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1990 Annual Operating Rept.
	ML17223B119
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	12/31/1990
From:	; FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML17223B118	List: ML17223B117; ML17223B119; ML17223B120;
References
	NUDOCS 9103050254
	Download: ML17223B119 (90)
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1990ANNUALOPERATINGREPORTST~LUCIEUNITS1&21990ST~LUCIEUNITS1&2STEAMGENERATORIN-SERVICEINSPECTIONREPORTt9103050254910227PDRADOCK05000335RPDR

..9103050241TABLEOFCONTENTSSection1Section2Section3Section4Section5Annual10CFR50.59ReportSteamGeneratorIn-ServiceInspectionMangroveStudyPersonnelExposureSummaryChemistrySummary SECTION1ST~LUCIEANNUAL10CFR50'9REPORTAsummaryofchangestothefacilityasdescribedintheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)(10CFR50.59(A)(1)(i))issubmittedbyseparatelettersatthesametimeastheannualFSARupdateforeachunit(July22forSt.LucieUnit1andApril6forSt.LucieUnit2).ChangestoproceduresasdescribedintheFSAR(10CFR50.59(A)(1)(ii))andtestsandexperimentsnotdescribedintheFSAR(10CFR50.59(A)(1)(iii))areattached.

10CFR50.59EvaluationsTemporaryChangesviaJumper/liftedLeadsRecgxests 10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-07Component/SystemAffected:RefuelingMachinemaincontrolcabinetDescriptionofChange:Thisjumper/liftedleadrequestistoinstallajumperacrossLS-HULtosimulateasignaltothehoistuplimitswitch.TheotherjumperistosimulateasignaltoLS-FSRtoindicatethefuelspreaderisretracted.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thehoistboxontherefuelingmachineisnotinstalledandundergoingrepairs.Thesejumpersarenecessarytoprovideelectricalpowertomovetherefuelingmachine.ThiswillenableunlatchingoftheCEA'susingelectricalpower,ratherthanhavingtohandcranktherefuelingmachine.Cautiontagtobeinstalledoncontrolstickonrefuelingmachinetoindicatethesejumpersareinstalled.ThejumpersaretoberemoveduponcompletionofunlatchingCEA's.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR,TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-09Component/SystemAffected:HeatingandVentilationExhaust(HVE)fan8BDescriptionofChange:Thisjumper/liftedleadrequestistorunHVE-8Bwithpowerfromthe"A"trainoroppositetrain.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.The"A"powerbusforthepurgefanscontactswillbeworkedon.Thisjumper/liftedleadrequestallowsthefanstocontinueoperation.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-17Component/SystemAffected:1A&1BDieselGeneratorsDescriptionofChange:Thisjumper/liftedleadrequestresultsfromtheinadvertantdieselgeneratorstartcausedbytheEngineeredSafeguardsFeaturesActuationSignal(ESFAS)PlantChangeModification(PC/M).StartsignalstothedieselgeneratorfromSafetyInjectionActuationSignal(SIAS),ContainmentIsolationSignal(CIS),andContainmentSprayActuationSignal(CSAS)werelifted.Undervoltagedieselgeneratorstarthasnotbeenaffected.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.Inmode6operationtheliftedleadonlyisolatesthedieselgeneratorsfromESFASandarenotinvolvedintheoperationofotherequipment.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.Again,thisliftedleaddoesnotimpactotherequipmentoperation,onlythedieselgeneratorstart.ESFASisnotrequiredtobeoperableinMode6.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-18Component/SystemAffected:ControlRoomOutsideAirIntakeRadiationMonitoringDescriptionofChange:ToperformcalibrationofControlRoomoutsideairintakeradiationmonitoring.SafetyEvaluationSummary:OnlyonechannelofControlRoomoutsideairintakeradiationmonitoringcanbejumperedatatime.Oncethejumperisinstalledworkmustbeprogressedinanexpeditiousmanner.Ifworkmustbestoppedpriortocompletionjumpersmustbeimmediatelyremoved.IftheControlRoomoutsideairintakesystemactuatesfromanothersource,immediatelystopworkandremovejumpers.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.OnechannelofControlRoomoutsideairradiationmonitoringwillremainoperableatalltimes.ThisiscapableoffullyactuatingtheControlRoomoutsideairintakeventilationsystem.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.Only"onechannelofControlRoomoutsideairradiationmonitoringwillbejumperedatatime.ContainmentIsolationSignalforUnit2willnotbeaffected.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.TheControlRoomoutsideairintakeventilationsystemactuationsignalsarenotaddressedintheTechnicalSpecification,equipmentaddressedbytheTechnicalSpecification3.7.7.1willremainoperable.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsmIUnit:RequestNumber:0-30Component/SystemAffected:Turbinetripfrom20ETSolenoidand20OverspeedProtectionControlDescriptionofChange:Needtostroketurbinevalves.Liftinglead38inRTGB101willdeenergize20ETsolenoid.Thiswillallowtestingofgovenor,reheat,throttleandinterceptvalvesofturbine.SafetyEvaluationSummary:SincetheUnitisshutdowninMode5withmorethanadequateshutdownmargin,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofrisktosafetyofhealthandpublic.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.UnitbeingshutdowninMode5withadequateshutdownmargin.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevalatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-31Component/SystemAffected:CEARod¹30DescriptionofChange:AproblemoccurredwiththeindicatorforCEA¹30.DuringtheUnit1outage,theReedSwitchPositionTransmitter(RSPT)forCEA¹30dayswasreplaced.Thepurposeofthisjumper/liftedleadistousesparecable,previouslyforpartlengthCEA¹35,fromthequickdisconnectincontainmenttotheterminalconnectionsinthecablespreadingroom,Sinceallofthecolorcodesarethesame,onetagisusedforthecableinthecablespreadingroomcabinet.Verificationofproperhookupwillbeaccomplishedviaroddroptestingpriortostartup.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFVSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.Thesparecablewillbetestedviaroddroptesting.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.ThesameindicatorisbeingusedfortheRSPT,howeverusingsparecablefrompartlengthCEAquickdisconnecttocablespreadingroom.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-33Component/SystemAffected:Transferpumps/DomesticwaterpumpsDescriptionofChange:Thisjumper/liftedleadwasinstalledtemporarilytoavoiddomesticwaterpumplockoutwhiletestinglowlevelalarm.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.FUSARsection9.2.6.3specificallystatesthedomesticwatersystemperformsnosafetyfunctions.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-38Component/SystemAffected:MainFeedwaterRegulatingValveDescriptionofChange:Specialpostmaintenancetestingchannelcheckonmainfeedwaterregulatingvalves.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.OperatorshavemanualcontrolcapabilityofallfeedsystemcomponentsasperFUSARsection7.7.1.3.1.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR,Aspreviouslystated,operatorshavemanualcontrolcapabilityofallfeedsystemcomponentsasperFUSARsection7.7.1.3.1.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecifications.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsRequestNumber:0-39Component/SystemAffected:27-1Undervoltage(degradedvoltage)relayforthe1A2480Vloadcenterterminals11&12.DescriptionofChange:Thisjumper/liftedleadrequestmaintainsthereferencedrelayinthetrippedpositionasperTechnicalSpecification3.3.2.1.Therelaymustbereplacedorrepairedbythenextcalibrationchannelcheck.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thisjumper/liftedleadrequestiscoveredintheFUSARsincea2-out-of-2logicisusedfortheseundervoltagerelays.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.AsreferencedintheFUSARpage8.3-5a,eachClassIE480Vbus(1A2&2B2)utilizestwoundervoltagedefinitetimerelaysina2-out-of-2coincidentlogicscheme.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-75Component/SystemAffected:Line5ofGaitronicsalarmrelaycabinetDescriptionofChange:Thisliftedleadreflectsachangerequestedbyoperationstosplitchannel5ontheGaitronicsbetweenUnit1andUnit2.Thisliftedleadwasoriginallydoneunderjumper/liftedleadnumber7-55,butanNCRwasgeneratedinordertoupdatetheevaluation.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-77Component/SystemAffected:FlowIndicatorSwitchFIS-21-9ADescriptionofChange:Thisjumper/liftedleadistofacilitateliftingleadforannunciatorS-3toremoveahardelectricalground.Thisgroundiscausingspurious,falseannunciations.ThecauseofthegroundiswaterintrusionandapparentdegradationoftheconduitfromFIS-21-9AintheComponentCoolingWater(CCW)area.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR,TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheworstcaseintheFUSARislossofoffsitepowerwithbothemergencydieselgeneratorsfailingtostart,naturalcirculationwouldbemaintainedforatleast3hours,averagerestorationofoffsitepoweris36.6minutes.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.OneCCWHeatExchangeralonecansafelyaccommodateaLossofCoolingAccident(LOCA)heatloadaspersection9.7.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.OnlyneedoneComponentCoolingWater/IntakeCoolingWaterHeatExchangertohandledesignbasisLOCA.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-01Component/SystemAffected:HCV-25-58cHCV-25-6ContainmentPurgeValvesDescriptionofChange:Thisjumper/liftedleadrequestwasforinstallinganairjumperaroundthefollowingvalves,SE-25-7andSE-25-8.ThiswasdonetosupportmechanicalmaintenancebyfailingopentheHCV-25-5EcHCV-25-6containmentpurgevalves.-SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.ContainmentintegritywasnotsetduetoMode5operationsduringarefuelingoutage.Therefore,itwasnotnecessaryforthepurgevalvestobeclosed.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR,InMode5operationcontainmentintegrityisnotrequired.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-03Component/SystemAffected:TurbineTripInstrumentationDescriptionofChange:Thisliftedleadrequestdisabledturbinetripinstrumentationtoenableworkonlimitswitches.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TurbinetripinstrumentationisnotrequiredtobeoperableduringMode5operation.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-04Component/SystemAffected:ReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)ChannelA&BSteamGeneratorLevelTripsDescriptionofChange:ThisliftedleadentailedliftingofmultipleleadsinRPScabinetsA&BinordertosimulatenormallevelonsteamgeneratorA.Thiswasdonetoallowworkonthecontrolelementdrivesystem.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.DuringMode5operations,thesteamgeneratorleveltripsarenotrequiredtobeoperable.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:tiRequestNumber:0-8Component/SystemAffected:FIS-14-15BDescriptionofChange:Thisjumper/liftedleadallowsforatemporaryhookup(lessthan72hours)ofinstrumentationacrossthefollowingcomponentsoftheBchannellossofCCWcircuitry:(1).TestresistoronoutputofflowtransmitterforCCWflowchannelB.(2).Resistoronsquarerootextractoroutput.(3).Agastatcoilontime.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThiswillallowthenickelAinstrumentationtobeginrecordingwhentheoutputofthesquarerootextractorgoeslessthan4.3volts.Inturn,thiswillallowrecordingofanyfluctuationsinthecircuitsuchthattherootcauseofthespurioustripsignalcanbeidentified.Toobtainmoredatathisjumper/liftedleadwaschangedtogreaterthan72hoursinstalled.Atthistimeitappearsspikesarebeingreceivedfromflowtransmitter.ChannelBisoutofservice.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.WithchannelBoflossofCCWtripinbypass,thereisstilltherequired2outof3logicasreferencedinsection7.2.1.1.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.ChannelBisalreadyinbypass,thisinstrumentationismerelymonitoringforachangeintransmitteroutput.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecification.Marginofsafetyisstillassuredwiththe2outof3logicwiththeBchannelinbypass.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-12Component/SystemAffected:Maincontainmentpurgevalves,FCV25-4,5DescriptionofChange:Thisjumper/liftedleadwasinstalledtoallowFCV-25-6toopenwithoutopeningFCV25-4and5.Thepurposeofthisjumper/liftedleadwastoallowtheTestGrouptoperformalocalleakratetest;thejumper/liftedleadwasremoveduponcompletionofthetest.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.FCV-25-4and5remainedsealedclosedcontainmentisolationvalvesasrequiredbyTechnicalSpecification3.6,1.7.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsRequestNumber:0-13Component/SystemAffected:ReactorCoolantPump(RCP)2A2StatorTemp.(TI-1165),UpperGuideBearingTemp.(TI-1166),LowerGuideBearingTemp.(TI-1167).DescriptionofChange:Thisjumper/liftedleadfacilitatesmonitoringtheRCP2A2UpperandLowerGuideBearingThermocouplesandStatorTemperatureswitharecorder.Thiswasduetosuspectedinaccuracyofthe2A2upperoilreservoirlevelindication.Levelwaslowered;however,noevidenceofoilsmokeinatmosphereisevident,nosignificantamountofoilhasaccumulatedinRCPoilcollectionsystemandtherehasbeennoincreaseorabnormalitiesnotedinother2A2instrumentation.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.Jumpersareforrecorders,for2A2RCP.StatorTemperature,UpperGuideBearingTemperatureandLowerGuideBearing-Temperature.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-16Component/SystemAffected:FSE-27-12,oftheHydrogenSamplingSystemDescriptionofChange:FSE-27-12solenoidistobereplaced.ItssolenoidisdeenergizedunderPlantWorkOrder(PWO)¹6816.ThismeetstherequirementofTechnicalSpecification3.6.1sincethisliftedleadremovesvalvepositionindication.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.FSE-27-12isafailedclosedvalveandisdeenergizedwhichputsitinthefailedclosedposition.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.Thevalveisinitscontainmentisolated(closed)position.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-20Component/SystemAffected:HCV-09-1BValveBox,AnnunciatorP-16&LocalannunciatorDescriptionofChange:OneswitchinPS-09-1B2hasfailedcausingtheannunciatortolockin.Needtoreplaceswitchandrestorewiringinaccordancewithcontrolwiringdiagram(CWD).SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thisjumper/liftedleadistodocumentworkalreadycompletedasperrequestoftheInstrumentation&ControldepartmentandtheAssistantNuclearPlantSupervisor(ANPS).APlantWorkOrderwasissuedandperformedtoremoveanuisancealarmthatislockedinwithnoreflashcapability.ThewirestothefailedpressureswitchPS-09-1B2wereliftedandthelocalannunciatorswitchwasthenwiredtothecontrolroomannunciation.AlterationstothewiringperCWD656(2998-B-327),MainFeedwaterIsolationValveHCV-09-1B,weremadeasfollows:1.Bluewirewasliftedoffterminal13.2.Redwirewasliftedoffterminal14.Thereasonthiswasdonewastopreventthefailedpressureswitchfromlockingintheannunciatorinthecontrolroom.3.Orangewirewasliftedoffterminal11andlendedtoterminal14.4.Yellowwirewasliftedoffterminal9andlendedtoterminal13.Thiswiredthelocalswitchintothecontrolroomannunciatorcircuit.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.Useofswitch,normallyusedforlocalannunciation,forannunciationincontrolroomhasnotaffectedequipmentsafety.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.

TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-21Component/SystemAffected:HCV-09-1AValveBox,AnnunciatorP-6&LocalannunciatorDescriptionnfChange:OneswitchmPS-09-1A2hasfailedcausingtheannunciatortolockin.Needtoreplaceswitchandrestorewiringinaccordancewithcontrolwiringdiagram(CWD).SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thisjumper/liftedleadistodocumentworkalreadycompletedasperrequestoftheInstrumentation&ControldepartmentandtheAssistantNuclearPlantSupervisor(ANPS).APlantWorkOrderwasissuedandperformedtoremoveanuisancealarmthatislockedinwithnoreflashcapabilities.ThewirestothefailedpressureswitchPS-09-1A2wereliftedandthelocalannunciationswitchwasthenwiredtothecontrolroomannunciation.CWD655(2998-B-B27)andMainFeedwaterIsolationValveHCV-09-1A,hadthefollowingalterations:1.Bluewirewasliftedoffterminal13.2.Redwirewasliftedoffterminal14.Thereasonthiswasdonewastopreventthefailedpressureswitchfromlockingintheannunciatorinthecontrolroom.3.Orangewirewasliftedoffterminal11andlendedtoterminal14.4.Yellowwirewasliftedoffterminal9andlendedtoterminal13.Thiswiredthelocalswitchintothecontrolroomannunciatorcircuit.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.Usingloca'.switchforannunciationinControlRoomhasnotaffectedequipmentsafety,onlylossoflocalindication.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.

TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-22Component/SystemAffected:HCV-09-1BTestStrokeDescriptionofChange:Torepairand/orreplaceopenlimitswitchandfixoilleaks.Reasonforthisrequestwastopreventthevalvefromcontinuoustestingduetoshortinlimitswitch.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thisjumper/liftedleadisnecessaryduetothevalveopenlimitswitchbeingfullofoil.Thiscausedshortingbetweenterminals24&25whichenabledanddisabledcontinuously,thepartstroketestcircuit.Thisjumper/liftedleaddisablescompletelythepartstrokecircuitry.Testingcanstillbefacilitated(ifneeded)withassistancefromtheInstrumentation&Controldepartment.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheactivityaffectsthetestcircuitryandnotthemechanicalintegrityofthesystemasreferencedintheFUSARsection15.2.5.1.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmenttosafety.Containmentintegritywillbemaintained.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety.Testcircuitrythatalreadymalfunctionedonthevalveforthisjumper/liftedleaddoesnotaffectthesafetyfunctionoftherelatedvalves.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-49Component/SystemAffected:HCV-08-1BTestPanelDescriptionofChange:Changedrawing2998-B-327sheet316toshowthebluewireincable20316A-SBisopen.Thesparewhite/blackwireistousedinitsplace.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.Theinstalledsparewireistobeusedforabrokenonesothatanewwiredoesnothavetobepulled.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.Useoftheinstalledspareisfortheexactpurposeforwhichitwasoriginallyinstalled.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.Theinstalledsparewireisthesamesizewireasthebluewireincable20316A-SB.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:RequestNumber:0-57Component/SystemAffected:6.9KVSwitchgear2B-1MeteringDescriptionofChange:Thisjumper/liftedleadrequestwilleliminatetheuseofabrokenfixedcontactblock.ThissamejumperwasinstalledpreviouslyonUnit2.ThisrequestisapersonnelsafetyconcernasitdefeatsthebusPTtransformersisolatingcapability.Thisisonthe2B-16.9KVbus.AcautiontagwillbeinstalledontheoutsideofthecabinettowarnpersonnelofthefactthebusPTtransformerisolationcapabilityisdefeated.SafetyEvaluationSummary:The6.9KVbusespowertheReactorCoolantPumpsandtheMainFeedwaterPumpwhicharenecessaryforpoweroperationbutnotforthesafeshutdownofthereactor.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecification.

10CFR50.59EvaluationsSummariesofEvaluationsApprovedbytheSt.LucieFacilityRevievGroup ST.LUCIEUNITlUSEOFSEALINGCOMPOUNDONVALVESI-FCV-23"3,4,5INTRODUCTION:PSL-1BlowdownContainmentIsolationvalvesI-FCV-23-3and5andSGBDsystemisolationvalveI-FCV-23-4havehadahistoryofleakageproblems'.NumerousleakrepairshavebeenperformedontheseSteamGeneratorblowdownsystemcontainmentvalvesonbothunits.ThepurposeofthisevaluationistoprovideamethodfortemporarilyrepairingbodytobonnetleaksonvalvesI-FCV-23-3,4and5.Themethodofrepairwillbesealantinjection.Thevalvesshallbereplacedorpermanentlyrepairedduringthenextscheduledoutageorothersuitabletimeperiod.Thesevalvesarenonisolableandnormallyopen.SAFETYEVALUATION:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased.Thesevalvesarenotaccidentinitiatingcomponents.ThesevalvesservetoisolatecontainmentandtheSGBDsystemintheeventofanaccident.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedbythisrepair.Thevalvesarerequiredformaintainingcontainmentandsystemisolation,andtheirabilitytodosowillnotbeaffected;Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.Thevalvesarerequiredformaintainingcontainmentandsystemisolation,andtheirabilitytodosowillnotbeaffectedbythisrepairsincethecapnutsperformanidenticalfunctionastheheavyhexnutsandbeltloadingsarenotaffectedbytheinjectionofsealant.Thegasketand/orsealantdoesnotperformasafetyfunction.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased.Theconsequencesofthefailureoftheinjectionsealisthesameasthefailureofthegasket,whichwouldresultinalossofsystemfluidintothecontainmentpenetrationroomorcontainment.Thepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Theproposedrepairdoesnotprovideanewmodeofnormaloremergencyplantoperation.Chemistrylimitsarenotalteredandnootherchangeisproposedtotheplantdesign,modesofoperationorassumptionsinthebasisfortheTechnicalSpecificationsorSafetyAnalysis.Therefore,thisrepairdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.Thepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Limitingtheinjectionofsealanttojustinteractingoutsidethevalvepressureboundaryprecludesamalfunctionofadifferenttype.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONFORTEMPORARYMODIFICATIONOFPOLARCRANEBRAKESYSTEMINTRODUCTION:ThisSafetyEvaluationistoprovidejustificationforremovalofthedamagedportionofthepolarcranemainhoist7P1brakedrumliningandtomodifythecontrolcircuitforthemainhoist81and7P2brakes.Themachiningofthedamagedpositionofthedrumisnecessarytoremovecracksandtherebypreventtheirpropagation.Thecircuitmodificationwillallowtheinterchangingoffunctionsofthe81and8'2brakesonthemainhoistintermsofengagementafterdeenergizationofthemainhoistmotororthecreepmotor.SAFETYEVALUATION:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreasedsincethesetemporarymodificationsandassociatedoperationalrestrictionswillassurethecapabilityofthepolarcranemainhoisttosafelycarryloadsuptoandincludingthereactorheadanditsliftrig.Theconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated$ntheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedbythesetemporarymodifications.Themodificationsperformedunderthisevaluationaretothepolarcranebrakingsystem.ThepolarcranecontinuestocomplytotherequirementsofNUREG-0612.Thepossibilityofan'accidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedbythistemporarymodification.ThemanufacturerhasindicatedthatthemachiningoftheNo.lbrakedrumandthecircuitryrevisionstoswitchtheprimaryandtime-delaybrakingfunctionswillnotadverselyaffecttheabilityofthemainhoisttosafelycarryloadsonlyuptoandincludingthereactorheadanditsliftrig.Themodificationstothepolarcranebrakingsystemdonotcreateanynewfailuremodeswhichcouldimpacttheoperationofequipmentimportanttosafety.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecificationshasnotbeenreduced.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONFORTEMPORARYMODIFICATIONOFPOLARCRANEBRAKESYSTEMANDLOADCELLCONTROLFUNCTIONSINTRODUCTION:ThisSafetyEvaluationistoprovidejustificationforremovalofthedamagedportionofthepolarcranemainhoistfPIbrakedrumlining,modifythecontrolcircuitforthemainhoistfland82brakes,andmodifytheinterlockfunctionsperformedbytheLoadCell.Themachiningofthedamagedportionofthedrumisnecessarytoremovecracksandtherebypreventtheirpropagation.Thecircuitmodificationforthemainhoistbrakeswillallowtheinterchangingoffunctionsofthe81and82brakesonthemainhoistintermsofengagementafterdeenergizationofthemainhoistmotororthecreepmotor.SAFETYEVALUATION:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreasedsincethesetemporarymodificationsandassociatedoperationalrestrictionswillassurethecapabilityofthepolarcranemainhoisttosafelycarryloadsuptoandincludingthereactorheadanditsliftrig.Theconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedinthe'USARhavenot~~beenincreasedbythesetemporarymodifications.Themodificationsperformedunderthisevaluationaretothepolarcranebrakingsystemandloadcellcontrolfunctions.ThepolarcranecontinuestocomplytotherequirementsofNUREG-0612.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreasedbythesetemporarymodifications.Themodificationsperformedunderthisevaluationareforthepolarcranebrakingsystemandloadcellcontrolfunctions.ThissystemcontinuestosatisfytherequirementsofNUREG-0612.Thepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedbythistemporarymodification.ThemanufacturerhasindicatedthatthemachiningoftheNo.1brakedrumandthecircuitryrevisionstoswitchtheprimaryandtime-delaybrakingfunctionswillnotadverselyaffecttheabilityofthemainhoisttosafelycarryloadsonlyuptoandincludingthereactorheadanditsliftrig.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecificationshasnotbeenreducedbythesetemporarymodifications.

II ST.LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONFORPLANTOPERATIONWITHCEMECHANICALPLUGSINEDMDAMAGEDSTEAMGENERATORTUBESINTRODUCTION:DuringimplementationofPCM251-189inFebruary1990,"SteamGeneratorTubePlugReplacement-WestinghousetoCEDesignPlug",fortytubesinthesteamgeneratorAandBcoldlegsideweredamagedbytheEDMprocessoperationswhileremovingtheWestinghouseplugs.Inaddition,aproblemwasidentifiedintheSteamgeneratorAcoldlegside.AnEDMscarwasfoundtohaveataperthatwasnottypicalasthosedemonstratedduringpreviousoperationsandCEqualificationtests.Afterreview,tenofthefortytubeswithEDMscarswerepluggedwiththeCEmechanicalplugandtheremainingthirtyhadweldedplugsinstalled.Priortofinaldeterminationoftherootcauseofthenonperpendicularelectrodetravel,anumberofweldedplugswereinstalledbecauseoftheuseofaninterimacceptancecriteria.SAFETYEVALUATION:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofadesignbasisaccidentofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARisnotincreasedsincetheflowdiodeeffectdoesnotresultinadverseplantconditionssuchasunacceptabledamagetoadjacentintacttubes,doesnotdecreasethedesignmarginoftheRCSpressureboundaryanddoesnotalterexistingaccidentmitigationequipmentorsyst'ems.TheconsequencesofapreviouslypostulateddesignbasisaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARarenotmademoresevereforthesamereasonsgivenabovetheconsequencesoffishmouthingandplugcollapsearenomoreseverethanasteamgeneratortuberupture,apreviouslyevaluatedcondition.ThepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyaddressedintheFUSARdoesnotexistsincefishmouthingdoesnotresultinunacceptabledamagetoadjacenttubesnoradverselyimpacttheperformanceofthesteamgenerator.Primarytosecondaryleakageafteraplugcollapserequiresasubsequenttubeleak.Failureofatubeplugwouldbenomoreseverethanasteamgeneratortuberupture,apreviouslyevaluatedcondition.Atubeplugcould"loosen"andfallfromthetubesheetafterplugcollapse.Ifthisscenarioweretooccur,theplugcouldcometo"rest"againstthelowersurfaceofoneormorefuelassemblyretentiongrids,flowtoaffectedfuelassemblieswouldnotbesignificantlyaffected,duetothesmallsizeandgeometryoftheplugs.Ifaplugweretomigratetothelowerpartofthecore,existingloosepartsmonitoringequipmentwouldalertcontrolroomoperatorstotheproblem,andactionasrequiredbyTechnicalSpecificationswouldbetaken.Therefore,nonewaccidentsarecreated.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedsincethetotalnumberoftubespluggedhasnotchanged.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONFORI-HV-09-08BYPASSLINEELBOWLEAKSEALANTENCLOSUREINTRODUCTION:NCR1-507identifiesapinholeleakontheupstreamweldonthefirstelbowonthe1"bypasslinearoundvalveI-MV-09-08.ThisSafetyEvaluationwillpermittheinstallationofaleaksealantenclosurearoundtheleakingelbowandprecludelossoffeedwaterorauxiliaryfeedwaterinventory.Anengineeringevaluationwillproceedinparallelfortheuseoftheenclosureaslongtermmodification.SAFETYEVALUATION:Theimplementationofthistemporarymodificationwillhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.AreviewoftheplantTechnicalSpecificationsandtheSafetyAnalysisReporthasshownthattherearenounreviewedsafetyquestionsorTechnicalSpecificationchangesinvolved.TheprobabilityofanoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARisnotincreasedbecausetheinstallationofaleaksealantenclosurehasbeenevaluatedandithasbeendeterminedthatthemodifiedsystemstressesremainwithinCodeallowables.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedbecausethedesignandoperationoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystemhasnotbeenchangedandthecapabilityofsupplyingfeedwatertothesteamgeneratorsisnotaffected.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipment'importanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreasedbecausetheinstallationoftheenclosurehasbeenseismicallyanalyzedwithacceptableresults,thesystemroutinghasnotbeenchangedsooperationalperformanceremainsthesame,thepressuredesignoftheclampwillprecludetheclampfrombecomingasourcemissileorfallingobjectbecauseithasbeendesignedforthesystempressure,thechemistryoftheleaksealanthasbeenevaluatedandwillnotintroducedeleteriousmaterialsintothefeedwatersystem,theinjectionofsealantwillbelimitedtothevolumeofannularspaceinsidetheenclosureperLeakRepairproceduresandtheclampdesignpreventsdisengagementofthepiping.Thepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedbecausetheinjectionofsealantwillbelimitedtoavoidtheintroductionofsealantintothefeedwatersystem,thechemistryofthesealantiscompatiblewiththepipingmaterial,theenclosureisfabricatedofcarbonsteelandthereforehasthesamecoefficientofexpansionasthepipingandthepressuredesignoftheclampwillprecludetheclampfrombecomingasourcemissileorfallingobjectbecauseithasbeendesignedforthesystempressure.

N1 PAGE2SAFETYEVALUATIONFORI-MV-09-08BYPASSLINEELBOWLEAKSEALANTENCLOSURETheproposedmodificationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbecausethemarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnicalSpecificationsistohavetworedundantauxiliaryfeedwatersystemscapableofprovidingfeedwatertothesteamgeneratorstomaintainsteamgeneratorlevelforremovalofdecayheat,coolingthereactorcoolantto325Ftemperature.Theinstallationoftheleaksealantenclosuredoesnotpreventthemodifiedsystemfromperformingitsdesignfunction.

STLUCIEUNIT1ST.LUCIEUNIT1CYCLE10,10CFR50.59FORMODE6OPERATIONINTRODUCTION:TheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reviewofMode6operation,(Reference1)presentstheevaluationtosupporttheshufflingoffuelfromtheCycle9loadingpatterntotheCycle10loadingpattern.ThisreviewwasdeemednecessaryduetotheearlyshutdownoftheCycle9.SAFETYEVALUATIONTheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reloaddoesnotresultinanychangestotheoverallconfigurationoftheplantforMode6,exceptfortherepositioningofthefuelassemblieswithinthecore.NothingoutsidethecoreisalteredbythischangeandthemethodofplantoperationwhileinMode6remainsunchanged.Therefore,theprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentforMode6importanttosafetyisnotimpacted.ForoperationatSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10themethodforrepositioningfuelinsidethecoreduringMode6hasnotchangedfrompreviouscycles.Nomodificationsinthemethodofplantoperationortheplantconfigurationarerequiredasaresultofthischange.ForMode6thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyanalyzedinthesafetyanalysesisnotcreated.TheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reloaddesignneutronicsinputforMode6andtheresultingsafetyanalyseshasbeenreviewed,andinallcasestheresults'rewellwithintheacceptancecriteriaofthedesignbasis.Furthermore,nochangesweremadeinthemethodsusedtoevaluatethemargintosafety.AsperFederalRegulation10CFR50.59(b)theaboveSafetyEvaluationprovidesthebasistoconcludethattheimplementationoffuelshufflingfromtheCycle9loadingpatterntoCycle10loadingpatternforSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10Mode6reloadoperationdoesnotinvolveanychangeswhichintroduceanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1EVALUATIONOFBgCCENTERFINGERCONTROLELEMENTASSEMBLIES(CEA's)INTRODUCTION:DuringCEAoperabilitytestingatMaineYankee,acontrolelementassembly(CEA)jammedatapproximately80%ofitsfullyinsertedposition".ThecenterfingerofthestuckCEAhadbecomelodgedinthecenterguidetubeofthehostfuelassemblyduetoalossofthemechanicalintegrityofthecenterfingertipregion(seeFigure1).CombustionEngineering,thedesignerandmanufactureroftheCEAsinuseatMainYankeeidentifiedthefailedCEAashavingthe"oldstyle"CEAdesign;i.e.,aCEAwhichcontainsBgCabsorbermaterialextendingtothetipofthecenterfinger.St.LucieUnit1cycle10coreoperateswithtwenty(20)CEAsoftheoldstyleCombustionEngineeringdesign.St.LucieUnit2operateswithCEAsthatarenotoftheolds'tyledesign".'ngeneral,thesafetyconcernassociatedwiththefailureofCEAsisthatinsufficientshutdownreactivitywillbeavailableifrequiredduringnormalor'transientoperation.TheresultofinsufficientshutdownreactivitycouldbeassevereasexceedingfueldesignlimitsleadingtolossoffuelrodintegrityorexacerbatingtheconsequencesofalimitingFUSARtransient".Inthisspecificcase,theconcernisthepotentialforcommonmodefailureofoldstyleCEAs'.FailureinthiscontextmeansthefailureofoneormoreoldstyleCEAstoinsertondemand.EVALUATION:St.LucieUnit1i.scapableofsafeoperationduringCycle10witholdstyleCEAs.Thefollowingsupportsthisconclusion.TheSt.LucieUnit1inspectionresultsindicatenoCEAendcapfailuresorcircumferentialcrackingforaninspectiongrouphavingexposureswhicharerepresentativeoftheoldstyleCEAscurrentlyinoperation.TheSt.LucieUnit1reviewofCEAmanufacturingrecordsshowedthatdesignandconstructionofCEAswereinaccordancewithapprovedmaterials,.tests,inspections,procedures,andspecifications.TheSt.LucieUnit1CEAinspectionwaswithintherangeofexposuresexperiencedby"thefailedCEAsatMaineYankee.NoneoftheSt.LucieUnit1CEAshadfailed.TheevaluationofnormalplantoperationsindicatethatcontinuedoperationwitholdstyleCEAsdoesnotaffecttheplant'sabilitytoachievesafeshutdown.ThepostulatedfailureofthreehighreactivityworthCEAsatanytimeduringtheremainderofCycle10resultsinsafetyconsequenceswhicharewithintheacceptancecriteriaforthecurrentUnit1safetyanalyses.Toensuresafeoperationwiththe20oldstyleCEAsuntiltheendofthecurrentcycle,thefollowingaugmentedCEAsurveillanceprogramwillbeinplacetoreducethelikelihoodofoperationwithaninoperableCEA.

PAGE2EvaluationofBgCCenterFingerControlElementAssemblies'(CEAs)FullstrokeCEAexercisingaftertripsandcoldshutdownswillensureCEAoperabilityfollowingthemostprobableprecursortofailure,namelyathermaltransition.QuarterlyfullstrokeCEAexercisingwillprovidefurtherassurancethattheplantwillnotoperatewithafailedCEA.Incorefluxmonitoringwillbeperformedsemi-weeklytoprovidedetectionofagrossCEAfailure,andthusprovidingfurtherassurancethatCEAsarenotfailedandthattheplantisoperatinginasafemannerRepositioningof20'oldstyleCEAstothefullywithdrawnpositionwillprovideminimumneutronfluencetothetipregion,thusminimizinganyembrittlementaffect.Therefore,basedonthesurveillancesandevaluationsdiscussed,St.LucieUnit1iscapableofsafeoperationwitholdstyleCEAsuntiltheendofthecurrentfuelCycle(EOC-10).ThisconclusionhasreceivedtheconcurrenceoftheNuclearRegulatoryCommission,OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1CYCLE1010CFR50.59INTRODUCTION:TheSt.LucieUnit1,Cycle10reloaddesignestablishedbyFPLconsistsof92BatchMnaturaluraniumaxialblanketassemblies.SixteenoftheBatchMassembliescontainnoburnableabsorberrods,twelveassembliescontainfour4w/oGd203,16assemblieshavetwelve6w/oGd203yfortyfourassemblieshavetwelve8w/oGd203rodsandtheremaining4assemblieshavetwelve6w/oandfour8w/oGd203rods.Theremainingofthecoreconsistsof8BatchH,9BatchJ,16BatchK,and92BatchLassemblies.TheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10SafetyAnalysisReport(FUSAR)(Reference1)presentstheevaluationofthereloadcorecharacteristicswithrespecttothesafetyanalysispresentedintheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle9FUSAR(Reference2).ThisbaseSafetyAnalysiswasperformedtosupportoperationsofSt.LucieUnit1,Cycle10.Afterthisanalysiswascompleted,theplantshutdownearlytoendCycle9.ANFperformedanadditionalSafetyAnalysisforCycle10(Reference3)inordertoaddresstheimpactoftheshortenedCycle9.ThisSafetyAssessmentsupplementstheCycle10FUSAR.SAFETYEVALUATION:Basedonthetechnicalevaluationperformedandthe'resultsofthereanalysisdiscussedinthisSafetyAnalysisReport,itcanbeconcludedthatt'eSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reloaddesignmeetsallthedesigncriteria,andcanbeimplementedwithnochangesrequiredtotheexistingSt.LucieUnit1TechnicalSpecifications.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreased.TheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reloaddoesnotresultinanychangestotheoverallconfigurationoftheplant.Theplant'smodeofoperationremainsunchanged.TheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reloaddesigndoesnotresultinanychangesexternaltothereactorcorewhichimpacttheoverallconfigurationoftheplant,orthemethodinwhichtheplantisoperated.Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyanalyzedinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.TheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reloaddesignneutronicsandfueldesigninputtosafetyanalysishasbeenreviewed,andinallcasestheresultsofanalysisarewellwithintheacceptancecriteriaofthedesignandlicensingbases.Theacceptancecriteriaforthesafetyanalysishavenotbeenchanged.BasedonFPLtechnicalreviewsoftheFUSARreportandofthesafetyassessmentoftheCycle9earlyshutdown,itcanbedeterminedthattheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle10reloaddesignmeetsalltheexistingacceptancecriteria.ThereforetheCycle10reloaddoesnotresultinareductiontothemarginofsafetyrelativetotheTechnicalSpecificationbasesforSt.LucieUnit1.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1ICWSYSTEMISOLATIONVALVERELININGINTRODUCTION:Theoriginalinteriorrubberliningonthesubjectbutterflyvalve(s)havedemonstratedarecurringproblemofdisbonding/looseningfromthevalvebody,allowingtheturbulentprocessmedium(seawater)tocomeincontactwiththecarbonsteelvalvebody.Thishasresultedinerosion/corrosiondeteriorationonthevalvebody.Replacingtheentirerubberliningwithapolymerepoxycoatingaccomplishestherequiredvalvebodyprotection.TheaffectedbutterflyvalvesserveintheIntakeCoolingWater(ICW)System(ASMESectionIII,Class3),aClass3,SafetyRelatedSystem,andtherefore,thischangeisclassifiedasSafetyRelated.Theoriginalvalverubberliningisidentifiedas"ResilosealNaturalP",affixedtothevalvebodyatthefactory,ThereplacementcoatingsarePalmerInternationalmaterials,"CeramalloyCL,CPandDuratoughDP",appliedinaccordancewiththe"ICWValveLiningTechnicalProcedure/Guidelines"providedwiththeQL--2RPAforthison-siteworkandthemanufacturer'sapplicationinstructions.Thenewcoatingisreportedtoberesistanttoerosion,corrosionandcavitation,andiscompatibleforuseoncarbonsteelsurfaceswithinaseawatermedium.EVALUATION:Applicationof,thepolymerepoxycoatinginaccordancewiththe"ICWValveLiningTechnicalProcedure/Guidelines"andthemanufacturer'sinstructionswillpreventdisbonding.DesignEquivalenceofthereplacementpolymerepoxycoatingmaterialtotheoriginalrubberliningisassuredby:1)2)Resistanceofthepolymerepoxycoatingtoerosion,corrosionandcavitationwillpreventvalvebodydeterioration.AProcurementClassificationofQL"2fortheRPAwasselectedbasedon:theICWsystemisSafety-Related,thereliningmaterialiscommercialgrade,10CFR21isnotrequired,QADapprovalisrequiredonboththeRPAandtheP.O.,'hesupplierisQAapproved,anddocumentationisrequired.FUSARSection9.2(Table9.2-1)willberevisedtoreflectthischange.Theaboveevaluationestablishesdesign'equivalenceandconformancetotheoriginalbasisandsupportstheanswersgivenonthe"NuclearSafetyEvaluationChecklist"(JPNForm4C).IthasthereforebeenshownthatthereisnounreviewedsafetyquestionsorTechnicalSpecificationchangesinvolvedinthismodificationpursuantto10CFR50.59.FUSARChapter9definesthis'systemassafetyrelated,therefore,thisDEEPisclassifiedassafetyrelated.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1EVALUATIONOFBgCCENTERFINGERCONTROLELEMENTASSEMBLIES(CEA)REV.2INTRODUCTION:RecentinspectionsattheMaineYankeeNuclearPlantidentifiedthreeControlElementAssemblies(CEA's)withmissingcenterfingerendcapsandoneCEAwithacircumferentialcrackinthecenterfingerendcapweldregion.ThefailedCEAsareofanoldCombustionEngineeringCEADesign,whichhasthecenterfingerwithBz,C'pelletsextendingtothetip.Theterm"old"CEAisdefinedinthecontextofthisdiscussionasaCEAofSt.LucieUnit1iscurrentlyoperatingwith17old=CEA's.EVALUATION:TheSt.LucieUnit1inspectionresultsdefinitivelyindicatenoCEAendcapfailuresorcircumferentialcrackingforaninspectiongroupwhichisoverthreetimesthesizeof,andrepresentstheprojectedexposuresof,theoldCEA'scurrentlyinoperation.Inaddition,reviewofCEAmanufacturingrecordsindicatesthatdesignandconstructionofCEAswereinaccordancewithapprovedmaterials,test,inspections,procedures,andspecifications.Therefore,theprobabilityofCEAinoperabilityduringCycle10isconsideredlow.Nonetheless,thefollowingaugmentedCEAsurveillanceprogramwillbeinplacefortheremainderofCycle10tofurtherreducethelikelihoodofoperationwithaninoperableCEA.1):FullstrokeCEAexercisingaftertripsandcoldshutdownswillensureCEAoperabilityfollowingthemostprobableprecursortofailure,namelyathermaltransition.2)QuarterlyfullstrokeCEAexercisingwillprovidefurtherassurancethattheplantwillnotoperatewithafailedCEA.3)Incorefluxmonitoringwillbeperformedsemi-weeklytoprovidedetectionofagrossCEAfailure,andthusprovidingfurtherassurancethatCEAsarenotfailedandthattheplantisoperatinginasafemanner.Further,anevaluationofnormalplantoperationsindicatesthatcontinuedoperationwiththe17oldCEAsdoesnotaffecttheplantsabilitytoachievesafeshutdown.Therefore,basedonthesurveillancesandevaluationsdiscussed,St.LucieUnit,liscapableofsafeoperationwith17olddesignCEAsuntiltheendofthecurrentfuelCycle(EOC-10)/TheconclusionhasreceivedtheconcurrenceoftheCombustionEngineeringNuclearSafetyCommittee.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONTOPERMITAMODIFIEDLITHIUMREACTORCOOLANTPROGRAMFORST.LUCIEUNIT1,CYCLE10INTRODUCTION:LithiumhydroxideisusedtocontroltheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)pHtomaintainazerocoefficientofsolubilityfordissolvedcorrosionproducts,i.e.crud.ThisresultsincrudgoingintosolutioninhotterregionsoftheRCS(thecore)andcruddepositionoccurringincoolerregionsoftheRCS(thesteamgenerators).Theoverallcorecrudloadwouldbereducedbypreventingcrudfromdepositingonthefuel'surfaces.Althoughthecrudloadinthesteamgeneratorswouldincrease,theneweffectistominimizetheactivationofcorrosionproductsbyreducingtheirresidencetimeinthecore.Thecoordinatedlithium-boroncontrolprogramfollowedinCycle9waspredicatedonthezero-coefficientofsolubilityofthecrudbeingatpHof7.4,basedonacrudcompositionofmostlycobaltandnickelsubstitutedferrites.Thepurposeoftheprogramistoreducetheactivationofcrudandtherebyreduceoutofcoreradiationfields.SAFETYEVALUATION:Themodifiedlithiumprogramwhichminimizesthetimethelithiumconcentrationisabove2.2ppmdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionanddoesnotinvolveachangetotheTechnicalSpecifications.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.Themodifiedlithiumcoolantchemistryprogramproposedforcycle10willresultinazircaloycorrosionratethatislowerthanthecorrosionrateobservedfollowinguseoftheelevatedlithiumcoolantchemistryprogramincycle9,whichwasfoundtobewithinacceptablelimits.Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.Nochangestothefuelortothefueloperatingenvironment,otherthanincreasingthelithiumconcentration,arebeingproposed.ThemodifiedlithiumRCSwaterchemistryprogramproposedforuseinPSL1cycle10doesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionasfarasitseffectonnuclearfuelperformanceisconcerned.Theacceleratedcorrosioneffectonzircaloyfromextendedexposureto3.5ppmlithiumwillbemitigatedbyoperatingbelowthislevel.Theresultingzircaloyoxidationwillbewithinthefuelroddesigncriterion.Assuch,nosafetyanalysisisimpactednorisanynewanalysisrequired.

0 ST.LUCIEUNIT1HPSIHEADERVALUEPOSITIONCHANGEINTRODUCTION:Thissafetyevaluationwillpermittheopeningoftheeighthighpressuresafetyinjection(HPSI)headerisolationvalvestoafullopenposition.Thevalvesarecurrentlysetforapproximatelytwo-thirdsopen.ThepurposeofthismodificationistoincreaseHPSIsystemflowdeliverytothereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)whenevertheHPSIpumpsareactuatedand,therefore,increasethemarginbetweenactualandrequiredflows.SAFETYEVALUATION:FullyopeningtheHPSIsystemheaderisolationvalvesdoesnotalteranyothercomponentorequipment.ThesafetyfunctionoftheHPSIsystemisactuallyenhancedbythismodification.Therefore,thismodificationhasnoadverseimpactontheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionpreviouslyevaluated.FullyopeningtheHPSIsystemheaderisolationvalvesdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentormalfunctionimportantto'afety.TheonlyplantsystemimpactedbythismodificationistheHPSIsystem.FullyopeningtheHPSIsystemheaderisolationvalvesdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofexceedingasafetylimit,sincetheincreaseinHPSIsystemflowdoes'notrequireachangetoanyofthe'lants'echnicalSpecifications.ThetechnicalspecificationsreviewedforpotentialimpactwerethoseregardingmaximumallowableheatupandcooldownrateswithsingleHPSIpump(figure3.1-1b),borationsystems(3/4.1.2),P/Tlimits(3/4.4.9),emergencycorecoolingsystems(ECCS)(3/4.5),andemergencycore'coolingsystemsdesignfeatures(5.5).Nochangestothesetechnicalspecificationsarerequired.Further,thesafetyanalysisconclusionshavenotchangedandtheplantprotectionandengineeredsafetyfeaturessystemssetpointsremainunchanged.Therefore,thereisnoreductiononthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesofanytechnicalspecification.Thesystemmodification,whichpermittheHPSIsystemheaderisolationvalvestobefullopen,canbeperformedundera10CFR50.59sinceitinvolvesneitherachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecificationsnoranunreviewedsafetyquestion.Therefore,plantoperationwiththeHPSIsystemheaderisolationvalvesfullyopenisnotasafetyconcern.

ST.LUCIEUNITlSAFETYEVALUATIONFORREACTORCOOLANTP&1P(RCP)MOTORBEARINGLUBEOILDRAINVALVESINTRODUCTION:ThissafetyevaluationispreparedtodocumenttheacceptabilityoftheasinstalledconfigurationoftheUnit1upperandlower,RCPmotorbearinglubeoillevelindication.'urrentlyplantdrawingsdonotcallforthepresenceofadrainlinebetweentheisolationvalveandthesightglass,whichistheasinstalledconfiguration.AlloftheaffectedpipingisqualitygroupDpiping,non-safetyrelatedandnon-seismicdesign(seismicallysupported).Theexistingconditionhasnoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.AreviewoftheplantTechnicalSpecificationsandtheSafetyAnalysisReporthasshownthatthere'arenounreviewedsafetyquestionsorTechnicalSpecificationchangesinvolved.SAFETYEVALUATION:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreasedsincetheasinstalledconfigurationdoesnotaffectanyaccidentinitiatingcomponents.ThedrainlinesdonotimpingeuponanyRCSpipingandareclassifiedasnon-safety,qualitygroupDlines;Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.Theexistingconfigurationdoesnotalterthefunctionordesignofanyexistingcomponents,andthusdoesnotincreasethepossibilityoftheirfailure.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedsincetheexistingconfigurationdoesnotcreateanewpathforuncontrolledradioactivereleases.Thedrainlineswillnotadverselyaffectanyradiationmonitoringequipmentorequipmentwhichperformsacontainmentisolationfunction.Thepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedsincetheexistingconfigurationwillnotinhibitorotherwiseadverselyaffecttheoperationofanyequipmentimportanttosafety.Theaffectedpipingisnon-safety,qualitygroupDpipinganddownstreamofthebearinglubeoilheaderisolationvalve.Theconfigurationofthedrainlineprecludesthepossibilityofleakageduetoasinglefailure.Thepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthe'safetyanalysisreporthas,notbeencreatedsincetheexistingconfigurationdoesnotaddoraffectanyequipmentcapableofinitiatinganaccident.Theaffectedpipingisnon-safety,qualitygroupDpipingandservesnosafetyfunction.TheexistingconfigurationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationsincetheexistenceofthedrainlinewillnotimpacttheoperationoftheRCPmotorbearinglubeoilsystemortheRCPitself.

0r,~~4I'T+~Jll ST.LUCIEUNIT1EVALUATIONOFB4CCENTERFINGERCONTROLELEMENTASSEMBLIES(CEA's)INTRODUCTION:RecentinspectionsatMaineYankeeidentifiedthreeCEA'swithcenterfingersmissingendcaps.GiventhatSt.LucieUnit1iscurrentlyoperatingwithsimilardesignCEA's(20outof73),anevaluationwasperformedtoexaminetheimpactofpotentialmultipleCEAfailuresonplantoperation.Theevaluationisnotcomplete,however,theresultscurrentlyavailableprovideaddedassurancethatintheeventofmultipleCEAfailuresSt.LucieUnit1canbesafelyshutdown.Inaddition,detectionofCEAfailuresislikelythroughtheuseofCEAexercisesand/orincore/excoremonitoring.EVALUATIONSzCurrently,noevidenceexiststhatSt.LucieUnit1hasexperiencedaCEAfailureofanytype.Tothecontrary,objectiveevidenceexistswhichdemonstratesthatall73CEA'sarefunctioningasdesigned.Duringthespringrefuelingoutage,theCEA'swereshuffledwithnoindicationofabnormaloperation.CEAsurveillanceforreactivitymeasurements(rodbankworth),involvedmovementofCEA'sfromtheirfullywithdrawntofullyinsertedposition.AllCEA'sfunctionednormallyandmeasuredrodworthsmetacceptancecriteria.Forexample,thedifferencebetweenpredictedandmeasuredtotalCEAbankworthforthecurrentcyclestartupwas2.2%comparedtoanacceptancecriteriaof10%.Sincethespringrefuelingoutage,'ullinsertionandwithdrawalofthe73CEA'shasbeenperformedpriortostartupon4/23/90,5/9/90and5/24/90.Priortostartupon6/14/90,allregulatingbanksunderwentfullinsertionandwithdrawal,andfunctionednormally.(TwelveofthereferenceCEA'sarepartoftheregulatingbanks.)TheCEA'scurrentlyintheSt.Luciespentfuelpoolhaveexposuresof4200-4400EFPD,whichisroughlyequivalenttothenominalCEAexposuresprojectedforEOC-10.SincenofailuresorabnormalitiesofthespentfuelpoolCEA'shavebeenobserved,thisindicatesfurtherassuranceoftheintegrityoftheincorereferenceCEA's.InspectiontoconfirmtheconditionofrepresentativedischargeCEA'sisplanned.Initialcriticalityconditionswereattainedwithinacceptancecriteria.Forexample,measuredHZPcriticalborondifferedfromdesigncalculationby27ppmcomparedto+50ppmacceptancecriteria.Uponr'eactortripsand/orcoldshutdow'ns,referenceCEAexercising(fullinsertion/withdrawal)willbeconducted.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1INSTALLATIONOFTEMPORARYMONITORINGEQUIPMENTONTHE1A1REACTORCOOLANTPUMP(RCP)INTRODUCTION:ThisSafetyEvaluationistoprovidejustificationforthetemporaryuseofadditionalshaftdisplacementvibrationmonitoringequipmentonthelAlReactorCoolantPump(RCP).ThiswillallowadditionaldatatobecollectedontheRCPperformanceduringalignmentandbalancingoftheshaft.Theprobesandassociatedsupportbracketsforthistemporarymodificationareallowedforuseduringanymodeofoperationforthefacility.Allothertemporarymonitoringequipmentandtemporaryjumpersshallberemovedpriortotheunitenteringstartupoperations(mode2).Theuseoftheadditionalmonitoringequipmentwillhavenoadverseeffectonanypermanentlyinstalledequipmentandwillbedisconnectedpriortostartupoperations.SAFETYEVALUATION:AreviewoftheplantTechnicalSpecificationsandtheSafetyAnalysisReporthasshownthatnounreviewedsafetyquestionsandnoTechnicalSpecificationchangesareinvolvedwiththistemporarymodification.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreasedsincetheadditionalvibrationmonitoringequipmenthasnoeffectontheoperationnorwillthestructuralintegrityorfunctionofthemotor/pumpbeaffected.TheconsequencesofanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedbythetemporaryvibrationmonitoringequipmentorlossofcontrolroomvibrationindicationoralarm.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreasedbythesetemporarymodifications.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipment.importanttosafetyhasnotbeenincreasedbythesetemporarymodifications.ThemodificationsperformedunderthissafetyevaluationaretothevibrationmonitoringsystemofthelAlRCP.Thepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedbythistemporarymodification.Thevibrationmonitoringsystemisapassivesystem.Thesystemperformsnoautomaticcontrollingfunctions.Thepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedasaresultofthesetemporarymodifications.ThetemporarylossofvibrationindicationandalarmfortheRCPlAldoesnotcreateanynewfailuremodeswhichcouldimpacttheoperationofanyequipmentimportanttosafety.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1INSTALLATIONOFTEMPORARYVIBRATIONMONITORINGEQUIPMENTON1A1REACTORCOOLANTPUMP(RCP)INTRODUCTION:ThisSafetyEvaluationistoprovidejustificationforthetemporaryuseofadditionalshaftdisplacementvibrationmonitoringequipmentonthe1AlReactorCoolantPump(RCP).ThiswillallowadditionaldatatobecollectedontheRCPperformanceduringalignmentandbalancingoftheshaft.Theprobesandassociatedsupportbracketsforthistemporarymodificationareallowedforuseduringanymodeofoperationforthefacility.Allothertemporaryvibrationmonitoringequipmentandtemporaryjumpersshallberemovedpriortotheunitenteringstartupoperations(mode2).Theuseoftheadditionalmonitoringequipmentwillhavenoadverseeffectonanypermanentlyinstalledequipmentandwillbedisconnectedpriortostartupoperations.SAFETYEVALUATION:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreasedsincetheadditionalvibrationmonitoringequipmenthasnoeffectontheoperationnorwillthestructuralintegrity,orfunctionofthemotor/pumpbeaffected.ITheconsequencesofanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedbythetemporaryvibrationmonitoringequipmentorlossofcontrolroomvibrationindicationoralarm.TheRCPvibrationmonitoringsystemisnotusedtomitigatetheconsequencesofanyaccidentevaluatedintheFUSAR.SincetheRCPshavenotbeenfunctionallyaffectednorwilltheaddedequipmentaffectitsstructuralintegrity,theRCP'swillcontinuetoperformtheirintendedpurposeandprovideadequatecoastdownflowfollowinganaccident.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyhasnotbeenincreasedbythesetemporarymodifications.Thepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedbythistemporarymodification.Thevibrationmonitoringsystemisapassivesystem.Thesystemperformsnoautomaticcontrollingfunctions.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreasedbythesetemporarymodifications.Themodificationsperformedunderthisevaluationforthetemporaryinstallationofadditionalvibrationmonitoring,equipmentandtemporarylossofcontrolroomindicationandannunciationofRCPvibrationhasnoimpactontheoperationofanyequipment.SincetheRCP'shavenotbeenfunctionallyaffectednorwilltheaddedequipmentaffectitsstructuralintegrity,theRCP'swillcontinuetoperformtheirintendedpurposeandprovideadequatecoastdownflowfollowinganaccident.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecificationshasnotbeenreduced.

ST.LUCIEUNIT1CONTAINMENTFANCOOLERUNQUALIFIEDCOATINGINTRODUCTION:ThissafetyevaluationaddressesthepresenceofunqualifiedcoatingsonthelA,1B,1C,and1DContainmentFanCoolercoilflanges.NewcoolingcoilswereinstalledunderPC/M081-189duringtheUnit11990Winterrefuelingoutage.Uponinspectionofthecoilspriortoinstallation,thecoatingonthecoilflangeswasdeterminedtobeimproperlyapplied(i.e.-unqualified).Someoftheseunqualifiedcoatingscouldnotberemovedandreplacedduetotheirproximitytothecoppercoilsandtheresultantpotentialfordamageofthecoppercoils.SAFETYEVALUATION:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreasedsincetheunqualifiedcoatingsdonotperformsafetyfunctionandtheirfailureduringaLOCAwillnotadverselyaffectthefunctionofanystructure,system,orcomponentimportanttosafety,oraffectanyaccidentinitiatingevents.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedsincefailureoftheunqualifiedcoatingswillnotaffectthefunctionofanyequipmentrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreasedsincefailureoftheunqualifiedcoatingswillnotalterthefunctionofanystructure,systemorcomponentimportanttosafety,andthusdoesnotincreasethepossibilityoftheirfailure.ThepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFUSARhasnotbeencreatedsincetheunqualifiedcoatingsdonotperformasafetyfunctionandtheirfailureduringaLOCAwillnotadverselyaffectthefunctionofanystructure,systemorcomponentcapableofinitiatinganaccidentThepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedsincefailureoftheunqualifiedcoatingswillnotinhibitorotherwiseadverselyaffecttheoperationofanystructure,system,orcomponentimportanttosafety.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedsincefailureoftheunqualifiedcoatingscannotaffecttheperformanceofanystructure,system,orcomponentimportanttosafety.ThefailedcoatingscannotadverselyaffecttheECCSsincetheywillnotclogthecontainmentsump,oraffecttheperformanceofECCSpumpsandcontainmentspraynozzles.TheproposedmodificationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationsincetheunqualifiedcoatingscannotaffectthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONFDRUSEOFSEALINGCOMPOUNDONVALVEI-V09252INTRODUCTIONsThegasketsealingsurfaceonthevalvebodyhingepinboreofvalveV09252(feedwatersupplycheckvalveto2Asteamgenerator)wasweldrepaired,inaccordancewithNCR-2-307.Asacontingencyintheeventthevalvecontinuestoleakatthisjointduringstartup,NCR-2-308wasinitiatedtorequestinstallationofLeakRepairs,Inc.capnutsandwirewrap.Thevalveislocatedsuchthatinstallationofthecapnutswouldbedifficultwhiletheleakisinprogress.Ifleakageisdetectedduringstartup,thesealantwouldbeinjectedthroughthecapnutsintothegasketarea.Thepurposeofthisevaluationistoevaluateinstallationofthecapnutsandwirewrap,andshouldleakageoccurduringstartup,provideamethodfortemporarilyrepairingthebodytohingepinleakonvalveI-V09252.Themethodof'repairwillbesealantinjection.Thevalvesshallbepermanentlyrepairedduringthenextrefuelingoutageoroutageofsufficientduration.SAFETYEVALUATIONsTheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased.Failureoftheinjectionsealiscomparabletoagasketfailureandisthereforeencompassedbytheoriginaldesignbases.~~~~TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedbythisrepair.FUSARSection15.2.5discussesthelargefeedwaterlinebreak(18"linedownstreamofthecheckvalve).Totalfailureofthisgasket/sealantwouldinnowayapproachthisscenario.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunction'ofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.Thegasketand/orsealantdoesnotperformasafetyfunction.Thesealantwillbelimitedtothevolumeofthegasketareavoidandtherefore,willnotadverselyaffectoperationofthevalve.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased.Thepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Theproposedrepairdoesnotprovideanewmodeofnormaloremergencyplantoperation.Chemistrylimitsarenotalteredandnootherchangeisproposedtotheplantdesign,modesofoperationorassumptionsinthebasisfortheTechnicalSpecificationsorSafetyAnalysis.Therefore,thisrepairdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.

ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONFORWIDERANGE'CONTAINMENTLEVELCHANNELMODIFICATIONINTRODUCTION:ThisSafetyEvaluationallowstemporaryrepairofthewiderangecontainmentlevelmonitoringinstrumentchannelL-07-13A.Thisrepairisnecessaryas,sensor11ofLE-07-13Aisnolongeroperational.Inordertocompensateforthiscondition,theelectronicsofLT-07-13AaretoberepairedThistemporarycircuitrepairwillprovidefortheproperoperationofchannelL>>07>>13A;Thisevaluationdocumentstheacceptabilityoftheleveltransmitter'scircuitryrepair.Therepairwillnotadverselyaffecttheoperationortheexistingqualificationofthecontainmentlevelsystem.SAFETYEVALUATION:Thistemporaryrepairwillhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation".AreviewofthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsandtheSafetyAnalysisReporthasshownthat.thischangeisnotanunreviewedsafetyquestionanddoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications.rTheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased.Theinoperabilityofthissystemisnotconsideredaninitiatingeventinanyaccidentscenario.Thewiderangecontainmentwaterlevelmonitoringchannelsareutilizedsolelyforpostaccidentmonitoringpurposes.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreasedwiththiscircuitryrepair.Thechannelstillprovidesmonitoringofcontainmentwaterlevelduringananalyzedaccident.Therepairdoesnotresultinanincreaseinprobabilityofamalfunction.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedbythisrepair.Thewiderangecontainmentlevelchannelswillcontinuetomonitorthewaterlevelincontainmentduringananalyzedaccident'.TherepairedchannelL-07-13Awillcontinuetoprovidepostaccidentmonitoringcapabilitieswiththeexceptionofdecreasedresolutionbetweensensorll(approx-imatelyelevation18'3")andsensor12(approximatelyelevation20'2"0.Waterlevelinthisrangewillbeindicatedastheelevationofsensor10(approximatelyelevation16'5").TheredundantchannelL-07-13Bwillcontinuetoprovidepostaccidentmonitoringcapabilitiesandwillprovidecorrectresolutionbetweensensorslland12.PossibleinoperabilityofchannelL-07-13Bbetweensensorslland12willnotadverselyimpactanyoperatoractionsassociatedwithaccidentmitigationasnoactionsordecisionpointsareanticipatedtooccurbasedonacontainmentwaterlevelconditionbetweentheelevationsofsensorslland12.ThepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypeandanyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFUSARhasnotbeencreated.Therepairedinstrumentloopprovidesonlymonitoringcapabilityofwiderangecontainmentlevelduringananalyzedaccidentandwilloperateasdescribedintheprecedingparagraph.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationsastherepairedchannelwillcontinuetoprovidethenecessarymonitoringfunctionofpostaccidentcontainmentwaterlevelasrequiredbythePlantTechnicalSpecifications' ST.LUCIEUNIT2ATWSDIVERSESCRAMSYSTEMINTRODUCTION:AspartoftheprojecttomeettherequirementsoftheATWSRule,lOCFR50.62,aDiverseScramSystem(DSS)hasbeendesignedbyEatonConsolidatedControls(ECC)andwillbeinstalledintheSt.Lucie-Unit2EngineeredSafetyFeaturesActuationSystem(ESFAS)cabinets.ThenewDSScomponentswillbecomprisedofprintedcircuitboardswhichwillbeintegratedintotheexistingESFAScircuitryandwillbeinstalledasagroupofindividualmodules'.Inaddition,theDSSmodulesaredesignedtoreplaceallexistingmodulesinthecabinetswhichhavesimilarcomponentfunctions,(i.e:bistabletrip,isolation,two-out"of-fouractuationlogic,three-out-of-fourblockpermissivelogic,andautomatictestfunctions).Therefore,thenewmodulesaredesignedtobefullyinterchangeablewiththeexistingonesandwillbeutilizedforfuturereplacements'.SAFETYEVALUATION:ThePlantTechnicalSpecifications,Section3/4.3.2describetheLimitingConditionsforOperationandthesurveillancerequirementsoftheESFASinstrumentation.Forthepurposesofthetest,onlyChannelAforContainmentRadiation"High,ChannelAforRefuelingWaterTank-Low,andtheAutomaticTestInserter(ATI)module,willbeutilized.AsstatedintheTechnicalSpecifications,forbothContainmentRadiation-HighandRefuelingWaterTank-Low,twochannelsoutoffourarerequiredfortripandthreechannelsarerequiredtobeoperable.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequenceofanaccidentofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreport(FUSAR)willnotbeincreasedbecauseoneoffourchannelswillbeconsideredtobeinoperableatanytime.Thisleavesthechannelfunctionsinatwo-out-of-threetripconditionduringthemajorityofthetest,whichiswithinthePlantTechnicalSpecifications.Fortheshortperiodoftimethatthefunctionisinone-out-of-threelogic(i.e.duringbistableandisolationmodulechangeout),theconditionismoreconservativethanPlantTechnicalSpecificationlimitingconditions.Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreport(FUSAR)willnotbecreatedbecausethetriplogicconditionsarethosepreviouslyevaluatedarespecificallystatedintheplantTechnicalSpecifications.Inaddition,thecabinetcircuitdesignseparatesandelectricallyisolatesmeasurementchannelsfromeachotherandsafetychannelsfromeachother.Therefore,theoperationofanyotherchannelwillnotbeadverselyaffected.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedsincetheTechnicalSpecificationsallowforplantoperationsinatwo-out-of-threetriplogicforaspecifiedtimeperiod; ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAPETYEVALUATIONPOR2BCCWHEATEXCHANGERPLANGEGASKETREV'.1INTRODUCTION:Thepurposeofthisevaluationistoaddressthepotentiallydegradedsealingcapabilityofthetubesheet/channelflangegasketintheinletandoutletwaterboxesofthe2BComponentCoolingWater(CCW)HeatExchanger(RefNCRk2.-434,NCRfP8740-2694M)andtojustifytheuseoftheArcorS-16/Arc-ThanejointcoatingsystemtoenhancethesealingofthejointforCycle6operation".RepairweldingperformedtoresolveNCR8'-428andNCR2-434slightlywarpedthetubesheetflangesatthe120'clockposition,whichmayimpacttheabilityoftheexistinggaskettosealthethesubjectflangejoints'.PC/M350-290MREV.2providedforcoatingthetubesheet/channelflangejointwiththeArcorS-16/Arc-Thanejointcoatingsystemtoallowforthermalmovementsandpreventseawaterfromcontactingthecarbonsteelchannelflange.TheArcorS-16/Arc-Thanejointcoatingsystemwillenhancethecapabilityofthegasket/flangejointconfigurationtoprovideaproperseal,particularlyintheareaofthedetectedwarpage.SAFETYEVALUATION:Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased';Thisconditiondoesnotalterthefunctionofanyexistingcomponents,andthusdoesnotincreasethepossibilityoftheirfailure'.TheadditionoftheArcorS-16/Arc-Thanesysteminthe2BCCWheatexchangertubesheet/channelflangejointprovidesanenhancementtotheexistingjointconfigurationtoensurethejointissealedandnoleakagewilloccur.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreasedsincethisconditiondoenotaffectanyaccidentinitiatingcomponents.The2BCCWheatexchangerisnotanaccidentinitiatingcomponent".TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedsincethisconditiondoesnothaveadetrimentaleffectonanysafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponents".Thepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedsincethiscondition,willnotinhibitorotherwiseadverselyaffecttheoperationoftheCCWorICWsystems.ThecomponentsoftheconditionareincompliancewiththeSafetyAnalysisReportrequirementsforthesystemelements.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedbythisconditionsincethisconditiondoesnothaveadetrimentalaffectonanyequipmentrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.'ailureofthegasketinthewarpedareaonthe2BCCWheatexchangerflangewouldallowonlyminorleakagecomparedtothetotalICWflowrate".TheleakagewouldbeontheICWoutletoftheCCWheatexchangerandthereforewouldnotaffecttheabilityoftheCCWheatexchangertoperformitssafetyrelatedfunctions.ShouldleakageoccurontheICWinlet,sufficientmarginisavailabletoperformthesafetyrelatedfunctionasaddressedinSection4:0".Failed PAGE,2ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONFOR2BCCWHEATEXCHANGERFLANGEGASKETcoatingpieceswouldbecarriedthroughthesystemandbereleasedintothedischargecanalwithoutaffectingtheoperationofthesystem.Thisconditiondoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationsincethisconditionisonlytoajointconfigurationonthe2BCCWheatexchanger.Nochangesarebeingmadetothesystemdesign,modesofoperationorassumptionsinthebasesfortheTechnicalSpecificationortheFUSAR.

ST.LUCIEUNIT2LEAKREPAIROFVALVE2I-V08111INTRODUCTION:Valve2I-V08111isleakingatthevalvebodytobonnetgasketconnectionasidentifiedbyNCR2-335.LeakRepairs,Inc.sealantwillbeinjectedtostoptheleakagebythedrillandtapmethod.Thepurposeofthisevaluationistoevaluatethetemporaryinstallationofthe1/8"injectionvalveforinjectionofthesealant,andinstallationofapipeplugsubsequenttoinjection.Thevalvebonnetwillbedrilledintheareaoftheboltcircle,atanangletointersectthegasketsealingsurface.Thevalveshallbepermanentlyrepairedduringthenextrefuelingoutageoroutageofsufficientduration.SAFETYEVALUATION:Theuseofthismethodtorepairthesubjectvalveswillhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.AreviewoftheplantTechnicalSpecificationsandtheSafetyAnalysisReporthasshownthattherearenounreviewedsafetyquestionsorTechnicalSpecificationchangesinvolved.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased.FailureoftheinjectionsealandplugiscomparabletoagasketfailureandisthereforeencompassedbytheoriginaldesignbasesandaccidentanalysisdescribedinFUSARSection15.1.6.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedbythisrepair.FUSARSection15.1.6discussesthemainsteamlinebreak,whichresultsinthemaximumsteamgeneratorblowdownratethrough6.36sqft(36"linebetweenthesteamgeneratornozzleandtheflowventuri).Totalfailureofthisgasket/sealantwouldnotapproachthisscenario.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.Thevalveisrequiredtomaintainpressureboundary.Itsabilitytodosowillnotbeaffectedbythisrepairsincetheboltloadingsarenotaffectedbytheinjectionofsealant.Thegasketand/orsealantdoesnotperformasafetyfunction.Thesealantwillbelimitedtothevolumeofthegasketareavoidandtherefore,willnotadverselyaffectoperationofthevalveoranycomponentsinthesafetyrelatedportionofthemainsteamsystem.Thepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Theproposedrepairdoesnotprovideanewmodeofnormaloremergencyplantoperation'.

PAGE2ST.LUCIEUNIT2LEAKREPAIROFVALVE2IV08111Thepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Limitingtheinjectionofsealanttojustinteractingoutsidethevalvepressureboundaryprecludesamalfunctionofadifferenttype.Leakageofsealantintothemainsteamsystemisprecludedbylimitingsealantinjectionvolumetothevolumeofthegasketareavoid,andthemethodofinjection,thusdownstreamcomponentswillnotbeadverselyaffected.Chemistrylimitsarenotalteredandnootherchangeisproposedtotheplantdesign,modesofoperationorassumptionsinthebasisfortheTechnicalSpecificationsorSafetyAnalysis.Therefore,thisrepairdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONFORI-FCV-23-3AND5LEAKREPAIRINTRODUCTION:PSL-2BlowdownContainmentIsolationValvesI-FCV-23-3,5havehadahistoryofleakageproblems.NumerousleakrepairshavebeenperformedontheseSteamGeneratorBlowdownsystemcontainmentvalvesonbothunits'.SteamGeneratorBlowdownisutilizedtocontrolsteamgeneratorsecondarysidewaterchemistry,monitorsecondarysideradioactivityforanyprimarytosecondaryleakage,reducethesteamgeneratorblowdowncontaminantstoanacceptablelevelpriortodischargetotheenvironment,andprovideblowdownsystemcontainmentisolationcapability.Theportionofthepipingandvalvesatthecontainmentpenetrationsareseismictoensurecontainmentintegrityfollowingacontainmentisolationsignal.ThepurposeofthisevaluationistoprovideamethodfortemporarilyrepairingbodytobonnetleaksonvalvesI-FCV-23-3and5.Themethodofrepairwillbesealantinjection.Thevalvesshallbereplacedorpermanentlyrepairedduringthenextscheduledoutageorothersuitabletimeperiod".Thesevalvesarenonisolableandnormallyopen.SAFETYEVALUATION:Theuseofthismethodtorepairthesubjectvalveswillhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.ThefailureofanycomponentintheSteam.GeneratorBlowdownSystem=doesnotaffectsafeshutdownoftheplant.'heprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased.Thesevalvesarenotaccidentinitiatingcomponents".Thesevalvesservetoisolatecontainmentintheeventofanaccident.'heconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedbythisrepair.Thevalveisrequiredformaintainingcontainmentisolation,anditsabilitytodosowillnotbeaffected".TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreasedThepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Theproposedrepairdoesnotprovideanewmodeofnormaloremergencyplantoperation".Bylimitingtheinjectionofsealanttojustinteractingoutsidethevalvepressureboundaryprecludesamalfunctionofadifferenttype.Chemistrylimitsarenotalteredandnootherchangeisproposedtotheplantdesign,modesofoperationorassumptionsinthebasisfortheTechnicalSpecificationsorSafetyAnalysis.Therefore,thisrepa'irdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.

0't ST.LUCIEUNIT2INSTALLATIONOFBLINDFLANGEONOUTLETOFPURGEEXHAUSTVALVEFCV-25-6INTRODUCTION:ThecontainmentisolationsystemprovidesthemeansofisolatingfluidsystemsthatpassthroughcontainmentpenetrationssuchthatanyradioactivitythatmaybereleasedtothecontainmentatmospherefollowingapostulatedDesignBasisAccident(DBA)isconfined.Table6.2-52andFig.6.2-69oftheSt.LucieUnit2FUSARshowsisolationvalvesFCV-25-4,-5and-6areinstalledinseriesinthe48"containmentpurgeexhaustsystemsandarelocatedinsidecontainment,intheannulus,andoutsidetheshieldwall,respectively.ValvesFCV-25-4and-5provideadoubleisolationforthecontainmentpenetration.ValvesFCV-25-5and-6provideadoubleisolationfortheshieldwallpenetration.FUSAR,Table6.2-53showsthesevalvesarenormallyclosed.ValvesFCV-25-4and-5arealsolistedasContainmentIsolationSignal(CIS)valvesintheSt.LucieUnit2TechnicalSpecification,Table3.6-2whichisineffectformodes1,2,3and4.SAFETYEVALUATIONsThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedbecausethecontainmentpurgeexhaustsystemisneitherrequiredtofunctionfollowingapostulatedDesignBasisAccidentnorisitrequiredfortheoperationaldesignofanysystem.Containmentpurgeduringnormalplantoperationisperformedbythe8"containmentpurgesystem.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedbythischangebecauseafterimplementingthischange,theblindflangeofvalveFCV-25-6providesasecondisolationboundaryandreplacestheisolationfunctionofFCV-25-5whichhasrepeatedlyleakedduringLLRT.ThischangeiswithintheactionitemsstatedintheSt'.LucieUnit2TechnicalSpecification,Section3.6.3.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthecontainmentpurgeexhaustsystemisnotasafetyrelatedsystemandisneitherrequiredtooperateduringnormalplantoperationnorafteraDesignBasisAccident".'owever,itisrequiredtoisolatetheContainmentaftertheAccident.TheinstallationofatemporaryblindflangeontheexhaustsideofvalveFCV-25-6willprovideasecondisolationboundaryandreplacetheisolationfunctionofFCV-25-5.ThepipingassociatedwithvalveFCV-25-6andPenetrationP-10,theweldbetweentheclosureplateandshieldbuildinganchorplantringandpenetrationsleevewereevaluatedfortheadditionalseismicanddeadweightloadsofthenewlydesignedflangeandexistingvalveFCV-25-6associatedpiping.Theywerefoundtobeadequatefortheadditionalloads.ApplicationofsealantinthevalvepackingofvalvesFCV-25-5and6willnotadverselyaffectthenormalfunctionofthevalvesandwillenhancetheabilityofthevalvestoperformitsdesignfunction.

ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONFORWIDERANGECONTAINMENTLEVELCHANNELMODIFICATIONINTRODUCTION:ThisSafetyEvaluationallowstemporarymodificationofthewiderangecontainmentlevelmonitoringinstrumentChannelL-07-13A.ThisalterationisnecessaryassensorllofLE-07-13Aisnolongeroperational.Inordertocompensateforthiscondition,theelectronicsofLT-07-13Aaretobemodified.ThistemporarycircuitalterationwillprovidefortheproperoperationofchannelL-07-13A.Thisevaluationdocumentstheacceptabilityoftheleveltransmitter'scircuitryalteration.Themodificationwillnotadverselyaffecttheoperationortheexistingqualificationofthecontainmentlevelsystem.SAFETYEVALUATION:Thistemporarymodificationwillhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.AreviewofthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsandtheSafetyAnalysisReporthasshownthatthischangeisnotanunreviewedsafetyquestionanddoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreased.Thefailureofthissystemisnot,consideredaninitiatingeventinanyaccidentscenario.Thewiderangecontainmentwaterlevelmonitoringloopsareutilizedsolelyforpostaccidentmonitoringpurposes.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreasedwiththiscircuitrymodification.Thechannelstillprovidesmonitoringofcontainmentwaterlevelduringananalyzedaccident.Themodificationdoesnotresultinanincreaseinprobabilityofamalfunction.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedbythismodification.Thewiderange,containmentlevelloopswillcontinuetomonitorthewaterlevelincontainmentduringananalyzedaccident.ThemodifiedchannelL-07-13Awillcontinuetoprovide'ostaccidentmonitoringcapabilitieswiththeexceptionofdecreasedresolutionbetweensensorll(approximatelyelevation18'3")andsensor12(approximatelyelevation20'2").Waterlevelinthisrangewillbeindicatedastheelevationofsensor10(approximatelyelevation16'5").TheredundantchannelL-07-13Bwillcontinuetoprovidepostaccidentmonitoringcapabilitiesandwillprovidecorrectresolutionbetweensensors11and12.PossibleinoperabilityofchannelL-07-13Bbetweensensors11and12willnotadverselyimpactanyoperatoractionsassociatedwithaccidentmitigationasnoactionsordecisionpointsareanticipatedtooccurbasedonacontainmentwaterlevelconditionbetweenandtheelevationsofsensors11and12.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreased.Becausethechannelwillcontinuetomonitorpostaccidentcontainmentwaterlevelasdescribedinthepreviousparagraph,theconsequencesofamalfunctionhavenotbeenchanged.

PAGE2ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONFORWIDERANGECONTAINMENTLEVELCHANNELMODIFICATIONThepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFUSARhasnotbeencreatedasthistemporarymodificationdoesnotintroduceanynewfailuremodestothepostaccidentcontainmentlevelmonitoringsystem.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationsasthemodifiedchannelwillcontinuetoprovidethenecessarymonitoringfunctionofpostaccidentcontainmentwaterlevelasrequiredbythePlantTechnicalSpecifications.

I ST.LUCIEUNIT2INSTALLATIONOFBLINDFLANGEONFCV-25-5INTRODUCTION:Thecontainmentisolationsystemprovidesthemeansofisolatingfluidsystemsthatpassthroughcontainmentpenetrationsuchthatanyradioactivitythatmaybereleasedtothecontainmentatmospherefollowingapostulateddesignbasisaccident(DBA)isconfined.IsolationvalveFCV-25-5hasexperiencedrepeatedleakproblemsduringlocalleakratetesting(LLRT).Tocorrectthisproblem,aspeciallydesignedblindflangewillbeinstalledontheexhaustsideofvalveFCV-25-6toprovideasecondisolationboundaryandreplacetheisolationfunctionofvalveFCV-25-5.SAFETYEVALUATION:Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.Thecontainmentpurgeexhaustsystemisnotasafetyrelatedsystemandisneitherrequiredtooperateduringnormaloperationnorafteradesignbasisaccident.TheinstallationofatemporaryblindflangeontheexhaustsideofvalveFCV-25-6willprovideasecondisolationboundaryandreplacetheisolationfunctionofFCV-25-5.Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethatanyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.BecausethecontainmentpurgeexhaustsystemisneitherrequiredtofunctionfollowingaDBAnorisitrequiredfortheoperationaldesignofanysystem.Containmentpurgeduringnormalplantoperationisperformedbythe8"containmentpurgesystem.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedbythischange.ThischangeiswithintheactionitemsstatedintheSt.LucieUnit2TechnicalSpecification,Section3.6.3.ThetemporaryblindflangeontheoutletofpurgevalveFCV-25-6isacceptableinthatitreplacestheisolationfunctionofvalveFCV2-5.TheenhancementofvalvepackingonvalvesFCV-25-5and6provideadditionalassurancefortheleaktightness.

1' ST.LUCIEUNIT2INSTALLATIONOFBLINDFLANGEONFCV-25"6INTRODUCTION:ThecontainmentisolationsystemprovidesthemeansofisolatingfluidsystemsthatpassthroughcontainmentpenetrationssuchthatanyradioactivitythatmaybereleasedtothecontainmentatmospherefollowingapostulatedDesignBasisAccident(DBA)isconfined.Table6.2-52andFig.6.2-69oftheSt.LucieUnit2FUSARshowsisolationvalvesFCV-25-4,-5and-6areinstalledinseriesinthe48"containmentpurgeexhaustsystemsandarelocatedinsidecontainment,intheannulus,andoutsidetheshieldwall,respectively.ValvesFCV-25-4and-5provideadoubleisolationforthecontainmentpenetration.ValvesFCV25-5and"6provideadoubleisolationfortheshieldwallpenetration.FUSAR,Table6.2-53showsthesevalvesarenormallyclosed.ValvesFCV-25-4and-5arealsolistedasContainmentIsolationSignal(CIS)valveintheSt.LucieUnit2Technical.Specification,Table3.6-2whichisineffectformodes,2,3and4.SAFETYEVALUATION:ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedbecausethecontainmentpurgeexhaustsystemisneitherrequiredtofunctionfollowingapostulatedDesignBasisAccidentnorisitrequiredfortheoperationaldesignofanysystem.Containmentpuxgeduringnormalplantoperationisperformedbythe8"containmentpurgesystem.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedbythischangebecauseafterimplementingthischange,theblindflangeofvalveFCV-25-6providesasecondisolationboundaryandreplacestheisolationfunctionofFCV-25-5whichhasrepeatedlyleakedduringLLRT.ThischangeiswithintheactionitemsstatedintheSt.LucieUnit2TechnicalSpecification,Section3.6.3.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.ThecontainmentpurgeexhaustsystemisnotasafetyrelatedsystemandisneitherrequiredtooperateduringnormalplantoperationnorafteraDesignBasisAccident.However,itisrequiredtoisolatetheContainmentaftertheAccident.TheinstallationofatemporaryblindflangeontheexhaustsideofvalveFCV-25-5.ThepipingassociatedwithvalveFCV-25-6andPenetrationP-10,theweldbetweentheclosureplateandshieldbuildinganchorplantringandpenetrationsleevewereevaluatedfortheadditionalseismicanddeadweightloadsofthenewlydesignedflangeandexistingvalveFCV-25-6associatedpiping.Theywerefoundtobeadequatefortheadditionalloads.ApplicationofsealantinthevalvepackingofvalvesFCV-25-5and6willnotadverselyaffectthenormalfunctionofthevalvesandwillenhancetheabilityofthevalvestoperformitsdesignfunction.

0 ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONFOR2BCCWHEATEXCHANGERFLANGEGASKETINTRODUCTION:Thepurposeofthisevaluationistoaddressthepotentiallydegradedsealingcapabilityofthetubesheet/channelflangegasketintheoutletwaterboxofthe2BComponentCoolingWater(CCW)HeatExchanger(Ref.NCR/f8740-2694M)andtojustifytheuseoftheArcorS-16/Arc-ThanejointcoatingsystemtoenhancethesealingofthejointforCycle6operation.RepairweldingperformedtoresolveNCR82-428slightlywarpedthetubesheetflangeatthe120'clockposition,whichmayimpacttheabilityoftheexistinggaskettosealatthesubjectflangejoint.PC/M350-290HRev.'providedforcoatingthetubesheet/channelflangejointwiththeArcorS-16/Arc-Thanejointcoatingsystemtoallowforthermalmovementsandpreventseawaterfromcontactingthecarbonsteelchannelflange.TheArcorS-16/Arc-Thanjointcoatingsystemwillenhancethecapabilityofthegasket/flangejointconfigurationtoprovideaproperseal,particularlyintheareaofthedetectedwarpage'.SAFETYEVALUATION:Thisconditionwillhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation".AreviewoftheplantTechnicalSpecificationsandtheSafetyAnalysisReporthasshownthattherearenounreviewedsafetyquestionsorTechnicalSpecificationchangesinvolvedsincethisconditiondoesnothinderorchangetheoperationofanycomponentsorsystems.Thepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedsincethisconditionwillnotinhibitorotherwiseadverselyaffecttheoperation'ftheCCWorICWsystems.Thecomponentsoftheconditionare,incompliancewiththeSafetyAnalysisReportrequirementsforthesystemelements.Thepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedsincethisconditiondoesnotaddoraffectanyequipmentcapableofinitiatinganaccident".Thisconditiononlyaffectsthe2BCCWheatexchangerflangejoint.ITheconsequencesofamalfunctionof'equipmentimportant,tosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhavenotbeenincreasedsincethisconditiondoesnothaveadetrimentaleffectonanysafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponents'.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.Thisconditiondoesnotalterthefunctionofanyexistingcomponents,andthusdoesnotincreasethepossibilityoftheirfailure.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARhasnotbeenincreasedsincethisconditiondoesnotaffectanyaccidentinitiatingcomponents.The2BCCWheatexchangerisnotanaccidentinitiatingcomponent.

PAGE2ST.LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONFOR2BCCWHEATEXCHANGERFLANGEGASKETThisconditiondoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationsincethisconditionisonlytoajointconfigurationonthe2BCCWheatexchanger.Nochangesarebeingmadetothesystemdesign,modesofoperationorassumptionsinthebasesfortheTechnicalSpecificationortheFUSAR.

ST.LUCIEUNITS16c2EVALUATIONOFDELETIONOFSPECIFICINSTRUMENTREFERENCESFROMTHEEMERGENCYACTIONLEVELSINTRODUCTION:AnevaluationofthepotentialeffectsofdeletingspecificinstrumentreadingsfromtheSt.LuciePlantEmergencyPlanhasbeenconductedinaccordancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.59and10CFR50.54(q.)Theproposeddeletionwasdeterminedtorequirereviewinaccordancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.59asitinvolvedachangetoarequirementspecificallyreferencedintheSt.LucieUnit2SafetyEvaluationReport,NUREG-0843,datedOctober,1981.Section13.3.2.4,"EmergencyClassificationSystem,"specificallyreferencesNUREG-0654,andthepreparationofEALswhichuse"'..'.specificinstrumentation,parametersandequipmentstatus."SAFETYEVALUATION:DeletionofthespecificinstrumentreferencesintheEmergencyActionLevel(EAL)TablesintheSt.LuciePlantEmergencyPlandoesnotimpacttheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedasthe,EALtablesarenotassumedtoplayanyroleineventinitiationintheSt.LucieUnits1and2UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FUSARs).DeletionofthespecificinstrumentreferencesintheEmergencyPlandoesnotimpacttheprobabilityofthemalfunctionofanyequipmentimportanttosafetyastheEALtablesdonotaffectequipmentoperationinanyway.Thepotentialconsequencesofanaccidentarenotaffectedastheproposedchangedoesnotincreaseanyhazardtothehealthandsafetyofthegeneralpublicinanyway.TheexistingemergencyoperatingguidelinestechnologyisbaseduponCEN-152,Revision3,"CombustionEngineeringEmergencyOperatingGuidelines."TheaccidentmitigationstrategyemployedinCEN-152isbaseduponasystematicapproachtoplantoperationsbasedonahierarchyofoperationalprotectiveactions.Theseactionsaredirectedatminimizingtheconsequencesofaneventand,oncefulfilled,ensure'propercontroloftheeventinprogress.Suchactionsaretermed"safetyfunctions",andaredefinedasconditionsoractionsthatpreventcoredamageorminimizeradiationreleasetothepublic.Fulfillmentofacompletesetof,safetyfunctionsensuresproperoperatorcontroloftheeventand,therefore,ensuresthatthehealth'ndsafetyofthepublicisnotthreatened.,Asnochangesarebeingmadetoanyoftheoperationalparametersaffectingtheabilitytomeetanysafetyfunctioninanyemergencyoperatingprocedure,theexistinganalyzedpotentialdoseratesatthesiteboundarywillnotbeaffectedbytheproposedchangetotheEmergencyActionLevelTableintheEmergencyPlan.Therefore,theproposedchangedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety.TherearenofacetsoftheEmergencyPlanEALTablewhichplayanyroleintheoperationofplantequipment,orinthedeterminationofgeneralplantoperationalguidelines;hence,achangetothistablecannotbeassumedtobeaninitiatingfactorinanyaccidentanalysis.ChangestotheEALTable

-r0 1JPAGE2EVALUATIONOPDELETIONOFSPECIFICINSTRUMENTREFERENCESPROMTHEEMERGENCY'ACTIONLEVELSwillthereforenotinvolvethepossibilityofcreationofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreport".TheEAL,tableisnotreferencedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationforeitherSt.LucieUnit1orSt.LucieUnit2.Therefore,changingtheEALtablewillnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.

4II ST.LUCIEUNITS16c2NUREG-0737ITEMII.D.lPRESSURIZERSRVANDPORVDISCHARGEPIPINGSTRESSANALYSISINTRODUCTION:rItemII.D.1ofNUREG-0737requiredthatlicenseesexaminethefunctionalperformancecapabilitiesofPWRpressurizersafety,reliefandblockvalvesandverifytheintegrityoftheassociatedpipingsystemsfornormal,transientandaccidentconditions.TheNRCissuedthestaff'sSafetyEvaluation(SE)andassociatedTechnicalEvaluationReports(TER's)fortheSt.LucieUnits1and2responsetoItemII.D.1ofNUREG-0737onMay11,1990.TheNRC'sSEconcludedthatFPLmetalloftheII.D.1requirementswiththeexceptionofthoseitemsidentifiedinSection5.2oftheTER's.ThemajorityoftheseitemswereresolvedviatheReference1transmittal.Thepurposeofthistransmittalistoresolvetheremainingopenitem(Item8oftheTER's)associatedwithItemII.D.1.Item8oftheNRCTER'sidentifiedthattheoriginalSt.LucieUnits1and2pipingstressanalysesdidnotfollowthethermal-hydraulicmodelingrecommendationspresentedinEPRIdocumentNP-2479,"RELAP5CalculationofSRVPipingLoads".Toresolvethisissue,newRELAP5modelsweredevelopedforbothSt.LucieUnits1and2incorporatingtheEPRImodelingrecommendations.TheseRELAP5resultswerethenutilizedininputsintorevisedpipingstressanalyses.SAFETYEVALUATION:TheSt.LucieUnit1pipingsatisfiesalloftheapplicablerequirementsofANSIB31.7(1969)andB31.1(1967).AlltheassociatedSt.LucieUnit1pipingsupports(withtheexceptionofsupportPRC-005-34B)areacceptableforthereviseddesignloads.SupportO'RC-005-34Bhasbeenshowntobeoperable/functionalforitsreviseddesignloadsfortheremainderofthepresentoperatingcycle(Cycle10).TheoperabilityevaluationforsupportNRC-005-34BcanbefoundintheattachedevaluationJPN-PSL-SEMJ-90-055,Revision0.Support8RC-005-34Bwillrequiremodificationduringthe1991St.LucieUnit1refuelingoutage.2.TheSt.LucieUnit2pipingsatisfiesalloftheapplicablerequirementsofASMESectionIII(throughsummer1973addenda)andB31.1(1967).Additionally,allassociatedSt.LucieUnit2pipingsupportshavebeenshowntobeacceptableforthereviseddesignload.3.TheSt.LucieUnits1and2pressurizernozzleshavebeenevaluatedfortherevisednozzleloadsandtheserevisedloadsproducestressesthatremainwithincodeallowablesunderallloadingconditions.I4.TheSt.LucieUnits1and2pressurizersafetyvalvesandPORV'scalculateddischargeflangebendingmomentsremainwithinthosevaluesobtainedthroughtheEPRIvalvetestprogramorvaluespreviouslyapprovedbytheNRC.Therefore,operabilityofthesafetyvalvesandPORV'sisdemonstrated.

ST.LUCIEUNITS162OCEANINTAKESYSTEMVELOCITYCAPPANELREMOVALINTRODUCTION:Precastconcretepanels(approximately12'19'.x1'-3"thick)fortheSt.LuciePlantoceanintakepipelinevelocitycapshaveexperiencedstructuralfailures.Oneofthecenterpanelsforthe16footdiameterpipelinevelocitycapandonepanelforthesouthernmost12footdiameterpipelinevelocitycaphascollapsedandbrokenapart.Itislikelypaneldebrishasfallenintothepipelines.ThefailuresweredocumentedinNCR's1-324and1-328,whichwereinitiallydispositionedwithengineeringoperabilityassessmentsconcludingthattheplantcouldbeoperatedsafelywiththefailedvelocitycappanels.Anevaluationwasalsopreparedconcludingthattotalfailur'eofthevelocitycapswouldhavenoadverseimpacttonuclearplantsafety.SAFETYEVALUATION:Adetailed,systematicplanformobilization,,rigging,liftinganddemobilizationhasbeendevelopedforremovalofsix(total)concretepanelsfromthetwoimpairedvelocitycaps.Onepanelfromthedamaged12footdiameterpipelinevelocitycapwillberemovedusingapedestalmountedcraneonboardananchoredbarge.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.Theprobabilityoflosingtheprimarysourceofcoolingwaterwillnotincreaseforthepanelremovaloperation.Thepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.Thevelocitycapstructuresandoceanintakepipelineshavenosafetyrelatedfunction.Inaddition,sufficientcoolingwaterwillcontinuetobeavailableforshutdowncoolingbyusingthesecond,independentsourceofwater(BigMudCreek)iftheprimarysourceofwaterisnotavailable.Therefore,modificationstothevelocitycapscannotcause,contributeto,orbecomefactorsinanewtypeofsafety-relatedequipmentmalfunction.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationsisnotreduced.Limitationsontheminimumwaterlevelfortheultimateheatsinkwillnotbeaffected.Thepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.

ST.LUCIEUNITS1&2IMPLEMENTATIONOFAPERMANENTPRIMARYCHEMISTRYCONTROLPROGRAMWITHMODIFIEDLITHIUMCONCENTRATIONSINTRODUCTION:Primarycoolantchemistryiscontrolledduringvariousplantoperationsandevolutionsto:minimizecorrosionrateofmaterialsincontactwiththereactorcoolant,minimizeexcessivefoulingatheattransfersurfaces,andminimizereactorplantradiationlevelsincomponent/access'areaswheremaintenancemayberequired.Toachievethesegoals,criticalparametersforcontrolincludebothoxygenandpH.DissolvedoxygenisscavengedbyhydrazineinthecoolantwhilepHismaintainedwithinaprescribedrangevialithium(Li)intheformoflithiumhydroxide.TheidealpHrange(6.9to7.4)hasbeenspecifiedinconjunctionwith0.2to2.4ppmLitoprovideawidemarginbetweentheupperoperationallimitandthethresholdforattackintheeventanyconcentratingphenomenaexist.Thisrangereducesthecorrosionandresultsinlessdissolvedcorrosionproductscirculatinginthereactorcoolant.Whenproperlycoordinated,highlithium/pHpromotesthedepositionofcorrosionproductsoncoolersurfaces(e.g.,steamgeneratordowncornerarea)ratherthanathottersurfaces(e.g.,fuelrodsandcoreareas).Theoverallirradiatedcrudloadwouldbereducedbypreventingcrudfromdepositingonthefuelsurfaces.Althoughcrudloadinthesteamgeneratorswouldincrease,theneteffectistominimizetheactuationofcorrosionproductsbyreducingtheircoreresidencetime.SAFETYEVALUATION:Therevisedprimarychemistryprogramasdescribedinthissafetyevaluationdoesnotresultinanunreviewedsafetyquestionorreductioninthemarginofsafetyasdefined-bytheSt.LucieTechnicalSpecifications,norhavean,adverseaffectonplantsafetyoroperation.SincethissafetyevaluationaddresseschemistrylimitationswhichprovidecorrosionprotectiontoensurethestructuralintegrityofthefuelandoftheRCS,thissafetyevaluationisclassifiedassafety-related.ThemodifiedlithiumcoolantchemistryprogramproposedforSt'.LucieUnitsland2beginninginCycleslland6,respectively,willresultinazircaloycorrosionratethatislowerthanthecorrosionratefromtheuseoftheelevatedlithiumcoolantchemistryprograminCycles9and5.Sincefuelrodperformanceparameterswillnotchange,exposureofthecladdingtogreaterthan2.4ppmandupto3.5ppmlithium,aspartofthemodifiedlithiumcoolantchemistryprogram,willnotresultinfuelcorrosionormechanicalbehavioreithergreaterthan,ordifferentfrom,thatpreviouslyconsideredintheinputtoanysafetyanalysis.Therefore,theconsequencesofpreviouslyanalyzedaccidentsarenotincreased.Asthefuelisoperatedinthesamemannerasinpreviouscycles,theprobabilityofanaccident'rmalfunctionofequipmentalsoremainsunchanged.iImplementationofthismodifiedlithiumprogramhasbeenrecentlyevaluatedbytheFPLNuclearFuelGroupandtheNSSSmanufacturer,ABB-CE,withoutanynegativeeffects.Structures,systemsandcomponentscontinuetomeetoriginaldesigncriteriaand"limitsincompliancewiththeFUSAR.

PAGE2IMPLEMENTATIONOPAPERMANENTPRIMARYCHEMISTRYCONTROLPROGRAMWITHMODIFIEDLITHIUMCONCENTRATIONSTheproposedmodifiedlithiumprogramwillnotincreasetheincidentofstresscorrosionofPWSCCofthecomponentswettedbyprimarycoolantsincetestingperformedonmillannealedsteamgeneratortubinghasnotshownacorrelationtoPWSCCandhighlithiumchemistry,norhasanyPWSCCobservedatothernuclearplantsduetoelevatedlithiumchemistry.Theproposedincreaseinlithiumlevelwillnotcreateamalfunctionora,differentfailuremechanismthanpreviouslyevaluated,sincethecorrosionrateswillnotincreasefortheplantcomponentswhichcontacttheprimarycoolantoritsletdown.ThemarginofsafetyasdescribedinthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedbecausenochangesinanysafetyanalysisinputorassumptionsarerequiredasaresultoftheproposedchanges;norareanychangestoanalysismethodologynecessarytodescribefuelrodbehavior.Asnoinputs,assumptions,ormethodshavechanged,theresultsoftheprecioussafetyanalysisremainunchanged.

ST.IUCIE.UNITS1&2BORICACIDSECONDARYWATERCHEMISTRYINTRODUCTIONsTwocommoncausesofsteamgeneratordegradationareintergranularattack(IGA)andtubedenting.Botharetheresultofcorrosionmechanismsinducedbythepresenceofimpurities.Theseimpuritiesbecomeconcentratedtodetrimentallevelsinsludgepilesandcreviceregions.Theuseofboricacidonthesecondaryside,however,hasbeenshowntomitigatetheeffectsoftheimpurities.TheJNSchemistrystaffhasconductedasafetyevaluationinaccordancewithJNS-QI-3.0whichimplementstherequirementsof10CFR50.59;ThissafetyevaluationaddressestheadditionofboricacidtothePSLsecondarysystems,inparticular,toPSL-1asaninhibitortotheongoingintergranularattack(IGA)ofthesteamgeneratorallow600tuubing.SAFETYEVALUATION:TheLimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)3.4.5SteamGenerators,addressestheoperabilityrequirementsofthesteamgenerators.Theassociatedsurveillancerequirementsreflectthedetailsofthetubeinspectionprogram.LCO3.4.7,undertheheading"Chemistry"refersonlytoreactorcoolantchemistry.ThelonechemistryrelatedTechnicalSpecificationassociatedwiththeSecondarySystemisLCO3.7.1.4.ThisLCOspecifiesalimitforspecificactivityinthesecondarycoolantsystem.Therefore,theproposedchangedoesnotaffectthisLCO.Baseduponthisreview,theadditionofboricacidtothesecondarycyclewillnotrequireachangetotheTechnical,SpecificationsincorporatedintothereferencedlicensesforSt.LucieUnits1and2asthereisnodirectlyapplicableTechnicalSpecification.Thecorrosionratesonsecondarysystemmaterialsarelow.Duetothelowconcentrationsofboricacidthroughoutthesecondarysystem,corrosionofexternalcomponentsasaresultofleakagefromthesystemwilltakesignificantlylongertooccurandwillbenegligible.TheconsequencesofpotentialaccidentsareboundedbytheanalysesoftheFUSAR.Therefore,theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetywillnotbeincreased.Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportshallnotbecreated.LCO3.4.5(SteamGenerators)addressestheoperabilityrequirementsofthesteamgenerators.Thebasisoftheassociatedsurveillancerequirementsforinspectionistoensurethatthestructuralintegrityofthesteamgeneratortubingismaintainedsuchthatprimarytosecondaryleakagefrombothsteamgeneratorsdoesnotexceed1.0gpm.Accordingly,,theplantisexpectedtobeoperatedsuchthatthesecondarycoolantwillbemaintainedwithinthosechemistrylimitsfoundtoresultinnegligiblecorrosionofthesteamgeneratortubes.Ifthesecondarycoolantchemistryisnotmaintainedwithintheselimits,localizedcorrosionmaylikelyresultinstresscorrosioncracking.Theproposedchangehasbeenshowntomitigatetheeffectsofcorrosiveimpuritiespresentwithinthesteamgenerator.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdescribedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreduced.

ST.LUCIEUNITS162SAFETYEVALUATIONOFROSEMOUNTSERIES115381154TRANSMITTERSUSCEPTIBLETOOILLEAKSINTRODUCTION:IntheengineeringevaluationfortheuseofRosemountModel1153and1154transmittersatSt.LucieUnits1a2,certainbatchesoftheRosemount1153and1154seriestransmittershavebeenidentifiedbyRosemountasbeingsusceptibletoalossofoilinthesealedsensingcell.SAFETYEVALUATION=Outofthe42suspectbatchtransmitters,27areinthestoreroom,10areinstalled,4havebeenremovedfromserviceand1hasnotbeenlocated.ThetransmittersinthestoreroomhavebeenplacedonQChold.TheonethathasnotbeenlocatedhasbeenverifiednottobeinstalledinanysafetyrelatedapplicationsatSt.Lucie.Atotalof20suspectbatchtransmitterswerefoundinstalledinSt.LucieUnits1&2basedonRosemountsFebruary7,1989andDecember22,1989notification.Outofthese20,lltransmittershavebeenreplaced.Thereare9remainingsuspectbatchtransmittersinUnits1a2whichwillremaininstalleduntilreplacementsareavailable.ThereisnosuspectbatchtransmitterinstalledinanysafetyrelatedapplicationincludingRPS,ESFAS,andAFASoutoftheseremaining9transmitters.ThereisnoconclusiveevidencethatthesuspectlotofRosemounttransmittersthatareinstalledatS.Luciewouldfailtooperateasdesigned.FailureofthesetransmitterswouldnotprecludethesafeshutdownofthePlant.

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