05000333/LER-1982-025

LER 82-025/03L-0:on 820524,one Set of Secondary Containment Air Lock Doors & One Door of Other Set Left Partially Opened.Caused by Personnel Error & Equipment Failure. Personnel Instructed in Containment Requirements

ML20054K540
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	06/18/1982
From:	W. Verne Childs POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20054K538	List: 05000333/LER-1982-025, Forwards LER 82-025/03L-0
References
LER-82-025-03L, LER-82-25-3L, NUDOCS 8207020298
Download: ML20054K540 (3)

LER-2082-025,

Event date:
Report date:
3332082025R00 - NRC Website

text

NRC Pof:M 364  ;, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMISS:CN (7 77) '

, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT coNTRot stock: l l l ll l- @ (PLEAsE PRINT oR TvPE ALL REQUIRED INPoRMATioN) lo lil8l 9Nl YlUcENstE 7

Jl AlcCot Fl'1lglS0 14 T l 0 l 0 l - l 0 l 0 l 0 2hgl 4 l 0 l -l 0 l 0U,CENstN6Metm 26 l 1 l 1 l 1 l 1 lgl l lg ucENsE TYPE JO si cat Se con'T -

10111 8

",5 l L l@l 0l5p0l0l0l3l3l3l@l0151214l812l@l0161118l812l@

(

74 80 7 40 88 oOCx5TNUMSER et 89 EVENr o4TE 75 REPOmr oATE EVENT oESCRIPTioN ANo PRCBABLE CONSEQUENCES h 10 : 21 l INTERIM REPORT: During normal operation, with one set of secondary containment air l F5 Fa 1 I lock doors open, one door of the other set was partially opened for a few seconds. I gl This resulted in violation of secondary containment when required by TS 3.7.C. I lo ist i The door was immediately closed thus restorir.) secondary containment. No significantl F5T61 l hazard existed. See attachment for details. I AI l' 10(dl l  !

$cN[ ccce susci$t component coos sueYo'os sNcNe .

[BTil l S l A l @ [A_j @ [C_J @ l Zl Zl 21 Zl Zl Zl @ l Zl @ @

u

<veNr v da 'a'Eo'E0 #'c55' "S"' "'U ~.

@ syg=,ao I al 21 l-l I ol 2151 Ld 1013l p0l L--J l0l 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 31 J2

<N 'A hon Mth wCURs 22 gg O PL Nr  : B FOR S. s MANLF c LX 33 Jgl34X lg l5 Zlg 3 l34Zl@ 37 l0 l0 l0 lY l 40 41

@ g lY lg 42 43 lZ l9l3"l'm9[g 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h i, i o i l The primary cause' was personnel error. Equipment failure also contributed. . To I g i prevent recurrence, personnel will be instructed in secondary containment require- 1 l b l ments and equipment designed to maintain integrity of secondary conta'inment through i 1

( g I the use of door interlocks will be repaired or modified as necessary. See~ attach- I gl ment for details. l

'sr*E sacwea orwenstatus @

oisEoSSEv' oiscoveny esseniencN @

IiI5i LE,J@ l ll 0l Ol@l NA l l**D l@l Resident Inspector [

• 4!nvity co'ArtNr. '* " " ** 30 i

astease tocaricNc,netease@

aucust NA en acnvity @ l l NA l'

l' i 18 '

• I W @o ' ea astmissW@l ** ** **

l einscNNat execsSes wo... rves oiscai,rieN@

NA l i l 7 l l 0 l 0 l 0 l@l Z l@l l

(

' penscNNe't 'm c' dss 8" Nuvec=

l li* l a 'l l 0 l 0 l 0 l@l:sscaiencN @ NA l

hs,s,ce :o 4,cr o raciurv g -

NA LLLtJ ' '

lzJ@l' I a0 '

8207020298 '320618 NRC USE CNLY PDR ADOCK 05000333 ,

12Iof 7 8 3 issusl @otScaianoN@

to S PDR  ;

68 69

; ; ;;;;;;;;;ly 80 .

W. Verne Childs (315) 342-3840 X207 o

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET N0. 50-333 ATTACHMENT TO LER 82- 025/03L-0 Page 1 of 2 During normal operation, on April 15, 1982, personnel opened the outer secondary containment air lock (Reactor Building Track Bay) doors in order to bring large equipment into the Reactor Building via the Track Bay. During the time that the outer doors were open an unidentified individual attempted to open the personnel access door through the larger inner air lock door. The personnel access door was pushed open approximately one (1) foot before an Auxiliary Operator in the air lock could close and latch the door. During the few seconds the access door was partially open the plant did not meet the secondary containment integrity requirement contained in Technical Specifications 3.7.C. The event described above was observed by the NRC Resident Inspector and was noted in Inspection 82-08.

At the time of the event on April 15, 1982 no " Occurrence Report",

the FitzPatrick plant internal document for recording significant events, was initiated because the auxiliary operator that closed the access door did not appreciate that the event involved Technical Specifications and consequently did not inform his supervisor.

On May 24, 1982, during review of NRC Inspection 82-08 (dated May 14, 1982 and received on May 17, 1982), the Operations Department Super-intendent became aware of the April 15, 1982 event and initiated an occurrence report to cause event documentation, review, corrective action and LER submittal.

Investigation of the event has revealed the following:

1. The Auxiliary Operator that closed the partially open access door did not initiate an occurrence report or infonn his supervisor of the event.

2. The unidentified individual that opened the access door part way either was not aware of the indication system installed to inform personnel that the other air lock door is open or the individual ignored the indication.

3. The electro-mechanical interlock system installed on the air lock doors, which is designed to preclude inadvertent breaking of secondary containment, did not function.

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 ATTACHMENT TO LER 82-025/03L-0 Page 2 of 2 To prevent recurrence the following action has been or will be taken:

1. Department Superintendents of those departments with personnel that enter the secondary containment on a regular basis will conduct training for their personnel regarding secondary containment require-ments and the initiation of occurrence reports. This training will be completed by August 6, 1982.

2. The maintenance effort to restore the door interlock system to an operable status will continue. In addition, the design of the existing system will be evaluated for adequacy and reliability.

Door interlock system repairs, depending on parts availability, are expected to be complete by July 23, 1982. Evaluation of the adequacy and reliability of the interlock system is expected to require approximately six (6) months after the system is restored to service

• and will include the conceptual design of any modifications that may be considered necessary to provide an adequate and reliable interlock system.

3. Until the door interlock system is repaired and during time periods where either the main inner or outer air lock doors are open for a '_

significant period for such activities as the movement of equipment or material into or out of the reactor building, the personnel moving the equipment or material will be required to " guard" the closed personnel access door through the main air lock doors to ensure that secondary containment integrity is maintained as required by Technical Specifications.

Following completion of the repair of the door interlock system an updated report will be submitted.

r

_ _ _ _ . _ , -- -- _