ML19253C324

LER 79-093/03X-1:on 791021,during Normal Operation,Routine Computer Printout Indicated Core Max Fraction of Limiting Power Density Was 1.003 Over Tech Spec Limit.Power Reduced 2%.Control Rod Pattern Adjusted.Cause Not Reported

ML19253C324
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	11/28/1979
From:	W. Verne Childs POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19253C319	List: ML19253C318 ML19253C324
References
LER-79-093-03X, LER-79-93-3X, NUDOCS 7911300516
Download: ML19253C324 (2)

Text

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POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333

_ ATTACHMENT TO LER 79-093/03X-1 Page 1 of 1 During normal operation, Operations personnel noted that a routine computer print out of the core performance log indicated that the Core Maximum Fraction of Limiting Power Density (CMFLPD) was 1.003 compared J to a Tecimical Specification limit of equal to or less than i.000.

Reactor power was immediately reduced approximately 2% in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specifications, Appendix A, Paragraph

3. 5. I, This action restored CMFL.PD to within the limits of Technical Specifications within the time frame allowed and is considered to be equivalent to operation in a degraded mode.

Following the initial power reduction, the core performance log was again demanded from the plant's process computer and revealed that CMFLPD was within speci ficat ions. Control rod pattern adjustments were made and approximately two hours later, power was restored to between 99 and 100%

of rated power. A core performance log demanded following the power increase revealed that CMFLPD was with speci fications.

Z.Z~.11 The event did not represent a significant hazard to the public health and safety.

NOTE: LER 79-083 is a related event and Revision 1 of this LER is submitted to correct the Technical Specification Paragraph reference above.

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0 Wisconsin Electnc mcoum 231 W. MICHIGAN. P.O. BOX 2046. MILWAUKEE, WI 53201 November 16, 1979 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention : Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #1 Gentlenen:

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301

-LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER EVENTS POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT Your letter dated October 1,1979 requested that we provide you with information concerning the loss of offsite power which occurred at Point Beach on October 13, 1973 and any other loss of offsite power events. There have been a total of four loss of offsite power events at Point Beach. The following details are provided in response to your request for information:

A. PARTIAL LOSSES OF 0FFSITE PGWER

1. Date: April 13,1971 Event: Loss of normal offsite supply to bus lA05.

Cause: Wiring error on relay test switch prevented blocking of undervoltage trip while relay was being tested.

Results: Diesel generator 3D started and picked up bus lA05.

No other offsite power supplies were affected.

There were no voltage or frequency problems.

Normal power supply was restored a short time later. There was no effect on the unit since it was shut down at the time.

B. TOTAL LOSSES OF 0FFSITE P0.WER

1. Date: February 5,1971 Event: Loss of all offsite power and all transmission lines.

Cause: Major ice storm and improper relay operation.

Results: All transmission lines were lost and differential lockout relays on transformers 1X03,1X04 and 2X04 tripped. Both diesel generators started and picked f up the safeguards loads on Unit I which was not on ]

9' D 144t 199 7911300 5/3

.M Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director November 16, 1979 B. TOTAL LOSSES OF 0FFSITE POWER - continued

1. Results: line at the time. One bus on Unit 2 was not picked up because a control power fuse had blown.

Unit 2 was not licensed yet and no fuel had been loaded. The restoration of offsite power to the plant was delayed by the need to evaluate gas saales from the transformers which had locked

c. The outage lasted for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and 22 t.nutes. There were no voltage or frequency problems.

2. Date: October 13, 1973 Event: Loss of all offsite power to safeguards buses.

Cause: A lightning mast failed and fell on transformer 2X03 while transformer 1X03 and the gas turbine generator wem temporarily out of service.

Results : The diesel generators started and supplied power to the safeguards buses of both units. Unit 1 was in hot shutdown and Unit 2 did not trip. The gas turbine generator was returned to service 55 minutes after the event and supplied offsite power to both units for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 30 minutes. At th 4t time transformer 1X03 was returned to service. There were no voltage or frequency problems.

3. Date: April 27,1974 Event: Loss of all offsite power to Unit 1.

Cause: A wire lifted in the switchyard control house during a relay modification initiated a breaker failure scheme which isolated 345kV bus section 1.

Results: The isolation of B.S.1 removed the power supply to transfomer 1X03, the Unit 1 high voltage station auxiliary. A fast transfer took place on the 13.8kV bus which would have restored the offsite power to Unit 1, but the 4kV bus under-voltage relays operated before the transfer.

These undervoltage relays trip the connections to offsite power and start the diesel generators.

The buses which were now being supplied by the diesel generators were synchronized to the off-site power supply almost innediately by the operator and the system was returned to nomal.

There wem no unit trips, nor were there any voltage or frequency problems.

Very truly yours, C. W. Fay, Director Nuclear Power Department 1444 100

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