ML19291B590

Tech Spec Change Request 61,Amend A,To DPR-50,App A,Re Throttle Valve Surveillance Requirements.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19291B590
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	10/21/1977
From:	METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19291B589	List: ML19291B588 ML19291B590
References
NUDOCS 7911080625
Download: ML19291B590 (6)

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METROPOLITAN EDISON CCMPMrf JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPA:Pt AND PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY THREE MILE ISLAND :;UCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Technical Stecification Chanze Beauest No. ol, Amendment A This Technical Specification Change Request is submitted in support of Licensee's request to change Appendix A to Operating License No. DPR-50 for Three Mile Island Nuclear Staticn Unit 1. As a part of this request, proposed replacement pages for Appendix A are also included.

METROPOLITri EDISCN COMPANY i

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Sworn and subscribed to me this I day of , 1977.

% Aa 4 Notary Public V NCTARY PLELIO Rea:rg, Eens Cur /, P2.

My Ccmm:ssien Enres sicv. 19, 1919 1583 353 7911080 27

U'lITED STATES OF A? ERICA NUCLEAP REGULATORY CCICIISSION IN TF.r"., MATTER OF DCCKET NO. 50-289 LICENSE NO. DPR-50 ILO,0POLITAN EDISON CCMPANY This is to certify that a copy of Technical Specification Change Request No. 61, Amendment A to Appendix A of the Operating License for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1, has, on the date given below, been filed with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cenmission and been served cr.

the chief executives of Londonderry Township, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania and Dauphin County, Pennsylvania by depcsit in the United States mail, addressed as follows:

Mr. Weldon 3. Arehart Mr. Harry 3. Reese, Jr.

Board of Supervisors of Board of County Cc issioners Lcndenderry Township of Dauphin County R. D. #1, Geyers Church Road Dauphin Ccunty Court House Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Harriscurg, Pennsylvania 17120 METROPOLITAN EDISON CCMPANY

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Dated: October 21, 1Q77 1583 354

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Technical Specification Change Request No. 61, Amendment A The licensee requests that the attached changed pages replace pages h-41, h-h2 of the Technical Specifications Appendix A.

Reasons for Change Request Amendment The NRC, in their letter dated July 1,1977, requested all nuclear stations which use HPI and/or LPI throttle valves to propose changes to the technical specifications to incorporate surveillance requirements on the throttle valves. This amendment is requested because a statement in 4.5.2.1 (c) was cmitted. Inclusion of this statement will eliminate the need for the surveillance within four hours, vnen the pumps are not required to be operable.

Safety Analysis Justifying Change This change request increases the surveillance requirements for the HPI and LPI systems to provide additional assurance that they will function as assumed in the ECCS analyses. The surveillance assures proper flow and flow distribution to all necessary injection points by periodically checking those elements of the HPI and LPI systems which could adversely affect minimum flov and/or correct flow distribution.

Exceptions have been taken to the NRC suggested surveillances in two instances. First, no verificaticn of the position stop is specified for the decay heat throttle valves in that they are manually operated and do not have positive stops. The intent of the suggested surveillance vill be fulfilled by verifying that the valves are locked in the correct throttled position by observation of the position indicators. Second, the correct position of the HPI throttle valves is verified by observation of the position indicator lights in lieu of direct observation in that:

(1) Direct observation of the HPI throttle valve position or position stop is not possible without partial disassembly of the valve operator.

(2) Due to the valves' small size, only gross chan5es in the position stop setting could be detected by direct observation, thus meaningful information could not be obtained.

(3) These throttle valves are frequently stroked and are in a relatively high radiation area, consequently frequent direct observation vould result in a significant man-rem doce commitment.

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(h) These valves utilize gear actuated limit switches as pccition stops.

The position stop and open indication settings are identical and acecmplished by the same limit switch assembly, and therefore, observation of the open indication in the control room assures that the valve has moved to the set throttled position.

(5) After three years of operating experience with these valves no drift of the position stop has occurred.

(6) Following maintenance that affects system flow characteristics, a system test shall be conducted to demonstrate that the system is operable and to verify minimum acceptable flow. Verification of minimum acceptable flow extends beyond the NRC suggested surveillance to verify proper throttle valve stop position.

For all of the reasons stated above this change request -is respcnsive to the NRC's request and does not represent a threat to the health and safety of the public.

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452 DU.RGENCY CCRE CCOLI!!G SYSTE4 Applicability Applies to periodic testing requirement for emergency core cooling systems.

Objective To verify that the emergency core cooling systems are operable.

Soecification h.5 2.1 Hich Pressure Injection

a. During each refueling interval and following =aintenance or =odification that affects system flow characteristics, system pu=ps and system high point vents shall be vented, and a systes test shall be conducted to demonstrate that the syste= is operable.

After a satisfactory test of the emergency loading sequence (h.5.1),

the M. U. Pump and its required supporting auxiliaries vill be started manually by the operator and a test signal vill be applied to the high pressure injection valves MU-V-16A, 3, C, D to de=onstrate actuation of the high pressure injection system for emergency core cooling operation.

b. The test vill be considered satisfactory if the valves have ccepleted their travel and the M. U. pu=ps are running as evidenced by the control board ccupenent operating lights. !Eni=us acceptable flow must be greater than or equal to 200 gp= per injection leg and greater than or equal to 500 gym per HPI p'ap.

c. The correct limit switch setting of MU-V-16A, 3, C, D will be verified within four hours of any maintenance on the valve or operator that affects the limit switch setting, when the High Pressure Injection System is required to be operable.

h.5 2.2 Lev Pressure Injection

a. During each refueling period and following maintenance or modificatien that affects system flow characteristics, system pumps and high point vents shall be vented, and a system test shall be conducted to demonstrate that the system is operable. The auxiliaries required for low pressure injection are all included in the emergency loading sequence specified in h.5 1.

b. The test will be considered satisfactory if the decay heat pumps listed in 4.51.lb have been successfully started and the decay heat injection valves and the decay heat supply valves have completed their travel as evidenced by the control board component operating lights. Minimum acceptable flow must be greater than or equal to 2700 gpm per injection leg /LPI pump.

1583 357 h hi

c. The correct position of DH-V-19A/B shall be verified within four

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hours of each valve stroking operation or valve maintenance, which affects the position indicator, when the Decay Heat System is required to be operable.

h.5.2.3 Core Flooding

a. During each refueling period, a system test shall be conducted to demonstrate proper operation of the system. During depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System, verification shall be made that the check and isolation valves in the core flooding tank discharge lines operate properly.

b. The test vill be considered satisfactory if control board indication of core flood tank level verifies that all valves have opened.

h.5 2.h Comronent Tests

a. At intervals not to exceed 3 months, the components required for emergency core cooling vill be tested.

b. The test will be considered satisfactory if the pumps and fans have been successfully started and the valves have completed their travel as evidenced by the control board component operating lights, and either the station computer or pressure / flow indication.

Bases The emergency core cooling systems are the principal reactor safety features in the event of a loss of coolant accident. The removal of heat from the core provided by these systems is designed to limit core denage.

The low pressure injection pumps are tested singularly for operability by opening the borated water storage tank outlet valves and the bypass valves in the borated water storage tank fill line. This allows water to be pumped from the borated water storage tank through each of the injection lines and back to the tank.

The minimum acceptable EPI /LPI flow assures proper flow and flow split between injection legs. Post maintenance inspection of the HPI/LPI injection valves l vill assure their correct throttled position in the event of Engineered Safeguards; I

actuation.

With the reactor shutdown, the valves in each core flooding line are checked for operability by reducing the reactor coolant system pressure until the indicated level in the core ficod tanks verify that the check and isolation valves have opened.

Reference (1) FSAR, Section 6.

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