Information Notice 1985-23, Inadequate Surveillance and Postmaintenance and Postmodification System Testing: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No: 6835 IN 85-23 UNITED STATES
{{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No:  
6835 IN 85-23


===UNITED STATES===
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
===OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT===
WASHINGTON, D.C.


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 22, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-23:  INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE AND POSTMAINTENANCE
20555


===March 22, 1985===
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-23:
===INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE AND POSTMAINTENANCE===
AND POSTMODIFICATION SYSTEM TESTING
AND POSTMODIFICATION SYSTEM TESTING


Line 40: Line 47:
It is expected that recipients will review the information contained in this
It is expected that recipients will review the information contained in this


notice for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropri- ate, to preclude similar problems from occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; there- fore, no specific action or written response is required.
notice for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropri- ate, to preclude similar problems from occurring at their facilities.
 
However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; there- fore, no specific action or written response is required.


==Description of Circumstances==
==Description of Circumstances==
Line 54: Line 63:
with Rosemont direct-acting differential pressure transmitters during April of
with Rosemont direct-acting differential pressure transmitters during April of


1984). As a result, the UHI isolation valves failed to close during draining
1984).
 
As a result, the UHI isolation valves failed to close during draining


of the accumulator when the water level in the UHI accumulator reached the-set
of the accumulator when the water level in the UHI accumulator reached the-set


point. In addition to the improper installation, the postmodification testing
point.
 
In addition to the improper installation, the postmodification testing


was limited to a dry calibration method that does not use the actual reference
was limited to a dry calibration method that does not use the actual reference
Line 64: Line 77:
leg of the accumulator; therefore, the installation error was not detected by
leg of the accumulator; therefore, the installation error was not detected by


the postmodification test. Consequently, the plant was operated for approxi- mately five months with the UHI isolation valves inoperable.
the postmodification test.
 
Consequently, the plant was operated for approxi- mately five months with the UHI isolation valves inoperable.


The McGuire UHI system design includes a separate nitrogen accumulator that
The McGuire UHI system design includes a separate nitrogen accumulator that
Line 72: Line 87:
the reactor vessel during the initial phase of a design-basis loss-of-coolant
the reactor vessel during the initial phase of a design-basis loss-of-coolant


accident (LOCA). Thus, if a design-basis LOCA had occurred while the UHI
accident (LOCA).
 
Thus, if a design-basis LOCA had occurred while the UHI


isolation valves were inoperable, the UHI system would have been actuated;
isolation valves were inoperable, the UHI system would have been actuated;
Line 79: Line 96:
8503210461
8503210461


IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 UHI accumulator had been depleted. As a result, nitrogen gas could have been
IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 UHI accumulator had been depleted.


===As a result, nitrogen gas could have been===
injected into the reactor vessel during the course of a design-basis LOCA.
injected into the reactor vessel during the course of a design-basis LOCA.


Line 91: Line 109:
A related but separate event involved the establishing of the set points for
A related but separate event involved the establishing of the set points for


closing the UHI isolation valves. On February 14, 1984, DPC approved the
closing the UHI isolation valves.


===On February 14, 1984, DPC approved the===
use of a dry calibration method, which would establish the trip set point for
use of a dry calibration method, which would establish the trip set point for


closing the UHI isolation valves relative to the bottom of the UHI water accumu- lator tank. However, a 24-inch nonconservative error in the trip set point
closing the UHI isolation valves relative to the bottom of the UHI water accumu- lator tank.
 
However, a 24-inch nonconservative error in the trip set point


occurred at McGuire Units 1 and 2 when the responsible instrument engineer
occurred at McGuire Units 1 and 2 when the responsible instrument engineer


misinterpreted the tank measurements made by instrument technicians. Because
misinterpreted the tank measurements made by instrument technicians.
 
Because


the dry calibration method does not use the actual process leg of the UHI accu- mulator, this error was left undetected at both units for several months. The
the dry calibration method does not use the actual process leg of the UHI accu- mulator, this error was left undetected at both units for several months. The
Line 119: Line 142:
This defect was discovered on November 26, 1984, by a DPC engineer while per- forming a posttrip review of a reactor scram in which signals of the two
This defect was discovered on November 26, 1984, by a DPC engineer while per- forming a posttrip review of a reactor scram in which signals of the two


affected channels responded contrary to that expected. This event was caused
affected channels responded contrary to that expected.


===This event was caused===
because an electrical jumper was not installed on two of the four overpower
because an electrical jumper was not installed on two of the four overpower


delta temperature input logic cards. The purpose of the jumper is to ensure
delta temperature input logic cards.


===The purpose of the jumper is to ensure===
that the overpower delta temperature system provides protection for decreasing
that the overpower delta temperature system provides protection for decreasing


temperature, as might be expected on a steam line break. DPC's surveillance
temperature, as might be expected on a steam line break.
 
DPC's surveillance


tests only verified that protection would be provided for increasing tempera- ture, but not for decreasing temperature. This defect was left undetected for
tests only verified that protection would be provided for increasing tempera- ture, but not for decreasing temperature. This defect was left undetected for
Line 133: Line 160:
an unknown period of time, but most likely it had existed since initial plant
an unknown period of time, but most likely it had existed since initial plant


startup. Subsequent investigations revealed that in addition to inadequate
startup.
 
Subsequent investigations revealed that in addition to inadequate


testing, there was an absence of instructions and descriptions of the required
testing, there was an absence of instructions and descriptions of the required
Line 152: Line 181:
Dieor
Dieor


Divis     of Emergency Preparedness
Divis
 
of Emergency Preparedness


and 'ngineering Response
and 'ngineering Response


Office of Inspection and Enforcement
===Office of Inspection and Enforcement===
Technical Contacts: I. Villalva, IE
 
(301) 492-9007
 
===H. Dance, RII===
(404) 221-5533 Attachment:
 
===List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices===
 
===Attachment 1===
IN 85-23
 
===March 22, 1985===
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
 
===IE INFORMATION NOTICES===
Information
 
Date of
 
Notice No.
 
Subject


Technical Contacts:  I. Villalva, IE
Issue


(301) 492-9007 H. Dance, RII
Issued to


(404) 221-5533 Attachment:  List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
85-22
85-21 Failure Of Limitorque Motor-


Attachment 1 IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
===Operated Valves Resulting===
From Incorrect Installation


IE INFORMATION NOTICES
===Of Pinon Gear===
Main Steam Isolation Valve


Information                                    Date of
===Closure Logic===
3/21/85
3/18/85
85-20
Motor-Operated Valve Failures 3/12/85


Notice No.     Subject                        Issue  Issued to
===Due To Hammering Effect===
85-19
85-10
Sup. 1
84-18
83-70
Sup. 1
85-17
85-16
85-15


85-22          Failure Of Limitorque Motor-  3/21/85 All power reactor
===Alleged Falsification Of===
Certifications And Alteration


Operated Valves Resulting              facilities holding
===Of Markings On Piping, Valves===
And Fittings


From Incorrect Installation            an OL or CP
===Posstensioned Containment===
Tendon Anchor Head Failure


Of Pinon Gear
===Failures Of Undervoltage===
Output Circuit Boards In The


85-21          Main Steam Isolation Valve    3/18/85 All PWR facilities
Westinghouse-Designed Solid


Closure Logic                          holding an OL or CP
===State Protection System===
Vibration-Induced Valve


85-20          Motor-Operated Valve Failures 3/12/85  All power reactor
Failures


Due To Hammering Effect                facilities holding
===Possible Sticking Of ASCO===
Solenoid Valves


an OL or CP
Time/Current Trip Curve


85-19          Alleged Falsification Of       3/11/85 All power reactor
Discrepancy Of ITE/Siemens-


Certifications And Alteration          facilities holding
===Allis Molded Case Circuit===
Breaker


Of Markings On Piping, Valves          an OL or CP
===Nonconforming Structural===
Steel For Safety-Related


And Fittings
Use


85-10          Posstensioned Containment      3/8/85 All power reactor
3/11/85
3/8/85
3/7/85
3/4/85
3/1/85
2/27/85
2/22/85


Sup. 1          Tendon Anchor Head Failure            facilities holding
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


an OL or CP
an OL or CP


84-18          Failures Of Undervoltage      3/7/85  All Westinghouse
===All PWR facilities===
holding an OL or CP


Output Circuit Boards In The          PWR facilities
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


Westinghouse-Designed Solid            holding an OL or CP
an OL or CP


State Protection System
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


83-70          Vibration-Induced Valve        3/4/85  All power reactor
an OL or CP


Sup. 1          Failures                              facilities holding
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


an OL or CP
an OL or CP


85-17            Possible Sticking Of ASCO    3/1/85  All power reactor
===All Westinghouse===
PWR facilities
 
holding an OL or CP


Solenoid Valves                      facilities holding
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


an OL or CP
an OL or CP


85-16            Time/Current Trip Curve      2/27/85 All power reactor
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


Discrepancy Of ITE/Siemens-          facilities holding
an OL or CP


Allis Molded Case Circuit            an OL or CP
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


Breaker
an OL or CP


85-15            Nonconforming Structural      2/22/85 All power reactor
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


Steel For Safety-Related              facilities holding
an OL or CP
 
Use                                  an OL or CP


OL = Operating License
OL = Operating License

Latest revision as of 10:24, 16 January 2025

Inadequate Surveillance and Postmaintenance and Postmodification System Testing
ML031180395
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill, Crane
Issue date: 03/22/1985
From: Jordan E
NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-85-023, NUDOCS 8503210461
Download: ML031180395 (4)
v • d • e


SSINS No:

6835 IN 85-23

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555

March 22, 1985

IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-23:

INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE AND POSTMAINTENANCE

AND POSTMODIFICATION SYSTEM TESTING

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a

construction permit (CP).

Purpose

This information notice is to alert addressees of several instances pertaining

to improper system modifications, inadequate postmodification system testing, and inadequate surveillance testing recently detected at the McGuire nuclear

power facility.

It is expected that recipients will review the information contained in this

notice for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropri- ate, to preclude similar problems from occurring at their facilities.

However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; there- fore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On November 1, 1984, Duke Power Company (DPC) informed the NRC that the four

Rosemont differential pressure transmitters that control the closing of four

isolation valves of the upper-head injection (UHI) system at McGuire Unit 1 were improperly installed (i.e., the impulse lines were reversed when the

original Barton reverse-acting differential pressure switches were replaced

with Rosemont direct-acting differential pressure transmitters during April of

1984).

As a result, the UHI isolation valves failed to close during draining

of the accumulator when the water level in the UHI accumulator reached the-set

point.

In addition to the improper installation, the postmodification testing

was limited to a dry calibration method that does not use the actual reference

leg of the accumulator; therefore, the installation error was not detected by

the postmodification test.

Consequently, the plant was operated for approxi- mately five months with the UHI isolation valves inoperable.

The McGuire UHI system design includes a separate nitrogen accumulator that

supplies pressurized nitrogen to force the water from the UHI accumulator into

the reactor vessel during the initial phase of a design-basis loss-of-coolant

accident (LOCA).

Thus, if a design-basis LOCA had occurred while the UHI

isolation valves were inoperable, the UHI system would have been actuated;

however, the UHI isolation valves would not have closed when the water in the

8503210461

IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 UHI accumulator had been depleted.

As a result, nitrogen gas could have been

injected into the reactor vessel during the course of a design-basis LOCA.

Under such conditions, and using Appendix K assumptions, DPC's analysis indi- cated that the peak cladding temperature of 2200'F most likely would have been

exceeded and that the worst-case increase in containment pressure could have

resulted in exceeding the design pressure by 2 psi.

A related but separate event involved the establishing of the set points for

closing the UHI isolation valves.

On February 14, 1984, DPC approved the

use of a dry calibration method, which would establish the trip set point for

closing the UHI isolation valves relative to the bottom of the UHI water accumu- lator tank.

However, a 24-inch nonconservative error in the trip set point

occurred at McGuire Units 1 and 2 when the responsible instrument engineer

misinterpreted the tank measurements made by instrument technicians.

Because

the dry calibration method does not use the actual process leg of the UHI accu- mulator, this error was left undetected at both units for several months. The

calibration error was finally detected on November 2, 1984, while DPC personnel

were taking "as-found" data in response to the previous error involving the

incorrect installation of the differential pressure transmitters. The conse- quences of this event would be the early isolation of the UHI water accumulator

during a design-basis LOCA, resulting in less water being delivered to the

vessel than assumed in the analysis.

A completely unrelated event involved the inoperability of two of the four

overpower delta temperature reactor protection channels at McGuire Unit 2.

This defect was discovered on November 26, 1984, by a DPC engineer while per- forming a posttrip review of a reactor scram in which signals of the two

affected channels responded contrary to that expected.

This event was caused

because an electrical jumper was not installed on two of the four overpower

delta temperature input logic cards.

The purpose of the jumper is to ensure

that the overpower delta temperature system provides protection for decreasing

temperature, as might be expected on a steam line break.

DPC's surveillance

tests only verified that protection would be provided for increasing tempera- ture, but not for decreasing temperature. This defect was left undetected for

an unknown period of time, but most likely it had existed since initial plant

startup.

Subsequent investigations revealed that in addition to inadequate

testing, there was an absence of instructions and descriptions of the required

jumpers.

The above examples illustrate the need for thorough reviews and detailed

attention to plant surveillance and postmaintenance and postmodification tests, to ensure that they accomplish the required verification of system function.

IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice;

however, if you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the

Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the technical

contact listed below.

Dieor

Divis

of Emergency Preparedness

and 'ngineering Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contacts: I. Villalva, IE

(301) 492-9007

H. Dance, RII

(404) 221-5533 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

Attachment 1

IN 85-23

March 22, 1985

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information

Date of

Notice No.

Subject

Issue

Issued to

85-22

85-21 Failure Of Limitorque Motor-

Operated Valves Resulting

From Incorrect Installation

Of Pinon Gear

Main Steam Isolation Valve

Closure Logic

3/21/85

3/18/85

85-20

Motor-Operated Valve Failures 3/12/85

Due To Hammering Effect

85-19

85-10

Sup. 1

84-18

83-70

Sup. 1

85-17

85-16

85-15

Alleged Falsification Of

Certifications And Alteration

Of Markings On Piping, Valves

And Fittings

Posstensioned Containment

Tendon Anchor Head Failure

Failures Of Undervoltage

Output Circuit Boards In The

Westinghouse-Designed Solid

State Protection System

Vibration-Induced Valve

Failures

Possible Sticking Of ASCO

Solenoid Valves

Time/Current Trip Curve

Discrepancy Of ITE/Siemens-

Allis Molded Case Circuit

Breaker

Nonconforming Structural

Steel For Safety-Related

Use

3/11/85

3/8/85

3/7/85

3/4/85

3/1/85

2/27/85

2/22/85

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All PWR facilities

holding an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All Westinghouse

PWR facilities

holding an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit


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