Information Notice 1986-57, Operating Problems with Solenoid Operated Valves at Nuclear Power Plants: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:11$S ORIGINAL | {{#Wiki_filter:11$S ORIGINAL | ||
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-57 | |||
===UNITED STATES=== | |||
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | ||
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT | ===OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT=== | ||
WASHINGTON, D.C. | |||
20555 | |||
===July 11, 1986=== | |||
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-57: | |||
===OPERATING PROBLEMS WITH SOLENOID OPERATED=== | |||
VALVES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS | VALVES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS | ||
| Line 35: | Line 42: | ||
This notice is to advise recipients of a series of valve failures that have | This notice is to advise recipients of a series of valve failures that have | ||
occurred recently at several nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipi- ents will review the events discussed below for applicability to their facili- ties and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar valve failures | occurred recently at several nuclear power plants. | ||
It is expected that recipi- ents will review the events discussed below for applicability to their facili- ties and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar valve failures | |||
occurring at their facilities. | occurring at their facilities. | ||
===However, suggestions contained in this notice=== | |||
do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written | do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written | ||
| Line 49: | Line 59: | ||
involving failures of certain valves that are actuated by solenoid operated | involving failures of certain valves that are actuated by solenoid operated | ||
valves (SOVs) to operate properly. | valves (SOVs) to operate properly. | ||
===These failures have adversely affected the=== | |||
intended functions of the main steam isolation system, pressure relief and | intended functions of the main steam isolation system, pressure relief and | ||
fluid control systems. Attachment 1 to this information notice describes the | fluid control systems. | ||
Attachment 1 to this information notice describes the | |||
failure events and the corrective actions taken. | failure events and the corrective actions taken. | ||
| Line 60: | Line 73: | ||
In most of the cases described in Attachment 1, the cause for triggering the | In most of the cases described in Attachment 1, the cause for triggering the | ||
event was attributed to a malfunctioning SOV that served as a pilot valve. This | event was attributed to a malfunctioning SOV that served as a pilot valve. | ||
This | |||
in turn resulted in the malfunction of the associated main valve. | in turn resulted in the malfunction of the associated main valve. | ||
===The failures=== | |||
of the SOVs can be traced to the following different causes: (1) potentially | of the SOVs can be traced to the following different causes: (1) potentially | ||
| Line 73: | Line 89: | ||
air systems) are being used periodically and are not designed to "oil-free" | air systems) are being used periodically and are not designed to "oil-free" | ||
specifications as required for Class IE service, (3) chloride contaminants | |||
causing open circuits in coils of the SOVs, possibly as a result of questionable | causing open circuits in coils of the SOVs, possibly as a result of questionable | ||
| Line 83: | Line 99: | ||
in SOVs has not been adequately maintained, and (5) lubricants have been used | in SOVs has not been adequately maintained, and (5) lubricants have been used | ||
excessively during maintenance. | excessively during maintenance. | ||
===ASCO provides installation and maintenance=== | |||
8607090425 | 8607090425 | ||
Attachment 1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 b. | ===Attachment 1=== | ||
IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 b. Viton has superior high-temperature performance when compared to EP | |||
and is impervious to hydrocarbons. | |||
===Its major disadvantage is that it=== | |||
is less resistant to radiation than EP by a factor of ten. | |||
ASCO | |||
recommends Viton for applications that are not oil-free and where | recommends Viton for applications that are not oil-free and where | ||
| Line 105: | Line 126: | ||
replaced all Unit 2 dual solenoid valves with valves having Viton seats | replaced all Unit 2 dual solenoid valves with valves having Viton seats | ||
and seals. Because Viton has a 20-megarad limit, the licensee plans to | and seals. | ||
Because Viton has a 20-megarad limit, the licensee plans to | |||
replace these elastomers every 3.3 years to meet environmental qualifica- tion requirements for the MSIV application. | replace these elastomers every 3.3 years to meet environmental qualifica- tion requirements for the MSIV application. | ||
| Line 118: | Line 141: | ||
using the subject dual solenoid valve.) | using the subject dual solenoid valve.) | ||
On October 5, 1985, the dc coils of two MSIVs failed during the perfor- mance of post-maintenance testing of the MSIVs. | On October 5, 1985, the dc coils of two MSIVs failed during the perfor- mance of post-maintenance testing of the MSIVs. | ||
failures indicated an open circuit in the dc coils. | ===Investigation into the=== | ||
failures indicated an open circuit in the dc coils. | |||
===The coils were=== | |||
replaced and the valves subsequently retested satisfactorily. | replaced and the valves subsequently retested satisfactorily. | ||
On October 15, 1985, an unplanned closure of an MSIV occurred while Unit 2 was operating at 99 percent full power. | On October 15, 1985, an unplanned closure of an MSIV occurred while Unit 2 was operating at 99 percent full power. | ||
===Closure of the MSIV occurred when=== | |||
the ac solenoid coil portion of the MSIV associated SOV was de-energized | the ac solenoid coil portion of the MSIV associated SOV was de-energized | ||
in accordance with a periodic test procedure. | in accordance with a periodic test procedure. | ||
===It was not known then that=== | |||
there was an open circuit in the associated dc solenoid coil portion of | there was an open circuit in the associated dc solenoid coil portion of | ||
the dual SOV. Consequently, when the ac coil was de-energized, closure of | the dual SOV. Consequently, when the ac coil was de-energized, closure of | ||
the MSIV resulted. | the MSIV resulted. | ||
===The failed dc coil was replaced and then retested=== | |||
satisfactorily. | satisfactorily. | ||
| Line 142: | Line 170: | ||
that the failures appeared to be separation of the very fine coil wire at | that the failures appeared to be separation of the very fine coil wire at | ||
the junction point where it connects to the much larger field lead. This | the junction point where it connects to the much larger field lead. | ||
This | |||
connection point is a soldered connection that is then taped and | connection point is a soldered connection that is then taped and | ||
| Line 152: | Line 182: | ||
storage) by the CP&L Research Center indicated the separation might be | storage) by the CP&L Research Center indicated the separation might be | ||
corrosion induced by chloride contaminants. | corrosion induced by chloride contaminants. | ||
ASCO are unable to determine the source of the chloride. | ===To date, the licensee and=== | ||
ASCO are unable to determine the source of the chloride. | |||
However, followup investigation by the NRC revealed that ASCO had previously | |||
experienced similar dc coil open circuit anomalies after a surface ship- ment of SOVs overseas to Japan. | |||
===At that time, ASCO believed that the salt=== | |||
water ambient conditions during shipping may have been the source of the | water ambient conditions during shipping may have been the source of the | ||
chlorine-induced failures. ASCO recommends specific handling, packaging, and storage conditions for spare parts and valves at facilities. | chlorine-induced failures. | ||
ASCO recommends specific handling, packaging, and storage conditions for spare parts and valves at facilities. | |||
Attachment 1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 The licensee initiated a temporary surveillance program to monitor opera- bility of the solenoid coils on October 16, 1985. A modification was | ===Attachment 1=== | ||
IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 The licensee initiated a temporary surveillance program to monitor opera- bility of the solenoid coils on October 16, 1985. A modification was | |||
performed to install a voltage dropping resistor in the individual coil | performed to install a voltage dropping resistor in the individual coil | ||
| Line 170: | Line 207: | ||
control room. This allows continuity of the coil circuitry to be verified | control room. This allows continuity of the coil circuitry to be verified | ||
by measuring a voltage drop across the resistor. | by measuring a voltage drop across the resistor. | ||
===According to the=== | |||
licensee, until the cause for failure can be determined, plans are to | licensee, until the cause for failure can be determined, plans are to | ||
check the coil circuitry for continuity on a daily basis. | check the coil circuitry for continuity on a daily basis. | ||
2. | 2. | ||
In November 1985, Carolina Power and Light's Brunswick facility experi- enced problems with several scram discharge SOVs. | ===Scram Discharge Solenoid Valve Failure=== | ||
In November 1985, Carolina Power and Light's Brunswick facility experi- enced problems with several scram discharge SOVs. | |||
===The problems were=== | |||
identified during periodic surveillance testing to determine the single | identified during periodic surveillance testing to determine the single | ||
rod insertion times and resulted in several rods with slow insertion | rod insertion times and resulted in several rods with slow insertion | ||
times. Initial troubleshooting isolated the problem to the SOVs in the | times. | ||
Initial troubleshooting isolated the problem to the SOVs in the | |||
scram discharge line for two of the control rods, which were subsequently | scram discharge line for two of the control rods, which were subsequently | ||
| Line 202: | Line 244: | ||
valves' internal passages or caused sticking of the diaphragms, thereby | valves' internal passages or caused sticking of the diaphragms, thereby | ||
contributing to the slow insertion times. | contributing to the slow insertion times. | ||
===The technical manual for the=== | |||
subject valves states that body passage gaskets should be lubricated with | subject valves states that body passage gaskets should be lubricated with | ||
| Line 216: | Line 259: | ||
required by the Technical Specifications provides sufficient assurance | required by the Technical Specifications provides sufficient assurance | ||
that this problem does not exist in other SOVs. | that this problem does not exist in other SOVs. | ||
===In addition, the licensee=== | |||
stated that maintenance procedures and practices would be reviewed and | stated that maintenance procedures and practices would be reviewed and | ||
| Line 227: | Line 271: | ||
On September 10, 1985, the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant was operating at 100 | On September 10, 1985, the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant was operating at 100 | ||
percent power when one of the six SOVs in the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) | percent power when one of the six SOVs in the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) | ||
failed to change state when de-energized. | failed to change state when de-energized. | ||
===This failure was detected during the=== | |||
performance of a preventive maintenance procedure developed to periodically | performance of a preventive maintenance procedure developed to periodically | ||
cycle each of the six SOVs to prevent a sticking problem similar to SOV fail- ures previously experienced on November 2, 1984. In that earlier event, two | cycle each of the six SOVs to prevent a sticking problem similar to SOV fail- ures previously experienced on November 2, 1984. | ||
===In that earlier event, two=== | |||
feedwater bypass valves failed to open automatically and the cause was deter- mined to be sticking SOVs. | |||
The faulty SOV was ASCO Model NP8320A-185E and the | |||
licensee has been unable to determine the cause of the malfunction. | |||
The | |||
===Attachment 2=== | |||
IN 86-57 | |||
===July 11, 1986=== | |||
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED | |||
===IE INFORMATION NOTICES=== | |||
Information | |||
Date of | |||
Notice No. | |||
Subject | |||
Issue | |||
Issued to | |||
86-56 | |||
===Reliability Of Main Steam=== | |||
Safety Valves | |||
7/10/86 | |||
===All PWR facilities=== | |||
holding an OL or CP | |||
86- | 86-55 | ||
86-54 Delayed Access To Safety- | |||
===Related Areas And Equipment=== | |||
During Plant Emergencies | |||
===Criminal Prosecution Of A=== | |||
Former Radiation Safety | |||
===Officer Who Willfully=== | |||
Directed An Unqualified | |||
===Individual To Perform=== | |||
Radiography | Radiography | ||
Improper Use Of Heat Shrink- able Tubing | |||
7/10/86 | |||
6/27/86 | |||
6/26/86 | |||
86-53 | |||
86-52 Conductor Insulation Degrada- 6/26/86 tion On Foxboro Model E | |||
Controllers | |||
Excessive Pneumatic Leakage | |||
6/18/86 In The Automatic Depressuriza- tion System | |||
===All power reactor=== | |||
facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP | an OL or CP | ||
All holders of by- product, source, or | |||
special nuclear | |||
material | |||
===All power reactor=== | |||
facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP | |||
===All power reactor=== | |||
facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP | |||
===All BWR facilities=== | |||
holding an OL or CP | |||
===All power reactor=== | |||
facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP | |||
===All power reactor=== | |||
facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP | |||
===All BWR facilities=== | |||
holding an OL or CP | |||
86-49 | 86-51 | ||
86-50 | |||
86-49 | |||
===Inadequate Testing To Detect=== | |||
Failures Of Safety-Related | |||
===Pneumatic Components Or=== | |||
Systems | |||
Age/Environment Induced | |||
===Electrical Cable Failues=== | |||
Inadequate Testing Of Boron | |||
===Solution Concentration In The=== | |||
Standby Liquid Control System | Standby Liquid Control System | ||
OL = Operating License | 6/18/86 | ||
6/16/86 | |||
6/13/86 | |||
86-48 OL = Operating License | |||
CP = Construction Permit}} | CP = Construction Permit}} | ||
{{Information notice-Nav}} | {{Information notice-Nav}} | ||
Latest revision as of 11:08, 16 January 2025
11$S ORIGINAL
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-57
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555
July 11, 1986
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-57:
OPERATING PROBLEMS WITH SOLENOID OPERATED
VALVES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Addressees
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or a
construction permit.
Purpose
This notice is to advise recipients of a series of valve failures that have
occurred recently at several nuclear power plants.
It is expected that recipi- ents will review the events discussed below for applicability to their facili- ties and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar valve failures
occurring at their facilities.
However, suggestions contained in this notice
do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written
response is required.
Description of Circumstances
The NRC has received reports from licensees of operating nuclear power plants
involving failures of certain valves that are actuated by solenoid operated
valves (SOVs) to operate properly.
These failures have adversely affected the
intended functions of the main steam isolation system, pressure relief and
fluid control systems.
Attachment 1 to this information notice describes the
failure events and the corrective actions taken.
Discussion:
In most of the cases described in Attachment 1, the cause for triggering the
event was attributed to a malfunctioning SOV that served as a pilot valve.
This
in turn resulted in the malfunction of the associated main valve.
The failures
of the SOVs can be traced to the following different causes: (1) potentially
high-temperature ambient conditions are not being continuously monitored in areas
where SOVs are installed and operating in an energized state, (2) hydrocarbon
contaminants, probably because backup air systems (e.g., plant service or shop
air systems) are being used periodically and are not designed to "oil-free"
specifications as required for Class IE service, (3) chloride contaminants
causing open circuits in coils of the SOVs, possibly as a result of questionable
handling, packaging, and storage procedures, (4) an active replacement parts
program associated with the elastomers and other short-lived subcomponents used
in SOVs has not been adequately maintained, and (5) lubricants have been used
excessively during maintenance.
ASCO provides installation and maintenance
8607090425
Attachment 1
IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 b. Viton has superior high-temperature performance when compared to EP
and is impervious to hydrocarbons.
Its major disadvantage is that it
is less resistant to radiation than EP by a factor of ten.
ASCO
recommends Viton for applications that are not oil-free and where
radiation levels do not exceed 20 megarads.
On the basis of a licensee review of the Brunswick Station maintenance
history, which showed the performance of Viton to be satisfactory in ASCO
valves, and the available literature and industry experience, the licensee
replaced all Unit 2 dual solenoid valves with valves having Viton seats
and seals.
Because Viton has a 20-megarad limit, the licensee plans to
replace these elastomers every 3.3 years to meet environmental qualifica- tion requirements for the MSIV application.
After replacing the faulty valves with valves having Viton disc and seal
material, the licensee experienced several SOV failures resulting from
open circuits of the dc coils on Unit 2. (Brunswick Station employs ASCO
NP8323A36V valves that use one ac coil and one dc coil in applications
using the subject dual solenoid valve.)
On October 5, 1985, the dc coils of two MSIVs failed during the perfor- mance of post-maintenance testing of the MSIVs.
Investigation into the
failures indicated an open circuit in the dc coils.
The coils were
replaced and the valves subsequently retested satisfactorily.
On October 15, 1985, an unplanned closure of an MSIV occurred while Unit 2 was operating at 99 percent full power.
Closure of the MSIV occurred when
the ac solenoid coil portion of the MSIV associated SOV was de-energized
in accordance with a periodic test procedure.
It was not known then that
there was an open circuit in the associated dc solenoid coil portion of
the dual SOV. Consequently, when the ac coil was de-energized, closure of
the MSIV resulted.
The failed dc coil was replaced and then retested
satisfactorily.
Investigation into the failures of the dc coil by the licensee determined
that the failures appeared to be separation of the very fine coil wire at
the junction point where it connects to the much larger field lead.
This
connection point is a soldered connection that is then taped and
lacquered.
Further analysis of the coils (two failed dc coils plus five spares from
storage) by the CP&L Research Center indicated the separation might be
corrosion induced by chloride contaminants.
To date, the licensee and
ASCO are unable to determine the source of the chloride.
However, followup investigation by the NRC revealed that ASCO had previously
experienced similar dc coil open circuit anomalies after a surface ship- ment of SOVs overseas to Japan.
At that time, ASCO believed that the salt
water ambient conditions during shipping may have been the source of the
chlorine-induced failures.
ASCO recommends specific handling, packaging, and storage conditions for spare parts and valves at facilities.
Attachment 1
IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 The licensee initiated a temporary surveillance program to monitor opera- bility of the solenoid coils on October 16, 1985. A modification was
performed to install a voltage dropping resistor in the individual coil
circuits so that they can be monitored directly from cabinets in the
control room. This allows continuity of the coil circuitry to be verified
by measuring a voltage drop across the resistor.
According to the
licensee, until the cause for failure can be determined, plans are to
check the coil circuitry for continuity on a daily basis.
2.
Scram Discharge Solenoid Valve Failure
In November 1985, Carolina Power and Light's Brunswick facility experi- enced problems with several scram discharge SOVs.
The problems were
identified during periodic surveillance testing to determine the single
rod insertion times and resulted in several rods with slow insertion
times.
Initial troubleshooting isolated the problem to the SOVs in the
scram discharge line for two of the control rods, which were subsequently
replaced and tested satisfactorily.
The licensee disassembled the failed SOVs, which were manufactured by ASCO
(Model HV-90-405-2A), for failure analysis. When the valves were disas- sembled, it was noted that copious amounts of silicone lubricant had been
applied by the licensee to all gaskets, seals, and diaphragms internal to
the valves during previous routine maintenance.. The licensee believes
that the excessive amount of lubricant may have blocked some of the
valves' internal passages or caused sticking of the diaphragms, thereby
contributing to the slow insertion times.
The technical manual for the
subject valves states that body passage gaskets should be lubricated with
moderate amounts of Dow Corning's Valve Seal Silicone Lubricant or an
equivalent high-grade silicone grease.
The licensee conducted successful scram tests on all other rods. A
periodic retest of 10 percent of the control rods every 120 days as
required by the Technical Specifications provides sufficient assurance
that this problem does not exist in other SOVs.
In addition, the licensee
stated that maintenance procedures and practices would be reviewed and
modified, as required, to prevent the application of excessive amounts of
lubricant during repair or overhaul of components.
Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant
On September 10, 1985, the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant was operating at 100
percent power when one of the six SOVs in the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW)
failed to change state when de-energized.
This failure was detected during the
performance of a preventive maintenance procedure developed to periodically
cycle each of the six SOVs to prevent a sticking problem similar to SOV fail- ures previously experienced on November 2, 1984.
In that earlier event, two
feedwater bypass valves failed to open automatically and the cause was deter- mined to be sticking SOVs.
The faulty SOV was ASCO Model NP8320A-185E and the
licensee has been unable to determine the cause of the malfunction.
The
Attachment 2
July 11, 1986
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issue
Issued to
86-56
Reliability Of Main Steam
Safety Valves
7/10/86
All PWR facilities
86-55
86-54 Delayed Access To Safety-
Related Areas And Equipment
During Plant Emergencies
Criminal Prosecution Of A
Former Radiation Safety
Officer Who Willfully
Directed An Unqualified
Individual To Perform
Radiography
Improper Use Of Heat Shrink- able Tubing
7/10/86
6/27/86
6/26/86
86-53
86-52 Conductor Insulation Degrada- 6/26/86 tion On Foxboro Model E
Controllers
Excessive Pneumatic Leakage
6/18/86 In The Automatic Depressuriza- tion System
All power reactor
facilities holding
All holders of by- product, source, or
special nuclear
material
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All BWR facilities
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All BWR facilities
86-51
86-50
86-49
Inadequate Testing To Detect
Failures Of Safety-Related
Pneumatic Components Or
Systems
Age/Environment Induced
Electrical Cable Failues
Inadequate Testing Of Boron
Solution Concentration In The
Standby Liquid Control System
6/18/86
6/16/86
6/13/86
86-48 OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit