IR 05000321/2013003

IR 05000321-13-003, 05000366-13-003; 04/01/2013 - 06/30/2013; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Integrated Inspection Report

ML13217A123
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	08/05/2013
From:	Croteau R Division Reactor Projects II
To:	Madison D Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
EA-13-159 IR-13-003
Download: ML13217A123 (30)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ust 5, 2013

SUBJECT:

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2013003 AND 05000366/2013003, EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

Dear Mr. Madison:

On June 30, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your E. I. Hatch Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on July 17, 2013, with David Vineyard and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection. However, a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green)

is listed in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest this non-cited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Hatch.

In addition, a violation of Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 was identified. However, because the violation was identified during the discretion period described in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 11-003, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 3.5, Violations Involving Special Circumstances, of the NRC Enforcement Policy and, therefore, will not issue enforcement action for this violation, subject to a timely license amendment request being submitted. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Richard P. Croteau, Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000321/2013003, 05000366/2013003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366,72-036 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Report Nos.: 05000321/2013003 and 05000366/2013003 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Location: Baxley, Georgia 31513 Dates: April 1 - June 30, 2013 Inspectors: E. Morris, Senior Resident Inspector D. Hardage, Resident Inspector M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector (Vogtle)

B. Collins, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R07)

Approved by: Frank Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000321/2013003, 05000366/2013003; 04/01/2013-06/30/2013; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear

Plant, Units 1 and 2, Integrated Inspection Report The report covered a three-month period of inspection by three resident inspectors and a reactor inspector. There were no NRC identified or self-revealing findings documented in this report. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process revision 4.

Violations of very low safety significance or severity level IV that were identified by the licensee have been reviewed by the NRC. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the inspection period at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP).

On May 31 power was reduced to approximately 60 percent RTP to conduct flux tilt testing. The unit returned to RTP on June 6 and operated the remainder of the inspection period at or near 100 percent RTP.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at or near 100 percent RTP. On April 1, a transient to 77 percent RTP occurred due the A adjustable speed drive (ASD) receiving several spurious stop signals during a controller primary to secondary swap. The unit returned to RTP on April 3. On April 13, power was reduced to 33 percent RTP in order to remove A recirculation pump from service and perform maintenance on the A ASD.

The unit returned to RTP on April 16 and operated the remainder of the inspection period at or near 100 percent RTP.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Summer Readiness of Offsite and Alternate AC Power System

a. Inspection Scope

The licensee did not implement equipment or procedure changes that potentially affect operation or reliability of offsite and alternate AC power systems since the last time the inspectors assessed grid reliability. The inspectors reviewed the material condition of offsite and onsite alternate AC power systems (including switchyard and transformers)by performing a walk down of the switchyard, reviewing outstanding work orders, and assessing corrective actions for any degraded conditions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial Walkdowns The inspectors verified that critical portions of selected risk-significant systems were correctly aligned. The inspectors selected systems for assessment because they were a redundant or backup system/train, were important for mitigating risk for the current plant conditions, had been recently realigned, or were a single-train system. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures and drawings. The inspectors verified that critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned by performing partial walkdowns. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors selected the following three systems/trains to inspect:

• Unit 2 B train of residual heat removal service water system while A train components were out of service for maintenance, April 3, 2013

• Unit 2 B train of plant service water system while the A train 2C plant service pump was out of service for maintenance, April 9, 2013

• Unit 2 B train of residual heat removal while the 2A train was out of service for maintenance, April 29, 2013 Complete Walkdown The inspectors verified the alignment of the Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling system.

The inspectors selected this system for assessment because it is a risk-significant mitigating system. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures, drawings, the updated final safety analysis report, and other documents. In order to identify any deficiencies that could affect the ability of the system to perform its functions, the inspectors reviewed records related to outstanding design issues and maintenance work requests. The inspectors verified that the selected system was correctly aligned by performing a complete walk down of accessible components.

To verify the licensee was identifying and resolving equipment alignment discrepancies, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents, including condition reports and outstanding work orders, as well as periodic reports containing information on the status of risk-significant systems, including maintenance rule reports and system health reports. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Quarterly Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of selected fire plans by comparing the fire plans to the defined hazards and defense-in-depth features specified in the fire protection program. In evaluating the fire plans, the inspectors assessed the following items:

(1) control of transient combustibles and ignition sources,

(2) fire detection systems, (3)water-based fire suppression systems,

(4) gaseous fire suppression systems,

(5) manual firefighting equipment and capability

(6) passive fire protection features, (7)compensatory measures and fire watches, and

(8) issues related to fire protection contained in the licensees corrective action program. The inspectors toured the following six fire areas to assess material condition and operational status of fire protection equipment. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1, reactor building southwest corner room, fire zone 1203C

• Unit 1 and 2, control room roof, fire zone 0031

• Unit 1 and 2, E and W DC switchgear rooms 1A, 2A, 1B, and 2B; fire zones 1018, 1020, 2018, 2020

• Unit 1 and 2, transformer rooms 1CD and 2CD, fire zones 1019 and 2019

• Unit 1, reactor building elevation 158 working floor south, fire zone 1203K

• Unit 1, reactor building northwest corner room, fire zone 1205C

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

Triennial Review of Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors interviewed plant personnel and reviewed records for a sample of heat exchangers that were directly cooled by the plant service water (PSW) system to verify that heat exchanger deficiencies, potential common cause problems, or heat sink performance problems that could result in initiating events or affect multiple heat exchangers in mitigating systems were being identified, evaluated, and resolved. The inspectors selected the following heat exchangers that were directly cooled by the service water system: emergency diesel generator 1B jacket water cooler, Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) room cooler, main control room condensing unit B, and Unit 1 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) room cooler. These heat exchangers were chosen based on their risk significance in the licensees probabilistic risk analysis, their safety-related mitigating system support functions, and previous NRC inspection efforts in this area.

For these heat exchangers, the inspectors reviewed the methods and results of heat exchanger performance testing to verify performance was maintained in accordance with the design basis. The inspectors determined whether the testing methods and monitoring of biotic and macro fouling were adequate to ensure proper heat transfer.

This was accomplished by determining whether the test methodology, test conditions, test frequency, acceptance criteria, and results were adequate to confirm the heat transfer capability of the heat exchangers and detect degradation prior to loss of heat removal capabilities below design basis values.

For the heat exchangers directly cooled by service water, the inspectors also reviewed the methods and results of heat exchanger inspections. The inspectors reviewed inspection records to determine whether the methods, frequency, and acceptance criteria used to inspect and clean heat exchangers were consistent with licensee procedures and adequate to ensure proper heat transfer performance in accordance with the design basis.

For these heat exchangers, the inspectors determined whether the condition and operation of the heat exchanger were consistent with design assumptions in heat transfer calculations, and as described in the final safety analysis report. Where applicable, the inspectors reviewed records of heat exchanger tube plugging to verify that the number of plugged tubes was within pre-established limits based on capacity and heat transfer assumptions. The inspectors reviewed calculations and operating procedures to determine whether the licensee evaluated the potential for water hammer in susceptible heat exchangers, and established adequate controls and operational limits to prevent heat exchanger degradation due to excessive flow induced vibration during operation.

The inspectors also determined whether the licensee ensured adequate isolation during design basis events, consistency between testing methodologies and design basis leakage rate assumptions, and proper performance of risk significant non-safety related functions.

The inspectors also reviewed historical data of thru wall pipe leakage in the service water system to identify any adverse trends and verify that adequate corrective actions were implemented.

The inspectors performed a system walkdown of the service water pump house to assess the material condition and functionality of accessible structures and components such as strainers, pumps, instrumentation, and component supports. In addition, the inspectors determined whether service water pump bay silt accumulation was monitored, trended, and maintained at an acceptable level, and that water level instruments were functional and routinely monitored. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operation of the service water system and ultimate heat sink, including monitoring, trending, and control of macro-fouling to prevent clogging. The inspectors also reviewed system health reports and corrective action program documents to determine whether the licensees biocide treatments were effective in controlling biotic fouling and the results were adequately monitored, trended, and evaluated.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents related to the service water system and heat sink performance issues to determine whether the licensee had an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective actions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

These inspection activities constituted a total of four inspection samples as defined in IP 71111.07-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification

The inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario administered to an operating crew conducted in accordance with the licensees accredited requalification training program. The inspectors assessed licensed operator performance, the ability of the licensee to administer the scenario and evaluate the operators, the quality of any post-scenario critique, any follow-up actions taken by the facility licensee, and the performance of the simulator. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (Licensed Operator Performance):

The inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room during Unit 1 power suppression testing on June 2. Inspectors observed licensed operator performance to assess the following:

• Use of plant procedures

• Control board manipulations

• Communications between crew members

• Use and interpretation of instruments, indications, and alarms

• Use of human error prevention techniques

• Documentation of activities

• Management and supervision Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensees treatment of the two issues listed below in order to verify the licensee appropriately addressed equipment problems within the scope of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65). The inspectors reviewed procedures and records in order to evaluate the licensees identification, assessment, and characterization of the problems as well as their corrective actions for returning the equipment to a satisfactory condition. Document reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

The inspectors also interviewed system engineers and the maintenance rule coordinator to assess the accuracy of performance deficiencies and extent of condition.

• Unit 1 and 2 standby gas treatment system, 1T46/2T46, Unit 2 standby gas treatment system inoperable due to flow rates exceeding 4000 cubic feet per minute, Unit 1 standby gas treatment system tripping on low flow

• Unit 1 and 2 reactor recirculation system, 1B31/2B31, Trip of 1B ASD due to a controller failure, 2A ASD run back due to NXG controller failure

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the five maintenance activities listed below to verify the licensee assessed and managed plant risk as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and licensee procedures. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensees risk assessments and implementation of risk management actions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee was identifying and resolving problems with assessing and managing maintenance-related risk using the corrective action program. Additionally, for maintenance resulting from unforeseen situations, the inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees planning and control of emergent work activities.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Week of March 30 - April 5, including Unit 1 A reactor protection system outage, reactor protection system alternate system outage, Unit 1 A condensate booster pump outage, Unit 2 A turbine building chiller outage, Unit 2 C residual heat removal service water pump motor replacement, and loss of the Unit 2 A adjustable speed drive A NXG controller which caused a recirculation pump runback.

• Week of April 8 - April 12, including Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine building chillers out of service for scheduled preventive maintenance, Unit 1 and Unit 2 station service battery charger out of service for scheduled preventive maintenance, and Unit 2 C plant service water pump out of service for scheduled preventive maintenance.

• Week of May 6 - May 10, including diving activities at the intake, A and B traveling water screen scheduled preventive maintenance.

• Week of May 13 - May 17, including Unit 2 scheduled maintenance on B loop residual heat removal.

• Week of May 25 - May 31, including scheduled maintenance on Unit 1 A emergency diesel generator, Unit 2 A station service air compressor, and emergent work on Unit 2 A and C emergency diesel generators.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected the five operability determinations or functionality evaluations listed below for review based on the risk-significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the determinations to ensure that technical specification operability was properly justified and the components or systems remained capable of performing their design functions. To verify whether components or systems were operable, the inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specification and updated final safety analysis report to the licensees evaluations. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1 plant service water piping leak near plant service water and fire protection crosstie isolation valve (Bay 9), 1P41-F120, condition report (CR) 620691

• Unit 1 standby liquid control tank boric acid leak, CR 621079

• Unit 2 B reactor building vent stack radiation monitor reading high, CR 632634

• Unit 1 plant service water piping leak severity increase, CR 641826

• Nonconservative Technical Specification for SR 3.8.4.8, CR 643620

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that the two plant modifications listed below did not affect the safety functions of important safety systems. The inspectors confirmed the modifications did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of risk significant structures, systems and components. The inspectors also verified modifications performed during plant configurations involving increased risk did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated whether system operability and availability, configuration control, post-installation test activities, and changes to documents, such as drawings, procedures, and operator training materials, complied with licensee standards and NRC requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with modifications. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Modification:

• SNC477826, Bypass Recirculation Adjustable Speed Drive External E-Stop Logic

• SNC371084, Install temporary Battery Charger 1R42-S045

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for the five maintenance activities listed below to verify the work performed was completed correctly and the test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following: acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; effects of testing on the plant were adequately addressed; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures; equipment was returned to its operational status following testing; and test documentation was properly evaluated. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with post-maintenance testing.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• WO SNC417231, Unit 2 C plant service water pump electrical annual preventive maintenance, April 9

• WO SNC331732, Unit 2 C residual heat removal pump discharge test, May 2

• WO SNC456321, Replace coupling and verify alignment of lube oil piping on 1A emergency diesel generator, May 2

• WO SNC423856, Inspect undervoltage trip attachment for 2D residual heat removal pump, May 15

• WO SNC105615, Inspection of 1A fire water tank, June 16

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the six surveillance tests listed below and either observed the test or reviewed test results to verify testing adequately demonstrated equipment operability and met technical specification and licensee procedural requirements. The inspectors evaluated the test activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with surveillance testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Routine Surveillance Tests

• 34SV-R43-003-2, Diesel Generator 2C Monthly Test

• 34SV-E21-001-1, Core Spray Pump Operability

• 34SV-E51-002-1, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump Operability

• 64CH-SAM-025-0, Reactor Coolant Sampling and Analysis

• 42SV-T46-003-2, Testing of SGT Filter Trains In-Service Test

• 34SV-E11-004-1, Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump Operability

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the emergency preparedness drill conducted on April 24, 2013.

The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator and technical support center to evaluate implementation of the emergency plan, including event classification, notification, and protective action recommendations. The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance against inspection criteria established in the licensees procedures. Additionally, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to assess the licensees effectiveness in identifying emergency preparedness weaknesses and verified the identified weaknesses were entered in the corrective action program.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the performance indicator (PI) data, submitted by the licensee, for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PIs listed below. To verify the accuracy and completeness of the data reported for the station, the inspectors reviewed plant records compiled between April 2012 and March 2013. The inspections verified that the PI data complied with guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, and licensee procedures. The inspectors also confirmed the PIs were calculated correctly. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with PI data. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

• Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate

• Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Routine Review

The inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program in order to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up. The inspectors reviewed daily condition reports, attended screening meetings, or accessed the licensees computerized corrective action database.

.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program and associated documents to identify trends which could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors focused their review on repetitive equipment issues but also considered the results of inspector daily condition report screenings, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The review nominally considered the six month period of January 2013 through June 2013 although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors compared their results with the results contained in the licensees trend documents. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action documents processed by the licensee to identify potential adverse trends in structures, systems, and/or components as evidenced by acceptance of long-standing non-conforming or degraded conditions.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected condition report 602671, CR 597855 closed without an adequate disposition, for detailed review. The inspectors evaluated the following attributes of the licensees actions:

• complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner

• evaluation and disposition of operability/reportability issues

• consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences

• classification and prioritization of the problem

• identification of root and contributing causes of the problem

• identification of any additional condition reports

• completion of corrective actions in a timely manner Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

.1 (CLOSED) LER 05000366/2013-002 Operation with Potential to Drain Reactor Pressure

Vessel in Mode 5 Without Secondary Containment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed this LER for potential performance deficiencies and/or violations of regulatory requirements. The inspectors also reviewed the plants implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 11-003 during the following Unit 2 maintenance activities which had the potential to drain the reactor vessel during the Unit 2 refueling outage:

• Local power range monitors removal and replacement February 19, 2013;

• Control rod drive removal and replacement February 20, 2013; and

• Hydraulic control unit venting and recoupling February 25, 2013.

These activities took place without secondary containment being operable. Inspectors verified compliance with the guidelines of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 11-003 prior to and during these activities. Additionally, discussions were held with Operations, Engineering and Licensing staff members to understand the details surrounding this issue. This condition was documented in the licensees corrective action program as CR 592898. LER 05000366/2013-002 is closed.

b. Findings

A violation of Unit 2 TS 3.6.4.1 was identified. However, the licensee performed actions to ensure water inventory was maintained and defense in-depth criteria were place prior to performing activities with the potential to drain the reactor vessel as described in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 11-003. In addition, the violation occurred during the discretion period stated in Memorandum. Therefore, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 3.5, Violations Involving Special Circumstances, of the NRC Enforcement Policy and, therefore, will not issue enforcement action for this violation, subject to a timely license amendment request being submitted.

.2 (CLOSED) LER 05000366/2013-001, Unplanned Reactor Protection System Actuation

due to Scram Discharge Water Level during Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed this LER for potential performance deficiencies and/or violations of regulatory requirements. Additionally, discussions were held with Operations, Engineering and Licensing staff members to understand the details surrounding this issue. This condition was documented in the licensees corrective action program as CR 591279. LER 05000366/2013-001 is closed.

b. Findings

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures, requires in part that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Contrary to this requirement, on February 16, 2013, the licensee failed to perform refueling interlock surveillance testing using a procedure of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, this was a performance deficiency because the procedure used did not contain guidance that addressed performance with the scram discharge volume level above the reactor scram trip setpoint. This performance deficiency was not more-than-minor. Although it is associated with the procedural quality attribute, it did not adversely affected the initiating events cornerstone to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown operations because although a scram occurred, there was no rod movement and no transient as a result. This issue is similar to IMC 0612 Appendix E, example 4a, in that no safety impact resulted from this issue. Corrective actions taken by the licensee to restore compliance included changing procedure 34SV-F15-001-1 and 2 to include guidance for performing refueling interlock testing with the scram discharge volume above the reactor scram trip setpoints. This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.

.3 (CLOSED) LER 05000366/2013-003 and 05000366/2013-003-001, HPCI Declared

Inoperable Due to Error in Connecting Tubing to a Hydraulic Actuator

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed this LER for potential performance deficiencies and/or violations of regulatory requirements. Additionally, discussions were held with Operations, Engineering and Licensing staff members to understand the details surrounding this issue. This condition was documented in the licensees corrective action program as CR 608230. LER 05000366/2013-003 and 05000366/2013-003-001 are closed.

b. Findings

The enforcement aspects of this finding are discussed in Section 4OA7.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.

These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.

These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors normal plant status review and inspection activities.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Report Review

In accordance with Executive Director of Operations Procedure 0220, the Hatch resident inspectors reviewed the most recent INPO evaluation and accreditation reports to determine if those reports identified safety or training issues not previously identified by NRC evaluations.

.3 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) (IP 60855.1)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the ISFSI on site (reference docket 72-036)and monitored the activities associated with the dry fuel storage campaign completed on June 14, 2013. The inspectors reviewed changes made to the ISFSI programs and procedures including associated 10 CFR 72.48 screens and evaluations to verify that changes made were consistent with the license or certificate of compliance. The inspectors reviewed records to verify that the licensee has recorded and maintained the location of each fuel assembly placed in the ISFSI. The inspectors also reviewed surveillance records to verify that daily surveillance requirements were performed as required by technical specifications. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On July 17, 2013, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. David Vineyard and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) or Severity Level IV was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation.

• A licensee-identified violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures, was discovered on March 18, 2013 when Unit 2 HPCI turbine control valve did not open as expected during the HPCI pump operability 165 psig test. 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, requires in part that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions. Contrary to this requirement, the licensee failed to correctly install hydraulic lines between the E-GR actuator and the remote servo during performance of Procedure 52PM-E41-002-0, HPCI Turbine and Auxiliaries Major Inspection.

The inspectors determined per IMC 0612 Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012 and IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process For Findings At-Power, dated July 1, 2012, that a detailed risk assessment was required. Regional senior reactor analysts reviewed the detailed risk assessment which determined the associated risk was less than 1E-6 core damage Frequency and less than 1E-7 large early release frequency due to the short exposure time. Therefore, this violation screened as Green. The licensee entered this violation into their corrective action program as CR 608230. (Section 4OA3.3)

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

B. Anderson, Health Physics Manager

S. Beverly, Licensing Engineer

C. Brantley, Plant Service Water System Engineer

G. Brinson, Maintenance Manager

C. Clark, RCIC/HPCI System Engineer

V. Coleman, Chemistry Manager

M. Crosby, Engineering Programs Manager

G. Johnson, Licensing Director

C. Lane, Engineering Director

K. Long, Operations Director

M. Madigan, Work Management Director

D. Madison, Hatch Vice President

C. Robinson, System Engineer

C. Rush, Engineering Supervisor

C. Sexton, RHR/RHRSW/Core Spray System Engineer

S. Tipps, Principal Licensing Engineer

M. Torrance, Engineering Programs Manager

R. Varnadore, Site Support Manager

D. Vineyard, Plant Manager

B. Waltman, System Engineer

A. Wheeler, Site Projects Manager

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened

None

Closed

LER Operation with Potential to Drain Reactor Pressure

05000366/2013-002 Vessel in Mode 5 Without Secondary Containment (Section 4OA3.1)

LER Unplanned Reactor Protection System Actuation due

05000366/2013-001 to Scram Discharge Water Level during Surveillance Testing (Section 4OA3.2)

LER

05000366/2013-003 and HPCI Declared Inoperable Due to Error in Connecting

05000366/2013-003-001 Tubing to a Hydraulic Actuator (Section 4OA3.3)