available to the Wet Fire Suppression System (Sprinklers) in the Basement, Tunnel and Cooling Tower Basement.6.3.1.1 CLOSE or CHECK CLOSED Valve FP-I.6.3.1.2 CLOSE Valve FP-10.6.3.1.3 CLOSE Valve FP-3.6.3.1.4 ACKNOWLEDGE and SILENCE alarm for Valve FP-1 Tamper Switch.6.3.1.5 Isolate the following, once the Wet Fire Main has been isolated:* Wet Fire Suppression System Grade Level lAW Section 6.3.3* Preaction System IAW Section 6.3.5* Rooms I 10/I 1 Wet Fire Suppression System lAW Section 6.3.13 11 ATTACHMENT 15 DRAFT OP-RO-555 Revision 11 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.3.2 Drain Wet Fire Main 6.3.2.1 ENSURE the Wet Fire Main is isolated IAW Section 6.3. 1.6.3.2.2 CONNECT hoses to Valves FP-56 and FP-205. Route hose from FP-56 to parking lot and hose from FP-205 to slop sink in Custodial Closet.6.3.2.3 OPEN Valve FP-56 (Fire Hose Connection). 6.3.2.4 OPEN Valve FP-205 to 'Drain' position.6.3.3 Isolate Wet Fire Suppression System -Grade Level 6.3.3.1 CLOSE Valve FP-30.6.3.3.2 ACKNOWLEDGE and SILENCE alarm for Valve FP-30 Tamper Switch.6.3.4 Drain Wet Fire Suppression System -Grade Level 6.3.4.1 ENSURE the Wet Fire Suppression System -Grade Level is isolated lAW Section 6.3.3.6.3.4.2 OPEN Valve FP-242 to the Drain' position.6.3.4.3 OPEN Valves FP-236 and FP-241.6.3.4.4 ACKNOWLEDGE and SILENCE alarms for flow switches FP-FS-5 and FP-FS-6.6.3.4.5 Once the system is drained, CLOSE Valves FP-241 and FP-242.6.3.5 Isolate Preaction System 6.3.5.1 CLOSE Valve FP-29.6.3.5.2 OPEN Valve FP-244.6.3.5.3 CLOSE Valves FP-31 and FP-38.6.3.5.4 ACKNOWLEDGE and SILENCE alarms for Valve FP-29 Tamper Switch, Air Pressure Supervisory Switch and Alarm Pressure Switch.12 ATTACHMENT 15 DP OP-RO-555 Revision I I 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.3.6 Drain Preaction System 6.3.6.1 ENSURE the Preaction System is isolated JAW Section 6.3.5.6.3.6.2 OPEN Valves FP-243, FP-33 and FP-18.6.3.6.3 OPEN Valve FP-245 to 'Drain' position.6.3.6.4 Once the system is drained, CLOSE Valve FP-245.NOTE: Valve FP-35 is installed so that the valve is closed when the handle is in line with the valve body.6.3.6.5 SLOWLY OPEN Valve FP-35. WHEN pressure (as read on gauge FP-PI-9) is relieved from the Preaction Valve (FP-32)actuator, THEN CLOSE FP-35.6.3.7 Isolate Basement Wet Fire Suppression System (Except 110/Ill Area)NOTE: Isolation restricts the quantity of water available to the Wet Fire Suppression System (Sprinklers) in the Tunnel and the Cooling Tower Basement.6.3.7.1 CLOSE Valve FP-10.6.3.7.2 CLOSE Valve FP-12.6.3.7.3 ACKNOWLEDGE and SILENCE alarms for Valves FP-10 and FP- 12 Tamper Switches.6.3.8 Drain Basement Wet Fire Suppression System (Except I 10/Ill Area)6.3.8.1 ENSURE the Basement Wet Fire Suppression System (except 110/111 Area) is isolated lAW Section 6.3.7.6.3.8.2 CONNECT a fire hose to Valve FP-212 and route to sink in Custodial Closet.6.3.8.3 OPEN Valve FP-212 to 'Drain' position.6.3.8.4 ACKNOWLEDGE and SILENCE alarm for Flow Switch FP-FS-I.13 ATTACHMENT 15 D. P AFT OP-RO-555 Revision 11 I 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.3.9 Isolate Cooling Tower Basement & Tunnel Wet Fire Suppression System 6.3.9.1 CLOSE Valve FP- 12.6.3.9.2 CLOSE Valve DCW-145.6.3. 10 Drain Cooling Tower Basement & Tunnel Wet Fire Suppression System 6.3.10.1 ENSURE the Cooling Tower Basement & Tunnel Wet Fire Suppression System is isolated IAW Section 6.3.9.6.3.10.2 Connect hose to outlet of Valve FP-213 and direct its discharge to Cooling Tower basement sump.6.3.10.3 OPEN Valve FP-213.6.3.10.4 OPEN Valve FP-214 to 'Drain' position.6.3.10.5 ACKNOWLEDGE and SILENCE alarms for flow switches FP-FS-3 and FP-FS-4.6.3.11 Isolate Room 299, MIB Wet Fire Suppression System 6.3.11.1 CLOSE Valve FP-73.6.3.12 Drain Room 299, MIB Wet Fire Suppression System 6.3.12.1 ENSURE Room 299, MIB Wet Fire Suppression System is isolated IAW Section 6.3.11.6.3.12.2 OPEN Valve FP-268.6.3.13 Isolate Room 110/Ill Wet Fire Suppression System 6.3.13.1 CLOSE Valve FP-3.6.3.14 Drain Room 110/111 Wet Fire Suppression System 6.3.14.1 ENSURE Room 110/111 Wet Fire Suppression System is isolated lAW Section 6.3.13.6.3.14.2 CONNECT a fire hose to Valve FP-8 and route to sink in Custodial Closet.14 ATTACHMENT 15 DRAFT OP-RO-555 Revision 11 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.3.14.3 OPEN Valves FP-8 and FP-272.6.3.14.4 ACKNOWLEDGE and SILENCE alarm for Basement Fire Panel.6.3.15 Isolate TOBs 1, 2, 4, & 5 Wet Fire Suppression System 6.3.15.1 CLOSE Valve FP-64.6.3.16 Drain TOBs 1, 2. 4. & 5 Wet Fire Suppression System 6.3.16.1 ENSURE the TOBs 1, 2, 4, & 5 Wet Fire Suppression System is isolated IAW Section 6.3.15.6.3.16.2 OPEN Valves FP-252, FP-255, FP-257 and FP-260.6.3.16.3 ACKNOWLEDGE and SILENCE alarm for Flow Switches FP-FS-7, FP-FS-8, FP-FS-9 and FP-FS-10.6.3.17 Isolate TOB 3 Wet Fire Suppression System 6.3.17.1 CLOSE Valve FP-52.6.3.17.2 ACKNOWLEDGE and SILENCE alarm for Valve FP-52 Tamper Switch.6.3.18 Drain TOB 3 Wet Fire Suppression System 6.3.18.1 ENSURE TOB 3 Wet Fire Suppression System is isolated IAW Section 6.3.17.6.3.18.2 OPEN Valve FP-241 to 'Drain' position.6.3.18.3 ACKNOWLEDGE and SILENCE alarm for Flow Switch FP-FS-6 and/or FP-FS-5.15 ATTACHMENT 15 D 7- T OP-RO-555 Revision 11 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.3.19 Operational Test of the Preaction System NOTE: This test requires the usage of the Facility Main Air System.6.3.19.1 Request permission from the LSRO to proceed.6.3.19.2 Announce to the facility that testing of the Fire Suppression System is in progress.6.3.19.3 Disable the facility strobe and alarms functions at the Fire Control Panels as follows: a. Unplug terminal connector TB I in Room 204 Fire Control Alarm Panel (FCAP). This disables communication between the two FCAPs (Room 204 and Lobby).b. Unplug terminal connector TB4 in Room 204 FCAP. This disables communication between Room 204 FCAP and the Control Room's Remote Panel.c. Turn the Notification Appliance Circuit (NAC) switch in Room 204 FCAP to 'Off.' This disables communication between Room 204 FCAP Room 273 NAC.d. Place Room 204 FCAP in Walk Test Mode.NOTE: FP-29 is to be closed until it is just cracked open.This is to allow sufficient pressure to operate the Claooer Valve.e. CLOSE Valve FP-29 to approximately 90% closed.NOTE: The pressure monitored by gauge FP- I I I abruptly drops when valve FP-35 is opened. Opening valve FP-35 trips the Clapper Valve. The following three steps must be completed immediately to minimize the amount of water that flows into the system.f. OPEN Valve FP-35.16 ATTACHMENT 15 A-.k.OP-RO-555 Revision 11 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)g. CLOSE Valve FP-29.h. OPEN Valve FP-18.I i. CLOSE Valve FP-35.j. Once water has completely drained from the system, CLOSE Valve FP-18.NOTE: The smoke detectors for the Preaction System should be tested while air pressure is being restored to the header.k. Test the smoke detectors for this system for Rooms 212, 233, 234, 235, 258, 259, 260 and 289.NOTE: Once air pressure has been restored to the header (Gage FP-1 11, approx. 50 psi), proceed to the next step. This may take 20 to 30 minutes.1. OPEN Valve FP-29 to the full open position.m. Enable the facility strobe and alarms functions at the Fire Control Panels as follows: " Plug the Network terminal connector into TBI in Room 204 FCAP." Plug the Control Room terminal connector into TB4 in Room 204 FCAP." Turn the NAC switch in Room 204 FCAP to 'On.'* Place Room 204 FCAP in Normal Mode.n. Reset the FCAP in the Lobby.o. Acknowledge and silence FCAP alarms for Valve FP-29 Tamper Switch, Air Pressure Supervisory Switch and Alarm Pressure Switch.p. NOTIFY the Control Room that test is completed. 17 ATTACHMENT 15 P OP-RO-555 Revision 11 I 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)q. COMPLETE the "Preaction System Operational Testing Valve Line-Up" (Attachment 8.6).r. Announce to the facility that testing of the Fire Suppression System is complete.6.3.20 Drain the Sprinkler System for the North Office Addition 6.3.20.1 ENSURE the NOA Sprinkler System is isolated lAW Section 6.2.5.6.3.20.2 Connect fire hose to external drain located on south wall of NOA next to lobby entrance. Route the hose to the driveway storm-drain.6.3.20.3 Drain the header by OPENING NOA Sprinkler System Drain Valve FP-275.6.3.21 Drain the Sprinkler System for the Shipping and Receiving Building 6.3.21.1 ENSURE the SaRB Sprinkler System is isolated lAW Section 6.2.6.6.3.21.2 Drain the header by OPENING SaRB South Wall Drain Valve FP-225.

7.0 REFERENCES

7.1 MURR Print 1090, "MURR Fire Protection System", Sheets I thru 7 7.2 Fire Protection System Tech Manual 8.0 ATTACHMENTS 8.1 Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up, TOBs 1, 2, 4, & 5 8.2 Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up, Room 299, MURR Industrial Building 8.3 Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up, Sprinkler System for the Laboratory Building 8.4 Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up, Preaction System 8.5 Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up, Dry Fire Main 18 ATTACHMENT 15 D -OP-RO-555 Revision 11 I 8.0 ATTACHMENTS (CONT.)8.6 Preaction System Operational Testing Valve Line-Up 8.7 Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up, NOA Preaction and Sprinkler System 8.8 Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up, SaRB Sprinkler System 19 ATTACHMENT 15 J,~OP-RO-555 Revision II Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up TOBs 1,2,4,& 5 This checksheet will be completed when required by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO). The operators performing the check will independently verify the position of each valve and indicate the verification by initialing the checksheet. Where appropriate, the positions of throttled valves are shown on a permanent tag secured to the valve. Note the throttled valve's position on the checksheet. Under the direction of the LSRO, a valve may be positioned other than listed on this checksheet. If this is required, the operators must ensure that the valve is in the desired position and indicate this position on the checksheet. If this change of position is not covered by a procedure in use, for example an RTP, SMP or Work Package, which would return the valve to the normal operating position, then the LSRO will issue and place a Danger Tag on the valve for the duration of time the valve is in the out-of-normal position.NOTE: Certain valve manipulations must be performed in a specific order during the perfonrance of this procedure. These valve manipulations are listed in bold font throughout this procedure and on Attachments

8.1 through

8.5.VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER FP-64 TOBs 1, 2, 4, & 5 Fire Water Isolation Locked Open FP-65 TOBs 1, 2, 4, & 5 Fire Water Isolation Locked Open TOB # 4 Wet Fire Suppression Sprinkler Isolation FP-66 (East) Open TOB # 4 Wet Fire Suppression Sprinkler Isolation FP-67 (West) Open FP-68 TOB # I Wet Fire Suppression Sprinkler Isolation Open FP-69 TOBs 2 & 5 Fire Water Isolation Open FP-70 TOB # 2 Wet Fire Suppression Sprinkler Isolation Open TOB # 5 Wet Fire Suppression Sprinkler Isolation FP-71 (East) Open TOB N 5 Wet Fire Suppression Sprinkler Isolation FP-72 (West) Open FP-247 FP-3 19 Test Valve #1 Closed FP-248 FP-3 19 Test Valve #2 Closed FP-249 FP-319 Test Valve #3 Closed FP-250 FP-319 Test Valve #4 Closed FP-251 TOBs Wet Fire Suppression Flow Test (TOB #4) Closed FP-252 TOBs Wet Fire Suppression Drain Closed FP-253 TOBs Wet Fire Suppression Auxiliary Drain Closed FP-254 TOBs Wet Fire Suppression Auxiliary Drain Closed Pagel of2 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

15 OP-RO-555 Revision 11 Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up (Cont.)TOBs 1, 2,4,&5 VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER TOBs Wet Fire Suppression Flow Test & Drain FP-255 (TOB #1) Closed FP-256 TOBs Wet Fire Suppression Auxiliary Drain Closed TOBs Wet Fire Suppression Flow Test & Drain FP-257 (TOB #2) Closed FP-258 TOBs Wet Fire Suppression Auxiliary Drain Closed FP-259 TOBs Wet Fire Suppression Flow Test (TOB #5) Closed FP-260 TOBs Wet Fire Suppression Drain Closed FP-261 TOBs Wet Fire Suppression Auxiliary Drain Closed FP-262 TOBs Wet Fire Suppression Auxiliary Drain Closed TOB #1 Wet Fire Suppression Pressure Gauge FP- 118 Isolation Open TOB #2 Wet Fire Suppression Pressure Gauge FP-I 19 Isolation Open Page 2 of 2 Attachment

8. 1 r~ ~ATTACHMENT 15 OP-RO-555 Revision 11 Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up Room 299, MURR Industrial Building This checksheet will be completed when required by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO). The operators performing the check will independently verify the position of each valve and indicate the verification by initialing the checksheet.

Where appropriate, the positions of throttled valves are shown on a permanent tag secured to the valve. Note the throttled valve's position on the checksheet. Under the direction of the LSRO, a valve may be positioned other than listed on this checksheet. If this is required, the operators must ensure that the valve is in the desired position and indicate this position on the checksheet. If this change of position is not covered by a procedure in use, for example an RTP, SMP or Work Package, which would return the valve to the normal operating position, then the LSRO will issue and place a Danger Tag on the valve for the duration of time the valve is in the out-of-normal position.NOTE: Certain valve manipulations must be performed in a specific order during the performnance of this procedure. These valve manipulations are listed in bold font throughout this procedure and on Attachments

8.1 through

8.5.VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER FP-73 ROOM 299 Fire Water Isolation Locked Open FP-74 ROOM 299 Fire Water Isolation Locked Open FP-263 FP-321 Test Valve #1 Closed FP-264 FP-321 Test Valve #2 Closed FP-265 FP-32 I Test Valve #3 Closed FP-266 FP-321 Test Valve #4 Closed FP-267 ROOM 299 Wet Fire Suppression Drain Closed FP-268 ROOM 299 Wet Fire Suppression Flow Test & Drain Closed ROOM 299 Wet Fire Suppression Pressure Gauge FP-103 Isolation Open Post Indicator Valve External Loop Supply Isolation PIV-4 to MIB Locked Open ADO A-fljAcAIc7-VALi c'Page I of I Attachment 8.2 7~ ~ATTACHMENT 15 FM-93 Revision 5 I POST MAINTENANCE VALVE LINE-UP CHECKSHEET This checksheet will be completed when required by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO). Tile operators perfomiling the check will independently verify the position of each valve and indicate tile verification by initialing the checksheet. Where appropriate, the positions of throttled valves are shown on a permanent tag secured to the valve. Note Y..d .-' po:.ition on tile checksheet. Date Performed: VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER McAFr-' It FP-287 MIB East Grade Level Drain CLOSED FP-288 MIB East Basement Drain CLOSED FP-289 MIB East Basement Drain CLOSED 4 -4 4 4 t 4 t I 4---... I COMMENTS: 'I L ATTACHMENT 15 OP-RO-555 Revision 11 Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up Sprinkler System for the Laboratory Building This checksheet will be completed when required by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO). The operators performing the check will independently verify the position of each valve and indicate the verification by initialing the checksheet. Where appropriate, the positions of throttled valves are shown on a permanent tag secured to the valve. Note the throttled valve's position on the checksheet. Under the direction of the LSRO, a valve may be positioned other than listed on this checksheet. If this is required, the operators must ensure that the valve is in the desired position and indicate this position on the checksheet. If this change of position is not covered by a procedure in use, for example an RTP, SMP or Work Package, which would return the valve to the normal operating position, then the LSRO will issue and place a Danger Tag on the valve for the duration of time the valve is in the out-of-normal position.NOTE: Certain valve manipulations must be performed in a specific order during the performance of this procedure. These valve manipulations are listed in bold font throughout this procedure and on Attachments

8.1 through

8.5.VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER Facility Fire Water Isolation -Laboratory FP- I Basement Open FP-2 Facility Fire Water Isolation -Laboratory Basement Open FP-3 Room 110/Ill Fire Main Isolation Open FP-4 Facility Fire Main Isolation Open FP-6 Room 110/111 Fire Main Isolation Open FP-7 Room I 10 Sprinkler Isolation Open FP-8 Flow Test Hose Connection Stop Closed FP-9 Room I II Sprinkler Isolation Open Laboratory Basement, Tunnel, & Cooling Tower FP-10 Fire Main Isolation Open FP-I I Freight Elevator Pit Sprinkler Isolation Locked Open FP-12 Tunnel, & Cooling Tower Fire Main Isolation Open Facility Fire Water Isolation -Cooling Tower FP- 13 Basement Open Facility Fire Water Isolation -Cooling Tower FP-14 Basement Open PagelI of 3 Attachment

8.3 ATTACHMENT

15 OP-RO-555 Revision 11 I Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up (Cont.)Sprinkler System for the Laboratory Building VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER Facility Fire Water Isolation -Cooling Tower DCW-145 Basement Locked Open Wet Fire Suppression Freight Elevator Sprinkler FP-51 Isolation Open FP-52 TOB # 3 Wet Fire Suppression Sprinkler Isolation Open FP-54 Fire Hose Connection Box Stop Closed FP-282 Wet Fire Suppression Auxiliary Drain Closed FP-56 Fire Hose Connection Box Stop Closed FP-57 Fire Hose Connection Box Stop Closed FP-58 Fire Hose Connection Box Stop Closed FP-59 Fire Hose Connection Box Stop Closed FP-60 Fire Hose Connection Box Stop Closed Post Indicator Valve External Loop Supply Isolation PIV-1 to Fire Protection and Emergency Pool Fill Systems Locked Open FP-201 FP-301 Test Valve #1 Closed FP-202 FP-301 Test Valve #2 Closed FP-203 FP-301 Test Valve #3 Closed FP-204 FP-301 Test Valve #4 Closed FP-205 Wet Fire Main Auxiliary Drain Closed FP-206 Wet Fire Main Vent/Gauge Closed FP-209 Test Port Isolation Closed FP-210 Test Port Isolation Closed Wet Fire Suppression Auxiliary Drain (Rin I Il FP-21 I Sprinklers) Closed Basement Wet Fire Suppression Flow Test &FP-212 Auxiliary Drain Closed FP-213 Cooling Tower Wet Fire Suppression Auxiliary Drain Closed Cooling Tower Wet Fire Suppression Flow Test &FP-214 Drain Closed FP-215 FP-302 Test Valve #4 Closed FP-2 16 FP-302 Test Valve #3 Closed FP-217 FP-302 Test Valve #2 Closed Page 2 of 3 Attachment

8.3 ATTACHMENT

15 OP-RO-555 Revision 11 I Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up (Cont.)Sprinkler System for the Laboratory Building VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER FP-229 South Storz Drain Closed FP-230 Wet Fire Main Vent Closed FP-231 Wet Fire Main Vent Closed FP-232 Wet Fire Main Vent Closed FP-233 North Storz Drain Closed FP-234 Wet Fire Main Vent Closed FP-236 Wet Fire Suppression Drain Closed FP-237 Wet Fire Suppression Auxiliary Drain Closed FP-238 Wet Fire Suppression Auxiliary Drain Closed FP-239 Wet Fire Suppression Auxiliary Drain Closed FP-240 Wet Fire Suppression Auxiliary Drain Closed FP-241 Wet Fire Suppression Flow Test & Drain Closed FP-242 Wet Fire Suppression Flow Test & Drain Closed FP-269 Wet Fire Suppression Auxiliary Drain/Gauge (Rm 110) Open FP-270 FP-302 Test Valve #1 Closed FP-271 Wet Fire Main Vent Closed FP-272 Wet Fire Suppression Flow Test (Rm. 110/111) Closed FP-273 Wet Fire Suppression Preaction System Auxiliary Drain Closed Room I 10/ 111 Fire Suppression Pressure Gauge FP-101 Isolation Open FP-102 Room 110 Fire Suppression Pressure Gauge Isolation Open FP-104 Wet Fire Main Pressure Gauge Isolation Open FP-105 Basement Fire Suppression Pressure Gauge Isolation Open FP-106 Wet Fire Suppression Pressure Gauge Isolation Open FP-107 Wet Fire Suppression Pressure Gauge Isolation Open Page 3 of 3 Attachment

8.3 ATTACHMENT

15 OP-RO-555 Revision 11 I Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up Preaction System This checksheet will be completed when required by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO). The operators performing the check will independently verify the position of each valve and indicate the verification by initialing the checksheet. Where appropriate, the positions of throttled valves are shown on a permanent tag secured to the valve. Note the throttled valve's position on the checksheet. Under the direction of the LSRO, a valve may be positioned other than listed on this checksheet. If this is required, the operators must ensure that the valve is in the desired position and indicate this position on the checksheet. If this change of position is not covered by a procedure in use, for example an RTP, SMP or Work Package, which would return the valve to the normal operating position, then the LSRO will issue and place a Danger Tag on the valve for the duration of time the valve is in the out-of-normal position.NOTE: Certain valve manipulations must be performed in a specific order during the performance of this procedure. These valve manipulations are listed in bold font throughout this procedure and on Attachments

8.1 through

8.5.VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER FP-28 Preaction Fire Suppression Priming Valve Open FP-29 Preaction Fire Suppression Water Control Valve Open FP-30 Wet Fire Suppression Control Valve Open FP-31 Preaction Fire Suppression Priming Valve Open FP-33 Preaction Fire Suppression Alarm Test Valve Closed FP-35 Preaction Fire Suppression Emergency Release Closed *Preaction Fire Suppression Air Maintenance Device FP-37 Bypass Closed FP-38 Preaction Air Maintenance Device Inlet Isolation Open FP-40 Preaction Air Maintenance Device Outlet Stop Open FP.41 Preaction Supervisory Air Pressure Isolation Open FP-42 Room 233 Preaction Sprinkler Isolation Open FP-43 Room 234 Preaction Sprinkler Isolation Open FP-44 Room 235 Preaction Sprinkler Isolation Open FP-45 Room 258 Preaction Sprinkler Isolation Open FP-46 Room 259 Preaction Sprinkler Isolation Open FP-47 Room 260 Preaction Sprinkler Isolation Open FP-48 Room 289 Preaction Sprinkler Isolation Open FP-49 Room 212 Preaction Sprinkler Isolation Open FP-18 Preaction Fire Suppression Drain Closed PagelI of 2 Attachment 8.4 Ir ý_ 117 ATTACHMENT 15 OP-RO-555 Revision 11 Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up (Cont.)Preaction System VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER FP-235 Wet Fire Main Drain Closed FP-243 Preaction Fire Suppression Auxiliary Drain Closed FP-244 Preaction Fire Suppression Drain Closed FP-245 Preaction Fire Suppression Flow Test & Drain Closed FP-108 Preaction Water Supply Pressure Gauge Isolation Opcn FP- 109 Preaction Priming Pressure Water Gauge Isolation Open FP-I 10 Preaction Alarm Shutoff Valve Open FP-I II Preaction Sensing Line Pressure Gauge Isolation Open FP-120 Preaction System Pressure Gauge Isolation Open FP- 113 Preaction System Pressure Gauge Isolation Open I* FP-35 is installed so that the valve is closed when the handle is in line with the valve body.Page 2 of 2 Attachment

8.4 ATTACHMENT

15 OP-RO-555 Revision 11 Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up Dry Fire Main This checksheet will be completed when required by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO). The operators performing the check will independently verify the position of each valve and indicate the verification by initialing the checksheet. Where appropriate, the positions of throttled valves are shown on a pennanent tag secured to the valve. Note the throttled valve's position on the checksheet. Under the direction of the LSRO, a valve may be positioned other than listed on this checksheet. If this is required, the operators must ensure that the valve is in the desired position and indicate this position on the checksheet. If this change of position is not covered by a procedure in use, for example an RTP, SMP or Work Package, which would return the valve to the normal operating position, then the LSRO will issue and place a Danger Tag on the valve for the duration of time the valve is in the out-of-normal position.NOTE: Certain valve manipulations must be performed in a specific order during the perfonnance of this procedure. These valve manipulations are listed in bold font throughout this procedure and on Attachments

8.1 through

8.5.VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER FP-5 Containment Dry Fire Main Isolation Locked Closed FP-61 Fire Hose Box Stop Closed FP-62 Fire Hose Box Stop Closed FP-63 Fire Hose Box Stop Closed FP-207 Dry Fire Main Vent Closed FP-208 Dry Fire Main Drain Closed FP-246 Dry Fire Main Vent Closed Page I of I Attachment

8.5 ATTACHMENT

15 OP-RO-555 Revision 11 Preaction System Operational Testing Valve Line-Up This checksheet will be completed when required by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO). The operators performing the check will independently verify the position of each valve and indicate the verification by initialing the checksheet. Where appropriate, the positions of throttled valves are shown on a permanent tag secured to the valve. Note the throttled valve's position on the checksheet. Under the direction of the LSRO, a valve may be positioned other than listed on this checksheet. If this is required, the operators must ensure that the valve is in the desired position and indicate this position on the checksheet. If this change of position is not covered by a procedure in use, for example an RTP, SMP or Work Package, which would return the valve to the normal operating position, then the LSRO will issue and place a Danger Tag on the valve for the duration of time the valve is in the out-of-normal position.VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER FP-29 Preaction Fire Suppression Water Control Valvc Open FP-35 Preaction Fire Suppression Emergency Release Closed FP-18 Prcaction Fire Suppression Drain Closed Page I of I Attachment

8.6 ATTACHMENT

15 OP-RO-555 Revision 11 Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up, NOA Preaction and Sprinkler System This checksheet will be completed when required by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO). The operators performing the check will independently verify the position of each valve and indicate the verification by initialing the checksheet. Where appropriate, the positions of throttled valves are shown on a permanent tag secured to the valve. Note the throttled valve's position on the checksheet. Under the direction of the LSRO, a valve may be positioned other than listed on this checksheet. If this is required, the operators must ensure that the valve is in the desired position and indicate this position on the checksheet. If this change of position is not covered by a procedure in use, for example an RTP, SMP or Work Package, which would return the valve to the normal operating position, then the LSRO will issue and place a Danger Tag on the valve for the duration of time the valve is in the out-of-normal position.VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER FP-77 NOA FP Main Supply Open FP-78 NOA Backflow Preventer Inlet Isolation Open FP-79 NOA Backflow Preventer Outlet Isolation Open FP-8 I NOA Sprinkler System Supply Open FP-82 NOA Preaction Supply Open FP-83 NOA Priming Open FP-84 NOA Preaction Flow Control Closed FP-85 NOA Release Solenoid #1 Closed FP-86 NOA Release Solenoid #2 Closed FP-87 NOA Pneumatic Actuator Closed FP-88 NOA Pressure Operated Relief Closed FP-1 12 NOA System Pressure Gauge Isolation Open FP-275 NOA Sprinkler System Drain Closed FP-276 NOA Preaction System Drain Closed FP-277 NOA PORV Line Drain Closed FP-278 NOA Preaction System Drain Closed FP-279 NOA Emergency Release Closed FP-281 NOA Preaction System Drain Closed FP-324 NOA Backflow Preventer Open FP-17 NOA Cyclotron Preaction Isolation Closed Page I of I Attachment

8.7 ATTACHMENT

15 OP-RO-555 Revision 11 Fire Suppression Valve Line-Up, SaRB Sprinkler System This checksheet will be completed when required by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO). The operators performing the check will independently verify the position of each valve and indicate the verification by initialing the checksheet. Where appropriate, the positions of throttled valves are shown on a permanent tag secured to the valve. Note the throttled valve's position on the checksheet. Under the direction of the LSRO, a valve may be positioned other than listed on this checksheet. If this is required, the operators must ensure that the valve is in the desired position and indicate this position on the checksheet. If this change of position is not covered by a procedure in use, for example an RTP, SMP or Work Package, which would return the valve to the normal operating position, then the LSRO will issue and place a Danger Tag on the valve for the duration of time the valve is in the out-of-normal position.VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER FP-1 5 SaRB Main Supply Header Isolation Open FP- 115 SaRB Pressure Gauge Isolation Open FP-222 SaRB Backflow Preventer Drain Closed FP-223 SaRB Backflow Preventer Drain Closed FP-224 SaRB Backflow Preventer Drain Closed FP-16 SaRB Backflow Preventer Isolation Open FP-306 SaRB Storz Connection Check Closed FP-225 SaRB South Wall Drain Closed FP-I 14 SaRB Sprinkler Pressure Gauge Isolation Open FP-226 SaRB West Wall External Drain Closed Page I of I Attachment

8.8 LEGEND

DRAFT Q0EVALV >< WRAL m LWv pm E~FP23 ATE VALVE N:J LOOM OEN D VALVE 1> PRSSRECOI VP- PRESSURE SOCHCP CRAIN (SALL. VALUEI 0 LOCKED MOM VALUE4 VMIW CONNCTI¶ON r U OEIMMY VALVEa ~ ~ T~t: rZW S U7^FP2 VCE A -P -EEGNYPMP-2ISA -1 APNMU VALVE Al DSAMMAM COMIR. VALUE SCPEW C EM -POSTC POICYO VI RiOý 0~ FP -PM TI~AB 0CONTROL VALVE D SOLDMO CMRCLO VALVE "M -ONEU or~ vALVE DOOR KIM TO min FP- VP-= 1W ID NEAR -l ROM4 UINVERSITY EMERGENCY __1_NEXTO _M-21______OGP43 SHOWER MMf W125--IF-,1-70 VP-lIE H7IMXT,* P-ill 10CR J 90" rICS-lA FP-207VP-14 HO VP-17 FP-206 0j O-S VP-3 VP-il-V-AFl-'l -p-M 0*I-VP-204 -p 0 VPiS 4-27 215EI.VtP-toNEA OCWPPL 5-F-2D 0 P-nj -FS- TUNNELP-2 I IM L Sry1 FP- VP*F-0-0 (4) _iiiw (8)imm 1-OR OWD I2439 1:: (1) ROO 100. (c3)) : ~LVS VALVE 208 (2)206 ()2050 (1)205A (1)ATTACH-MENT 15 FV ný 263A (I)1-42 Cn 2d1A (1)L:251(1)On.. 209A(2 Rm. 2099 (2)--.-,. 202A (2--., 204 (1) Z. 203(1)[~n.202 (2) M-4. 0 (2)r- -- --LJ.0-Rm. 213 (3)-R- .214 (2)--,. 215 (1)-Rm. 215A (2)RRm. 216 (3)-R.. 217 (1)-rn. 210 (3)-211 Cwrln (13)--.- 220(l)-Rn. 222 (2)-Rn, 223 (I)R-n. 224 (3)I-. 225(3)R,226 (1)Rn. 227 (3)-Rn, 291 (1)29n.3 (1)MA (I)R. 202 (2)-Rn. 296 (4)L 2 o 0 Cwridw (7)207 Cn,.idw (3)-I Rn.. 269 (2)-fl R-. 2674 )-I R. 24 (1)-Rn, 207 (1)- Rn. 24(2)--273 PIPE CHASE (4)--R- 213 1 292 (6)--261 CHASE (4)4r 3 281 PIPE CHASE;P-238294 (1)201 C,,,.. (7)221 Cwdn, (5)o -- AUX. 04I 4 Mold1AOE JOHNSON;.-723; AIR COMP RTI. 271A (5)--RZ. 2710 (6) -Rn.. 274 AUX. DRAIN NEXT TO 274c~ FP-240 R.,. 257 (2)-Rn,. 226 (I)-Rn,. 200 (3)-254 Gnwridw (5)-EXTENAL 0DRAN NEAR SOUN STORZ SP9-242 IF 272 Conif (7)-270 Cwdft (3)-A U XL O RN ELEC A/CRm 279 (3)LOADIN DOCK (2)250 Cw,,w1 (2)Rn,. 247 (3)j Rn,. 252 (I)--R,,. 244 (1)-R_,. 241 Rn. 242 (I Rn, 244 ()--R.. 242A () , Rn. 254 (0)-2424 (1)-R. 245 (2)Rn,. 242A (I)Rm240 (1)1 Rn,. 241 (3- 240 Cn,.do. (5)-r-ran. 23 (1)-280 PIPE CHASE (2) I-n.277 (l)-R ,. 2310 (4) R. 236 (1)--On,. 220 (3) Rn, 237 (1)-1 7 n.d 2 Ri,. 2322 (1i)- 27R 23 Rn,. 220 (1)11 Rn, 234 (1 248 Clnd. (8) 205 (1-Rn, 20/1J 20CI~.FP-152 102 P9-241 2072w (a)-- 0 27C (I)-4 (1)--3.W 297A (1)-a 297b (l)-3X 0(1)-3..20'X (l)III. 207K2(1)-ft, 2020 (2)-OA.. 2974 (1)-On,. 2971 (1)0.6 v)i 0 0-0 w w Of A-.I T 1 I MS 2 30O(2)-ZJ] F -1 231F (1)_FS9 -51 P IT 70 EX40R44A DR IN2 F )P0404 WETR InO -MNN 23E 5)O FRM ET P IR0ECt 0)2102 000 MURR TO PREACTI2OI GRACE LEVE7L 100PAGE ODFINE SUPPRESSION4 SEE 20160I L- P2 pga, E212RMA LEGEND 02.000 VALVE NORMALLY GLOSED VALVE:" CHECK VALVE-- NORM4ALLY OPEN VALVE CATE VAL.VE j> ~ LOCKED OPEN4 VALVE[64ALL VALVE 1 01 LOCKED CLOSED VALVEP~BUJTTERFLY VALVE0 MoJ A" SU1CH c ANGL1E VALV.E 02J60 OWO.'2..CONTROL. VALVE [ GOL'01CNOID CONTROL VALVE PRIESSURE REGULATORCE W/ OIENTAt. SENSINGCASE PRES0URE S'WITCH CLIP BRAINy rP FORE PROTECTION SCREW CAP E EMERGENCY POL FLL PIE PLUG -D PIV OST 00CATOR VALVE WV WA1ER VALV CONCIN--0 (#) # OFSRNLE ED HCSE 5 391 w 4-2337 ADD SPRIW4LERS T0 RM M6 2/26/14 1.6R t PATE PAGE NUMBERS 0 /71/3 I -.6 3 REVISED NUMB ER WOF ER A00 HAS 0//1 2 404'FlouET fID A CT[2 [UPDATED PACE NUMBERS 110/19:1l.6JL... t " j GLOBE VALVE CHECK VALVE[: GATE VALVE BALL VALVE I 0 I BUTTERFLY VALVE 1'C.I LEGEND NORMALLY CLOSED VALVE PRESSURE REGULATOR jJ W/ INTERNAL SENSING NORMALLY OPEN VALVE P U A PRESSURE SAGEC LOCI<ED OPEN VALVE [LOCKED CLOSED VALVE LC PRESSURE SWITCH TAMPER FLOW SWITCH MONI)TORED VALVE FLWTSMC DIAPHRAGM CONTROL VALVE <SCREW CAP -PIPE PLUG SOLENOID CONTROL VALVE [2 HOSE CONNECTION "-0 FILTER [F]ORIFICE STRAINER Il CUP DRAIN FROM FACIUTY AIR SUPPLY A- 135 SEE MURRý flW .' 0J SHEET ."I., > -FP- 0 *FP-37 ANGLE VALVE CONTROL VALVE FP -FIRE PROTECTION EPF -EMERGENCY POOL PILL PtV = POST INDICATOR VALVE WV = WATER VALVE (#) # I OF SPRINKLER HEADS ROOM 231F-1 FP-39 233 (1)234 (I)235 (1)258 (I) 1 10 I 259 (3)260 (4)289 (I)212 (4)P-243 I f l2FROM WET FIRE MAWN. SEE MURR FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM DIWG #1090 PAGE I PSi E KIERNAL DRAIN NORTH WALL OF 231Cý PSI ATT-Ar- !PAFNT- 41r I -LEGEND GLOBE VALVE CHECK VALVE GATE VALVE 1ALL VALVE I0i BUTTERFLY VALVE 1"0,1 ANGLE VALVE CONTROL VALVE NORMALLY CLOSED VALVE NORMALLY OPEN VALVE LOCKED OPEN VALVE LO LOCKED CLOSED VALVE " LC TAMPER SWITCH [<MONITORED VALVE TS DIAPHRAGM CONTROL VALVE SOLENOID CONTROL VALVE PRESSURE REGULATOR W/ INTERNAL SENSING PRESSURE GAGE PRESSURE SWITCH ~j FLOW SWITCH SCREW CAP PIPE PLUG -43 HOSE CONNECTION -0]ORIFICE --STRAINER CUP DRAIN FP = FIRE PROTECTION EPF = EMERGENCY POOL FILL PIV = POST INDICATOR VALVE WV= WATER VALVE (#) = # OF SPRINKLER HEADS z z F F-i6 NORTH WALL TOP OF STAIRS FP-246 w 0 1--FILTER[E 5TH LEVEL~6 ] NEAR CONTROL ROOM DOOR 3RD LEVEL V)z 2 La id A-LdL I-co-) -109 41--1ST LEVEL__________ --BASESM-ENT LEVEL 7-I- 1.1L FP-207 CH-P-6-T] NEAR ETi ELEVATOR WALL FROM WET FIRE MAIN SEE MURR FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM DWG #1090 PGC' f LC 1- .. FP-5 I I I L SEAL TRENC 11FP-208 1ýr 2 UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS 07/16/13 JKA UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS 10/19/11 JRL REV. DESCRIPTION DATE DR. BY y I I It -firr-141H1110=1011 It ft Ti:('A., a?j GLOBE VALVE ><1 CHECK VALVE C GATE VALVEl BALL VALVE I 0 I BUT-ERFLY VALVE I ANGLE VALVE CONTROL VALVE WATER METER @NORMALLY CLOSED VALVE NORMALLY OPEN VALVE >1 LOCKED OPEN VALVE LOCKED CLOSED VALVE TAMPER SWITCH DIAPHRAGM CONTROL VALVE SOLENOID CONTROL VALVE 2Y RACKFLOW PREVENTOR GEND PRESSURE REGULATOR [P WB INTERNAL SAENSING PRESSURE CAGE PRESSURE S lTCHERFLOW SOITCH SCREW CAP -3 PIPE PLUG -43 HOSE CONNECTION -0 FILTER En SIRARERI 7 CUP DRAB FP FIRE PROTECTION EPF = EMERGENCY POOL FLL PIV -POST INDICATOR VALVE WV -WATER VALVE (#) I OP SPRINKLER HEADS MIB/BOB TOBs 1.2.4 & 5 IROM UNIVERSITY DCW SUPPLY. SEE MUORR WG f2439 F-F -FP-251 IV 5 FROM SIAMESE CONNECTION SEE MURR D0G 52439 FP-247 IP-249 I PP-2501 0 R-5-Is**LO FP-64 RM 230L ii-- I---------- FP-320 TO TONS I 7STORM DRAIN FP-118).L +/-..L _IRON UNIVERSITY DSW SUPPLY. SEE REV 4 A TON2 MURR DWG 02439 O- -L DA2N PIV-4 FP- 3211 (NV-TSAR) FP-73 -A EXTENNAL DRAIN FP-21 7 EXTERNAL DRAIN FP-2---- -- ---1 PP-103 P-P-IS-IT RM 230L--" C -299 72)112.1 0- -1121 t299C (41 M'P-259 9D (2 2 : IU (A 1 FP-25 I TAX (Il-TE299C (11 EXTERNAL DRAIN 929F II)FR-2N -499 III 0 IH I(I-71 --FP-72 -) --- __j , , Ilu HALL (B) HALL (6) I Rm. 230 M-13 (I) .R- 230 M-I (2) 2RR (6I RI. 230 M-12 (1) -R-. 2.30 M-7 (1) 2"Q -i 41 2990T X R-. 230 M-II (I) Rm. 230 M-3 (I) (,) *ooo -IX M299D -I)-= 230 M-1ID (1) Rn,. 230 M-I (I) f. S~~-29W P I--F -XIXT -39 {21 in. 230 M -9 (1) .- .. .. .C. I T IN -(2.-,. 230 B -B (1) Rn, 230 A-6 (1) MCfA ' -m u -51 WPI1-0F in 23V U-1 (I) NIB EAST EXPANSIA/I UPDATE.) PAVE NUMBERS 0716/I OA WAT 3.-AT75 UPDATE FLIR 2RV&P UPDATEI NUMBER OF SNýRIIKLV P HEALIS z Clo LJi IAZ--LLJ V_) -z 0I F-- .9 Q0 a_C0 1090Z 0 0 FP-65 -O FP-67 FP-PS-8-HALL (6) -ALL (1)R- R,. 230 K-IS (2) -R, 230 K-I (1)R- Nm 230 K-12 (1) -Rm. 230 K-2 (1)R- N. 230 k-11 (1) -R- 230 (1)-Rm. 230 K-10 (1) R-. 230 K-4 (I)-Rn 230 K-9 (1) R-. 230 K-S (1)-- Rn. 23 K-B (1) Rm 230 K-6 (I)Rm 230 K-7 (I1-HALL (5)RNm. 230B (I-R-. 230 J (I)-Nm, 230K )-Rm 230 I (1)-Rn 230 C (I-A m. LI, A ('-Rn,. 230 N (1i-Rm 230 G (I)-Rm 230 E (I)-Nm. 230 F 2)I- I ,p_ ,o I--- 5 FP-257 EON 4 Ent- Il FlP-70 T.-230 L. (2) --P-I SOB 5 EnInes (I)Rm. 230 L-I (2)HALL (6)Nm. 230 Z (1)Rm. 230 N (I)Nm 230 9 (1)R. 230 P (I)Rm. 230 N (1)Rm 2300(I) R i Rn,. 230 u (,)Rm. 230 U (I-zRn. 230 R (I)RP, 230 V (1) R PI, 230 5 (I)Rn,. 210 1 (I)FP- 25 s FI T* rP-53 T* F-5,I T V-TSR P-2 6 'TO8#S e FP-26*T A SS ROOM 2S9E 05/1-/12 l{BEINBEIED PIV-5.3 REROVE) 3 ADDED S INCA SITLE 10/12/07 D TOR#.'NOHqIl TO8#2{E" R UPOI"7E 1922/G I TI UI I 5. Al LS, I'F -6 .67'.. 2 J ..... L7.sI-[ ATTAeJ-wIUIMT 14r 14-2, 2ICkI.1ACH s 2 R.5%9~.l 5-91 R1C.0.,* I 91-a f121190.WZI W97 D-IC*d5,oa 532 zw4693 S-79 K.*7$47 95 s-41 v5a1.0Q.491. 5,.9 211C5.t.29 5437 Imi9Se..n7am 124. FPt?90.b24.?23O 91.35 Tomad59b,0927 M4-96 E~o.WM2X.n23g 6.9' TO9C..0E95 S-33 E.osBW..423*1,1 5-53 L*T93,27 low 9.91 9,.307BR.30 5.10 T9l"I40 oalo M-99 .4 s-28 .0 1AIVA-qN un .5ka r4C.c~ %l,, Vn.0w& -ur *'r- -"56 .15,,5..-. A,4..,r 15.991. 9.917 291.09 99~I0~..K"-A FP F.5o0I4.,,P.9I F- P- -s9, 1525TA5 5 9.ý. 9.5-1 R CCAI' R-.. F- C.,,4 950- P-1 FS F- F14 l PAYM1573 C- t.5CI C955 T~viC .T..,,,Cs1.... F, .5 -,,.AD 99920 93909994)191437 IW l '1190 flSA-11 wfwas9~2l I NI v I 2C9WT9094 DATE FW By FIRE PROTEC(iON SYSTEM ISAR(H H rALIOR FACILITY uNIV ERITY OF MISS"UI 50.0 &'25... m T OFN Th.ca Pf-I 6OF 13 ATTACHMENT 15 I Wet Fire Suppression .~ na .WA, ~ N N N 06-- N ---1-1 L f Murr Drawina No. 22 Facility Air Supply 522 Electrical Dtribution 895 Fan Failure Warning System Schematic 1091 Domestic Cold Water 1125 Schematic Diagram of Laboratory and Containment BuildingsVentilativrý Systcm 2303 Fire Sprinkler System for Room #111 & Seal Trench Are -Historical Reference 2439 Fire Line Loop at the Research Reactor 2522 MURR Print Legend, Systems, and Abbreviations 2641 Emergency Pool Fill DRAFT* ..N.....IUN.n.mN.N.AN~sN.flN.N.fld Sprinkler Head Information Sprinkler Temp. Maximum Ambient Location # Heads Class. lon. Ratinm(FusinaPt Ceitin TemD.Bulb Color Rm. 231E 3 High CT Base. & Tunnel 12 High Rm. 2311) 1 Intenned.Loading Dock 2 Inermoed.Remaing Areas N/A Oridintay 296 Deg F 286 Deg F 200 Deg F 200 Deg F 155 DegF 225 Deg F 225 Deg F 150 DegF 150 Deg F 100 Deg F Blue Blue Green Green Red_______LLLI'T I' I E~E1I Heat Dete Location Oumnitv Non. Rs~a le<Ahlam Pt ter Informuation __________I Pre-Action ire u iress j x~~ x x* x ' I-hNSN2.NLNNflZSUNNt x x --x Freight Elev Shaft I Ran 101 1 Rut lHlA I Rm lI2A I 112 Corridor I Rm 114 2 Rm 119 Rm231A I Rm 231D I Rm231E I Rm 299 135 Ds F 135 DegF 135 Deg F 135 Deg F 135 Deg F 200 DegF 135 Dzg F 135 Deg F 135 D-g F 135 Dag F 135 Deg F Location Rm 299B Rm 302A Rm 305 Rm 307 Ran 308 Rut 407 Rra 408 Rm 409 RPu 505 Rm 507 Rm 509 Rm 2009 Ran 2009A Quanity Non. Rating (Alaum Pt 135 Deg F 135 DegF 135 Deg F 135 DegF 135 DegF 135 Deg F I r,* 1, 135 Deg F 135 DegF 135 Deg F 135 Deg F 160 Deg F 160 Deg F x x x N INI N x x X X X N x XN N X I N I-711/2M1I JKA SOPaN-w: I IN/INOAlt aTILE: FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM Assoc. Dwp. A ,sI nfo. (System Actku)RESEARCH REACTOR FACILITY UNIVERITY OF MISSOURI DRAFT 4 NJp&~ bN.d.fl~~*.a5~Ns.d 102a'2N15.RL J_____ 4 IM"%,I3 mr MOVEDJDAT BAD MCcCRAENL I.ChWho ftw14 i 2 ft0i stysil I voN_____ 4 .4.-70OF:13 REV. I DESC'RtPTION DATE IDR. BY r3ANG N0 o" REV. I DESCRIPTION DATE I ULBY 7 Of 13 ATTACHMENT 15 S"AC .9 l fbi Ak C~. V.a.FCAP -ft*C WIbM.PI RCW -&WMC." M-.. P I 4ý .1 PSto-DRAFT NMSAT . ATTACHMENT 15 DRAFT DRAFT MAC N" PýC Pr.AP f ý b W S... oSm Twc.C .Th...d Cw.I". -p -.p .ps P-S CT Cdsft T-C.. C*w..PMD.. DIVDbC K2TA~ SOeIALIUA.NC '" ARM5I I 15A ITm'-= PROTE CTK*4 SYSTm DETECh1ON & CONTROL -SAB PANEL 9O3E ,AI'PJIM Jl ! ! I I W IVI g V A,, 0-301) PS Fp-120 PENTHOUSE ROOM 3000 F , .3 0 0 (3 5 )WA 0 1ID- W-010 9UOM -C PW[M1401 78-J-Lobby Rm. 210 (12)-V~t It (1)-Vo, Rn V2108 (1)Doo 100PMD(7)FP-28MG-C,,-W C2000 (11)-Corio C2001 (6)-Cclor C2002 (9)-R- 200 (1)-w 2002 (2)-ft 2003 (1)-Nm 2004 (2)-Rft 20o *()-R.,. 2006 (2)--207 (4)2meA, (1)-Ibn. 2009At(11)-ft.. 201MI (2)--f. 20000-I (1)-fto, 200 (6)ern. 2047 (1)V.. 2047A (3)6..2D010 (4)-M.. C2041 (6)-.. am1 (S)-1-. 2012 (2)--. 2014 (4)--. 2014A (4)-1.. 2014 (4)-.. 2M5 (43)--Im. 201 (I)-R.. 20M7 (2)-Ra. 2018 (2)-R- 2019 (I)-Aft 2020 (1)-.. 2021 (1)1-- 2044 (5)-,. 20430 (l)-204M (1)-.. 2045A (3)-N.. 2045 (2)200B (2)-6.. 2M0 (4)-1M. 2041 (22)-A- 2. (1)-irn. 20o (1)-R. 2034 (1)-f 2033 (t)-Am 2D22 ()--r 203 (1)-*- 2m21(1)-Ru.. 2m29(1)-IbN. 2026 (1)-N.. 2027 (1)--2026 (1)-Ibrý 2025%,)-6.. 2024 (1)am.VI)z 0 w a-i 0j~-P- 2M22(I)-ft, 200 (1)9604d NOA POWAICYPO FM=F NOA 070M _ _ __ _moac lTa EA'I T EXTEPINAIL MAN ON__SOM WAL OF MOW TV==DRAFT#v-0847 FRMFROP SEE L MR0,FIRE PAVI9f¶)RO~dOM 2015~ ~LEGEND 01.060 VALVE ">J ONMALJLY 0.0000 VAL% NE IW 'i GAlEVALVE LOOCXD CMh VAVED&ALLt~t VALVE 101 LOKE CLSE VL* PESRE w0 DRAIN KnO.0 VALVE 1'0,14A FLOWRU SMW -PIPE ILwI -J3 Ply PM 9T 600410 VALVE SWV- &WANl VALIIE CONTROL. VAL.VE I:1 SOLENOID 001(109. VALVE t1 H000 CONNECTDI-ON 0I OF WW W NIAGS WARER &MERR () ACcFLOW PREVENlCR (3 9.11 m>j.02 04 l0)Ipm6 PC1 0 001044 IS2UANCE 0 AJ236 1090 i'o 1 0.,l DESCRIPTIO 1 -A mýr d- M*r 1 flt, I~~I ii To Atmospher--I Fromi Ak j Ccnsremor = .Moin Uo Atm~w FP-88 Detoll GLOBE VALVE CHECK VALVE GATE VALVEC BALL VALC BUTTERFLY VALVE 101 ro.i LEGEND NORMALLY CLOSED VALVE PRESSI REGUATAOR W/ WINERNAL SENSIN NORMALLY OPEN VALVED-LOCKED WPEN VALEM.W RESRECG TAD SNT A f~ FLOW SWITCHII DIAPHRAGM CONTROL VALWfSRW A -SO(DCW~ O~l~. VLPIPFE PLUJG -SOLEOID ONTRL VAW "MCONNECTION -0 FITRrnE STRAINER I7 CUP DRAIN FP FIRE PROTECTION EPF EMCERGENCY POOL FILL Ply POST INDICATOR VALVE WV -WATER VALIX (0) f OF S'WRIMAE HEADS ANGLE VALVE CONTROL VALVE TO AIMOSPHERE am s cucr VM. -o V)z 0 ii 0i~NET FIRE SUPPRESSION. MOMJ NOA WET mW 5LIPPRESSION. mu MURI PROWC1IO4 POIOB PACE 10 1-7ý-FRM D IE FRE4#FRSS C z Ld ck: LU c: 0 U)CL.0~0 z 1090 ow, 11,s3 0 1 I nor I in ftI I DA11E I DR BY I I AtiAuimLNI i %tv SARB-I ------------- -I FP-JS-130-0-200 P" FP-225 T-=-10 0 FP-16\ FP-FP-1 ff-A WMJOVSAP 1-SAM (12)In"W.L.z 0 0-i 0N'I FPP 08 10 SAMB DWW01 EX1E3MA DRAWE0 SotM WALL 0 SAMS sm0---------- I., 1DrA:F mm OE LO W. W Dw 02431PA LEGEND CLOSE VALVE D>< WMALLY CED VALVE*. PLm EU7AM __COCM VALK fZ:j MOMALLY MEN2 VALVE [1 GAIE VALVE tCK LOOMCNN VALVE Do', BALL VALVE 101I LOMb UCLC VALVE "L u M=M SM mpDAW SU11ElY VALVE r-oj uVDLW SUC ,.P -N ROE ANGLE VALVE ISAWIAO CAPUO VAWPP-PuP3X DIAPAGMCONTNX ALKEM -AODROCY PM0 FIL PIPE PLUGO -j3 PI POS M I CAIOR VALVE Wa WA"E VA~LK CMIfRX VALVE SOL.040 CONIRO VA.rLVE HOS OFACII 0 W- O' RLERW IAA WATER PAElO BACIIPLW PREWWU C7)1-11 0.uL)I-0 U), L ORISNAL HM 7/16/ 1 JAAýN. arel"TIMI DANE I DR. RYI 1090 12.13 ATTACHMENT 15 Loop Address LIMI LIM2 LIM3 LIM4 LIS1 L152 L2S3 LI4 LIS5 LIS6 LIS7 L158 LIS9 LISIO LIS11 L1S12 L1S13 Alphanumeric Display ExitBOBC299U ExitsOeRm199 BOSM399TAirHandier ExitBOBC299T BOBRmI99S1 BOBRm199S2 BOBRm199S3 BOBRm199S4 BOBRm199S5 8OB~m199S6 8OBRm199S7 BOBRrn199S8 BOBRmI9959 B0BM399SIO BO8M399S11 BOBM399S12 BOBM399TRetumAir Serves Ci99U Exit Rm 199 Exit AIr lMandler-AHU-2 C299T Exit Rnsl99 RM1l99 RM199 RmI99 RM199 RmlS9 RnIl99 NMI"9 RmIl99 M299V M2991 M299U AHU-2 Device Pull Station Pull Station Relay (Cutoff)Pull Station Photo Sensor Photo Sensor Photo Sensor Photo Sensor Photo Sensor Photo Sensor Photo Sensor Photo Sensor Photo Sensor Photo Sensor Photo Sensor Photo Sensor Duct Sensor 6pAC~r P*AmL(-Location C299U Rm 199 M399T C299T Rm 199 (South, East)Rm 199 (Center, East)Rm 199 (North, East)Rm 199 (North, Center)Rm 199 (Center, Center)Rm 199 (South, Center)Rm 199 (South, West)Rm 199 (Center, West)Rm 199 (North, West)M399V 399U (South)399U (North)M399T DRAFT 5FcAP. NW.16- -"-a.,-O-W -..*V. W-V w FS FI- .0.k w. -r..,*onk. -P.Ownh-9M AW- b-l522T 1 -a. S-MEPROTECnO0N SYSTrEM DETECTMO & CONTROL -SAMB PANEL RMAM-UK IAUUM'I UNIE. IT_ OF. ~ ........... OKKKA W-W &1ý K MWRY.L ..........

• MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM AP-RO-1 15 Revision 8 FOR: I) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 04-03; Addendum 2 WAF b Modification Title: Liquid Radioactive Waste in MIB Eastward Expansion 4umber: 14-7646 By Paue No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Procedure, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Required Yes No_[ _ _E Ri Date Completed ft7 ?/7ia (6B91V/2fA' ~hIDAWW By (Initials) 3 L5 50.59 Screen Completed: 'Asst. Reactor Manager -Engineering) Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review: ( eact Manag )Modification Approved: I A ý7-(Reacr Manager)Modification Completed: " Date: q-0.- I Date: G 14 Date: c- -j4-I Date: 1'c" " Date:/(RWeactor Manager)Modification Closed: (Reactor Manager)I ORIGINAL!Attachment 8.1 AT-&."KWC6 AP-RO-1 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 04-03; Addendum: REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION Item No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review Operating Procedures Updated Preventive Maintenance Procedures Updated Compliance Procedures Updated MURR Prints Updated Spare Parts System Updated Required Yes No-L, -Date-Completed Documented by (Initials) Iv,_____ / ~g(e6,t'4_____ 'LI _________~1~~_______ ____ J~1iLL5L la Attachment

8.1 ORTI4thILN

T 16 AP-RO-1 15 04-0; Adendm 'Revision 8 Modification Number: 04-03; Addendum: MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)This Modification Record documents the changes required to extend facility Liquid Radioactive Waste (LRW) system to the Eastward expansion of the MURR Industrial Building (MIB).BACKGROUND Modification Record 04-03; "Liquid Radioactive Waste Modification" upgraded the original system of gravity drains and below grade retention system with an above ground drain header and retention system.Modification Record 04-03; Addendum 1 "Liquid Radioactive Waste System in MURR Industrial Building" incorporated the MIB LRW system into the facility LRW system.EXISTING FACILITY SYSTEM All drains for potentially contaminated liquids are delivered to a LRW retention system in the below grade area of the reactor building. The liquid waste retention system consists of three tanks of approximately 5000 gallons capacity each, and one tank of approximately 550 gallons, transfer pumps, filter banks, and associated piping and valves. In addition the MIB houses three additional 150 gallon tanks which also may be used to hold LRW. Liquid waste is retained or chemically treated until an assay indicates activity levels are less than the limits for disposal specified in 10 CFR 20 and then is released into the sanitary sewerage. In addition to having activity levels measured, all liquid waste is circulated through a filter bank to ensure no suspended solids of visible size are present prior to release.continued on Page 2a Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page I, with justification) The Short Form of the Modification Record is appropriate because this is an Addendum to a previously reviewed and approved Modification Record (Reason No. 1), and is a modification to a non-safety system that requires documentation and review only (Reason No. 4).2 Attachment 8.1 AP-RO-I 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 04-03; Addendum 2 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (cont.)SCOPE OF WORK This modification will require two lift stations and an elevator sump to be installed in order to service the MIB Eastward Expansion drain needs. The eyewash station and sink located in corridor C229U will be connected to a lift station (small retention tank and discharge pump) which will discharge to the larger duplex lift station located in the MIB eastward expansion basement (Room 199). The basement duplex lift station will also receive condensate water from the air handling units and cooling coils and the Room 299V sink. The elevator sump pump will discharge directly to the MIB eastward expansion LRW header. The loads and discharge piping arrangement for these lift stations are illustrated on the attached schematic (Page 2b).The electrical work associated with the installation of the lift station and sink are included in the electrical analysis and documentation of Modification Record 14-02; Addendum 1.2a Attachment 8.1 MIS MIS EXPANSION! TO LASB _ TO BUILDING N LIOUIO--I WASTEXNO NN TANK EXPANSION Cr cWT-134 VWT-131 WT-128 OR-N TO MIS TA14KS WTA27 MF I EXPANSION E.EVAfOR PIT MIS EXPANSION AHU CONDENSATE MIS EXANSION MIS EXPANSION HALL. SINK WT.124 Wr12 STATION MIS EXPANSION HALL EYE WASH MIS EXPANSION LIFT STATION MIS EXPANSION OC LAS SINK MIS SOUTH EAST AMU CONDENSATE WT.128 WT-125 MIS EXPANSION COOLING COILS CONDENSATE t)M&MhV16 AP-RO-1 15 Modification Number: 04-03; Addendum: Revision 8 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report? -, krp5 Yes: lporti Signature: Date: QA/5f2am If YES, make an analysis below and pro ide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.No, this change does not involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report.The Liquid Radioactive Waste System is only described or discussed in the Original Hazards Summary Report Section 7.3.3, Liquid Waste Disposal. No changes to the HSR are required.All other Sections and Figures of the HSR and its addenda are correct and will remain the same.3 Attachment

8.1 AJ54f

Offl 6 AP-RO-I 15 Revision 8 04-03; Addendum: Modification Number: REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Yr I No 1:1 L Yes: V"No:" Signature: _______ __--_Date: 7/1204 If YES, the change must be performed usi 4 g a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or an unreviewed question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.A 50.59 Screen (14-32) is attached to show that the proposed activity may be implemented without further evaluation or license amendment. 4 Attachment 8.1 A II--A 0 RAr IEk I -T A P%/MI I /..ifl-IVIlI-..llI It.)AP-RR-003 Revision 9 50.59 SCREEN Number: 14-32 © © [V Page 1 of 2 Title: Lud Ririn tive Wate in MR EaStwbad Epan@sion L.-r Description of Activity (ithat is being changed and wih))': Fxpandinq I iquid Radinartive Wnste drain inio in. iviiL Fa!Tward FEpxnion via twn lift stations nnd an 'Pl&vytnr pump Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safe facility (i.e., I Z I MURR) operations? YES NO If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: II1 D I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designfiJnction YES NO described in the HSR?2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR D described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested? YES NO 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology III that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses? YES NO 4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is D utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or YES NO is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? D YES NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicahle annroved faoility procedure(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is no.t required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. 1 NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use Page 2 of this form to document your statements. Print Name Sign Name Date Preparer: John Kroeckel -.,,4 Reviewer: Mark Corbett '/(-Reactor Manaoer: John Fruits Submit copy of screen to I-ISR / SAR f ile_,circle cncr)? -- I. No Attachlment

9. 1 A-rrAf"%UftACIK1rT II.E1tEE I li AP-RR-003 Revision 9 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Number: 14-32 Page 2 of 2 Title: Liquid Radioactive Waste in MIB Eastward Expansion If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination:

[ Use and attach additional pages as necessary. ]I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designfienction described in the HSR?No. this activity will not involve i chanoe to q SSC ,that adversely affects the desion function ripcrihPri in thp ROMR Thiq i-, nn 4znqn-ion of n lim jiri rqrdiorc.tive wnqtp s-vistpm n~oni in nlnrin 2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to aprocedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design ft ctions are performed, controlled, or tested?No, 'the waste tank system procedure changes are for operator instruction only. This activity will not chanae a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC desian functions are Derformed. controlled, or tested.3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an I-SR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?No this, rctiyity will not Pentnil rpevi.sing or rpplacing HR4R rdp..;rihe.d evaluation m.tholdologip.s that qre Isp.d in P.Pthlishin the dp..ign hase.s The waste tank V.-tpm has no impact on the. safpty annlyVsis nr aesign has.e-4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, wh'ere an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. there are no tests or experiments involved with the expansion of the waste tank system.List the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]tP-D-If-7A1 n:nnc 11-1c W~q I int ri\N Wnto nfiennci catfinrn 7 'A 'A nmno 7.99 KAI I1P1 Arcft nrit-i#523 page 3 of 3 WT Filtpr Replacermpent. SMP-RO-1 1 and AppPndice.s Modification RPcord 04-03 Ariddendhlm 2 WP#14-7R4R MIR lift Station Atlachnient 9.1 AP-RO-I 15 Modification Number: 04-03; Addendum: Revision 8 OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?Yes: V. No: __ Signature: j, Date: 0,/27/26-L/ If YES, provide the suggested revision(s). OPERATING PROCEDURES: OP-RO-741 Waste Tank System Operation -Revise per attached draft PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES: Pumps and motors require no routine maintenance COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification PRINTS: MURR Print No. 523; Sheet 3 of 3 Revised sheet depicts MIB drain header system per attached draft 5 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 MURR OPERATING PROCEDURE OP-RO-741 WASTE TANK SYSTEM OPERATION MASTER COPY ISSUED FEB 1 9 2014 RESPONSIBLE GROUP: Reactor Operations PROCEDURE OWNER: APPROVED BY: Mark Corbett John Fruit~soký Date IS-I- 7 , This procedure contains the following: Pages Attachments Tables Figures Appendices Check-Off Lists 1 None None None None through through through through through through 16 5 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-74 1 Revision 15 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1.0 P U R P O S E ............................................................................................................................ 3 2 .0 S C O P E ................................................................................................................................. 3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ........................................................................ 3 4.0 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS ........................................................ 3 5.0 P R O C E D U R E ...................................................................................................................... 4 5.1 DRAINING WASTE TANK #3 TO WASTE TANK #2 ................................... 4 5.2 RECIRCULATING WASTE TANK #2 ............................................................ 6 5.3 SAMPLING WASTE TANK #2 ....................................................................... 7 5.4 PUMPING WASTE TANK #2 TO SANITARY SEWER ................................. 8 5.5 PUMPING WASTE TANK #2 TO WASTE TANK #3 ................................... 10 5.6 DUMPING WASTE TANK #3 SLUDGE ........................................................ 11 5.7 RINSING WASTE TANK #2 ......................................................................... 12 5.8 FILLING WASTE TANK #2 WITH DOMESTIC COLD WATER ............... 13 5.9 SWITCHING MURR INDUSTRIAL BUILDING (MIB) DUPLEX LIFT STATION DISCHARGE TO MIB WASTE TANKS OR WASTE TANK #4 ..................................................................................... 13 5.10 TRANSFERRING WASTE TANK 299-1, 2 OR 3 TO WASTE TANK #4 ........ 14 6.0 R E F E R E N C E S .................................................................................................................. 15 7 .0 R E C O R D S ......................................................................................................................... 15 8.0 A T T A C H M EN T S .............................................................................................................. 16 2 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 WASTE TANK SYSTEM OPERATION 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 Instructions for using the Waste Tank (WT) System.2.0 SCOPE 2.1 Procedural steps and precautions required to operate and sample the WT System.3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

3.1 Unless

otherwise directed by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO), a WT must have a level greater than 160 cm before sampling for Health Physics analysis.3.2 A pH of 5.5 to 9.5 is required to pump a WT to the sanitary sewer.3.3' The total activity of H-3 shall be less than 10 mCi and all other activities shall be less than 2 mCi before pumping the WT to the sanitary sewer system. The Reactor Manager may authorize discharge to the sanitary sewer system if these limits are exceeded.3.4 The normal method of receiving and processing wastewater is: 3.4.1 Pumping wastewater from WT #4 to WT #3.3.4.2 Holding wastewater in WT #3 for as long as possible to allow for the settling of solids.3.4.3 Draining WT #3 wastewater to WT #2 through the standpipe for filtering and sampling.3.4.4 Pumping wastewater from WT #2 to the sanitary sewer.4.0 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS

4.1 Sanitary

Sewer Discharge Valves WD- I and WD-2 are closed.4.2 Obtain LSRO permission prior to performing all Waste Tank System evolutions. 4.3 IF sampling a WT, THEN the WT must have recirculated through 0.5 micron filters for greater than twelve (12) hours.3 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 4.0 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS (CONT.)4.4 IF pumping a WT to the sanitary sewer, THEN: Obtain discharge approvals from the LSRO, Reactor Manager, and Health Physics as required on Reactor Health Physics "Waste Tank Sample Analysis" spreadsheet (Record 7.3).4.5 IF dumping WT #3 sludge, THEN: " A Radiation Work Permit (RWP) has been obtained." All Laboratory Hot Sink valves are closed and "Do Not Use" signs are posted over the Laboratory Hot Sinks.* WT #4 pump breakers have been opened and tagged out (Reference 6.3).5.0 PROCEDURE 5.1 DRAINING WASTE TANK #3 TO WASTE TANK #2: NOTE: WT #3 is used as a holdup tank. To minimize mixing due to influent turbulence, draining from WT #3 to WT #2 should be performed at night when the volume of wastewater being pumped from WT #4 to WT #3 is at a minimum.5.1.1 ENSURE WT #4 level is less than 50 cm. IF not, THEN manually pump WT #4 to less than 50 cm.5.1.2 ENSURE WT System is in proper operational line-up (Attachment 8.1).5.1.3 VERIFY sufficient volume in WT #2 to accept drained volume from WT #3 (References 6.5 and 6.6).5.1.3.1 IF insufficient volume in WT #2, THEN MONITOR WT #2 level during transfer to prevent overflow.4 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 5.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)5.1.4 OPEN WT Pump Bypass Valve WT-65.5.1.5 OPEN WT Filter Bank #2 Inlet Valve WT-62.5.1.6 OPEN WT Filter Bank #2 Outlet Valve WT-63.5.1.7 OPEN WT #2 Inlet/Recirculation Valve WT-24.5.1.8 CHECK OPEN Demin Recirc Isolation Valve WT#12.5.1.9 OPEN WT #3 Standpipe Valve WT-3A.5.1 .10 RECORD "Draining WT #3 to WT #2" in Console Log Book.5.1.11 IF draining WT #3 to WT #2 has slowed, THEN* CLOSE WT-65," OPEN DCW Isolation to WT System WT-38,* Wait three or four seconds,* CLOSE WT-38 and* OPEN WT-65.5.1.12 WHEN draining WT #3 to WT #2 is complete, THEN* CLOSE WT-3A," CLOSE WT-24," CLOSE WT-63,* CLOSE WT-62 and" CLOSE WT-65.5.1. 13 RECORD "Secured Draining WT #3 to WT #2" in Console Log Book.5 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 5.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)5,2 RECIRCULATING WASTE TANK #2: 5.2.1 ENSURE WT System is in proper operational line-up (Attachment 8.1).5.2.2 OPEN WT #2 Drain Valve WT-2B.5.2.3 OPEN WP-2 Inlet Valve WT-7.5.2.4 OPEN WP-2 Outlet Valve WT-8.5.2.5 OPEN Filter Bank #1 Inlet Valve WT-16.5.2.6 OPEN Filter Bank #1 Outlet Valve WT-18.5.2.7 CHECK OPEN Demin Recirc Isolation Valve WT #12.5.2.8 OPEN WT #2 Inlet/Recirculation Valve WT-24.NOTE: WT #2 should not be air sparged during recirculation. NOTE: WP-2 is controlled by a paddle flow switch driven hold-in circuit that shuts the pump off when flow is lost.NOT]5.2.9 E: The pump used for all filtering and water transfer operations is WP-2 (50 gpm). WP-2 is selected using the two-way safety switch.START WP-2 as follows: 5.2.9.1 ENSURE WP-2 is selected.5.2.9.2 Depress AND hold "Start" button AND VERIFY flow through Bull's-Eye Flow Indicator. 5.2.9.3 WHEN pump flow and filter differential pressure increase, THEN release "Start" button.RECORD "Recirculating WT #2" in Console Log Book.Recirculate for greater than 12 hours..1 5.2.10 5.2.11 6 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 5.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)5.2.12 IF WT #2 will not be sampled, THEN perform Step 5.3.10, AND THEN 5.2.12.1 RECORD "Secured WT #2 Recirculation" in Console Log Book (Record 7.1).5.3 SAMPLING WASTE TANK #2: 5.3.1 ENSURE WT #2 has been recirculated for at least twelve (12) hours.5.3.2 IF WT #2 is not recirculating THEN perform Step 5.2.1 through Step 5.2. 10.NOTE: A WT Sample requires:* One 500 ml poly bottle and cap* One 120 ml sample cup and cap e Waste Tank Sample Report sheet NOTE: If suspended or dissolved solids can be seen in the sample, additional recirculation may be necessary. The determination to continue recirculating will be made by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator.5.3.3 ENSURE sample bottles are new or clean.5.3.4 OPEN and CLOSE WT System Sample Line Valve WT-22 as necessary to fill sample bottles.5.3.5 Fill 500 ml poly-bottle.

5.3.6 Empty

bottle to floor drain.5.3.7 Fill 500 ml poly bottle to top AND cap tightly.5.3.8 Fill 120 ml sample cup to top AND cap tightly.5.3.9 VERIFY Valve WT-22 is CLOSED.7 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 5.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)5.3. 10 Depress pump "Stop" button, AND THEN" CLOSE WT #2 Drain Valve WT-2B,* CLOSE WT #2 Inlet/Recirculation Valve WT-24," CLOSE Filter Bank #1 Outlet Valve WT-18," CLOSE Filter Bank #1 Inlet Valve WT-16," CLOSE WP-2 Outlet Valve WT-8 and* CLOSE WP-2 Inlet Valve WT-7.5.3.11 Complete applicable sections of FM-20, "Waste Tank Sample Report" (Attachment 8.2) (Record 7.2).5.3.12 Deliver WT samples AND FM-20, "Waste Tank Sample Report," (Attachment 8.2) to Reactor Chemistry Laboratory. 5.3.13 Notify Health Physics Group WT sample has been obtained.5.3.14 RECORD "Sampled/Secured Recirculating WT #2" in Console Log Book (Record 7.1 ).5.4 PUMPING WASTE TANK #2 TO SANITARY SEWER: 5.4.1 ENSURE Reactor Health Physics "Waste Tank Sample Analysis" spreadsheet (Record 7.3) has been completed and approved.5.4.2 ENSURE WT System is in proper operational line-up (Attachment 8.1).5.4.3 ENSURE WT #4 Disch Isolation Valve to San Sewer Valve WT-68 and WT-47 are closed.5.4.4 OPEN WT #2 Drain Valve WT-2B.5.4.5 OPEN WP-2 Inlet Valve WT-7.5.4.6 OPEN WP-2 Outlet Valve WT-8.5.4.7 OPEN Filter Bank #1 Inlet Valve WT-16.5.4.8 OPEN Filter Bank #1 Outlet Valve WT-18.5.4.9 OPEN Sanitary Sewer Discharge Valve WD- 1.8 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-74 1 Revision 15 5.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)5.4.10 OPEN Sanitary Sewer Discharge Valve WD-2.5.4.11 START WP-2 by: 5.4.11.1 ENSURE WP-2 is selected.5.4.11.2 Depress AND hold "Start" button AND VERIFY flow through Bull's-Eye Flow Indicator. 5.4.11.3 WHEN pump flow and filter differential pressure increase, THEN release "Start" button.5.4.12 RECORD "Pumping WT #2 to the Sanitary Sewer" in Console Log Book (Record 7. 1 ).NOTE: Normally continuous monitoring of the WT pumping process is not necessary. When WT #2 is empty, the pump will stop automatically. 5.4.13 WHEN pumping is completed, THEN* Depress pump "Stop" button,* CLOSE WD-I,* CLOSE WD-2,* CLOSE WT-18,* CLOSE WT-16,* CLOSE WT-8," CLOSE WT-7 and" CLOSE WT-2B.5.4.14 RECORD "Secured Pumping WT #2 to the Sanitary Sewer" in Console Log Book.5.4.15 Forward completed Reactor Health Physics "Waste Tank Sample Analysis" spreadsheet to Reactor Health Physics (Attachment 8.5)(Record 7.3).9 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 5.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)5.5 PUMPING WASTE TANK #2 TO WASTE TANK #3: NOTE: When moving water from one WT to another, the non-standpipe suction line is normally used so that all of the water will be transferred. The standpipe suction valve should only be used if the tank will be used as a sludge holdup tank.5.5.1 ENSURE WT System is in proper shutdown line-up (Attachment 8.1).5.5.2 VERIFY sufficient volume in WT #3 to accept drained volume from WT #2.5.5.2.1 IF insufficient volume in WT #3, THEN MONITOR WT #3 level during transfer to prevent overflow.5.5.3 OPEN WT #2 Drain Valve WT-2B.NOTE: The pump used for all filtering and water transfer operations is WP-2 (50 gpm). WP-2 is selected using the two-way safety switch.5.5.4 OPEN WP-2 Inlet Valve WT-7.5.5.5 OPEN WP-2 Outlet Valve WT-8.5.5.6 OPEN Filter Bank Bypass Valve WT-5.5.5.7 CHECK OPEN WT #12.5.5.8 OPEN WT #3 Inlet/Recirculation Valve WT-27.5.5.9 START WP-2 by: 5.5.9.1 ENSURE WP-2 is selected.5.5.9.2 Depress AND hold "Start" button AND VERIFY flow through Bull's-Eye Flow Indicator. 5.5.9.3 WHEN pump flow and filter differential pressure increase, THEN release "Start" button.10 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 5.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)5.5.10 OPEN WT #2 Air Sparge Valve WT-2C enough to produce a vigorous air sparge without air binding WP-2.5.5.11 RECORD "Pumping WT #2 to WT #3" in Console Log Book (Record 7. 1).NOTE: Normally continuous monitoring of the WT pumping process is not necessary. When WT #2 is empty, the pump will stop automatically. 5.5.12 WHEN pumping is completed, THEN" Depress pump "Stop" button* CLOSE WT-2C," CLOSE WT-27," CLOSE WT-5,* CLOSE WT-8,* CLOSE WT-7 and* CLOSE WT-2B.5.5.13 RECORD "Secured Pumping WT #2 to WT #3" in Console Log Book (Record 7. 1 ).5.6 DUMPING WASTE TANK #3 SLUDGE: NOTE: Three drying troughs are available for use if required.5.6.1 Manually pump WT #4 to less than 15 cm.5.6.2 OPEN and danger tag WP-3A and WP-3B breaker (#10) on LP-26.5.6.3 Position drying troughs under WT #3.5.6.4 Position large flexible dump hose from WT #3 Sludge Dump Isolation Valve WT-3D to first drying trough.11 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 5.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)5.6.5 OPEN WT #3 manhole cover.5.6.6 Connect a garden hose to Domestic Cold Water (DCW) Valve DCW-32 AND place in WT #3 through manhole.5.6.7 OPEN WT-3D AND MONITOR dumping process.5.6.8 OPEN DCW-32 AND wash out WT #3 with garden hose while dumping sludge.5.6.9 WHEN first drying trough is full THEN move dump hose to second drying trough.5.6.10 WHEN second drying trough is full move dump hose to third drying trough.5.6.11 WHEN WT #3 is empty, THEN CLOSE WT-3D.5.6.12 CLOSE DCW-32 AND remove garden hose from WT #3 manhole.5.7 RINSING WASTE TANK #2: NOTE: WT #1 and WT #2 are not normally used as sludge holdup tanks.5.7.1 5.7.2 5.7.3 5.7.4 5.7.5 5.7.6 5.7.7 5.7.8 OPEN WT #2 manhole cover.Connect garden hose to Domestic Cold Water (DCW) Valve DCW-32 AND place in WT #2 through manhole.OPEN DCW-32.Pump WT #2 to WT #3 using Step 5.5, while rinsing down WT #2 inner tank walls.CLOSE DCW-32.DISCONNECT garden hose from DCW-32.CLOSE WT #2 manhole cover.RECORD "Rinsed and Pumped WT #2 to WT #3" in Console Log Book (Record 7.1).12 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-74I Revision 15 5.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)5.8 FILLING WASTE TANK #2 WITH DOMESTIC COLD WATER: 5.8.1 VERIFY WT #3 Standpipe Valve WT-3A is CLOSED.5.8.2 OPEN WT #2 Inlet/Recirculation Valve WT-24.5.8.3 OPEN Filter Bank Bypass Valve WT-5.5.8.4 OPEN WT Pump Bypass Valve WT-65.5.8.5 OPEN DCW Isolation to WT System Valve WT-38.5.8.6 Monitor WT #2 level until the desired level is reached.5.8.7 WHEN filling is completed, THEN" CLOSE WT-38," CLOSE WT-65," CLOSE WT-5 and" CLOSE WT-24.5.9 SWITCHING MURR INDUSTRIAL BUILDING (MIB) DUPLEX LIFT STATION DISCHARGE TO MIB WASTE TANKS OR WASTE TANK #4: 5.9.1 Discharge to MIB Waste Tanks as follows: a) ENSURE MIB Waste Tank System is in proper operating line-up (Attachment 8.1).b) IF pumping to WT 299-1, THEN OPEN Waste Tank 299-1 Inlet Valve WT-100.c) IF pumping to WT 299-2, THEN OPEN Waste Tank 299-2 Inlet Valve WT- 103.d) IF pumping to WT 299-3, THEN OPEN Waste Tank 299-3 Inlet Valve WT-106.e) OPEN Waste Header to MIB Tank Header Isolation Valve WT-1 14.f) CLOSE Waste Header to WT #4 Isolation Valve WT- 116.13 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-74 I Revision 15 5.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)5.9.2 Discharge to Waste Tank #4 as follows: a) ENSURE Waste Header to WT #4 Isolation Valve WT-1 16 is OPEN.b) ENSURE Waste Header to MIB Tank Header Isolation Valve WT- 114 is CLOSED.c) CLOSE Waste Tank 299-1 Inlet Valve WT-100.d) CLOSE Waste Tank 299-2 Inlet Valve WT-103.e) CLOSE Waste Tank 299-3 Inlet Valve WT-106.f) ENSURE MIB Waste Tank System is in proper operating line-up (Attachment

8. 1).5.10 TRANSFERRING WASTE TANK 299-1,2 OR 3 TO WASTE TANK #4: 5.10.1 ENSURE MIB Waste Tank System is in proper operating line-up (Attachment 8.1).5.10.2 OPEN WT 299 System Discharge Isolation Valve WT-! 13.5.10.3 OPEN WP-33 Discharge Valve WT-l I 1.5.10.4 OPEN WP-33 Suction Valve WT-I 10.5.10.5 IF pumping WT 299-1, THEN OPEN Waste Tank 299-1 Outlet Valve WT-102.5.10.6 IF pumping WT 299-2, THEN OPEN Waste Tank 299-2 Outlet Valve WT- 105.5.10.7 IF pumping WT 299-3, THEN OPEN Waste Tank 299-3 Outlet Valve WT-108.NOTE: WP-33 is controlled by a flow switch driven hold-in circuit that shuts the pump off when flow is lost.5.10.8 Depress AND hold "Start" button until flow maintains contacts, THEN release "Start" button.14 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 5.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)5.10.9 WHEN pumping is completed, THEN:* IF pumping WT 299-3, THEN CLOSE Valve WT-108.* IF pumping WT 299-2, THEN CLOSE Valve WT-105." IF pumping WT 299-1, THEN CLOSE Valve WT-102.* CLOSE Valve WT-1 10." CLOSE Valve WT- I 11." CLOSE Valve WT-1 13.

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 MURR Print 523, "Liquid Radioactive Waste Disposal System and Waste Tank Pump Controls" 6.2 RM-RO-400, "Waste Tank System Filter Replacement" 6.3 AP-RO- 100, "Equipment Tag Out" 6.4 MURR Print 1091, "Domestic Cold Water" 6.5 MURR Print 1201, Sheet 2 of 4, "Waste Tank I & 2 Volume vs. Height" 6.6 MURR Print 1201, Sheet 4 of 4, "Waste Tank 3 Volume vs. Height" 6.7 OP-HP-353, "Waste Tank Sample -Analysis" 7.0 RECORDS 7.1 Console Log Book 7.2 FM-20, "Waste Tank Sample Report" 7.3 OP-HP-353, Reactor Health Physics Computer Spreadsheet "Waste Tank Sample Analysis" 15 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 8.0 ATTACHMENTS

8.1 Operational

Waste Tank System Valve Line-Up 8.2 FM-20, "Waste Tank Sample Report" (Obtain "Controlled" copy from MURR Intranet)8.3 MURR Print 1201, Sheets 2 and 4, "Waste Tank I & 2 Volume vs. Height" and"Waste Tank 3 Volume vs. Height" 8.4 MURR Print 2658, Sheet 2, "Waste Tank 4 Volume vs. Height" 8.5 OP-HP-353, Reactor Health Physics Computer Spreadsheet "Waste Tank Sample Analysis" 16 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 Date: OPERATIONAL WASTE TANK SYSTEM VALVE LINE-UP This checksheet will be completed when required by the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO). The operators performing the check will independently verify the position of each valve and indicate the verification by initialing the checksheet. Where appropriate, the positions of throttled valves are shown on a permanent tag secured to the valve. Note the throttled valve's position on the checksheet. Under the direction of the LSRO, a valve may be positioned other than listed on this checksheet. If this is required, the operators must ensure that the valve is in the desired position and indicate this position on this checksheet. If this change of position is not covered by a procedure in use, for example an RTP, SMP, or Work Package, which would return the valve to the normal operating position, then the LSRO will issue and place a Danger Tag on the valve for the duration of time the valve is in the out-of-normal position.LOCATION: WASTE TANK ROOM (Room 112, 112A)VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER WT- I WT# I Drain to WT#2 (Reach Rod) CLOSED WT-1A WT #1 Standpipe CLOSED WT-IB WT #1 Drain CLOSED WT-IC WT #1 Air Supply CLOSED WT- ID WT #I Transfer CLOSED WT-1E WT #1 Top Sightglass Isolation OPEN WT-IF WT #1 Bottom Sightglass Isolation OPEN WT-2A WT #2 Standpipe CLOSED WT-2B WT #2 Drain CLOSED WT-2C WT #2 Air Supply CLOSED WT-2D WT #2 Transfer CLOSED WT-2E WT #2 Top Sightglass Isolation OPEN WT-2F WT #2 Bottom Sightglass Isolation OPEN WT-3A WT #3 Standpipe CLOSED WT-3B WT #3 Drain CLOSED WT-3C WT #3 Air Supply CLOSED I Page I of 6 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 I LOCATION: WASTE TANK ROOM (Room 112, 112A) (Cont.)VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER WT-3D WT #3 Sludge Dump Isolation CLOSED WT-3E WT #3 Top Sightglass Isolation OPEN WT-3F WT #3 Bottom Sightglass Isolation OPEN WT-4 WT #4 Dump CLOSED WT-4A WT #4 Top Sightglass Isolation OPEN WT-4B WT #4 Bottom Sightglass Isolation OPEN WT-5 Filter Bank Bypass CLOSED WT-6 WT #4 Drain CLOSED WT-7 WP-2 Inlet CLOSED WT-8 WP-2 Outlet CLOSED WT-9 Demin Recirc Supply CLOSED WT-10 WP-3A Suction OPEN WT-12 Demin Recirc Isolation OPEN WT-13 WP-3A Discharge OPEN WT-14 WP-3B Suction OPEN WT-16 Filter Bank #1 Inlet CLOSED WT-17 WP-3B Discharge OPEN WT-18 Filter Bank #1 Outlet CLOSED WT-19 WP-3A Recirc CLOSED WT-20 Filter Bank #1 to Filter Bank #2 Inlet CLOSED WT-21 WP-3B Recirc CLOSED WT-22 WT System Sample Line CLOSED WT-23 WT to Pool System Cross Connect CLOSED WT-24 WT #2 Inlet/Recirculation CLOSED WT-25 WT #I Inlet/Recirculation CLOSED WT-26 WT #1 Inlet/Recirculation CLOSED WT-27 WT #3 Inlet/Recirculation CLOSED WT-38 DCW Isolation to WT System CLOSED Page 2 of 6 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

16 OP-RO-74 I Revision 15 LOCATION: WASTE TANK ROOM (Room 112, 112A) (Cont.)VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER WT-41 WT #4 Recirc Isolation CLOSED WT-42 WT #1 to WT #2 Isolation CLOSED WT-44 WT #4 to WT #3 Isolation OPEN WT-45 WT #4 to WT #1 Isolation CLOSED WT--46 WT #4 Filter Recirc CLOSED WT-47 WT #4 Disch Isol Valve to San Sewer CLOSED WT-48 WT #4 Filter Outlet Isolation CLOSED WT-49 Filter Bank #2 Vent CLOSED WT-50 Filter Bank #2 Vent CLOSED WT-51 WT Filters Drain CLOSED WT-52 WT #4 Common Disch Valve to WT #3 OPEN WT-53 WT #4 to WT #1 Isolation CLOSED WT-61 WT Filter Bank #1 Vent CLOSED WT-62 WT Filter Bank #2 Inlet CLOSED WT-63 WT Filter Bank #2 Outlet CLOSED WT-64 WT #4 Filter Inlet Isolation CLOSED WT-65 WT Pump Bypass CLOSED WT-68 WT #4 Disch Isolation Valve to San Sewer CLOSED WT-69 Drain CLOSED WT-85 WT #4 Sample CLOSED WT-87 Room 200/202 Drain Isolation OPEN WT-88 Room 200/202 Alternate Drain Isolation CLOSED WT-89 SW, SE, NE Quad & Containment Drain OPEN Isolation Valve to WT #4 WT-90 SW, SE, NE Quad & Containment Alternate CLOSED Drain Isolation WT-91 NW Quad Drain Isolation Valve to WT #4 OPEN WT-92 NW Quad Alternate Drain Isolation CLOSED WT-97 Alternate Filter Bypass CLOSED Page 3 of 6 Attachment

8. 1 ATTACHMENT 16 OP-RO-74 1 Revision 15 LOCATION:

WASTE TANK ROOM (Room 112, 112A) (Cont.)VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER WD-I Sanitary Sewer Discharge CLOSED WD-2 Sanitary Sewer Discharge CLOSED LOCATION: SOUTHWEST INNER CORRIDOR (Room 278)VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER WT-66 Acid Scrubber Vent CLOSED WT-67 Acid Scrubber Isolation OPEN LOCATION: CONTAINMENT (Room 101)VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER WT-71 WP-22 Isolation OPEN WT-73 WP-23 Isolation OPEN WT-75 WP-15 Isolation OPEN WT-77 WP- 14A Isolation OPEN WT-79 WP-14B Isolation OPEN WT-96 SSP-I Isolation OPEN LOCATION: MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM (Room 114)VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER WT-84 WP-6A Isolation WT-86 WP-7 Isolation WT-94 WP-6B Isolation Page 4 of 6 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 LOCATION: BASEMENT JANITOR CLOSET (Room 109)VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER WT-82 I WP-8 Isolation I OPEN LOCATION: MIB WASTE TANK ROOM (Room 299A)VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER WT- 100 Waste Tank 299-1 Inlet CLOSED WT- 101 Waste Tank 299-1 Cross-connect OPEN WT- 102 Waste Tank 299-I Outlet CLOSED WT- 103 Waste Tank 299-2 Inlet CLOSED WT- 104 Waste Tank 299-2 Cross-connect OPEN WT-105 Waste Tank 299-2 Outlet CLOSED WT- 106 Waste Tank 299-3 Inlet CLOSED WT- 107 Waste Tank 299-3 Cross-connect OPEN WT- 108 Waste Tank 299-3 Outlet CLOSED WT-109 Waste Tank Outlet Header Drain CLOSED WT- 110 WP-33 Suction CLOSED WT-1 I I WP-33 Discharge CLOSED WT- 113 WT 299 System Discharge Isolation CLOSED LOCATION: OVERHEAD CATWALK (Room 299L)VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER WT- 114 Waste Header to MIB Tank Header Isolation CLOSED WT- 115 Waste Header to Sanitary Sewer Isolation CLOSED WT- 116 Waste Header to WT #4 Isolation OPEN Page 5 of 6 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 LOCATION: MIB CLEAN ROOM (299Q)VALVE VALVE DESCRIPTION POSITION PERFORMER VERIFIER WT- 117 Waste Header Inlet OPEN WT-l 18 Pump Discharge Drain CLOSED WT- 119 Duplex Pump I Outlet OPEN WT- 120 Duplex Pump 2 Outlet OPEN WT- 122 Duplex Pump Inlet OPEN Page 6 of 6 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 FM-20 Revision 10 NVASIE TANK SAMPI,E RE;POR'r TANK NO.: TANK V'OLL:ME: (Liwtr)SAMPLER: (Print Name)TIXIEN DI) £rI.NOTE: pIH must be p11 _______________ Visible suspended solidst: ITS .NO Attached it) Procedure: O)P- Ro-7.41 behveen 5.5 mid 9.5 for release.I I Pago I of'l Page 1 of I FM-20 Attachment 8.2 OP-RO-74I Revision 15 I WASTE TANKS 1 & 2 VOLUME VS. HEIGHT CM4 LITERS (0 z w 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 12 33 60 92 128 168 211 258 307 359 413 470 529 590 654 719 786 855 925 998 1072 1147 1224 1302 1382 1463 1545 1629 1714 1800 1887 1976 CH LITERS 33 2066 34 2156 35 2248 36 2340 37 2434 38 2528 39 2624 40 2720 41 2817 42 2915 43 3014 44 .3114 45 3214 46 .3315 47 3417 48 3520 49 3623 50 3727 51 3832 52 3937 53 4043 54 4150 55 4257 56 4363 57 4473 58 4581 59 4691 60 4800 61 4910 62 5021 63 5132 64 5244 LITERS 5355 5468 5580 5693 5807 5920 6034 6148 6263 6378 6493 6608 6723 6839 6955 7071 7187 7304 7420 7537 7653 7770 7887 8004 8121 8238 8355 8472 8589 8706 8823 8940 CM LITERS 97 9057 98 9174 99 9291 100 9407 101 9524 102 9640 103 9756 104 9872 105 9988 106 10104 107 10219 108 10335 109 10450 110 10564 111 10679 112 10793 113 10907 114 11021 115 11134 116 11247 117 11359 118 11471 119 11583 120 11695 121 11806 122 11916 123 12026 124 12136 125 12245 126 12354 127 12462 128 12569 CH LITERS 129 12676 130 12783 131 12889 132 12994 133 13099 134 13202 135 13306 136 13408 137 13510 138 13611 139 13712 140 13811 141 13910 142 14008 143 14105 144 14201 145 14297 146 14391 147 14485 148 14577 149 14668 150 14759 151 14848 152 14937 153 15024 154 15110 155 15194 156 15278 157 15360 158 15441 159 15521 160 15599 CM LITERS 161 15676 162 15751 163 15824 164 15897 165 15967 166 16036 167 16102 168 16167 169 16230 170 16291 171 16350 172 16407 173 16461 174 16513 175 16561 176 16608 177 16650 178 16690 179 16726 180 16757 181 16784 182 16804 182.88 16813 HURR 1201 Sheet 2 of 4 Page I of 2 Attachment 8.3 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 WASTE TANK 3 VOLUME VS. HEIGHT (D z w I 0 C H-LITERS 12 34 63 96 134 176 221 270 322 376 433 493 554 619 685 753 823 896 970 1045 1123 1202 1282 1364 1448 1533 1619 1707 1796 1886 1977 2070 LITERS 2164 2259 2355 2452 2550 2649 2749 2849 2951 3054 3158 3262 3367 3473 3580 3688 3796 3905 4015 4125 4236 4347 4460 4572 4686 4800 4914 5029 5144 5260 5376 5493 LITERS 5610 5728 5846 5964 6083 6202 6321 6441 6561 6681 6802 6923 7044 7165 7286 7408 7530 7651 7773 7896 8018 8140 8263 8385 8508 8630 8753 8876 8998 9121 9243 9366 CH LITERS 97 9488 98 9611 99 9733 100 9855 101 9977 102 10099 103 10221 104 10342 105 10464 106 10585 107 10706 108 10827 109 10947 110 11067 111 11187 112 11307 113 11426 114 11545 115 11664 116 11782 117 11900 118 12018 119 12135 120 12252 121 12368 122 12484 123 12593 124 12714 125 12828 126 12942 127 13055 128 13168 CH LITERS 129 13280 130 13392 131 13502 132 13613 133 13722 134 13831 135 13939 136 14047 137 14154 138 14259 139 14365 140 14469 141 14572 142 14675 143 14777 144 14878 145 14977 146 15076 147 15174 148 15271 149 15367 150 15462 151 15555 152 15648 153 15739 154 15829 155 15918 156 16005 157 16092 158 16176 159 16260 160 16342 CM LITERS 161 16422 162 16501 163 16578 164 16654 165 16727 166 16799 167 16869 168 16937 169 17003 170 17067 171 17129 172 17188 173 17245 174 17299 175 17350 176 17398 177 17443 178 17485 179 17522 180 17555 181 17583 182 17604 182.88 17614 MURR 1201 Sheet 4 of 4 Page 2 of 2 Attachment 8.3 OP-RO-74 1 Revision 15 WASTE TANK 4 VOLUME VS. HEIGHT CM LITERS CM LITERS CM LITERS (0 z w I 17 C)1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 5 10 17 27 37 48 59 71 84 97 112 127 144 161 178 197 215 234 254 274 295 316 337 358 380 402 425 447 470 493 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 516 540 563 587 611 635 659 683 707 732 756 780 805 829 853 878 902 926 950 975 61 1240 62 1264 63 1289 64 1313 65 1338 66 1362 67 1386 68 1410 69 1435 70 1459 71 1483 72 1507 73 1530 74 1554 75 1578 76 1601 77 1624 78 1647 79 1670 80 1692 81 1715 82 1737 83 1758 84 1780 85 1801 86 1822 87 1842 88 1862 89 1882 90 1900 CM LITERS 91 1919 92 1937 93 1954 94 1972 95 1987 96 2003 97 2017 98 2030 99 2043 100 2054 101 2066 102 2076 103 2086 104 2096 105 2102 106 2107 107 2111 999 1023 1047 1071 1095 1119 1143 1167 1191 1216 MURR DWG. #2658 Sheet 2 ot 2 Page I of I Attachment

8.4 ATTACHMENT

16 OP-RO-741 Revision 15 Releases to Sewer. IOCFR20 Appendix B. Table 3 Page 1 of 1 418/2011 Page I of I Attachment

8.5 ATTACHMENT

16 DRAFT OP-RO-741 Revision DRAFT LOCATION: MIB Basement (199)Date:.Valve Description Position Performer Verifier-- -Duplex Pump 1 Outlet OPENV2-, Duplex Pump 2 Outlet OPEN1_q Lift Station Discharge OPEN L " Elevator Sump Outlet OPEN Elevator Sump Discharge CLOSED L-iT- \ Header Drain Elevator Sump Discharge OPEN VT z -Header Isolation LOCATION: OVERHEAD CATWALK (299L)Date: Valve Description Position Performer Verifier MIB -E Waste Header to MIB CLOSED\ Tank Header Isolation MIB -E Waste Header to UJT- c Facility-LiR Header Isolation OPEN IL w DRAFT Attachment 8.1 S IEP -- -----'- -- --- ---------DRAFT M " B HEADER r ~~W'E \,. ..."AN[ ...__ _ _ _ ____ ____ _ -{- __ _ \ _ ' 7 I \',c I NCT O NK.TAN NK.... 11 1 A N I WT-Hl rLOL ISTE WATE WAST DRAAIN NK TANK-TAN 9-1= PA9- 2AS-3 SE HlR B231 VT-ITO~ME VT WLT.V~l---------------C-C~nem~4 NOMALLYCLOSE NORMALY COSEDDRAFT 1S@fNwUT 1 6 AP-RO-1 15 Modification Number: 04-03; Addendum: SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory? Yes: ___ No: V./ Signature: Date: A/I6/-cdL'V If YES, provide a list of the spare parts ll U No spare parts are required to be maintained for this change.6 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

16 SPECIFICATION DATA Vertical Centrifugal Pump Lift Stations*r ot always common in Standard Features ties. Wastech's standard pump lift

• Molded polyethylene tank (16, 32, and 63 solution for transferring chemical gallon tanks available) ty drain is not possible.
• Fabricated polypropylene lid 0 One or two pumps-CPVC pump head on comes in either simplex (one
• Check valve for each pump vo pumps) configuration.

Every

• 2" side mount inlet connection
• w level switch, a level switch for 0 2" top mount vent connection igh-high level switch. There is a 9 4"x6" view window w window on the lid so that an
• Three or four level switches the level in the tank at any given
• NEMA 4X junction box to connect to remote heck valves on the discharge of c panelm nt liquid from flowing back into the control panel s stop. Optional Features tations include a high-high level
• Fabricated polypropylene double containment high level alarm. Adding double tank with optic leak switch leak alarm switch and one of our
• 6' pre-wired flex cable to connect to remoternntrnl nneln nrnoviri-n control panel Gravity drains are n manufacturing facili stations are a great waste when a gravit Each pump lift static pump) or duplex (tw system has a low-lo each pump, and a h 4"x6" clear PVC vie operator can check time. We provide ci the pumps to preve tank once the pump All of our pump lift s switch to activate a containment with a standard pump lift s complete waste tran operator safety.isfer package and maximizes Remote control panel sold separately

© 2008 Wastech Controls & Engineering 80-1001 June 2008 ATTACHMENT 16 Tank Inside Tank Overall Size Motor Dimensions Dimensions Wastech Part Number (gal) HP LxWxH LxWxH Simplex Pump Lift Stations SVPLS-16-003 16 1/3 18"x12"x18" 21"x15"x30" SVPLS-16-005 16 1/2 18"x12"x 18" 21"x15"x30" SVPLS-32-003 32 1/3 24"x18"x18" 27"x21"x30" SVPLS-32-005 32 1/2 24"x18"x18" 27"x21"x30" SVPLS-32-007 32 3/4 24"x18"x18" 27"x21 x30" SVPLS-32-010 32 1 24"x18"x18" 27"x21"x30" SVPLS-63-007 63 3/4 36"x20"x20" 39"x23"x32" SVPLS-63-010 63 1 36"x20'x20" 39"x23"x32" Duplex Pump Lift Stations DVPLS-32-003 32 1/3 24"x18"x18" 27"x21"x30" DVPLS-32-005 32 1/2 24"x 18"x 18" 27"x21"x30" DVPLS-32-007 32 3/4 24N I8"x 18B" 27"x21 "x30" DVPLS-32-010 32 1 24"x 18"x 18" 27"x21"x30" DVPLS-63-007 63 3/4 36"x20"x20" 39"x23"x32" DVPLS-63-010 63 1 36"x20"x20" 39"x23"x32" Pump Lift Station Options -DC (16 gallon) add 1.5"x4"xO.5" S-DC (32?ga!lon)- .add 11.5'x4"xO.5"-DC (63 gallon) add 1.5"x4"xO.5"-FC-DC = Double Containment and includes containment tank and optic leak switch-FC = Flex Connection and includes a 6' pre-wired harness for connection to a remote control panel Power Requirements: 115VAC, single phase, 60Hz Remote control panel required -please visit our website for pricing.Wastech Controls & Engineering, Inc.21201 Itasca Street 9 Chatsworth, CA 91311 USA+1.818.998.3500 Main 9 +1.818.998.4939 Fax http://www.wastechengineering.com e sales@wastechengineering.com Specifications subject to change without notice ATT" I AP-RO-l115 Revision 8 MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM FOR: I) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 14-02 WAF Nun Modification Title: Normal Electrical Distribution in MIB Eastward Expansion nber: 14-1278 Page No.i 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Procedure, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Required Yes No FA El 5r] n 5)(1~Date Completed de/vLal 06r/'.*I vI 4606/W1IL By (Initials) TLs art(50.59 Screen Completed: , /' "(Asst. Reactor Manager -E neering)Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review: -._ ('eactor Mailager)M odification A pproved: -7. .r M a ge f-- -( R 'eator M _anager)Modification Completed: _.(Recto Manager)Modification Closed: 2D Yw (R ctor Manager)Date: (A0t'Z7/f0/Q Date: 4--Date: Date: ." iA-.[Date: 121A4 I DRIGINAL Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

1.?D)R IGINAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 14-02 REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION Item No.I 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review Operating Procedures Updated Preventive Maintenance Procedures Updated Compliance Procedures Updated MURR Prints Updated Spare Parts System Updated Required Yes No_________ ,_____V __Date Comp~leted 0512Wf4 Documented by (Initials)"jt,I a DRIGINAL Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

17 14-02 GINAL Modification Number: AP-RO-! 15 Revision 8 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)This modification record documents the expansion of the Normal Electrical Distribution System for the Eastward expansion to the MURR Industrial Building. The power will be supplied by HVP-3 and the 120/208V Distribution Center 1.In order to provide sufficient electrical capacity for future laboratory construction, the Eastward Expansion of the MURR Industrial Building will house 3 new electrical distribution panels; HVP-3A, LP-46, and HC-1 1 Electrical Power Panel. The new high voltage panel HVP-3A will be supplied from a 200 Amp 3 Phase breaker off of HVP-3. The HC-1 1 Panel and LP-46 panels will be supplied from individual 200 Amp 3 Pole breakers off of 120/208V Distribution Center 1.Load has been analyzed for both the 120/208V Distribution Center 1 and the HVP-3 to ensure that new loads will be within the capacity of the existing panels. Both panels were found to have sufficient capacity to provide the necessary loads, and stay below a 80%overall panel loading.Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page 1, with justification) The short form of the Modification Record is appropriate because this is a modification to a non-safety system that requires documentation and review only (Reason No. 4).2 O~RIGINALj' Attachment

8. I ATTACHMENT 17 -ORIGINAL AP-RO-I 15 Revision 8 Modification Number: 14-02 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: X No: Signature: 0____c_'. _ Date: & A L If YES, make an analysis below and proide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does involve a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda. The Normal Electrical Power System is described or discussed in the following Sections and Figures of the HSR and its addenda: Original HSR None Addendum 1 Figure 3.8.1 (No Change Required)Addendum 3 Section 2.4 Figure 2.3.a Figure 2.3.b Figure 2.3.c Figure 2.3.d Figure 2.3.e Figure 2.4 Figure 2.5 Addendum 5 Section 2.0 Figure 2.1 (MURR Print #522 Sheet 1 of 5)(MURR Print #522 Sheet 2 of 5)(MURR Print #522 Sheet 3 of 5)(MURR Print #522 Sheet 4 of 5)(MURR Print #522 Sheet 5 of 5)(MURR Print #522 Sheet 1 of 5)(No Change)(Change as Attached)(No Change)(No Change)(Change as Attached)(No Change)(No Change)(No Change)(No Change)(Change as Attached)All other Sections and same.Figures of the HSR and its addenda are correct and will remain the-GA 3 ORIGINAL Attachment 8.1 AiLAj1AUMMt:NI I IW-MA~-- ~~ ------ --------------- rStfK ---------- 1545S ss 50OMAM. Sc~fn nSO-b 4-0 A, ------- a IVLKI TO~nf CAST.ef ~s 5------------- s 2 \ S. W O--- -- -- --- -- -- ----05 s*5W ~ SdW ED~ I ____ PI KVWI. DAT Oc C-Q P3 1 1~z:D u-J u-i-J I-7 E--<m 4_I--El HK."Imlv m-CC, 5555 550644 ISIS 55155154 C5 I V~bAaE2.~ UTm. */"t'r ci CL,.C3: (UI~oJ zj Cý I--LJ U L.J 522*F I %R.-M I2 "v~ ow... U~vs ~ 1940 ~v~.vvva A.dfl5P4 S.asvintNýý I ý.A ,vverlvrvv.vvUS 1 tA.,Xft....CA.~,, ow- I ,ýIlllm C& r..a ,.s 10 1$ .~,van- 4 0121 rykx \10 I -1' I --1 1 t I I ~ ~9~i 012012~ ~ 9 U:,wOvECeD~EOOV__[v~v we fl~~0 ~ ~ 922 9,12W Ae.doAas.e, p10~0.$ w-w.., 9 0 9*9r. *1l *.,...9 ALSO nO to&~..r.I 11 -L.L..--. m! I REýN "I I -_________ -I 4 50 -OR el I rl.T I "ý', IESCWTION lo flY L --lb ATTACHMENT 17.R IGINAL AP-RO-I 15 Revision 8 14-02 Modification Number: ....REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Signature: -Yes: No: _X Date: 0 5/27/2.01/I o 'f 7' -If YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or create a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.The MURR Normal Electrical Power System is not discussed in the Technical Specifications. A 50.59 Screen (14-14) is attached to this Modification Record to show that the proposed activity does not involve a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, and may be implemented without further evaluation or license amendment. 4 ORIGINAI. Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

17 IJl LUPY AP-RR-003 Rev'ision 8 50.59 SCREEN Number: 14-14 Io Page 1 of ,'8" Title: Mndific.tinn 14-f1);-.rl a .LFIpntrinrl fI'itrihiifinn 1n MjB, E-,twqrdl Fxncninn Description of Activity (what is being changed and whi): Connect house power electrical connections for the MIB/BOB eastward expansion to the existing MURR Normal Electrical Distribution System.Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safe ficility (i.e., NMURR) operations? D-YES NO If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions:

1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designfitnetion described in the IlSR?2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how H1SR described SSC design functions arc performed, controlled, or tested?3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an 11SR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications?

Yl YES YES D YES Eli YES YES NO NO NO NO NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approved fAcility procedure(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.if Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of,!.c activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question I, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determnination. In addition, list the documents (H-lSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use Page 2 of this form to document your statements. Print Name .Sign Name Date Preparer: /Aric Luebbering ______I '- /7---...ew er: / c/" Reactor Manager: John Fruits .5-Submit copy of screen to IISR / SAR file (circle onij? Yes[coPy Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

17 C1 COPY Revision 8 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)it Number: 14-14 Page 2 of Z e.Title: Modification Record 14-02; Normal Electrical Distribution In MIB Eastward Expansion If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessary. ]1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designfimciion described ill the HSR?No. The connection of these new circuits to the electrical system will not involve changes to an SSC that could adversely affect a design function described in the HSR. The addition and utilization of these new circuits in the MIB Eastward Expansion is within the design function of the electrical distribution system and will not result in any electrical panel loading exceeding the 80% loading requirement.

2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No Thp connentinn of the.se new cirnuits, tn thp elpetrioal will not invnlveny Irocdtre, changes related to HSR described SSC design functionsn These new rirc uilts do affect any SSC design functions-Reactor Emergency Procedures (REPs) related to electrical power loss and the emergency electrical system are unaffected by this change. See Page 3 of 3 for additional information

3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an I-ISR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safet, analyses?No The ronnnetion of th.ep new circuits to the electrical system will not involve any HSR descrrihed

_eyvahation methodology iused for estahlishing design haes nr msed in .safety analys-es. The safety analysiS assumes a total loss nf Plectrical power an additional Inad ti the.system will not changethis m thodnlngy. These,. new circuits are not related tn any dersign hases or safety analyse.* .Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is useo ur controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the MSR?No. The connection of these new circuits to the electrical system will not involve any tests or experiments not described in the HSR. The scope of this Modification Record is only the connection of Normal Electrical Power to the MIB Eastward Expansion. See Page 3 of 3 for additional information. .ocuments (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) revweweu wiacfe relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]HSR Section 7.1.4; HSR Addendum 3, Section 2-4 Technical Specifications 3.10, 4.5. 5.6 REP 9, 10, 11 MURR Print #522 (Sheet 1 of 5 and Sheet 4 of 5).,,, op -/'.7,7[' Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

17 AP-RR-003 Revision 8 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)I)Number: 14-14 Page 3 ot3w Title: Modification Record 14-02; Normal Electrical Distribution In MIB Eastward Expansion Additional notes referenced in Page 2 of 3" It should be noted that the drawings included from MU Campus Facilities include work that is beyond the scope of this Modification Record, and may or may not be implemented in the future. Any work beyond the scope of Work Authorization Form 14-1278 contained in Modification Record 14-02 shall be the subject of additional and completely separate review as per MURR Administrative Procedure AP-RR-003 "10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations". o This specific Work Authorization Form and Modification Record are to provide only"Normal Electrical Power" for the shell space of this expansion project. Future proposed work involving "Emergency Electrical Power" (as referenced above) shall be covered under separate Work Authorization Forms and 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation at such time as required if implemented.

• Future modifications beyond those mentioned above (if any) and utilization of this space in the future is not covered nor evaluated under the scope of 50.59 Screen Number 14-14, and will be evaluated separately.

C I I':i .. I I ATTACHMENT 17 1- \I1-.3 3 ,-p- 1s4 VS 20! I Er/i, Pone[ PI':IICN.lh,:i (ap~cily tcic Ificoiker (.apaditN P-VI. I 12 00 Amp I 148 W) 1\0VA Secr'icd Eioranctc 1200 Amps I 9964 SO VA*Jate 1W'I. mo d (V,,Total Measured Proposed (;, o1 tkerCll or III Load (VA) ..J Load (VA\) I~ r e Caa It 5/6/2014 516/2014 Stlirlimi1 14-1278 111614 178304 111614 11%178304 18%Total Connected Load, see proposed panelboard valueC.Total Measured Load, see current pan.lboard valiues.Proposed Demand Load = Most recent Total Measured Load + the change in the Total Connected Load.% of lPanelboard or Breaker Capacity is the Proposed Demand Load divided by the smaller of the pianelboard or Breaker capacity.5/6/2014 14-1278 Added Panelboard H1VI-3A and LP-46 (11013 Expansion) Electrical l.o~ad Summnary': The proposed of non-.licrue.ncy elec.rical lIods lssocialed \vil1 \he .A :F.1-12781 modification are within the so% loadime r.eluirl.'me.nt Im t11V ele i',ic supply plcr e',ipuiIl" ItIII in 'VolvCd. "IhC i[I1)pl,.1eIICntItlIioI.I oIf this l,.,rIk, ., ,, ... .: :1 .c:,,,.; ." l..',c'iric:d ill ,ls1m.'.miol

alid w.ill not

dxv rsel', :mI'e IlIl ,lclrical di-tl il',utiomm ssmm.m.I\I lg,.('m c r Ui.m(l-N,,( rack*

HVPI-3 (Rm231 D) 5-6-14 WlP 14-1778: 5-6. 1 .ý 1111.3 11I 'P-3 SlIgilied B%' 1 2011 Atilt Service Switch Ik'wer Per Phase (VAI\ J Pwer Per Phasv (VA C.rtcuil Dc:,C~ 0if Bf C____ G ______ A~~~~ ~ [! ~ ~ Dsr~0 0 0 0 5'0 0 0 0)0 21 19515 IIVI %- -,A A)OKV A, Trijrsfronncr: Distributio 0)Center-2 Spatre 58545 119759 19515 39920 39920 0 19515 39920 200 450 400 I)0 0 IT, 450 300K\ rV slitrIFtiIit Ccrttcr- I)1~*1.1 II 0 3 I)0 0 P~ae Shit~r. L~t 59435 1 59 3 klanufa( -er:= = .~59435\lit ~gm AY-S taRnii 3PHA I P~anel %Imn, Breake I Am 490lY1277 1 2011 Model Nu None GE Spectra Series Total Connected Load (VA)=Total Measured Load (VA)-0 1 () I -hase, Subtotal. Right 5943 594'-35~ 1 =4jTofa per phase WVA)178304 215 w Toual (:n,--cled A rps E =FLA Load per Phascl VA) I. I -Iý1 0 () -ITonl FLAX Amps er, 4: 2rz Iauc I il I ATTACHMENT 17 I )ist Center -1 : 5 4 Capacilics 5/8/2014 k.- .L so-1-1 401 Panle Vi PalnIhoard pacit y B lrcaker c 1Brcakcr (. paci -- --v-....... .. ... 1--- -....0 -- -----------.. .. ----. .. ....... ....... .....---.- 1 .... A m ,-i ---.. ... -: .--- 4 3 180 8...6 Ct J t 1 ,300 KA .rainst.Ormc,. 300000 VA Dde W Total Connecwed T, 1;11 Pr~mitt~a oposed Demand %/ of, Panelhoard or Load (VA) I Load (VA) Breaker Capacitv 5/6/2014 Starting 111614 37%5/6!2014 14-1278 8145 119759 40%Total Connected Load, see proposed panelboard valuC.Total Measured Load, see current panelboard values.Proposed Demand Load = Most recent Total Measurcd Load + the change in the Total Connected Load.% of Panelboard or Breaker Capacity is the Proposed Demand Load divided by the smaller of the panelboard or Breaker capacity.5/6/2014 14-1278 Added LP-46 (BOB Expansion) Electrical Load Summary: The proposed modification of non-emergency electrical loads associated with the WAF 14-1278 modification are within the 80% loading re .:.r , ' electric supply power equilplicne involved. 'he implementation of' this modification is within the limits of the electrical equipment in question and will not adversely aftMct ? lectrical distribution system.Brad McCracken Facility Enuincer lue. I o I Dist Center -I; 5-6-14 WP 14-t278; 5-6-14.S2014 D~ist. C(ener-I Sunimied 1w 300 KVA Trajnsformter Circuit Power Per Phase (VA) Power Per Phase (A Circuit.. e "- D escription Description A~ B C it A B: Decit I T09 t 1.1' I'M1111111iii,.. IC [ating I"tc 'i1. 1PH)'vanc \mnps tiwiel Main 1. :sakcr (Ainr,)i 0 0 0 2715 0 0 2715 0 0 0 2715 0 200 200 100 3 200 3 200 3 200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 T015 TOt-H-.1 16 I S 101 122 16 26 0 m Z 8145-h=d=~ _______ LJU...JL.......A..........U ______ 4 .1 ~ S J Pire Sublotal. Leti =1 2715 1 2715 2715 Manufictuier: 20SY1t 20 1200 Model Number 1200 GE Spectra Series L QL...i--- -Phase Subtotal, Right Total Connected Load I5 2715 2715 = Total per Phase (VA)(VA)= 8145 23 = Total Connected Amps Total Measured Load 1 37663 41570( 32381 = Measured Load per Phase(VA) I (VA)= I 11614 310 -Total Measured Armps-7-0 E~.5.-. Pale I o 1 I ATTACHMENT 17 HV\"-3A (RmC.299U) 5-6-14 Caplacitics 5 .:S20 14 T- .117, t- j tTotl Connected /'rposed Demand ol Panelboard oi i Load ('A) I Load (VA) Breaker C1pacity 5i6/2014 14-127S; Starting 554'5 58545 35%Total Connected Load, see proposed panelboard value.Total Mieasured Load, see current panclboard values.Proposed Demand Load = Most recent Total Measured Load + the change in the Total Connected Load.% of Panelboard or Breaker Capacity is the Proposed Demand Load divided by the smaller of the panelboard or Breaker capacity.5/6/2014 14-1278 Added t-I\FP-3A (BOB Expansion). t did not have manufacturer FLA for Air Handler or Chill Water Pump.Electricail Load SumI1lmary: rhc proposed modi lcation of non-cnaency electrical loads associated \with the WAF 14-12781 modi fication are within the 10. loading requirement or the electric eIlpply pooer.qutlilclI t involved. The h plei'lr tt.a i, I:!"' , .. -. c, ., .i inc elcct.cal CteIiipmlienlt in LIuhesliol and %%ili nol adlveIscly "lietl I( s 1 lbctricat distrithutio s\ .t,1.' .Il iad ( ,. NICr okcn I lcii ,. t tl,.in .I HVP-3A (RniC299U) 5-6-14 WP 14-1278i 5-6-14 Siarling< (I4 IINIP-A3 Sujpllictd lv HVP-3 Girow, N-2t Dcscripfion Power Per Phase (VA).I B c nC n: 0 Power Per Phase (VA)A 1 13 1 C>.Descrilpinn lhill \\tler lhimp 166NO 5536 0 5536 3*5979 10000 5 7 19 15'7 19 5536 3979 I 0.o010.1 3971)A ir Ui-,ndl ei A.\ir I-landler Pre-I i c~0)30000 0 10000 0 0 0 0 0)IT 0 0 0 0)3 0I Phase Subit,'tal. Left=1 5536 1 5536 1 5536 Manuacturer: Miurna: SI c (Cuie I A;),np,s 4HUY-77 1200)Nohic GE Spectra Series Total Comecried Lwad lota) Measured I cad L3979.. '979 1397i = Pluse Suhkeal. ih 19515~ ')5 15 1 S 195 TouI per Phnse (VA 58545 71 1loin) Connecicd Air_______________________I'LA Lond ra il.e'la I A-I ;-oxib 0 0) -'ma FLA P Amupsu.",ldeI Number I-)0 l'aluc I o' I ATTACHMENT 17 LI'40: 5-6-14 Capacities 5,0. 5/8/2014 Panel 1 I'anellIoaId Capaci v Brcaker Breaker Calpacity LP-4 6 1200r A 710968 0 VA Dist Center- I Bkr 200 Amps 7 1968 V A Total Connected Load, see proposed panelboard value.Total Measured Load, see current panclboard values.Proposed Demand Load = Most recent Total Measured Load + the change in the Total Connected Load.% of Panelboard or Breaker Capacity is the Proposed Demand Load divided by the smaller of the panelboard or Breaker capacity.Installed a 200 Amp Lighting Panel on Distribution Center -I for BOB East 5/6/2014 14-1278 Expansion Project. I did not have manufacturer FLA's For Sump Pump, Snac Panel, Stonn Water Sump Pump and Overhaed Door.Electrical Load Summary: The proposed modification of non-emergencv electrical loads associated with the WAF 14-1278 modification arc within the 8 0% loading rcquirement for the electric supply power equipment involved. The implementation of this modification is within the limits of the electrical equIipment ill question and will not ad'versely affect BOB's electrical distribution systet .Brad McCracken IFacility I ngincctr Pare I of I LP46; 5 14 Starting 5.-W2014 I'-P-46 Pafnlbo~rartI Supoijed bv Dist. Center -1 (LC~ITC1 IDeSCTIPuson Power Per Phase (VA) rn 6 an 1a.Power Per Phasse (VA)A B C A u B3 C 5 -C ~ -'- 4 Q 1 17 39 2Y i Maissnal Li'i Sssmp Pssssp Recepis.5R P2. -R pi, R..c pis_.fpt N64 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 36t 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 360 360 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 20 20_20 2 00--,y--20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20.4 4 4 4 4 4'0 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 10 20 20 20 20 864 0 0 0 360 0 0 720 1000 0 0 0 313 784 720 720 360 1000 864 Circuit Description1 BaeetLiIght Bassemsents Recces SN/SC Panel Olerlicad D~oor Slns_~.'ssrSsrpPumssp z.-5 10 I,-71 IS.26 24 j 2-I m Z H-li:simnur AIC Ratinsg Volhge (3PH-I PH)Panel Amps Panel Main Breaker lAmps Phase Subtotal. L.e -208Y.' 120 200 None 1584 1 1080 720 Mantifacturer: Square D I! 1 11:2 Phase Subtotal, Right Total Connsected Load l 12224 I 20 =Tol per Phase (VA)(VA)= 9145 23 = Total Connected Amps Total Measured Load s Measnsed Load per Ph.ss -,'A)(VA)= 0 0 Total Measured Amps .Model Number: NQOD Paselboard "10 V A per Recepi' .1 11 T-8 blhS lis 2%-11 Sms. It hUlhs% -5q5 %asiS 5.'5'.' ATTACF I!7,AL'AP-RO-1 15 14-02 Revision 8 Modification Number: OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?Yes: )11 No: Signature: Date: tS1271201 If YES, provide the suggested revision(s). OPERATING PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. PRINTS: MURR Print 522 Sheet 1 of 5 (see attached draft)MURR Print 522 Sheet 4 of 5 (see attached draft)5 Attachment

8.1 ORIGINAL

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~* I ~to, V.P ] 0203U?~10 j 042412 p.] 100(11 700 f 0¶o~522 --31 ENTRANCE RM 114 32 RU 105(S*Wwd tuc) Lp-32A R Kvnlm "W 1=l L-i'i Zj CL-Jo WUU Li 522... I ý '..o..~. 0 lilt bCd.4111P.14 .6a,4 WýI -. ~*002 err 000111 III Vfll *11111, i --0100 ll.443,l,2,7 %0100 0 0.00*CN',R.~- tlCi-'S j -l*hiiOAdd.110001 ~ I 20.0125'C*.\ \% I -T -IMAII 7 --17,.S lSll..M0101*I* THS m I i 101.at11ll0 24.1114 11,1 11Ev -- 1,11,510111*02 ~I~rfI7 1 1 1,211, I ov I ,ESCIIIýON OR 86 I D0E 4,5 I I i ATTACHMENT 17 O)RIGINAL AP-RO-I 15 D : Modification Number: 14-02 SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory? Yes: No: Yj Signature: / Date: Ifr YES, provide a list of the spare parts No spare parts are required for this modification. n10 6 O)RIGINAL Attachment

8. I ATT~tf.8 AP-RO-l115 Revision 9 MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM FOR: 1) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 14-04 WAF Number: Modification Title: Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor Page No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Procedure, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Required Yes No 71F....L [Date Comp~leted 12/ri5/2oW Wer/,7A720%A/ By (Initials) ltL TL-s 50.59 Screen Completed:- /'/(Asst. Reactor Manager -Engineering) Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review: Modification Approved: (Reactor Manager)-to _ A 0eactor Manager)Date: 12/2 -ai2,rr,!ý Date: Date: _a[5i4 Date: Modification Completed: (Reactor Manager)Modification Closed: (Reactor Manager)I O RIGINAL Date: Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

18 I.,,;R IGI NAL Modification Number: 14-04 REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION AP-RO- 115 Revision 9 Item No.I 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review Operating Procedures Updated Preventive Maintenance Procedures Updated Compliance Procedures Updated MURR Prints Updated Spare Parts System Updated Required Date Yes Noo Completed x Documented by (Initials) la U3RiGINAL Attachment

8. 1 ATTACHMENT 1a I G IN AL AP-RO-115 Modification Numbcr: 14-04 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)This Modification Record documents the installation of a permanently installed Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitoring System for detection of radioactive airborne iodine discharged through the MURR Industrial Building (MIB) Expansion ventilation system to the Laboratory and Containment Building Exhaust Ventilation System. The installation of the MIB ductwork is included in Modification Record 88-07 Addendum 3, "Exhaust Ventilation in MIB Eastward Expansion." The monitoring equipment consists of a single-channel radiation detection system designed to measure airborne concentrations of radioactive iodine in the exhaust air that is sampled by a shrouded probe in the ventilation ducting downstream of all of the hot cell and room filtrations systems. The system will be capable of measuring real-time exhaust flow rate as its basis for release concentrations.

A pitot tube measurement device and flow transmitter will provide input to the system. This provides continuous monitoring of all radioactive iodine releases discharged through the MIB Expansion ventilation exhaust system.The system will also be capable of providing measurement data, via a network connection, such as concentration as a function of time, average concentration for specific time periods, and total releases for specific time periods. This historical data will be used to determine possible filtration degradation over time. It should also be noted that this data will not be used to determine facility stack effluent release concentrations. That data will continue to be determined using the existing facility exhaust stack monitor systems. Historical data will be maintained by Health Physics personnel via an integral database.The database output may be accessed via a network terminal installed in the Health Physics office. At the discretion of the facility, this output may also be remotely accessed by the manufacturer via Internet connection for troubleshooting purposes. All database outputs are for monitoring only, and provide no control functions. Additional details of the system are provided in the listed attachments: Attachment 1 MURR Print 2777, "MIB East Addition Exhaust Schematic" Attachment 2 MAN0042, "CMS-1 Iodine Operation and Maintenance Manual" Attachment 3 MAN0104, "SmartMCA Operation and Maintenance Manual" Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page 1, with justification) A short for modification is appropriate because this modification is to a non-safety system, for documentation and review purposes only. (Reason #4)2 Attachment 8.1 SRIG IN AL ATTAC HMNTA 8 CIR Ll R TCAP-RO- l115 Modification Number: 14-04 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: No: Signature: Date: i2/10-12¢ol,! If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda.The Laboratory and Containment Building Exhaust Ventilation System is described or discussed in the following Sections and Figures of the HSR and its addenda: 1. HSR -Sections 3.2.7 and 7.2.7;2. Addendum 1 -Questions 3.20 and 3.22, and Figure 3.22.1;3. Addendum 2 -Question 11 (This question is no longer relevant due to facility Modification Record 88-7. This question is discussed in Section 5.3.3 of Addendum 3.); and 4. Addendum 3 -Sections 3.7 and 5.3.3.The Off-Gas Radiation Monitoring System is described or discussed in the following Sections and Figures of the HSR and its addenda: 1. HSR -Sections 7.3.1 and 9.7.3 All sections, tables and figures of the HSR and its addenda are considered correct and will remain unchanged. 3 ORIGINAL Attachment 8.1 AJVI MAC18 AP-RO-i 15 Revision 9 Modification Number: 14-04 REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the I-tSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Yes: No: X Signature: e:____Date: ) If YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. A 50.59 Screen (14-42) is attached which shows that the proposed activity may be implemented without further evaluation or license amendment. 4~ORIGINAL Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

18 Y AP-RR-003 Revision 9 50.59 SCREEN Number: 14-42 Page I of 3 Title: Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor Description of Activity (what is being changed and why):_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _The addition of a permanently installed Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitoring System for detection of radioactive airborne iodine discharged through the MURR industrial building Expansion ventillation system to the Laboratory and Containment Building Exhaust Ventilation System.Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safe facility (i.e., L MURR) operations? YES NO If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: ]-Z-I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designfinction YES NO described in the HSR?2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HISR DF7-described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested? YES NO 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an fISR described evaluation methodology L. D I _that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses? YES NO 4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is E 2L utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or YES NO is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?.5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? L_..Z YES NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approved facility procedur-(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question I, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use Page 2 of this form to document your statements. Print Name Sign Name Date Preparer: Caleb Braun ....... 12/10/14 Reviewer: Mark Corbett 12/19/14 Reactor Moanager: ) o 4 _HRlcc_?_/o ______________ Sb it cop), of screen to HSR I SAR file (circle e6)? Y. /,N,.eoPY Attachment

9. I ATTACHMENT 18" --AP-RR-003 Revision 9 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Number: 14-42 Page 2 of 3 Title: Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination:

[ Use and attach additional pages as necessary. ]I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designfitnction described in the HSR?No. the proposed activity does not involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR. The proposed activity is for the installation of a radiation monitor that will be used to monitor ventilation systems which will not adversely affect the design functions of any SSC described in the HSR. This change is not a replacement or addition to the existing Stack Monitors described in the HSR. (Continued on Page #3)2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No. the prooosed activity does not involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC functions are performed, controlled, or tested. The only procedural changes that will be made are the addition of operating procedures for Calibration and Maintenance of the Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor and print revisions to MURR Print #1125 sheet 4 of 4.3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?No the pnron;drJ ativity does not involve revising or ranlring en HRR deP.rrihed Pvalihitinn meithodnloy thet ic t'~ed in P.tehli.qhinn th. deo.inn haee or iimed in the e.Afpetv nly-eN The. d.ign ha... end -.fpWty anelv.g.e dn nnt rply nn the I ah Indinp u'ct Mnnitor in their Fy-hyaition Methodnlnoy-

4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. the proposed activity does not involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR. where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for the SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR. The addition of the Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor will monitor Iodine produced in an experiment covered under RUR 440(TeO2 -to produce 1-131), RUR 449 (Preliminary TeO2 Target Irradiations), and RL-76.List the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewcd where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]HSR Sections 3-2-7 (pq 3-7) 7-2_7(p.-7-19);7.3 1(pg 7-24)-9.7.3(pp.9-17)

Modification Record 14-04 "Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor" MURR Print #1125 Sheets 1-4 RUR-440(TeO2 -to Produce 1-131 449 (Preliminary TeO2 Taroet IrradiationsV: RL-76 RUR-440(TeO2 -to Produce 1-131)*RUR449 (PreliminaryTe 2TargetIrradoationsIrEL-76 Attachment 9.1 PCL XL error Error: Operator: Position: ExtraData Readimage 560 ATTtTp AP-RO-i 15 Revision 9 MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM FOR: 1) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 14-04 WAF Number: Modification Title: Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor Page No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Paue Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Procedure, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Required Yes No F-71--oN-__Ii_ -Date Comn~leted /2lo rl 20w l I 2/,?AY24a1/ By (Initials)-LL YL.S T. Lts 50.59 Screen Completed:___ ___ ___ ___ ___/"'(_Asst. Reactor Manager -Engineering) Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review: Date: 12/2 Date: Date: _ _tA_ J I I Modification Approved: (Reactor Manager)-" eactor Manager)Modification Completed: (Reactor Manager)Modification Closed: (Reactor Manager)Date: Date:________ RI G I NAL'Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

18 I., RIGiNAt Modification Number: 14-04 REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION AP-RO-l 15 Revision 9 Item No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review Operating Procedures Updated Preventive Maintenance Procedures Updated Compliance Procedures Updated MURR Prints Updated Spare Parts System Updated Required Date Yes No Completed X Documented by (Initials) la URGNA Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

1-SIUGINAL Modification Number: 14-04 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)This Modification Record documents the installation of a permanently installed Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitoring System for detection of radioactive airborne iodine discharged through the MURR Industrial Building (MIB) Expansion ventilation system to the Laboratory and Containment Building Exhaust Ventilation System. The installation of the MIB ductwork is included in Modification Record 88-07 Addendum 3, "Exhaust Ventilation in MIB Eastward Expansion." The monitoring equipment consists of a single-channel radiation detection system designed to measure airborne concentrations of radioactive iodine in the exhaust air that is sampled by a shrouded probe in the ventilation ducting downstream of all of the hot cell and room filtrations systems. The system will be capable of measuring real-time exhaust flow rate as its basis for release concentrations. A pitot tube measurement device and flow transmitter will provide input to the system. This provides continuous monitoring of all radioactive iodine releases discharged through the MIB Expansion ventilation exhaust system.The system will also be capable of providing measurement data, via a network connection, such as concentration as a function of time, average concentration for specific time periods, and total releases for specific time periods. This historical data will be used to determine possible filtration degradation over time. It should also be noted that this data will not be used to determine facility stack effluent release concentrations. That data will continue to be determined using the existing facility exhaust stack monitor systems. Historical data will be maintained by Health Physics personnel via an integral database.The database output may be accessed via a network terminal installed in the Health Physics office. At the discretion of the facility, this output may also be remotely accessed by the manufacturer via Internet connection for troubleshooting purposes. All database outputs are for monitoring only, and provide no control functions. Additional details of the system are provided in the listed attachments: Attachment 1 MURR Print 2777, "MIB East Addition Exhaust Schematic" Attachment 2 MAN0042, "CMS-1 Iodine Operation and Maintenance Manual" Attachment 3 MAN0104, 'SmartMCA Operation and Maintenance Manual" Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page 1, with justification) A short for modification is appropriate because this modification is to a non-safety system, for documentation and review purposes only. (Reason #4)2 Attachment 8.1 c RIGINAL ATTACHMENT. 18 AP-RO-l 15 Modification Number: 14-04 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: No: Signature: Date: 1 2/eZ-/2woLi If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda.The Laboratory and Containment Building Exhaust Ventilation System is described or discussed in the following Sections and Figures of the HSR and its addenda: 1. HSR -Sections 3.2.7 and 7.2.7;2. Addendum 1 -Questions 3.20 and 3.22, and Figure 3.22.1;3. Addendum 2 -Question 11 (This question is no longer relevant due to facility Modification Record 88-7. This question is discussed in Section 5.3.3 of Addendum 3.); and 4. Addendum 3 -Sections 3.7 and 5.3.3.The Off-Gas Radiation Monitoring System is described or discussed in the following Sections and Figures of the HSR and its addenda: 1. HSR -Sections 7.3.1 and 9.7.3 All sections, tables and figures of the HSR and its addenda are considered correct and will remain unchanged. I ORIGINAL Attachment 8.1 , ý 6 het18 AP-RO-l115 Revision 9 Modification Number: 14-04 REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the H-ISR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Signature: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _Yes: No: X Date: ) 21Z&gYlZW If YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. A 50.59 Screen (14-42) is attached which shows that the proposed activity may be implemented without further evaluation or license amendment. 4 OWRI G IN AL Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

18 UlyAP-RR-003 Revision 9 50.59 SCREEN Number: 14-42 Page I of 3 tAc4AL&aZZ-\ i-t Title: Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor Description of Activity (what is being changed and why): The addition of a permanently installed Lab Imoex Iodine Duct Monitoring System for detection of radioactive airborne iodine discharged through the MURR industrial building Expansion ventillation system to the Laboratory and Containment Building Exhaust Ventilation System.Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safeficility (i.e., W=1 MURR) operations? YES NO If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: F] 1 I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an IK5C that adversely affects a designfimction YES NO described in the HSR?2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to aprocedure that adversely affects how HSR El F-described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested? YES NO 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an 1ISR described evaluation methodology ] LZ that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses? YES NO 4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is 1 LV utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or YES NO is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? D Iiz YES NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approved facility procedur.(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1,2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "'No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use Page 2 of this form to document your statements. I Print Name Sign Name Date Pre___er __Caleb Braun 12/10/14 Reviewer: Mark Corbett 12/19/14 Reactor Manager: HSubmit copy' of screen to HSR I SAR file (circle e)?40)No rCoPY Attachment

9. I ATTACHMENT 18*: AP-RR-003 L .- .W- ;0,' uJ Revision 9 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Number: 14-42 Page 2 of 3 Title: Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination:

[ Use and attach additional pages as necessary. ]I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR?No. the proposed activity does not involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design function described in the HSR. The proposed activity is for the installation of a radiation monitor that will be used to monitor ventilation systems which will not adversely affect the design functions of any SSC described in the HSR. This change is not a replacement or addition to the existing Stack Monitors described in the HSR. (Continued on Page #3)2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No. the proposed activity does not involve a chanqe to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC functions are performed, controlled, or tested. The only procedural changes that will be made are the addition of operating procedures for Calibration and Maintenance of the Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor and print revisions to MURR Print #1125 sheet 4 of 4.3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?Nn th. pnrnpnnPd antivitv dncp. not invnlvy ryviking nr rnplanlinp an HqR dipgrihad PvAiahfftinr rnmthndnlngv that i6 iqpd in PAtAhlighing the dc.sipn hagp--q or imp"d in the..-f.ty AnAlyAAt Thp d.ipn haqE.q and dn nnt rPely nn thp I Ah Impp.x lodin. Mlirt Mnnitnr in thpir Fyvali'atinn M~thndnlnov

4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. the proposed activity does not involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR. where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for the SSC.or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR. The addition of the Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor will monitor Iodine produced in an experiment covered under RUR 440(TeO2 -to produce 1-131), RUR 449 (Preliminary TeO2 Target Irradiations), and RL-76.List the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewcd where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]HSR Sections 3 2 7 (pg 3-7)' 7-2_7(pg 7-19)7.3.1 (pg-7-24);9.7 3(pg 9-17)Modification Record 14-04 "Lab Imp.ex Iodine Duct Monitor" MURR Print #1125 Sheets 1-4 RUR-440(TeO2

-to Produce 1-131 ):RUR 449 (Preliminary TeO2 Target Irradiations)v RL-76 Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

18 Continued from Question 1Page 3 of 3 The system will take flow from the ventilation ducting in the MURR Industrial Building Eastward Expansion downstream of all hot cell and room filtration systems using a shrouded probe. The data collected by the monitor will be used to continuously monitor all airborne radioactive releases discharged through the MIB Expansion ventilation exhaust system. This data will not be used to determine facility stack effluent concentrations. ATT II l 18 AP-RO-I 15 Revision 9 Modification Number: 14-04 OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?Yes: X No: Signature: Date: I,2"/2C U If YES, provide the suggested revision(s). OPERATING PROCEDURES: CALIBRATION -LAB IMPEX IODINE DUCT MONITOR -FLOW CALIBRATION -new procedure per attached draft CALIBRATION -LAB IMPEX IODINE DUCT MONITOR -new procedure per attached draft CALIBRATION -LAB IMPEX IODINE DUCT MONITOR -DP2001 -new procedure per attached draft OPERATION -LAB IMPEX IODINE DUCT MONITOR -FILTER CHANGE AND SOURCE CHECK -new procedure per attached draft PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification PRINTS: MURR Print No. 1125 Sheet 4 of 4, "Diagram of Laboratory and Containment Building Ventilation System" revised with the addition of the attached draft-I CI)RIGINAL 5 Attachment 8.1I ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT MURR INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION IC-HP-XXX CALIBRATION -LAB IMPEX IODINE DUCT MONITOR -FLOW CALIBRATION RESPONSIBLE GROUP: Reactor Health Physics PROCEDURE OWNER: APPROVED BY: Date: This procedure contains the following: Pages Attachments Tables Figures Appendices Check-Off Lists N None None None None None through through through through through through 5 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1.0 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................ 3 2.9 SCOPE ................................................................................................................................. 3 3.0 DEFIN ITION S ............................................................................................................. 3 4.0 PRECA UTION S AN D LIM ITA TION S ......................................................................... 3 5.0 SPECIA L TOO LS OR EQUIPM ENT ............................................................................. 3 6.0 PROCEDURE ............................................................................................................. 3 7.0 REFEREN CES ............................................................................................................ 5 8.0 RECO RD S ........................................................................................................................... 5 2 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT CALIBRATION -LAB IMPEX IODINE DUCT MONITOR- FLOWRATE METER 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 Establishes a standard method for calibration of the Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor Flow rate Meter.2.0 SCOPE 2.1 Procedural steps and precautions necessary to perform a calibration of the Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor Flow rate Meter.2.2 Describes when and how to calibrate the Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor and the documentation necessary to record the completion.

3.0 DEFINITIONS

3.1 Annual

-Calibration performed every twelve months with a maximum allowed interval of fourteen months.3.2 Operable -A system or component is operable when it is capable of performing its intended function in a normal manner.4.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

4.1 Calibration

MUST be performed at annual intervals.

5.0 SPECIAL

TOOLS OR EQUIPMENT 5.1 DIGITAL MINI CALIBRATOR-Model # MC-75L 6.0 PROCEDURE NOTE: Because of the way the solid-state flow sensor works there are periods (typically less than a minute) when flow changes are not shown immediately on the LCD. During these periods the indicated flow does not change and is highlighted with asterisks (*). For this reason the flow should normally be adjusted only when the asterisks (*) are not displayed, so that the effects of the adjustment can be seen.6.1 Refer to the "CMS- I Iodine Operation and Maintenance Manual" to perform the following (Reference 7.1).6.1.1 SET "Display Mode" parameter to "Flow Calibration".

6.1.2 CHECK

that flow configuration is SET to 1.3 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.2 Connect the DIGITAL MINI CALIBRATOR to the inlet of the CMS 2000 Particulate remote head.6.3 Insert a filter card in the sample head.6.4 SET the airflow calibrator to LPM.CAUTION: DO NOT BLOCK FLOW METER INLET WHEN ON.NOTE: The Temperature reading must not vary during Sections 7.5 to 7.15 below.6.5 SET the airflow to XX LPM with the pump valve.6.6 Press the right arrow on each CMS until flow is displayed.

6.6.1 Allow

the readings to update twice.6.7 RECORD the flow frequency on each CMS (top row in brackets [ 1).6.8 As soon as the

• appear on the flow display quickly change the airflow meter to XX LPM.6.8.1 When the
• disappears and the readings update record the flow frequency on each CMS (top row in brackets [ ]).6.8.2 RECORD the temperature on each CMS (Bottom Row T :).NOTE: PREFORM STEP 7.9 FOR EACH CMS UNIT.6.9 Refer to the "CMS-1 Iodine Operation and Maintenance Manual" to perform the following (Reference 7.1).6.9.1 Enter the Calibration Menu and select "Flow Calibration".

6.9.2 Enter

the temperature from step 7.8.b and press OK.6.9.3 Enter the frequency for XX LPM from step 7.7 and press OK.6.9.4 Enter the frequency for XX LPM from step 7.8.a and press OK.4 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)NOTE: THE DISPLAY WILL NOW SHOW "OFFSET" AND "CONV" VALUES.6.9.5 RECORD the Offset: value 6.9.6 RECORD the Cony: value 6.9.7 Press ESC to return to the main menu 6.9.8 Select "Parameters" and press OK 6.9.9 Enter "Offset:" value 6.9.10 Enter "Cony" value 6.9.11 Press OK, then ESC twice to return to normal operation 6.10 SET the airflow calibrator to XX LPM. Wait until the flow results is updated and verify the value on each CMS is x.xxCFM+10% (x.xx CFM to x.xx CFM ).6.11 RESET the "Display Mode" and "Flow Configuration" to the original settings

7.0 REFERENCES

7.1 MAN0042

"CMS- 1 Iodine Operation and Maintenance Manual" 8.0 RECORDS 8.1 Duct Monitor Preventive Maintenance -LAB IMPEX DUCT MONITOR -Checksheet 5 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT a MURR INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION IC-HP-XXX CALIBRATION -LAB IMPEX IODINE DUCT MONITOR RESPONSIBLE GROUP: PROCEDURE OWNER: Reactor Health Physics APPROVED BY: This procedure contains the following: Date: Pages Attachments Tables Figures Appendices Check-Off Lists 1 None None None None through through through through through through 6 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Pape Number 1.0 PU RPO SE ............................................................................................................................ 3 2.0 SCO PE ................................................................................................................................. 3 3.0 D EFIN ITION S .............................................................................................................. 3 4.0 PRECA UTION S AN D LIM ITA TIO N S ......................................................................... 3 5.0 SPECIA L TO O LS O R EQ U IPM EN T ............................................................................ 3 6.0 PRO C ED U RE .............................................................................................................. 3 7.0 REFEREN CES ............................................................................................................. 6 8.0 RECO RD S ........................................................................................................................... 6 9.0 A TTA CHM EN TS ............................................................................................................. 6 2 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT CALIBRATION -LAB IMPEX IODINE DUCT MONITOR 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 To establish a standard method for calibration of the Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor.2.0 SCOPE 2.1 Provides procedural steps and precautions necessary to perform a calibration of the Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor.2.2 Describes when and how to calibrate the Lab Impex instrument and the documentation necessary to record the completion.

3.0 DEFINITIONS

3.1 Semi-annual -Calibration performed every six months with a maximum allowed interval of eight months.3.2 Stock -The isotope used for calibration. Stock can be in diluted or undiluted, liquid or gaseous form.3.3 Operable -A system or component is operable when it is capable of performing its intended function in a normal manner.4.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 4.1 No processing activities may be performed during the calibration

4.2 Calibration

MUST be performed at semi-annual intervals. 4.3 The stack monitor efficiency MUST NOT be changed without permission from the Reactor Health Physics Manager.5.0 SPECIAL TOOLS OR EQUIPMENT* Eckert and Ziegler Ba- 133 Source Set* Wire tie to lock open ball valve* New, small plastic bag to store in-service iodine filter 6.0 PROCEDURE 6.1 SOURCE PREPARATION:

6.1.1 RECORD

source activity on Duct Monitor Calibration Datasheet (Attachment 9.1 ).3 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT 6.2 DUCT MONITOR PREPARATION:

6.2.1 NOTIFY

Control Room of intent to turn the system off.6.2.2 STOP sampling pump AND RECORD time.6.2.3 CLOSE Duct Monitor Inlet Valve V-XX.6.2.4 Remove in-service iodine filter from filter holder AND store in plastic bag.6.3 DUCT MONITOR READINGS NOTE: All test readings must be obtained from the local indication or from the 9205 archive system.NOTE: Before taking each test reading, the technician should allow the meter reading to increase until it appears to have stopped. The technician should also allow the reading to return to background level after the source has been removed.6.3.1 Insert empty filter holder into detector chamber to obtain background readings.6.3.2 RECORD local readings.6.3.3 Count all source standards as specified in the following: a) Remove filter holder AND place source standard into source holder with source direction arrow pointed into the holder.b) Place holder into detector chamber.c) Count source until reading stops increasing. d) RECORD local reading and time on Duct Monitor Calibration Datasheet (Attachment

11. 1).6.3.4 WHEN all source standards have been counted, THEN remove the last source standard.4 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT 6A4 SYSTEM RESTORATION:

6.4.1 Reinstall

in-service charcoal Filter.6.4.2 OPEN valve V-XX.6.4.3 START sampling pump AND RECORD time.6.4.4 Adjust flow to x.xx CFM.6.4.5 Notify Control Room that the pump is on.6&5 CALCULATIONS: NOTE: The Reactor Health Physics Spreadsheet Program "Duct Monitor Calibration" will: " compute the efficiency of detection,* compute the average efficiency,* compute and plot linear regression data, and* compute and plot actual readings versus filter standards activity.6.5.1 Transfer data from Duct Monitor Calibration Datasheet (Attachment 9.1)to computer spreadsheet program (Record 8.1).5 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT 6.5.2 DETERMINE by linear regression, the slope, intercept, and correlation coefficient of recorded readings versus activity of filter standards.

6.5.3 Using

computer program, compute efficiency of detection for each point.6.5.4 IF computer program is unavailable, THEN compute efficiency of detection for each point using the following equation: EFF = CPM / DPM EFF Efficiency (CPM / DPM)CPM Local meter readings for filter (CPM)DPM Activity of filter standard (DPM)6.5.5 DETERMINE efficiency from average of all efficiency data points.6.6 REPORT: (Record 8.1)6.6.1 Manually or using computer program, plot results of local meter readings versus activity of filter standards and note linear regression data on graph.6.6.2 Enter test data in Reactor Health Physics computer spreadsheet (Record 8.1).6.6.3 Provide Reactor Health Physics Manager with the following: " copy of graph" computed efficiencies

7.0 REFERENCES

7.1 MAN0042, "CMS- 1 Iodine Operation and Maintenance Manual" 8.0 RECORDS 8.1 Reactor Health Physics Computer Spreadsheet, "Duct Monitor Calibration" 9.0 ATTACHMENTS 9.1 "Duct Monitor Calibration Datasheet" 6 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT Duct Monitor Calibration Datasheet Channel:

Background:

Health Physics: Date: Page I of I Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

18 AFT IC-HP-XXX DRAFT MURR INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION IC-HP-XXX-LAB IMPEX IODINE DUCT MONITOR -DP2001 Health Physics CALIBRATION RESPONSIBLE GROUP: PROCEDURE OWNER: APPROVED BY: Date This procedure contains the following: Pages Attachments Tables Figures Appendices Check-Off Lists None None None None through through through through through through 11 5 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1.0 PURPOSE ........................................................................................................................... 3 2.0 SCOPE ................................................................................................................................ 3 3.0 PRECAUTION S AN D LIM ITATION S ......................................................................... 3 4.0 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS ......................................................... 3 5.0 SPECIAL TO O LS O R EQUIPM ENT ........................................................................... 3 6.0 PROCEDURE ............................................................................................................. 4 7.0 REFEREN CES ................................................................................................................. I1 8.0 RECORD S ........................................................................................................................ 11 9.0 ATTACHM EN TS ............................................................................................................. 11 2 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT CALIBRATION -LAB IMPEX IODINE DUCT MONITOR -DP2001 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 To verify the operability of DP2001 Pressure Transducer.

2.0 SCOPE

2.1 Procedural steps and precautions to perform this calibration.

3.0 PRECAUTIONS

AND LIMITATIONS

3.1 Before

any work is performed on this system, the equalizing valve on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold must be opened to prevent any damage from occurring to the transmitter, caused by over-pressurization. This operation will cause the DP2001 transmitter to read "no flow".4.0 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS 4.1 The DP2001 must be in the Square Root Processing Mode as indicated on the second line of the display.4.2 The Shortridge Multimeter is at full charge.4.3 The U-Tube Assembly is charged with water.4.4 Performer is familiar with operation of the DP2001 and has reviewed the DP2001 User Interface (Attachment 9.1).4.5 Performer is familiar with the operation of the five (5) valve manifold and has reviewed the DP2001 Valve Manifold (Attachment 9.2).4.6 Calibration MUST be performed at annual intervals.

5.0 SPECIAL

TOOLS OR EQUIPMENT 5.1 Shortridge Multimeter

5.2 Pressure

Assembly 5.3 Fluke Multimeter 3 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT 6.0 PROCEDURE 6.1 RECORD CURRENT CONFIGURATION: 6.1.1 OPEN the clear plastic cover.NOTE: The unit must be in the Square Root Processing Mode as indicated on the second line of the display.6.1.2 Observe for 30 seconds the values displayed on the DP2001 and RECORD the minimum and maximum values observed on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3).6.1.3 Press the menu button until "Menu: 0 Run" appears in the lower line of the LCD. Use the up button to scroll until "Menu: 1 Options" is displayed.

6.1.4 Press

enter.6.1.5 Use the up button to scroll to Menu 1 "Item: Lock".6.1.6 RECORD the value displayed on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3). This value should be 4.0 mA.6.1.7 Use the up button to scroll to Menul "Item: Mode".6.1.8 RECORD the value displayed on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3). This value should be 5.0 mA.6.1.9 Press the menu button until "Menu: 0 Run" appears. Use the up button to scroll to "Menu: 2 Range".6.1 .10 Press enter.6.1.11 Use the up button to scroll the Menu 2 "Item: Range".6.1.12 RECORD the value displayed on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3). This value should be 5.04 mA.6.1.13 Use the up button to scroll to Menu 2: "Item: EU Select".6.1.14 RECORD the value displayed on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3). This value should be 250.0 cfs.6.1.15 Use the up button to scroll to Menu 2: "Item: EU Factor".4 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.1.16 RECORD the value displayed on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3). This value should be 250.0 cfs.6.1.17 Press the menu button until "Menu: 0 Run" appears in the lower line of the LCD.6.1 .18 Press enter. "Sq. Root" should appear on the lower line of the LCD.6.1.19 If any recorded value differs from the identified value, stop the test and consult the Facility Engineer.6.2 VOLTAGE CHECK: CAUTION: If the voltage is outside the 10 to 50 vdc range, stop the test and consult the Facility Engineer.6.2.1 Set the Fluke Multimeter to the DC voltage setting.6.2.2 Insert the Fluke Multimeter leads into the voltage ports on the DP2001 Test Port and CHECK the voltage across the terminals.

6.2.3 RECORD

the value displayed by the Fluke Multimeter on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3) to the nearest tenth of a volt (0.1 v).6.3 CONFIGURING TRANSMITTER FOR CALIBRATION:

6.3.1 Secure

power to the transmitter by removing the jumper from the current ports on the DP2001 Test Port.6.3.2 Set the Fluke Multimeter to the DC mA setting.6.3.3 Power the transmitter by inserting the Fluke Multimeter leads into the DP2001 Test Port (current ports) for current readings.6.3.4 Observe for 30 seconds the values displayed on the DP2001 and RECORD the minimum and maximum values observed on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3).5 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.3.5 Observe for 30 seconds the values displayed on the Fluke Multimeter and RECORD the minimum and maximum values observed on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3).6.3.6 OPEN Equalizing Valve V-36 on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold.6.3.7 CLOSE the Pitot Tube High Pressure Isolation Valve V-32 on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold.6.3.8 CLOSE the Pitot Tube Low Pressure Isolation Valve V-33 on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold.6.3.9 Remove the caps from the High and Low Pressure Test Ports.6.3.10 OPEN the High Pressure Test Port Isolation Valve V-34 on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold.6.3.11 OPEN the Low Pressure Test Port Isolation Valve V-35 on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold.6.4 4 mA SET CALIBRATION CHECK: 6.4.1 Press the menu button until "Menu: 0 Run" appears in the lower line of the LCD.6.4.2 Use the up button to scroll to "Menu: 6 Settings".

6.4.3 Press

enter button.6.4.4 Use the up button to scroll to Menu 6 "Item: 4mA Set".6.4.5 RECORD the value displayed by the Multimeter on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3).NOTE: The Multimeter should read 3.99 to 4.01 mA.6.4.6 IF the meter reading is within this range THEN proceed to step 6.5.6.4.7 Press enter. The display will now read "Adjust: 4mA Set".6 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.4.8 Use the up and down buttons to adjust the display until the Multimeter reads 3.99 to 4.01 mA.6.4.9 Press the enter button, the display will momentary show "Store: 4mA Set" then return to "Item: 4mA Set".6.4.10 RECORD any changes made on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3).6.4.11 To set the unit back to the working mode press the menu button until"Menu: 0 Run" appears, then press enter.6.5 20 MA SET CALIBRATION CHECK: 6.5.1 Press the menu button until "Menu: 0 Run" appears in the lower line of the LCD.6.5.2 Use the up button to scroll to "Menu: 6 Settings".

6.5.3 Press

enter.6.5.4 Use the up button to scroll to Menu 6 "Item: 20mA Set".6.5.5 RECORD the value displayed by the Multimeter on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3).NOTE: The Multimeter should read 19.99 to 20.01 mA.6.5.6 IF the meter reading is within this range THEN proceed to step 6.6.6.5.7 Press enter. The display will now read "Adjust: 20mA Set".6.5.8 Use the up and down buttons to adjust the display until the Multimeter reads 19.99 to 20.01 mA.6.5.9 Press the enter button, the display will momentarily show "Store: 20mA Set" then return to "Item: 20mA Set".6.5.10 RECORD any changes made on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3).7 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.5.11 To set the unit back to the working mode press the menu button until"Menu: 0 Run" appears, then press enter.6.6 TRANSMITTER ZERO CHECK:[ NOTE: Before proceeding review DP2001 Valve Manifold (Attachment 9.2).NOTE: Valves V-XX, V-XX and V-XX, and the test ports shall be open before performing the Zero Check. At this stage, with the equalization valve open the DP2001 should read zero. If the display indicates a positive or negative off-set, the unit can be zeroed by pressing both the up and down arrow buttons together. As the buttons are being pressed the displayed pressure will be driven to zero.6.6.1 Press the menu button until "Menu: 0 Run" appears in the lower line of the LCD.6.6.2 Press enter.6.6.3 Press the up and down buttons together and hold for a few seconds until the display reads "0".6.7 TRANSMITTER OUTPUT CHECK: 6.7.1 Connect the pressure assembly output to the high pressure test port on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold.6.7.2 Close Valve V-XX on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold.8 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)CAUTION: Do not exceed 1050 Pascals of applied pressure to the instrument. NOTE: If any recorded reading is outside the min/max reading for that point as identified by the Graphs of Attachments 9.4-9.6, consult Facility Engineer for appropriate action.NOTE: The full scale flow reading for the transmitter corresponds to 119.0 Pascals of input pressure. When applying this input pressure, the objective is to get within 3 Pascals of the full scale value without exceeding that value.6.7.3 Apply a test pressure of 65.0 Pascals (+/- 3 Pascals) AND RECORD the flow (cfs) displayed by the instrument and the mA output measured by the Fluke Multimeter on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3).6.7.4 Apply a test pressure of 119.0 Pascals ( -3 Pascals) AND RECORD the flow (cfs) displayed by the instrument and the mA output measured by the Fluke Multimeter on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3).6.8 CONFIGURING TRANSMITTER FOR OPERATION: NOTE: Before proceeding review DP2001 Valve Manifold (Attachment 9.2).6.8.1 OPEN Valve V-XX on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold.6.8.2 CLOSE Valve V-XX on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold.9 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.8.3 CLOSE Valve V-XX on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold.6.8.4 Remove the pressure assembly output from the high pressure test port on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold.6.8.5 Install the caps on the High and Low Pressure Test Ports.6.8.6 OPEN Valve V-XX on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold.6.8.7 OPEN Valve V-XX on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold.6.8.8 CLOSE Valve V-XX on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold.6.8.9 Press the menu button until "Menu: 0 Run" appears in the lower line of the LCD.6.8.10 Press enter.6.8.11 Observe for 30 seconds the values displayed on the DP2001 and RECORD the minimum and maximum values observed on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3).6.8.12 Observe for 30 seconds the values displayed by the Multimeter and RECORD the minimum and maximum values observed on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3)6.8.13 Secure power to the transmitter by removing the Fluke Multimeter leads from the DP2001 Test Port (current ports).6.8.14 Power the transmitter by inserting the jumer into the DP2001 Test Port (current ports).6.8.15 ENSURE the unit is in working mode, "Menu: 0 Run" appears in the lower line of the LCD. If"Menu: 0 Run" does nto appear, press "menu" until it appears.6.8.16 Press Enter. "Sq. Root" should appear on the lower line of the LCD.10 ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.8.17 Observe for 30 seconds the values displayed on the DP2001 and RECORD the minimum and maximum values observed on DP2001 Calibration Readings (Attachment 9.3).6.8.18 Close the clear plastic cover.6.8.19 Notify the Control Room that the power to the CMS 2000 will be cycled.6.8.20 Cycle power to CMS 2000.6.8.21 Notify Control Room that Calibration is complete.

7.0 REFERENCES

7.1 MAN0042, "CMS-1 Iodine Operation and Maintenance Manual" 8.0 RECORDS 8.1 Attachment 9.3, "DP2001 Calibration Readings" 9.0 ATTACHMENTS

9.1 Reactor

DP2001 User Interface 9.2 DP2001 Valve Manifold 9.3 DP2001 Calibration Readings 9.4 Operating Point Graph 9.5 Full Scale Point Graph II ATTACHMENT 18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT DP2001 USER INTERFACE NOTE: There are a number of adjustable parameters (called Items) in the DP2001. The Items are arranged in 7 menus, with up to 5 Items under each menu.* To Select a Menu, press Menu until Menu appears in the lower line of the LCD. The unit is now at Menu level. Use the Up/Down buttons to select the required Menu." Pressing Menu while in Menu Level will reset the unit to Menu O:Run. Pressing Enter will then go to the Run Item (working mode)." To Scan a selected Menu, press Enter. The unit is now at the Item level. Use the Up/Down buttons to select the required Item. (Do NOT do this in the Run Menu)The name and present value of the Item will show on the LCD." To Adjust a selected Item, press Enter. The unit is now at the Adjust level. (Adjust level cannot be entered if the DP2001 is Locked.) Use the Up/Down buttons to adjust the Item." To Store an adjusted Item, press Enter. "Store" will appear on the LCD. On releasing Enter, the DP2001 reverts to the Item level ready to select another Item.* To Abort the adjustment of an Item, press Menu while in the Adjust level.* To go from the Item level to the Menu level, press Menu.NOTE: Before any work is to be performed on this system the equalizing valve on the DP2001 Differential Pressure Transducer Manifold must be opened to prevent any damage from occurring to the transmitter, caused by over-pressurization. This operation will cause the DP2001 transmitter to read "no flow".Page I of I Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

18 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT Page I of I Attachment

9.2 ATTACHMENT

18 DP2001 Calibration Readings IC-HP-XXX DRAFT 6.1. Record Current Configuration: 6.1.2 Sq. Root Mode Value (cfs)6.1.6 Menul: Lock Value (mA)6.1.8 Menul: Mode Value (mA)6.1.12 Menu2: Range Value (mA)6.1.14 Menu2: EUSelect Value (cfs)6.1.16 Menu2: EUFactor Value (cfs)6.2. Voltage Check: 6.2.3 Terminal Voltage Value (volts)6.3. Configuring Transmitter for Calibration: 6.3.4 Sq. Root Mode Value (cfs)6.3.5 Fluke Multimeter Reading (mA)6.4. 4 mA Set Calibration Check: 6.4.5 Fluke Multimeter Reading (mA)6.4.10 4 mA Set Adjustment Value (mA)6.5. 20 mA Set Calibration Check: 6.5.5 Fluke Multimeter Reading (mA)6.5.10 20 mA Set Adjustment Value (mA)6.7 Transmitter Output Check: 6.7.3 65 Pascal Test Test Pressure Applied (Pa)Flow Displayed (cfs)Fluke Multimeter Reading (mA)6.7.4 119.0 Pascal Test Test Pressure Applied (Pa)Flow Displayed (cfs)Fluke Multimeter reading (mA)to to to 6.8 Configuring Transmitter for Operation: 6.8.11 Sq. Root Mode Value (cfs)6.8.12 Multimeter Reading (mA)6.8.17 Sq. Root Menu Value (cfs)Completed by: to to to Date: Page I of I Attachment 9.3 IC-HP-XXX DRAFT 16.20 mA.Operating Point 1 6 .1 5 rn A .. .......... ..... .............65 62-68 Pa / 11,086 CFM .K _I+16.10--- Pitot Tube "K" Factor 0.6721.... ... !- .............. -..........16.05 mA ., -.4 --..- .. -16.00 mA ------ -.--.--.. -------.----

---

-- ---159 MA----I 15.90OmA >~40-0 15.80 mA .- .... --- -.-- M 15.75 m A --.. ....-- *......15.60 mA~- --- ---,.-- --4--mA (Nominal)MA *m (minimal).,, _!*, " 1-..- -.........

mA (maximum)15.40 mA ... ..--- -- t -........... ..... --.. ........ .U ."*- --- -- -----" t -I 15.45 .A.- -- -. ..r 15.40 mA -' ........J .........62.0 Pa 63.0 Pa 64.0 Pa 65.0 Pa 66.0 Pa 67.0 Pa 68.0 Pa Page 1 of 1 Attachment 9.4 IC-HP-XD X DRAFT 20.10MA -; ------ -- .Full Scale Point 116-119.0 Pa / 15,000 CFM Pitot Tube "K" Factor 0.6721 20.00 mAi --' .:" ...19.95 m A !t. ..... ... .....19.90 mA* -a-. 7, 0000 19.85 mA ..19.80 mA *)>H H 0 I m Z-H co ,--mA (Nom[nal)l U

• mA -a-I mA (maximum)19.75 mA. --....... .. ... ............

19.70 mA -i 19.65 mA .. ........ ..... .-116.0 Pa 116.5 Pa 117.0 Pa 117.5 Pa 118.0 Pa 118.5 Pa 119.0 Pa Page I of I Attachment

9.5 ATTACHMENT

18 OP-HP-XXX DRAFT MURR OPERATING OP-HP-XXX OPERATION -LAB IMPEX IODINE DUCT MONITOR -FILTER CHANGE AND SOURCE CHECK RESPONSIBLE GROUP: Reactor Health Physics PROCEDURE OWNER: APPROVED BY: _ _____ ____ Date: This procedure contains the following: Pages Attachments Tables Figures Appendices Check-Off Lists I 1 None None None None through through through through through through 7 1 None ATTACHMENT 18 OP-HP-XXX DRAFT TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1.0 PU RPO SE ............................................................................................................................ 3 2.0 SCO PE ................................................................................................................................. 3 3.0 D EFIN ITION S ............................................................................................................. 3 4.0 PRECA UTIO N S A N D LIM ITA TIO N S ......................................................................... 3 5.0 SPECIA L TO O LS O R EQ U IPM EN T ........................................................................... 4 6.0 PRO CED U RE ...................................................................................................................... 4 7.0 REFEREN CES ............................................................................................................. 6 8.0 RECO RD S ........................................................................................................................... 6 9.0 A TTA CH M EN TS ............................................................................................................ 6 2 ATTACHMENT 18 OP-HP-XXX DRAFT OPERATION -LAB IMPEX IODINE DUCT MONITOR -FILTER CHANGE AND SOURCE CHECKS 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 Establishes a standard method for changing the Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor filter.1.2 Establishes a standard method for performing a source check of the Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor 2.0 SCOPE 2.1 Procedural steps and precautions necessary to change the filter and perform source check of the Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor.2.2 Describes when and how to change the filter of the Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor, and how and when to perform source check and the documentation necessary to RECORD the completion.

3.0 DEFINITIONS

3.1 Weekly

-Performed every seven days between checks with a maximum allowed interval of nine days.3.2 Operable -A system or component is operable when it is capable of performing its intended function in a normal manner.4.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS NOTE: Notify Control Room that the Lab Impex Iodine Duct Monitor filter will be changed.4.1 No processing activities may be performed during the filter change or source checks of the Duct Monitor 4.2 Filter should be changed on a weekly interval.4.3 Source Check must be performed on a monthly interval.3 ATTACHMENT 18 OP-HP-XXX DRAFT 5.0 SPECIAL TOOLS OR EQUIPMENT 5.1 FILTER* TEDA-Impregnated Carbon Cartridges (TC-45)5.2 CHECK SOURCES* 05-07-04 Ba-133 Iodine Check Channel Source 6.0 PROCEDURE 6.1 SECURING SAMPLE AIRFLOW 6.1.1 RECORD the CPM readings on all three channels.6.1.2 Use the arrow key on each CMS to scroll to the flow screen.6.1.3 RECORD the flow for Iodine channel.6.1.4 Turn off the sample pump.6.1.5 CLOSE Duct Monitor Inlet Valve V-XX.6.1.6 Press the F4 button on each CMS to silence the audible alarm.6.2 IODINE FILTER REMOVAL AND SOURCE CHECK 6.2.1 OPEN the sliding lid and unscrew the detector chamber cap.6.2.2 Remove the filter cartridge and install the Iodine check source.6.2.3 Reinstall the chamber cap and the sliding lid.6.2.4 Wait two minutes for detector to stabilize. 6.2.5 Use the arrow key to scroll to the raw count screen.6.2.6 RECORD the raw counts on the top line (A:).6.2.7 OPEN the sliding lid and unscrew the detector chamber cap.6.2.8 Remove the check source and install the new filter cartridge.

6.2.9 Reinstall

the chamber cap and the sliding lid.4 ATTACHMENT 18 OP-HP-XXX DRAFT 6.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)6.3 RESTORING SAMPLE FLOW 6.3.1 OPEN valve V-20.6.3.2 Turn on the sample pump.6.3.3 Use the arrow key on each CMS to scroll to the flow screen.6.3.4 RECORD the flow for the Iodine channel.6.4 RESTORING THE CMS UNITS 6.4.1 Restart the CMS unit: a) Turn power switch to the "OFF" position to the CMS unit.b) Turn power switch to the "ON" position to the CMS unit.c) Verify readings.d) Notify Control Room that Source check process is completed and the Duct Monitor is operational. 5 ATTACHMENT 18 OP-HP-XXX DRAFT REFERENCES

6.5 MAN0042

"Lab Impex Stack Monitoring Systems Manual" 7.0 RECORDS 7.1 "Lab Impex Data Sheet" 8.0 ATTACHMENTS 8.1 "Lab Impex Data Sheet" 6 ATTACHMENT 18 OP-HP-XXX DRAFT DUCT MONITOR DATA SHEET Dae Off I Lo.lI I Local1 g. I odine Imelalled Ca r lull.I I~ I Flow"Ast 1C4T1I it Cl C CpM CPS Ilasel no30w I j Wpm. E I I I'I I r I i I r- I- --iI I l l -PagelI of I Attachment 9.1 Roof Line DRAFT ATTACHMENT 18 i 1 I mtz DRAFT I DRAFT Tc-IN 'aLC4toý ))Vd KIZ6A 4-ATTACHMENT7 18 ORRIGINAL AP-RO-l115 Revision 9 Modification Number: 14-04 SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory? Yes: No: Signature: _ Date: 12k/-12@/tl1 //" If YES, provide a list of the spare parts This equipment is similar to other instruments installed at MURR. No additional spare parts are required.DRIGINAL Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

18 DRAFT DRAFT ATTACHMENT 19 ORIGINAL AP-RO-I 15 Revision 3 MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM FOR: 1) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.NOTE: Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 75-16: Addendum 4 Modification Title: Reactor Safety System Monitorinq Circuit ("White Rat") Panel -Revision to Panel Overlays in Support of Flux-Trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST)Page No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Page Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation OP, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Y KC Required Date es No Completed.,__ -2,.p- ?K: K:_____ -- 2P-07 By (Initials)-K-50.59 Screen Completed: Ma.Xy /Enginering (Asst. Reactor Man er -Engineering) Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review: Ai (Asst. Reactor Manager -Engineering) Modification Approved-(Rea or ager)Modification Completed: Date: - "- 0 ý_Date: ,7--3/- e.Date: 7-7-o0 Date: a-OW -I I Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

19 ORIGINAL AP-RO-l 15 Revision 3 Modification Number: 75-16: Addendum 4 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)This Modification Record documents a revision to the Reactor Safety System Monitoring Circuit ("White Rat") Panel. New overlays will reflect the addition of a series contact in both the "green leg" and "yellow leg" of the Reactor Safety System. The new contacts provide a SCRAM function from the Flux-Trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST) instrument channel as described in the FIRST Preliminary Long-Form Modification Record. This modification does not change the function of the "White Rat" Panel itself.The Reactor Safety System Monitoring Circuit was originally installed in October 1973, under Modification Record 72-3, as a way of monitoring the reactor scram circuit for spurious scrams that were too short in duration to be sensed by the Annunciator or that may have developed in unmonitored sections of the system. During the upgrade to 10 MWs, Modification Record 74-10 documented the addition of seven (7)new monitoring points to the "yellow leg" of the safety system. Modification Record 75-16 documented the addition of two portable units ("White Rats") to the monitoring circuit. Addendum 1 to Modification Record 75-16 documented the permanent mounting of fourteen (14) individual monitoring circuits, which were contained in the portable units, to a sub panel located on the right side of the reactor control room Instrument Panel. Modification Record 75-16, Addendum 2 documented the relocation of the monitoring circuit from this subpanel to a subpanel on the left side of the Instrument Panel in support of installing the new Secondary Cooling System pump control circuit. Modification Record 75-16, Addendum 3 documented the revision to the "White Rat" Panel overlays due to the replacement of instrumentation for the replacement Primary Coolant System heat exchangers HX 503A and 503B.The attached draft of the "White Rat" Panel overlays shows the following revisions: For the "Green Leg" of the Safety System: Add Contact "K62-2" between terminal point P7-F and K26-2 to be worded as "FIRST." For the "Yellow Leg" of the Safety System: Add Contact "K61-2" between terminal point P6-L and K31-2 to be worded as "FIRST." This modification is being performed in support of the FIRST Preliminary Long-Form Modification Record.Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page 1, with justification) The short form of the Modification Record is appropriate because (a) this is an Addendum to an existing, previously reviewed and approved Modification Record, and (b) this is a modification to a non-safety system that requires documentation and review only.2 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

19 ORIGINA/AP-RO-I 15 Revision 3 Modification Number: 75-16: Addendum 4 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes:__ No: A4 -Signature: f /4 Date: _-__.____If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda.The Reactor Safety System Monitoring Circuit ("White Rat") Panel is not described or discussed in detail in the HSR and its addenda. It's name and location are depicted in Table 9.2 and Figure 9.3, respectively of the HSR.These and all other Sections and Figures of the HSR and its addenda are considered correct and will remain the same.3 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

19 ORIGINAL AP-RO-l115 Revision 3 I Modification Number: 75-16: Addendum 4 REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a safety hazard as described in 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Yes:_ No: Signature: ý'eý ,, d Date: "Z--7_. 4-0.If YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. The Reactor Safety System Monitoring Circuit is not discussed in the Technical Specifications. 50.59 Screen (No. 09-06) is attached and shows this modification may be implemented without further regulatory review.4 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

19 ORIGINAL AP-RO-I 15 Revision 3 Modification Number: 75-16: Addendum 4 OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, AND COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE, AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?Yes: V No: __ Signature: D-;ýZý Date: S- 7-'-,e3 If YES, provide the suggested revision(s). OPERATING PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. PRINTS: "White Rat" Panel overlays will be revised per the attached revision.5 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

19 ORIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 3 I Modification Number: 75-16: Addendum 4 SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory? Yes: No: L Signature: _ _____ Date: i-- -O If YES, provide a list of the spare parts.SPARE PARTS: No spare parts are required for this modification. 6 Attachment

8.1 DhAFT

op mmmmmmmmmmminmmnnmmmmmmnm 40 m100m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m *..mmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmi 00 mmmnm lm nmmnmimniiil nmgm 0 m i mom mmmm m imnm mgamnmmm m m m m m+ d mm DRAFmT C)m z-I CD K .L POWER LEVEL 11K13 INTERLOCK{ ~ m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m 4 4L-OOP %2K28 LOW PRESSURE 4, (PT..944B) "m'mmm'mmm'm'mm-'m'm'm'mm'm'mmm I4 RX LOOP 942 LOW PRESSURE (PT-943)HI RX LOOP A LOW FLOW 918 REFLECTOR DELTA P HX 503A LO (PT-917) K38-2 (ALARM 920C) 'mm mm m mm mm mm m mmmmmm-LO 31121 -amm mmmmmof 2I RX BRIDGE OR 1(622 FIST j BLDG. AIR PLENUM 2KI~r B ~HI ACTIVITYm mmmm mmmmmmmm I PRESSURIZER 1w u,26-2 p q "pp 4 RX BRIDGE OR m z co"lI T% %7UJ5 (PS-939)PRESSURIZER LOW LEVEL (LC-935)POOL LOOP LOW FLOW HX 521A (ALARM 920D)K37-2. -2KIA BLDG. AIR PLENUM HI ACTIVITY 920G -RX LOOP B LOW FLOW HX 503B (ALARM 920G)980B "J LOOP B HI TEMP THX 503B RX LOOP A HI TEMP m m m 980A T HX 503A IGREEN LEG III H I I I I D [a 4% IF Ir ATTACHMENT 19 COPY AP-RR-003 Revision 4 50.59 SCREEN Activity Screening Number: 09-06 Page I of 2 Title: Modification Record 75-16 Addendum 4 Reactor Safety System Monitoring Circuit ("White Rat") Panel -Revision to Panel Overlays Description of Activity (what is being changed and why): The "White Rat" overlays are being revised due to the addition of the FIRST rig and associated instrumentation. The changes to the overlays deal with this change in nomenclature only and dw;`not affect the electronics of the "White Rat" system.Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safefacifity (i.e., F--MURR) operations? YES NO If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions:

1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design fiInction__-

described in the HSR? YES NO 2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR F. 1'x described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested? YES NO 3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology _-- _-X that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses? YES NO 4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is F--" utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or YES NO is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HISR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? ___ IX YES NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approved facility procedure(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evahlation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use page 2 of this form to document your statements. Print Name Sign Name Date Preparer: Billy J. White 5- Ze- zoo'Reviewer: L-/-I. ,-c,/ _________Reactor Manager: Les P. Foyto r6-07 Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

19 Ir AP-RR-003 Revision 4 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Activity Screening Number: 09-06 Page 2 of 2 Title: Modification Record 75-16 Addendum 4 Reactor Safety System Monitoring Circuit ("White Rat") Panel -Revision to Panel Overlays If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is no__ required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessary. I I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design finction described in the HSR?No. The proposed activity does not involve a change to any SSC described in the Hazards Summary Report. This modification does not alter the function of the Safety System or create new modes of failure.2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No. The proposed activity does not involve a change to any procedure.

3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?No. The proposed activity does not affect any of the design bases or safety analyses described in the Hazards Summary Report.4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. The proposed activity does not involve any test or experiment.

List the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]Mod. Record 75-12; Mod. Record 75-16 Add. 1; Mod Record 75-16 Add. 2; Mod Record 75-16 Add. 3: Mod Record 74-10: Mod Record 72-3: Mod Record 05-8: Mod Record 05-8 Add. 1: Mod Record 05-8 Add. 2; HSR Chapter 9 MURR Drawing 74, Instrument Cabinet.Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

20 ORIGINAL AP-RO-I 15 Revision 3 MODIFICATION RECORD: SHORT FORM FOR: 1) Addenda to existing Modification Records (e.g., modifications of same nature as ones previously reviewed and approved).

2) Significant modifications to the facility or facility systems that are not described in the Hazards Summary Report.3) Modifications that require engineering decisions/implementation in a time frame that precludes normal licensed operator review prior to implementation.

4) Modifications to non-safety systems; for documentation and review only.NOTE: Licensed operators will review these modifications as part of the Operator Requalification Program.The Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review these modifications.

Modification Number: 06-3; Addendum 2 Modification Title: Replace Flux Trap Holder Wear Ring Page No.1 2 3 4 5 6 Paue Title Modification Record: Short Form Modification Description (Why Short Form is appropriate) Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation OP, PM, CP, and Print Evaluation Spare Parts Requirements Required Date Yes No Completed K 5__/_C_9 K _____K _____-K-.sr- -aV By (Initials) 4.,.,/50.59 Screen Completed: <(Asst. Reactor Managqe-i Engineering) Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review: -, ,(Asst. Reactor Manager -neering)Date: "7- i".- 0 Date: 7-1/-,?Date: 7-6-o0 Date: 91- / 5-O0 Modification Modification Completed:.(Reactor 4.anager)1Z-I Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

20 ORIGINAL AP-RO- 115 Revision 3 I Modification Number: 06-3; Addendum 2 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)This Modification Record documents the replacement of the Center Test Hole Canister temporary wear ring with a different design. The new ring covers a larger circumference of the Flux Trap Holder; ensuring rotation will not disengage the position sensing switches.The Center Test Hole (Flux Trap) is that portion of the reactor through the center of the core bounded by the 4.5 inch inside diameter tube and extends 15 inches above and below the core vertical centerline. The Center Test Hole Canister is inserted into this region of peak thermal flux (6 x 10A14 n/cmA2-sec) for the purpose of material irradiations. The flux trap can provide a rather large reactivity effect and is thus subject to a high degree of administrative control to minimize the possibility of inserting or removing a sample with a high reactivity worth during reactor operation. Three center test hole assemblies are designed and approved for use at the MURR, the commonly used one being a three-tube, or "three-barrel' test hole canister. It consists of three hollow aluminum tubes, a guide foot to maintain alignment, a hold-down fixture to secure the sample contents in the three aluminum tubes, and a latching fixture to secure the holder to the island tube (inner pressure vessel). A wear ring is attached at the top of the test hole canister to mate with a similar ring attached to the island tube. The current temporary ring from Modification Record 06-3; Addendum 1 has two tabs attached with threaded fasteners that engage a pair of vertical plunger type switches.This wear ring will be replaced with a wear ring that has a solid extended ring that is fabricated as part of the wear ring. This ring is a 7 inch outside diameter ring that is 0.25 inches thick. This ring extends beyond the 4.487 inch outside diameter of the current wear ring. There are two machined gaps in the ring, orientated 180 degrees apart, to allow for proper alignment of the handling tool to disengage "latching fingers." These"latching fingers" are attached to the wear ring with threaded fasteners and latch onto the inner pressure vessel to secure the Canter Test Hole Canister when in place. A draft print showing the details of the wear ring modification is attached. This installation is being done in support of Preliminary Long Form Modification Record, "Flux-Trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST) Instrument Channel." The prototype FIRST support rig was installed under Modification Record 08-5, and subsequent details of the FIRST device and its function are provided in Modification Record 08-5.Why a Short Form is appropriate.(At least one of four reasons listed on Page 1, with justification) The short form of the Modification Record is appropriate because this is an addendum to a previously reviewed and approved Modification Record (Reason No. 1).2 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

20 ORIGINAL AP-RO-I 15 Revision 3 Modification Number: 06-3; Addendum 2 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: ._- No: Signature: Z Lle Date: "---l/-If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does involve a change to the reactor facility as defiried in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda. The Flux Trap and its use is described or discussed in the following sections of the HSR and its addenda: 1. Hazards Summary Report Section 8.2 Figure 8.4 (MURR Print No. 2505, Sheet I of 3)Figure 8.5 (MURR Print No. 2528, Sheet 1 of 3)2. HSR Addendum 1 Sect 3.17 3. HSR Addendum 3 Section 3.10 The following sections of the HSR and its addenda will be revised: 1. Hazards Summary Report Figure 8.4 (MURR Print No. 2505, Sheet 1 of 3) -revised to reflect the modified wear ring.Figure 8.5 (MURR Print No. 2528, Sheet 1 of 3) -revised to reflect the modified wear ring.3 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

20 ORIGINAL AP-RO-i 15 Revision 3 I Modification Number: 06-3; Addendum 2 REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a safety hazard as described in 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: 1. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.___No: .X Signature: c___1---"",, ..! -/, Date: ,.V--/-072 Yes: If YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Mod tion Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or a question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.50.59 Screen (09-05) is attached and shows that the proposed activity can be implemented without further evaluation or license amendment. The change to the wear ring design duplicates the existing function and manner of ensuring the flux trap experiment samples remain secured. Extended circumferential coverage is provided by this ring to ensure the vertical position switches remain engaged under all conditions, and has no impact on its ability to perform its primary function.4 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

20 ORIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 3 Modification Number: 06-3; Addendum 2 OPERATING, PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, AND COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE, AND PRINT EVALUATION Does this change require a revision(s) to any Operating, Preventative Maintenance, or Compliance Procedure, or any Print?Yes: Node: t Signature: Date: _sns)If YES, provide the suggested revision(s). OPERATING PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required for this modification. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES: No revision is required under this modification. PRINTS: MURR Print No. 2505, Sheets 1 through 3 -revised to reflect the modified wear ring.MURR Print No. 2528, Sheets 1 through 3 -revised to reflect the modified wear rng.5 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

20 ORIGINAL AP-RO-I 15 Revision 3 I Modification Number: 06-3; Addendum 2 SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION Does this change require that any new or additional Spare Parts be maintained in inventory? Yes:_ No: AI Signature: Date: If YES, provide a list of the spare parts.No additional parts are required to be maintained in spares to implement this modification. 6 Attachment

8.1 ATTACHMENT

20ý9(9[pv I AP-RR-003 Revision 4 50.59 SCREEN Activity Screening Number: 09-05 Page I of 2 Title: Modification Record 06-3; Addendum 2, Replace Flux Trap Holder Wear Ring Description of Activity (what is being changed and wh1):_Temporary Flux Trap Holder Wear Ring is being replaced with a final design chanqe in preparation for Preliminary Long Form Modification Record "Flux-Trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip FIRST Instrument Channel. " Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safe facuil.v (i.e., MURR) operations? If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions: I. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design fimnction described in the IISR?2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safet, analyses?4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the IISR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications? YES O-NO F-YES F-YES F YES ,r-YES IE YES N-NO NO NO NO If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approved facility procedure(s). Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.A License If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evahlation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use page 2 of this form to document your statements. Print Name Sign Name .. Date Preparer: c X A / -y'o Reactor Manager: Les P. Foyto Attachment

9.1 ATTACHMENT

20 AP-RR-003 Revision 4 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Activity Screening Number: 09-05 Page 2 of 2 Title: Modification Record 06-3; Addendum 2, Replace Flux Trap Holder Wear Ring If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessary. I 1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a design fimction described in the HSR?No. The proposed activity does not involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects any HSR described design function. The replacement wear ring will continue to function in a manner identical to and consistent with the current wear ring. It will have the added feature of an extended upper ring that will engage switches to positively indicate the holder is properly secured and latched.2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No. The proposed activity does not affect the performance, control, or testing of HSR-described SSC functions. No procedural changes are required to implement the proposed activity.3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safet, analyses?No. The proposed activity does not involve any evaluation methodology used to establish the design bases or used in the safety analyses. While not strictly a Bulk Pool experiment, this installation is a modification that is outside the scope of the design basis and safety analyses.4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. The proposed activity does not involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where a SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR. This installation will conform to the reactivity and materials limitations stated in the Technical Specifications. List the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers.]HSR Sections 8.2, Figures 8.4 and 8.5.Addendum 1, Section 3.17 and Addendum 3 sections 3.5 and 3.10 Modification Record 06-3: Addendums 1 and 2. Modification Record 08-5.MURR draft Print No. 2505 Sheets 1 through 3, MURR draft Print No. 2528 Sheets I through 3 Attachment

9.1 DRAFT

SECTInN THRU 3-TUBE FLUX TRAP t/2 SCALE PLANVIEW 3-TUBE FLUX TRAP FULL tC I ~~f L ....---------

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= === -= ---------------------------------------- HS3 M.nf -SECTION THRU 3-TUBE FLUX TRAP -FINISH FULL SCALE DRAFT IM32 X 45" LOL2WC -IANVm0 a; -SETONm F-RWlG -SUETf41 C-C O&RDE -PtM ANVir (ALmzNIl- 52T11 C-C 1/32 10&3125 IM X 45' CHAl/1 ~ 1.3750+ 002ýOO938 FO-2500-F 1h~x Ti m L 2pcg S===j laIT 0 r A TT * %~ *fl f1& 1t nfl I 3 Ai I riMIVIt'H u LU DR 020 SETO //A kFT 9Am e/4M~MAV nl CHM 0-Li x <J D I-2505 NWm 3 a,3 i I ... .... .... .i i 0 5 0 0 J 0230J X 45" MEAIL -LATCHING FINGER@MATERIAL, MAKE rRtM PLATE A/HICH MEETS CHEMICAL AND MECHANICAL REQUIREMENTS OF SPEC. BMOYP44AI-INCI]NEL X -750. HEAT TREAT PER PIOJ-YPIC. DRAFT SAft I (A ED x KMWA MVi. ~4J 2.0 5 61 40.875' BARREL FLUX TRAP AM mWDG (4) EMV u&J.u CR~ANIALY G~ROOM IN TH 33T! 34 P~n OFV THE....... ........ _" .1, M SMAL SAPL TW OW 0) RSUIE SPACE rID CLARITY.PLAN VIEW 6-BARREL FLUX TRAPSCALE SECTION THRU 6-BARREL FLUX TRAP -CONTINUED NOTE, SOME MI)EM LOSD L BCKIIaC ITE5$M r ARE I S4TVA IM FTSU VI1 f"R CLARITY.1/4fJ ....SECTION THRU 6-BARREL FLUX TRAP -FINISH rULL SCALE lolT, E wIoE LINUES L SACK"D InS Anr NOT IN THIS VIEW rOA 'LARITT.0--gb ATTACHMENT 20 D gn x I*-VU 1 45-JW M- PI AN V1A( W AMG-SCION 11-0625 0313 FI L-MAIJU~ AEAR RIMI~~~~~~~~~o~ TRIP,...~hR~f WADR Pun-~PCHd nR LA IICE- PI AN VXV @ AVCYTTA Ottol SME 00 ALL AMNl LNIESAR Nff SHO JRIMA T1413 VVV Pil CLARIYT.'AFT MY&h 7/23/99 REVISION NLKN, z p I-Labi C3 Ld-i -LL i 8L I< bLJ 1 Lj C <,1 1fl C x Wm 2528 OaI33 00.719 2.55'--o oa'301.750 CW LOCATIONS 00250' T OOlvmN RomBs 45'MILES. LOCAFTEASS 'COR CID sm or C3. Hmm SEE !ELEVATION FOR SMALL SAMPLIE LON=LOCATIS AS SHMiM.tar MARY.g&LMVN REID HEAD PLAN VIEW 0,625 lVX45. 00WER;, OL~~ n HEAD _ SE:CTR -LINES ARE MDRT SHOWN IN THUS VDIEV FIR CLA~IITy.45* CIAWER ODA ýO. THRU HOL DLIL~..8.L0k2 VI PAS KEYINT U0Lý WATELR HLES BOTTOM Or PLATE, W&LEIEMC RASE CLIP -PL AN VIEVV S 01.750 LUCA LWT 4~ 01.750 GEEA TARS -PLAN VIEW NVRASE: OP -SECTIONJ G-GE SME OR ALL AIRWAM LINES AIMNI SHOWN RIM THIP VPEV TOM CARITY.ING TAPS, 3SPETS PEEUIRM t PE WIlAR BOTTM OF ASSEMBLY. ERJN.LL SPACE ER SETS IN 31OA WA ASSEKIARt TACK WELD TAS TR TABSS-I ~ -I R RI /A R t-ET 2o3 JI-TACK WELD 1/8 THK PLATE ON ROD TO PREVENT THE HOLD DOWN PIN FROM BEING INSERT INCORRECTLY. 0,188" 10.000 0.500-1.375' ni1 X 083 WALL 0.500 0.6250-1--

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__ -__--------------\.60,~\ -60*4' IE -MATERIAL. HAKE FROM PLATE VHICH MEETS CHEMICAL AND MECHANICAL [Y SPEC. 550YP44A1-INCIINEL X -7550 HEAT TREAT PER PISJ-YPIC. 0 T 0,2500 _I't" I I IIU I 0.12515 1.0" ,--.221 DRILL(#2)Cs 80-82 X 7/64 0.250o- DEEP 2 HOLES-0.500 1.000 5.750 6 nn7' LUNG, P.UG VIED TO L. Mr SWPE TUIES 32 Z' LN., PLUG VELT TD M ID5 F TUES TWPsiTE Tw m rM LOADING SýIE CAN&.SECURING HEAD PIN L HAR PIN KEEPER nrTAIL -LATrHING FINGFR Y ATTACHMENT 21'-RIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 6 MODIFICATION RECORD: LONG FORM Modification Number: 11-1 WAF Number: 12-2027 Modification Title: Flux-trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST) Instrument Channels Requ Page No.1 2 3 4 5a-c 6 7 8 9 Page Title Modification Record: Long Form Modification Description Hazards Summary Report Evaluation Reactor Safety Evaluation Operator Review and Evaluation Operating Procedure & Prints Evaluation CP and PM Evaluation Parts Requirements Spare Parts and Technical Manual Requirements Yes-I-x ired Date No Completed"___ i K.- /--2.- -"d-/.2 2 -.,' -J2____z-'g- By (Initials) d1,,z-50.59 Screen or ,o. ;~ ,, , Ce.Ai.Evaluation Completed: 7/-e --- A/o/ l " (rA rC ,N-t. , /P7.)(Asst. Reactor Manager -Enginpring) Modification Approved: ?re , -(keeaq--r Manager)Modification Completed: DS.e/-(R Modification Closed:__-___ /- (Retor Man~ager)Date: 7- ZO//-- 2 ,o/2..Date: F-)- 9 69r" Date: A-1,6 -1 Date: ) -'Date: 7- z '-- 1 I I Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

21 ORIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 6 Modification Number: 11-1 REVIEW AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION Item No. Page Title 1 Reactor Safety Subcommittee Review 2 Reactor Advisory Committee Review 3 U.S. NRC Review 4 Operating Procedures Updated 5 MURR Prints Updated 6 Compliance Procedures Updated 7 Preventive Maintenance Procedures Updated 8 Spare Parts System Updated Required Yes No Date Completed"3-, f-2.Sa AL-OLAJ"--z-,/-IZ Documented by (Initials) _____//- 2"- /1 In-.- 1 .PZL'JT 1 j ?% .P , "C-J. 93 bir 3-- I ol9 TT- w- 13/ PAýI a f7/ 1?T, TY a-710L1 , (t 1.11g YCJ," .I "b?re-Fb a-, O- ao I ;.Ml 1T ?-l I'(;k ýX E T .0 ")-DýTCD -7 -ao I Ila Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

21 ORIGINAL AP-RO-l115 11-1 Revision 6 I Modification Number: MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION Provide a concise description of the system change. Include any proposed PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTS required for this change. (If additional pages are necessary, insert after this page.)Overview The Flux-Trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST) is a proposed addition to the Reactor Safety System that will ensure that the Center Test Hole Canister, commonly referred to as the Flux Trap Holder, and its contents remain in place during reactor operation. This feature will allow a change in the methodology that is currently used to calculate the reactivity contribution of samples loaded in the flux trap region.Background The current method of calculating the total reactivity worth of experiments in the Center Test Hole during reactor operation includes the reactivity contribution of the Flux Trap Holder. This is a conservative approach that severely limits the total available reactivity of samples loaded into the canister. Since the flux trap region has a positive void coefficient of reactivity, the empty canister itself appears as a void in the flux trap, thus adding a significant amount of positive reactivity (0.0036 delta-k for the 3-barrel holder and 0.0050 delta-k for the 6-barrel holder) to the calculation methodology. The MURR is considering an alternative methodology in which the reactivity contribution of the Flux Trap Holder is not included, and only the reactivity contribution of the experiment samples is included in the calculation. To conservatively implement this methodology, it is suggested that instrumentation be provided such that insertion or removal of the Flux Trap Holder cannot physically be performed during reactor operation. This instrumentation would provide an input signal to the Reactor Safety System such that the reactor could not operate unless the Flux Trap Holder, or strainer, is properly installed. Modification Record 08-5; "Install Temporary Prototype of the Flux-trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST) Device," documented the installation of a testing prototype for the FIRST. The prototype was installed in December 2008, and tested almost continuously since that time. The results of that testing are described primarily in the "Testing" section below, but are also referred to throughout this Modification Record. Several improvements as a result of the testing have been incorporated into the proposed FIRST device and described in the Preliminary Modification Record.The Preliminary Modification Record was reviewed in accordance with procedure, and produced several questions, which are formally answered in this Modification Record. Also included with those answers are answers to questions posed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) through the formal NRC amendment process. During the intervening time, several improvements as a result of both continued testing and the formal review processes have been incorporated into the proposed FIRST device and described in this Modification Record.(Modification Description continued on Page 2a)2 Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

21 ORIGINAL AP-RO-I 15 Revision 6 Modification Number: 1I-I MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)Theory of Operation The FIRST will comprise two new instrument channels using two independent sensors to detect the position of the Flux Trap Holder. When a sensor is 'made-up,' a relay coil is energized, maintaining a normally open contact in the closed position. This contact is one of several in series that make up one leg of the 24VDC input to the Safety System Non-Coincidence Logic Units (NCLU). This configuration is duplicated for the other sensor. When a sensor is no longer'made-up,' the relay coil de-energizes, opening a contact, thus interrupting the 24 VDC input signal to the Safety System NCLU. The resulting trip of the NCLU will de-energize the Trip Actuator Amplifiers (TAAs) and scram the reactor. This action ensures that if the position of the Flux Trap Holder changes from its secured and latched position, reactor operation will cease.Conversely, if the sensors are not 'made-up,' the TAAs cannot be reset. This ensures that the Flux Trap Holder cannot be installed during reactor operation. Layout and Description The FIRST is two new instrument channels, including sensors, components and modules, which detect the position of the Flux Trap Holder and converts that position into a logic input to the Reactor Safety System. The FIRST is comprised of the following components: Flux Trap Holder Wear Ring, Sensor Switches, Support Rig, Relays and Power Supply, Safety System Interface, and FIRST Bypass Switches.Flux Trap Holder Wear Ring The wear ring is an existing component of the Flux Trap Holder. This wear ring is the top-most component of the Flux Trap Holder. Its position is fixed with respect to both the holder and the Island Tube (inner pressure vessel) when the holder is installed. The wear ring will be modified to provide a flanged radial extension at its top. This extension will be the reference point for contact with the sensor switches. Modification Record 06-3; Addendum I, "Install Temporary Flux Trap Holder Wear Ring," provides a basis for modifying the wear ring to perform this function. Modification Record 06-3; Addendum 2, "Replace Flux Trap Holder Wear Ring," documents modifications to the wear ring to perform the function described here.Sensor Switches The sensors chosen for this service are waterproofed plunger-type switches with molded cables of sufficient length to ensure all connections are made above the water line (see attached diagram of switch). These switches have been tested over several months and numerous cycles under their intended service conditions. Further testing description for these switches is provided in the later section, entitled "Testing." The material used in the fabrication of the instrument cable jacket is a form of neoprene called"Carolprene." As stated in the report Radiation Resistance of Elastomners, neoprene has good radiation resistant properties up to a fluence of I E8 rads and does not display signs of brittleness until approximately 3E8 rads. As measured directly at IOMWs, the radiation field on the pressure vessel head is approximately 1.3K rads/hr gamma and essentially no neutron. Assuming that the reactor operates on average 150 hours per week, 52 weeks/year at 10 MWs, it would take approximately 10 years to reach a fluence of 1 E8 rads.(Modification Description continued on Page 2b)2a Attachment

8.2 ATTACHMENT

21 ORIGINAL AP-RO-l 15 Revision 6 Modification Number: 11-1 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)Full travel of the switch is 3/8-inch, is limited by the protective collars to be roughly 1/4-inch, and is expected to be compressed under service conditions to roughly 3/16-inch. Details of the FIRST device construction including the switches are provided in the attached draft MURR Print No. 2712.Support Rig The support rig will attach to the reactor pressure vessel head via the existing handling ears, and will support and vertically align the two independent switches that close when the Flux Trap Holder is in its secured and latched position. The support rig will be fabricated in-house from 6061-T6 Aluminum and 304 Stainless Steel as described in the attached draft MURR Print No.2712.The support rig will be of welded construction, with the exception of the rack and pinion mechanisms, which must be accessible for inspection and repair. The support rig will have two extension legs protruding downward from the plate to ensure that the rig cannot tip over during handling evolutions at the pressure vessel head. The plate also features two additional '/2-13 UNC threaded holes for unanticipated handling evolutions. The support rig will use rack and pinion engagement pins to engage the existing handling ears of the pressure vessel head, will provide means to be positively installed, removed and stored, and will allow physical access to all bolts of the vessel head should the device prove unable to be disengaged and removed underwater. The rack and pinion engagement pins will be operated using a 2-inch rotating rod (a common handling tool in the pool), and will have opposed direction of operation to counter any induced moment.The switches will be adjustable in height, held in place using jam nuts, and be provided protective collars to prevent over travel of the switches. This condition would only occur in the event of improper handling or improper installation of the support rig. Cables from the switches will be attached beneath the support rig plate, and be provided adequate strain relief as they exit the support rig.Relays and Power Supply The relays will be of the standardized K-relay type, commonly used in the Safety System, which have an excellent service history. The relays, K-61 in the Yellow Leg and K-62 in the Green Leg, will be located in the existing K-relay drawer. This enables them to be accessible, use a standardized shorted relay if needed for testing and troubleshooting, and to provide a configuration consistent with existing Safety System components and operation. The relay coils will be powered via 24VDC Power Supply 2PS3. This power supply has ample capacity, is already present in the K-relay drawer, and currently powers all existing K-relays in the K-relay drawer. This approach will greatly simplify the installation of the new relays and again provide a configuration consistent with existing Safety System components and operation.(Modification Description continued on Page 2c)2b Attachment

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21 ORIGINAL AP-RO-l 15 Revision 6 Modification Number: 11-1 MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)The normally open contact I from each relay will be connected into the existing Annunciator logic for the Power Level Interlock Scram. The contacts will be connected in series with the existing annunciator function to provide a scram annunciation in the event that any of the four contacts should open. The existing annunciator window "POWER LEVEL INTERLOCK SCRAM" will be replaced with a new annunciator window "PLI OR FIRST SCRAM." The normally open contact 2 from each relay will be connected into the existing Yellow and Green Legs as described below.Safety System Interface Two contacts will be added to the existing Yellow Leg and Green Leg series inputs to the Safety System. These normally open (meaning contacts will open when coil is de-energized) contacts (K-61, contact 2, in the Yellow Leg, and K-62, contact 2, in the Green Leg) will provide the ability to interrupt the 24VDC input signal to the Safety System. The resulting trip of the respective NCLU will de-energize the TAAs and scram the reactor. All contacts in the Yellow and Green Legs are shown in the Reactor Safety System Monitoring Circuit (commonly referred to as the "White Rat") Panel Overlays. Modification Record 75-16; Addendum 3, "Reactor Safety System Monitoring Circuit ("White Rat") Panel -Revision to Panel Overlays in Support of Modification Record 05-8," provides a previous basis for revising the overlays to this panel.Modification Record 75-16; Addendum 4, "Reactor Safety System Monitoring Circuit ("White Rat") Panel -Revision to Panel Overlays in Support of Flux-Trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST)," will document revisions to the overlays to this panel to indicate the function described here.FIRST Bypass Switches The FIRST Bypass Switches (IS29 in the Yellow Leg, and IS28 in the Green Leg) will provide the following two functions: (i) allow testing and troubleshooting capability, and (2) provide the use of both the proposed methodology and the current methodology for calculating the reactivity contribution of samples and the holder in the flux trap region.When it is desired to use the current methodology of including the reactivity contribution of the Flux Trap Holder, the First Bypass keys will be inserted and the switches placed in the"BYPASS" position.The bypass switches will be of the standardized keyed-type, currently used in the Safety System with an excellent service history, and labeled I S29 and 1 28. They will be located in the Reactor Console adjacent to the existing bypass switches. The switches directly jumper each FIRST sensor switch to energize relay coils on K-61 and K-62. This configuration provides the Reactor Operator a direct and unmistakable indication at the Reactor Console that this Safety System function is bypassed.Installation of the bypass switches requires relocating the Annunciator RESET and TEST pushbuttons. These pushbuttons will be relocated to directly above the existing Annunciator ACKNOWLEDGE pushbutton.(Modification Description continued on Page 2d)2c Attachment

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21 ORIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 6 Modification Number: 1l-I MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)System Layout and Routing a. The support rig is held in place by the lifting ears of the Pressure Vessel Head.b. The switches are supported and aligned by the support rig.c. The Flux Trap Holder wear ring engages the sensor switches.d. Switch leads are routed through the Pool, through an access on the south side of the Bridge, and down to a junction box on the Mezzanine.

e. Switch leads will continue on through existing chases to the keyed bypass switches, I S29 and I S28, on the Reactor Console.f. Switch leads will continue on through existing chases to the Instrument Panel area.g. The switch contacts control the coils of relays K-61 and K-62 in the K-relay drawer.h. The normally open contacts of these K-relays provide an additional series contact in each of the Yellow and Green Legs of the Reactor Safety System.i. An additional normally open contact in each relay provides an input to the "PLI OR FIRST SCRAM" Annunciation.

Redundancy Considerations The applicable questions addressable in IEEE-279 are outlined in the Hazards Summary Report Evaluation (page 3) of this Modification Record. These proposed instrument channels are most similar to existing instrument channels that provide a reactor scram in the event that any one of the three primary or pool coolant system isolation valves V507A, V507B, or V509 come off their open seat. Only failure modes that are conservative and operationally limiting can occur due to the installation of these instrument channels.Testing A temporary installation was put in place in December 2008. This device was instrumented with the sensor switches proposed here, but was connected to a digital chart recorder to monitor the operation and reliability of the switches and their support rig. Detailed assessments of the support rig and its switches have been performed on several occasions since initial installation. Choosing a suitable and reliable sensor switch was a major focus area for implementing these instrument channels. Extensive bench and in-situ testing was performed to ensure the chosen switch could perform well. Initial testing of the switch was done in a deionized (DI) water bath, where the switch was mechanically cycled many times to verify water-tight integrity. Next, repeatability testing was done to ensure the switch travel and contact break point could be consistently achieved. Excellent precision was obtained in this testing. As stated above, full travel of the switch is 3/8-inch, is limited by the protective collars to be roughly 1/4-inch, and is expected to be compressed under service conditions to roughly 3/16-inch. Testing revealed that the contact closed at roughly 1/8-inch of compression, and opened at roughly 5/64-inch of compression. Testing was extremely consistent for any one switch, and varied between switches by as much as 1/32-inch. These bench tests plus the in-pool support rig testing support the choice of these switches for their intended service.(Modification Description continued on Page 2e)2d Attachment

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21 ORIGINAI.AP-RO- 115 Revision 6 Modification Number: 1I-!MODIFICATION DESCRIPTION (con't)The intended precedent for establishing switch height in the rig is to allow 3/16-inch travel between fully compressed at the protective collar and 'contact-open.' This will allow roughly 1/8-inch of vertical travel prior to initiating a FIRST scram if the Flux Trap Holder is moved from its secured and latched position.See the License Amendment Response section for a detailed discussion of the reactivity response due to moving the Flux Trap Holder.Supporting Documents This work will be performed in conjunction with a modification of the wear ring for the "3-barrel" Center Test Hole Canister. Modification Record 06-3; Addendum 2 will document the modification of this wear ring to provide engagement of the wear ring to the switches described here.This work will also be performed in conjunction with a modification to the Reactor Safety System Monitoring Circuit ("White Rat") Panel Overlays. Modification Record 75-16;Addendum 4 will document revisions to the overlays to this panel to indicate the function described here.2e Attachment

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21 ORIGINAL AP-RO- 115 i 1-1 Revision 6 Modification Number: 1__ 1_Revision_6 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION Does this change involve a modification to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report?Yes: All No: Signature: Date: __-_-/o"-/ If YES, make an analysis below and provide the suggested revision(s) to the HSR. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.This modification does involve a change to the reactor facility as defined in the Hazards Summary Report (HSR) and its addenda. The Center Test Hole, and its use, and the Reactor Safety System, as applicable to this modification, are described or discussed in the following Sections of the HSR and its addenda: I. HSR: Section 8.2, Figures 8.4, 8.5, and 9.4 2. Addendum 1: Sections 3.15 and 3.17 3. Addendum 2: Subject No. 10 4. Addendum 3: Sections 2.5.5, 3.5, 3.8, 3.10 and 3.13.6 5. Addendum 4: Sections A.3.10, A.3.14, and Figues A.I and A.7 6. Addendum 5: Section 3.0 The following sections of the HSR and its addenda will be revised as follows: I. HSR: Section 8.2, Figures 8.4 and 8.5, Table 9.1, Figures 9.2 and 9.4, and new Section 9.9 a. Revise Section 8.2, "Flux Trap," paragraph I from: "Consequently, use of this facility will be subject to a high degree of administrative control to minimize the possibility of inserting or removing a sample with high reactivity worth during reactor operation." To read: "Consequently, use of this facility will be interlocked with the Reactor Safety System to ensure that the reactor will scram should the center test hole canister be removed during reactor operation. The facility will also be subject to a high degree of administrative control to minimize the possibility of inserting or removing a sample with high reactivity worth during reactor operation." b. Revise Section 8.2, "Flux Trap," paragraph 2 from: "A latching device located at the top of the canister positively determines the canister position." To read: "A latching device located at the top of the canister positively determines the canister position and two Reactor Safety System instrument channels positively sense the canister position during reactor operation." (Hazards Summary Report Evaluation continued on page 3a)3 Attachment

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21 DRIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 6 Modification Number: II-1 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION (con't)c. Figure 8.4 (MURR Print No. 2505, Sheet I of 3) and Figure 8.5 (MURR Print No. 2528, Sheet I of 3) were revised by Modification Record 06-3, Addendum 2.d. Add the following to the end of Table 9.1 "Control Console Displays and Controls": "61 FIRST "Off-Bypass" 2 Pos. Key Lock""62 FIRST "Off-Bypass" 2 Pos. Key Lock" e. Revise Figure 9.2 "Control Console Layout" per the attached draft.f. Revise Figure 9.4 (MURR Print No. 139, Sheet I of 1) per the attached draft.g. After Section 9.8.3.2, "Reactor Pressurizer System," add the following new section: "9.9 Center Test Hole Instrumentation The center test hole instrument channels, called the Flux-Trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST), detect the position of the center test hole canister, or strainer, when installed. If these channels do not detect that the center test hole canister, or strainer, is in the secured and latched position, a scram is initiated." 2. HSR Addendum 1 a. 3.15 -Step Reactivity Insertion Analysis This section will not be revised. The section refers to a step reactivity insertion at 5 MWs.b. 3.17 -Description of Experiments This section will not be revised.3. HSR Addendum 2 a. Subject No. 10 -Transients from 10 MWs This section will not be revised. The worst-case insertion accident without fuel damage envelops the scenario where the Flux Trap Holder is inserted or removed in its entirety.The circuit response time is far less than the stated 400 milliseconds, which itself is far less than the time required for any significant reactivity change to occur as a result of the Flux Trap Holder being inserted or removed.4. HSR Addendum 3 Note: To preserve 10MW upgrade information intact, precedence has been established that Addendum 3 will be revised only to the minimum extent necessary.

a. Section 2.5.5, "Safety System" This section will not be revised.b. Section 3.5 "Analysis of Rapid Step Reactivity Insertions from Full Power in the MURR" This section will not be revised.(Hazards Summary Report Evaluation continued on page 3b)3a Attachment

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21 ARIGINAL AP-RO- 115 Revision 6 Modification Number: 11-1 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT EVALUATION (con't)c. Section 3.8, "Single Failure Criterion Analysis" This section will not be revised.d. Section 3.10, "Safety Analysis of the Center Test Hole" This section will not be revised.e. Section 3.13.6, Experiment Reactivity Limits" This section will not be revised.5. HSR Addendum 4 a. Add the following at the end of Section A.3.10, paragraph 2, after "Pressurizer level (unmonitored level controller):""Center Test Hole Canister position (limit switches)." b. Revise Section A.3.14, "Indication of Bypasses," paragraph 2 from: "Bypass switches are utilized to change the protective system to correspond to the three modes of operation (50 kW, 5 MW, or 10 MW)." To read: "Bypass switches are utilized to change the protective system to correspond to the three modes of operation (50 kW, 5 MW, or 10 MW), and to bypass the center test hole instrument channels." c. Add the following new section: "A.3.3.15 "Center Test Hole Scram" Protection against an excessive reactivity step insertion in the Flux Trap region is achieved by two independent position sensing switches mounted on a removable support rig at the top of the pressure vessel head. In the event the Center Test Hole Canister leaves its secured and latched position, a reactor scram is initiated by either or both of these sensing switches, which actuate auxiliary relays K61 and K62, which in turn interrupt logic unit inputs E4A and E3B respectively." d. Revise Figure A.I (MURR Print No. 139, Sheet 1 of 1) per the attached draft e. Revise Figure A.7 (MURR Print No. 138, Sheet 1 of I) per the attached draft.6. HSR Addendum 5 a. Section 3.0, "Step Reactivity Insertion Analysis for Determination of Experiment Reactivity Limits" This section will not be revised.All other Sections, Figures, and Tables of the HSR and its addenda are considered correct and will remain the same.3b Attachment

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21 ARIGINAL AP-RO-! 15 Revision 3 I Modification Number: 11-1 REACTOR SAFETY EVALUATION Does this change involve a revision(s) to the Technical Specifications or a safety hazard as described in 10 CFR 50.59?NOTE: A licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the HSR without obtaining a license amendment only if: (i) A change to the Technical Specifications incorporated in the license is not required, and (ii) The change does not produce any of the following results: I. More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;2. More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the HSR;3. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the HSR;4. More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the H-ISR, 5. Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the HSR;6. Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the HSR;7. Altering or exceeding a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the HSR;8. A departure from a method of evaluation described in the HSR used in establishing the design bases or the safety analyses.Yes: Y_ No: Signature: 45 $ Z Date: ___________ If YES, the change must be performed using a Long Form Modification Record. If NO, outline the basis for the decision.YES, this change does involve a revision to the Technical Specifications and is therefore being performed using a Long Form Modification Record. Additionally, in order to implement this change, the Technical Specification revision is being performed by application for License Amendment and must be approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission prior to implementation. Technical Specification 3.1.g states: "The reactivity worth of each secured removable experiment shall be limited to 0.006 delta-k." Technical Specification 3.1.h states: "The absolute value of the reactivity worth of all experiments in the center test hole shall not exceed 0.006 delta-k." In the past, MURR has conservatively included the reactivity worth of the sample canister within the definition of an "experiment" in the center test hole. The intended methodology is to count only the reactivity worth of the samples, and not the reactivity worth of the canister, toward the absolute value of the reactivity worth of the experiments in the center test hole.Technical Specification 3.3 will be revised to include two instruments, or measuring channels, in the reactor safety system that will sense the position of the center test hole canister. The capability to bypass the channel will also be included in the instances where MURR opts to include the reactivity worth of the canister.4 Attachment

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21 ORIGINAL.AP-RO-I 15 Revision 6 I Modification Number: 11-1 OPERATOR REVIEW AND EVALUATION Operators are asked to comment on any safety and/or operational concerns relating to the proposed change. Please indicate any additions, questions, or changes regarding the Hazards Summary Report and Reactor Safety evaluations. Name Comments'-~- r T,-~ P PiL. ~ ~ ,~r,~ey- To~.-Vf -, r -* Q -/ cle- r 7-^X 5a Attachment

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21 ORIGINA AP-RO-l 15 Revision 6 I Modification Number: 11-1 OPERATING PROCEDURE AND PRINT EVALUATION If a revision to, or a new Operating Procedure and/or Print are required in order to implement the change, note the Procedure or Print Number, Title, and Section and attach a copy of the proposed new or revised procedure or print.OPERATING PROCEDURES Number SM-RO-500 Title REPLACEMENT OF FLUX TRAP REACTIVITY SAFETY TRIP (FIRST) SUPPORT RIG Section NEW PRINTS Number 79, Sheet 1 of 1 138, Sheet 1 of 1 139, Sheet 1 of 1 651, Sheet 1 of 2 651, Sheet 2 of 2 1386, Sheet 5 of 5 2712, Sheet 1 of 3 2712, Sheet 2 of 3 2712, Sheet 3 of 3 Title 10 MW Annunciator Annunciator Control 10 MW Safety System Annunciator Control 10 MW Annunciator Control 10 MW (NEW)Relay Schedule Flux-trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (NEW)Flux-trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (NEW)Flux-trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (NEW)6 Attachment

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21 ORIGINAL AP-RO-I 15 Revision 6 Modification Number: 11-1 COMPLIANCE AND PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE EVALUATION If a revision to, or a new Compliance and/or Preventative Maintenance Procedure are required in order to implement the change, note the Procedure Number, Title, and Frequency and attach a copy of the proposed new or revised procedure. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES Title Number CP-36 (NEW)CP-2 CP-3 CP4 A,B,C,D CP-5 CP-6 CP-7 A,B CP-8 A,B CP-27 CP-30 FIRST Scrams (NEW)Pressurizer Level and Pressure Control Pool Low Level Scram -LC-966 Primary Flow Transmitters (FT-912 A); (FT-912 E): (FT-912 G): (FT-912 H)PT-917 -10 MW Building Evacuation/Isolation Scram, Building Hi Activity Scram Pool Flow Orifice 921 (Green Leg); (Yellow Leg, V509 OFF OPEN)Primary RTD's (901 A&B); (980 A&B)Power Level Interlock Static Scram ARMS and 16-Inch Valve Cabinet and Associated Horns and Lights Frequency Semi-Annually Semi-Annually Semi-Annually Semi-Annually Semi-Annually Semi-Annually Semi-Annually Semi-Annually Semi-Annually Monthly Number RX-Q2 (NEW)PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES Title Inspect FIRST Rig Frequency Quarterly 7 Attachment

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21 i tW0 a, 4~AP-RO-l 15 Revision 6 Modification Number: 11-1 PARTS REQUIREMENTS List all parts that are required in order to implement the change, noting Part Number, Description, and Quantity.Part Number Part Description FIRST Support Rig -fabricated per MURR Print No. 2712 FIRST sensor switches (SeaCon AU-LS-SD-C) 40' leads Bypass Key Switches (1S29 and 1S28)Qty.2 6 2 PO No.: Procard Date: Various P0 No.: Procard Date: 5/20/2009 Ordered From: various materials vendors were Ordered From: SeaCon AP used to procure the component Assembly, Limit Switch, 7 Amp parts for the Support Rig. Where (AU-LS-SD-C) needed, specifications have been Limit Switch (Standard Duty)called out in MURR Print No.2712 40' lead conductors PO No.: Ordered From: Date: PO No.: Ordered From: Date: 8 Attachment

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21 Modification Number: 111 ORIGINAL AP-RO-1 15 Revision 6 I SPARE PARTS and TECHNICAL MANUAL REQUIREMENTS List all spare parts and technical manuals that are required in order to implement the change, noting Part Number, Description, and Quantity, and Manual Title and where ordered from.SPARE PARTS Part Description Qty.Part Number FIRST Support Rig, Complete Spare with switches FIRST Sensor Switches (see above)1 2 PO No.: Date: PO No.: Date: Ordered From: Ordered From: PO No.: Ordered From: Date: PO No.: Ordered From: Date: TECHNICAL MANUALS Manual Title Ordered From 9 Attachment

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21 ORIGINAL Responses to Crew Review and Evaluation Questions Crew response produced a total of twenty-four questions from six operators. Those questions and the formal response to them are provided below.The original NRC license amendment request was evaluated under the relicensing process. This initial evaluation produced a total of seven questions, to which MURR responded on August 31, 2010.The FIRST portion of the relicensing process was then evaluated as a separate NRC license amendment. This second evaluation produced a total of five questions, to which MURR responded on January 31, 2011.Following the above response, a third evaluation produced a total of four questions, to which MURR responded on July 11, 2011.Following the above response, the NRC requested clarification on the usage of the "center test hole Strainer." MURR responded on December 19, 2011.The four responses to NRC requests for additional information are provided in the following section.Formal Response to Crew Review Questions Question 1: On page 26, paragraph 4 it refers to isolation relay coils. It might be more clear if it's noted that this is the type of relay. When I hear isolation I think about an isolation of containment. The term 'isolation', where it refers to the relays, has been removed from the Final Modification Record.Question 2: Secondly. the mod record refers, in several places, including the HSR changes (8.2 and Add. 4) to instrument channel in the singular. By tech spec definition, 1.7 this should be two instrument channels especially as we are including IEEE 2 79 discussion and taking credit for redundancy. The FIRST system should correctly be referred to as two instrument channels. This correction has been made throughout the Final Modification Record.Question 3: Along this same line, does only having one bypass key negate that redundancy? After all the two channels join together where one failure could take out both trips. The same point should be considered for the routing of the wires.MURR has chosen to use two bypass keys. This change has been made throughout the Final Modification Record.Question 4: Finally in the rewrite of HSR add 4 A. 3.3.15 the relays are referred to as 2K61 and 2K62.Unless I've missed something they should be K61 and K62.The correct reference to the relays should be K61 and K62. This error has been corrected in the Final Modification Record. ATTACHMENT 21 ORIGINAL Question 5: Page #7. New CP is listed as CP-38, but the draft is number CP-36.The correct CP is CP-36. This error has been corrected in the Final Modification Record.Question 6: Could the PM to inspect the FIRST rig also include an inspection of the wire and mounts?This revision has been incorporated into the PM. A draft of this PM is included in the Final Modification Record.Question 7: How is the wire to be mounted?The routing of the cables is described in the Final Modification Record. Mounting of the cables is depicted in MURR Print 2712, Sheet I of 3. A draft of this Print is included in the Final Modification Record.Question 8: Print 2712 is referenced as having 3 sheets: however only I (page 3) is included A draft of MURR Print 2712, Sheets I of 3, 2 of 3, and 3 of 3 are included in the Final Modification Record.Question 9: Print 139 -The yellow leg monitoring point 6 should be before the Rx loop B low flow scram.This error has been corrected on Print 139. A draft of the corrected Print is included in the Final Modification Record.Question 10: Print 139 -Since 1S28 bypasses the FIRST scram, should this not also be included in the print.Bypass Switches I S29 and I S28 bypass the FIRST scrams by powering the coils to relays K61 and K62, which then maintain contacts closed that are depicted on Print 139. The bypass switches and the K-relay coils they energize are depicted on Print 138, Annunciator Control.Question 11: Page 3 Rev IA: should read "... use of this facility will be interlocked with the reactor safety system to ensure that the reactor will SCRAM should the center test hole canister be removed..." Agreed. This correction has been made in the Final Modification Record.Question 12: Page 3 Ic, Id." Mod record lists Figure 8.4 and 8.5 as being revised, but they are not included in the Mod record Recommend either including the prints or remove them from the Mod record. This revision is included in the flux trap wear ring mod record.Figure 8.4 and 8.5 were revised by Modification Record 06-3, Addendum 2. These Figures will be referenced in the Final Modification Record, but not revised.Question 13: Page 3a. IH: Since we are adding section 9.9 do we need to address the change in the following section numbers. ATTACHMENT 21 JRIGINA -Section 9.9 is being added to the end of Chapter 9 of the Original HSR. Following Section numbers in the combined Original and Addendum volumes will not be revised.Question 14: CP-36 should include section 3.3 as a reference. Technical Specification 3.3 has been included as a reference in the draft of CP-36, which is included in the Final Modification Record.Question 15: CP-36 uses siandard phrase for placing bypass key to 'OFF'. Steps 26 and 17 shoud read"Place FIRST scram bypass switch 1S28 to "OFF" position.This nomenclature has been standardized throughout the draft of CP-36, which is included in the Final Modification Record.Question 16: CP-36 should we test with 3 barrelflux trap device also?Each of the three holders featuring the flanged wear ring section have been test fit on the support rig and shown to make up the switches regardless of which device is installed. CP-36 will continue to use the strainer due to ease of installation and removal, but could be adequately performed using any of the three holders.Question 17: Figure 9.2 need to add labels for 1S28 and new location ofAnn. Test switch.This oversight has been corrected in the draft Figure 9.2, which is included in the Final Modification Record.Question 18: CP-36 why not complete this cp with pool and primary systems on line?To remain consistent with current CP methodology, CP-36 will continue to utilize jumpers in place of systems on-line. However, a systems on-line alternative could be added to a future CP revision if distinct advantages to doing doing so emerge after implementation. Question 19. RX-Q2 step 6 remove the "or placed in storage" this would also ensure the installation of the rig is checked The rig can be stored ajier completion of the PM While this wording was considered, it was determined that proper installation of the support rig should be determined prior to each use, and will be performed during Start-Up Checks. The OR portion of step 6 will remain to provide the LSRO with flexibility. Question 20: Do we need to fabricate additional shorted relays?No. All CPs can be performed without requiring additional shorted relays. CP-30 will use the most at seven of the eight available. Question 21: Probably need to consider slight revision to definition of '*Experiment" in TS during amendment request. Otherwise going from 3-barrel to 6-barrel would be a change in "normal" reactor component change. ATTACHMENT 21 OR(. INAL The purpose of the amendment and the FIRST system is to remove the holder from its role as a part of the experiment, and make it a "normal" part of the reactor. Regardless of which holder or strainer is installed, it will be considered and administratively controlled as a "normal" part of the reactor.Question 22: Add a step in startup checks to verify bypass status? The totalflux trap holder and loading can have different limits depending on whether FIRST is bypassed or not.During startup checks, the configuration of the FIRST will be administratively determined by the Reactor Manager or his designee, and this will be reflected by signature on the Flux Trap Loading Sheet. If bypass keys are authorized and in place, this condition will be annotated on the startup checksheet as approved by the Reactor Manager.Question 23: There are penned corrections on the print.Further revisions including penned corrections to all prints have been incorporated into the draft prints, which are included in the Final Modification Record.Question 24: Also there is a post added to the rigs that have been built that is not reflected on the prints.Print 2712 has been extensively revised to depict several additional features, including the stabilizing posts. A draft of this print is included in the Final Modification Record. ATTACHMENT 21 ORIGINAL August 31, 2010 Response to NRC regarding seven questions CHAPTER 10 10.5 Section 10.3. 1, Center Test Hole. Related to license amendment request of August 6, 2009.a. Describe any occurrences where the center test hole canister failed to properly latch or when a canister was removed from the reactor when not intended.Each time the center test hole canister is installed, proper latching is verified by two members of the Operations staff, one being a licensed senior reactor operator, both visually and physically (by pulling upward on the canister rope). Instances in which the center test hole canister can not be verified latched result in reinstallation or repair followed by verification. The hold-down fixture within the canister is also verified latched prior to installation. With the hold-down fixture and the existing latching means being verified at each installation, no instances of improper latching or unintended canister removal have occurred.b. Describe any changes to procedures for sample handling or irradiation in the center test hole necessitated by the installation of the flux-trap irradiations reactivity safety trip (FIRIX)system.The existing procedures for sample handling in the center test hole will remain essentially unchanged, with the following exception: with the ability to operate the FIRST system in BYPASS, the appropriate administrative reactivity limit must be selected by the loading preparer, and reviewed and approved by the Assistant Reactor Manager-Physics. If the FIRST system is in BYPASS, the reactivity worth of the center test hole sample holder must be included in the calculation of the absolute value of the reactivity worth of all experiments in the center test hole.BYPASS operation will require Reactor Manager's approval to perform. ATTACHMENT 21 c. Describe the possible failure modes of the switches used on the FIRST system.In December, 2008, a temporary, prototype FIRST device and a mock instrument channel were installed to test operation and reliability of the FIRST system, including the switches. This test has continued to date in order to accumulate operating experience in using the device and to validate its long term reliability. Within the first few months of the test, it was determined that the original center test hole canister wear ring design could potentially prevent proper contact with the switch plungers, thus preventing the switches from closing and 'making-up' the safety system input. The wear ring was redesigned to ensure full contact with the switch plungers and no additional problems regarding proper contact have occurred.The failure mode mentioned above -where a switch failed to close -is conservative in that the safety system cannot be reset. While the failure mode where a switch cannot open the contact has not occurred, the failure of one switch would not prevent the remaining switch from performing its intended safety function.The mode where contact make or break could change with respect to plunger travel or maladjustment have not been observed but would result in one of the above two failures -not closing or not opening. However, neither is a reactor safety system failure.Periodic surveillance and maintenance inspections will also reveal maladjustments in switch positioning or potential switch failures that do not make themselves apparent through nuisance trips. ATTACHMENT 21 d. The SAR states that the cable jacket will display good radiation resistance for about 10 years of operation. Discuss the consequences of any potential failure of the FIRST cabling.Degradation of the FIRST cabling is specifically noted during periodic inspections, and cabling is replaced if signs of degradation are present. Failure modes for the cabling will result in either open circuit, a conservative failure where the safety system cannot be reset, or closed circuit, where the condition would not prevent the remaining circuit from performing its safety function.Periodic surveillance and maintenance inspections are intended to bring to light any cabling degradation prior to failure, and failure modes can be shown to be conservative.

e. Discuss the proposed methodology that will be used to determine sample reactivity when the FIRSTsystem is in use.The current methodology that is used to determine the reactivity present in the flux trap region or center test hole involves several independent measurements as described below. The same methodology will be used to determine sample reactivity values when the FIRST system is in use.The reactivity neutral condition of the reactor, as far as the central flux trap region is concerned, assumes a center test hole filled with just water (at 110 °F) and no individual experimental samples or the center test hole canister (also known as the removable experiment sample canister as defined in TS 1.3) installed.

The reactivity contribution of the center test hole canister is first determined by performing two back-to-back reactor startups; first one with the center test hole empty (only water present) and the second one with an empty center test hole canister -either the 3 or 6-barrel as described in Section 10.3.1.2. The difference in the control rod heights between the two startups in conjunction with the known integral rod worth curve is then used to determine the reactivity contribution from the empty test hole canister. Any reactivity contribution due to the temperature change is accounted for by the primary and pool coolant temperature coefficients of reactivity and the corresponding temperature difference between the two critical measurements. ATTACHMENT 21 The same methodology is used to determine the total reactivity contribution from a fully loaded sample holder. That is, two back-to-back reactor startups are performed; one with just water in the central region and the second one with the loaded test hole canister. The difference in control rod heights is used to determine the reactivity contribution from the loaded center test hole canister.Individual sample materials are irradiated in the central test hole by placing them inside tightly sealed standard sized aluminum cans. Materials that require multiple encapsulations are first placed inside smaller sealed quartz or aluminum vials and then placed within the welded aluminum cans. Typically, several of these individual sample cans are placed inside the tubes that make up the center test hole canister. The reactivity contribution from these individual sample targets are also measured in a very similar fashion. After estimating the possible reactivity worth of a new individual sample target to determine no reactivity limits will be exceeded, two back-to-back reactor startups are performed. First, a hollow thin-walled aluminum can filled with water (referred to as water can) with the same dimensions as the individual sample can is placed within one of the center test hole canister tubes and a reactor startup is performed. Next the water can is replaced with the sample can of unknown reactivity and a second reactor startup is performed. The difference in the control rod heights is then used to determine the reactivity worth of the unknown sample.The current methodology that is used to determine the total reactivity present in the flux trap region, including the reactivity contribution of the center test hole canister itself, will be the same methodology used when the FIRST system is in BYPASS.The proposed methodology that will be used when the FIRST system is in use does not include the reactivity worth of the test hole canister, but continues to sum the reactivity worth of the individual samples. The sum of the individual sample reactivity worth is and will be subject to existing Technical Specification limits, as well as more restrictive administrative limits, and must be approved by the Assistant Reactor Manager and Lead Senior Reactor Operator prior to loading.The methodology is also described in a letter to the NRC, dated August 6, 2009, requesting to amend the Technical Specifications that would allow implementation of the FIRST system. ATTACHMENT 21 f. Provide a discussion of how the design of the FIRST system meets the requirements of IEEE-279.The single failure criterion of IEEE-279 is completely met at the component level. The channel independence criterion of IEEE-279 will in large part be met, but in the case of certain components will not be fully complied with. Detection of the canister position must occur in the same physical space and from the same physical surface. This is a commonly accepted practice, where the channel independence criterion does not have to be extended to mean independent detection devices. Certain channel components, such as in-pool cabling and the BYPASS switch, are not physically separate. Where these proximities are concerned, no credible failure can be expected to occur that would simultaneously prevent both channels from performing their safety functions. Thus the design of the FIRST system effectively meets the intent of IEEE-279.g. There does not appear to be a surveillance requirement to help ensure proper operation of the FIRST system. Propose and justify an appropriate surveillance requirement for the FIRST system or explain why a surveillance is not needed As required by Technical Specification 4.4.a, the FIRST system will be tested for operability on a semiannual basis. A draft surveillance procedure (compliance procedure CP-36, "FIRST Scrams") has been prepared to verify proper operation of the FIRST system with regard to the reactor safety system.A draft preventative maintenance procedure (RX-Q2, "Inspect FIRST Support Rig") has been prepared to ensure mechanical integrity of the FIRST system, and will be performed quarterly. ATTACHMENT 21 DRAFT (changes shown in bold)TABLE 9.1 (Cont.)(b) Controls ORIGINAL Number 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 Function Rod Control Mode Rod Control Mode Power Schedule Selector Regulating Rod Operate Regulating Rod Operate Master Control Power Level Selector Control Rod Selector Control Rod Operate Regulating Rod Operate Annunciator Acknowledge Annunciator Reset Annunciator Test Scram Scram Reset Rod Run-In Rod Run-In Reset Magnet Current Reactor Isolation Facility Evacuation Hi/Lo Reflector AP Low Pressurizer Pressure Low Primary Pressure Vent Tank Low Level Rod Magnet Contact Ant-Siphon High Level Intrusion Alarm Airlock Door Security Thermal Column Shutter Pneumatic Tube Blowers Airlock Door Open Range Switch Intercom Bridge Door Unlock FIRST FIRST Positions"Manual""Auto""Raise-Off-Lower""Jog In""Jog Out""Off-Test-On""5OkW-5MW-I0MW""A-B-C-D-Gang""In-Normal-Out""In-Normal-Out" N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A"Off-On""Off-On""Off-On""Off-Bypass""Off Bypass""Off-Bypass""Off-Bypass""Off-Bypass""Off Bypass""Off-On""Normal-Closed-Outer Open""Off-On""Off-On""Outer-Inner" N/A N/A N/A"Off-Bypass""Off-Bypass" Type of Switch Push Button Push Button 3 Pos. Spring Ret.Push Button Push Button 3 Pos. Key Lock 3 Position 5 Position 3 Pos. Spring Ret.3 Pos. Spring Ret.Push Button Push Button Push Button Push Button Push Button Push Button Push Button 2 Position 2 Position 2 Position 2 Pos. Key Lock 2 Pos. Key Lock 2 Pos. Key Lock 2 Pos. Key Lock 2 Pos. Key Lock 2 Pos. Key Lock 2 Position 3 Position 2 Position 2 Position 3 Pos. Spring Ret.18 Position N/A Push Button 2 Pos. Key Lock 2 Pos. Key Lock DRAFT (changes shown in bold)9-5 Rev. FIRST ATTACHMENT 21 Control Console Layout a -ao-La ATTACHMENT 21 SM-RO-500 Revision 0 MURR SPECIAL MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE SM-RO-500 REPLACEMENT OF FLUX TRAP REACTIVITY SAFETY TRIP (FIRST) SUPPORT RIG RESPONSIBLE GROUP: DOCUMENT OWNER: APPROVED BY: Reactor Operations Carl Herbold John Fruits Date This procedure contains the following: Pages Attachments Tables Figures Appendices Check-Off Lists N None None None None None-t w-"&At,,-h through through through through through 6 0 ul-0--ul A IF Tr ATTACHMENT 21 SM-RO-500 Revision 0 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1.0 PU RPO SE ............................................................................................................................ .2.0 SCO PE ................................................................................................................................. 3 3.0 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS ......................................................... 3 4.0 PRO C ED U RE .............................................................................................................. 3 5.0 REFEREN C ES ........................................................................................................... 5 6.0 RECO RD S ........................................................................................................................... 6 2 ATTACHMENT 21 SM-RO-500 Revision 0 REPLACEMENT OF FLUX TRAP REACTIVITY SAFETY TRIP (FIRST)SUPPORT RIG 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 To provide instructions to the Operations Group for replacing the Flux Trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST) Support Rig.2.0 SCOPE 2.1 Provides procedural steps for establishing the proper height of the two (2) sensor switches in the replacement support rig.2.2 Provides procedural steps for replacement of the in-pool portions of the support rig.2.3 Identifies and provides guidance on inspections and retest requirements to place the replacement support rig into service as part of two (2) safety system instrument channels.3.0 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS

3.1 Reactor

secured.3.2 Radiation Work Permit (RWP) obtained from Health Physics.3.3 Pool pumped down to refuel level per OP-RO-466, "Pool Level Control-Pool Coolant System" (Reference 5.1).3.4 Replacement sensor switches on hand per Seacon AP (AU-LS-SD-C) with 40-foot leads.3.5 Replacement support rig has been inspected in accordance with PM RX-Q2,"Inspect FIRST Support Rig," through Step 3 (Reference 5.2).4.0 PROCEDURE 4.1 ESTABLISHING THE HEIGHT OF THE TWO (2) SENSOR SWITCHES CAUTION: The total travel of the switches is 3/8-inch.4.1.1 INSTALL the switches into the replacement FIRST support rig, attaching them with the protective collars on top and the jam nuts underneath. 3 ATTACHMENT 21 SM-RO-500 Revision 0 4.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)NOTE: When properly adjusted, the switches will be compressed to approximately 3/16-inch under service conditions.

4.1.2 Adjust

the installed height of the switches so that each switch has 1/4-inch of travel when compressed to the top of the protective collars.4.1.3 VERIFY switch continuity at a travel of approximately 3/16-inch compression.

4.1.4 Label

switch wiring with a 'Y' or 'G' as indicated by its position in the support rig.4.1.5 ENSURE protective collars and jam nuts are tight.4.2 REMOVING THE EXISTING SUPPORT RIG 4.2.1 Obtain LSRO permission to replace FIRST support rig.4.2.2 OPEN AND Danger Tag breaker #3 on UPS-3.4.2.3 ENSURE FIRST support rig wiring is properly labeled.4.2.4 Disconnect FIRST support rig wiring from mezzanine junction box.4.2.5 Connect cable snake to disconnected wire ends.4.2.6 Pull cables from the mezzanine side into the pool refuel area.4.2.7 Disconnect cable snake from cables.4.2.8 Remove FIRST support rig from pressure vessel head using the handling poles.4.2.9 From the refuel bridge, remove the FIRST support rig from the handling poles.4.2.10 Remove old rig and cables from pool area per RP-HP-137, "Handling Radioactive Material in the Reactor Pool" (Reference 5.4).4 ATTACHMENT 21 SM-RO-500 Revision 0 4.0 PROCEDURE (CONT.)4.3 INSTALLING THE REPLACEMENT SUPPORT RIG 4.3.1 Label leads on new cable Y 1, Y2, G1 and G2.4.3.2 Connect cable snake to new cables.4.3.3 Pull cables through existing conduit from the refuel bridge to the junction box on the mezzanine.

4.3.4 Disconnect

cable snake from cables.4.3.5 Connect leads to their assigned junction box contacts on mezzanine.

4.3.6 ENSURE

new cable orientation in the pool will not interfere with nonnal sample handling operation.

4.3.7 Using

handling poles, lower the FIRST support rig onto pressure vessel head with cables leaving the rig to the south.4.3.8 Install the FIRST support rig on pressure vessel head AND VERIFY proper fit.4.3.9 Place the FIRST support rig on pressure vessel head OR place into storage location.4.3.10 Inform LSRO of completion of the replacement. 4.3.11 Clear Danger Tag on Breaker #3 on UPS-3.4.3.12 Restore pool level as required per OP-RO-466, "Pool Level Control-Pool Coolant System" (Reference

5. 1).4.4 RETEST 4.4.1 Perform CP-36, "First Scrams" (Reference 5.3).

5.0 REFERENCES

5.1 OP-RO-466, "Pool Level Control-Pool Coolant System" 5.2 PM RX-Q2, "Inspect FIRST Support Rig" 5.3 CP-36, "FIRST Scrams" 5.4 RP-HP-137, "Handling Radioactive Material in the Reactor Pool" 5 ATTACHMENT 21 SM-RO-500 Revision 0 6.0 RECORDS 6.1 CP-36, "FIRST Scrams" 6 24,750 ANNUNCIATOR SEQUENCE~~=3 CONDITION TROUBLE NAMEPLATE SIGNAL AUDIBLE__________ CONTACT LAW~S SIL4NAL.NORMAL l4OY4AL-CLOSED OFF OFF ALERT ABNMR'AL OPEN fIWIII LASNN6, ON AUDIBLE SILENCED ABNORMAL -OfN StEADY-Ofi [FF eEYLjRN TO NOODTA[ NOMAI.-CLOSED DIM4 FLASHING N RESET 1LCQE O-1Of NAMEPLATE pl.-t 11 750257 Ve'tro.,C II 410 Sove.igr" ct Sut 7 mochýstr,- mo 601-4400 Co,46036 394-6242 FAX 636 394-6407 OPERATIONAL TEST ATTACHMENT 21 I -~ ----- ---_ _.in J,.l ,.. i ., ! ,iiii"~ ~ :.7 ;L222i ,, U U Tu" fmim mmd U v1 I * '4 I I II-I- : .T- T FIT I i]A *r RE=1 "t 1 1 .1 J .I _ __ __\-I.~~kp ANNUNCIAlUff L-AK I im p. ,_li-, z (t)0 F::: w 01__1 0 F--z 0 D z z 138 1.1)Tvm F~1 E~J I [- -] REFERENCE DRAWINGS--. I NEJTRON MOM101 SYSTE ELSEM. 01AG -40 6. PROCESS ReST MLI.2.4- .. 2PRCESS 0AlATN MON SYS, , ELEM. DIM, -202 7. ROD RIM-IN S I SAFETY SYSTEM ELEM -13 .a AUX&IJY A 4, ARA RADIATION MNO SYSTEM ELEM. SlAG. -203 0. ANNIMCIATOR 9' , -52 REACTOR CONTIROL ELEN. O-AG -42 U .I(it) *&ýAKS LAMP 10 K COWNED M1,1 A RE CAP. (0)MOCATES LAMPT BE SCOMM WMl A KML CAP.!NIERLOOC ELEM.. 0110 -41 9 F -~ .I YSNE ELEM D1. -WR U R940AEOR 2MI *lG -10d ft, N ll*lw ON.. 3MM-COTRL652 W__________ _"_I~ m WOW-L-fflumm.ommm

• All Im A+-I-Arci pq EM14+ 4i 9-FPM SE COLL ill ý ! i ! E : 2 ý 2 1 ý ! t : 1 f 1 ý y y 1 1 ! ! !V...* 0tu wn ai orgmo unIsi TO LL3" 0 z 0-J 0 I--z 0 0 z z z LU..I b :," ' .4U , #-:: -DIRAFT 1-2 REV DE CRIPTION DR, BY DATE I .I____________________

L........ _ _ A1-T, ACMEN'T 21 Bottom view of Drawer Dig-rn llýCHOU W"I a-fliii iiai o a-a1-C~j-een Leg uný,ccA coý7 ,P Q),R,, fjj.V WXY.7 V Ow LC9 c ( X 0_J u u z Z z z Q(S.-Ký10c 13< Kc+ I I 651 I DESCRIPTIONq DESCRPI[DR Bim DATE 1 Reactor Control Sys 2 Safty Sys 3. Rod Run-In Sys.4. Area Radiston Mor. SyS.5 Annunmator Control 6. Neutron Mon. Sys.MUIRR 13111 Rev. #8 Rev. data *ltr??Shlet 5 of 5#42#/139#140$203#138#40 7. P, hut (vLNveU ) #41 8. Proces inat. (trp., flow. esc) #41 B. Proces Red Mon. sy. #202 10. Poawon Ind. By #208 11. AADIwy ,manii Sys. re2m 12. Contoi Blade Drop Tiner. #1905 RELAY COIL COIL FUNCTION COIL CONTACT CONTACT CONTACT" CONTACT NUBR VOLTAGE AM* ..LOG, 'ME TYPE FNCTION K(43 Rod 8 MagnetM 9w~t 5 5 1 NO K51 5 2 NO C, lala 1 KOO K44 Rod C Magne Switc 5 5 1 NO Rod not in -ma wih magnet Rod Run-IN inlpu 5 2 NO R nnoti nc 0 imap* RR (2-5)K45 Rod C Magnet Switch 5 5 1 NO Contols 1(3 5 2 NO Capionls K53 w~hK K48 Rod 0 Magnet Switch 5 5 1 NO Rod not in ,ont o uMi mnegt Rod Rwn-IN input 5 2 NO ROd no In cotm

• Me" RRI Amn (2-51 K47 Rod D Magnet Switch 5 6 1 NO Controls (K56 5 2 NO Conlrls K55 wIh K54 K48 Rod A Lower LUmit Switch 5 5 1 NO Rode Fully Inmrad Antan (3-4)-5 2 NO Cob K4e w41h K41 K49 Rod A Man Engaged and on 5 5 1 NO Rods not Fuly IW~ed w*hawal pmhibit 2K WLm- 2 NO K40 K50 Rod B Lowe LilmI Swltch 5 5 1 NO Rode Ftfy Inslld Anc (34)515 2 NO. CAOMr K51 wMh 4 K(51 Rod B Magnet Engaged and on 5 5 1 NO Rode not Fully InstmM withdrawal pohbit 2K16 Lnower Lih 5 2 NO K51 K52 Rod C Lower ILO Switch 5 5 1 NO Rode Fuly Imewtd Anmcn (34)6 2 NO C m Kw K4 K53 Rod C Magnet Engaged aid on 5 5 1 NO Rode not Fuly Inuied wldmel poWhibit 2K11 lwwr iW 5 2 NO K53 K54 Rod 0 Lower LkUn Sw~tch 5 5 1 NO RISde led (34)5 2 NO C..otrKoMwk K47 K55 Rod D Magnet En.aged and on a 5 1 NO Rodt not Ft*y inastwidr, mwel pr h"bi 2Ki(6 Lower WLM 5 2 NO K56 K ,5 Sp re I K57 Spare I 2 K58 Channel 4 ownacele (95%) 5 5 1 NO Channel 4. 5 & 6 Downcaule Annm (5-10)K(59 ChmnnelS 5 ocnecife (95%) 5 5 1 NO0 CheWMis 4.5 & 8 Downacala Armoc. (5-10)K51(0 Chnnel 6 Domn*cie (96%) 5 5 1 --N-7 Channel 4,5 & 6 Dowecsieol Aveaitc. (5-10)K81 FIRST 5 5 1 NO FIRST Saumn Ameic (2-2)Z YELLOW 2 2 NO Sumn input(Yeow)wI W K82 FIRST 5 5 I NO FIRST San AnnCn (2-2)GREEN 2 2 N Rcrem input (Green leW)-r" I I I I~7> ip See MURR 139 CAUN LED TO PT917 (11)P7-F K62-2 FIRST I PRESSURIZER K26-2 HI PRESSURE PRESSURIZER LOW LEVEL K29-; '-(LCL-935)

K POOL LO1P LOW FLOW K37- F 521) (ALARM 920 0)" -(FE 921)Rx LOOP ALOW FLOW (ALARM 92m)HX 503A FE 913A P7-G TOYEL.UN LECi TO 2K12(8)0P6-L K61-2 FIRST SPP013 LOOP K31-2 'OV FLOW HX521 ALARM 92C0)FE921)RX LOOP A LOW FLOW K30- --(ALARM 920A)HX 503A FE 913A RRx LOOP HI K27-2 TEMP (ALARM 953B)(TE 901D)l P6-K TO K9-I See MURR 138 PLI OR FIRST SCRAM KSA13 U ZEN ILI "t IA KTýS.pB4 -- -,s, '+ FASfl1.-Ut. -AA.~r-UAtU I-LGO.-AI/ ~aAAPLAA ACUACIACLA 1'OLAC

• U f-~ -.ý11 I t rl- -

SEACON Advanced 21 1321 Nelius Road PO Box 767 Bellville, TX 77418 Phone 979-865-8846 Fax 979-865-8859 E-Mail sales@seacon-ap.com naMINIM Nlgilh'96'st' 0010460 Ship Date: I University of Missouri H Research Reactor Center IP 1513 Research Park Drive HT Columbia, MO 65211 s University of Missouri Research Reactor i0 1513 Research Park Drive D Columbia, MO 65211 Li Ex. Works: Bellville, TX 77418 USA I Purchase Order 11 Ship Via I Tracking Number 11 Reference ISerep Entered By Douglas Charlton 2 FedEx Express Saver KW KW 512/2008 L rduct -1 AU-LS-SD-C(MCR)(DWG A009-101)I Description Qty Ordered Oty BIO 2.00 0.00 Oty Shipped 1200 Limit Switch (Standard Duty) 1" Shaft with .440 Thread with molded RA Cable Item 001 of purchase order.Molded to 50 ft. of 18/3 SO Cable.Standard delivery / lead time: shipping 8-10 weeks A R.O.r'.AI..AX... fii 4 4 ffI I I ..Uiellvery Uo- I -UO SHIPPING DETAILS: 06-09-08 )',Pfta,,;:. CARRIER: FED EX (EXPRESS SA ER).TRACKING #: 9513 5702 4673 .-BOX: 12X12X8; WT. 10 LBS. N, S/N: 0010460-01-001 & 001046-01 00 'ON CoC No SS0010460-UOM-001 " W ' .LLj 1Q F )ct Coordinator Revew: Shipped By: " '., /'.If you have questions regarding this shipment, please contact the Project Coordinator at + 1-979-865-8846. RETURNS: POSITIVELY NO MERCHANDISE MAY BE RETURNED WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION, RMA OR CF #QR 44 ATTACHMENT 21 ACO N 1321 NELIUS ROAD BELLVILLE, TX 77418 PHONE: 979-865-8846 FAX: 979-865-8859 www.sales@seacon-ap.com CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMANCE 'V Sold To: University of Missouri Research Reactor 1513 Research Park Drive Columbia, MO 65211 Ship To: University of Missouri Research Reactor Center 1513 Research Park Drive Columbia, MO 65211 TEL: 573-882-5256 Ship Date: 06-09-08 Customer PO #: Doualas Chariton SAPL Sales Order #: 0010460 SWITCHES 2 N/A AU-LS-SD-C (MCR)A009-101;REV. P3 0010460-01-001 0010460-01-002 LIMIT SWITCH (STANDARD DUTY) 1" SHAFT WITH .440 THREAD WITH MOLDED RA CABLE. MOLDED TO 50 FT. OF 18/3 SO CABLE.SO# 2384 N/A I -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _"CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMANCE" We certify that all materials, processes, parts and/or assemblies shipped herewith under subject purchase order conform to specifications as called out in the purchase order and associated documents. PARTS FURNISHED ON THIS ORDER ARE FREE FROM MERCURY CONTAMINATION. All O-rings supplied conform to the ARP5316 and MIL-HDBK-695D elastomer seal component guidelines based upon the o-ring cure dates.Qu ity Assurance Representative Title Date CoC NO SS0010460-LIOM-001 ATTACHMENT 21 SE ACO N Final Acceptance Test Report lb .V~N.V'~ ¶7/0 Positive Action/Limit Switches Sales Order# Ci Part # A1A-LS-S C b j --Customer , Description L. S'.L Customer PO (I .efAA __.- Dwg #Customer PN __Shop Order# _ _ _ _ _Material 3 14 i _S Serial No. ---.Switch Contact Identification Cable Wire Colors Connector.ut (pul!) osition ( When Appfica ble) (Whtn Applicable)

1. COMMON 1. Green 1. [2. Normally Closed 2. White 3.4.3. Normally Open 3. Black 5.Switch Testing to Header Contacts (To cable wires or connector pins if applicable)

Header Pins I to 2 Pinslto2 Pins I to 3 Pins I to 3 Insulation Resistance Pin to< 1 Ohm >100 >100 <1 Ohm Shell=/>100 Megaohm @ 500 Megaohm Megaohm VDC S/N Out=Closed In = Open Out = In In = Closed 1 2 3____f >_ 16_n >_ &A, DVM Meter: S/N kq-Hi Pot Meter: S/N i j Tq Calibration Due Date 10 -7S--09 Calibration Due Date 2 -2 8- 09 Final Inspection QIn pector Date Date Final Test Report AUF-PP-SD-C ATTACHMENT 21 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE ORIGINAL NUMBER: PAGE: REVISION: RX-Q2 1 OF 1 11/29/11 Preventive Maintenance: PM System: Reactor Control Inspect FIRST Support Rig PM Components: FIRST Plant Conditions: Frequency: Quarterly Reactor Shutdown Pool Coolant System Shutdown Number of Men Needed: 2 Flux Trap Holder and Strainer Removed Estimated Time: 1 hour Test Equipment, Tools and Materials 1. Various hand tools 2. Blotter paper 3. Contamination controls References Modification Record 11-1, "Flux-trap Irradiations Reactivity Safety Trip (FIRST)" RP-HP-137, "Handling Radioactive Material in the Reactor Pool" Procedure 1. Disconnect FIRST support rig from Pressure Vessel Head.2. Raise FIRST support rig to the bridge area per RP-HP-137, "Handling Radioactive Material in the Reactor Pool." 3. INSPECT FIRST support rig for the following:

a. Structural integrity, tightness, and no warping b. Proper connection and condition of the switch cables c. Smooth operation of both switches d. Smooth operation of both engagement mechanisms

4. Report any abnormality to the Assistant Reactor Manager -Engineering for further guidance.5. Lower FIRST support rig to the Pressure Vessel Head area.6. Reconnect FIRST support rig on Pressure Vessel Head OR place in storage.7. Log PM completed in the Console Log Book and Maintenance Day Book.Date Completed:

LSRO Signature: DU~~AIFssROrED Rateactor~ Manager ATTACHMENT 24 UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA MISSOURI UNIVERSITY RESEARCH REACTOR PROJECT APPLICATION and HEALTH PHYSICS SAFETY EVALUATION for UTILIZATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL/RADIATION UNDER THE MURR REACTOR LICENSE Project Leader: 2. MURR Affiliation:

3. Project Name: 4. Radioactive Source: Products and Services Principle Radioisotope Form Quantity Processed/Day 1-131 (8 day ti/,)gas in single distillation:

liquid after absorption: solid (tellurium oxide)solid (tellurium oxide)solid (tellurium oxide)Te-127 (9 hour tI/,)Te-127m (109 day t,)Te-131m (32 hour t,.)up to 1200 Curies up to 11 Curies up to 44 Curies Note: Above activities are based on processing with a 24 hour dt activities renresent the cnmhined calculated activities of in to E RUR Controlling Irradiation RUR #440, Tellurium Dioxide 5. Location Requested: A dedicated laboratory in the eastward expansion of the MURR Industrial Building (MIB) has been constructed for this project. The Reactor Manager, Reactor Health Physics Manager and the Reactor Safety Subcommittee will review the 10 CFR 50.59 Screen prepared for this laboratory to help ensure all Reactor License and Technical Specification requirements are met.6. Purpose and General Description of Project: ATTACHMENT 24 The following is a brief description of the process: a. The irradiated tellurium dioxide targets will be delivered to the MURR Target and Waste Handling Hot Cell (HHC) where the targets will have their encapsulation removed. The target material will be placed in crucibles and transferred to the Processing Hot Cell (PHC) via a pass through between the cells.c. The bulk product solution will be sealed in a suitable transfer vial and transferred via a pass-through to the HHC for transfer via shielded cask to the Dispensing Hot Cell (DHC) for formulation into final product solution. It will then be dispensed according to customer requirements into vials suitable for shipping. An aliquot will be taken from the bulk solution and removed from the DHC for QC analysis.After cooling down the furnace and removing the expended target material, a second process may be performed. The expended target material (waste) will be sealed in a can within the PHC. After multiple processes and when the can is full it will be allowed to decay for a sufficient time and then will be moved via the pass-through to the HHC for interim storage.7. Special Facilities/Utilities/Equipment Required: A hot cell train, specifically designed for containment of 1-131 during the production process, has been constructed. This system of cells and the processing equipment were purchased as a turnkey system from a manufacturer with extensive experience with 1-131 production. Details for these hot cells and their design are included in a 10 CFR 50.59 Screen that will be reviewed by the Reactor Manager and Health Physics Manager. The design incorporates multiple barriers to help ensure any potential release of 1-131 will be controlled to well within 10 CFR 20 limits for both normal operation and potential accident conditions. Any potential 1-131 release, during normal operation, will be controlled to be within the goals of the MURR ALARA Program. A description of the 1- 131 Laboratory and equipment follows.A. 1-131 Processing Laboratory Location The 1-131 Processing Laboratory will be located within a new two level building addition attached to the MURR Industrial Building (MIB), (Figure 1). The design of the attached building will incorporate the necessary floor loading for the 1-131 hot cells and the height requirements for the necessary ventilation exhaust system filter banks. Two consultants, one with previous and one with current 1-131 production experience, have provided input to the laboratory and process design. ATTACHMENT 24 Figure 1- MURR Industrial Building Expansion B. Design Considerations for the 1-131 Hot Cells The processing laboratory will contain three adjoined and inter-connected hot cells located on the ground level (see Figure 2, next page): a target and waste handling hot cell (HHC); a processing hot cell (PHC);and a dispensing hot cell (DHC). The HHC and the PHC will have 200 mm (7.9 inches) of vertical lead shielding and the DHC will have 100 mm (3.9 inches) of vertical lead shielding. The area to the rear of the cells, labeled the cask loading area, is where the cell support facilities and equipment are located and where all cell inputs and outputs occur. The area in front of the hot cells, labeled the operator area, is where the cell windows, manipulators and controls will be located.The design philosophy for the hot cells is to provide adequate personnel shielding and containment of the]-131, precluding or minimizing any potential release to the individual cells to the reactor facility or to any unrestricted area.The three (3) cell hot cell processing system incorporates a six (6) detector radiation monitoring system (ALMO-6) designed to provide radiation dose level information to the process operators. Three of the detectors are located at the operator's work station where the hot cell manipulators are located. These detectors provide real time dose rate information to the operators when they are performing a process.The remaining three detectors are located next to the first in a series of charcoal filters located above each of the three bays of the processing hot cell. These are designed to give the process operators real time information related to the capture and loading of I-131 onto the first charcoal filter in each bank of the individual cells. This allows the process operators to monitor the condition of the charcoal filters and will alert them of the need to change to an available bank of alternate filters. ATTACHMENT 24 rigu1m / -I- Ii I L.ub I I tu ygL il atul y ATTACHMENT 24 B1. Target and Waste Handling Hot Cell Design Features The target and waste handling hot cell (HHC) is designed for two principal purposes: (1) to receive irradiated targets and house support equipment to remove the target encapsulation and (2) to store process waste for an interim period. This cell will have a floor access to allow entry of irradiated targets from a target transfer cask designed to seal with the cell floor port. Here the target encapsulation will be removed and the irradiated TeO 2 material will be placed in crucibles and transferred via a pass-through to the PHC.The HHC containment is provided by appropriate negative pressure and an exhaust system that includes high efficiency particulate filters (HEPA) and high efficiency gas absorber filters (HEGA).The cell will be designed to have waste materials from the PHC returned via a pass-through chamber for interim storage. The pass-through will have a door at each side and will be sized to hold any object that will be moved to and from the PHC. The waste material from the PHC (e.g., expended target material, contaminated used equipment) will be placed in containers with press-seal lids.The volume of the waste cell will be designed to hold the process waste for approximately 10 half-lives of the 1-131 (about 80 days) after which time the cans may be moved to longer term shielded storage. The cell will have 200 mm (7.9 inches) thick vertical lead shielding with a stainless steel liner and will have two master-slave-manipulators (MSM) penetrating the cell from the operator side.B2. Processing Hot Cell Design Features The processing hot cell (PHC) is where the dry distillation of the TeO 2 targets will be performed. This cell will have 200 mm (7.9 inches) thick vertical lead shielding with a stainless steel liner and two master-slave manipulators (MSM) which will penetrate the cell from the operator side of the cells. There will be a shielded entry door on the rear of the cell which will be used primarily for the initial setup of process equipment. After process equipment setup and cold testing it will be sealed and any subsequent equipment and consumables will enter the cell through the pass-through from the HHC.The PHC will have a pass-through chamber for moving waste material to the HHC. The sodium iodide (I-131) product solution will be moved to the DHC in a sealed vial via transfer back to the HHC and then with a cask to the DHC.The PHC, during processing, will provide three barriers to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment: (1) the processing equipment itself, (2) an additional inner containment for the separation furnace within the PHC with a dedicated iodine filter, and (3) the PHC containment provided by appropriate negative pressure and an exhaust system that includes high efficiency particulate filters (HEPA) and high efficiency gas absorber filters (HEGA). The process is designed to contain 1-131 within the process equipment; therefore, there should be minimal release of airborne radioactivity to the hot cell.The hot cell will be connected to the facility exhaust ventilation system so that any releases from the hot cells will be through the ventilation system on the 1-131 processing laboratory (including a dedicated stack gas monitor), as well as the facility exhaust ventilation system where it is again monitored by the facility off-gas radiation monitoring system.B3. Dispensing Hot Cell Design Features The dispensing hot cell (DHC) will be des:.rneciallv desi~med transnort cask_to receive the bulk 1-131 in This cell will have a sealable floor port for entry of items such as product vials, lead pigs, and dispensing equipment. This port will also be the exit point for the shielded pigs containing 1-131 product. ATTACHMENT 24 The dispensing cell will have 100 mm (3.9 inches) of vertical lead shielding and will have two MSM penetrating the cell from the operations side. Its containment will again be provided by appropriate negative pressure and an exhaust system that includes high efficiency particulate filters (HEPA) and high efficiency gas absorber filters (HEGA).C. Design Considerations for the 1-131 Process C1. Target Fabrication The targets will be fabricated in a laboratory space that includes a dedicated ventilated enclosure to assure the quality of the targets. Hazards identification in the Sigma-Aldrich Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)indicates that TeO 2 has no known OSHA hazards. The same MSDS indicates TeO 2 is not a dangerous substance according to the Global Harmonization System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals (GHS).'The target mass will be adjusted to the fluence predicted at the target irradiation location to produce a peak 1- 131 activity limited to by the RUR. The techniques for developing the targets for mass production while maintaining the necessary QC of the targets are being developed. C2. Target Processing MURR plans to remove the two layers of target encapsulation within the HHC using a MURR designed can opener. The irradiated TeO 2 material will then be placed in crucibles and transferred to the PHC via the pass-through. Below is an example of the processing equipment for the dry distillation of tellurium dioxide for 1-131 production. This process is similar to dry distillation processes described in IAEA-TECDOC-

1340, ATTACHMENT 24 C3. Target Waste Disposal The crucibles, containing expended target material after each process, will be placed in a disposal container to reduce the spread of contamination inside the cell. When full, the disposal container will be sealed and transferred to the HHC for temporary storage.Health Physics staff has performed an analysis of the waste stream. This analysis is documented in the"Safety and Design Review for the Proposed Production of 1-131 at the MU Research Reactor," and will only be summarized here. The analysis indicates that expended target material would require a minimum of 52 weeks decay before being considered for disposal.

The analysis recommends that adequate storage be provided to allow a minimum of 1.5 to 2 years decay in order to decrease the handling dose that would be incurred during preparation for shipment and to decrease the cost of disposal. ATTACHMENT 24 8. Handling Procedures for Radiation Safety Purposes: Written documents related to handling of radioactive materials Procedures approved by the Project Leader or Co-Project Leader and Health Physics Manager, or draft procedures with a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) are required for all target processing and activities involving greater than 100 mCi. Checklists associated with these procedures will be completed for each performance of these procedures to provide documentation of activities, dose rate measurements, dosimeter readings, and other information relevant to the process. Completed procedure checklists will be filed with Document Control in the project file for reactor license project RL-76.The following activities will be controlled by procedure and will incorporate the Standard Operating Procedures where applicable as required by the Reactor Manager and Reactor Health Physics Manager.Quality Control of TeO 2 Target Material Fabrication and Leak Testing of the TeO 2 Targets Online Iodine Monitoring for Pool Water Radioactivity Target Transfer from the Main Hot Cell to the 1- 131 Hot Cells Target Can Opening Target Processing & Post Processing Product Testing SOP # Name Status GMP-BR-501 Tellurium dioxide Target Preparation Batch Record Draft GMP-BR-502 1- 131 Processing Batch Record Number assigned GMP-BR-503 Iodine 131 Process Cleaning and Line Clearance Draft GMP-FAC-501 Placing Iodine 131 Suite in a Safe Condition Draft GMP-FAC-502 HEPA Filters in Iodine 131 Cleanrooms Draft GMP-MCE-029 Operation of 1-131 HC- 11 B and HC- I1C Crimper/Decrimper Approved not Issued GMP-MCE-031 Operation and Maintenance of Masterflex 77923-70 Peristaltic Pump Draft GMP-MCE-036 Labels for cGMP Iodine 131 Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient Products Draft GMP-MCE-037 Cleaning, Maintenance and Operation of HC-11 A/B/C Draft GMP-MCE-064 Operation of the Furnace Assembly Draft GMP-MCE-069 Operation and Maintenance of Quartz Separator Draft GMP-PRC-501 Use of Assembly Apparatus for Iodine 1-131 Production Draft GMP-PRC-502 Setup and Function of Dry Distillation Apparatus Assembly for 1-131 Draft Production GMP-QC-501 Determination of Radiochemical Purity of 1-131 Draft GMP-QC-502 1-131 Identification and Determination of Radionuclidic Purity Draft GMP-QC-503 pH Determination of 1-131 Radiochemical Solution Draft GMP-QC-504 Determination of the Metal Content and Specific Activity of 1-131 Draft Radiochemical Solution GMP-QC-505 Activity Concentration Verification of Iodine 131 Solution Draft Post Process Waste Monitoring and Management ATTACHMENT 24 Response Procedures for Potential Equipment Failures and Alarms IRP # Title Status IRP-1 Failure of Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) Approved IRP-2 Failure of Main Electrical Power Draft IRP-3 Failure of Uninterruptible Power Supply Approved IRP-4 Failure of the Pneumatic System Draft IRP-5 Failure of the Ventilation System Draft IRP-6 Failure of Quartz Furnace Approved IRP-7 Failure of Separator Approved IRP-8 Failure of the PLC Touchscreen Approved IRP-9 Failure of Trap Pump Approved IRP-10 Response to ALMO-6 Alarm Conditions Approved IRP-1 1 Failure of Absorber Trap Approved IRP-12 Ventilation Filtration Loading: high d/p, high activity Draft IRP-13 Response to Continuous Air Monitor (CAM) Alarm Draft IRP-14 Failure of Containment Filter Pump Approved IRP-15 Response to Quartz Furnace Alarm Conditions Approved IRP-16 Response to Inflatable Seals Alarm Conditions Approved IRP-18 Response to 1-131 Solution Spill Inside of Hot Cells Draft IRP-19 Response to 1-131 Solution Spill Outside of Hot Cells Draft Protective Clothing: Gloves will be worn: Safety Glasses: Monitoring requirements: Lab coats will be worn within the 1-131 Laboratory at all times. HP may require additional protective clothing during special evolutions. When handling radioactive samples or performing work in the laboratory. Will be worn when performing or observing work in the laboratory. Whole body and ring dosimeters will be worn by all personnel. Continuous air monitoring will be set up at predetermined locations to provide early detection of potential loss of hot cell containment. HP personnel will be required for all transfers into and out of the hot cells.MURR will establish an 1-131 thyroid monitoring program which will require all persons who will enter the laboratory to have a baseline thyroid measurement followed by periodic checks thereafter at a frequency determined by HP.Special monitoring requirements: The entire processing procedure will initially be covered under an RWP by HP personnel. Early warm run and scale-up activities may identify additional monitoring requirements for each step in the process or activity based on dose rates measured during a portion of the process or at a container surface for sam leP2en ssed out of the shielded hot cells. Analytical samples of the final product solution will be removed from the DHC for quality purposes.Product solution dispensed for transportation will be removed from the DHC in lead pigs. An HP is required to be present whenever material is introduced or removed from the 1- 131 hot cells. ATTACHMENT 24 Processing personnel must check out on frisker or portal monitor when leaving the 1-131 Laboratory. Lead shielding of product vial containers will be swipe-checked for contamination before being transferred to the transportation packaging area. Transfer casks used for target delivery will be swipe-checked before leaving the 1-131 Laboratory. Any work area suspected of potential contamination will be swipe checked in a timely manner.9. Administrative Controls and Training Requirements: Quality Control of the target material is extremely important to prevent the introduction of unwanted contaminants into the target material. This is important to help ensure the quality of the final product as well as providing consistency in correlation of dose rates measured during the warm runs and scale-ups. Personnel training and approval requirements will be unique to this project and will be reviewed and approved by appropriate supervisors and health physics. The hot cell and equipment suppliers will provide specific training for operation of the hot cells and operation of the process equipment within the hot cells as part of a turn-key contract for the production of 1- 131.Class I training is required for authorized supervisors. Additionally, authorized supervisors must have comprehensive project related knowledge and experience sufficient for them to supervise and/or train workers to perform project specific procedures. Class II training is required for approved workers under this project. Additional task-specific training by an authorized supervisor is conducted in accordance with an approved SOP.10. Anticipated Radiation Doses and Contamination Levels: The HHC and PHC will have 200 mm of lead shielding. Calculations show that if a target were placed against the 200 mm wall of the cell the resulting dose rate outside the cell would be less than 20 mR/hr. The 1-131 process equipment will not be adjacent to the wall so contact reading outside the cell will be less and the processing person will have an additional distance which will make the dose rate lower at the receptor position. Monitoring of early wann runs will provide actual dose rate to compare to the estimates. Other results for Dose Levels: Microshield Results for Hot Cell Shielding Assumed 100 Ci of 1-131 and 6 Ci of Te-131m (24 hour decay)HHC and PHC -200 mm Pb DHC -100 mm Pb 1-131 Te-131im Total 1-131 only Dose (mR/hr) with (negligible) 0.09 mR/hr 0.09 mR/hr 0.16 mR/hr source in middle of hot cell Dose (mR/hr) with (negligible) 1.1 mR/hr 1.1 mR/hr 7.9 mR/hr source at inner wall surface ATTACHMENT 24 The 1- 131 target transfer cask is designed to handle up to four, 180 gram TeO 2 targets. These will be transferred to the hot cells no sooner than 24 hours post EOI, at which time the significant contributions to dose are from 1- 131, Te- 131 in and Na-24. Using a conservatively high activity content for these isotopes of of 1-131, 20 Ci of Te-131m and 0.15 Ci of Na-24, calculations indicate that the contact dose rate on the transfer cask surface will be and the dose rate at 1 foot will be ý. Monitoring of early warm runs will be used to confirm these calculations. Overall, it is anticipated that dose to workers will be similar to doses received by workers on other isotope production projects currently performed at MURR.11. Transfer, Waste Production, and Disposal Requirements: Waste Volume:

Description:

Long-Lived: Liquid samples for assay: Liquid waste is expected to be minimal for this dry distillation process.Liquid waste will be from water or dilute NaOH used for cleaning the cell after processing. This liquid will be absorbed and contribute to the estimated solid waste stream. Dry active waste is expected to be less than 0.5 ft 3 per process and comprised of expended target material and paper product used for cleaning. The dry waste will be stored in sealed "paint" cans within the processing cell until full and then transferred to the HHC for interim storage.Solid: expended target material, plastic syringes, QC samples, waste aluminum cans and lids Long-lived isotopes will be decayed for sufficient time and then sent off site for disposal. It is anticipated that a minimum decay of 52 weeks for any target material is required to meet disposal criteria. It appears it will be most cost effective to store the waste for 1.5 to 2 years. Initially the plan is for waste to be stored in sealed cans within the waste handling hot cell and then transferred to shielded interim storage, after sufficient decay, prior to preparation for shipment.Liquid analytical samples will be transferred to an appropriate laboratory for analysis.12. Other Approvals/Authorizations/Interfaces Required: Review and approval of RUR 440 for irradiation of the tellurium dioxide target. Review and approval of the 10 CFR 50.59 Screen for the 1-131 Laboratory.

13. Revision Analysis: This is a new project.

ATTACHMENT 24 14. I have read the MURR Radiation Worker Procedures and recognize its application to my requested project in the utilization of radioactive material/radiation under the MURR Reactor License. I recognize my responsibility as a project leader to inform and provide a safe work environment for individuals at MURR in accordance with University and NRC requirements. I recognize my responsibility to maintain proper and current documentation in regard to utilization of radioactive material/radiation under this project authorization. Evaluation Conducted and Submitted By: Health Physics: Date: Date: Project Leader: 15. Approvals: Reactor Manager: Date: Health Physics Manager: Date:________ 1OSHA has modified the Hazards Communication Standards (HCS) to adopt the GHS to improve safety and health of workers through more effective communication of chemical hazards. ATTACHMENT 250 50.59 SCREEN Number: 12-07 Page 1 of 18 Title: Iodine -131 Processing Laboratory Description of Activity (what is being changed and why): This 50.59 Screen describes and evaluates the newly constructed 1-131 Processing Laboratory located adjacent to the MURR Industrial Building. See additional information in the attachment provided.Safety Determination: Does the proposed activity have the potential to adversely affect nuclear safety or safe facility (i.e., MURR) operations? D YES NO If this question is answered yes, do not continue with this procedure. Identify and report the concern to the Reactor Manager.50.59 Screening Questions:

1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designfiunction described in the HSR?2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safetv analyses?4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the HSR?5. Does the proposed activity require a change to the MURR Technical Specifications?

F YES NO NO NO NO NO D YES If all screening questions are answered NO, then implement the activity per the applicable approved facility procedure(s). A License Amendment or a 50.59 Evaluation is not required.If Screen Question 5 is answered YES, then request and receive a License Amendment prior to implementation of the activity.If Screen Question 5 is answered NO and Question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES, then complete and attach a 50.59 Evaluation form.[ Refer to Attachment 9.2. ]NOTE: If the conclusion of the screening questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification for the "No" determination. In addition, list the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. Include section / page numbers. Use Page 2 of this form to document your statements. Print Name Sign Name Date Preparer: Gregory Gunn n Reviewer: Les Foyto Reactor Manager: John Fruits I_____ _ ISubmit copy of screen to HSR / SAR file (circle one)? Yes / No /AI I /AU r1VI r-IN I zL0 50.59 SCREEN (Cont.)Number: 12-07 Page 2 of 18 Title: Iodine -131 Processing Laboratory If the conclusion of the five (5) Screening Questions is that a 50.59 Evaluation is not required, provide justification to support this determination: [ Use and attach additional pages as necessary. ]1. Does the proposed activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects a designfinction described in the HSR?No. This is a new construction addition that connects to the existing facility exhaust system but will not adversely affect the design function of a system, structure or component (SSC) described in the HSR 2. Does the proposed activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how HSR described SSC design functions are performed, controlled, or tested?No. HSR, addendum 1, provides guidance for the review of reactor facilities and experiments. The evaluation of the design and usage of this Processing Laboratory indicates its acceptability and ensures that it will operate within the limits and guidelines established by the Technical Specifications and the HSR. The development and use of this facility will be reviewed by both the Reactor Safety Subcommittee and the Isotope Use Subcommittee which is consistent with HSR guidance.3. Does the proposed activity involve revising or replacing an HSR described evaluation methodology that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?No- HSR safety analyv.se for reactor experiments are translated into lic..nse. Technical Specification limits that assure experiment safety (T -' 316)- The facilities used to proer.ss tellurium dioxide targets for prodrcing 1-131 will he de.igned to me.t the.se. Tpehnical Specification require.me.nts-

4. Does the proposed activity involve a test or experiment not described in the HSR, where an SSC is used or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC, or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions presented in the HSR?No. Neutron irradiation and isotope production experiments are described in original HSR section 8.0 and HSR Addendum 1. section 3.17. Reactor License R-103, Section 2.B (3) specifically authorizes MURR "to possess, use, but not separate except for byproduct material produced in reactor experiments, such byproduct materials as may be produced by operation of the Facility." (Amendment

1. 22 -8/17/92)List the documents (HSR, Technical Specifications, and other Licensing Basis documents) reviewed where relevant information was found. [ Include section / page numbers. ]HSR section 8.0 Experiment Facilities:

HSR section 12.5 Reactor Utilization: HSR section 12.6 Internal Safety Reviews: HSR Addendum 1 section 3.17 Experiment Descriptions: Technical Specification 3.6 Experiments; Technical Specification

3.7 Facility

Gaseous and Particulate Radioactivity Release: RUR 440 (TeO2 -to produce 1-131): RUR 449 (Preliminary TeO2 Tarcget Irradiations): RL-76 ATTACHMENT 25 Attachment to 10 CFR 50.59 Screen No. 12-07, "Iodine-131 Processing Laboratory" (In support of RL -76, "Production of 1-131 Radiochemical Sodium Iodide Solution")

1.0 Introduction

The University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) has evaluated the safety considerations necessary to safely irradiate and process tellurium dioxide (TeO 2) targets to produce radiochemical sodium iodide (1-131) solution. Preliminary investigation into the feasibility of such an endeavor resulted in the document, "Safety and Design Review for the Proposed Production of 1-131 at the MU Research Reactor." This document, which includes a preliminary assessment of safety, regulations and process, recognized that a significant investment in infrastructure and equipment was necessary to pursue the goal of producing 1- 131 safely and reliably.Using information provided by two consultants with 1-131 experience and literature research of other facilities producing 1-131 safely, this 50.59 Screen evaluates the infrastructure and equipment that MURR has incorporated into the design of the 1-131 Processing Laboratory. 2.0 1-131 Processing Laboratory Location The 1-131 Processing Laboratory will be located within a new two-level building addition attached to the MURR Industrial Building (MIB) (see Figure 1). The design of the attached building will incorporate the necessary floor loading for the 1-131 hot cells and the height requirements for the necessary ventilation exhaust system ducting and filter banks. Two consultants, one with previous and one with current 1-131 production experience, have provided input to the laboratory and process design.Figure 1 -MURR Industrial Building Expansion ATTACHMENT 25 3.0 Design Considerations for the 1-131 Hot Cells The processing laboratory will contain three adjoined and inter-connected hot cells located on the grade level (see Figure 2): a target and waste handling hot cell (HHC or HC-1 1A); a processing hot cell (PHC or HC- I1B); and a dispensing hot cell (DHC or HC- I1C). The HHC and the PHC have 200 mm (7.9 inches) of vertical lead shielding and the DHC has 100 mm (3.9 inches) of vertical lead shielding. Table 1 provides the lead thicknesses of all of the hot cell components in millimeters. The area to the rear of the cells, labeled the cask loading area, is where the cell support facilities and equipment are located and where all cell inputs and outputs occur. The area in front of the hot cells, labeled the operator area, is where the cell windows, manipulators and controls are located.Table 1 -Hot Cell Lead Shielding (in millimeters) The design philosophy for the hot cells is to provide adequate personnel shielding and containment of the 1-131, precluding or minimizing any potential release to the individual cells, or to the reactor facility, or to any unrestricted area. ATTACHMENT 25 Figure 2 131 Processing Laboratory ATTACHMENT 25 3.1 Target and Waste Handling Hot Cell Design Features The target and waste handling hot cell (HHC or HC-I 1A) is designed for two principal purposes: (1) to receive irradiated targets and house support equipment to remove the target encapsulation, and (2) to store process waste for an interim period. This cell has a floor access to allow entry of irradiated targets from a target transfer cask designed to seal with the cell floor port. Here the target encapsulation is removed and the irradiated TeO 2 material is placed in crucibles and transferred via a pass-through to the PHC.The cell is designed to have waste materials from the PHC returned via a pass-through chamber for interim storage. The pass-through has a door at each side and is sized to hold any object that will be moved to and from the PHC. The waste material from the PHC (e.g., expended target material, contaminated used equipment) will be placed in containers with press-seal lids.The volume of the cell is designed to hold the process waste for approximately 10 half-lives of the 1-131 (about 80 days) after which time the cans may be moved to longer term shielded storage. The cell has 200 mm (7.9 inches) thick vertical lead shielding with a stainless steel liner and two master-slave-manipulators (MSM) penetrating the cell from the operator side.This cell will also have a sealable glove box for entry of items such as product vials and processing equipment.

3.2 Processing

Hot Cell Design Features The processing hot cell (PHC or HC-1 1B) is where the dry distillation of the TeO 2 targets is performed. This cell has 200 mm (7.9 inches) thick vertical lead shielding with a stainless steel liner and two master-slave manipulators (MSM) which penetrate the cell from the operator side of the cells. There is a shielded entry door on the rear of the cell which will be used primarily for the initial setup of process equipment. After process equipment setup and cold testing it will be sealed and any subsequent equipment and consumables will enter the cell through the pass-through from the HHC.The sodium iodide (1-131) product solution will be moved back to the HHC in a sealed vial through a pass-through. Note: A pass-through has been designed between the PHC and DHC that could be used in the future to transfer the product solution from the PHC directly to the DHC.The PHC, during processing, provides three barriers to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment: (1) the processing equipment itself, (2) an additional inner containment for the separation furnace within the PHC with a dedicated iodine filter, and (3) the PHC containment provided by appropriate negative pressure and an exhaust system that includes high efficiency particulate filters (HEPA) and high efficiency gas absorber filters (HEGA). The process is designed to contain 1-131 within the process equipment; therefore, there should be minimal release of airborne radioactivity to the hot cell. The hot cell will be connected to the facility exhaust ventilation system so that any releases from the hot cells will be through the facility exhaust ventilation system and monitored by the facility off-gas radiation monitoring system. An additional off-gas radiation monitor will also be installed in the MIB Expansion. ATTACHMENT 25 3.3. Dispensing Hot Cell Design Features The dispensing hot cell (DHC or HC-1 IC) will be designed to receive the bulk 1-131 in solution from the HHC in a specially designed transport cask. The bulk sodium iodide-131 radiochemical will then be dispensed in bulk quantities to meet customer order requirements. This cell will also have a sealable glove box for entry of items such as product vials, lead pigs, and dispensing equipment. The dispensing cell has 100 mm (3.9 inches) thick of vertical lead shielding and two MSM penetrating the cell from the operator side.4.0 Design Considerations for the 1- 131 Process 4.1 Target Fabrication The targets will be fabricated in a laboratory space that includes a ventilated glove box to assure the quality of the targets. Hazards identification in the Sigma-Aldrich Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)indicates that TeO 2 has no known OSHA hazards. The same MSDS indicates TeO 2 is not a dangerous substance according to the Global Harmonization System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals (GHS).'The techniques for developing the targets for mass production while maintaining the necessary QC of the targets are being developed.

4.2 Target

Processing MURR plans to remove the two layers of target encapsulation within the HHC using a MURR designed can opener. The irradiated TeO 2 material will then be placed in crucibles and transferred to the PHC via the pass-through. Below is an example of the planned process equipment for the dry distillation of tellurium oxide for 1-131 production. This process is similar to dry distillation processes described in IAEA-TECDOC-1340,"Manual for Reactor Produced Radioisotopes," page 99. ATTACHMENT 25 Figure 3 131 Processing Equipment 4.3 Target Waste Disposal The crucibles, containing expended target material after each process, will be placed in a disposal container to reduce the spread of contamination inside the cell. When full, the disposal container will be sealed and transferred to the HHC for temporary storage.Reactor Health Physics staff has performed an analysis of the waste stream. This analysis is documented in the "Safety and Design Review for the Proposed Production of 1-131 at the MU Research Reactor," and will only be summarized here. The analysis indicates that expended target material would require a minimum of 52 weeks decay before being considered for disposal. The analysis recommends that ATTACHMENT 25 adequate storage be provided to allow a minimum of 1.5 to 2 years decay in order to decrease the handling dose that would be incurred during preparation for shipment and to decrease the cost of disposal.5.0 Design Considerations for the 1-131 Laboratory and Hot Cell Exhaust Ventilation System 5.1 Introduction The heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning system (HVAC), which supports the MIB Expansion, provides heated and conditioned air for the spaces within that facility, creating an acceptable working atmosphere for personnel and equipment. The ventilation system is also designed to perfornn the following radiological control functions:

• Maintain rooms 299T (hot cell operator area), 299U (hot cell cask handling area), and 299V (QC Laboratory) at a slightly negative pressure with respect to the surrounding areas to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination;" Maintain hot cells HC- I1A (HHC), HC-1 lB (PHC), and HC- I1C (DHC) at a negative pressure to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination;" Provide the necessary air exchanges to ensure that radioactive airborne concentrations are maintained at levels which are below the limits of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 1 for restricted areas;" Provide the necessary filtration

[charcoal and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA)] to ensure any radioactive airborne releases discharged to the environment are kept at minimum concentrations; and" Provide continuous monitoring of all radioactive airborne releases discharged through the MIB Expansion ventilation exhaust system.The MIB Expansion HVAC system consists of an HVAC unit, Fan Filter Units (FFUs), charcoal and HEPA filter banks, an airborne radiation monitoring system, constant volume control valves (CVCVs), chill water coils, a preheat coil, hot cell exhaust ventilation fans, flow and pressure measurement devices, and associated ducting and dampers (See Figure 4).Air exiting the MIB Expansion through the exhaust ventilation system is continuously monitored for airborne activity by a radiation monitoring system. The monitoring equipment consists of a single-channel radiation detection system designed to measure airborne concentrations of radioactive iodine in the exhaust air that is sampled by a shrouded probe located in the ventilation ducting downstream of all of the hot cell and room filtration systems.The HVAC system in the MIB Expansion is divided into the following six (6) distinct zones or spaces: (1) corridors C299U and C299T, (2) hot cell operator area 299T, (3) hot cell cask handling area 299U, (4) ATTACHMENT 25 QC Laboratory 299V, (5) hot cells HC-11A, HC-I lB and HC-I 1C, and (6) basement 199. Each zone or space is explained in detail below.5.2 Corridors C299U and C299T Conditioned air is provided to these spaces by the MIB Expansion HVAC unit. Fresh air is supplied to the building expansion through a louver located on the north face of the building. Fresh air is mixed with return air and conditioned by the HVAC unit and then ducted into corridors C299U and C299T.5.3 Hot Cell Operator Area 299T The ventilation system for room 299T consists of four (4) FFUs and two (2) chill water coils. Make-up air is supplied to the room through louvers located on the north and south ends of the room FFU header at a rate of approximately 250 cubic feet per minute (cfm). The air is then exhausted through a CVCV, HEPA filter and a (selected) parallel charcoal filter (one filter on service -one in standby) into the facility main ventilation exhaust system at a rate of approximately 250 cfm. Air is removed from the room by the exhaust system at a rate of approximately 3 to 5 air changes per hour (ACPH). The make-up and exhaust air flows are adjusted to maintain the room at a slightly negative pressure (approximately 0.05 inches of H 2 0 or greater) in relationship to the surrounding area. The four (4) FFU's recirculate the air within the room at a rate of approximately 30 to 60 ACPH through the two (2) chill water coils.5.4 Hot Cell Cask Handling Area 299U The ventilation system for room 299U is very similar to that of 299T but consists of only three (3) FFUs, two (2) chill water coils and one (1) electric preheat coil. Make-up air is supplied to the room through a louver located on the north end of the room FFU header at a rate of approximately 160 cfm. The air is then exhausted through a CVCV and the same HEPA and parallel charcoal filter system which also supports room 299T and then into the facility main ventilation exhaust system at a rate of approximately 100 cfln. The air is also exhausted as make-up air for the hot cells at a rate of approximately 60 cfin. Air is removed from the room by the exhaust system at a rate of approximately 3 to 5 ACPH. The make-up air and exhaust flows are adjusted to maintain the room at a slightly negative pressure (approximately 0.05 inches of H 2 0 or greater) in relationship to the surrounding area. The three (3) FFUs recirculate the air within the room at a rate of approximately 30 to 60 ACPH through the two (2) chill water coils and 1 preheat coil.5.5 QC Laboratory 299V Air is supplied to room 299V from the HVAC supply ducting at a rate of approximately 450 cfm. The air is exhausted from the room through a fume hood, a CVCV, HEPA filter and a (selected) parallel charcoal filter (one filter on service -one in standby), and then into the facility main ventilation exhaust system at a rate of approximately 450 cfm. The supply and exhaust flows are adjusted to maintain the room at a slightly negative pressure (approximately 0.05 inches of H 2 0 or greater) in relationship to the surrounding area. The air is recirculated within the room by two (2) FFUs at a rate of approximately 30 to 60 ACPH. ATTACHMENT 25 5.6 Hot Cells HC-I IA, HC-11B, and HC-11C The supply and exhaust ventilation for hot cells HC-1 1A, HC-I lB and HC-I I C, which are the handling, processing and dispensing hot cells, respectively, consists of an intricate combination of HEPA and charcoal filtration systems, two (2) booster fans, and flow measurement and control devices. The supply and exhaust systems for each cell combine to form a common header, but each hot cell has its own independent filtration system. Air is supplied to each hot cell from a common header (suction located in room 299T) through a HEPA and charcoal filter at a rate of approximately 17 cfm. Air is exhausted from each hot cell through an intemal parallel set of charcoal filters, then through a (selected) external parallel charcoal and HEPA filtration bank (one bank on service -one in standby), a CVCV, a second (selected) parallel charcoal filter (one filter on service -one in standby), and then through a (selected) parallel exhaust fan into the facility main ventilation exhaust system at a rate of approximately 60 cfin (one fan operating -one in standby). Air is removed from the hot cells by the exhaust system at a rate of approximately 10 ACPH. The exhaust fans are 3 HP centrifugal models, each controlled by an Adjustable Speed Drive (ASD) that maintains a constant flow rate of 60 cfm through the system based on a control signal from a pressure transmitter located between the CVCV and the second set of charcoal filters. The transmitter measures a static pressure of approximately 2 to 8 inches of H 2 0. The fans are powered from lighting panel LP-46.There are two glove boxes mounted to the hot cells; one on the north end of HC- I1A and one on the south end of HC-I IC. These gloves boxes provide the means of introducing or removing items from the hot cells. Each glove box also has its own independent supply and exhaust system. Air is supplied to each glove box at a rate of approximately 1.7 cfm through a combination HEPA/charcoal filter. Air is exhausted from each glove box through a charcoal filter and then a HEPA filter. The exhaust ducting for each glove box connects to the hot cell common exhaust header downstream of the hot cell filtration systems.5.7 Basement 199 Air is supplied to the basement from the MIB Expansion HVAC supply ducting at a rate of approximately 450 cfm. Air is circulated through the area and back up to the grade level through a louver located in the stairwell. ATTACHMENT 25 Ii 'I'ii i ~ii ii I I 1 1 11 MIB EAST ADDITION It I~ EXHAUST SCHEMATIC Figure 4 -MURR Industrial Building Exhaust Ventilation System ATTACHMENT 25 6.0 Evaluation of an 1-131 release in the Processing Hot cell The PHC will have the highest possible content of volatile 1-131.This is a very conservative assumption for two reasons: (1)and (2) the furnace is designed with a containment which has a dedicated charcoal filter such that minimal 1-131 can escape the furnace containment to enter the hot cell volume. Any indication of leakage from the process equipment into the hot cell (e.g., malfunction of the process equipment) would cause staff to secure the furnace resulting in the 1-131 evolution to be reduced and then to cease.6.1 High Level Evaluation Initial assumptions regarding 1- 131 release: Technical Specification (TS) 3.7, "Facility Gaseous and Particulate Radioactivity Release," specifies that the maximum stack discharge rate shall not exceed MPC (now Air Effluent Concentration -or AEC) for a maximum controlled instantaneous release concentration (averaged over 24 hours) for halogens with half-lives greater than 8 days (1-131 half-life is 8.05 days). The AEC for 1-131 in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 2, column 1 is 2E-10 pCi/ml. This is equivalent to the radionuclide concentration that, if inhaled or ingested continuously over the course of a year, would produce a Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) of 50 mrem.The MURR exhaust ventilation system, operating at 30,500 cfm, has a flow rate equivalent to 1.24E12 ml/day (4.5E14 ml/yr). If one assumes a release at the TS 3.7 limit concentration averaged over one day, this would equate to: (2E- 10 pCi/ml) x (1.24E 12 ml/day) = 248 pCi/day To meet TS 3.7 any 1-131 release from the stack, averaged over 24 hours, would need to be less than 248 pCi total. For this analysis, the design goal for the hot cell ventilation exhaust system is to limit the 1-131 activity to less than this value before the radioactivity enters the facility main ventilation exhaust system.This design goal assumption considers the dilution by the exhaust flow rate but does not take credit for any additional reduction of 1-131 activity (by plate-out or other means) in the facility main ventilation exhaust system. ATTACHMENT 25 6.2 Conservative Evaluation of Charcoal Filters (intended to bound the assumptions in 2.2.6.2 of the Accident Analysis provided by GSG/ITD)GSG hot cell design provides two charcoal filters in series in the exhaust system for each cell; one internal and one external (see attached drawing). Each of these charcoal filters has a stated design efficiency of 99.97% (as derived from the absorption effectiveness of 3E-4 reported in GSG email, 12/9/2013). This implies a decontamination factor (DF) of 3333/charcoal filter. For this evaluation the DF will be conservatively assumed to be 1000/charcoal filter (which is a reduction in efficiency to 99.9%). [This is the efficiency used for the charcoal filters for the GA experiments]. This evaluation focuses on the PHC as the highest potential source of 1-131 gas.RUR 440, "Tellurium Dioxide," limits the maximum target inventory to such that the accident scenario during target irradiation is bounded by the Maximum Hypothetical Accident (MHA). It appears that yield calculations based on target density may actually result in an inventory of less than = per target. For this analysis a more conservative 200 Ci/batch will be assumed to be in the PHC furnace at one time.[GSG document "Safety Aspects and Troubleshooting" recommends a transmission factor (TF) of I E-3 for the emission of 1-131 from the 1-131 iodide solution." Another document published in the Journal of Nuclear Medical Technology, "Volatility of radiopharmacy-prepared sodium iodide-131 capsules," indicates a release in an experiment of 0.035% of the activity in 24 hours which appears to be consistent with the TF recommended by GSG/ITD.]ii If the entire = inventory was released into the PHC the two vendor-supplied charcoal filters in series (one inside and one outside) would provide a DF of 11E6, such that the downstream inventory of 1-131 would be a maximum ý entering the part of the ventilation exhaust outside the 1-131 laboratory. This would be sufficient to meet the instantaneous (24-hour) release limit of 248 PtCi/day.GSG has recommended that MURR add at least one charcoal filter beyond their supplied charcoal filters as a precautionary measure (mainly to protect the main facility ventilation system from residual contamination). Two different scenarios are shown in the following drawing. The first assumes a release in the PHC filtered by 3 filter banks (two supplied by GSG and one additional filter bank supplied by MURR) all operating at decontamination factors of 1000. The resulting release into the MURR stack would be M. The second scenario assumes degradation of the filters to a DF of 100, resulting in *E release into the stack. ATTACHMENT 25 With DF of 100 (99-0% efficiency) the instantaneous release limit shou ld not be exceeded The evaluation above intentionally neglects the added barrier provided by the GSG design where the furnace is in a containment/confinement with a charcoal filter that could reduce any 1-131 activity within the furnace by at least a factor of about 1000 before the activity entered the hot cell volume. Ignoring this additional stage of charcoal filtration provides additional conservatism to the release scenario.The evaluation also neglects the fact that the 1-131 evolved from the furnace occurs over a short period of time (about 1 hour) and is continuously being captured in the = traps. Procedures will dictate that, if any unexpected 1-131 release were to occur into the cell during a distillation process, the furnace would be secured and 1-131 evolution would be reduced and then cease.Perhaps a more realistic source term could be considered based on the time release of 1-131. During the distillation process in the furnace the evolution of the target 1-131 inventory occurs roughly 6.3 Other Considerations Because containment (confinement) of 1-131 requires the hot cells to be kept at negative internal pressure at all times, redundant hot cell exhaust fans will be installed. GSG/ITD has provided a procedure by which the hot cells can be placed in a condition for exhaust fan maintenance activities but this procedure requires extensive time consuming clean-up of the cells prior to securing the facility exhaust fans. ATTACHMENT 25 6.4 Analysis of a Stack Release of 1- 131 from a Spill of 1- 131 Sodium Iodide Solution Outside of the Hot Cell (this evaluation is consistent with analysis 2.2.7 of the Accident Analysis provided by GSG/ITD)The scenario involves a spill of 50 Ci of 1-131 Sodium Iodide solution during packaging of product outside the DHC. This 50 Ci is based upon the assumption that a nominal = shipment to a customer (U3) would be distributed among I vials. 13 has specified a concentration of ý, so 50 Ci would occupy 7.7 ml in the 20 ml vial.During the accident, perhaps a broken vial, the solution flows onto the floor of the laboratory. The value of possible airborne activity stack release is calculated using an estimated transmission factor (TF) equal to L.OE-3 for the 1-131 release from solution. This evaluation considers a charcoal filter with DF of 1000 (supplied by MURR) on the ventilation exhaust from the room.Release to stack = (50E6 1 iCi) x TF x DF (MURR laboratory filter)Release to stack = (50E6 jtCi) x (1E-3) x (1E-3) = 50 tiCi This calculated value is less than the 1-131 24-hour release activity limit.A rough calculation of the airborne activity possible in the 1-131 laboratory indicates about a four (4)minute stay time in the potential concentration before annual limits would be reached (see analysis below). Obviously, from an ALARA perspective, any clean-up effort would require persons to use respiratory protection equipment. The DAC for 1-131 is 2E-8 pCi/ml. The estimated volume of the laboratory cask loading area is 2900 ft 3 , or _ 8.2E7 ml.Applying the TF of 1.0E-3 to the 50 curie spill would result in a release of 5E4 gCi from the solution into the lab volume. This results in an 1-131 concentration of 6.1 E-4 pCi/ml in the laboratory volume, or: (6.1E-4 pCi/ml / 2E-8 pCi/ml / DAC) = 30,500 DAC Since 2000 DAC-hours results in a dose of 50 Rem CDE to the thyroid, the stay time to reach this limit is given by: 2000 DAC-hours / 30,500 DAC = 0.066 hours or 3.96 minutes or -4 minute stay time.This scenario is very unlikely because the DHC will have interlocks that will only allow product vials to be removed from the hot cell while in a cask insert. ATTACHMENT 25 6.5 General Information Regarding Charcoal Adsorption Filtersiv a. Elemental iodine is absorbed by attraction of the iodine to the carbon. This is referred to as Kinetic adsorption. Kinetic adsorption of a gas molecule or chemical vapor is the physical attraction of the molecule to the carbon granule by electrostatic forces. These forces, as they apply to small particles, are termed van der Waals forces.b. The capacity of activated carbon is the percentage of its own weight that an activated carbon can absorb of a given vapor under certain conditions (vapor concentration, temperature, humidity, air velocity). One gram of carbon will absorb one milligram of iodine.c. Elemental iodine, once absorbed, usually stays absorbed.d. The lower the concentration of a material, the harder to achieve a high removal percentage.

e. With a properly designed HEGA system that includes proper absorber selection, absorbent and resident time, any absorbable contaminant can be filtered and contained.

The grade of carbon designated Grade A is activated 8 x 16 mesh carbon and is used to absorb elemental iodine.f. Carbon filters must exhibit a minimum mechanical efficiency of 99.9%, use high quality coconut shell activated carbon, and be sized for about 0.125 second residence time.g. All filters should be installed in "bag-in/bag-out" housings to protect maintenance personnel.

h. Decontamination factor (DF) is the ratio of the concentration (or activity) of a contaminant in the untreated (unfiltered) air to the concentration (or activity) of the contaminant in the treated air. It is the reciprocal of the penetration expressed as a fraction.

It is calculated from a known efficiency as: DF = 1 / (1- efficiency). Efficiency is calculated from a known DF as: efficiency = 1-(1/DF).i. Residence time is the term given to the time that a gas stream contacts a carbon bed. The concept of residence time is very important for the designer because the removal efficiency of an absorber is determined by the type and amount of contaminant in the gas stream, the type and amount of absorbent, and the residence time.7.0 References

1. IAEA-TECDOC-1340, "Manual for Reactor Produced Radioisotopes," January 2003.2. IAEA-TECDOC-1430, "Radioactive Handling Facilities and Automation of Radioisotope Production," December 2004.3. "Safety and Design Review for the Proposed Production of 1-131 at the MU Research Reactor," R. Butler, K. Brooks, R. Dobey, J. Ernst, M. Flagg, L. Foyto, J. Fruits, D. Robertson, March 2012.

ATTACHMENT 25 4. "Airborne Iodine Monitoring at the Radioisotope Test Production Plant, JAERI, Fukada, et al, 1969.5. "Dry-Distillation of Iodine-131 from Several Tellurium Compounds," Shikata, et al, 1972.6. "Physiochemical and Radiochemical Aspects of Separation of Radioisotopes from TeO 2 Targets," Beyer, et al, March 2000.7. DOE-HDBK-1132-99, "Design Considerations." 8. DOE-HDBK-1 169-2003, "DOE Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook."'OSHA has modified the Hazards Communication Standards (HCS) to adopt the GHS to improve safety and health of workers through more effective communication of chemical hazards.GSG/ITD document "Safety Aspects and Troubleshooting," provided in email dated December 18, 2013.Bright, J.M., Rees T.T., Baca L.E., Green R.L., "Volatility of radiopharmacy-prepared sodium iodine-131 capsules," J Nucl Med Technol 2000 Mar; 28(1):52-55. iv Flanders High Efficiency Gas Adsorber (HEGA) website [http://www.flanders-csc.com/Downloads/hega.pdfl}}