Information Notice 1986-03, Potential Deficiencies in Enviromental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring

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Potential Deficiencies in Enviromental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring
ML031220484
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date: 01/14/1986
From: Jordan E
NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-86-003, NUDOCS 8601090679
Download: ML031220484 (3)


11$ ORIGINAL SSINS No.:

IN 86-03

6835 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 January 14, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-03: POTENTIAL DEFICIENCIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALIFICATION OF LIMITORQUE MOTOR VALVE

OPERATOR WIRING

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a

construction permit (CP).

Purpose

This notice is provided to alert recipients of potential generic problems

regarding the environmental qualification of electrical wiring used in

Limitorque motor valve operators. It is expected that recipients will review

this information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities.

However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements;

K-"J therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On September 30, 1985, Commonwealth Edison (Zion Generating Station) reported

to the NRC that it had discovered four Limitorque motor .valve operators with

jumper wires different from those tested by Limitorque in its environmental

qualification program. Subsequently, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

notified the NRC that the manufacturer of the internal control wiring of its

Limitorque operators at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant either could not be identified

or qualification could not be established where the manufacturer was known.

Similar circumstances have recently been identified at other nuclear plants.

Discussion:

The results of NRC inspections at Limitorque and TVA have determined that even

though Limitorque has conducted environmental qualification testing of motor

valve operators, the qualification test reports do not specifically address

wiring or wiring qualification. Limitorque has installed wires from several

different manufacturers in safety-related operators.

8601090679

IN 86-03 January 14, 1986 Limitorque stated that it can provide or reference documentation to support

qualification of wires it has installed; however, valve manufacturers, licensees, and/or others may have added additional wires that are not qualified by this

data. The NRC physical inspection of Limitorque operators at the Sequoyah plant

determined that some valve operators contained wires not qualified by the

Limitorque tests.

The NRC staff considers the resolution of this issue to be part of the licensee's

environmental qualification program to establish and maintain the qualified

status of electrical equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.

Because qualification of Limitorque installed wiring may be based on separate

qualification tests of wire, it is important that adequate analyses have been

performed and that documentation exists to demonstrate that the separate wire

qualification tests encompass the parameters for the valve operator qualification.

If additional wiring has been added or replaced after operator shipment from

Limitorque, then additional documentation may be appropriate for establishing

qualification of the additional wires and subsequently the valve operators for

the valve operator specific application.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office, or this office.

ward . r Dirrector

Division Emergency Preparedness

and Eng eering Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Contact: G. Hubbard, IE

(301) 492-9759 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

Attachment 1 IN 86-03 January 14, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Subject Issue Issued to

Notice No.

Failure Of Valve Operator 1/6/86 All power reactor

86-02 facilities holding

Motor During Environmental

Qualification Testing an OL or CP

Failure Of Main Feedwater 1/6/86 All power reactor

86-01 facilities holding

Check Valve Causes Loss Of

Feedwater System Integrity an OL or CP

And Water-Hammer Damage

Applicability of 10 CFR 21 12/31/85 All power reactor

85-101 facilities holding

To Consulting Firms Providing

.Training an OL or CP

Rosemount Differential 12/31/85 All power reactor

85-100 facilities holding

Pressure Transmitter Zero

Point Shift an OL or CP

Cracking In Boiling-Water- 12/31/85 All BWR facilities

85-99 having a Mark I or

Reactor Mark I And Mark II

Containments Caused By Failure Mark II containment

Of The Inerting System

Missing Jumpers From Westing- 12/26/85 All Westinghouse

85-98 designed PWR

house Reactor Protection

System Cards For The Over- facilities holding

Power Delta Temperature Trip an OL or CP

Function

Jail Term For Former 12/26/85 All power reactor

85-97 facilities holding

Contractor Employee Who

an OL or CP

Intent

ionally Falsified

Welding Inspection Records

Temporary Strainers Left 12/23/85 All power reactor

85-96 facilities holding

Installed In Pump Suction

Piping an OL or CP

Leak Of Reactor Water To 12/23/85 All BWR facilities

85-95 holding an OL or CP

Reactor Building Caused By

Scram Solenoid Valve Problem

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit