ML19332F775: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:g . - . ~ _ | {{#Wiki_filter:g . - . ~ _ | ||
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10 CFR 50e73 q , | 10 CFR 50e73 q , | ||
; | ; | ||
ra PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY i i | ra PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY i i | ||
LIMERICK GENER ATING SYATION P.O. BOX A | LIMERICK GENER ATING SYATION P.O. BOX A | ||
Line 28: | Line 25: | ||
. (215) 3271200 smt. 2000 | . (215) 3271200 smt. 2000 | ||
: u. s. u.co uicx. u., e.c. December 11, 1989 u-...7".'."."."',*,.".u,. Docket No. 50-353 : | : u. s. u.co uicx. u., e.c. December 11, 1989 u-...7".'."."."',*,.".u,. Docket No. 50-353 : | ||
License No. NPF-85 | License No. NPF-85 U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control ~ Desk- ' | ||
U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control ~ Desk- ' | |||
Washington, DC 20555 | Washington, DC 20555 | ||
-SUBJFCT: Licensee Event Report Limerick Generating Station - Unit 2 | -SUBJFCT: Licensee Event Report Limerick Generating Station - Unit 2 This LER. reports the leakage of a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system safety relief valve which caused the Regenerative | ||
This LER. reports the leakage of a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system safety relief valve which caused the Regenerative | |||
' Heat Exchanger room temperature to increase. This resulted in an , | ' Heat Exchanger room temperature to increase. This resulted in an , | ||
isolation of the RWCU system due to a Nuclear Steam Supply l | isolation of the RWCU system due to a Nuclear Steam Supply l | ||
Line 41: | Line 34: | ||
==Reference:== | ==Reference:== | ||
Docket No. 50-353 a L .ReportLNumber: 2-89-012 j L Revision ~ Number: 00 g | Docket No. 50-353 a L .ReportLNumber: 2-89-012 j L Revision ~ Number: 00 g Event.Date: November 10, 1989 Report Date: December 11, 1989 Facility: Limerick Generating Station 1 P.O. Box A, Sanatoga, PA 19464 This LER is.being submitted pursuant to the requirements of | ||
Event.Date: November 10, 1989 Report Date: December 11, 1989 Facility: Limerick Generating Station 1 P.O. Box A, Sanatoga, PA 19464 This LER is.being submitted pursuant to the requirements of | |||
:10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) . ) | :10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) . ) | ||
l l | l l | ||
Very truly yours, | Very truly yours, | ||
\ , | \ , | ||
c CCE: kap cc: W. T. Russell, Administrator, Region I, USNRC T. J. Kenny, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, LGS 8912190003 891211 PDR ADOCK 03000353 i 1 | c CCE: kap cc: W. T. Russell, Administrator, Region I, USNRC T. J. Kenny, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, LGS 8912190003 891211 PDR ADOCK 03000353 i 1 | ||
.J S ._. - _. FlD_C _ , _, __ | .J S ._. - _. FlD_C _ , _, __ | ||
a. | a. | ||
aseC Po,m att U 5. I"1ACLEA2 f.tiULATOAY COMMi&SION AP7CCygp OMS NO 3194 0104 | aseC Po,m att U 5. I"1ACLEA2 f.tiULATOAY COMMi&SION AP7CCygp OMS NO 3194 0104 | ||
, LICENSEE EVFNT REPORT (LER) '"''~ "" 'l 2' S | , LICENSEE EVFNT REPORT (LER) '"''~ "" 'l 2' S P ACILITY NAME til DOCKtY NUMeth 12) P A G8 '3' Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2 0 ls l0 [0 l0l 3 51 1 3 1 loFl 0 l 6 flTLE Idi e age of a Reactor Water leanup Safetv e alve Caused a Nuclear Steam Suppl utoff System Isolation etuation(R ating th ystem SVENT DAf t (53 LtR NUMstR 46) SitPORY DATE 171 OTHER P ActLifies INVOLVtO IS) | ||
P ACILITY NAME til DOCKtY NUMeth 12) P A G8 '3' Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2 0 ls l0 [0 l0l 3 51 1 3 1 loFl 0 l 6 flTLE Idi e age of a Reactor Water leanup Safetv e alve Caused a Nuclear Steam Suppl utoff System Isolation etuation(R ating th ystem SVENT DAf t (53 LtR NUMstR 46) SitPORY DATE 171 OTHER P ActLifies INVOLVtO IS) | |||
YtAR 'Ak OAv P Acitity NAwls DOCnti NUustR,si MONTH DAY YEAR - | YtAR 'Ak OAv P Acitity NAwls DOCnti NUustR,si MONTH DAY YEAR - | ||
8 8,Q , Qv,se MONTM vtAR 0(510l0l0l l l | 8 8,Q , Qv,se MONTM vtAR 0(510l0l0l l l | ||
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1l1 1l 0 8 9 8l9 0l1 l2 0l0 1 l2 1l1 8l9 0t5iOIOt0ill TMit REPORT IS BusMITTED PURSUANT TO TME REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CPR $:Ich.ca one er more et ene fonearm,) 111) 08006 W 20 402M 20 406tel X 90.73ieH2Hevi 73.71161 | 1l1 1l 0 8 9 8l9 0l1 l2 0l0 1 l2 1l1 8l9 0t5iOIOt0ill TMit REPORT IS BusMITTED PURSUANT TO TME REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CPR $:Ich.ca one er more et ene fonearm,) 111) 08006 W 20 402M 20 406tel X 90.73ieH2Hevi 73.71161 POWSR te.408teH1HQ 00.36teH1) to.73t.H2Het 73.71tsi | ||
POWSR te.408teH1HQ 00.36teH1) to.73t.H2Het 73.71tsi | |||
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20 40thW1Hivl 50.73teH2 Hill go.734.H2Hv4HHet | 20 40thW1Hivl 50.73teH2 Hill go.734.H2Hv4HHet | ||
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.. 'Y? YMg: : M.40s hm HW 50.73hH2 %l | .. 'Y? YMg: : M.40s hm HW 50.73hH2 %l 00.7hM2Hd LICINSit CONTACT ,OR THl3 LIR 4121 N&Mt TELt#MONE NUM98R ARIA CODE C. R. Endriss, Regulatory Engineer, Limerick Generating Stacion 21 115 3 l 2l 71-l 1 I 21010 l COMPLEf t ONE LING FOR LACH COMPONENT P AILURE Ot9CRISED IN THIS REPORT ttal M^N '' | ||
00.7hM2Hd LICINSit CONTACT ,OR THl3 LIR 4121 N&Mt TELt#MONE NUM98R ARIA CODE C. R. Endriss, Regulatory Engineer, Limerick Generating Stacion 21 115 3 l 2l 71-l 1 I 21010 l COMPLEf t ONE LING FOR LACH COMPONENT P AILURE Ot9CRISED IN THIS REPORT ttal M^N '' | |||
CAust sysitM COMPON E NT MC- "EC"*'$'' | CAust sysitM COMPON E NT MC- "EC"*'$'' | ||
, [ cAust sysTIM cOMPONtNT "',y,'C' Rfn0R,T,Agt ' | , [ cAust sysTIM cOMPONtNT "',y,'C' Rfn0R,T,Agt ' | ||
s-s X Cl E I I RlV Ll2l6 l5 N i i ; ; i ; s t | s-s X Cl E I I RlV Ll2l6 l5 N i i ; ; i ; s t s | ||
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I I I I I I l I l I l 1 I I ' > | I I I I I I l I l I l 1 I I ' > | ||
Line 90: | Line 69: | ||
-determining that the RWCU isolation was due to steam leakage from the RHX tube side safety relief valve (PSV-44-209 - Lonergan Model D72G). The RWCU system remained isolated following the investigation until PSV-44-209 was removed and a blank flange was installed under a temporary circuit alteration. The RWCU system was returned to service on November 12, at 1350 hours, after being isolated for approximately 55 hours. As a result of this event and other similar RWCU isolations, a re-evaluation of the potential failure mechanisms of the safety relief valve is being performed. As part of this evaluation, a different model relief valve has been installed on the RWCU system replacing PSV-44-209. | -determining that the RWCU isolation was due to steam leakage from the RHX tube side safety relief valve (PSV-44-209 - Lonergan Model D72G). The RWCU system remained isolated following the investigation until PSV-44-209 was removed and a blank flange was installed under a temporary circuit alteration. The RWCU system was returned to service on November 12, at 1350 hours, after being isolated for approximately 55 hours. As a result of this event and other similar RWCU isolations, a re-evaluation of the potential failure mechanisms of the safety relief valve is being performed. As part of this evaluation, a different model relief valve has been installed on the RWCU system replacing PSV-44-209. | ||
gR4,.m m. - | gR4,.m m. - | ||
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( nc P.ea. assa . U.s. hucktAR Klautatoav CouutssioN | ( nc P.ea. assa . U.s. hucktAR Klautatoav CouutssioN | ||
* amovgo ome =o adoio4 | |||
amovgo ome =o adoio4 | , LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION ' | ||
, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT | |||
(LER) TEXT CONTINUATION ' | |||
EXPint8 8'3i 45 i Pacittiv haut m doca.tf Nuusin m ten huusta tes FAQt tai . | EXPint8 8'3i 45 i Pacittiv haut m doca.tf Nuusin m ten huusta tes FAQt tai . | ||
,,.. ..w.u... .. . e Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2 o l5 l0 jo jo l 3l5 l3 8l 9 - | ,,.. ..w.u... .. . e Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2 o l5 l0 jo jo l 3l5 l3 8l 9 - | ||
0l1[2 - | 0l1[2 - | ||
Line 122: | Line 90: | ||
'(NSSSS)((EIIS:JM) isolation actuation, an Engineered Safety . | '(NSSSS)((EIIS:JM) isolation actuation, an Engineered Safety . | ||
a Feature (ESP), from a Steam Leakage Detection (SLD) (EIIS IJ) . y' isolation signal. | a Feature (ESP), from a Steam Leakage Detection (SLD) (EIIS IJ) . y' isolation signal. | ||
Operations personnel were placing the 2A RWCU Filter /Demineralizer (F/D) (EIIS FDM) into service per System ' | Operations personnel were placing the 2A RWCU Filter /Demineralizer (F/D) (EIIS FDM) into service per System ' | ||
; Procedure-S45,l'.B " Placing RWCU Filter /Demineralizer in Service," | ; Procedure-S45,l'.B " Placing RWCU Filter /Demineralizer in Service," | ||
4 RWCU' flow-oscillations occurred. The F/D inlet valve (EIIS:V) ' | 4 RWCU' flow-oscillations occurred. The F/D inlet valve (EIIS:V) ' | ||
was open and the F/D was pressurized to approximately 1100 psig | was open and the F/D was pressurized to approximately 1100 psig | ||
((see Figure 1).- When the F/D discharge valve (EIIS:FCV) was | ((see Figure 1).- When the F/D discharge valve (EIIS:FCV) was | ||
; opened, to place the F/D in service, the "RWCU High Differential Flow Isolation Timer Initiated" annunciator (EIIS: ANN) alarmed, | ; opened, to place the F/D in service, the "RWCU High Differential Flow Isolation Timer Initiated" annunciator (EIIS: ANN) alarmed, and' cleared, several times. A System Engineer (SE).was | ||
and' cleared, several times. A System Engineer (SE).was | |||
"~ | "~ | ||
, : dispatched-to the Auxiliary Equipment room to observe the RWCU differential flow instrumentation (EIIS:FFI).. The SE observed i flowloscillations on'the instrumentation from 30 gpm to 100 gpm. | , : dispatched-to the Auxiliary Equipment room to observe the RWCU differential flow instrumentation (EIIS:FFI).. The SE observed i flowloscillations on'the instrumentation from 30 gpm to 100 gpm. | ||
Whil'e the SE was attempting to relay this information to the Main j Control Room operators, an isolation of the RWCU system occurred, -1 | Whil'e the SE was attempting to relay this information to the Main j Control Room operators, an isolation of the RWCU system occurred, -1 | ||
:at 0700 hours. The isolation occurred when the Regenerative Heat Exchanger.(RHX) (EIIS:HX) room temperature sensing element | :at 0700 hours. The isolation occurred when the Regenerative Heat Exchanger.(RHX) (EIIS:HX) room temperature sensing element (TE-44-2N016D) of the SLD system sensed a room temperature above its 122 degree Fahrenheit setpoint initiating a NSSSS, Group III, Division 4 isolation actuation. The RWCU isolation signal caused l the RWCU Outboard'PCIV, HV-44-2F004, to close. The isolation was j accompanied by a "Div.4 Steam Leak Det. Sys Hi Temp" annunciator i and was immediately followed by an automatic fire alarm code for , a the-" Reactor Enclosure Elevation 283 feet -' North East Area / East Side," which is for the area of the RHX room. | ||
(TE-44-2N016D) of the SLD system sensed a room temperature above its 122 degree Fahrenheit setpoint initiating a NSSSS, Group III, Division 4 isolation actuation. The RWCU isolation signal caused l the RWCU Outboard'PCIV, HV-44-2F004, to close. The isolation was j accompanied by a "Div.4 Steam Leak Det. Sys Hi Temp" annunciator i and was immediately followed by an automatic fire alarm code for , a the-" Reactor Enclosure Elevation 283 feet -' North East Area / East Side," which is for the area of the RHX room. | |||
1 | 1 | ||
; Operations personnel conducted an investigation to determine the cause of the RWCU isolation and concluded that the RHX tube side Esafety relief valve, PSV-44-209 (Lonergan Model D72G) (EIIS:RV), | ; Operations personnel conducted an investigation to determine the cause of the RWCU isolation and concluded that the RHX tube side Esafety relief valve, PSV-44-209 (Lonergan Model D72G) (EIIS:RV), | ||
was' leaking. During the investigation, an expected second NSSSS isolation actuation, initiated from a high RWCU system differential flow condition occurred, closing the RWCU Inboard g.a. | was' leaking. During the investigation, an expected second NSSSS isolation actuation, initiated from a high RWCU system differential flow condition occurred, closing the RWCU Inboard g.a. | ||
, g 3 . ,,,, | , g 3 . ,,,, | ||
y-ne.g..,w ,-.w -<. *'w a >w' M' ' '- - - - - - - - - - ' ' ' - - - - - - | y-ne.g..,w ,-.w -<. *'w a >w' M' ' '- - - - - - - - - - ' ' ' - - - - - - | ||
44 4 hRC f.qd 3891 U.$ huCLt&R Kl3ULATOAY COMMISS#ON | 44 4 hRC f.qd 3891 U.$ huCLt&R Kl3ULATOAY COMMISS#ON | ||
, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION | , LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION | ||
*movio oms =c 2m-oio4 ' | *movio oms =c 2m-oio4 ' | ||
to. ass e aiis P AC4LITV NAM 4 tts WOCKET hupata(28 i LtR huMSER t$p P&OS 133 vs." "ut.g." ' | to. ass e aiis P AC4LITV NAM 4 tts WOCKET hupata(28 i LtR huMSER t$p P&OS 133 vs." "ut.g." ' | ||
Line 162: | Line 117: | ||
The RWCU system remained isolated until PSV-44-209 was removed and a blank flange was installed using.a temporary circuit alteration. The RWCU system was returned to service on November 12, at 1350 hours. The RWCU system was out of service'for approximately 55 hours. | The RWCU system remained isolated until PSV-44-209 was removed and a blank flange was installed using.a temporary circuit alteration. The RWCU system was returned to service on November 12, at 1350 hours. The RWCU system was out of service'for approximately 55 hours. | ||
A four hour notification was made to the NRC on November 10, at 1057 hours, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(li) since the event resulted in the automatic actuation of an ESP. Accordingly, this event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of 10 CPR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). | A four hour notification was made to the NRC on November 10, at 1057 hours, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(li) since the event resulted in the automatic actuation of an ESP. Accordingly, this event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of 10 CPR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). | ||
Consequences of the Event: | Consequences of the Event: | ||
The consequences of this event were minimal. There was no release of radioactive material to the environment as a result of this event. The RWCU system isolated, as designed, when the RHX room temperature sensing element of the SLD system initiated a NSSSS Group III, Division 4 isolation signal. Had the RWCU Outboard isolation valve failed to close and steam continued to leak,-the redundant SLD/NSSSS channel (Inboard)_high temperature isolation signal would have initiated, isolating the RWCU system. - | The consequences of this event were minimal. There was no release of radioactive material to the environment as a result of this event. The RWCU system isolated, as designed, when the RHX room temperature sensing element of the SLD system initiated a NSSSS Group III, Division 4 isolation signal. Had the RWCU Outboard isolation valve failed to close and steam continued to leak,-the redundant SLD/NSSSS channel (Inboard)_high temperature isolation signal would have initiated, isolating the RWCU system. - | ||
Line 172: | Line 126: | ||
The RHX tube side safety relief valve leakage was possibly initiated by a pressure perturbation ~that occurred when the 2A RWCU F/D was placed in service. A root cause evaluation has determined the probable influences causing the valve leakage ga;,.a.M a... | The RHX tube side safety relief valve leakage was possibly initiated by a pressure perturbation ~that occurred when the 2A RWCU F/D was placed in service. A root cause evaluation has determined the probable influences causing the valve leakage ga;,.a.M a... | ||
PRC 4.es. 30e4 . U.S NUCLE AA E60VLAT03Y COMM5580N | PRC 4.es. 30e4 . U.S NUCLE AA E60VLAT03Y COMM5580N | ||
,> LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION | ,> LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION | ||
* maoveo ous ~c sm-oica , | * maoveo ous ~c sm-oica , | ||
soians e u u p m tetyasaettu docati NvMain m taa NUMata tge PACE @ | soians e u u p m tetyasaettu docati NvMain m taa NUMata tge PACE @ | ||
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Line 190: | Line 139: | ||
L were received and concluded that a RWCU steam leak caused by a l leaking RHX safety relief valve had occurred. To confirm this, Operations personnel reset the RWCU isolation, on November 10, at 1008 hours, using General Plant (GP) procedure, GP-8, " Primary | L were received and concluded that a RWCU steam leak caused by a l leaking RHX safety relief valve had occurred. To confirm this, Operations personnel reset the RWCU isolation, on November 10, at 1008 hours, using General Plant (GP) procedure, GP-8, " Primary | ||
[ and Secondary Containment Isolation Verification and Reset." A portion of the RWCU system was pressurized and included the tube side of the RHX. As a result, Operations personnel verified that the RHX tube side safety relief valve, PSV-44-209, was leaking. | [ and Secondary Containment Isolation Verification and Reset." A portion of the RWCU system was pressurized and included the tube side of the RHX. As a result, Operations personnel verified that the RHX tube side safety relief valve, PSV-44-209, was leaking. | ||
I' Continuing the investigation to determine if the RHX shell side L safety relief valve, PSV-44-208, was leaking required | I' Continuing the investigation to determine if the RHX shell side L safety relief valve, PSV-44-208, was leaking required pressurizing the Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger (NRHX) and the shell side of the RHX. The possibility that the pressurization could initiate a high differential flow condition of sufficient duration to initiate a second SLD/NSSSS isolation signal was considered by Operations personnel. Upon pressurizing the NRHX and the shell side of the RHX, a RWCU Inboard (HV-44-2F001) and Outboard (HV-44-2F004) PCIVs isolation occurred on high RWCU system differential flow as expected, at 1023 hours. During the pressurization and subsequent isolation of the RWCU system, no leakage was evident from PSV-44-208. | ||
pressurizing the Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger (NRHX) and the shell side of the RHX. The possibility that the pressurization could initiate a high differential flow condition of sufficient duration to initiate a second SLD/NSSSS isolation signal was considered by Operations personnel. Upon pressurizing the NRHX and the shell side of the RHX, a RWCU Inboard (HV-44-2F001) and Outboard (HV-44-2F004) PCIVs isolation occurred on high RWCU system differential flow as expected, at 1023 hours. During the pressurization and subsequent isolation of the RWCU system, no leakage was evident from PSV-44-208. | |||
The RWCU system remained isolated following the above investigation until PSV-44-209 was removed and a blank flange was installed under a temporary circuit alteration. The RWCU system was returned to service on November 12, at 1350 hours. | The RWCU system remained isolated following the above investigation until PSV-44-209 was removed and a blank flange was installed under a temporary circuit alteration. The RWCU system was returned to service on November 12, at 1350 hours. | ||
lll**~ *** | lll**~ *** | ||
mRC foem 3544 U.8 NUCLEAR 5 E3ULATDAY COMMIS$som | mRC foem 3544 U.8 NUCLEAR 5 E3ULATDAY COMMIS$som | ||
'1 | '1 | ||
. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Anaovio ove =o vio-oio4 ExPep54 4'3115 f ACILITV NAME Ill JOCKET NVM88R (3) LER huMSERto: FAQt (3a n*= " h t.W.* | . LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Anaovio ove =o vio-oio4 ExPep54 4'3115 f ACILITV NAME Ill JOCKET NVM88R (3) LER huMSERto: FAQt (3a n*= " h t.W.* | ||
Line 210: | Line 151: | ||
-As identified in LER 88-009, Revision 3, submitted to the NRC on March'7, 1989, a modification was generated to minimize the possibility of air entering the system during maintenance, thus reducing the potential for relief' valve lifting due to trapped air and the associated system transient. Currently, air entering the pump suction and discharge piping between the block valves during system maintenance cannot be completely vented before returning the pump to service. As a result, an air slug can make its way into the system. This modification adds high point vents and demineralizer water fill connections to the RWCU pumps, thereby limiting the amount of air entering the system. This l modification will be implemented during future RWCU pump outages initiated due to pump seal failures. | -As identified in LER 88-009, Revision 3, submitted to the NRC on March'7, 1989, a modification was generated to minimize the possibility of air entering the system during maintenance, thus reducing the potential for relief' valve lifting due to trapped air and the associated system transient. Currently, air entering the pump suction and discharge piping between the block valves during system maintenance cannot be completely vented before returning the pump to service. As a result, an air slug can make its way into the system. This modification adds high point vents and demineralizer water fill connections to the RWCU pumps, thereby limiting the amount of air entering the system. This l modification will be implemented during future RWCU pump outages initiated due to pump seal failures. | ||
l As a result of this event and sther similar RWCU i.solations, a re-evaluation of the potential failure mechanisms of the safety ; | l As a result of this event and sther similar RWCU i.solations, a re-evaluation of the potential failure mechanisms of the safety ; | ||
relief valve is being performed. As part of this evaluation, a | relief valve is being performed. As part of this evaluation, a | ||
): different model relief valve has been installed on the RWCU L system replacing PSV-44-209. The operation of the new style valve will be monitored to determine whether it is suitable for | ): different model relief valve has been installed on the RWCU L system replacing PSV-44-209. The operation of the new style valve will be monitored to determine whether it is suitable for | ||
' permanent use in both Unit 1 and Unit 2 RWCU systems. | ' permanent use in both Unit 1 and Unit 2 RWCU systems. | ||
!~ | !~ | ||
Suitability will be determined based on the safety relief valve i | Suitability will be determined based on the safety relief valve i | ||
performance during RWCU system evolutions and operations, piping induced loads / vibrations and thermal effects associated.with | performance during RWCU system evolutions and operations, piping induced loads / vibrations and thermal effects associated.with these evolutions. If the new model valve is not suitable, , | ||
these evolutions. If the new model valve is not suitable, , | |||
additional' actions will be taken until a suitable valve and , | additional' actions will be taken until a suitable valve and , | ||
system configuration are obtained. | system configuration are obtained. | ||
l- Previous Similar Occurrences: | l- Previous Similar Occurrences: | ||
Line 228: | Line 164: | ||
Previous evaluations of the relief valve failure mechanism were completed. In light of the new failures, the potential failure mechanisms are being re-evaluated for a more definitive cause and development of effective corrective actions. ! | Previous evaluations of the relief valve failure mechanism were completed. In light of the new failures, the potential failure mechanisms are being re-evaluated for a more definitive cause and development of effective corrective actions. ! | ||
Tracking Code: B2 - Failure due to Abo ^rmal Wear g.o- u.. | Tracking Code: B2 - Failure due to Abo ^rmal Wear g.o- u.. | ||
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Revision as of 14:25, 31 January 2020
ML19332F775 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Limerick |
Issue date: | 12/11/1989 |
From: | Endriss C, Mccormick M PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
References | |
LER-89-012-02, LER-89-12-2, NUDOCS 8912190003 | |
Download: ML19332F775 (7) | |
Text
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10 CFR 50e73 q ,
ra PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY i i
LIMERICK GENER ATING SYATION P.O. BOX A
- 5AN ATOG A. PENNSYLV ANI A 19464
. (215) 3271200 smt. 2000
- u. s. u.co uicx. u., e.c. December 11, 1989 u-...7".'."."."',*,.".u,. Docket No. 50-353 :
License No. NPF-85 U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control ~ Desk- '
Washington, DC 20555
-SUBJFCT: Licensee Event Report Limerick Generating Station - Unit 2 This LER. reports the leakage of a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system safety relief valve which caused the Regenerative
' Heat Exchanger room temperature to increase. This resulted in an ,
isolation of the RWCU system due to a Nuclear Steam Supply l
-Shutoff System isolation actuation, an Engineered Safety Feature, l from a Steam Leakage Detection signal. i l:
L .
Reference:
Docket No. 50-353 a L .ReportLNumber: 2-89-012 j L Revision ~ Number: 00 g Event.Date: November 10, 1989 Report Date: December 11, 1989 Facility: Limerick Generating Station 1 P.O. Box A, Sanatoga, PA 19464 This LER is.being submitted pursuant to the requirements of
- 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) . )
l l
Very truly yours,
\ ,
c CCE: kap cc: W. T. Russell, Administrator, Region I, USNRC T. J. Kenny, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, LGS 8912190003 891211 PDR ADOCK 03000353 i 1
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ABSTRACT On November 10, 1989, while placing the 2A Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Filter /Demineralizer (F/D) into service, RWCU system differential flow oscillations were observed by Operations personnel. At 0700, a Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NSSSS) isolation actuation, an Engineered Safety Feature (ESP),
from a Steam Leakage Detection (SLD) signal (from a high RWCU Regenerative Heat Exchanger (RHX) room temperature) resulted in the automatic isolation of the'RWCU Outboard Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV), HV-44-2F004. The RWCU system isolation was per design. Operations personnel performed an investigation
-determining that the RWCU isolation was due to steam leakage from the RHX tube side safety relief valve (PSV-44-209 - Lonergan Model D72G). The RWCU system remained isolated following the investigation until PSV-44-209 was removed and a blank flange was installed under a temporary circuit alteration. The RWCU system was returned to service on November 12, at 1350 hours0.0156 days <br />0.375 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.13675e-4 months <br />, after being isolated for approximately 55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br />. As a result of this event and other similar RWCU isolations, a re-evaluation of the potential failure mechanisms of the safety relief valve is being performed. As part of this evaluation, a different model relief valve has been installed on the RWCU system replacing PSV-44-209.
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Plant Conditions Prior to the Event:1
- 4 Operating Condition: 1 (Power Operation). ,
Power Level: 90%
Description of the Event:-
On November-10,'1989, at 0700-hours, the Reactor' Water Cleanup (RWCU).(EIIS:CE) Outboard Primary Containment Isolation Valve
_(PCIV) (EIIS:ISV), HV-44-2F004, automatically isolated. This isolation was due.to a-Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System
'(NSSSS)((EIIS:JM) isolation actuation, an Engineered Safety .
a Feature (ESP), from a Steam Leakage Detection (SLD) (EIIS IJ) . y' isolation signal.
Operations personnel were placing the 2A RWCU Filter /Demineralizer (F/D) (EIIS FDM) into service per System '
- Procedure-S45,l'.B " Placing RWCU Filter /Demineralizer in Service,"
4 RWCU' flow-oscillations occurred. The F/D inlet valve (EIIS:V) '
was open and the F/D was pressurized to approximately 1100 psig
((see Figure 1).- When the F/D discharge valve (EIIS:FCV) was
- opened, to place the F/D in service, the "RWCU High Differential Flow Isolation Timer Initiated" annunciator (EIIS
- ANN) alarmed, and' cleared, several times. A System Engineer (SE).was
"~
, : dispatched-to the Auxiliary Equipment room to observe the RWCU differential flow instrumentation (EIIS:FFI).. The SE observed i flowloscillations on'the instrumentation from 30 gpm to 100 gpm.
Whil'e the SE was attempting to relay this information to the Main j Control Room operators, an isolation of the RWCU system occurred, -1
- at 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />. The isolation occurred when the Regenerative Heat Exchanger.(RHX) (EIIS:HX) room temperature sensing element (TE-44-2N016D) of the SLD system sensed a room temperature above its 122 degree Fahrenheit setpoint initiating a NSSSS, Group III, Division 4 isolation actuation. The RWCU isolation signal caused l the RWCU Outboard'PCIV, HV-44-2F004, to close. The isolation was j accompanied by a "Div.4 Steam Leak Det. Sys Hi Temp" annunciator i and was immediately followed by an automatic fire alarm code for , a the-" Reactor Enclosure Elevation 283 feet -' North East Area / East Side," which is for the area of the RHX room.
1
- Operations personnel conducted an investigation to determine the cause of the RWCU isolation and concluded that the RHX tube side Esafety relief valve, PSV-44-209 (Lonergan Model D72G) (EIIS
- RV),
was' leaking. During the investigation, an expected second NSSSS isolation actuation, initiated from a high RWCU system differential flow condition occurred, closing the RWCU Inboard g.a.
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Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2 o l5 lo lo lo l 3l5 l3 Bj 9 -
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tnxrau nam .a m .m e cem w wIw (HV-44-2F001) and Outboard (HV-44-2P004) PCIVs, on November 10, at 1023 hour0.0118 days <br />0.284 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.892515e-4 months <br />.
The RWCU system remained isolated until PSV-44-209 was removed and a blank flange was installed using.a temporary circuit alteration. The RWCU system was returned to service on November 12, at 1350 hours0.0156 days <br />0.375 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.13675e-4 months <br />. The RWCU system was out of service'for approximately 55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br />.
A four hour notification was made to the NRC on November 10, at 1057 hours0.0122 days <br />0.294 hours <br />0.00175 weeks <br />4.021885e-4 months <br />, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(li) since the event resulted in the automatic actuation of an ESP. Accordingly, this event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of 10 CPR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).
Consequences of the Event:
The consequences of this event were minimal. There was no release of radioactive material to the environment as a result of this event. The RWCU system isolated, as designed, when the RHX room temperature sensing element of the SLD system initiated a NSSSS Group III, Division 4 isolation signal. Had the RWCU Outboard isolation valve failed to close and steam continued to leak,-the redundant SLD/NSSSS channel (Inboard)_high temperature isolation signal would have initiated, isolating the RWCU system. -
The RWCU system was out of service for approximately 55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br />.
The Reactor Water purity remained within the limits specified by Technical Specifications. During that interval conductivity (an indicato' of Reactor Water purity) increased from a pre-event value of u.201 micro mhos per centimeter (cm) to a peak value of i 0.429 micro mhos per cm, on November 12. At 0100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />, on November 15, the conductivity value was 0.115 micro mhos per cm indicating the return of Reactor Water purity to conditions better than prior to the event.
Cause of the Event:
K 1
The RWCU isolation was caused by the RHX tube side safety relief valve (PSV-44-209) leakage increasing the RHX room's temperature.
The RHX tube side safety relief valve leakage was possibly initiated by a pressure perturbation ~that occurred when the 2A RWCU F/D was placed in service. A root cause evaluation has determined the probable influences causing the valve leakage ga;,.a.M a...
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Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2 TLXT 15 mere sp.ce e rettererst ease eJabhanel MC form JbM 'st t1h 0 l5 l0 l0 lo l 3l5 l 3 8l 9 -
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0l0 014 0F 0l6 to be a combination of trapped air, system evolutions and operations, piping induced loads / vibrations, and thermal effects associated with these evolutions. Major elerants of the investigation included design reviews for tne heat exchanger, its relief valves, and their installation cc.ifiguration. Also included was a review of maintenance history, examinations of the failed valve, and the results of differential seat leakage and set pressure tests on a. spare valve. When the RHX tube side safety relief valve passed water, the water flashed to steam as it encountered the lower room pressure. - The flashed steam vented to the room via an open funnel drain, and increased the room temperature. The increased temperature was sensed by the SLD room temperature sensor and triggered the NSSSS isolation actuation of the RWCU system. Additionally, the water that flashed to steam in the RHX room initiated the'ior'izing chamber type smoke detector in the room and caused the Reactor Enclosure
-fire alarm code to activate.
l Corrective Actions:
Operations personnel evaluated the high RHX room temperature I isolation of the RWCU system and the alarms and annunciators that ,
L were received and concluded that a RWCU steam leak caused by a l leaking RHX safety relief valve had occurred. To confirm this, Operations personnel reset the RWCU isolation, on November 10, at 1008 hours0.0117 days <br />0.28 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.83544e-4 months <br />, using General Plant (GP) procedure, GP-8, " Primary
[ and Secondary Containment Isolation Verification and Reset." A portion of the RWCU system was pressurized and included the tube side of the RHX. As a result, Operations personnel verified that the RHX tube side safety relief valve, PSV-44-209, was leaking.
I' Continuing the investigation to determine if the RHX shell side L safety relief valve, PSV-44-208, was leaking required pressurizing the Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger (NRHX) and the shell side of the RHX. The possibility that the pressurization could initiate a high differential flow condition of sufficient duration to initiate a second SLD/NSSSS isolation signal was considered by Operations personnel. Upon pressurizing the NRHX and the shell side of the RHX, a RWCU Inboard (HV-44-2F001) and Outboard (HV-44-2F004) PCIVs isolation occurred on high RWCU system differential flow as expected, at 1023 hours0.0118 days <br />0.284 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.892515e-4 months <br />. During the pressurization and subsequent isolation of the RWCU system, no leakage was evident from PSV-44-208.
The RWCU system remained isolated following the above investigation until PSV-44-209 was removed and a blank flange was installed under a temporary circuit alteration. The RWCU system was returned to service on November 12, at 1350 hours0.0156 days <br />0.375 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.13675e-4 months <br />.
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0l0 015 OF 0l6 wuu wa.v.es.nem.a mcinmaanm Actions'Taken to Prevent Recurrence: .
-As identified in LER 88-009, Revision 3, submitted to the NRC on March'7, 1989, a modification was generated to minimize the possibility of air entering the system during maintenance, thus reducing the potential for relief' valve lifting due to trapped air and the associated system transient. Currently, air entering the pump suction and discharge piping between the block valves during system maintenance cannot be completely vented before returning the pump to service. As a result, an air slug can make its way into the system. This modification adds high point vents and demineralizer water fill connections to the RWCU pumps, thereby limiting the amount of air entering the system. This l modification will be implemented during future RWCU pump outages initiated due to pump seal failures.
l As a result of this event and sther similar RWCU i.solations, a re-evaluation of the potential failure mechanisms of the safety ;
relief valve is being performed. As part of this evaluation, a
): different model relief valve has been installed on the RWCU L system replacing PSV-44-209. The operation of the new style valve will be monitored to determine whether it is suitable for
' permanent use in both Unit 1 and Unit 2 RWCU systems.
!~
Suitability will be determined based on the safety relief valve i
performance during RWCU system evolutions and operations, piping induced loads / vibrations and thermal effects associated.with these evolutions. If the new model valve is not suitable, ,
additional' actions will be taken until a suitable valve and ,
system configuration are obtained.
l- Previous Similar Occurrences:
~.
LERs 1-86-040, 1-88-009, 1-89-033 and 1-89-055 reported isolations of the RWCU system due to leaking relief valves.
Previous evaluations of the relief valve failure mechanism were completed. In light of the new failures, the potential failure mechanisms are being re-evaluated for a more definitive cause and development of effective corrective actions. !
Tracking Code: B2 - Failure due to Abo ^rmal Wear g.o- u..
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