ML19323G656

LER 80-017/01T-0:on 800516,while Performing Control Rod Interference checks,green-green Rod Position Indication Remained Illuminated While Withdrawing Rod 10-23.Caused by Operator & Procedure in Bypass & Component Failure

ML19323G656
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	05/30/1980
From:	Ross D JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19323G651	List: ML19323G650 ML19323G656
References
LER-80-017-01T, LER-80-17-1T, NUDOCS 8006060424
Download: ML19323G656 (3)

Text

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61 DGC*t ET NU'/S E r. 62 63 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT oEsCmPTioN AND PRcBASLE CoNSEcuENCES h l o l 21 l On May 16,1980, while performing control rod interference checks, operators noticed l the " Green-Green" rod position indication remained lighted while withdrawing rod l

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[ o j .s ] l 10-23. Investigation revealed that the one rod interlock bypass jumpers for rods j

lo tel i 10-23 and 14-15 had not been removed af ter replacement of these control blades and lo is t [ prior to insertion of the rods for subsequent fuel loading. The same indication was l l

ll o l 71 i found for rod 06-19 but a stuck reed switch on the position probe was the cause.

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li l o l I Cause of the occurrence was attributed to both ooera_tpr and crocedure in the byoass I The bypass li li] [ of two control rod interlocks. The third was due to component failure.

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tig7, j jumpers were removed and the position probe was replaced. Action was taken to Fn Tl I strengthen procedural controls. In addition, an evaluation is being made by GORB to j I

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J f/.c" s*0v.n New JPHf 079E0 201 539 6111 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION For,ed k River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-17/1T_

P2 port Date_ ,

Report Date - May 30, 1980 Occurrence Date_

May 16,1980 l

Identification of Occurrence Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.9.F.1. Refueling interlocks associated with the withdrawal of two control rods were bypassed while fuel assemblies were in each fuel cell surrounding the rods. Additiorally, as CRD interference checks were continued, a third rod was discovered with a faulty position probe which bypassed its interlock.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined '.i a Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a(6).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was shutdown for a refueling /caintei.6nce outage.

Description of Occurrence On May 16,1980 at approximately 0130 hours0.0015 days <br />0.0361 hours <br />2.149471e-4 weeks <br />4.9465e-5 months <br />, while performing c>ntrol rod interference checks, it was noticed that the " Green-Green" rod position idication remained illuminated while withdrawing rod 10-23. An im;iediate investisation revealed that the one rod interlock bypass jumpers for control rods 10-23 and 14-15 had not been removed after the replacement of the respective control blades and prior to insertion of the rods for subsequent fuel loading of nach of the two associated control cells. Failure to remove the bypass jumpera made it possible to withdraw three control rods while in the refueling mode. T:lis condition existed since approximately 0200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> on February 18, 1980. On the same day, as control rod interference checks were continued, control rom 06-19 displayed the same indication as the other two rods while being withdraz n. The rod was inserted and an administrative rod block was initialed. Upon investigation it was discovered that the " Green-Green" reed switch on the position indication probe was stuck closed.

An investigation of the event was conducted by the Operating Experience Assessment Committee. The investigation revealed that procedural steps associated with the removal of the bypass jumpers for each of the associated control rods was incorrectly

" signed off" as being completed. A review of other refueling documentation also revealed that many required signatures were missing.from procedural " sign-off

-sheets".

ID3MINM IAGMr of the General Pubhc Umes Sys:em

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Fepcrtable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-17/1T -

Report Date - P,ay 30, 1980  !

Apparent Cause of Occurrence _

Cause of the occurrence was attributed to both the operator and the procedure in the case of two (2) control rod interlocks being bypassed. The third was due to component failure. I Malysis of Occurrence Although partial administrative ccntrol was lost, the procedure was designed so i that indeperident checks of rod insertion prior to cell loading was accomplished.

Even though individual refueling interlocks were bypassed, these additional 2 levels of verification required by the procedure assured that no fuel was loaded into a fuel cell unless the control rod was fully inserted. A review of the .

Centrol Room log, control rod position log, and control cell verification surveill-1 ance was conducted. The review verified that the control rods of concern were fully inserted prior to the reloading of their control cells and remained inserted throughout the remainder of the fuel reload period.

l I Corrective Action Immediately after discovery, the bypass jumpers were removed and all control rod position panels were inspected to insure no other bypass jumpers were installed.

The position probe for control rod 06-19 was replaced. Additionally, immediate correction action has been taken to strengthen procedural controls. These actions are as follows:

1. A memorandum has been sent to all operation department personnel with copies to all department heads clearly stating management's requirement for strict procedural adherence

2. The Acting Sup3rvisor of Station Operations discussed the event and the requirements for strict procedural adherence with all Operations Shift Supervisors. In the discussion, the requirement of insuring proper completion of all documents entering or existing in the control 1

room was stressed.

3. The Supervisor of Station Operations will assure of the review of all Operation's Department documentation. (It should be noted that this has been done in the past; however, the worksheets associated with control cell unloading and relaoding were not required to follow the normal review chain). In the future all documentation requiring signatures or initials will be reviewed by a cognizant operations' staff member.

The incident has been reviewed by the Operating Experience Assessment Committee and the General Office Review Board. The recommendations of both committees are currently being evaluated. The results of the evaluation will determine appropriate long term corrective actions.

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