ML20024E365

New Contentions Re Spent Fuel Cask Safety.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20024E365
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	08/04/1983
From:	Eddleman W EDDLEMAN, W.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20024E334	List: ML20024E333 ML20024E340 ML20024E360 ML20024E365
References
82-468-01-OL, 82-468-1-OL, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8308100290
Download: ML20024E365 (9)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA August 4,1983 NUCLEAR BEGULATORY COMMISSION f arcttrra 3-BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAED s Glenn O. Bri D Dr. James H.ght Carpenter

@ 3 7903 > ;sc James L. Kelley, Chairman #

\'9d styj,C9tivy ,, g tclf,"f

. Pcrt In the Matter of wr yc '"

Dockets 50 400 OL CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO. et al. ) 50-401 OL (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 ar:12) ) ASLBP No. 82-h68-01

) OL New Contentions re Spent Fuel Cask Safety

(& 5 factors for each) by Wells Eddle-an Following the breakdown of settlenent negotiations on Contention 6hf on 7-29-83, Applicants' attorney O'Neill informs me that there is nothing to preclude my bringing basis matters of the following contentions before the Board. I reasonably i

l believed that a condition of the negotiations erecluded my doing l

l so earlier. This is discussed under the 5 factors. O'Neill has a different view as I now understand it, but I was only apprised of this 7/29 to the best of my recollection. I'll let him speak to that.

CONTENTION 164 Applicants and NRC Staff have not denonstrated that shipment of failed fuel (fuel that is spent, and also has leaks in the cladding) would not release unaccentable amounts of uraniun 0 0:

$N aerosols and other radioactive materials during an accident. The l 88 use of a rupture disk (an all-or-nothing device that cannot reseal) gg O

@g conpounds this risk. The health and safety of the public is Nu 0 insufficiently protected during soent fuel shionents to or from m

gg Harris if this situation is not nrevented from occurring.

ma.o BASIS: PATRAM '80, pp 646-653, details the nroduction of

uranium aerosols possibly including U 0 and U O g as well as UO2 '

7 and release of Ce-lhh, Ru-106, Cs-13h, Cs-137 and actinides, from a shipning cask containing failed PWR fuel (oxidation inside cask, aerosolization, see at 6h8-649). These are released as finely divided particulates (see 653,650, etc).

A letter from Battelle Colunbus Laboratories (Ad Hoc Comnittee to D.A. McKown, 5-19-80) describes the release of a " blackish cloud" from the cask that obscured visibility (underwater), and the release of an aerosol from the pool in which the cask was opened (despite its being opened underwater). This last event casts doubt on the idea that uraniu aerosols and other . radioactive materials would be entrained even by solid water; atmospheric release is a virtual certainty if the cask is breached.

As to the extraordinary radiotoxicity of uraniun aerosols and airborne carticulates of radioactive naterial, see e.g. Gofnan, Radiation and Hunan Health, 1981, 564-5, h92, h 88 -90. 509 , 56h , h41 -492 ,

and chapters 12-18 of the book which give background to the detailed cancer-dose estinates for lung cancer fr. rom inhaled nawticles, especially transuranics and uranium.

According tc the Battelle letter cited above, the est?-Ated decay heat for the assembly involved in nro lucing aerosols was 3 1kW (about 10,500 BTU ner hour 3. Annlicants, interrogatory resronses on 6hf, 5-27-83 at 13, say their cask can handle 40,000 BTU per hour. The Battelle letter (p.2) says that "The nature of the (aerosol release) incident could have widespread implications about dry shipments of fuel ..."

Applicants' use of a ruuture disk (they now say they are going to do that for sure, 7/29 interrogatory res-onse to 6h-lh(a),

at-page 10, compounds these troblems, for a rupture disk nay

fail in transit (and then cannot be reclosed), e.g. in a fire or crash, releasing radioactive aerosols to the environnent.

Dr. Marvin Resnikoff in The Next Nuclear Ganble (1983) 263-4,265-72, (See p. 165 re failure of rupture disks in fire) docunents these risks as exceeding URC estimates.

CP&L',has had, substan,tf al amounts of failed, fuel at Brunswick l

which they may seek to ship to Harris.

There are no restrictions in CP&L's orcrosed license (allowing possession of spent fuel at Harris) on the amount of failed fuel that may be stored at Harris. If it can be stored there, then it can be shipned there. Thus, if CP&L ships any snent fuel to Harris at all, failed fuel nay be included. I an not aware of any CP&L position against shipning failed fuel to Harris.

The abcve also applies to failed fuel fron the Robinson reactor.

Although P',fR fuel (like Robinson's) was oxidized in the incident referred to above, there is no indication it can't happen with l

B'da fuel (see PATRAM '80 at 652, " FINDINGS", "the source terr.

l was particulate spent fuel material released fron the f ailed rods.

1 i Such carticulate matter was Generated either by the normal cracking l

i of fuel cellets during overstion,"(or by heat in transit, "e-oxidation).

See aise Battelle letter (supra) at 2, " Alternative exnlanatiens for the release of uraniun oxide powder from the pins are that it fell l

out of breaches in the cladding as the result of vibrations during shipnent, or was spalled off the fuel surface as the result of quenching with water during cooldown orier to unloading the cask."

The vibration, crack, and normal cracking during oneration methods of uraniun oxide aerosol / particulate release surely arnly to BWR fuel i

(they logically apoly to all fuel assemblies with pellets and cladding). Possibly the other methods, heat & quenching, would annly.

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CONTENTION 165: Anplicants and NnC Staf* have not demenstrated that in the event of (1) a fire during shipnent of snent fuel, or (ii) a crash of the cask in transit, that uraniun aerosols and other radioactive naterials including Cs-134 and -137, Ru-106, Ce-lhh and actinide oxides, will not be released to the environment.

With a rupture disk in niace, once release starts it cannot be readily stopped, narticularly under fire conditions but also during regular accident conditions. Persons ecuinned to go into a radmioactive release to reseal the cask are not available in many towns along CF&L's rail routes to Harris.

BAS 75: Sane as for 164 (incornorated here by reference, no use retyping it as it's innediately above for easy reference).

Towns lacking nrenaredness: NC o a diation Protection Section has stated that only Greensboro in NC is now equinned to deal with a nuclear transnort accident. Greensboro is cutside CP&L's service area.

$ factors (the sane for contentions 16h and 165):

Good cause for failure to file on tine: I understand CP&L has still not completed changing its cask valve to a rupture disk.

Prior to this acticn (which they annear to connit to as of 7/29, see resnonse to Interrogatory 1h(a) on Eddlenan 6hr, 7-29-83 at 10) they could readily have sought denial of such a contention for nootness. In addid on, I understood directly from Apnlicants that a condition of our negotiations on 6hf was that I not bring certain facts before the Board; one such fact was the runture disk being planned to be used. Annlicants' counsel 7-29 says this fact is in the public donain and I can use it. I also thought it not prudent to file such a contention during negotiations for fear of upsetting the negotiations.

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Now that negotiations have terminated unsuccessfully (7-29) I am filing these cententions as nromptly as nracticable. In light of Anplicants' changing the basis of Eddleman 6hr, I think it reasonable to allow me an opportunity to file new or amended contentions in the light of this change in spent fuel shipment equipment. As noted above, an earlier filing re the ruuture disk could have brought the renly, "We have no definite plans to use a rupture disk"(or, "We 're not using a runture disk now"), "so your contention has no basis and is noot, speculative, renote."

These contentions will not broaden the issues, since the safety of snent fuel shipnents and radioactive releases to atmosphere therefrom in accidents or fireshave been issues from the begir.ning (in Eddleman 64f). In any case, the broadening is not significant, as the basic rroblen (atmospheric release of radioactivity from a spent fuel shinnent) is the same, and the basic causes (Bilure of sealing) are the sane.

These contentions cannot delay the croceed?.ng because they are safety contentions and discovery doesn't open on safety cententions until about 5 nonths fren now (early 1984).

There are no other parties pursuing contentions on snent fuel safety that I an aware of. There are no other means to nrotect ny interest in these matters: Annlicants won't do it, Staff (resnonse to interrogatories at 71,77, June '83) does not agree with .

64f. There can be no hearing on these issues without a contention.

I believe my discovery on 6hf does show that I have the ability to help develop a sound record on these issues. I understand the technical aspects of heat and nressure and have worked on industrial sealing systens. I can do technical cross-examination.

I have access to information about snent fuel cask design & analysis.

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To the extent that the tinaliness factor above nay weigh against adnission of either Eddleman 16h or 165, I argue that the need for a sound record offsets that weight (when considered in conjunction with the other 3 factors, n.5 above, which favor admission of both).

There can be no sound reco*d on the question of svent cuel accidents without a contention. I can assist in develoning that "ecord. (see above)

These accidents can have severe impact (see Resnikoff, Next Nuclear Ganble, Chapter 6; Sandia study referenced in Eddlenan 6hf). This possible severe impact on nublic health and safety (and also on property and troperty values -- uranium aerosols are awfully hand to clean up) is reason for more detailed exanination of the issues of snent fuel transnort safety. The use of a "unture disk which cannot be r8 closed conclicates these problems. At least with a valve the uroblen was that it night not reseat, or could have connonents telt. A rupture disk will ructure (see 9esnikoff at 165, TNL study cited therein). That leads to great risk to the public, and that risk should be examined in this proceeding (unless Apulicants withdvaw their annlication to store svent large fuel from other nlants ut Harris) . The amount cf fa*1ed fuel Apelicants have at Bnunswick, and their apnarent intent to ship fuel, failed or not, plus the existence of failed fuel at Robinson, are additional reasons why the scenarios of Eddlenan 164 and 165 are credible and these issues should be examined.

. CONTENTION 166: The IF-300 spent fuel cask (which Applicants use for spent fuel shipnents) has a basket that cannot assure that suent fuel contained in it will not exnerience nuclear criticality (self-sustaining nuclear chain react'on) under all conditions. Use of the cask with this problem is unaccentable for the protection of nublic health and safety.

3 ASIS: Resnikoff, Next Nuclear Ganble, p.16k, footnote.

Applicants state they only use the IF-300, 5-27-83 answers to W.E. interrogatories; it 's the only scent fuel cask they have.

re " sound reco"d".

Additional basis 5 factors: is below,ikoff The Resn study just becane available as urinted (I have never nossessed a cory of any draft of it) and I received it in nid-July. I filed as cronntly as nossible once I got the information. This is the good cause #cr failuwe to file on tine; additionally, the info on which this contention is based did not exist 5-lh-82 and was unavailable to ne until I got the Resnikoff book. I didn't know it otherwise existed.

TheThis use contention of a ruuture disk (new basis) didn't exist 5-lh-62 either.

will broaden the issues, in the sense that a6cidental criticality in the spent fuel pool (Eddlenan and Wilson contentions) had been ruled out of the nroceeding nreviously.

This issue (criticality in snent fuel casks) had net been adnitted before.

It will not delay the proceeding. It is a safety contention, i.e.

on which discovery would not beei ng for some 5 nonths, until 1984 I know of no other parties pursuing this issue. Thus, no other narties can be exnected to renresent ny interests.

I know of no other neans than having a contention in which ny interest in this natter will be urotected.

I can assist in develoning a sound record on this issue, first by having the contention (withcut which there is no reco-d on this issue),

and also by conducting technical cross-exanination, discovery, and possibly by nroducing a witness or witnesses. The issue is an incortant one because criticality in snent fuel is a beyond-design-basis accident for spent fuel casks and could have large radiological consecuences and do great damage. Direct radiati_on from the criticality wculd be a risk,

but the great energy released by criticality, and fornation of fission products, increased nressure in old fuel rods (which may have failed in the reactor or in storage nrior to shionent, or during shinnent, e.g. in an accident whichhelus cause accidental criticality), and potential to rupture the ruptu"e disk on the CP&L cask (which cannot then be resealed).

The notential cf such events for harm to the public health and safety is good cause for them to be investigated in this proceeding. I an not aware of any other nroceeding where they are being adjudicated before N90 at oresent.

CP&L's use of c rupture disk means that the accident would be alnost incossible to control once the disk were ruptured.

Because of these serious consequences, any negative weight of tinely filing and broadening of issues is outweighed when all 5 factorn (inziuding those discussed p.7 above) are considered.

UCTE: I understand that Arnlicants' counsel 0 "Teill, who hns been dealing with these irsues, will not be available until about August 15 I will not ornose a reasonable extension of time for response by Ap"licants to these contentions, due to his absence. The Staff can have as nuch t!me as the App 14. cants Eet, so far a s I'm concerned. If any rarty wants nore time, over this, please ask ne; on these contentions I an likely to agree.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA O NUCLTAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION /pg /

In the matter of CAROLIKA POWER & LIGHT CO. Et al. /4 geAs 50 ell o Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 }lp a 56401.,6.L. ,. <

. O 'l' CERTIFICATE 0F SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of MOTOM 70 lbMPEL D 'S C6M'

@C 4 i +6F), l[Nb OF RESfCnsE To wrhRo6Hnces by '15 f Dlgy USM) @gTCNno* LC ff gf[gf fyD_

p pib OP HAVE been served this 4% day of A uS&Sr 198],bydepositin the US Mail, first-class postage prepaid, upon all parties whose names are listed below, except those whose nanes are parked with an asterisk, for whom service was acconplished by

+ fubiG YSfpf -4 C} Scwila o iv ik & ,ta k o v a t> ,9 v.e 5 , y '

(Dochdwg ' SerWe Shl! Sef S 3 Qf &)

Y Judges James Kelley, Glenn Bright and James Carpenter (1 copy each)

Atomic Safety and Licensire Board US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washin6 ton DC 20555 i

George F. Trowbridge (attorney for Applicants)

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge @ R uthanne G. Miller 1800 M St. 274 ASLB Panel Washington, DC 20036 USNRC Washington DC 2055 5

,P0ffice of the Executive Legal Directer Phyllis Lotchin, Ph.D.

Attn Docke ts 50-!+00/401 0.L. 106 Bridle Run USNRC Chanel Hill NC 2751h Washington DC 20555 Dan Read Docketing and Service 3ection (3x) CEAUGE/FLP Attn Docke ts 50-1400/h01 0.L. Raleigh,7707 NCWaveross l

Office of the Secretary 27606

""* Li"d* "' Littl*

Na$$natonDe 20555 Governor's Waste Mgt. Bd.

513 Albemarle Bldg.-

John Runkle Karen E. Long 325 N. Salisbuiv St.

CCNC Box 991 Raleigh, NC 27611 307 Granville Rd Raleigh NC 27602 #sradley w. Jones

! Chapel Hill Ne 2751h.

USNRC Region II i ' Travi s Payne 101 Marietta St.

l Edelstein & Payne Atlanta GA 30303 l Box 12601 i Raleigh NC 27605 Richard Wilson, M.D. Certified by h 729 Hunter St.

Apex NC 27502 1

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